Re: Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-26 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Jason Resch 

There is and cannot be two identical uploaded minds
unless you are me. 


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/26/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Jason Resch 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-24, 15:32:08
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism





On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 2:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: 



On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

Hi Jason Resch

Since 1p has the property of perspective,
and no two people can be at the same place at the
same time,


But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain 
the same first person perspectives?


Jason



If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same external signals 
to them, e.g. from a camera at a particular location, and thus have 'the same' 
visual perspective.? But I expect that their *perceptions* will still be quite 
different and you could do as well by just having them stand close together or 
look at the same TV screen.


Put two identical uploaded minds each in the same deterministic simulation. 
?hen their perceptions should be identical.


Jason
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-26 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Jason Resch 

Could those two people see and talk to one another ?
Could they shake hands ? 
Then their memories of that event would be different.

 
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/26/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Jason Resch 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-25, 09:37:35
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism


Well if two people have the same mind and identity, then might they share the 
same soul (at least for a moment)?


Jason


On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

Hi Jason Resch 
 
Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion.
The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and 
to him everybody must be different (have an 
individual monad= soul = identity= memory, 
etc. etc. etc. ). 
 
 
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/25/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
 
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Jason Resch 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-24, 11:13:17
Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism





On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

Hi Jason Resch

Since 1p has the property of perspective,
and no two people can be at the same place at the
same time,


But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain 
the same first person perspectives?


Jason
3p has multiple perspectives.

That is the only multiworld theory that I can
believe in.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/24/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Jason Resch
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism





On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark ?rote:


On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal ?rote:



 In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future 
 1p view.



Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view.


Then as I said,? there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is only 
a future 1p view.




The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man.

Please note the use of the word and.



 that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been wrong.



Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many 
would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some 
kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of 
the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort 
of final authority on the Washington Man.



 the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is 
 the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What 
 more is there to know?


?

 The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied,



In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be 
seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know?


 the Helsinki man will see both cities.


 In the 3p view, that's correct,


And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 
3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not 
necessarily true.


You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in philosophy 
of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same physical state 
will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That is not what is at 
issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone.

Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you 
wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome 
regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, 
or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly wrong, as 
Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's 
cat from the cat's perspective.


Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put yourself 
into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some progress.

?



? but fail to answer the question asked.


Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising 
that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal.


 Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died.


If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and 
the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is 
the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than 
it is.



Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: The 
critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate it' to 
simply 'I hate it'.

Jason


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Fw: Re: Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-26 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Jason,


I should have that if those two people can shake hands,
they cannot be identical.


- Have received the following content - 
Sender: Roger Clough 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-26, 08:27:06
Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism


Hi Jason Resch 

There is and cannot be two identical uploaded minds
unless you are me. 


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/26/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Jason Resch 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-24, 15:32:08
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism





On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 2:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: 



On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

Hi Jason Resch

Since 1p has the property of perspective,
and no two people can be at the same place at the
same time,


But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain 
the same first person perspectives?


Jason



If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same external signals 
to them, e.g. from a camera at a particular location, and thus have 'the same' 
visual perspective.? But I expect that their *perceptions* will still be quite 
different and you could do as well by just having them stand close together or 
look at the same TV screen.


Put two identical uploaded minds each in the same deterministic simulation. 
?hen their perceptions should be identical.


Jason
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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Dec 2012, at 14:27, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Jason Resch

There is and cannot be two identical uploaded minds
unless you are me.


Right for the 1p, not necessarily for the 3p mind, depending on  
different conventions.


Two identical program running in even different universes, or in  
different arithmetical computations, will be related to one (1p) mind,  
one consciousness (but perhaps with different relative measure).


Bruno





[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/26/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Jason Resch
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-24, 15:32:08
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism



On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 2:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough  
rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

Hi Jason Resch

Since 1p has the property of perspective,
and no two people can be at the same place at the
same time,

But could there be two places that are identical to each other  
which contain the same first person perspectives?


Jason


If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same  
external signals to them, e.g. from a camera at a particular  
location, and thus have 'the same' visual perspective.� But I  
expect that their *perceptions* will still be quite different and  
you could do as well by just having them stand close together or  
look at the same TV screen.


Put two identical uploaded minds each in the same deterministic  
simulation. 燭hen their perceptions should be identical.


Jason

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-25 Thread Jason Resch
Well if two people have the same mind and identity, then might they share
the same soul (at least for a moment)?

Jason

On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

  Hi Jason Resch

 Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion.
 The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and
 to him everybody must be different (have an
 individual monad= soul = identity= memory,
 etc. etc. etc. ).


 [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] rclo...@verizon.net]
 12/25/2012
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


 - Receiving the following content -
 *From:* Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
 *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
 *Time:* 2012-12-24, 11:13:17
 *Subject:* Re: Re: Against Mechanism



 On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.netwrote:

 Hi Jason Resch

 Since 1p has the property of perspective,
 and no two people can be at the same place at the
 same time,


 But could there be two places that are identical to each other which
 contain the same first person perspectives?

 Jason
 �

 3p has multiple perspectives.

 That is the only multiworld theory that I can
 believe in.


 [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
 12/24/2012
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

 - Receiving the following content -
 From: Jason Resch
 Receiver: everything-list
 Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13
 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism





 On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark 爓rote:

 On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal 爓rote:



  In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the
 future 1p view.



 Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view.

 Then as I said,? there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is
 only a future 1p view.



 The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man.

 Please note the use of the word and.



  that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been
 wrong.



 Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt
 many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just
 some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the
 nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man
 is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man.



  the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington
 Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it?
 What more is there to know?

 ?
  The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied,



 In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will
 be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there
 to know?


  the Helsinki man will see both cities.


  In the 3p view, that's correct,


 And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in
 the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse
 is not necessarily true.

 You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in
 philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same
 physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.?
 That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone.

 Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and
 you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome
 regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third
 person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is
 plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or
 even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective.

 Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put
 yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some
 progress.
 ?



 ? but fail to answer the question asked.

 Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not
 surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno
 Marchal.


  Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died.


 If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything
 happens and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I
 think that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not
 more popular than it is.


 Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark
 commented: The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense
 and I hate it' to simply 'I hate it'.

 Jason

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 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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 You received this message

Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-25 Thread Richard Ruquist
Roger,

I appreciate your claim that all monads must be distinct and unique
because that is the basis of my string consciousness theory. However,
I have never read of leibniz saying that. So could you supply a link
to him saying so?
Richard

On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
 Hi Jason Resch

 Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion.
 The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and
 to him everybody must be different (have an
 individual monad= soul = identity= memory,
 etc. etc. etc. ).


 [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
 12/25/2012
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


 - Receiving the following content -
 From: Jason Resch
 Receiver: everything-list
 Time: 2012-12-24, 11:13:17
 Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism



 On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

 Hi Jason Resch

 Since 1p has the property of perspective,
 and no two people can be at the same place at the
 same time,


 But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain
 the same first person perspectives?

 Jason
 �

 3p has multiple perspectives.

 That is the only multiworld theory that I can
 believe in.


 [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
 12/24/2012
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

 - Receiving the following content -
 From: Jason Resch
 Receiver: everything-list
 Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13
 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism





 On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark 爓rote:

 On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal 爓rote:



  In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the
  future 1p view.



 Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view.

 Then as I said,? there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is
 only a future 1p view.



 The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man.

 Please note the use of the word and.



  that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been
  wrong.



 Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many
 would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some
 kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature
 of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any
 sort of final authority on the Washington Man.



  the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington
  Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about 
  it?
  What more is there to know?

 ?
  The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied,



 In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will
 be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there
 to know?


  the Helsinki man will see both cities.


  In the 3p view, that's correct,


 And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in
 the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse
 is not necessarily true.

 You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in
 philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same
 physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That
 is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone.

 Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and
 you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome
 regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third
 person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly
 wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just
 Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective.

 Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put
 yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some
 progress.
 ?



 ? but fail to answer the question asked.

 Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not
 surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno
 Marchal.


  Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died.


 If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens
 and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think
 that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more
 popular than it is.


 Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented:
 The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate
 it' to simply 'I hate it'.

 Jason

 --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
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Re: Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-24 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Jason Resch  

Since 1p has the property of perspective, 
and no two people can be at the same place at the 
same time, 3p has multiple perspectives.  

That is the only multiworld theory that I can
believe in. 


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/24/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Jason Resch  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism 





On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark  wrote: 

On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal  wrote: 



 In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future 
 1p view. 



Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view.  

Then as I said,? there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is only 
a future 1p view. 



The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man.  

Please note the use of the word and. 



 that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been 
 wrong. 



Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many 
would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some 
kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of 
the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort 
of final authority on the Washington Man.  



 the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is 
 the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What 
 more is there to know? 

? 
 The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied,  



In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be 
seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to 
know? 


 the Helsinki man will see both cities. 


 In the 3p view, that's correct, 


And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 
3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not 
necessarily true. 

You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in philosophy 
of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same physical state 
will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That is not what is at 
issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. 

Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you 
wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome 
regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, 
or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly wrong, as 
Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's 
cat from the cat's perspective. 

Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put yourself 
into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some progress. 
? 



? but fail to answer the question asked. 

Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising 
that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal.  


 Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died.  


If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and 
the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is 
the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than 
it is.  


Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: The 
critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate it' to 
simply 'I hate it'. 

Jason 

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Re: Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-24 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

 Hi Jason Resch

 Since 1p has the property of perspective,
 and no two people can be at the same place at the
 same time,


But could there be two places that are identical to each other which
contain the same first person perspectives?

Jason


 3p has multiple perspectives.

 That is the only multiworld theory that I can
 believe in.


 [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
 12/24/2012
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

 - Receiving the following content -
 From: Jason Resch
 Receiver: everything-list
 Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13
 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism





 On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark  wrote:

 On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal  wrote:



  In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the
 future 1p view.



 Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view.

 Then as I said,? there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is
 only a future 1p view.



 The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man.

 Please note the use of the word and.



  that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been
 wrong.



 Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many
 would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some
 kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the
 nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man
 is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man.



  the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington
 Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it?
 What more is there to know?

 ?
  The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied,



 In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will
 be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there
 to know?


  the Helsinki man will see both cities.


  In the 3p view, that's correct,


 And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in
 the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse
 is not necessarily true.

 You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in
 philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same
 physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.?
 That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone.

 Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and
 you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome
 regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third
 person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is
 plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or
 even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective.

 Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put
 yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some
 progress.
 ?



 ? but fail to answer the question asked.

 Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not
 surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno
 Marchal.


  Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died.


 If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens
 and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think
 that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more
 popular than it is.


 Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented:
 The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate
 it' to simply 'I hate it'.

 Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-24 Thread meekerdb

On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net 
mailto:rclo...@verizon.net wrote:


Hi Jason Resch

Since 1p has the property of perspective,
and no two people can be at the same place at the
same time,


But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same 
first person perspectives?


Jason


If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same external signals to them, 
e.g. from a camera at a particular location, and thus have 'the same' visual perspective.  
But I expect that their *perceptions* will still be quite different and you could do as 
well by just having them stand close together or look at the same TV screen.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-24 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 2:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.netwrote:

 Hi Jason Resch

 Since 1p has the property of perspective,
 and no two people can be at the same place at the
 same time,


  But could there be two places that are identical to each other which
 contain the same first person perspectives?

  Jason


 If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same external
 signals to them, e.g. from a camera at a particular location, and thus have
 'the same' visual perspective.  But I expect that their *perceptions* will
 still be quite different and you could do as well by just having them stand
 close together or look at the same TV screen.


Put two identical uploaded minds each in the same deterministic simulation.
 Then their perceptions should be identical.

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 22 Dec 2012, at 22:01, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/22/2012 11:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.


I don't think so.  If you are referring to his decision analysis, it  
only seems to work for simple binary choices - QM predicts  
probabilities that are often irrational numbers.  Gleason's theorem  
goes part way but it depends on solving the einselection  problem.


So, is it not that everything is solved with both Gleason theorem  
(measure)  and MW+comp (einselection)?


Except the mind-body problem, of course, which needs to generalize  
both MW and Gleason on arithmetic, but the logic of self-reference  
already shows the shadow of a Gleason theorem for arithmetic and its  
inside views.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-23 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Dec 23, 2012 at 8:20 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  as I said,  there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is
 only a future 1p view.

  But you have been duplicated.


Yes.

 from your future person points of view


In a world of duplicating machines there is no such thing as your future
person point of view, there is only a  future person point of view, and
in none of those views can anybody in the present know much about.

 there will be only one future,


Not for you in a world with duplicating machines.

 even if there both in the 3p view.


How could they not be in the 3p?


  the question asked was on the future 1p as seen by the 1p,


Philosophically I don't see how it matters but if you want to know if the
question was answered correctly there is only one way to go about it

1) Waite for the future to arrive.
2) Find the future 1p men, that means finding anybody who remembers being
the Helsinki Man.
3) Ask them what city they are now experiencing.

A future 1p man will answer Washington AND a future 1p man will answer
Moscow. If the Helsinki Man got the prediction right then fine, but if he
didn't then who cares; regardless of the veracity of the prediction the
important thing is that the Moscow man will still correctly believe he is
the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man will still correctly believe he is
the Helsinki Man

 and *both* are right that they are in one city,


Yes.

 so that the 1p views becomes non symmetrical.


Yes.

 The duplication has break the symmetry.


Yes, and that is why in a world with duplicating chambers things would seem
odd to us, we have become very accustomed to that symmetry so, although not
paradoxical, it would definitely take some getting used to being without
it. In fact some of us have become so accustomed to that symmetry that even
though they know intellectually it has been broken and now things are
profoundly different they just can't stop themselves from talking about
the future 1p view and continue to use personal pronouns in exactly in
the same way they always have as if nothing has been broken.

 the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington
 Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it?
 What more is there to know?



 The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied,



  In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city
 will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is
 there to know?



The chance of being which who from the 1p perspective.


Well you tell me, what is the chance that the one that sees Washington is
the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington?
I'd say that the chance of that happening must be pretty high, pretty damn
high indeed! What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to
know?

 And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical
 in the 3p view


  Ambiguous.


Which word didn't you understand?

 it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not
 necessarily true.


  Sure.


Thank you.

 Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked


  I am the one asking the question, so that remark makes not much sense.


That's OK, Bruno Marchal wouldn't be the first one to ask a nonsensical
question.

  John K Clark






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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Dec 2012, at 22:18, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Dec 20, 2012 at 5:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 You are asking about the present first person point of view of  
someone,


 NO. read the question: it is about a future first personal event.

That is totally false! The Helsinki man  is informing you about his  
PRESENT first person state of mind, he may be preoccupied trying to  
guess about what his future state of mind could be but that doesn't  
change the fact that you cannot communicate with the future Helsinki  
man you can only ask questions to the present Helsinki man and  
regardless of the subject of his thoughts he can only tell you about  
his present state of mind.
 Bruno Marchal has said, and John Clark agrees, that both the  
Moscow Man and the Washington Man are the Helsinki Man, and so  
assuming that the Helsinki Man believed the same thing and is  
rational, then the conclusion is obvious, the Helsinki Man will say  
that the Helsinki man will see Washington AND Moscow.


In the 3p view,

Yes, and as I've said before if 2 things are identical in the 3p  
they are certainly identical in the 1p, although the reverse is not  
necessarily true.


 but the question is about the future 1p view

In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the  
future 1p view.


Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. The 1-view of  
the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. If they don't exist, you would  
die, and comp is false. The use the is just an emphasis on the fact  
that, although there are two such view, they are felt unique by the  
experimenter.





 For example: suppose the Washington Man said the Helsinki Man's  
prediction in the past about a hypothetical first person point of  
view that would occur in the future turned out to be wrong, would  
that mean that the Washington man would no longer feel in his gut  
that he was the Helsinki Man? Of course not! That's why to follow a  
chain of identity the way to go is from the present to the past not  
from the present to the future.


But we have to do prediction to confirm or refute a theory on  
reality, which is the present case.


Not with personal identity we don't! If you are like me and most  
people you have made predictions about what you will do that turn  
out to be wrong, but incorrect or not when that happens you still  
feel like you were the one that made the prediction.


Exactly, and that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly  
admit having been wrong.





 This is just obviously wrong. It is correct in the 3p picture,  
but the question was about the 1p picture.


 And that's the problem right there, THERE IS NO THE 1P  
PICTURE, THERE IS ONLY A 1P PICTURE!


 And?

And so in a world with duplicating machines asking about the   
future 1p picture is as silly as asking how long is a piece of  
string because it depends on the string.


Then QM without collapse is refuted at once.





 It is not weird as it is only an indetermination on the person  
result after a self-duplication. the math are easy to do,


It's not just the math, everything about it is easy; the one that  
sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the  
one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it?  
What more is there to know?


The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, like in QM- 
without-collapse, or in arithmetic.









 both remember being the Helsinki Man, so although different both  
ARE the Helsinki Man,


 Exactly, and that is why the question makes sense.

So does the answer, the Helsinki man will see both cities.


In the 3p view, that's correct, but fail to answer the question asked.






 If he was asked on the 3p view after the duplication.

Apparently asking somebody something on the 3p is supposed to be  
different than just asking somebody, but I have no idea how.


Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died.  
The most probable experimenter 1p outcome, is I stay alive. When  
self-multiplication exist, the 1p and 3p difference play a big role,  
in both comp and Everett QM.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-22 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the
 future 1p view.


 Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view.


Then as I said,  there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is
only a future 1p view.

The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man.


Please note the use of the word and.

 that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been
 wrong.


Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many
would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some
kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the
nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man
is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man.

 the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington
 Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it?
 What more is there to know?



 The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied,


In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will
be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there
to know?

 the Helsinki man will see both cities.


  In the 3p view, that's correct,


And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in
the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse
is not necessarily true.

  but fail to answer the question asked.


Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising
that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal.

 Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died.


If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens
and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think
that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more
popular than it is.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-22 Thread Jason Resch
On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the
 future 1p view.


 Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view.


 Then as I said,  there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is
 only a future 1p view.

 The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man.


 Please note the use of the word and.

  that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been
 wrong.


 Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many
 would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some
 kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the
 nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man
 is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man.

  the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington
 Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it?
 What more is there to know?



  The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied,


 In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will
 be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there
 to know?

  the Helsinki man will see both cities.


  In the 3p view, that's correct,


 And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in
 the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse
 is not necessarily true.


You are misapplying this rule.  This rule is most often comes up in
philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same
physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.
That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone.

Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you
wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome
regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third
person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.  This is
plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or
even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective.

Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put
yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some
progress.




   but fail to answer the question asked.


 Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not
 surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno
 Marchal.

  Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died.


 If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens
 and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think
 that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more
 popular than it is.


Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.  As Tegmark commented:
The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate
it' to simply 'I hate it'.

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-22 Thread Jason Resch
I meant to write:

On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 1:56 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:


 Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and
 you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any *difference in 
 the*experimental outcome regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by
 an external third person, or experienced first-hand through the
 first-person.  This is plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum
 suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's
 perspective.


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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-22 Thread meekerdb

On 12/22/2012 11:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem. 


