subject:"RE\\\\\\\: How can a grown man be an atheist \\\\\\\?"

On 12/17/2013 1:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Dec 2013, at 02:03, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/16/2013 4:41 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 13:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

In a sense, one can be more certain about arithmetical reality than the
physical
reality. An evil demon could be responsible for our belief in atoms, and
stars,
and photons, etc., but it is may be impossible for that same demon to give
us the
experience of factoring 7 in to two integers besides 1 and 7.

But that's because we made up 1 and 7 and the defintion of factoring.
They're our
language and that's why we have control of them.

If it's just something we made up, where does the unreasonable effectiveness come
from? (Bearing in mind that most of the non-elementary maths that has been found to
apply to physics was made up with no idea that it mighe turn out to have physical
applications.)

I'm not sure your premise is true. Calculus was certainly invented to apply to
physics. Turing's machine was invented with the physical process of computation in mind.

Absolutely not. The physical shape of the Turing machine was only there for
pedagogical purpose.

Are you denying that Turing wanted to reason about realizable computation?? Of course his
reasoning itself was abstract and led to a mathematical theorem. But Liz was asking about
the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics. I don't think you can say that Turing, or
Babbage or Post or Church just became interested in sequences of symbol manipulation
because they dreamed about it. They were concerned with real instances of inference and
calculation, from which they abstracted recursive functions and Turing machines.

the discovery of universal machine is a purely mathematical, even arithmetical,
discovery. physical implementation came later (if you except Babbage, but even Babbage
will discover the mathematical machine (and be close to Church thesis), when he realized
that his functional description language (intended at first as a tool for describing his
machine) was a bigger discovery than his machine.

The discovery of the universal machine is the bigger even discovery made by nature. It
is even bigger than the big bang. And nature exploit it all the time, and with comp we
understand completely why.

I agree with the first sentence. I don't understand the second.

That discovery is a theorem of elementary arithmetic, and has nothing to do with the
physical, except that with comp, we get the explanation of the physical as a consequence
of that theorem in arithmetic.

Non-euclidean geometry of curved spaces was invented before Einstein needed it, but it
was motivated by considering coordinates on curved surfaces like the Earth. Fourier
invented his transforms to solve heat transfer problems. Hilbert space was an
extension of vector space in countably infinite dimensions. So the 'unreasonable
effectiveness' may be an illusion based on a selection effect.

This beg the question, of both the existence of math, and of a primitive physical
reality (and of the link between).

So what's your answer to Wigner? Is it just an accident that the math the universe
instantiates, out of all mathematical universes Tegmark contemplates, happens to use the
same math we discovered?

Brent

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?


On 12/17/2013 2:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Dec 2013, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/16/2013 10:02 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 11:56 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com 
mailto:stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:


Yes, but why are you being anthropocentric?


I thought that was your position, or at least (observer-centric), in that numbers only 
have properties when observed/checked/computed by some entity somewhere.


If there can exist a physical process that is a bisimulation of the 
computation of
the test for primeness, then the primeness is true. Otherwise, we are merely
guessing, at best.


When we check the primaility of some number N, we may not know whether or not it is 
prime. However, eventually we run the computation and find out either it was, or it 
wasn't.


My question to you is when was it determined that N was or was not prime?  Any time we 
re-check the calculation we get the same result. Presumably even causally isolated 
observers will also get the same result. If humans get wiped out and cuttlefish take 
over the world and build computers, and they check to see if N, is prime is it 
possible for them to get a different result?


My contention is that it is not possible to get a different result, that N was always 
prime, or it was always not prime, and it would be prime (or not prime) even if we 
lacked the means or inclination to check it.


That's fine.  But it's a leap to go from the truth value of 17 is prime, to 17 
exists.


The truth of Ex(x = (0)) is enough.



But just writing a symbol E and calling it exists doesn't impress me as proving 17 
exists in the same way that my refrigerator exists, I could write Ex(Refigerator_x  
Brent's_x) too.







That's what I mean by mathematicians assuming that satisfying a predicate = 
exists.


That can be false. You need a non empty model, which is usually assumed for simple sound 
and consistent theories. It is built in in predicate logic.


exist is defined by the starting theoretical assumptions. I have given mine. What is 
yours? If you assume anything physical, and assume that you have to assume them, then 
you are no more working in the comp theory.


I chose my theoretical assumptions depending on the problem I need to solve.  Sometimes 
it's Newtonian mechanics, sometimes it's general relativity,...


Brent

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-17 Thread LizR

On 18 December 2013 07:23, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/16/2013 11:44 PM, LizR wrote:
  Probably not.  Just that a very big number like 10^80 is effectively
 divisible by any small number, since the remainder can be neglected.

 Well, that will certainly help anyone who is trying to crack something
cryptographically encoded!

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?


On 12/17/2013 1:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Dec 2013, at 00:58, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/16/2013 2:05 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 10:43, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


Is that another way of saying you don't think Arithmetical Realism is 
correct?
(Which is fair enough, of course, it is a supposition.)
Yes. I think it is a questionable hypothesis.


Yes, I think so too on days with an 'R' in them.

Well if you don't think AR is correct, then of course it sounds magical 
(although
that leaves the problem of how those equations which somehow (magically?) 
control
the behaviour of atoms actually do so.)

I don't think they 'control' them, I think they describe them (to the best 
of our
knowledge). Notice that this explains where the laws of physics come from;
they're invented by us.

Bad phraseology on my part. What I meant was, there is a possible problem of 
unreasonable effectiveness that AR purports to explain, but which otherwise remains 
magical.


Obviously the laws of physics as written down and taught and understood by us were 
invented by us, but we have this hope that they correspond to something real out 
there, and it's at least possible that the something real out there comes in a form 
(something like) the laws we've invented to describe it, and may be in a form 
/exactly/ like some laws we will one day invent. On that glorious day it may seem like 
splitting haris to say that mass, energy, space and time are in some magical way 
different from the equations describing them, assuming such equations exist.