I don't think so.  If you are referring to his decision analysis, it only seems to work 
for simple binary choices - QM predicts probabilities that are often irrational numbers.  
Gleason's theorem goes part way but it depends on solving the einselection problem.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Dec 2012, at 17:19, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Dec 17, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 the question is about a future first person points of view,

 That is incorrect and I'm surprised at such a elementary error in  
logic.


 This is rhetoric.

No, in fact it is vitally important.

 The question is about a PRESENT first person point of view about  
what that person guesses a FUTURE first person point of view will be.


 That is not necessary.

Of course it is. You are asking about the present first person point  
of view of someone,


NO. read the question: it is about a future first personal event.




in this case the Helsinki Man of right now. It doesn't matter if the  
answer is true, it doesn't matter if some hypothetical future  
versions agree with the Helsinki Man of right now or not,


Only that matter.




all that matters is that the Helsinki man said what the Helsinki Man  
believed to be true.


About his future experience. You change the questions; and avoid it by  
all means. That is what we can see.






Bruno Marchal has said, and John Clark agrees, that both the Moscow  
Man and the Washington Man are the Helsinki Man, and so assuming  
that the Helsinki Man believed the same thing and is rational, then  
the conclusion is obvious, the Helsinki Man will say that the  
Helsinki man will see Washington AND Moscow.


In the 3p view, but the question is about the future 1p view, in which  
case  Washington AND Moscow is obviously excluded.







 Keep in mind that you have to convince the majority of your copies

No, and that is exactly the point! I don't have to convince the  
copies about anything and I don't even have to prove that what the  
Helsinki Man said was correct (although I happen to think it was,  
but that's not important), I only have to prove (and I have) that is  
what the Helsinki man would say if the Helsinki Man was rational and  
believed as John Clark and Bruno Marchal do that the Helsinki Man  
survives because the Washington Man survives and because the Moscow  
Man survives.


But with exclusive first person experiences, and that is what all is  
about.





For example: suppose the Washington Man said the Helsinki Man's  
prediction in the past about a hypothetical first person point of  
view that would occur in the future turned out to be wrong, would  
that mean that the Washington man would no longer feel in his gut  
that he was the Helsinki Man? Of course not! That's why to follow a  
chain of identity the way to go is from the present to the past not  
from the present to the future.


But we have to do prediction to confirm or refute a theory on reality,  
which is the present case.




The Helsinki Man doesn't know what sort of person the Helsinki Man  
will become,


That's the point.


but the Washington Man knows what sort of person the Washington Man  
was.


Yes.





 If you read the post you can see that I have no more use  
pronouns for a whole. I use H-man, W-man, M-man,


 The few times that was attempted it did not work because Bruno  
Marchal does not know who the Helsinki Man is.


 So if I use pronoun, you don't get it, and if I use H-man, etc.  
you don't get it


Either you or the H-Man would work fine provided their implicit  
meaning remained constant throughout the argument, but instead its  
all over the map. .


 all what counts in the reasoning is the 1-3 distinction.

All that counts is that it is clear which person's first person's  
view is being referred to, there are after all lots of first person  
views.


 About half the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki  
Man the same way John Clark does, as anybody who remembers being the  
Helsinki Man; in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man  
seeing Washington in the future is 100%.


 This is just obviously wrong. It is correct in the 3p picture, but  
the question was about the 1p picture.


And that's the problem right there, THERE IS NO THE 1P PICTURE,  
THERE IS ONLY A 1P PICTURE!


And? This changes nothing, as the it is unique, and the H-man knows  
this in advance. So it is a among two in the 3p picture, and the,  
among two, in the 1p picture. It is not weird as it is only an  
indetermination on the person result after a self-duplication. the  
math are easy to do, once you follow the protocol and read the  
definition of 1p and 3p.







 You keep describing the 3p view, and not the future 1p view

That's because there actually is a the 3p view and there is only  
one of those, but there is no unique the future 1p view.


Indeed, that's part of the point. As Quentin said, we have the same in  
the MWI.




There are 2 people, one in Washington and one in Moscow and they  
both have a 1p view, or at least the Helsinki Man of right now can  
hypothesize that in the future there will be such views.


Indeed, and that such views are incompatible.





 the other half of the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the  
Helsinki 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-20 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Dec 20, 2012 at 5:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 You are asking about the present first person point of view of someone,


  NO. read the question: it is about a future first personal event.


That is totally false! The Helsinki man  is informing you about his PRESENT
first person state of mind, he may be preoccupied trying to guess about
what his future state of mind could be but that doesn't change the fact
that you cannot communicate with the future Helsinki man you can only ask
questions to the present Helsinki man and regardless of the subject of his
thoughts he can only tell you about his present state of mind.

  Bruno Marchal has said, and John Clark agrees, that both the Moscow Man
 and the Washington Man are the Helsinki Man, and so assuming that the
 Helsinki Man believed the same thing and is rational, then the conclusion
 is obvious, the Helsinki Man will say that the Helsinki man will see
 Washington AND Moscow.

 In the 3p view,


Yes, and as I've said before if 2 things are identical in the 3p they are
certainly identical in the 1p, although the reverse is not necessarily
true.


  but the question is about the future 1p view


In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future
1p view.

 For example: suppose the Washington Man said the Helsinki Man's
prediction in the past about a hypothetical first person point of view that
would occur in the future turned out to be wrong, would that mean that the
Washington man would no longer feel in his gut that he was the Helsinki
Man? Of course not! That's why to follow a chain of identity the way to go
is from the present to the past not from the present to the future.

But we have to do prediction to confirm or refute a theory on reality,
 which is the present case.


Not with personal identity we don't! If you are like me and most people you
have made predictions about what you will do that turn out to be wrong, but
incorrect or not when that happens you still feel like you were the one
that made the prediction.

 This is just obviously wrong. It is correct in the 3p picture, but the
 question was about the 1p picture.


 And that's the problem right there, THERE IS NO THE 1P PICTURE, THERE
IS ONLY A 1P PICTURE!

 And?


And so in a world with duplicating machines asking about the  future 1p
picture is as silly as asking how long is a piece of string because it
depends on the string.

 It is not weird as it is only an indetermination on the person result
 after a self-duplication. the math are easy to do,


It's not just the math, everything about it is easy; the one that sees
Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees
Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to
know?

 both remember being the Helsinki Man, so although different both ARE the
 Helsinki Man,



 Exactly, and that is why the question makes sense.


So does the answer, the Helsinki man will see both cities.

 If he was asked on the 3p view after the duplication.


Apparently asking somebody something on the 3p is supposed to be
different than just asking somebody, but I have no idea how.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 16 Dec 2012, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Dec 16, 2012 at 7:34 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:
  it's true that after the duplication there will be 2 first  
person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that before  
the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it  
is here the question is asked about the future state of you and  
demands are made for one and only one answer.


 Of course, as the guy is duplicated, and the question is about a  
future first person points of view,


That is incorrect and I'm surprised at such a elementary error in  
logic.





This is rhetoric.





The question is about a PRESENT first person point of view about  
what that person guesses a FUTURE first person point of view will be.


That is not necessary. On the contrary, given the 3p meta-definition  
of 1p (content of the diary taken with in the annihilation box), the  
guess, and its solution (P = 1/2) makes sense at the 3p level.






 which is single

With the stipulation that there can be one and only one correct  
answer, and that is also a error.


Well, if you have a better answer. Keep in mind that you have to  
convince the majority of your copies, by the definition, and the  
protocol. You last answer (W  M) was refuted by all copies. P(M) =  
1 and P(W) = 1 are refuted for all copies except 2. Etc.







 John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of  
personal pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long  
time now, and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to  
use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those  
people just cannot help themselves.


 If you read the post you can see that I have no more use pronouns  
for a whole. I use H-man, W-man, M-man,


The few times that was attempted it did not work because Bruno  
Marchal does not know who the Helsinki Man is.


So if I use pronoun, you don't get it, and if I use H-man, etc. you  
don't get it, when all what counts in the reasoning is the 1-3  
distinction.




About half the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki  
Man the same way John Clark does, as anybody who remembers being the  
Helsinki Man; in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man  
seeing Washington in the future is 100%.



This is just obviously wrong. It is correct in the 3p picture, but the  
question was about the 1p picture. By definition, you must anticipate  
that the copy in Moscow, will keep P(W) = 1 in his memory, and when  
comparing to the result of the experience (opening the box), will say  
I (me, the H-man, or the HM-man) remember P(W) = 1, yet I am not in W,  
so I was wrong to have bet on W when I was in Helsinki.


You keep describing the 3p view, and not the future 1p view, which you  
know exisrs, by the comp assumption, and is an experience of being  
unique and entire in ONE city, as you did already agree.






But the other half of the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the  
Helsinki Man as someone who is currently experiencing Helsinki;


Not at all. It is the same man.



in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington  
in the future (or anything else for that matter) is 0% because in  
the future nobody will be experiencing Helsinki anymore.


?




These definitions and not congruent, and if that wasn't bad enough  
under neither definition is the probability 50%.



 And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person  
points of view you should put feet into


 Wong. I told you: all of them.


Good, then the probability Bruno Marchal will see Washington is 100%  
and the probability Bruno Marchal will see Moscow is 100%.


The proba is on the 1p, not on where the 1p will be. W and M refers to  
the 1-p experience itself, not on their localisation. As such, as you  
have already agree, W and M are exclusive incompatible experience. So  
you have P(W)+P(M) = 1, in this protocol. But with your theory P(W) 
+P(M) = 2.


Bruno








 You get stuck in the easy part of the derivation.

If that was the part of the proof that was the clearest and most  
obviously true then I'm very glad I didn't try to read more.


  John K Clark



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Dec 2012, at 04:25, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/14/2012 6:07 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote:


Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I  
think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno  
is proposing to explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps  
in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno,  
Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and  
it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and  
repeats this process many times.  Eventually  
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to  
be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random  
with probability 1/2.  This is hailed as a great discovery...in  
Copenhagen.  But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of  
Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general  
feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, but  
only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different view of  
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed  
the button two whole universes were created, separated by more  
than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in  
the other he went to Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability  
involved, exactly the same thing happened every time.  It only  
seemed like probability and randomness.  Some people thought this  
was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and  
how could this theory be tested.  But they were silenced by being  
told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the  
probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right.


--

Hi,

Great post! I would like to know how the sequence  
wmwwmwmmmww...mwm  is recorded and passed along. There is a  
tacit assumption of a book keeper at infinity' here!


No, each Bruno takes his notebook with him which get transported  
also and he just writes down where he arrived before heading back  
to Helsinki.


Brent
--


Hi Brent,

OK, so the notebook gets copy and pasted too?


??

 It is the only difference between 1p and 3p used in the UDA. For the  
3p the diary are outside the teleportation boxes, and for the 1p, the  
diary are inside, and thus gets copy and pasted too.


Bruno




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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Dec 2012, at 21:54, John Clark wrote:




On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:



 In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM,  
alias comp), there are two first person points of view


Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after  
the duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of  
view, but the problem is that before the duplication there is only  
one first person point of view at it is here the question is asked  
about the future state of you and demands are made for one and  
only one answer.


Of course, as the guy is duplicated, and the question is about a  
future first person points of view, which is single (as the two copies  
can handled only one diary and put only a definite result in there).
To confirm the probabilities, with such a definition of 1-view, you  
have to interview all copies.






John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal  
pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now,  
and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those  
pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people just  
cannot help themselves.


If you read the post you can see that I have no more use pronouns for  
a whole. I use H-man, W-man, M-man, and you have agreed on the key  
points:

- the M and W men are both the H-man
- the M and W men are different.
this gives sense to the first person indeterminacy lived by the H-man  
before the duplication.
Your problem is that you keep the 3p view throughout the experience,  
in which case everything is deterministic, but this avoids the  
question asked, simply.




The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas  
without using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some  
insight into the nature of those aforesaid ideas.


I have no more used pronouns, to help yopu, as this was pure red  
herring once you label them correctly with respect to the 1/3  
distinctions.






 you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in  
the shoes of the reconstituted person,


And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person  
points of view you should put feet into


Wong. I told you: all of them. It is easy, they all agree that they  
get a result that they was unable to predict, so the 1p-indeterminacy  
is a certainty for the original candidate.



and which first person viewpoint you should not. Bruno Marchal  
simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 to 10% of the words  
are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it was always  
clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would be  
unnecessary.


pfft You are discouraging as you don't even read the comments. You  
get stuck in the easy part of the derivation.


Nobody can teach anything to people who does not the homework.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Dec 2012, at 00:07, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote:


Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I  
think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is  
proposing to explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a  
transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w  
goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again andit  
sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and  
repeats this process many times.  Eventually  
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be  
random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with  
probability 1/2.  This is hailed as a great discovery...in  
Copenhagen.  But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of  
Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general  
feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, but  
only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different view of  
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed  
the button two whole universes were created, separated by more  
than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in  
the other he went to Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability  
involved, exactly the same thing happened every time.  It only  
seemed like probability and randomness.  Some people thought this  
was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and  
how could this theory be tested.  But they were silenced by being  
told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the  
probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right.


--

Hi,

Great post! I would like to know how the sequence  
wmwwmwmmmww...mwm  is recorded and passed along. There is a tacit  
assumption of a book keeper at infinity' here!


No, each Bruno takes his notebook with him which get transported  
also and he just writes down where he arrived before heading back to  
Helsinki.


Exactly.

Bruno




Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Dec 2012, at 00:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, John Mikes wrote:


Brent,
I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for  
one reason:
if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference  
whether you will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your'  
undisrupted self. However, if it goes into a multiple existence  
then - my problem is - what happens to the 'experience' of self1  
while you consider yourself at self2 location? the self-s  
inadvertently diverge so you cannot be both (or more).
In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. YOU are the ONE  
passing several locations - accumulating continual experience upon  
yourself (the 1) and if you happen to return to a former one, it  
will not be YOU.


I think the conclusion is that there is no you in the sense of  
unique.


But there is: the content of all diaries determined each time, in all  
situations, such a you.




  It's like talking about the dollar coin.  If it's duplicated or  
multiplied it's not unique and you is ambiguous - which is what  
John Clark complains about.


Because John introduce ambiguous to avoid indeterminate, but with  
the definition of the 1-view, there is no ambiguity at all, just  
indetermination. Ambiguity is taking care of by the 1-3 distinction.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-16 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Dec 16, 2012 at 7:34 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

   it's true that after the duplication there will be 2 first person
 Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that before the
 duplication there is only one first person point of view at it is here the
 question is asked about the future state of you and demands are made for
 one and only one answer.

  Of course, as the guy is duplicated, and the question is about a future
 first person points of view,


That is incorrect and I'm surprised at such a elementary error in logic.
The question is about a PRESENT first person point of view about what that
person guesses a FUTURE first person point of view will be.

 which is single


With the stipulation that there can be one and only one correct answer, and
that is also a error.

 John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal
 pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet
 those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as
 frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves.

 If you read the post you can see that I have no more use pronouns for a
 whole. I use H-man, W-man, M-man,


The few times that was attempted it did not work because Bruno Marchal does
not know who the Helsinki Man is. About half the time Bruno Marchal
implicitly defines the Helsinki Man the same way John Clark does, as
anybody who remembers being the Helsinki Man; in which case the probability
of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington in the future is 100%. But the other
half of the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki Man as
someone who is currently experiencing Helsinki;  in which case the
probability of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington in the future (or
anything else for that matter) is 0% because in the future nobody will be
experiencing Helsinki anymore. These definitions and not congruent, and if
that wasn't bad enough under neither definition is the probability 50%.

 And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points
 of view you should put feet into


 Wong. I told you: all of them.

Good, then the probability Bruno Marchal will see Washington is 100% and
the probability Bruno Marchal will see Moscow is 100%.

 You get stuck in the easy part of the derivation.


If that was the part of the proof that was the clearest and most obviously
true then I'm very glad I didn't try to read more.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-15 Thread Jason Resch
On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:25 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:18 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yes, and there are two of them and so there are 2 heres and 2 not
 theres.  So what ONE and only ONE thing does John Clark the
 experimenter enter into the lab notebook??


  You are hopeless.  I've answered this at least 10 times.


 Avoided the question at least 10 times. Jason #1 says Washington and Jason
 #2 says Moscow, there is only one lab notebook and only one experimenter,
 so what one and only one check mark should the experimenter put in that one
 and only one lab notebook, the one next to the word Washington or the one
 next to the word Moscow?


  Can anyone (the 1 or 2 remaining John Clarks, being the only person (or
 people) left on Earth) say whether he was transported randomly to one of
 the two locations, or duplicated to two different locations?


 That depends on how much is known. Subjective probability depends on the
 amount of information, or lack of it, the person involved has; and if Many
 Worlds is correct then all probabilities are subjective. If you told me
 nothing about the machine and just said walk into the chamber and I did so
 and found myself in Moscow I would have no way of knowing that there was
 another John Clark in Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the
 cities in the world you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even
 know that a reason existed.


Well say you knew there was a 50% chance it would duplicate you and a 50%
chance it would transport you.  Are the one or two John Clark's any wiser
following this protocol about which it was?  If they aren't then
subjectively duplication produces an experience indistinguishable from the
random selection of a single course.  Do you agree?



  My bet: you will find some excuse for not answering or merely ignore
 this question


 You loose.




   as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your comfort.


 Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most people
 want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all first
 person indeterminacy is, a pompous way of saying I dunno.


It's more than simple ignorance though.  Even with perfect knowledge you
cannot know.  Even if you are God you cannot know.  This type of
uncertainty only comes about in regards to first person duplication of
minds, and is altogether unlike other forms of uncertainty (save perhaps
quantum uncertainty, which may be related to or explained by it).




  And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?


 I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?


 And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?


 I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?


Yes.  First you start with the integers.  Then you sit back and let their
interrelations and connections build upon each other, and watch as some
form infinitely recursive relations, some of which proceed for very long
times if not indefinitely.  Some of these numbers, with each iteration,
develop internal patterns which multiply and divide themselves, some of
those patterns through mostly random processes adapt to their local
environment of  more stable patterns in the series of numbers, some develop
what we would call brains, some learn to build planes they call 747's, and
some build networks of computers to communicate on e-mail lists and discuss
the possible nature of reality.  All of these things can be found among the
relations between the integers.





  If pronouns are not ambiguous John Clark may or may not have the
 ability to provide answers, but at least John Clark will understand the
 question.



  Or if John Clark is uncomfortable with where he perceives the line of
 questions and reasoning to be heading be may make up some excuse about
 pronouns or answer a different question than was asked.


 Then simply call John Clark's bluff and stop using personal pronouns with
 abandon as it their meaning was as clear in a world with duplicating
 machines as it is in our world without them.

 So both are you but you only see through the eyes of one of them.
 So which one is blind.

 Neither is blind, but each sees through only one pair of eyes.

 OK.

  You (subjectively) survived


 Yes, and subjective survival is all I'm interested in, I'm not even sure
 what objective survival means.

  as one of them,


 One? Which one?


   if MWI is true in each universe there is one and only one
 photographic plate and one and only one spot on it;



   Not in the cosmological form of MWI.


 Bullshit.


Then you ought to tell Anthony Aguirre and Max Tegmark what the error is in
their paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066



  As I said before, no information is gained unless you are the one who
 enters the duplication chamber.


 And that's the difference, a physicist doesn't have to personally squeeze
 through those 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-15 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 4:50 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.


John Clark is happy to read that but is somewhat skeptical it is true.

 I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is
 proposing to explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a
 transporter and it sends him to Washington.


As John Clark has said people just can not help themselves, in order to
express vague flabby philosophical ideas personal pronouns simply must be
used to hide their vacuous nature at their heart. John Clark is going to
rephrase the above by excising the cancerous pronouns suppose Bruno is in
Helsinki and Bruno steps into a transporter and it sends Bruno to
Washington. Already much of the mystery is gone and things are much
clearer, but there is still ambiguity about the nature of the transporter.
If the transporter is a airplane then when Bruno goes to Washington Bruno
is no longer in Helsinki, however if the transporter is a duplicating
machine then when Bruno goes to Washington Bruno remains in Helsinki.

 That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again
 and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats
 this process many times.  Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that
 the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or
 Moscow at random with probability 1/2.


Brent Meeker just said that the machine would send Bruno to Washington AND
Moscow many times, and then in the very next sentence Brent Meeker says
that the machine would send Bruno to Washington OR Moscow; and if Bruno had
seen wmwwmwmmmww...mwm then Bruno has certainly seen Washington AND Moscow.
Of course this absurdity can be covered up, and that's where personal
pronouns come in, although John Clark thinks the disguise doesn't work very
well, lipstick can't brink a corpse back to life and personal pronouns
can't give focus to bad ideas.

And John Clark is confused about what direction Brent Meeker believes one
should look to understand this issue, from the present to the past or from
the present to the future. John Clark believes that the important thing is
that no matter how many iterations are done all those Bruno's remember
being Bruno in Helsinki long before Bruno had even seen a duplicating
chamber, and that's why all of them, although different from each other,
are all equally Bruno.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-15 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 3:16 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Subjective probability depends on the amount of information, or lack of
 it, the person involved has; and if Many Worlds is correct then all
 probabilities are subjective. If you told me nothing about the machine and
 just said walk into the chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I
 would have no way of knowing that there was another John Clark in
 Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world
 you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason
 existed.


 Well say you knew there was a 50% chance it would duplicate you and a 50%
 chance it would transport you.


So a coin would be flipped and if it was heads then Jason Resch would
simply allow the duplicating machine to do it's work and John Clark would
remain in Helsinki and John Clark would go to Washington, but if the coin
was tails then one second after the machine finished its work Jason Resch
would put a bullet into John Clark's brain in Helsinki. If John Clark knew
all of this beforehand John Clark would conclude there is a 100% chance
that John Clark will go to Washington and a 0% chance John Clark will
remain in Helsinki.


   as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your
 comfort.


  Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most people
 want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all first
 person indeterminacy is, a pompous way of saying I dunno.


 It's more than simple ignorance though.  Even with perfect knowledge you
 cannot know.


John Clark knows with certainty that if something (like seeing Washington)
causes John Clark to turn into the Washington Man then John Clark will see
Washington and if something (like seeing Moscow) causes John Clark to turn
into the Moscow Man then John Clark will turn into the Moscow Man. Not deep
but true. So it all boils down to uncertainties in external environmental
causes, and first person indeterminacy is just a pompous way of saying I
dunno about what changes the external world will cause in John Clark.


  Even if you are God you cannot know.


Which should give a hint that the question makes no sense.


   Tell me whether you disagree with the following and if so why:
 You open the door to emerge from a duplication chamber, observe the
 skyline and find it includes the Kremlin.  The experimental setup says your
 duplicate in the other city found the skyline included the Washington
 monument.  One of you saw the Kremlin and became the saw the Kremlin man
 and the other saw the Washington monument and became the saw the
 Washington monument man.  Through the duplication and observance of
 something different, each duplicate has acquired the subjective feeling of
 observing a random unpredictable event.


The subjective feeling would be depended entirely on the individual
involved , I'm only a expert on John Clark and John Clark would say he saw
the Kremlin because he's the Moscow man and he's the Moscow man because he
saw the Kremlin and he did not see the Washington monument because then
he's be the Washington man. And he's not.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/12/15 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

 On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 3:16 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

  Subjective probability depends on the amount of information, or lack of
 it, the person involved has; and if Many Worlds is correct then all
 probabilities are subjective. If you told me nothing about the machine and
 just said walk into the chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I
 would have no way of knowing that there was another John Clark in
 Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world
 you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason
 existed.


 Well say you knew there was a 50% chance it would duplicate you and a
 50% chance it would transport you.


 So a coin would be flipped and if it was heads then Jason Resch would
 simply allow the duplicating machine to do it's work and John Clark would
 remain in Helsinki and John Clark would go to Washington, but if the coin
 was tails then one second after the machine finished its work Jason Resch
 would put a bullet into John Clark's brain in Helsinki. If John Clark knew
 all of this beforehand John Clark would conclude there is a 100% chance
 that John Clark will go to Washington and a 0% chance John Clark will
 remain in Helsinki.


   as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your
 comfort.


  Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most
 people want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all
 first person indeterminacy is, a pompous way of saying I dunno.


 It's more than simple ignorance though.  Even with perfect knowledge you
 cannot know.


 John Clark knows with certainty that if something (like seeing Washington)
 causes John Clark to turn into the Washington Man then John Clark will see
 Washington and if something (like seeing Moscow) causes John Clark to turn
 into the Moscow Man then John Clark will turn into the Moscow Man. Not deep
 but true. So it all boils down to uncertainties in external environmental
 causes, and first person indeterminacy is just a pompous way of saying I
 dunno about what changes the external world will cause in John Clark.


  Even if you are God you cannot know.


 Which should give a hint that the question makes no sense.


   Tell me whether you disagree with the following and if so why:
 You open the door to emerge from a duplication chamber, observe the
 skyline and find it includes the Kremlin.  The experimental setup says your
 duplicate in the other city found the skyline included the Washington
 monument.  One of you saw the Kremlin and became the saw the Kremlin man
 and the other saw the Washington monument and became the saw the
 Washington monument man.  Through the duplication and observance of
 something different, each duplicate has acquired the subjective feeling of
 observing a random unpredictable event.


 The subjective feeling would be depended entirely on the individual
 involved , I'm only a expert on John Clark and John Clark would say he saw
 the Kremlin because he's the Moscow man and he's the Moscow man because he
 saw the Kremlin and he did not see the Washington monument because then
 he's be the Washington man. And he's not.

   John K Clark



So in your world, it is impossible to assign probabilities for subjective
feeling in a duplication experiment, yet still in your vision, you can in a
MWI context and you see absolutely no contradiction with that, agreed ?

If you agree, then I think we can spare electrons from now on.

Quentin












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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-15 Thread meekerdb

On 12/15/2012 9:50 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 4:50 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.


John Clark is happy to read that but is somewhat skeptical it is true.

 I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is 
proposing to
explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it 
sends him
to Washington. 



As John Clark has said people just can not help themselves, in order to express vague 
flabby philosophical ideas personal pronouns simply must be used to hide their vacuous 
nature at their heart. John Clark is going to rephrase the above by excising the 
cancerous pronouns suppose Bruno is in Helsinki and Bruno steps into a transporter and 
it sends Bruno to Washington. Already much of the mystery is gone and things are much 
clearer, but there is still ambiguity about the nature of the transporter. If the 
transporter is a airplane then when Bruno goes to Washington Bruno is no longer in 
Helsinki, however if the transporter is a duplicating machine then when Bruno goes to 
Washington Bruno remains in Helsinki.


 That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again 
and it
sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this 
process
many times.  Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the 
transporter seems
to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with 
probability 1/2.


Brent Meeker just said that the machine would send Bruno to Washington AND Moscow many 
times,


Once for each start from Helsinki.

and then in the very next sentence Brent Meeker says that the machine would send Bruno 
to Washington OR Moscow;


I wrote, Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and 
just sends him to Washington or Moscow.


and if Bruno had seen wmwwmwmmmww...mwm then Bruno has certainly seen Washington AND 
Moscow. Of course this absurdity


What's absurd about visiting Washington and Moscow many times, always starting from 
Helsinki.   I'll bet there are several Finnish airline pilots who have done exactly that.  
I think you must be listening to voices in your head, instead reading what's written.


can be covered up, and that's where personal pronouns come in, although John Clark 
thinks the disguise doesn't work very well, lipstick can't brink a corpse back to life 
and personal pronouns can't give focus to bad ideas.


And John Clark is confused about what direction Brent Meeker believes one should look to 
understand this issue, from the present to the past or from the present to the future. 
John Clark believes that the important thing is that no matter how many iterations are 
done all those Bruno's remember being Bruno in Helsinki long before Bruno had even seen 
a duplicating chamber, and that's why all of them, although different from each other, 
are all equally Bruno.


Did I say there was a duplicating chamber??

Brent



  John K Clark


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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 13 Dec 2012, at 22:25, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:18 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:
Yes, and there are two of them and so there are 2 heres and 2 not  
theres.  So what ONE and only ONE thing does John Clark the  
experimenter enter into the lab notebook??



 You are hopeless.  I've answered this at least 10 times.

Avoided the question at least 10 times. Jason #1 says Washington and  
Jason #2 says Moscow, there is only one lab notebook and only one  
experimenter,


In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM,  
alias comp), there are two first person points of view, and the  
question concerns them, not the 3p view. As J	ason said, you just  
limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the shoes of  
the reconstituted person, as asked in the protocol.
You stuck yourselves in the corner quasi deliberately, to avoid to  
proceed in the reasoning.


Bruno



so what one and only one check mark should the experimenter put in  
that one and only one lab notebook, the one next to the word  
Washington or the one next to the word Moscow?


 Can anyone (the 1 or 2 remaining John Clarks, being the only  
person (or people) left on Earth) say whether he was transported  
randomly to one of the two locations, or duplicated to two different  
locations?


That depends on how much is known. Subjective probability depends on  
the amount of information, or lack of it, the person involved has;  
and if Many Worlds is correct then all probabilities are subjective.  
If you told me nothing about the machine and just said walk into the  
chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I would have no way  
of knowing that there was another John Clark in Washington, nor  
would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world you chose  
to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason  
existed.


 My bet: you will find some excuse for not answering or merely  
ignore this question


You loose.

  as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your  
comfort.


Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most  
people want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and  
that's all first person indeterminacy is, a pompous way of saying  
I dunno.


 And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?

I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?

And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?

I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?


 If pronouns are not ambiguous John Clark may or may not have the  
ability to provide answers, but at least John Clark will understand  
the question.


 Or if John Clark is uncomfortable with where he perceives the line  
of questions and reasoning to be heading be may make up some excuse  
about pronouns or answer a different question than was asked.


Then simply call John Clark's bluff and stop using personal pronouns  
with abandon as it their meaning was as clear in a world with  
duplicating machines as it is in our world without them.
So both are you but you only see through the eyes of one of  
them. So which one is blind.


Neither is blind, but each sees through only one pair of eyes.
OK.

 You (subjectively) survived

Yes, and subjective survival is all I'm interested in, I'm not even  
sure what objective survival means.


 as one of them,

One? Which one?

  if MWI is true in each universe there is one and only one  
photographic plate and one and only one spot on it;


  Not in the cosmological form of MWI.

Bullshit.

 As I said before, no information is gained unless you are the one  
who enters the duplication chamber.


And that's the difference, a physicist doesn't have to personally  
squeeze through those 2 tiny slits to do the experiment, that's the  
electrons job, nevertheless he can learn something from just  
watching it. Nothing is learned from watching Bruno's experiment.


 You measure the spin state of an electron on the x-axis and find  
it is left.  MWI says your duplicate in the other branch found it  
was right.  One of you saw the left-state and became the saw the  
left-state man and the other saw the right-state and became the  
saw the right-state man.  Through the split, duplication, and  
observance of something different, each duplicate has acquired the  
subjective feeling of observing a random unpredictable event.


Yes.

  Enough time and electrons have been wasted repeating ourselves.

I agree, many free electrons have given their lives for this thread  
and there is not much to show for their sacrifice.


 John K Clark





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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Craig Weinberg
So if there is a brain conjoined twin (Adam  Ben) in Albuquerque and they 
are duplicated once in Buffalo and once in Cleveland, but in Cleveland 
something goes wrong and Adam does not get duplicated. 

What are you both saying happens to Adam  Ben in Albuquerque and to Ben in 
Cleveland?

Craig


On Friday, December 14, 2012 3:54:44 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:



 On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript:
  wrote:


  In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, alias 
 comp), there are two first person points of view


 Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the 
 duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but 
 the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person 
 point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of 
 you and demands are made for one and only one answer.  

 John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal 
 pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet 
 those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as 
 frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. 
 The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without 
 using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into 
 the nature of those aforesaid ideas. 

  you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the 
 shoes of the reconstituted person,


 And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of 
 view you should put feet into and which first person viewpoint you 
 should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 
 to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it 
 was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would 
 be unnecessary.

   John K Clark 



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread meekerdb

On 12/14/2012 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote:



On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



 In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, alias 
comp),
there are two first person points of view


Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the duplication 
there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that 
before the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it is here the 
question is asked about the future state of you and demands are made for one and only 
one answer.


John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal pronouns in a world 
with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet those who disagree with John 
Clark continue to use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people 
just cannot help themselves. The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express 
ideas without using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into 
the nature of those aforesaid ideas.


 you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the 
shoes of the
reconstituted person,


And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of view you 
should put feet into and which first person viewpoint you should not. Bruno Marchal 
simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 to 10% of the words are personal 
pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it was always clear what those pronouns referred 
to this entire debate would be unnecessary.


Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I think it needs to put in 
the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki 
and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes 
back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm 
goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times.  Eventually 
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends 
him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2.  This is hailed as a great 
discovery...in Copenhagen.  But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of Puget 
Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general feeling that randomness can never 
be a property of the world, but only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different 
view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the button two 
whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno 
went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability 
involved, exactly the same thing happened every time.  It only seemed like probability and 
randomness.  Some people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy 
conserved and how could this theory be tested.  But they were silenced by being told the 
theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability theory without probabilities, 
so it must be right.


Brent
Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them
where they cannot be seen.
--- Stephen W. Hawking

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Craig Weinberg
If this were done in real life, my guess is that Bruno_w dies in the 
transporter (sorry Bruno), and a disoriented amnesiac identical twin is 
born at every transporter location. I don't know if these clones would even 
survive, I think they would be brain dead and lacking a heartbeat but maybe 
could be resuscitated as infants in adult bodies. They might have odd 
discoveries of recovered memories of a past life as Bruno.

On Friday, December 14, 2012 4:50:45 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

  On 12/14/2012 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote: 



 On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript:
  wrote:


   In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, 
 alias comp), there are two first person points of view


 Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the 
 duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but 
 the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person 
 point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of 
 you and demands are made for one and only one answer.  

 John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal 
 pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet 
 those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as 
 frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. 
 The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without 
 using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into 
 the nature of those aforesaid ideas. 
  
you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the 
 shoes of the reconstituted person,
  

 And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of 
 view you should put feet into and which first person viewpoint you 
 should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 
 to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it 
 was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would 
 be unnecessary.
  

 Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I think it 
 needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to 
 explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it 
 sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in 
 the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back 
 to Helsinki and repeats this process many times.  Eventually 
 Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random 
 and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2.  
 This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen.  But in Washington 
 (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random 
 things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the 
 world, but only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different view 
 of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the 
 button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble 
 radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to 
 Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing 
 happened every time.  It only seemed like probability and randomness.  Some 
 people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy 
 conserved and how could this theory be tested.  But they were silenced by 
 being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability 
 theory without probabilities, so it must be right.

 Brent
 Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them 
 where they cannot be seen.
 --- Stephen W. Hawking 
  

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote:


Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I think 
it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing 
to explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter 
and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to 
Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. 
That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many 
times.  Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the 
transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or 
Moscow at random with probability 1/2.  This is hailed as a great 
discovery...in Copenhagen.  But in Washington (state) near the upper 
reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a 
general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, 
but only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different view of 
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the 
button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the 
Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he 
went to Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability involved, exactly 
the same thing happened every time.  It only seemed like probability 
and randomness.  Some people thought this was a little extravagant and 
asked how was energy conserved and how could this theory be tested.  
But they were silenced by being told the theory predicted exactly the 
same things as the probability theory without probabilities, so it 
must be right.


--

Hi,

Great post! I would like to know how the sequence 
wmwwmwmmmww...mwm  is recorded and passed along. There is a tacit 
assumption of a book keeper at infinity' here!


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread John Mikes
Brent,
I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one
reason:
if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference whether
you will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' undisrupted self.
However, if it goes into a multiple existence then - my problem is - what
happens to the 'experience' of self1 while you consider yourself at self2
location? the self-s inadvertently diverge so you cannot be both (or more).
In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. YOU are the ONE passing
several locations - accumulating continual experience upon yourself (the 1)
and if you happen to return to a former one, it will not be YOU.

You can dismiss my problem by you did not follow the suvject.
John M

On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 4:50 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/14/2012 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote:



 On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


   In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM,
 alias comp), there are two first person points of view


 Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the
 duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but
 the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person
 point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of
 you and demands are made for one and only one answer.

 John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal
 pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet
 those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as
 frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves.
 The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without
 using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into
 the nature of those aforesaid ideas.

you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the
 shoes of the reconstituted person,


 And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of
 view you should put feet into and which first person viewpoint you
 should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5
 to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it
 was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would
 be unnecessary.


 Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I think it
 needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to
 explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it
 sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in
 the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back
 to Helsinki and repeats this process many times.  Eventually
 Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random
 and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2.
 This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen.  But in Washington
 (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random
 things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the
 world, but only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different view
 of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the
 button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble
 radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to
 Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing
 happened every time.  It only seemed like probability and randomness.  Some
 people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy
 conserved and how could this theory be tested.  But they were silenced by
 being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability
 theory without probabilities, so it must be right.

 Brent
 Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them
 where they cannot be seen.
 --- Stephen W. Hawking

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread meekerdb

On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Brent,
I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one reason:
if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference whether you will 
CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' undisrupted self. However, if it goes 
into a multiple existence then - my problem is - what happens to the 'experience' of 
self1 while you consider yourself at self2 location? the self-s inadvertently diverge so 
you cannot be both (or more).
In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. YOU are the ONE passing several 
locations - accumulating continual experience upon yourself (the 1) and if you happen to 
return to a former one, it will not be YOU.


I think the conclusion is that there is no you in the sense of unique.  It's like 
talking about the dollar coin.  If it's duplicated or multiplied it's not unique and 
you is ambiguous - which is what John Clark complains about.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/14/2012 6:07 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote:


Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I think 
it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is 
proposing to explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a 
transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes 
back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to 
Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process 
many times.  Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the 
transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or 
Moscow at random with probability 1/2.  This is hailed as a great 
discovery...in Copenhagen.  But in Washington (state) near the upper 
reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a 
general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the 
world, but only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different 
view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he 
pushed the button two whole universes were created, separated by 
more than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in 
the other he went to Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability 
involved, exactly the same thing happened every time.  It only 
seemed like probability and randomness.  Some people thought this 
was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and how 
could this theory be tested.  But they were silenced by being told 
the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability 
theory without probabilities, so it must be right.