True, the models /might/ be accurate.  But even if they are we can't know it with any 
certainty.


Except our own consciousness here and now, we cannot have any certainty, in any 
scientific matter.

Science is doubt, and leads to more doubt, always.




That's one thing that bothers me about Bruno's definition of knowledge as true 
belief.  We may have true beliefs by accident.


Yes.




But notice that the 'laws of physics' don't describe everything - in general they rely 
on 'boundary conditions' which are not part of the laws.  Most theories of cosmogony 
put forward rely some randomness, e.g. 'quantum fluctuations', as boundary conditions.


I don't believe in any 3p-randomness. I mean, no more than in Santa Klaus. That's why I 
consider Everett to be the first sensical version of QM.




Not believing can be just as dogmatic as belief.  Everett doesn't pretend to fix boundary 
conditions.








Secondly, note that even as physics becomes more successful in predictive power and 
more comprehensive in scope, it's ontology changes drastically, from rigid bodies to 
classical fields to elementary particles to quantum field operators. What stays roughly 
constant are the experimental facts.


Yes. A reason more to appreciate that with comp, the ontology can be reduced to its 
minimal (0 and successor, of K and S and their applications).









Bruno, has a good point about 'primitive matter'.  It doesn't really mean 
anything
except 'the stuff our equations apply to.'; but since the equations are 
made up
descriptions, the stuff they apply to is part of the model - not 
necessarily the
ding an sich. To say physicist assume primitive matter is little more than 
saying
that they make models and some stuff is in the model and some isn't - which 
of
course is contrary to the usual assumption on this list.  :-)


Yes, some people on this list seem to read far more into the existence of matter 
(energy, etc) than that it's just the object referred to in some equations. (Arguments 
that the UD couldn't really exist because there aren't enough resources in the 
universe to build one, for example.)


Bruno et al may also have a good point about the (lack of) supervenience of mind on 
matter, although I'm still trying to get my head around that one (appropriately enough).


I don't think the supervenience of mind on material processes is any more problematic 
than its supervenience on computation.


Supervenience of mind on material processes is refuted by the UDA.


I don't think it does.


It just doesn't make any sense anymore, unless you put in matter a magic which is non 
Turing emulable, nor FPI recoverable, but then I don't see how I could say yes to a 
doctor.






The nice thing about Bruno's theory is that it provides a model which might explain the 
incommunicable nature of consciousness.  And he even provides a critereon, Lobianity, 
for whether a computer is conscious.


Hmm... I accumulated evidence that consciousness starts with universality. Löbianity 
would give self-consciousness, or reflexive consciousness.





But it leaves so much of the physical aspects of consciousness and perception 
unexplained,


This means you have not yet get the full understanding of UDA or AUDA. The reasoning 
shows that all physical aspects are entirely explained or explainable.

Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 12/17/2013 7:58 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 12:43 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/16/2013 10:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

...

Instead of concluding only that the only thing he could prove is that
he
exists, he might have reasoned further that mathematical laws
exist,

Only by adopting the mathematicians idea of exists = satisfies
some
predicate.

I mean it in a deeper sense than that. They exist in the same way any
physical laws exist; they limit and restrict what is possible to
experience,
they have a genuine perceptible effect.

Indeed, physical laws tell us what to expect - but they don't restrict
anything, rather they are restricted to agree with observation. You
seem to
have picture of a divine lawgiver who gave us the laws on golden
tablets.

I believe there is a truth we search for. In both mathematics and physics,
we never
get the ultimate truth, but the reality is something out there and it is
real.

There are the true physical laws, and there is our imperfect and
incomplete
conception of them.

A statement of faith? or hope?

A statement of faith, which I hope other scientists studying the world also believe.
Otherwise, aren't they wasting their time?

On the other hand, I maintain that the cosmic religious feeling is the strongest and
noblest motive for scientific research. Only those who realize the immense efforts and,
above all, the devotion without which pioneer work in theoretical science cannot be
achieved are able to grasp the strength of the emotion out of which alone such work,
remote as it is from the immediate realities of life, can issue. What a deep conviction
of the rationality of the universe and what a yearning to understand, were it but a
feeble reflection of the mind revealed in this world, Kepler and Newton must have had to
enable them to spend years of solitary labor in disentangling the principles of
celestial mechanics! Those whose acquaintance with scientific research is derived
chiefly from its practical results easily develop a completely false notion of the
mentality of the men who, surrounded by a skeptical world, have shown the way to kindred
spirits scattered wide through the world and through the centuries. Only one who has
devoted his life to similar ends can have a vivid realization of what has inspired these
men and given them the strength to remain true to their purpose in spite of countless
failures. It is cosmic religious feeling that gives a man such strength. A contemporary
has said, not unjustly, that in this materialistic age of ours the serious scientific
workers are the only profoundly religious people. -- Albert Einstein

P.S. I know its not as pithy as the quotes you usually provide, but I had to include all
the context for it to be meaningful.

I'll see your Einstein and raise you a Scott Aaronson:

From my perspective, then, the best way to frame the question is not: “why be interested
in philosophy?” Rather it’s: “why be interested in anything else?”

But I think the latter question has an excellent answer. A crucial thing humans learned,
starting around Galileo’s time, is that even if you’re interested in the biggest
questions, usually the only way to make progress on them is to pick off smaller
subquestions: ideally, subquestions that you can attack using math, empirical observation,
or both. For again and again, you find that the subquestions aren’t nearly as small as
they originally looked! Much like with zooming in to the Mandelbrot set, each subquestion
has its own twists and tendrils that could occupy you for a lifetime, and each one gives
you a new perspective on the big questions. And best of all, you can actually answer a few
of the subquestions, and be the first person to do so: you can permanently move the needle
of human knowledge, even if only by a minuscule amount. As I once put it, progress in math
and science — think of natural selection, Godel’s and Turing’s theorems, relativity and
quantum mechanics — has repeatedly altered the terms of philosophical discussion, as
philosophical discussion itself has rarely altered them!