--

Hi,

Great post! I would like to know how the sequence 
wmwwmwmmmww...mwm  is recorded and passed along. There is a tacit 
assumption of a book keeper at infinity' here!


No, each Bruno takes his notebook with him which get transported also 
and he just writes down where he arrived before heading back to Helsinki.


Brent
--


Hi Brent,

OK, so the notebook gets copy and pasted too?

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Stephen

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/14/2012 6:09 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Brent,
I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one 
reason:
if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference 
whether you will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' 
undisrupted self. However, if it goes into a multiple existence then 
- my problem is - what happens to the 'experience' of self1 while you 
consider yourself at self2 location? the self-s inadvertently diverge 
so you cannot be both (or more).
In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. YOU are the ONE 
passing several locations - accumulating continual experience upon 
yourself (the 1) and if you happen to return to a former one, it will 
not be YOU.


I think the conclusion is that there is no you in the sense of 
unique.  It's like talking about the dollar coin.  If it's 
duplicated or multiplied it's not unique and you is ambiguous - 
which is what John Clark complains about.


Brent
--


Hi Brent,

Isn't this the concept of fungibility that D. Deutsch goes on and 
on about?


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


 On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 
 
  On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:

 
 
  Your servitor:
 
  1) Arithmetic (comp)
 
  :)
 
  Bruno
 
  To which I add:
 
  0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise
  to comp.


 OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp.

 No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for
 granted.

Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence,
are theorem in the tiny arithmetic.

Tiny compared to what though?


Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described.



As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from  
nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory- 
motor primitive, which has no possible explanation.


First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or  
Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them, if only to make sense  
of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor.

Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation.




Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of experiences


Keep in mind that experiences is what I want explain.




which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in  
arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of  
frustration.


In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness.




It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all  
it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete  
sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the  
Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure  
capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers?






 Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't
 necessary in the first place.

By postulating what we want to explain.

There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain  
arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of  
arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense  
which persists in spite of having no arithmetic value.


If you say so ...








 You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back.

 It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If
 you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non-
 ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other
 beings in public space.

You take the problem, and then say it is the solution.

The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and  
solutions.


Well, the cosmos is a problem with comp, and which makes comp  
interesting.






That's the god-
of-the-gap mistake.

No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos -  
beneath all gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is  
sense itself.


We don't even know if there is one.






We have of course already discuss this. You are
just saying don't search.

You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the  
only answer that can ever be universally true.


Hmm...






It looks *you* are talking everything for
granted at the start, in the theory.

I take only sense for granted because sense cannot be broken down  
into any more primitive elements. Everything else can be broken down  
to sense.


The CTM + classical theory of knowledge can explain that feeling.











 With the CTM ( a
 better name for comp), that which perceives, understands,  
participates

 and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its
 consciousness) by the only two laws:

 Kxy = x
 Sxyz = xz(yz)

 Laws? What are those? How do they govern?

Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first
equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x.

So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in
eleimnainating the left parentheses):
KKK = K.

For the same reason

KSK = S
KSS = S
K(S K) K = (S K)
etc.

For example SKK is an identity operator:

SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation,  = x, by the first equation.

S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a
Turing universal language/system/machine.

Axioms are philosophical. They don't make things happen. Systems  
don't appear without some capacity to generate and participate in  
them which exists first. You presume that there is such a thing a  
Law, but when I ask what you mean by that, you give more details on  
this specific proposition. I'm asking about the proposition itself  
though? What Turing universal language allows S and K to 'behave',  
or to exist or to relate to each other?


Any one, if you don't like combinators. But we have to start from 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread Jason Resch

Craig,

If in your theory sense is fundamental, a hence explains everything,  
how could your theory explain concepts like:


Gravity
Quantum mechanics
Fine tuning

It seems you need some formal laws and definitions concerning sense in  
order to build from it as a basis of understanding.


What might those laws of sense be?

Jason

On Dec 13, 2012, at 7:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com  
wrote:





On Thursday, December 13, 2012 5:22:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:

 On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 
 
  On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:
 
  On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 
  
  
   On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:
  
  
   Your servitor:
  
   1) Arithmetic (comp)
  
   :)
  
   Bruno
  
   To which I add:
  
   0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives  
rise

   to comp.
 
 
  OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding  
comp.

 
  No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for
  granted.

 Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running  
existence,

 are theorem in the tiny arithmetic.

 Tiny compared to what though?

Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described.

But if the universe contains no K to begin with, then it is  
insurmountably un-tiny, no?





 As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from
 nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory-
 motor primitive, which has no possible explanation.

First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or
Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them,

That's what I keep telling you though, I have already done this.  
Numbers cannot be assumed and they can be explained as epiphenomenal  
protocols within sense.


if only to make sense
of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor.

Now sensory-motor really cannot be explained with less than sensory- 
motor. That's because it is the legitimate universal primitive.  
That's why 'seeing is believing' and 'there is no substitute for  
experience' and 'you had to be there' and 'it's lost in  
translation'. Experience is trans-rational. Logic arises from  
experience, not the other way around. It isn't numbers who dream, it  
is dreams who count. See? You are experiencing sensory-motor now -  
it is all that anything has ever experienced. All 'explanations'  
arise through it, from it, and to it as isomorphisms of sense- 
making. Juxtapostion of like experiences on different levels, from  
the concrete and personal to the abstract and generic.


Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation.

That's what I'm saying. In sense, everything has lots of  
explanations. New explanations all the time. Explanations are made  
of sense.





 Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of  
experiences


Keep in mind that experiences is what I want explain.

That's circular. Explanation is already an experience. You are  
trying to put the shoebox into the shoe.






 which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in
 arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of
 frustration.

In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness.

Any machine that physically exists must be executed through some  
material which, on some level of description, has some level of  
awareness - molecules if nothing else. That doesn't mean though, if  
you make a walking machine out of PVC pipes (which are fantastic  
btw) that the walker as a whole hosts a unified awareness. Whatever  
awareness we project onto it is ultimately a reflection of our own  
sensory expectations and the sensory-motive intentions of the  
engineer(s) who created it. We watch TV, but the TV doesn't watch  
TV. We use a computer, but the computer doesn't use it's own  
computations to make sense. It reminds us very much of  
consciousness, but ultimately that reminder is a sculpture made of  
collections of metal pins and glassy films rather than living cells  
divided from a mammalian sexual syzygy event.





 It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all
 it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete
 sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the
 Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure
 capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers?





  Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't
  necessary in the first place.

 By postulating what we want to explain.

 There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain
 arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of
 arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense
 which persists in spite of 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 13 Dec 2012, at 04:39, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/12/2012 4:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Dec 11, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


 Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.

 Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible  
computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and  
MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and differentiated.
 Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum  
computer that is conscious.


Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason  
it's so difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault,  
the reason is that the conventional view says that conscious  
observers obey different laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do  
not, so to test who's right we need a mind that  
usesquantum properties.


In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many  
worlds other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots  
electrons at a metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does  
this one at a time. The quantum computer has detectors near each  
slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went through.  
The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed  
each and every electron and knows what slit each electron went  
through. It is very important that the document does not say which  
slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went  
through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one.  
Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory  
of what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories  
and the document remains undamaged.


But why should I think this is possible?  I'd like to see the  
actual mechanism or Hamiltonian that allows this.



And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the  
photographic plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at  
it, if you see interference bands then the many world  
interpretation is correct.


No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function'  
theory is incorrect.  It doesn't follow that MWI is correct.



If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function  
then what does?


Creating a record of it.

I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen.   
And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI.


MWI has the same problem as decoherence theory (except it tries to  
ignore it): How or what chooses the basis in which the reduced  
density matrix becomes approximately orthogonal and what is the  
significance of it not being exact.  Copenhagen said the choice is  
made by the experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this  
because he thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious.   
Decoherence theory hopes to show it is some objective feature of the  
experiment, e.g. the Schmidt decomposition and purification has been  
proposed


http://ipg.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=en:courses:2009-2010:qit:lect5quantinfo0910.pdf

Neither has really said how to deal with the inexactness of  
orthogonality, but once you assume you can ignore the off diagonal  
terms then QM just predicts probabilities, as Omnes says.


That works FAPP.
But there is no conceptual reason to ignore the off diagonal terms,  
given that they can play role physically testable. It is  
instrumentalist.


If you define a world by the transitive closure of interactions, then  
the linearity of the SWE and the linearity of the tensor product  
entails the existence of the many worlds. The many worlds is just the  
literal reading of QM applied to our world including us.


And I think QM itself, the wave, is already a literal reading of  
arithmetic by itself, ... but I can't convince people who believes in  
Something or Someone selecting their realities and not the others.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Dec 12, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently
 Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is
 conscious


No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked to him
about it. In the many worlds interpretation neither choice nor
consciousness nor mind in general have anything to do with the way the laws
of physics work, however in order to devise a experiment that attempts to
prove that Many Worlds makes better predictions than other interpretations
where mind is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind into
the experiment.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread meekerdb

On 12/13/2012 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Dec 2012, at 04:39, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/12/2012 4:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Dec 11, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


 Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.


 Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible 
computation and
an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are 
theories
which can be tested and differentiated.

 Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum 
computer
that is conscious.


Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so 
difficult
to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the
conventional view says that conscious observers obey different laws of 
physics,
Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we need a mind that 
uses
quantum properties.

In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds 
other
than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal 
plate that
has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer 
has
detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went
through. The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed 
each
and every electron and knows what slit each electron went through. It is 
very
important that the document does not say which slit the electrons went 
through,
it only says that they went through one slit only, and the mind has 
knowledge of
which one. Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the 
memory of
what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories and the 
document
remains undamaged.


But why should I think this is possible?  I'd like to see the actual 
mechanism or
Hamiltonian that allows this.



And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic 
plate. Now
develop the photographic plate and look at it, if you see interference 
bands then
the many world interpretation is correct.


No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory is
incorrect.  It doesn't follow that MWI is correct.


If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what 
does?


Creating a record of it.

I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen.  And if there is no 
collapse then you have the MWI.


MWI has the same problem as decoherence theory (except it tries to ignore it): How or 
what chooses the basis in which the reduced density matrix becomes approximately 
orthogonal and what is the significance of it not being exact.  Copenhagen said the 
choice is made by the experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he 
thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious.  Decoherence theory hopes to show it 
is some objective feature of the experiment, e.g. the Schmidt decomposition and 
purification has been proposed


http://ipg.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=en:courses:2009-2010:qit:lect5quantinfo0910.pdf

Neither has really said how to deal with the inexactness of orthogonality, but once you 
assume you can ignore the off diagonal terms then QM just predicts probabilities, as 
Omnes says.


That works FAPP.
But there is no conceptual reason to ignore the off diagonal terms, given that they can 
play role physically testable. It is instrumentalist.


But MWI has the same problem.  There are superpositions of conscious states too, but the 
cross trems are ignored FAPP just as in an instrumentalist interpretation.  It essentially 
boils down to the problem of explaining the classical worlds emergence from the quantum.




If you define a world by the transitive closure of interactions, then the linearity of 
the SWE and the linearity of the tensor product entails the existence of the many 
worlds. The many worlds is just the literal reading of QM applied to our world including us.


How I define a world's in a model only effects the model.  There is no 'literal reading' 
of QM that works in this world except FAPP.  Maybe a successful theory of consciousness 
will change that, but so far I see CTM as relying on the same FAPP diagonalization of 
density matrices in a basis which is chosen - not predicted.


Brent



And I think QM itself, the wave, is already a literal reading of arithmetic by itself, 
... but I can't convince people who believes in Something or Someone selecting their 
realities and not the others.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread meekerdb

On 12/13/2012 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Dec 12, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently 
Deutsch
agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious


No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked to him about it. In the 
many worlds interpretation neither choice nor consciousness nor mind in general have 
anything to do with the way the laws of physics work, however in order to devise a 
experiment that attempts to prove that Many Worlds makes better predictions than other 
interpretations where mind is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind 
into the experiment.


Which agrees with my point that the experiment is only designed to test the Wigner theory 
that consciousness collapses the wave-function.  Rejecting Wigner's interpretation (which 
he dropped later anyway) is not the same as proving MWI.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/12/13 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

  On 12/13/2012 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote:

 On Wed, Dec 12, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

   Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently
 Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is
 conscious


 No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked to him
 about it. In the many worlds interpretation neither choice nor
 consciousness nor mind in general have anything to do with the way the laws
 of physics work, however in order to devise a experiment that attempts to
 prove that Many Worlds makes better predictions than other interpretations
 where mind is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind into
 the experiment.


 Which agrees with my point that the experiment is only designed to test
 the Wigner theory that consciousness collapses the wave-function.
 Rejecting Wigner's interpretation (which he dropped later anyway) is not
 the same as proving MWI.

 Brent


Isn't that prove wrong any collapse explanations ?

Quentin

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:18 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yes, and there are two of them and so there are 2 heres and 2 not
 theres.  So what ONE and only ONE thing does John Clark the 
 experimenterenter into the lab notebook??


  You are hopeless.  I've answered this at least 10 times.


Avoided the question at least 10 times. Jason #1 says Washington and Jason
#2 says Moscow, there is only one lab notebook and only one experimenter,
so what one and only one check mark should the experimenter put in that one
and only one lab notebook, the one next to the word Washington or the one
next to the word Moscow?


  Can anyone (the 1 or 2 remaining John Clarks, being the only person (or
 people) left on Earth) say whether he was transported randomly to one of
 the two locations, or duplicated to two different locations?


That depends on how much is known. Subjective probability depends on the
amount of information, or lack of it, the person involved has; and if Many
Worlds is correct then all probabilities are subjective. If you told me
nothing about the machine and just said walk into the chamber and I did so
and found myself in Moscow I would have no way of knowing that there was
another John Clark in Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the
cities in the world you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even
know that a reason existed.

 My bet: you will find some excuse for not answering or merely ignore this
 question


You loose.

  as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your comfort.


Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most people want
to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all first
person indeterminacy is, a pompous way of saying I dunno.

 And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?


 I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?


 And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?


I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?



  If pronouns are not ambiguous John Clark may or may not have the
 ability to provide answers, but at least John Clark will understand the
 question.



 Or if John Clark is uncomfortable with where he perceives the line of
 questions and reasoning to be heading be may make up some excuse about
 pronouns or answer a different question than was asked.


Then simply call John Clark's bluff and stop using personal pronouns with
abandon as it their meaning was as clear in a world with duplicating
machines as it is in our world without them.

 So both are you but you only see through the eyes of one of them. So
 which one is blind.

 Neither is blind, but each sees through only one pair of eyes.

OK.

 You (subjectively) survived


Yes, and subjective survival is all I'm interested in, I'm not even sure
what objective survival means.

 as one of them,


One? Which one?


   if MWI is true in each universe there is one and only one
 photographic plate and one and only one spot on it;



   Not in the cosmological form of MWI.


Bullshit.

 As I said before, no information is gained unless you are the one who
 enters the duplication chamber.


And that's the difference, a physicist doesn't have to personally squeeze
through those 2 tiny slits to do the experiment, that's the electrons job,
nevertheless he can learn something from just watching it. Nothing is
learned from watching Bruno's experiment.

 You measure the spin state of an electron on the x-axis and find it is
 left.  MWI says your duplicate in the other branch found it was right.  One
 of you saw the left-state and became the saw the left-state man and the
 other saw the right-state and became the saw the right-state man.
  Through the split, duplication, and observance of something different,
 each duplicate has acquired the subjective feeling of observing a random
 unpredictable event.


Yes.

  Enough time and electrons have been wasted repeating ourselves.

I agree, many free electrons have given their lives for this thread and
there is not much to show for their sacrifice.

 John K Clark





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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/13/2012 3:36 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/13/2012 11:46 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2012/12/13 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

On 12/13/2012 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Dec 12, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and
apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's
significant that his AI is conscious


No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked
to him about it. In the many worlds interpretation neither
choice nor consciousness nor mind in general have anything to do
with the way the laws of physics work, however in order to
devise a experiment that attempts to prove that Many Worlds
makes better predictions than other interpretations where mind
is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind into
the experiment.


Which agrees with my point that the experiment is only designed
to test the Wigner theory that consciousness collapses the
wave-function.  Rejecting Wigner's interpretation (which he
dropped later anyway) is not the same as proving MWI.

Brent


Isn't that prove wrong any collapse explanations ?


No it just proves wrong theories that say the conscious knowledge of 
the quantum computer, which is not erased, collapses the wf. That's 
why I say I'd like to see the experimental setup or at least the 
theoretical Hamiltonian.  Suppose the interference fringes are 
observed - then we say OK erasing the which-way, but keeping the 
some-way, information is possible.  Suppose the interference fringes 
aren't observed - then we say it isn't really possible (with the given 
experiment anyway) to erase the which-way information and keep the 
some-way information.  Although the AI doesn't know which-way, the 
information is 'out there' just like in the buckyball Young's slit 
experiment.


Brent

Hi Brent,

Wait... For the the hypothetical quantum computer, what plays the 
role of the environment (that is an effectively infinite heat reservoir) 
that the IR radiation of the buckyball's couples to such that they (at 
some temp) behave classically? Here are a couples of on-line articles:


http://www.julianvossandreae.com/Work/C60article/c60article.pdf
http://www.flayrah.com/3351/physicist-mulls-double-slit-cat-cannon-experiment

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Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Your servitor:

1) Arithmetic (comp)

:)

Bruno

To which I add:

0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise  
to comp.



OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp.  
You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. With the CTM ( a  
better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates  
and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its  
consciousness) by the only two laws:


Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

or if you prefer:

x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1

 x *0 = 0
 x*(y + 1) = x*y + x

By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an  
unnecessary magic.


I think,

Regards,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: 

  
  
  On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
  
  
  Your servitor: 
  
  1) Arithmetic (comp) 
  
  :) 
  
  Bruno 
  
  To which I add: 
  
  0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise   
  to comp. 


 OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp.   


No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for granted. 
Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't necessary in 
the first place.
 

 You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back.


It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If you 
don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non-ordinary state of 
consciousness which does not commute to other beings in public space. 
 

 With the CTM ( a   
 better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates   
 and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its   
 consciousness) by the only two laws: 

 Kxy = x 
 Sxyz = xz(yz) 


Laws? What are those? How do they govern? How do these formulas become 
perception, understanding, participation, and discovery? I know what sense 
is, because everything that I can experience makes some kind of sense with 
in some sensory experience or is itself a sensory experience. 'Two Laws' is 
an idea which makes intellectual sense but has no presence or effect 
without a participant who is in some way subject to that presence or 
effect. Being present and subject to an effect is sense.
 


 or if you prefer: 

 x + 0 = x 
 x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 

   x *0 = 0 
   x*(y + 1) = x*y + x 

 By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an   
 unnecessary magic. 


The perceiver does not have to be added, it is impossible to remove. You 
are looking at a blackboard in the sky and deciding that it is a doorway to 
a world in which actual experience comes from the idea of counting. 
Counting is an experience. Computing requires computers. Computers require 
sense.

I continue to be,
Craig

 


 I think, 

 Regards, 

 Bruno 


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 





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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 Your servitor:

 1) Arithmetic (comp)

 :)

 Bruno

 To which I add:

 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise
 to comp.


OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp.

No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for  
granted.


Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence,  
are theorem in the tiny arithmetic.





Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't  
necessary in the first place.


By postulating what we want to explain.




You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back.

It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If  
you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non- 
ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other  
beings in public space.


You take the problem, and then say it is the solution. That's the god- 
of-the-gap mistake. We have of course already discuss this. You are  
just saying don't search. It looks *you* are talking everything for  
granted at the start, in the theory.







With the CTM ( a
better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates
and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its
consciousness) by the only two laws:

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

Laws? What are those? How do they govern?


Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first  
equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x.


So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in  
eleimnainating the left parentheses):

KKK = K.

For the same reason

KSK = S
KSS = S
K(S K) K = (S K)
etc.

For example SKK is an identity operator:

SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation,  = x, by the first equation.

S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a  
Turing universal language/system/machine.




How do these formulas become perception, understanding,  
participation, and discovery?


By comp, it exist an SK- combinator which emulates my perception,  
understanding, participation and discovery. How? By explorartion, self- 
reference, memorisation, ... that kind of things. Why qualia? Perhaps  
by the fact that combinators, or numbers, machines, programs, when  
looking inward, get unjustifiable bunch of information, including  
unexpressible one.




I know what sense is, because everything that I can experience makes  
some kind of sense with in some sensory experience or is itself a  
sensory experience.


OK. But if we can use the directly obvious at the metalevel, does not  
mean we can't explain that very use from a simpler level.





'Two Laws' is an idea which makes intellectual sense but has no  
presence or effect without a participant who is in some way subject  
to that presence or effect. Being present and subject to an effect  
is sense.


I can't agree more. I appreciate your intuition on the first person.  
What you say here is the base of defining knowledge of p by a belief  
in p in case p is true.  Kp = Bp  p, with p arithmetical, and B too.  
So any particular knowlegde will be arithmetical, despite Kp is not  
definable in one strike, in arithmetic. This entails that no machine  
can know who she really is. She can only give a 3p description of  
herself or a summary of it (like an identity card).








or if you prefer:

x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1

  x *0 = 0
  x*(y + 1) = x*y + x

By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an
unnecessary magic.

The perceiver does not have to be added, it is impossible to remove.



Keep is mind that I am a scientist, or if you prefer, I am simple  
minded. I expect a theory to be given by what we assume. The theorems  
will show what is emerging from what we have assumed. If you do not  
add the perceiver, then tell me precisely what you assume, and how you  
derive the perceiver from it.


In such complex subject, it is very useful to put ALL the cards on the  
table. That is why I assume a bit of logic, the natural numbers,  
addition and multiplication, and then, using comp at the metalevel, I  
show that we need nothing more, and that adding anything more is a  
sort of treachery, which can deprive the natural quanta/qualia  
distinction to get derived from self-reference.




You are looking at a blackboard in the sky and deciding that it is a  
doorway to a world in which actual experience comes from the idea of  
counting. Counting is an experience. Computing requires computers.  
Computers require sense.


I continue to be,
Craig


You continue to be a good phenomenologist and a bad metaphysician, imo.

I would not care so much if you didn't become a consciousness- 
eliminativist with respect to material and immaterial machines.



Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Dec 11, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

   Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.


   Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation
 and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are
 theories which can be tested and differentiated.

   Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum
 computer that is conscious.


Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so
difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is
that the conventional view says that conscious observers obey different
laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we
need a mind that uses quantum properties.

In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds
other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a
metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The
quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the
various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document
saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit
each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not
say which slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went
through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the
mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits
the electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains
undamaged. And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the
photographic plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at it, if
you see interference bands then the many world interpretation is correct.
If you do not see interference bands then there are no worlds but this one
and the conventional interpretation is correct.

Deutsch is saying that in the Copenhagen interpretation when the results of
a measurement enters the consciousness of an observer the wave function
collapses, in effect all the universes except one disappear without a trace
so you get no interference. In the many worlds model all the other worlds
will converge back into one universe when the electrons hit the
photographic film because the two universes will no longer be different
(even though they had different histories), but their influence will still
be felt. In the merged universe you'll see indications that the electron
went through slot X only and indications that it went through slot Y only,
and that's what causes interference.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: 

  
  
  On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
  
  On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
  
   
   
   On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
   
   
   Your servitor: 
   
   1) Arithmetic (comp) 
   
   :) 
   
   Bruno 
   
   To which I add: 
   
   0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise 
   to comp. 
  
  
  OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. 
  
  No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for   
  granted. 

 Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence,   
 are theorem in the tiny arithmetic. 


Tiny compared to what though? As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of 
arithmetic truth from nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of 
a sensory-motor primitive, which has no possible explanation. Arithmetic is 
easily explained as one of the many types of experiences which allow us to 
refer to other experiences, but nothing in arithmetic will ever point to 
the taste of a carrot or a feeling of frustration. It may leave room for 
undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all it is: room. Nothing points 
positively to realism and concrete sensory participation, only 
simulations...but what simulates the Turing machine itself? What props up 
the stability and erasure capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to 
detect numbers?





  Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't   
  necessary in the first place. 

 By postulating what we want to explain. 


There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain 
arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of 
arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense which 
persists in spite of having no arithmetic value. 



  
  You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. 
  
  It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If   
  you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non- 
  ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other   
  beings in public space. 

 You take the problem, and then say it is the solution.


The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and solutions. 
 

 That's the god- 
 of-the-gap mistake. 


No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos - beneath all 
gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is sense itself.
 

 We have of course already discuss this. You are   
 just saying don't search.


You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the only 
answer that can ever be universally true.
 

 It looks *you* are talking everything for   
 granted at the start, in the theory. 


I take only sense for granted because sense cannot be broken down into any 
more primitive elements. Everything else can be broken down to sense.
 





  
  With the CTM ( a 
  better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates 
  and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its 
  consciousness) by the only two laws: 
  
  Kxy = x 
  Sxyz = xz(yz) 
  
  Laws? What are those? How do they govern? 

 Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first   
 equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x. 

 So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in   
 eleimnainating the left parentheses): 
 KKK = K. 

 For the same reason 

 KSK = S 
 KSS = S 
 K(S K) K = (S K) 
 etc. 

 For example SKK is an identity operator: 

 SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation,  = x, by the first equation. 

 S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a   
 Turing universal language/system/machine. 


Axioms are philosophical. They don't make things happen. Systems don't 
appear without some capacity to generate and participate in them which 
exists first. You presume that there is such a thing a Law, but when I ask 
what you mean by that, you give more details on this specific proposition. 
I'm asking about the proposition itself though? What Turing universal 
language allows S and K to 'behave', or to exist or to relate to each 
other? It's consistent within a particular frame of generalized truth but 
it has no proprietary traction. It doesn't move eyeballs and cross streets, 
it just equals or increments.




  How do these formulas become perception, understanding,   
  participation, and discovery? 

 By comp, it exist an SK- combinator which emulates my perception,   
 understanding, participation and discovery. How? By explorartion, self- 
 reference, memorisation, ... that kind of things. Why qualia? Perhaps   
 by the fact that combinators, or numbers, machines, programs, when   
 looking inward, get unjustifiable bunch of information, including   
 unexpressible one. 


But this is what we 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread meekerdb

On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Dec 11, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


 Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.


 Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation 
and an AI
yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which 
can be
tested and differentiated.

 Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum computer 
that is
conscious.


Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so difficult to 
test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the conventional view 
says that conscious observers obey different laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do 
not, so to test who's right we need a mind that uses quantum properties.


In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds other than 
this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal plate that has 2 small 
slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer has detectors near each 
slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went through. The quantum mind now 
signs a document saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit 
each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not say which 
slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went through one slit only, and 
the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely 
destroy the memory of what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories and 
the document remains undamaged.


But why should I think this is possible?  I'd like to see the actual mechanism or 
Hamiltonian that allows this.


And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic plate. Now develop 
the photographic plate and look at it, if you see interference bands then the many world 
interpretation is correct.


No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory is incorrect.  It 
doesn't follow that MWI is correct.


Brent

If you do not see interference bands then there are no worlds but this one and the 
conventional interpretation is correct.


Deutsch is saying that in the Copenhagen interpretation when the results of a 
measurement enters the consciousness of an observer the wave function collapses, in 
effect all the universes except one disappear without a trace so you get no 
interference. In the many worlds model all the other worlds will converge back into one 
universe when the electrons hit the photographic film because the two universes will no 
longer be different (even though they had different histories), but their influence will 
still be felt. In the merged universe you'll see indications that the electron went 
through slot X only and indications that it went through slot Y only, and that's what 
causes interference.


  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote:

 On Tue, Dec 11, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

   On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

   Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.


   Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible
 computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus
 they are theories which can be tested and differentiated.

   Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum
 computer that is conscious.


 Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so
 difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is
 that the conventional view says that conscious observers obey different
 laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we
 need a mind that uses quantum properties.

 In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds
 other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a
 metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The
 quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the
 various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document
 saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit
 each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not
 say which slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went
 through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the
 mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits
 the electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains
 undamaged.


 But why should I think this is possible?  I'd like to see the actual
 mechanism or Hamiltonian that allows this.


  And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic
 plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at it, if you see
 interference bands then the many world interpretation is correct.


 No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory
 is incorrect.  It doesn't follow that MWI is correct.


If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what
does?  I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen.
 And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI.

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/12/2012 7:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then 
what does?  I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not 
happen.  And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI.


Jason

Hi,

It seems to me that we would not observe any sign of a collapse in 
a local sense even if there actually was one. We only observe the end 
result, no the process. No?


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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:

 On 12/12/2012 7:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then
 what does?  I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not
 happen.  And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI.

 Jason

 Hi,

 It seems to me that we would not observe any sign of a collapse in a
 local sense even if there actually was one. We only observe the end result,
 no the process. No?

 Correct.  But the CI says you can't learn the result of a measurement
without the wave function collapsing.  Actually it was never entirely
defined when the collapse happened, or what did it, but it was supposed
that for any observer to know a result it must have collapsed.

For DD's experiment to work, there must be two definite results which are
definitely measured and observed., since the collapse never occurred and
yet the observer recalled measuring a definite result.

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread meekerdb

On 12/12/2012 4:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Dec 11, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


 Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.


 Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible 
computation and
an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are 
theories
which can be tested and differentiated.

 Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum 
computer that
is conscious.


Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so 
difficult
to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the 
conventional
view says that conscious observers obey different laws of physics, Many 
Worlds says
they do not, so to test who's right we need a mind that uses quantum 
properties.

In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds 
other
than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal 
plate that
has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer 
has
detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went 
through.
The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed each and 
every
electron and knows what slit each electron went through. It is very 
important that
the document does not say which slit the electrons went through, it only 
says that
they went through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one. 
Now the
mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits the
electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains 
undamaged.


But why should I think this is possible?  I'd like to see the actual 
mechanism or
Hamiltonian that allows this.



And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic 
plate. Now
develop the photographic plate and look at it, if you see interference 
bands then
the many world interpretation is correct.


No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory is
incorrect.  It doesn't follow that MWI is correct.


If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what 
does?


Creating a record of it.

I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen.  And if there is no 
collapse then you have the MWI.


MWI has the same problem as decoherence theory (except it tries to ignore it): How or what 
chooses the basis in which the reduced density matrix becomes approximately orthogonal and 
what is the significance of it not being exact.  Copenhagen said the choice is made by the 
experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant 
that his AI is conscious.  Decoherence theory hopes to show it is some objective feature 
of the experiment, e.g. the Schmidt decomposition and purification has been proposed


http://ipg.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=en:courses:2009-2010:qit:lect5quantinfo0910.pdf

Neither has really said how to deal with the inexactness of orthogonality, but once you 
assume you can ignore the off diagonal terms then QM just predicts probabilities, as Omnes 
says.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread meekerdb

On 12/12/2012 5:10 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net 
mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:


On 12/12/2012 7:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then 
what
does?  I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not 
happen.  And if
there is no collapse then you have the MWI.

Jason

Hi,

It seems to me that we would not observe any sign of a collapse in a 
local sense
even if there actually was one. We only observe the end result, no the 
process. No?

Correct.  But the CI says you can't learn the result of a measurement without the wave 
function collapsing.  Actually it was never entirely defined when the collapse happened, 
or what did it, but it was supposed that for any observer to know a result it must have 
collapsed.


For DD's experiment to work, there must be two definite results which are definitely 
measured and observed., since the collapse never occurred and yet the observer recalled 
measuring a definite result.


I'm not clear on what you mean by two definite results.  In order to detect an 
interference pattern you need to send many particles through Young's slits.  So I assume 
the two results must be an ensemble for which there was no which-way observation by the 
conscious AI and another ensemble for which the observation was made for each particle, 
but then quantum-erased.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum  
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And  
Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His  
view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the  
density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just  
assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities.  QM is a  
probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can  
ask of it.



Is science just about its applications or about understanding the  
world?  I would argue that science would not progress so far as  
it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end  
all of science.  The shut up and calculate mindset can be  
translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the  
antithesis of scientific thinking.


Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do  
the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting  
planetary motion, so shut up and calculate!


Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be  
probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many  
inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.



It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with  
him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our  
understanding of it.  I am not sure how accurate this statement  
is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s 
 says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense  
interpretation of quantum law itself.  To me, it almost seems as  
if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.  I lean more  
towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good  
explanations.


Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and  
defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter,  
he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one  
reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no  
more rational at all.


What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being  
able to give coherent reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent  
reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality.


But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat  
earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force  
to keep the same speed, etc. Usually when we refer to experience we  
are wrong (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot  
mention experience in experiment ...).


Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something  
(consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from  
theories already extrapolated.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born  
rule. a good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better  
explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  But simply postulating an  
ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in  
arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not  
well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the  
collapse needed to get one physical reality).


That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.


Only against theories which postulate objective indeterminacy (and  
what is that?) to avoid a simpler theory.




The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.   
The interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't  
need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated  
probabilities.  That's what probability means - some state is  
actualized and others aren't.


That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as  
first person indeterminacy explains their appearance completely, in  
simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Dec 2012, at 19:54, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 3:08 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:


 From whose perspective is there a single unique result?

From my perspective! Whenever I, the simple non-godlike  
experimenter, send a photon (or electron) through 2 slits and it  
hits a photographic I, the simple non-godlike experimenter, always  
see a single unique result. After the experiment I, the simple non- 
godlike experimenter, can always say the photon hit right there on  
the plate and it did not hit way over there on the other side of the  
plate.


The outcome of the 2 slit experiment cannot be predicted precisely  
but once it is performed and the experimenter knows for certain if  
the left hand side of the plate box or the right hand side of the  
plate box should be checked in the lab notebook. After Bruno's  
experiment should the Washington or Moscow box be checked?  Should  
the experimenter believe the Washington man or the Moscow man or  
both? If it's both then the experimenter has learned nothing.


  From the God's-eye view of reality, there certainly is not a  
single outcome.


Perhaps, but I am not God; I applied but unfortunately did not get  
the job.


  Your issue is you use the God's-eye view for Bruno's experiment  
but not for the 2-slit experiment.


No. In Bruno's experiment from my perspective, I the simple non- 
godlike experimenter, always see exactly the same thing, I the  
simple non-godlike experimenter always see 2 people who have a equal  
right to call themselves Bruno always check both the Washington box  
and the Moscow box and thus nothing is learned. And I don't care  
what God sees because this simple non-godlike experimenter does not  
believe in God.


You need only to believe that both the W-man and the M-man have a  
first person experience. And both confirms that sometimes they see W,  
sometimes they see M, and never both.






 it says that in the 2 slit experiment the absolute value of the  
square of the value of the Schrodinger wave equation of a photon at  
a point on a photographic plate will be the classical probability of  
finding the photon at that point when you develop the plate. This  
prediction of Quantum Mechanics has been proven to be correct many  
many times and according to SUAC that's the end of the matter.


 But those predicted probabilities are more similar to those of  
Bruno's first person indeterminacy


No it is not. Quantum Mechanics could have been disproved by  
actually performing the 2 slit experiment and obtaining a different  
probability distribution, but as it happens Quantum Mechanics  
predicted correctly. However there is no way to check Bruno's  
prediction about which city you will see due to the inconsistency of  
what you means, the experiment produces no result.


 In any case, what Tegmark shows is that when reality gets very  
big, stuff like QM becomes unavoidable.


It doesn't matter. If our universe is big enough to have a exact  
copy of me in the way that Tegmark talks about then he is so far  
away that I can never meet him or detect him in any way, not even if  
I had a infinite (and I DON'T just mean very large) number of years  
to do it.  Due to the expansion of the universe that other John  
Clark is already moving much much faster than the speed of light  
away from me, and due to the acceleration of the universe he is  
moving away even faster every day.


 If I remember correctly you are a Platonist.

I prefer to think of Plato as being a Clarkist, and I don't  
understand why people keep saying I have a big head.


  Do you believe there are platonic objects containing patterns  
complex enough to be conscious?


You can't fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747 they need to be  
implemented with matter, but matter is generic, one aluminum atom is  
as good as another so its the information that's important.


  Had QM not been found, it would be strong evidence against the CTM.

It took me long time to figure out that acronym and I'm still not  
sure, I considered Computational Turing Machine but that seemed  
redundant, then with Google's help I thought about Central Texas  
Mountaineers and Children's Theater of Madison and Classic Tile and  
Mosaic, now my best guess is Computer Theory of Mind but I could be  
wrong.


 Say there are 2 computers and both are running the Microsoft Word  
program. I tell you that I am about to type the word red into one  
computer and the word green into the other computer. The two  
computers are never connected so  each computer outputs a single  
definite result. Do you agree that there is a 100% chance that  
Microsoft Word will input the word red from a keyboard and display  
those ASCII characters on a screen and a 100% chance that Microsoft  
Word will input the word green from a keyboard and display those  
ASCII characters on a screen?


 Yes I do.  But that explains things from the God's-eye view.

Unfortunately I am 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread meekerdb

On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is 
that
once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix 
(either
by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have
predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
probabilities is all you can ask of it.


Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?  I
would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought
finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The shut up 
and
calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, 
it
is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets
merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary
motion, so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be probabilistic? 
So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to

mimic a probabilistic world.


It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is in his 
belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.  I am not sure 
how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, 
find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself.  To me, it almost seems as 
if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.  I lean more towards David 
Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations.


Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, 
except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be 
irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes 
QM indeed no more rational at all.


What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give 
coherent reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one 
reality - we experience one reality.


But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat earth, we see the 
Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to keep the same speed, etc.


And all those inferences were perfectly rational.  The fact that later, more comprehensive 
theories were found doesn't change that.   Rational is not the same as 'always right'.



Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong


We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's 
extrapolations.

(and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention experience in experiment 
...).


Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something (consciousness, mainly) 
and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already extrapolated.


I agree.  But the model of reality we build should comport with experience.  We don't 
experience many worlds, so a valid model must include that.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread meekerdb

On 12/11/2012 7:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good 
explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  
But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities 
deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined 
(apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one 
physical reality).


That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.


Only against theories which postulate objective indeterminacy (and what is that?) to 
avoid a simpler theory.




The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The interference 
happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept 
that you have calculated probabilities.  That's what probability means - some state is 
actualized and others aren't.