It's not contrary to Einstein, but I think it's a good cautionary on building
TOEs.

Brent

Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 12/17/2013 8:07 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 12:49 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/16/2013 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 12:06 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/16/2013 10:02 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 11:56 PM, Stephen Paul King
stephe...@provensecure.com mailto:stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

Yes, but why are you being anthropocentric?

I thought that was your position, or at least (observer-centric), in
that
numbers only have properties when observed/checked/computed by some
entity
somewhere.

If there can exist a physical process that is a bisimulation of the
computation of the test for primeness, then the primeness is true.
Otherwise, we are merely guessing, at best.

When we check the primaility of some number N, we may not know whether
or not
it is prime. However, eventually we run the computation and find out
either
it was, or it wasn't.

My question to you is when was it determined that N was or was not
prime? Any
time we re-check the calculation we get the same result. Presumably even
causally isolated observers will also get the same result. If humans
get wiped
out and cuttlefish take over the world and build computers, and they
check to
see if N, is prime is it possible for them to get a different result?

My contention is that it is not possible to get a different result,
that N was
always prime, or it was always not prime, and it would be prime (or not
prime)
even if we lacked the means or inclination to check it.

That's fine. But it's a leap to go from the truth value of 17 is
prime, to 17
exists. That's what I mean by mathematicians assuming that satisfying
a
predicate = exists.

All you need are truth values. If it is true that the recursive function
containing an emulation of the wave function of the Hubble volume contains a
self-aware process known as Brent which believes he has read an e-mail from
Jason,
then it is true that the aforementioned Brent believes he has read an
e-mail from
Jason. We don't need to add some additional exists property on top of
it, it
adds nothing.

It does if you don't have an axiomatic definition of all those predicates
such that
satisfaction of the predicate is provable. Otherwise you're just assuming
there's a
mathematical description that implies existence. That might be true, but I
think
it's not knowable that it's true. It's like the laws of physics.

Truth is independent of axiomatic systems as shown by Godel.

I don't think that's quite right. Godel showed that *given an axiomatic system* there
will be true sentences that are unprovable. But the form of such Godel a sentence, This
sentence is not provable. implicitly refers to the axiomatic system, i.e. the axioms and
rules of inference. So it's not really independent. In general it can be proven within a
different axiomatic system or even disproven.

This implies you don't need a universe containing a person who writes down a set of
axioms to create the truth of some number's primality, or Brent meeker's thoughts in
some large recursive function. With this understanding, you can get Wigner's
effectiveness (a rational, law following, mathematically describable universe), the
first cause, and the answer to the existence and relation between mathematical truth
and mathematicians' minds all for free.

You are aware aren't you that Wigner was mostly referring to mathematics over real and
complex number fields and that Godels incompleteness does NOT apply there.

This is much simpler than proposing an independent physical reality, some nebulous
undefinable connection between mathematics and mathematicians,

There's nothing nebulous in my idea of the relationship between mathematics and
mathematicians. The latter evolved to know some simple mathematics and they (culturally)
invented the rest (c.f. William S. Cooper The Evolution of Reason.

and some shock at the absence of any magic (not mathematical describable, or not
modelable) things in our own universe. Why should anyone who subscribes to Occam not
favor arithmetical realism over physical universe + unreasonable effectiveness +
(either arithmatical realism or mystical source of truth in mathematicians' minds)?

I'll favor it as soon as it provides some surprising but empirically true predictions -
the same standard as for every other theory.

Brent

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?


On 12/17/2013 8:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
I think there may be a confusion of what I am suggesting. Let's say there is some 
integer N, so large it cannot be described by anyone in this universe.  What I am saying 
is that exactly one of the following two statements is true:
N is prime, N is not prime. I agree it is unreasonable to assert one statement over 
the other in a universe where it is not known and not knowable. However, whether the 
first statement happens to be true, or the second statement happens to be true, that 
statement was true independently of anyone in any universe proving it, and so it would 
be true even if there were no physical universes or mathematicians.


Suppose I took the negation, It is not the case that N is prime or N is not prime and 
the rules of inference of paraconsistent logic.  Would it make any difference to me?  to 
anyone?


Brent

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?


On 12/17/2013 11:39 AM, LizR wrote:
On 18 December 2013 07:32, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net 
wrote:



But I don't have to believe true=exists.

It seems to me this parallels your comment that the difference between maths and 
matter is that we can prove that mathematical truths are true (or words to that effect 
- sorry posting in haste. Hope you know what I mean!)


I think I do.



Plus existence isn't a well defined notion, altho I did have a go earlier.


I think of exists as relative to a domain.  So there exists a divisor of 17 is true in 
arithmetic.  But if exists is well defined that means your domain is not reality (or 
more precisely you can't assert that it's reality).  Reality is stuff you can point to.  I 
think this is compatible with Bruno's theory.  In his theory reality is not computable and 
therefore is never completely definite.


Brent

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-17 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 3:55 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/17/2013 8:07 AM, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 12:49 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

   On 12/16/2013 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 12:06 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/16/2013 10:02 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 11:56 PM, Stephen Paul King 
 stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

  Yes, but why are you being anthropocentric?


  I thought that was your position, or at least (observer-centric), in
 that numbers only have properties when observed/checked/computed by some
 entity somewhere.


  If there can exist a physical process that is a bisimulation of the
 computation of the test for primeness, then the primeness is true.
 Otherwise, we are merely guessing, at best.


  When we check the primaility of some number N, we may not know whether
 or not it is prime.  However, eventually we run the computation and find
 out either it was, or it wasn't.