That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as first person 
indeterminacy explains their appearance completely,


It only 'explains' it by recasting the inherent probability into an ignorance of ensemble 
samples form, but with not possible way of resolving the ignorance, so that the two 
'explanations' are strictly equivalent




in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM.


Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.

Brent




Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:05 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:

  On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

   On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

  And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
 Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


  That's not an interpretation at all.


 Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is
 that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix
 (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you
 have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
 probabilities is all you can ask of it.


 Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?
 I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we
 thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The
 shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask
 embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

 Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the
 planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
 Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary
 motion, so shut up and calculate!

 Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


  So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be
 probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible
 worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.


 It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is
 in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.
 I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary
 source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will
 never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law
 itself.  To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to
 find an answer.  I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is
 about finding good explanations.


  Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense
 of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that
 we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really
 cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all.


 What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being able
 to give coherent reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent reason for
 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality.


  But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat
 earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to
 keep the same speed, etc.


 And all those inferences were perfectly rational.  The fact that later,
 more comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that.   Rational is
 not the same as 'always right'.


  Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong


 We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's
 extrapolations.


  (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention
 experience in experiment ...).

  Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something
 (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from
 theories already extrapolated.


 I agree.  But the model of reality we build should comport with
 experience.  We don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must include
 that.


We don't (in this present) experience our conscious state of 5 minutes ago.
 Would you reject the idea that the universe is a 4-dimensional static
structure with no objective present on this basis?

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:09 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/11/2012 7:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:

  On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a
 good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a
 deterministic one.  But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make
 the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any
 improvement.


  It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well
 defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed
 to get one physical reality).


 That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.


  Only against theories which postulate objective indeterminacy (and
 what is that?) to avoid a simpler theory.



  The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The
 interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need
 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities.
 That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't.


  That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as first
 person indeterminacy explains their appearance completely,


 It only 'explains' it by recasting the inherent probability into an
 ignorance of ensemble samples form, but with not possible way of resolving
 the ignorance, so that the two 'explanations' are strictly equivalent



  in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM.


 Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.


Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and
an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories
which can be tested and differentiated.

Talking about many worlds as a interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is like
talking about dinosaurs as an interpretation of the fossil record. --
David Deutsch

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 12:23:08 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:



 On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:05 AM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.netjavascript:
  wrote:

  On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 


  On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:

  On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 


  On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.netjavascript:
  wrote:

   On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 



 On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.netjavascript:
  wrote:

  On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 

  And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum 
 Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),
  

  That's not an interpretation at all.

  
 Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is 
 that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix 
 (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then 
 you 
 have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so 
 predicting 
 probabilities is all you can ask of it.

  
 Is science just about its applications or about understanding the 
 world?  I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if 
 we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The 
 shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask 
 embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

 Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the 
 planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
 Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting 
 planetary motion, so shut up and calculate!

 Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.
  

  So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be 
 probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible 
 worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.

  
 It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is 
 in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.  
 I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary 
 source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We 
 will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum 
 law itself.  To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying 
 to find an answer.  I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is 
 about finding good explanations.
  

  Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and 
 defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he 
 insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This 
 is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all.
  

 What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being able 
 to give coherent reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 
 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality.
  

  But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat 
 earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to 
 keep the same speed, etc. 
  

 And all those inferences were perfectly rational.  The fact that later, 
 more comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that.   Rational is 
 not the same as 'always right'.


  Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong 
  

 We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's 
 extrapolations.


  (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention 
 experience in experiment ...).

  Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something 
 (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from 
 theories already extrapolated.
  

 I agree.  But the model of reality we build should comport with 
 experience.  We don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must include 
 that.


 We don't (in this present) experience our conscious state of 5 minutes 
 ago.  Would you reject the idea that the universe is a 4-dimensional 
 static structure with no objective present on this basis?


We know by special relativity that there is no objective present. 
Simultaneity is relative.

We do typically experience our conscious state of 5 minutes ago, unless we 
have Dementia or some other physiological condition which inhibits memory.

The idea that the ordinary world which we experience of visible, tangible 
phenomena is an unexplained side-effect of an invisible, intangible set of 
formulas is in no way an improvement on even Cartesian dualism. Descartes, 
flawed as he was, was light years ahead of all of QM and Information 
Science in terms of explaining the actual world which we experience as 
living human beings.

Craig (aka erroneously self-localized probabilistic flux parameter haunting 
the cardinality-vomiting multiverse)


 Jason 


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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Dec 2012, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum  
Mechanics among  
working   
physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His  
view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the  
the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or  
just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities.   
QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is  
all you can ask of it.



Is science just about its applications or about understanding  
the world?  I would argue that science would not progress so  
far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all  
and end all of science.  The shut up and calculate mindset  
can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is  
the antithesis of scientific thinking.


Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do  
the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the  
sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting  
planetary motion, so shut up and calculate!


Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be  
probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many  
inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.



It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree  
with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in  
our understanding of it.  I am not sure how accurate this  
statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s 
 says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense  
interpretation of quantum law itself.  To me, it almost seems  
as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.  I lean  
more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding  
good explanations.


Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and  
defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or  
chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and  
select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM  
indeed no more rational at all.


What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means  
'being able to give coherent reasons'.  There's a perfectly good  
coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one  
reality.


But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a  
flat earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need  
of force to keep the same speed, etc.


And all those inferences were perfectly rational.  The fact that  
later, more comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that.
Rational is not the same as 'always right'.


OK. But I was pointing of the fact that there was a pattern in the  
mistake, which consists in extrapolating from our experience. Progress  
along the path Galileo, Einstein, Everett always come from a better  
distinction between what is, and how it can appear to us.
Then in the search of a TOE, we need to use coherent reasons, but we  
need also a coherent big picture.


I agree I tend to use rational is an unusually restricted sense:  
going from the earth look flat to the earth looks round is  
rational. Going from the earth looks flat to the earth *is* round  
is irrational.






Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong


We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about  
it's extrapolations.


OK. That is what I meant.





(and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention  
experience in experiment ...).


Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something  
(consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and  
from theories already extrapolated.


I agree.  But the model of reality we build should comport with  
experience.  We don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must  
include that.


But we do experience many worlds. We see those interference that we  
can see, and without collapse, that we don't see, this is a sort of  
experiencing the many worlds. Like we do experience the roundness of  
the earth, through travel, media, pictures, etc. If not, we never  
experience anything physical to start with. We are just more and more  
conscious of the assumptions we make.


Being rational we prefer to explain the complex from the simple than  
the simple from the complex. 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 12:48 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/10/2012 10:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

   On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule.
 a good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a
 deterministic one.  But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make
 the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any
 improvement.


  It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well
 defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed
 to get one physical reality).


 That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The
 interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The
 interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need
 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities.
 That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't.


  How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse?  It seems
 you need to give up not only determinism, but also locality.

  Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for
 Deutsch's proposed experiment:

   In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin
 state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach
 apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as
 either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is
 then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of
 an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition
 travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two
 options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's
 conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that
 this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with
 either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The
 Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will
 record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right').

  The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the
 entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result
 it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories
 however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a
 definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of
 the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it
 will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal
 probability.


  I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information
 (which I think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or
 otherwise) will leave the atom in an up/down state.


 Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows?


 Quantum erasure requires that the which-way information be eliminated from
 the world.  Once an AI consciousness gets the result I think that implies
 entanglement with the world and after that the result can't be quantum
 erased.


What theory of consciousness are you operating under?  CTM or something
else?


 I know Deutsch supposes a quantum computer AI can 'know' there was
 which-way information even though the which-way information was quantum
 erased.  But I find that doubtful.  And even if it's true, the 'reversal'
 may bring the atom back to 'left'.


That is the proposed result that would prove MWI.  If the left state is
restored always then the universe never collapsed, it split a difference
was observed, and a record of observing that difference was stored, then
all information pertaining to the result is erased such that the two
universes recombine (the split was undone, even though it should have
collapsed because the difference was observed).




  Why do you think it is impossible for a conscious process learn the
 result and then have that result erased as in the quantum eraser experiment?


 Because I think consciousness must be quasi-classical.  Consciousness
 needs stable memory and it needs to interact with its environment -
 together I think that implies it must be essentially classical as a
 computer.


In this case it has stable memory, and is able to interact with its
environment, but then all traces of its memory of the which-way result are
erased.  We operate with unstable memories and forget things, and yet are
still conscious.


 That's one of my reservations about Bruno's oft repeated assertion that he
 has proven that matter doesn't exist.


He says matter exists, but that it is not primitive.  It can be explained
in terms of something 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Dec 2012, at 18:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/11/2012 7:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born  
rule. a good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better  
explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  But simply postulating  
an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic  
in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not  
well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the  
collapse needed to get one physical reality).


That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.


Only against theories which postulate objective indeterminacy  
(and what is that?) to avoid a simpler theory.




The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.   
The interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't  
need 'collapse' you  just need to accept that you have  
calculated probabilities.  That's what probability means - some  
state is actualized and others aren't.


That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as  
first person indeterminacy explains their appearance completely,


It only 'explains' it by recasting the inherent probability into an  
ignorance of ensemble samples form,


It is only realist on what our best theories describe. Both QM-Everett  
and CTM cannot avoid those ensembles. And they are not just  
ensemble. In QM Everett its is a universal wave, a solution of the SWE  
(or Dirac, or deWitt-Wheeler, ...), and in CTM it is a tiny part of  
the arithmetical reality (which after Gödels appears as something  
*very* big, and structured in many-ways, with many different inside  
views.






but with not possible way of resolving the ignorance, so that the  
two 'explanations' are strictly equivalent


CTM illustrates the contrary. It is made testable, and up to now the  
two quantum logic resemble enough. of course it might be a  
coïncidence, but it is a strong point, imo, that where the UDA tells a  
quantum probability should appear, we get indeed an arithmetical  
quantization making something quite quantum like, formally, where we  
expected it to be, by UDA.








in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM.


Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.


I disagree on this, despite most would agree with you. But perhaps not  
Everett itself who talks only about a formulation. And indeed  
Everett's main contribution in QM is the formulation of a new QM which  
is just the old QM without the collapse postulate. Everett explains  
why the observers, in any base in which they can have memories, will  
believe in probabilities, until they explain this by the wave itself,  
and a notion of first person (called Subjective by Everett).
Then my point is just that if CTM is correct, we have to pursue that  
move in the whole arithmetic, not just the wave, which is itself  
selected through a similar self-selection process. I show that it  
works, thanks to incompleteness, which both makes equivalent all the  
points of view, p, Bp, Bp  p, Bp  Dt, Bp  Dt  p, yet prevent the  
machines to ever know that, which makes the logics behaving very  
differently, and giving different views on arithmetical truth, from  
arithmetical truth.


Look at the progress in conceptual elegance of those different  
theories of reality:


Old QM:

1) Wave
2) collapse
3) Unintelligible theory of mind

Everett:

1) Wave
2) Arithmetic (comp)

Your servitor:

1) Arithmetic (comp)

:)

Bruno




Brent




Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread meekerdb

On 12/11/2012 9:23 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:05 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And 
Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view 
is
that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density 
matrix
(either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) 
then
you have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so
predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it.


Is science just about its applications or about understanding the 
world?  I
would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we 
thought
finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The shut 
up
and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing
questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the 
planets
merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting 
planetary
motion, so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be
probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible 
worlds
- which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.


It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is 
in his
belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.  I am 
not
sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès
believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself.  To 
me, it
almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.  I lean
more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good 
explanations.


Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of 
the
MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have 
to be
irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really 
cosmo-solipsism, and
makes QM indeed no more rational at all.


What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being able to 
give
coherent reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 
'selecting' one
reality - we experience one reality.


But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat 
earth, we see
the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to keep the same 
speed, etc.


And all those inferences were perfectly rational.  The fact that later, more
comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that.   Rational is not 
the same as
'always right'.



Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong


We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's
extrapolations.



(and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention experience in
experiment ...).

Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something 
(consciousness,
mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already 
extrapolated.


I agree.  But the model of reality we build should comport with experience. 
 We
don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must include that.


We don't (in this present) experience our conscious state of 5 minutes ago.  Would you 
reject the idea that the universe is a 4-dimensional static structure with no objective 
present on this basis?


No, but I would expect a theory of conscious experience to include that.

Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



 Your servitor:

 1) Arithmetic (comp)

 :)

 Bruno


To which I add:

0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise to comp.

:)

Craig 

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread meekerdb

On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM.


Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.


Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and an AI yields 
different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and 
differentiated.


Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum computer that is 
conscious.  If there is a form of the experiment in which the 'a definite up/down value 
was measured' is recorded objectively but the atom still comes out pointing 'left' then 
I'd say it's a theory; although I don't see how that would necessitate multiple worlds.  
It would just be a refutation of the idea that consciousness collapses the wave function.  
Is there any explicit calculation of how this quantum computer would work, and why it 
would matter whether it was conscious?


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread meekerdb

On 12/11/2012 9:53 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 12:48 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/10/2012 10:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born 
rule. a
good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a
deterministic one.  But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to 
make
the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike 
me as
any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not 
well
defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse
needed to get one physical reality).


That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The
interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The
interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need
'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated
probabilities.  That's what probability means - some state is 
actualized
and others aren't.


How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse?  It seems 
you need
to give up not only determinism, but also locality.

Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's
proposed experiment:

In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate 
spin
state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a 
Stern-Gerlach
apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another 
axis, as
either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the 
atom is
then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the 
perspective of
an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This 
superposition
travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided 
with two
options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The 
AI's
conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach 
predicts
that this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate 
state, with
either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') 
spin. The
Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one 
mind
will record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 
'right').

The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the
entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which 
result
it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other 
memories
however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be 
in a
definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the 
entrance of
the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts 
that it
will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with 
equal
probability.



I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information 
(which
I think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or 
otherwise)
will leave the atom in an up/down state.


Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows?


Quantum erasure requires that the which-way information be eliminated from 
the
world.  Once an AI consciousness gets the result I think that implies 
entanglement
with the world and after that the result can't be quantum erased.


What theory of consciousness are you operating under?  CTM or something else?

I know Deutsch supposes a quantum computer AI can 'know' there was which-way
information even though the which-way information was quantum erased.  But 
I find
that doubtful.  And even if it's true, the 'reversal' may bring the atom 
back to 'left'.


That is the proposed result that would prove MWI.


It doesn't prove MWI, it disproves consciousness causes collapse; which is a theory no 
one holds anymore.


If the left state is restored always then the universe never collapsed, it split a 
difference was observed, and a record of observing that difference was stored, then all 
information pertaining to the result is erased such that the two universes recombine 
(the split was undone, even though it should have collapsed because the difference was 
observed).


Only in a Wignerian theory of collapse where 'observed' means 

RE: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread William R. Buckley
Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something
(consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from
theories already extrapolated. 

 

 

Bruno has it down!

 

 

 

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:40:58 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

 Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something 
 (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from 
 theories already extrapolated. 

  

  

 Bruno has it down!

  

Agreed, but experiencing a single reality is not the same as experiencing 
qualities of realism - which are a significant aspect of our experience and 
one which is not supported by a universe of arithmetic phantoms.
 

  

  


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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum  
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view  
is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density  
matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per  
Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic  
theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it.



Is science just about its applications or about understanding the  
world?  I would argue that science would not progress so far as it  
has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all  
of science.  The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated  
as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of  
scientific thinking.


Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the  
planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting  
planetary motion, so shut up and calculate!


Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be  
probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many  
inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.



It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with  
him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our  
understanding of it.  I am not sure how accurate this statement is,  
since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s 
 says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense  
interpretation of quantum law itself.  To me, it almost seems as if  
he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.  I lean more  
towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good  
explanations.


Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and  
defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he  
insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality.  
This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational  
at all.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Dec 2012, at 07:32, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum  
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view  
is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the  
density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just  
assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities.  QM is a  
probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can  
ask of it.



Is science just about its applications or about understanding the  
world?  I would argue that science would not progress so far as it  
has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all  
of science.  The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated  
as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of  
scientific thinking.


Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the  
planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting  
planetary motion, so shut up and calculate!


Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be  
probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many  
inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.



It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with  
him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our  
understanding of it.  I am not sure how accurate this statement is,  
since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s 
 says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense  
interpretation of quantum law itself.  To me, it almost seems as  
if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.


Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, We will never find a common sense  
interpretation of the sphericity of the Earth.  He'd have been  
right; we didn't, instead we changed 'common sense'.


I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding  
good explanations.


But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born  
rule. a good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better  
explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  But simply postulating an  
ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in  
arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well  
defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse  
needed to get one physical reality).


Bruno





Brent
As to the fable that there are Antipodes, that is to say,
men on the opposite side of the earth where the sun rises
when it sets to us, men who walk with their feet opposite
ours, that is on no ground credible. Even if some unknown
landmass is there, and not just ocean, there was only one
pair of original ancestors, and it is inconceivable that
such distant regions should have been peopled by Adam's
descendants.
  --- St. Augustine

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 12:32 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

   On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

  And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
 Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


  That's not an interpretation at all.


 Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is
 that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix
 (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you
 have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
 probabilities is all you can ask of it.


 Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?
 I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we
 thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The
 shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask
 embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

 Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the
 planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
 Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary
 motion, so shut up and calculate!

 Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


  So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be
 probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible
 worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.


 It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is
 in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.
 I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary
 source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will
 never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law
 itself.  To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to
 find an answer.


 Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, We will never find a common sense
 interpretation of the sphericity of the Earth.  He'd have been right; we
 didn't, instead we changed 'common sense'.


I don't know, I think Sagan's explanation fits most people's common sense:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jwr8CLX3NJAt=1m19s




  I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good
 explanations.


 But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a
 good explanation.


It is worse than that.  From:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/q7/if_manyworlds_had_come_first/

All right, says Nohr.  He sighs.  Look, if this theory of yours were
actually true—if whole sections of the wavefunction just instantaneously
vanished—it would be... let's see.  The only law in all of quantum
mechanics that is non-linear, non-unitary, non-differentiable and
discontinuous.  It would prevent physics from evolving locally, with each
piece only looking at its immediate neighbors.  Your 'collapse' would be
the only fundamental phenomenon in all of physics with a preferred basis
and a preferred space of simultaneity.  Collapse would be the only
phenomenon in all of physics that violates CPT symmetry, Liouville's
Theorem, and Special Relativity.  In your original version, collapse would
also have been the only phenomenon in all of physics that was inherently
mental.  Have I left anything out?

The page also asks:

But suppose that decoherence and macroscopic decoherence had been realized
immediately following the discovery of entanglement, in the 1920s.  And
suppose that no one had proposed collapse theories until 1957.  Would
decoherence now be steadily declining in popularity, while collapse
theories were slowly gaining steam?



 I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  But
 simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities
 deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.



MWI follows directly from a literal reading of the equations, which contain
no mention of collapse or only applying only at certain scales.  Even
better, the Born rule falls out as Everett himself noticed.  If anyone is
performing a stretch (postulating new things), it is those in the collapse
camp who add new conjectures to the theory in an unjustified effort to
preserve the notion of a single universe.  The theory itself explains why
the other universes are not observed, so pretending we have to augment the
theory by adding new postulates (observers, collapse, born rule) to make it
agree with our observations is somewhat absurd.

In the history of science efforts to keep humanity on the center stage seem
to always fail ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o8GA2w-qrcg ).  I think
that very reason, to keep the Earth near the center of the 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread meekerdb

On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics
among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is 
that
once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix 
(either by
eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have
predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
probabilities is all you can ask of it.


Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?  I 
would
argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought 
finding the
equation was the be all and end all of science.  The shut up and calculate
mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the
antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets 
merely
appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary 
motion,
so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be 
probabilistic?  So
instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to 
mimic a
probabilistic world.


It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is in his belief 
that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.  I am not sure how 
accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, 
find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself.  To me, it almost seems as 
if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.  I lean more towards David Deutsch 
who says science is about finding good explanations.


Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, 
except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, 
in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no 
more rational at all.


What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give coherent 
reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we 
experience one reality.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread meekerdb

On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good 
explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  But 
simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in 
arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined 
(apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical 
reality).


That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The interference is inherent 
in the complex Hilbert space states.  The interference happens in one world.  As Omnes 
says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated 
probabilities.  That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:25 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

   On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

  And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
 Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


  That's not an interpretation at all.


 Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is
 that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix
 (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you
 have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
 probabilities is all you can ask of it.


 Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?
 I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we
 thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The
 shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask
 embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

 Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the
 planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
 Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary
 motion, so shut up and calculate!

 Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


  So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be
 probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible
 worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.


 It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is
 in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.
 I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary
 source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will
 never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law
 itself.  To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to
 find an answer.  I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is
 about finding good explanations.


  Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense
 of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that
 we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really
 cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all.


 What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being able
 to give coherent reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent reason for
 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality.


It is as rational as clinging to geocentric theories on the basis that we
don't feel the Earth moving when Newtonian mechanics fully explains not
only the motions of the planets but also why we don't feel the Earth move.

Everett argued this point best
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/manyworlds/orig-02.html :

A crucial point in deciding on a theory is that one does not accept or
reject the theory on the basis of whether the basic world picture it
presents is compatible with everyday experience. Rather, one accepts or
rejects on the basis of whether or not the experience which is predicted by
the theory is in accord with actual experience.

Let me clarify this point. One of the basic criticisms leveled against the
Copernican theory was that the mobility of the earth as a real physical
fact is incompatible with the common sense interpretation of nature. In
other words, as any fool can plainly see the earth doesn't really move
because we don't experience any motion. However, a theory which involves
the motion of the earth is not difficult to swallow if it is a complete
enough theory that one can also deduce that no motion will be felt by the
earth's inhabitants (as was possible with Newtonian physics). Thus, in
order to decide whether or not a theory contradicts our experience, it is
necessary to see what the theory itself predicts our experience will be.

Now in your letter you say, the trajectory of the memory configuration of
a real physical observer, on the other hand, does not branch. I can testify
to this from personal introspection, as can you. I simply do not branch. I
can't resist asking: Do you feel the motion of the earth?

In another place: ...Everett's theory contains all possible branches in it
at the same time. In the real physical world we must be content with just
one branch. Everett's world and the real physical world are therefore not
isomorphic. Yet another: But the real world does not branch, and therein
lies the flaw in Everett's scheme.

I must confess that I do not see this branching process as the vast
contradiction that you do. The theory is in full accord with our
experience (at least insofar as ordinary quantum 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a
 good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a
 deterministic one.  But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make
 the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any
 improvement.


  It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well
 defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed
 to get one physical reality).


 That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The
 interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The
 interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need
 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities.
 That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't.


How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse?  It seems you
need to give up not only determinism, but also locality.

Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's
proposed experiment:

In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin
state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach
apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as
either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is
then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of
an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition
travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two
options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's
conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that
this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with
either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The
Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will
record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right').

The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the
entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result
it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories
however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a
definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of
the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it
will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal
probability. If the Everett approach is correct then the atom will be in
the same state that it was in before the measurement, it will still have a
'left' spin.

  --- http://www.thestargarden.co.uk/EvidenceOfParallelWorlds.html


Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread meekerdb

On 12/10/2012 5:41 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 12:32 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And 
Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view 
is that
once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix 
(either
by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you 
have
predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so 
predicting
probabilities is all you can ask of it.


Is science just about its applications or about understanding the 
world?  I
would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we 
thought
finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The shut 
up and
calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing 
questions, it
is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the 
planets
merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting 
planetary
motion, so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be
probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible 
worlds -
which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.


It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is 
in his
belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.  I am 
not sure
how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès
believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself.  To 
me, it
almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.


Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, We will never find a common sense 
interpretation of
the sphericity of the Earth.  He'd have been right; we didn't, instead we 
changed
'common sense'.


I don't know, I think Sagan's explanation fits most people's common sense:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jwr8CLX3NJAt=1m19s 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jwr8CLX3NJAt=1m19s




I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good 
explanations.


But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a 
good
explanation.


It is worse than that.  From: 
http://lesswrong.com/lw/q7/if_manyworlds_had_come_first/

All right, says Nohr.  He sighs.  Look, if this theory of yours were actually true—if 
whole sections of the wavefunction just instantaneously vanished—it would be... let's 
see.  The only law in all of quantum mechanics that is non-linear, non-unitary, 
non-differentiable and discontinuous.  It would prevent physics from evolving locally, 
with each piece only looking at its immediate neighbors.  Your 'collapse' would be the 
only fundamental phenomenon in all of physics with a preferred basis and a preferred 
space of simultaneity.  Collapse would be the only phenomenon in all of physics that 
violates CPT symmetry, Liouville's Theorem, and Special Relativity.  In your original 
version, collapse would also have been the only phenomenon in all of physics that was 
inherently mental.  Have I left anything out?


The page also asks:

But suppose that decoherence and macroscopic decoherence had been realized immediately 
following the discovery of entanglement, in the 1920s.  And suppose that no one had 
proposed collapse theories until 1957.  Would decoherence now be steadily declining in 
popularity, while collapse theories were slowly gaining steam?


I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  But 
simply
postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic 
in
arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.



MWI follows directly from a literal reading of the equations, which contain no mention 
of collapse or only applying only at certain scales.


No it doesn't.  It is no more than decoherence, which means that in a selected basis the 
reduced density matrix becomes approximately diagonal.  At that point Everett says the 
different diagonal eigenvalues are the 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread meekerdb

On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a 
good
explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. 
But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities

deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well 
defined
(apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get 
one
physical reality).


That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The 
interference is
inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The interference happens in 
one
world.  As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept 
that you
have calculated probabilities.  That's what probability means - some state 
is
actualized and others aren't.


How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse?  It seems you need to give 
up not only determinism, but also locality.


Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's proposed 
experiment:


In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin 
state in one
axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus which 
has the
possibility of measuring it in another axis, as either spin 'up' or spin 
'down' in
this case. This means that the atom is then in a superposition of 'up' and 
'down'
states from the perspective of an observer who has not yet become entangled 
with it.
This superposition travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is 
provided
with two options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. 
The AI's
conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that 
this
will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with either a
determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The Everett 
approach
predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will record up and 
one down
(but neither will record 'left' or 'right').

The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the 
entrance to the
Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result it recorded. This 
process
does not erase any of the AI's other memories however, including the memory 
that
they did record the atom to be in a definite state. If a 'left-right' 
detector was
placed at the entrance of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse 
approach
predicts that it will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' 
state with
equal probability.



I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information (which I think is 
actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or otherwise) will leave the atom in 
an up/down state.  You keep asking me about 'collapse', but Copenhagen's physical collapse 
is not the same as Omnes epistemic collapse.


Brent


If the Everett approach is correct then the atom will be in the same state 
that it
was in before the measurement, it will still have a 'left' spin.

  --- http://www.thestargarden.co.uk/EvidenceOfParallelWorlds.html


Jason
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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread Jason Resch



On Dec 10, 2012, at 12:54 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 3:08 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:


 From whose perspective is there a single unique result?

From my perspective! Whenever I, the simple non-godlike  
experimenter, send a photon (or electron) through 2 slits and it  
hits a photographic I, the simple non-godlike experimenter, always  
see a single unique result.


As do the duplicates.

After the experiment I, the simple non-godlike experimenter, can  
always say the photon hit right there on the plate and it did not  
hit way over there on the other side of the plate.


And each duplicate can say I ended up here and not there.




The outcome of the 2 slit experiment cannot be predicted precisely  
but once it is performed and the experimenter knows for certain if  
the left hand side of the plate box or the right hand side of the  
plate box should be checked in the lab notebook. After Bruno's  
experiment should the Washington or Moscow box be checked?


It depends which duplicate you are.

  Should the experimenter believe the Washington man or the Moscow  
man or both?


You forget, the experimenter is the one duplicated.  He listens only  
to his local self, after the duplication.


Just as you check the box corresponding to where the photon was  
observed in your local history.



If it's both then the experimenter has learned nothing.


It's not, each duplicate has only one local self to listen to.




  From the God's-eye view of reality, there certainly is not a  
single outcome.


Perhaps, but I am not God; I applied but unfortunately did not get  
the job.


Maybe you did but forgot.





  Your issue is you use the God's-eye view for Bruno's experiment  
but not for the 2-slit experiment.


No. In Bruno's experiment from my perspective, I the simple non- 
godlike experimenter, always see exactly the same thing,


The experimenter is duplicated.  Sometimes he finds himself in Moscow  
other times Washington.


I the simple non-godlike experimenter always see 2 people who have a  
equal right to call themselves Bruno always check both the  
Washington box and the Moscow box and thus nothing is learned.


That's the third person omniscient view.  Pretend there is only one  
person in the world, John Clark, and he is duplicated.  What would  
that experience seem like?


Could you rule out whether you were randomly transported to either  
Washington or Moscow or if you were duplicated to both (without  
looking for your duplicate at the other location)?


And I don't care what God sees because this simple non-godlike  
experimenter does not believe in God.


 it says that in the 2 slit experiment the absolute value of the  
square of the value of the Schrodinger wave equation of a photon at  
a point on a photographic plate will be the classical probability of  
finding the photon at that point when you develop the plate. This  
prediction of Quantum Mechanics has been proven to be correct many  
many times and according to SUAC that's the end of the matter.


 But those predicted probabilities are more similar to those of  
Bruno's first person indeterminacy


No it is not. Quantum Mechanics could have been disproved by  
actually performing the 2 slit experiment and obtaining a different  
probability distribution, but as it happens Quantum Mechanics  
predicted correctly. However there is no way to check Bruno's  
prediction about which city you will see due to the inconsistency of  
what you means, the experiment produces no result.


 In any case, what Tegmark shows is that when reality gets very  
big, stuff like QM becomes unavoidable.


It doesn't matter. If our universe is big enough to have a exact  
copy of me in the way that Tegmark talks about then he is so far  
away that I can never meet him or detect him in any way, not even if  
I had a infinite (and I DON'T just mean very large) number of years  
to do it.  Due to the expansion of the universe that other John  
Clark is already moving much much faster than the speed of light  
away from me, and due to the acceleration of the universe he is  
moving away even faster every day.


So far away duplication leads to definite results?  That's good you  
think so.  Uue those two far away locations (instead of W and M) and  
you make step 3 work for yourself.  Now you can go on to step 4.





 If I remember correctly you are a Platonist.

I prefer to think of Plato as being a Clarkist, and I don't  
understand why people keep saying I have a big head.


  Do you believe there are platonic objects containing patterns  
complex enough to be conscious?


You can't fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747 they need to be  
implemented with matter, but matter is generic, one aluminum atom is  
as good as another so its the information that's important.


And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?





  Had QM not been found, it would be strong evidence 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule.
 a good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a
 deterministic one.  But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make
 the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any
 improvement.


  It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well
 defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed
 to get one physical reality).


 That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The
 interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The
 interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need
 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities.
 That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't.


  How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse?  It seems
 you need to give up not only determinism, but also locality.

  Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's
 proposed experiment:

   In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin
 state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach
 apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as
 either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is
 then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of
 an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition
 travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two
 options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's
 conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that
 this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with
 either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The
 Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will
 record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right').

  The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the
 entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result
 it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories
 however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a
 definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of
 the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it
 will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal
 probability.


 I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information
 (which I think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or
 otherwise) will leave the atom in an up/down state.


Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows?  Why do you
think it is impossible for a conscious process learn the result and then
have that result erased as in the quantum eraser experiment?



 You keep asking me about 'collapse', but Copenhagen's physical collapse is
 not the same as Omnes epistemic collapse.


I am sorry.  I don't feel I have a good understanding of what the
distinction is.

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread meekerdb

On 12/10/2012 10:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. 
a good
explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a 
deterministic
one.  But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the 
probabilities
deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well 
defined
(apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to 
get one
physical reality).


That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The 
interference is
inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The interference happens 
in one
world.  As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to 
accept that
you have calculated probabilities.  That's what probability means - 
some state
is actualized and others aren't.


How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse?  It seems you 
need to
give up not only determinism, but also locality.

Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's 
proposed
experiment:

In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin 
state in
one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach 
apparatus which
has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as either spin 
'up' or
spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is then in a 
superposition
of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of an observer who has 
not yet
become entangled with it. This superposition travels to the AI's 
artificial
'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two options, it may be detected 
as
either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's conscious mind then records 
the
result. The collapse approach predicts that this will cause the atom to
collapse into one determinate state, with either a determinate 'up' or 
'down'
(but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The Everett approach predicts that 
the mind
will branch into two, one mind will record up and one down (but neither 
will
record 'left' or 'right').

The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the 
entrance
to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result it 
recorded.
This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories however, 
including
the memory that they did record the atom to be in a definite state. If a
'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of the Stern-Gerlach 
apparatus
then the collapse approach predicts that it will be detected as being 
in either
a 'left' or 'right' state with equal probability.



I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information 
(which I
think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or otherwise) 
will
leave the atom in an up/down state.


Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows?


Quantum erasure requires that the which-way information be eliminated from the world.  
Once an AI consciousness gets the result I think that implies entanglement with the world 
and after that the result can't be quantum erased.  I know Deutsch supposes a quantum 
computer AI can 'know' there was which-way information even though the which-way 
information was quantum erased.  But I find that doubtful.  And even if it's true, the 
'reversal' may bring the atom back to 'left'.


Why do you think it is impossible for a conscious process learn the result and then have 
that result erased as in the quantum eraser experiment?


Because I think consciousness must be quasi-classical.  Consciousness needs stable memory 
and it needs to interact with its environment - together I think that implies it must be 
essentially classical as a computer.  That's one of my reservations about Bruno's oft 
repeated assertion that he has proven that matter doesn't exist.  When pressed he allows 
that it may exist, but only derivatively within the computations of the UD.  But it seems 
to me likely that it, or something very like it, must exist (derivatively of not) in order 
that consciousness exist; that 'matter' is necessary for consciousness of a human kind to 
exist.




You keep asking me about 'collapse', but Copenhagen's physical collapse is 
not the
same as Omnes epistemic collapse.


I am sorry.  I don't feel I have a good understanding of what the distinction 
is.


Omnes looks at it as a mathematical operation 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Dec 2012, at 02:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/8/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


People change over time and the meaning of the pronoun associated  
with that changing person will change over time too, and the  
meaning of the pronoun will change even more suddenly if a  
duplicating chamber is used.


But both remember the protocol, and make sense of the P=1/2, and  
use it correctly in future iterated experiences.


I suppose P=1/2 comes from an implicit symmetry.  But that's not  
analogous to probabilities in QM which and take a range of real  
values. And that's one of the problems with Everett's MWI - it  
implies that when there are two equi-probable choices then there  
must be two orthogonal worlds which by symmetry have  
probability  1/2, but if the two outcomes have probabilities  
0.5+x and 0.5-x where x is some transcendental number then  
infinitely many parallel worlds must come into existence to  
instantiate the right measure, even though x is very small.


In QM+CTM, the probabilities are given by P = A^2  (with A the  
amplitude of the wave, and it gives the relative measure, always on an  
infinite sets of worlds). I know this can be debated (and infinities  
can be replaced by big numbers in some discrete physics, but they  
contradict CTM).


In pure CTM, you can manage to have any proportion you want in any  
iteration, if only by killing some consistent extensions.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-09 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 12:37 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:


 If I understand your point correctly the deciding factor of an
 experiment's value is whether there is a result obtained not known before
 the experiment is conducted.


 If a experiment produces nothing surprising then nothing is learned, and
 ever time Bruno's experiment is preformed the result is always the same,
 every box that can be checked in the lab notebook will be checked.

  Further, you argue that in the case of QM (under the MWI), or in the
 case of duplicating entire Hubble volumes there is a definite result


 MWI is just something to help to figure out what a theory means, but it
 doesn't effect the numbers obtained for a experiment so forget it, in fact
 forget the theory too, forget Quantum mechanics; the 2-slit experiment
 always produces a unique result and one that can not be predicted
 beforehand.


From whose perspective is there a single unique result?  From the God's-eye
view of reality, there certainly is not a single outcome.  Your issue is
you use the God's-eye view for Bruno's experiment but not for the 2-slit
experiment.



 And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
 among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


 it says that in the 2 slit experiment the absolute value of the square of
 the value of the Schrodinger wave equation of a photon at a point on a
 photographic plate will be the classical probability of finding the photon
 at that point when you develop the plate. This prediction of Quantum
 Mechanics has been proven to be correct many many times and according to
 SUAC that's the end of the matter.


But those predicted probabilities are more similar to those of Bruno's
first person indeterminacy than the strict 100% for all possibilities
that your reasoning seems to predict.  Someone with assumptions would have
a pretty easy time disproving the MWI of QM, but you not only do not reject
MWI, but appear to favor it.  Thus there is a contradiction somewhere.  It
is why I keep returning to the MWI in this thread.




  because those who observe different results cannot communicate with each
 other. This suggests the value of the experiment is in some part determined
 by how far apart the duplicates are separated.


 One can always say that the results of a experiment could be invalidated
 if new information is obtained, but in the case of the 2-slit experiment
 this new information is not only unavailable it is in another universe and
 so can never be available even in theory.

  Perhaps then 10^1000 light years is sufficient?  Such duplicates who
 could prove us wrong may in fact exist far far away.  Max Tegmark has
 calculated that due to the limited number of quantum states a fixed volume
 can be in that statistically there is a duplicate exactly identical to you
 less than 10^10^28 meters away and 10^10^118 meters away there is an entire
 Hubble volume exactly identical to ours.


 Yes, assuming the universe is much much much much bigger than anything we
 will ever be able to observe, assuming that the universe is perfectly flat
 and so doesn't curve around and form a finite multidimensional sphere
 before it is allowed to get that big. And at present there is little
 evidence to support that view and little evidence to refute it. It's true
 that recently it has been found, from closely measuring the cosmic
 microwave background radiation, that the universe is pretty flat so we know
 for sure it's much bigger than what we can see, but we don't know for sure
 that it's anywhere close to being big enough for what Tegmark is talking
 about.