  My question to you is when was it determined that N was or was not
 prime?  Any time we re-check the calculation we get the same result.
 Presumably even causally isolated observers will also get the same result.
 If humans get wiped out and cuttlefish take over the world and build
 computers, and they check to see if N, is prime is it possible for them to
 get a different result?

  My contention is that it is not possible to get a different result,
 that N was always prime, or it was always not prime, and it would be prime
 (or not prime) even if we lacked the means or inclination to check it.


  That's fine.  But it's a leap to go from the truth value of 17 is
 prime, to 17 exists.  That's what I mean by mathematicians assuming that
 satisfying a predicate = exists.


  All you need are truth values.  If it is true that the recursive
 function containing an emulation of the wave function of the Hubble volume
 contains a self-aware process known as Brent which believes he has read an
 e-mail from Jason, then it is true that the aforementioned Brent believes
 he has read an e-mail from Jason.  We don't need to add some additional
 exists property on top of it, it adds nothing.


  It does if you don't have an axiomatic definition of all those
 predicates such that satisfaction of the predicate is provable.  Otherwise
 you're just assuming there's a mathematical description that implies
 existence.  That might be true, but I think it's not knowable that it's
 true.  It's like the laws of physics.


  Truth is independent of axiomatic systems as shown by Godel.


 I don't think that's quite right.  Godel showed that *given an axiomatic
 system* there will be true sentences that are unprovable.  But the form of
 such Godel a sentence, This sentence is not provable. implicitly refers
 to the axiomatic system, i.e. the axioms and rules of inference.  So it's
 not really independent.  In general it can be proven within a different
 axiomatic system or even disproven.


No axiomatic system can prove for any given Turing machine whether or not
it halts. Any axiomatic system that is correct will agree that the Turing
machine halts when it does, or does not halt when it does not.  The truth
that any given Turing machine halts or doesn't exists whether or not we
have or know the axiomatic system that enables us to access that truth.




   This implies you don't need a universe containing a person who writes
 down a set of axioms to create the truth of some number's primality, or
 Brent meeker's thoughts in some large recursive function. With this
 understanding, you can get Wigner's effectiveness (a rational, law
 following, mathematically describable universe), the first cause, and the
 answer to the existence and relation between mathematical truth and
 mathematicians' minds all for free.


 You are aware aren't you that Wigner was mostly referring to mathematics
 over real and complex number fields and that Godels incompleteness does NOT
 apply there.


It applies to any axiomatic system that contains at least the integers.
Axiomatic systems in use at Wigner's time which can describe real or
complex fields certainly also contain the integers, and Godel's proof
applies to them.




   This is much simpler than proposing an independent physical reality,
 some nebulous undefinable connection between mathematics and
 mathematicians,


 There's nothing nebulous in my idea of the relationship between
 mathematics and mathematicians.  The latter evolved to know some simple
 mathematics and they (culturally) invented the rest (c.f. William S. Cooper
 The Evolution of Reason.


   and some shock at the absence of any magic (not mathematical
 describable, or not modelable) things in our own universe. Why should
 anyone who subscribes to Occam not favor arithmetical realism over
 physical universe + unreasonable effectiveness + (either arithmatical
 realism or mystical source of truth in mathematicians'

Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-17 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 4:11 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/17/2013 8:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

 I think there may be a confusion of what I am suggesting. Let's say there
 is some integer N, so large it cannot be described by anyone in this
 universe.  What I am saying is that exactly one of the following two
 statements is true:
  N is prime, N is not prime. I agree it is unreasonable to assert one
 statement over the other in a universe where it is not known and not
 knowable. However, whether the first statement happens to be true, or the
 second statement happens to be true, that statement was true independently
 of anyone in any universe proving it, and so it would be true even if there
 were no physical universes or mathematicians.


 Suppose I took the negation, It is not the case that N is prime or N is
 not prime and the rules of inference of paraconsistent logic.  Would it
 make any difference to me?  to anyone?


It would only violate the law of the excluded middle.

Jason

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?


On 12/17/2013 4:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 3:55 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:



I'll favor it as soon as it provides some surprising but empirically true
predictions - the same standard as for every other theory.



What if in some alternate history Bruno's UDA came before Everett's, and it provided a 
possible explanation of the appearance of random collapse through FPI as seen within an 
infinite reality?


It would still be an explanation - not a prediction.

Brent

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?


On 12/17/2013 4:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 4:11 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 12/17/2013 8:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

I think there may be a confusion of what I am suggesting. Let's say there 
is some
integer N, so large it cannot be described by anyone in this universe.  
What I am
saying is that exactly one of the following two statements is true:
N is prime, N is not prime. I agree it is unreasonable to assert one 
statement
over the other in a universe where it is not known and not knowable. 
However,
whether the first statement happens to be true, or the second statement 
happens to
be true, that statement was true independently of anyone in any universe 
proving
it, and so it would be true even if there were no physical universes or 
mathematicians.


Suppose I took the negation, It is not the case that N is prime or N is not 
prime
and the rules of inference of paraconsistent logic.  Would it make any 
difference to
me?  to anyone?


It would only violate the law of the excluded middle.


That's not a violation in paraconsistent logics.

Brent

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-17 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 5:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/17/2013 11:39 AM, LizR wrote:

  On 18 December 2013 07:32, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  But I don't have to believe true=exists.

   It seems to me this parallels your comment that the difference between
 maths and matter is that we can prove that mathematical truths are true
 (or words to that effect - sorry posting in haste. Hope you know what I
 mean!)


 I think I do.



  Plus existence isn't a well defined notion, altho I did have a go
 earlier.


 I think of exists as relative to a domain.  So there exists a divisor
 of 17 is true in arithmetic.  But if exists is well defined that means
 your domain is not reality (or more precisely you can't assert that it's
 reality).  Reality is stuff you can point to.


According to this concept, only presentism could be valid, since no one can
point to the 4th dimension or things in the past or future. But presentism
is contrary to special relativity, and would have to be false according to
this concept of pointing ability.  Similarly, only Copenhagen could be
true, since we can't point to those other branches that Everett supposes to
exist. String theory would also be false, since it admits too many other
possible universes which we have no way whatsoever of pointing to.

I think it is better to judge a theory based on what it predicts our
experiences should be, rather than whether it predicts things we cannot
point to.

Jason

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-16 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Dec 2013, at 17:04, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 you know in Helsinki that you will survive and feel to be in  
only one city with probability one


 That depends, Is You the Helsinki Man or the Moscow Man or the  
Washington Man or John K Clark?


 They are the same man, we have already discussed this

If they are all the same man then the Washington Man is the Helsinki  
Man, thus the report from the Moscow Man that he sees Moscow and  
only Moscow is insufficient information


Exactly. As I said, we can only have a 3p confirmation of the comp 1p- 
indeterminacy by tracking and interviewing all copies (or some  
reasonable sample).






to judge the quality of the prediction about which cities the  
Helsinki Man will see, you've got to hear what the Washington Man  
has to say too if you want to know if the prediction was correct;


Yes. And in the step 3 case, both confirms they see only one city, and  
that gives the complete information each of them have access too in  
the first person way. They both confirms that they were unable to  
predict the city with certainty.





not that the accuracy of predictions has anything to do endowing us  
with a sense of self. And they are NOT all the same man, they are  
all John K Clark but the Moscow Man is not the Washington Man.


Exact. That is the root of the indeterminacy. They are the same man,  
but their history have irreversibly differentiated.

We agree on all this, but this explains the 1-indeterminacy.






  As I said you confuse indeterminacy (the general vague concept)  
with the many different sort of indeterminacy:
 1) by ignorance on initial conditions (example: the coin), that is  
a 3p indeterminacy.
 2) Turing form of indeterminacy (example: the halting problem),  
that is again a 3p indeterminacy.
 3) quantum indeterminacy in copenhague (3p indeterminacy, if that  
exists)
 4) quantum indeterminacy in Everett (1p indeterminacy, which needs  
the quantum SWE assumption)
 5) computationalist 1p-indeterminacy (similar to Everett, except  
that it does not need to assume the SWE or Everett-QM). Itis the  
one we get in step 3, and it is part of the derivation of physics  
from comp.


Only the first 3 make any sense, and even there all those peas are  
unnecessary.



OK. But here, contrary to what you answered many times to Quentin, you  
seem to agree that if your argument is valid again the comp- 
indeterminacy, it is valid against Everett formulation of QM.


I recall you that, like Einstein and many others, I believe that 3)  
is insanity. You might be  right that it is logically conceivable  
(perhaps---I am not even sure about that), but once we accept events  
without cause, we fall in the don't ask type of theories. As  
explanation, it is as bad as the God-of-the-gap. On the contrary, self- 
duplication explains the appearance of such indeterminacy, without  
adding any further assumptions. Occam favors it. Your belief in 3)  
substitutes a very simple explanation by a call to a form of built-in- 
non-explainable magic.


Bruno





 John K Clark






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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-16 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 3:53 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:


As I said you confuse indeterminacy (the general vague concept)
 with the many different sort of indeterminacy:
  1) by ignorance on initial conditions (example: the coin), that is a 3p
 indeterminacy.
  2) Turing form of indeterminacy (example: the halting problem), that is
 again a 3p indeterminacy.
  3) quantum indeterminacy in copenhague (3p indeterminacy, if that
 exists)
  4) quantum indeterminacy in Everett (1p indeterminacy, which needs the
 quantum SWE assumption)
  5) computationalist 1p-indeterminacy (similar to Everett, except that
 it does not need to assume the SWE or Everett-QM). Itis the one we get
 in step 3, and it is part of the derivation of physics from comp.


  Only the first 3 make any sense, and even there all those peas are
 unnecessary.


  What doesn't make sense about number 4 (the MWI explanation of
 indeterminacy) ?


It adds nothing to number 3, and if there were a explanation of
indeterminate changes, if there were a reason they did what they did, then
they wouldn't be indeterminate. And # 5 is the same as number # 2.

  John K Clark

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-16 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  to judge the quality of the prediction about which cities the Helsinki
 Man will see, you've got to hear what the Washington Man has to say too if
 you want to know if the prediction was correct;

  Yes. And in the step 3 case, both confirms they see only one city,


Acording to Bruno Marchal's terminology you will see only one city and
one city only; and you will see both Washington and Moscow; therefore
Bruno Marchal's terminology is inconsistent in the one pee, two pee, three
pee, and pee pee point of view.

 contrary to what you answered many times to Quentin, you seem to agree
 that if your argument is valid again the comp-indeterminacy, it is valid
 against Everett formulation of QM.


I can't comment because I don't know what comp-indeterminacy is or
understand how it is more (or is it less?) indeterminate than regular old
indeterminacy.

  John k Clark

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 17 December 2013 07:30, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 3:53 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

  What doesn't make sense about number 4 (the MWI explanation of
 indeterminacy) ?


 It adds nothing to number 3,


It adds a better explanation to number 3, and removes an adhoc postulate
from it.

and if there were a explanation of indeterminate changes, if there were a
 reason they did what they did, then they wouldn't be indeterminate.


The point of the exercise is to explain how *apparent* indeterminism arises
from *actual* determinism.

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 12/16/2013 12:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Dec 2013, at 17:04, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

you know in Helsinki that you will survive and feel to be in
only one
city with probability one

That depends, Is You the Helsinki Man or the Moscow Man or the
Washington
Man or John K Clark?