This reminded me a bit of The Presumptuous Philosopher thought experiment:


It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a
theory of  everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories,
T1 and T2 (using  considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to
T1 the world is very,  very big but finite, and there are a total of a
trillion trillion observers in  the cosmos. According to T2, the world is
very, very, very big but finite, and  there are a trillion trillion
trillion observers. The super-duper symmetry  considerations seem to be
roughly indifferent between these two theories. The  physicists are
planning on carrying out a simple experiment that will falsify  one of the
theories. Enter the presumptuous philosopher: Hey guys, it is  completely
unnecessary for you to do the experiment, because I can already show  to
you that T2 is about a trillion times more likely to be true than T1
(whereupon the philosopher runs the God’s Coin Toss thought experiment and
explains Model 3)!

One suspects the Nobel Prize committee to be a bit hesitant about awarding
the presumptuous philosopher the big one for this contribution.


In any case, what Tegmark shows is that when 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-09 Thread meekerdb

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 
among
working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is that once you can 
explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, 
dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities.  QM is a 
probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-09 Thread meekerdb

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


This reminded me a bit of The Presumptuous Philosopher thought experiment:


It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a theory of 
everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories, T1 and T2 (using 
considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to T1 the world is very,  very

big but finite, and there are a total of a trillion trillion observers in  
the
cosmos. According to T2, the world is very, very, very big but finite, and  
there
are a trillion trillion trillion observers. The super-duper symmetry  
considerations
seem to be roughly indifferent between these two theories. The  physicists 
are
planning on carrying out a simple experiment that will falsify  one of the 
theories.
Enter the presumptuous philosopher: Hey guys, it is  completely 
unnecessary for you
to do the experiment, because I can already show  to you that T2 is about a 
trillion
times more likely to be true than T1  (whereupon the philosopher runs the 
God’s Coin
Toss thought experiment and  explains Model 3)!

One suspects the Nobel Prize committee to be a bit hesitant about awarding 
the
presumptuous philosopher the big one for this contribution.



Which is why the anthropic principle is useless until you have something else determine 
the ontology.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-09 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

  And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
 among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


  That's not an interpretation at all.


 Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is that
 once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either
 by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have
 predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
 probabilities is all you can ask of it.


Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?  I
would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought
finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The shut up
and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing
questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets
merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary
motion, so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-09 Thread meekerdb

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics among
working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is that 
once you
can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by 
eigenselection,
dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted 
probabilities.  QM
is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask 
of it.


Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?  I would argue 
that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was 
the be all and end all of science.  The shut up and calculate mindset can be 
translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific 
thinking.


Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear 
to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so 
shut up and calculate!


Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be probabilistic?  So 
instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a 
probabilistic world.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-09 Thread meekerdb

On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics
among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is 
that once
you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by
eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have 
predicted
probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting 
probabilities is
all you can ask of it.


Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?  I 
would
argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought 
finding the
equation was the be all and end all of science.  The shut up and calculate
mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the
antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets 
merely
appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary 
motion,
so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be 
probabilistic?  So
instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to 
mimic a
probabilistic world.


It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is in his belief 
that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.  I am not sure how accurate 
this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, 
find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself.  To me, it almost seems as if 
he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.


Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, We will never find a common sense interpretation of the 
sphericity of the Earth.  He'd have been right; we didn't, instead we changed 'common sense'.



I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good 
explanations.


But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good 
explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  But 
simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in 
arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.


Brent
As to the fable that there are Antipodes, that is to say,
men on the opposite side of the earth where the sun rises
when it sets to us, men who walk with their feet opposite
ours, that is on no ground credible. Even if some unknown
landmass is there, and not just ocean, there was only one
pair of original ancestors, and it is inconceivable that
such distant regions should have been peopled by Adam's
descendants.
  --- St. Augustine

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Dec 2012, at 18:33, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 6, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Doing the experience yourself

Which one is yourself after duplication?

One of them with P = 1/2.

That neatly sums up the entire problem,


Indeed.



the insistence that there is only one correct answer to the question  
what city will you see? even though you have been duplicated;


Because with the CTM, you can't feel the split. You remain one and  
unique from any or your first person b-view after the duplication, as  
both copies can confirmed.






and the probability figure is worse than useless.


Not really, but you have to proceed in the reasoning to see this.




AFTER a good experiment has been performed nothing has a probability  
of 1/2, everything has a probability of 1 or 0.


But evaluation of future result of an experiment is done before.




After the experiment both will claim to be yourself


Rightly so by CTM.



and a third party would agree with both of them because a third  
party could not find any reason to accept one claim and reject the  
other.


OK, but we were specifically NOT asking for the 3-view after  
duplication, but for the 1-views. And both confirmed a specific city,  
and no ability to have been able to predict which one.




And I have NOT forgotten that each will see one city and one city  
only, and I have not forgotten that Bruno Marchal's question which  
one will see Moscow? is a silly question.


The question is not which one will see Moscow. that's a silly  
question indeed. the question is asked before, to the H-man, and the  
question is how do you evaluate the chance of living the Moscow (or  
Washington) experience.





Seeing Moscow is the one and only thing that turns the Helsinki man  
into the man who sees Moscow, so the man who sees Moscow will be the  
Moscow man and the Moscow man will be the man that sees Moscow. That  
is not deep, tautologies seldom are, but you've built your  
philosophy on top of it.


Trivially, but again you elude the question asked.




 I can think of examples where you and another are identical in  
the 3p and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical  
in the 1p but not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you  
and another are identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you?


 Yes, with identical in the sense that I am identical with me in  
the morning.


In other words in no sense whatsoever, you are different from what  
you were this morning in the 3p view and thus obviously in the 1-p  
view.


This contradicts the fact that you ahev agreed that both the M-man and  
the W-man can identify themselves with the H-man, but not with their  
respective doppelganger after the duplication.




You remember being Bruno Marchal this morning even though you're  
different,


I am different, I feel different, but I am the same person.



and Moscow is different from what it was this morning too but it's  
convenient to use the same word for both. People change over time  
and the meaning of the pronoun associated with that changing person  
will change over time too, and the meaning of the pronoun will  
change even more suddenly if a duplicating chamber is used.


But both remember the protocol, and make sense of the P=1/2, and use  
it correctly in future iterated experiences.






 You forget that a unique person can be in many different states.

And I hope I never remember it because that is nonsense, if there  
are different versions of something then it's not unique.


Then you die at each instant, and CTM becomes meaningless. There is no  
more sense at all for the word survive. Even for a heart operation.






 he is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search  
his (unique) diary, open the door, and write I see both W and M.


He is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his  
(unique) diary, open the door, and write I see W or M.


I meant he will push on the button. I ill probably write only W, or  
only M. This makes the W or M prediction correct, by definition of  
or.






 But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki)  
which city each of them is seeing right now


  Each of them? In Helsinki there is no each of them for the  
Helsinki man to pick out, there is only one person.


A person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment.

I don't understand what you're trying to say because that is not a  
complete sentence. What about a person trying to evaluate the result  
of an experiment?


It is the H-man, before the experience. He know s with certainty (by  
CTM, right level, etc.) that he will survive one and entiore in a  
unique city. Both can confirmed that after. None can confirm W and M.





 The Helsinki man can say the one that sees Moscow will be the  
Moscow man


 That does not help.

It does not help what? I admit it doesn't help picking the man who  
will see Moscow


Again, the question is not in picking the 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-08 Thread meekerdb

On 12/8/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
People change over time and the meaning of the pronoun associated with that changing 
person will change over time too, and the meaning of the pronoun will change even more 
suddenly if a duplicating chamber is used.


But both remember the protocol, and make sense of the P=1/2, and use it correctly in 
future iterated experiences.


I suppose P=1/2 comes from an implicit symmetry.  But that's not analogous to 
probabilities in QM which and take a range of real values. And that's one of the problems 
with Everett's MWI - it implies that when there are two equi-probable choices then there 
must be two orthogonal worlds which by symmetry have probability 1/2, but if the two 
outcomes have probabilities 0.5+x and 0.5-x where x is some transcendental number then 
infinitely many parallel worlds must come into existence to instantiate the right measure, 
even though x is very small.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-07 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Dec 6, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Doing the experience yourself


 Which one is yourself after duplication?


 One of them with P = 1/2.


That neatly sums up the entire problem, the insistence that there is only
one correct answer to the question what city will you see? even though
you have been duplicated; and the probability figure is worse than useless.
AFTER a good experiment has been performed nothing has a probability of
1/2, everything has a probability of 1 or 0.  After the experiment both
will claim to be yourself and a third party would agree with both of them
because a third party could not find any reason to accept one claim and
reject the other. And I have NOT forgotten that each will see one city and
one city only, and I have not forgotten that Bruno Marchal's question
which one will see Moscow? is a silly question. Seeing Moscow is the one
and only thing that turns the Helsinki man into the man who sees Moscow, so
the man who sees Moscow will be the Moscow man and the Moscow man will be
the man that sees Moscow. That is not deep, tautologies seldom are, but
you've built your philosophy on top of it.

  I can think of examples where you and another are identical in the 3p
 and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical in the 1p but
 not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you and another are
 identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you?

  Yes, with identical in the sense that I am identical with me in the
 morning.


In other words in no sense whatsoever, you are different from what you were
this morning in the 3p view and thus obviously in the 1-p view. You
remember being Bruno Marchal this morning even though you're different, and
Moscow is different from what it was this morning too but it's convenient
to use the same word for both. People change over time and the meaning of
the pronoun associated with that changing person will change over time too,
and the meaning of the pronoun will change even more suddenly if a
duplicating chamber is used.


  You forget that a unique person can be in many different states.


And I hope I never remember it because that is nonsense, if there are
different versions of something then it's not unique.

 he is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his
 (unique) diary, open the door, and write I see both W and M.


He is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his
(unique) diary, open the door, and write I see W or M.

 But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki) which city
 each of them is seeing right now


   Each of them? In Helsinki there is no each of them for the Helsinki
 man to pick out, there is only one person.


 A person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment.


I don't understand what you're trying to say because that is not a complete
sentence. What about a person trying to evaluate the result of an
experiment?

  The Helsinki man can say the one that sees Moscow will be the Moscow
 man

  That does not help.


It does not help what? I admit it doesn't help picking the man who will see
Moscow because in Helsinki there is nothing to pick from due to the fact
that the man who sees Moscow won't exist until there is a man who sees
Moscow, so I can't pick the man who sees Moscow in Helsinki. Not deep but
true.

 If Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle did not exist then the world would
 be different, I could measure both the position and velocity of a particle
 with infinite accuracy, and that's how I know it's talking about something
 real. Suppose, just suppose that this 1-P indeterminacy stuff of yours
 did not exist, how would the world be different?

 Computationalism would be false.


So if indeterminacy of the 1-P sort did not exist then computationalism, a
purely deterministic process, could not exist. That does not compute.

 hard to say how this can look.


Hard indeed, and you've hit the nail exactly on the head. It doesn't matter
if 1-P indeterminacy exists or not because with or without it even AFTER
the experiment (forget about using it to make predictions) things would
look exactly the same. With or without it there would still be 2 people
insisting that they were yourself and a third party could still find no
reason to think that one claim was stronger than the other. And so 1-P
indeterminacy joins luminiferous aether as something that doesn't exist or
makes no difference if it does.

 Without 1-P indeterminacy how would the Helsinki man respond to the
 question what city will you see?


 You tell me. You are the one assuming that such a thing is possible.


I'm not assuming anything, I'm showing that it makes no difference if 1-P
indeterminacy exists or not, so busy men should do other things with their
time than obsess over it.

 So without 1-p indeterminacy, please tell me how you predict, and how you
 confirm. More exactly how this is confirmed from the first person points of
 view.


I will tell you as soon as you 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Dec 2012, at 16:32, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 a observer who did not want to play games and honestly wanted to  
convey the maximum amount of information would NOT say from a first  
person view I saw W or M. And I meant that me would say I saw M  
AND me would say I saw W.


 This is not relevant. The question is about confirming a  
prediction made before the duplication.


And Bruno's prediction was that somebody by the mane of me would  
say I saw W or M,


Wrong. See previous explanations.





but nobody said that, certainly not me. This entire problem is  
caused by the inability of some to realize that in a world that has  
working duplicating chambers and pronouns are still used with  
abandon just like they are in our world without duplicating chambers  
then the end result can only be tautologies or gibberish.


 If they are identical the one in W does not even know if he's in  
W or M, and the same is true of the one in M.


 So when the W-man look around and see W, he does not know it is W?

If the W-man looks around and the M-man does not then they are no  
longer identical, and if nobody looks around then there is no W man  
or M man regardless of where they are, there is just one man, the  
Helsinki man in a box.


Irrelevant.





 but now they have differentiated.

 Yes but not at the instant of duplication, at the instant one  
sees something the other does not.


 ?

Which word didn't you understand?


The ? was for Does John ever listen to what is asked to the guy in  
Helsinki? he is asked to evaluate the chance to see W after pushing  
the box *and* opening the box?


He believes in comp so he agree he will survive. He knows in advance  
that he can feel himself surviving only in one city, as it is the case  
for all possible eventualities. One will write  only W in the diary,  
and the other will write only M. And the question beared on that  
accessible first person experience which concerns the result after  
differentiation.


You continue to avoid the question. It looks like you fake to not  
understand it.





 When you drink vodka in Moscow, and drink whisky in Washington.  
You are still the same H-man


Yes.

 but yet have different 1p view, as vodka taste differently than  
whisky.


Yes and now a third party would now find a difference between the  
two men too.


OK.



 Other example I am the same guy now, as I was this morning when  
teaching math. But my 1p now is quite different than from this  
morning.


In this case a conscious being is different in the 3 p and the 1p. I  
can think of examples where you and another are identical in the 3p  
and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical in the  
1p but not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you and  
another are identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you?


Yes, with identical in the sense that I am identical with me in the  
morning. And the W-man and M-man are both not identical between  
themselves, yet identical with the H-man. There is no paradox, the H- 
man has been duplicated. But that is why he is indeterminated on its  
future 1-views in such cases. he cannot predict I  will feel to be in  
W with certainty, as he knows (being computationalist) that the one  
in Moscow will have to acknowlegde he was wrong.






 You should not conflate being the same person with being the same  
3p body or same 1p mind.


You admit that it's impossible to have 2 brains identical from the  
3p but not from the 1p; and yet you confidently state the above. It  
does not compute.


You forget that a unique person can be in many different states.






 It is typical for the same person to change its mind.

And if you've changed your mind then you've changed your brain too,  
you've changed the state of your brain because mind is what the  
brain does.


 you can't use Leibniz rule for identity.

 I duplicate you. You and your identical copy are in 2 identical  
sealed boxes. I instantaneously exchange the position of you and the  
copy. A third person cannot tell that anything has happened. You can  
not tell that anything has happened. The copy can not tell that  
anything has happened. So unless you can find a difference that is  
neither objective nor subjective then there is no difference between  
you and the copy.


 But we have agreed that even after opening the box, and  
differentiated they are the same man,


That is NOT what I agreed to! After opening that box and seeing  
different things they are no longer each other,


Yes. But they are still the same man as the H-guy.



they are separate people and different from each other from BOTH the  
3p and the 1P view, and this in no way contradicts the fact that  
they both retain the right to be called the H-man because THE H-MAN  
HAS BEEN DUPLICATED.


So, how could the H-man be sure he will end up as the W-man?

he is certain of one thing, he will not push 

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-05 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 a observer who did not want to play games and honestly wanted to convey
 the maximum amount of information would NOT say from a first person view I
 saw W or M. And I meant that me would say I saw M AND me would say
 I saw W.


  This is not relevant. The question is about confirming a prediction made
 before the duplication.


And Bruno's prediction was that somebody by the mane of me would say I
saw W or M, but nobody said that, certainly not me. This entire problem
is caused by the inability of some to realize that in a world that has
working duplicating chambers and pronouns are still used with abandon just
like they are in our world without duplicating chambers then the end result
can only be tautologies or gibberish.

 If they are identical the one in W does not even know if he's in W or M,
 and the same is true of the one in M.


  So when the W-man look around and see W, he does not know it is W?


If the W-man looks around and the M-man does not then they are no longer
identical, and if nobody looks around then there is no W man or M man
regardless of where they are, there is just one man, the Helsinki man in a
box.

 but now they have differentiated.


  Yes but not at the instant of duplication, at the instant one sees
 something the other does not.


  ?


Which word didn't you understand?

 Only in the 3-sense [...]


  Only in the 3-sense? ONLY?! I repeat my request yet again, without
 invoking the supernatural please give a example of 2 beings identical from
 the 3p but not from the 1p


 You keep asking me that. It is impossible,


Then why do you keep complaining that I've answered the question only in
the 3-sense?!??

 When you drink vodka in Moscow, and drink whisky in Washington. You are
 still the same H-man


Yes.

 but yet have different 1p view, as vodka taste differently than whisky.


Yes and now a third party would now find a difference between the two men
too.

 Other example I am the same guy now, as I was this morning when teaching
 math. But my 1p now is quite different than from this morning.


In this case a conscious being is different in the 3 p and the 1p. I can
think of examples where you and another are identical in the 3p and the 1p,
and examples where you and another are identical in the 1p but not the 3 p,
but I can't think of a example where you and another are identical in the
3p but not the 1p. Can you?

 You should not conflate being the same person with being the same 3p body
 or same 1p mind.


You admit that it's impossible to have 2 brains identical from the 3p but
not from the 1p; and yet you confidently state the above. It does not
compute.

 It is typical for the same person to change its mind.


And if you've changed your mind then you've changed your brain too, you've
changed the state of your brain because mind is what the brain does.

 you can't use Leibniz rule for identity.


  I duplicate you. You and your identical copy are in 2 identical sealed
 boxes. I instantaneously exchange the position of you and the copy. A third
 person cannot tell that anything has happened. You can not tell that
 anything has happened. The copy can not tell that anything has happened. So
 unless you can find a difference that is neither objective nor subjective
 then there is no difference between you and the copy.


  But we have agreed that even after opening the box, and differentiated
 they are the same man,


That is NOT what I agreed to! After opening that box and seeing different
things they are no longer each other, they are separate people and
different from each other from BOTH the 3p and the 1P view, and this in no
way contradicts the fact that they both retain the right to be called the
H-man because THE H-MAN HAS BEEN DUPLICATED.

 You try hard to avoid the question asked.


I try hard to understand the question asked, but in the middle of a
ambiguous pronoun blizzard it is very hard indeed.

 But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki) which city
 each of them is seeing right now


Each of them? In Helsinki there is no each of them for the Helsinki man
to pick out, there is only one person. The Helsinki man can say the one
that sees Moscow will be the Moscow man and becomes the Moscow man by
seeing Moscow, and the one that sees Washington will be the Washington man
and becomes the Washington man by seeing Washington. I don't understand
what more you expect the poor Helsinki man to say.

If Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle did not exist then the world would be
different, I could measure both the position and velocity of a particle
with infinite accuracy, and that's how I know it's talking about something
real. Suppose, just suppose that this 1-P indeterminacy stuff of yours
did not exist, how would the world be different? Without 1-P
indeterminacy how would the Helsinki man respond to the question what
city will you see? and even more important how could we confirm 

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