They are the same man, we have already discussed this

If they are all the same man then the Washington Man is the Helsinki Man, thus the
report from the Moscow Man that he sees Moscow and only Moscow is insufficient information

Exactly. As I said, we can only have a 3p confirmation of the comp 1p-indeterminacy by
tracking and interviewing all copies (or some reasonable sample).

to judge the quality of the prediction about which cities the Helsinki Man will see,
you've got to hear what the Washington Man has to say too if you want to know if the
prediction was correct;

Yes. And in the step 3 case, both confirms they see only one city, and that gives the
complete information each of them have access too in the first person way. They both
confirms that they were unable to predict the city with certainty.

not that the accuracy of predictions has anything to do endowing us with a sense of
self. And they are NOT all the same man, they are all John K Clark but the Moscow Man
is not the Washington Man.

Exact. That is the root of the indeterminacy. They are the same man, but their history
have irreversibly differentiated.

We agree on all this, but this explains the 1-indeterminacy.

As I said you confuse indeterminacy (the general vague concept) with
the many
different sort of indeterminacy:
1) by ignorance on initial conditions (example: the coin), that is a 3p
indeterminacy.
2) Turing form of indeterminacy (example: the halting problem), that is
again a 3p
indeterminacy.
3) quantum indeterminacy in copenhague (3p indeterminacy, if that exists)
4) quantum indeterminacy in Everett (1p indeterminacy, which needs the
quantum SWE
assumption)
5) computationalist 1p-indeterminacy (similar to Everett, except that it
does not
need to assume the SWE or Everett-QM). It is the one we get in step 3, and
it is
part of the derivation of physics from comp.

Only the first 3 make any sense, and even there all those peas are unnecessary.

OK. But here, contrary to what you answered many times to Quentin, you seem to agree
that if your argument is valid again the comp-indeterminacy, it is valid against Everett
formulation of QM.

JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds, although Everett
didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only considered one world and wrote about the
relative state of the observer and the observed system. In some ways this is more
fundamental because in principle the different worlds of MWI can interfere with one
another. That they usually don't is a statistical result.

I recall you that, like Einstein and many others, I believe that 3) is insanity. You
might be right that it is logically conceivable (perhaps---I am not even sure about
that), but once we accept events without cause, we fall in the don't ask type of
theories. As explanation, it is as bad as the God-of-the-gap.

I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic theories just push the
problem back in time. Ultimately there is either an uncaused event or an infinite past.
So there is not great intellectual virtue in rejecting uncaused events. Quantum mechanics
is an interesting intermediate case. It has randomness, but randomness that is strictly
limited and limited in such a way that it produces the classical world at a statistical level.

Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the computations of a universal
dovetailer. The whole idea of everythingism was inspired by QM, but QM itself doesn't
entail that everything happens. If you measure a variable you only get eigenvalues of that
variable - not every possible value. If you measure it again you get the same eigenvalue
again - not any value.

On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such indeterminacy, without
adding any further assumptions.

Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further
assumption.

Occam favors it. Your belief in 3) substitutes a very simple explanation by a call to
a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.

No more magic than a UD.

Brent

Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
 although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds.  Everett only
 considered one world and wrote about the relative state of the observer
 and the observed system.  In some ways this is more fundamental because in
 principle the different worlds of MWI can interfere with one another.
 That they usually don't is a statistical result.

 (Many worlds is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like Big
Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly
Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :)

I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen.  Deterministic theories
 just push the problem back in time.  Ultimately there is either an uncaused
 event or an infinite past.  So there is not great intellectual virtue in
 rejecting uncaused events.  Quantum mechanics is an interesting
 intermediate case.  It has randomness, but randomness that is strictly
 limited and limited in such a way that it produces the classical world at a
 statistical level.


The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If
there is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge
naturally from (for example) the equations that are believed to describe
the universe. One can say the same about an infinite past.

Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the computations of
 a universal dovetailer.  The whole idea of everythingism was inspired by
 QM, but QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure a
 variable you only get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible
 value.  If you measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any
 value.


I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, and
that they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary
consequence of its existence. Did I get that wrong?

 On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
 indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.

 Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further
assumption.

Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises
from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the
same extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I
misunderstood that too?

(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all
the time anyway?)

 Occam favors it. Your belief in 3) substitutes a very simple explanation
 by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.

 No more magic than a UD.

Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
although Everett
didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only considered one world and
wrote
about the relative state of the observer and the observed system. In
some ways
this is more fundamental because in principle the different worlds of MWI
can
interfere with one another. That they usually don't is a statistical
result.

(Many worlds is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like Big Bang (better
than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly Glowing Region of Infinite
Gravity :)

I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic theories
just push
the problem back in time. Ultimately there is either an uncaused event or
an
infinite past. So there is not great intellectual virtue in rejecting
uncaused
events. Quantum mechanics is an interesting intermediate case. It has
randomness,
but randomness that is strictly limited and limited in such a way that it
produces
the classical world at a statistical level.

The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If there is an
original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge naturally from (for example)
the equations that are believed to describe the universe. One can say the same about an
infinite past.

Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the computations of
a
universal dovetailer. The whole idea of everythingism was inspired by
QM, but QM
itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure a variable
you only
get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value. If you
measure it
again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any value.

I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, and that they
simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary consequence of its existence.
Did I get that wrong?

I wouldn't say wrong. It depends on whether you think There exists a successor of 2.
implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a confusion to say that a logical formula
is satisfied by X is the same as saying X exists in the ontological sense.

On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
indeterminacy,
without adding any further assumptions.

Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further
assumption.

Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises from the
equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the same extent that one has
it within ones own personal past? Or have I misunderstood that too?

(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all the
time anyway?)

Occam favors it. Your belief in 3) substitutes a very simple explanation
by a
call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.

No more magic than a UD.

Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)

It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it? It's in Platonia.
It's the word made flesh. Sounds a lot more magical than that atom decayed by
potential tunneling just like the equations say.

Brent

Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 17 December 2013 10:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
 although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds.  Everett only
 considered one world and wrote about the relative state of the observer
 and the observed system.  In some ways this is more fundamental because in
 principle the different worlds of MWI can interfere with one another.
 That they usually don't is a statistical result.

   (Many worlds is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like
 Big Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly
 Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :)

 I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen.  Deterministic theories
 just push the problem back in time.  Ultimately there is either an uncaused
 event or an infinite past.  So there is not great intellectual virtue in
 rejecting uncaused events.  Quantum mechanics is an interesting
 intermediate case.  It has randomness, but randomness that is strictly
 limited and limited in such a way that it produces the classical world at a
 statistical level.


  The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If
 there is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge
 naturally from (for example) the equations that are believed to describe
 the universe. One can say the same about an infinite past.

  Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the computations
 of a universal dovetailer.  The whole idea of everythingism was inspired
 by QM, but QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure
 a variable you only get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible
 value.  If you measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any
 value.


  I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events,
 and that they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary
 consequence of its existence. Did I get that wrong?

  I wouldn't say wrong.  It depends on whether you think There exists a
 successor of 2. implies that 3 exists.  Personally I think it is a
 confusion to say that a logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as
 saying X exists in the ontological sense.

 Is that another way of saying you don't think Arithmetical Realism is
correct? (Which is fair enough, of course, it is a supposition.)

 On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
 indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.

Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further
assumption.

Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises
from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the
same extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I
misunderstood that too?

 (Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all
the time anyway?)

  Occam favors it. Your belief in 3) substitutes a very simple
 explanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.

No more magic than a UD.

Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)

 It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it?  It's
 in Platonia.  It's the word made flesh.  Sounds a lot more magical than
 that atom decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say.

 Well if you don't think AR is correct, then of course it sounds magical
(although that leaves the problem of how those equations which somehow
(magically?) control the behaviour of atoms actually do so.)

Personally, I don't find the argument from incredulity works for me any
more towards maths being less real than primitive matter. Maybe I've been
in contact with Bruno for too long.

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 12/16/2013 1:30 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 10:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:

On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
although
Everett didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only considered
one world
and wrote about the relative state of the observer and the observed system.
In some ways this is more fundamental because in principle the different

worlds of MWI can interfere with one another. That they usually don't
is a
statistical result.

(Many worlds is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like Big
Bang
(better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly Glowing
Region of
Infinite Gravity :)

I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic
theories just
push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is either an uncaused
event or
an infinite past. So there is not great intellectual virtue in
rejecting
uncaused events. Quantum mechanics is an interesting intermediate case.
It has
randomness, but randomness that is strictly limited and limited in such
a way
that it produces the classical world at a statistical level.

The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If
there is an
original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge naturally from (for
example) the equations that are believed to describe the universe. One can
say the
same about an infinite past.

Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the
computations of a
universal dovetailer. The whole idea of everythingism was inspired by
QM, but
QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure a
variable you
only get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value. If
you
measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any value.

I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, and
that they
simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary consequence of its
existence. Did I get that wrong?

I wouldn't say wrong. It depends on whether you think There exists a
successor
of 2. implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a confusion to say
that a
logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as saying X exists in the
ontological
sense.

Is that another way of saying you don't think Arithmetical Realism is correct? (Which is
fair enough, of course, it is a supposition.)

Yes. I think it is a questionable hypothesis.

On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
indeterminacy,
without adding any further assumptions.

Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further
assumption.

Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises from the
equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the same extent that one
has it within ones own personal past? Or have I misunderstood that too?

(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all the time
anyway?)

Occam favors it. Your belief in 3) substitutes a very simple explanation
by a
call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.

No more magic than a UD.

Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)

It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it? It's
in
Platonia. It's the word made flesh. Sounds a lot more magical than
that atom
decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say.

Well if you don't think AR is correct, then of course it sounds magical (although that
leaves the problem of how those equations which somehow (magically?) control the
behaviour of atoms actually do so.)

I don't think they 'control' them, I think they describe them (to the best of our
knowledge). Notice that this explains where the laws of physics come from; they're
invented by us.

Personally, I don't find the argument from incredulity works for me any more towards
maths being less real than primitive matter. Maybe I've been in contact with Bruno for
too long.

Bruno, has a good point about 'primitive matter'. It doesn't really mean anything except
'the stuff our equations apply to.'; but since the equations are made up descriptions, the
stuff they apply to is part of the model - not necessarily the ding an sich. To say
physicist assume primitive matter is little more than saying that they make models and
some stuff is in the model and some isn't - which of course is contrary to the usual
assumption on this list. :-)

Brent

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 17 December 2013 10:43, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 Is that another way of saying you don't think Arithmetical Realism is
 correct? (Which is fair enough, of course, it is a supposition.)

Yes. I think it is a questionable hypothesis.


Yes, I think so too on days with an 'R' in them.

Well if you don't think AR is correct, then of course it sounds magical
 (although that leaves the problem of how those equations which somehow
 (magically?) control the behaviour of atoms actually do so.)


 I don't think they 'control' them, I think they describe them (to the best
 of our knowledge).  Notice that this explains where the laws of physics
 come from; they're invented by us.

 Bad phraseology on my part. What I meant was, there is a possible problem
of unreasonable effectiveness that AR purports to explain, but which
otherwise remains magical.

Obviously the laws of physics as written down and taught and understood by
us were invented by us, but we have this hope that they correspond to
something real out there, and it's at least possible that the something
real out there comes in a form (something like) the laws we've invented to
describe it, and may be in a form *exactly* like some laws we will one day
invent. On that glorious day it may seem like splitting haris to say that
mass, energy, space and time are in some magical way different from the
equations describing them, assuming such equations exist.

Bruno, has a good point about 'primitive matter'.  It doesn't really mean
 anything except 'the stuff our equations apply to.'; but since the
 equations are made up descriptions, the stuff they apply to is part of the
 model - not necessarily the ding an sich.  To say physicist assume
 primitive matter is little more than saying that they make models and some
 stuff is in the model and some isn't - which of course is contrary to the
 usual assumption on this list.  :-)


Yes, some people on this list seem to read far more into the existence of
matter (energy, etc) than that it's just the object referred to in some
equations. (Arguments that the UD couldn't really exist because there
aren't enough resources in the universe to build one, for example.)

Bruno et al may also have a good point about the (lack of) supervenience of
mind on matter, although I'm still trying to get my head around that one
(appropriately enough).

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-16 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
 although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds.  Everett only
 considered one world and wrote about the relative state of the observer
 and the observed system.  In some ways this is more fundamental because in
 principle the different worlds of MWI can interfere with one another.
 That they usually don't is a statistical result.

   (Many worlds is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like
 Big Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly
 Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :)

 I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen.  Deterministic theories
 just push the problem back in time.  Ultimately there is either an uncaused
 event or an infinite past.  So there is not great intellectual virtue in
 rejecting uncaused events.  Quantum mechanics is an interesting
 intermediate case.  It has randomness, but randomness that is strictly
 limited and limited in such a way that it produces the classical world at a
 statistical level.


  The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If
 there is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge
 naturally from (for example) the equations that are believed to describe
 the universe. One can say the same about an infinite past.

  Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the computations
 of a universal dovetailer.  The whole idea of everythingism was inspired
 by QM, but QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure
 a variable you only get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible
 value.  If you measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any
 value.


  I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events,
 and that they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary
 consequence of its existence. Did I get that wrong?


 I wouldn't say wrong.  It depends on whether you think There exists a
 successor of 2. implies that 3 exists.  Personally I think it is a
 confusion to say that a logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as
 saying X exists in the ontological sense.


  On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
 indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.

 Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a
 further assumption.

 Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises
 from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the
 same extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I
 misunderstood that too?

  (Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make
 all the time anyway?)

   Occam favors it. Your belief in 3) substitutes a very simple
 explanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.

 No more magic than a UD.

 Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)


 It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it?  It's
 in Platonia.  It's the word made flesh.  Sounds a lot more magical than
 that atom decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say.



In a sense, one can be more certain about arithmetical reality than the
physical reality. An evil demon could be responsible for our belief in
atoms, and stars, and photons, etc., but it is may be impossible for that
same demon to give us the experience of factoring 7 in to two integers
besides 1 and 7. So while Descartes could doubt physical reality, he could
not doubt the unreality of arithmetically impossible experiences. In that
sense, arithmetic would in-part control possible experiences, and is harder
to doubt than the possibility that physics is constrains experiences.
Indeed, computationalism suggests this is true.  An appropriately
programmed computer can generate any experience that can be possibly
experienced in any universe: our own laws of physics do not constrain our
possible experience whatsoever, so long as a Turing machine can be built
within the laws of some physical universe.

Jason

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 12/16/2013 2:05 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 10:43, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

Is that another way of saying you don't think Arithmetical Realism is
correct?
(Which is fair enough, of course, it is a supposition.)
Yes. I think it is a questionable hypothesis.

Yes, I think so too on days with an 'R' in them.

Well if you don't think AR is correct, then of course it sounds magical
(although
that leaves the problem of how those equations which somehow (magically?)
control
the behaviour of atoms actually do so.)

I don't think they 'control' them, I think they describe them (to the best
of our
knowledge). Notice that this explains where the laws of physics come
from;
they're invented by us.

Bad phraseology on my part. What I meant was, there is a possible problem of
unreasonable effectiveness that AR purports to explain, but which otherwise remains
magical.

Obviously the laws of physics as written down and taught and understood by us were
invented by us, but we have this hope that they correspond to something real out there,
and it's at least possible that the something real out there comes in a form
(something like) the laws we've invented to describe it, and may be in a form /exactly/
like some laws we will one day invent. On that glorious day it may seem like splitting
haris to say that mass, energy, space and time are in some magical way different from
the equations describing them, assuming such equations exist.

True, the models /might/ be accurate. But even if they are we can't know it with any
certainty. That's one thing that bothers me about Bruno's definition of knowledge as
true belief. We may have true beliefs by accident. But notice that the 'laws of
physics' don't describe everything - in general they rely on 'boundary conditions' which
are not part of the laws. Most theories of cosmogony put forward rely some randomness,
e.g. 'quantum fluctuations', as boundary conditions.

Secondly, note that even as physics becomes more successful in predictive power and more
comprehensive in scope, it's ontology changes drastically, from rigid bodies to classical
fields to elementary particles to quantum field operators. What stays roughly constant
are the experimental facts.

Bruno, has a good point about 'primitive matter'. It doesn't really mean
anything
except 'the stuff our equations apply to.'; but since the equations are
made up
descriptions, the stuff they apply to is part of the model - not
necessarily the
ding an sich. To say physicist assume primitive matter is little more than
saying
that they make models and some stuff is in the model and some isn't - which
of
course is contrary to the usual assumption on this list. :-)

Yes, some people on this list seem to read far more into the existence of matter
(energy, etc) than that it's just the object referred to in some equations. (Arguments
that the UD couldn't really exist because there aren't enough resources in the universe
to build one, for example.)

Bruno et al may also have a good point about the (lack of) supervenience of mind on
matter, although I'm still trying to get my head around that one (appropriately enough).

I don't think the supervenience of mind on material processes is any more problematic than
its supervenience on computation. The nice thing about Bruno's theory is that it provides
a model which might explain the incommunicable nature of consciousness. And he even
provides a critereon, Lobianity, for whether a computer is conscious. But it leaves so
much of the physical aspects of consciousness and perception unexplained, except by
hand-waving it must be so, that I find plenty of room for doubt.

Brent

Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?