Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Jason Resch There is and cannot be two identical uploaded minds unless you are me. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-24, 15:32:08 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 2:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same external signals to them, e.g. from a camera at a particular location, and thus have 'the same' visual perspective.? But I expect that their *perceptions* will still be quite different and you could do as well by just having them stand close together or look at the same TV screen. Put two identical uploaded minds each in the same deterministic simulation. ?hen their perceptions should be identical. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Jason Resch Could those two people see and talk to one another ? Could they shake hands ? Then their memories of that event would be different. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-25, 09:37:35 Subject: Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism Well if two people have the same mind and identity, then might they share the same soul (at least for a moment)? Jason On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion. The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and to him everybody must be different (have an individual monad= soul = identity= memory, etc. etc. etc. ). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/25/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-24, 11:13:17 Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason 3p has multiple perspectives. That is the only multiworld theory that I can believe in. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark ?rote: On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal ?rote: In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future 1p view. Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. Then as I said,? there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is only a future 1p view. The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. Please note the use of the word and. that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been wrong. Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? ? The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? the Helsinki man will see both cities. In the 3p view, that's correct, And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not necessarily true. You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some progress. ? ? but fail to answer the question asked. Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal. Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than it is. Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate it' to simply 'I hate it'. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Fw: Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Jason, I should have that if those two people can shake hands, they cannot be identical. - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-26, 08:27:06 Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism Hi Jason Resch There is and cannot be two identical uploaded minds unless you are me. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-24, 15:32:08 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 2:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same external signals to them, e.g. from a camera at a particular location, and thus have 'the same' visual perspective.? But I expect that their *perceptions* will still be quite different and you could do as well by just having them stand close together or look at the same TV screen. Put two identical uploaded minds each in the same deterministic simulation. ?hen their perceptions should be identical. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 26 Dec 2012, at 14:27, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Jason Resch There is and cannot be two identical uploaded minds unless you are me. Right for the 1p, not necessarily for the 3p mind, depending on different conventions. Two identical program running in even different universes, or in different arithmetical computations, will be related to one (1p) mind, one consciousness (but perhaps with different relative measure). Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-24, 15:32:08 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 2:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same external signals to them, e.g. from a camera at a particular location, and thus have 'the same' visual perspective.� But I expect that their *perceptions* will still be quite different and you could do as well by just having them stand close together or look at the same TV screen. Put two identical uploaded minds each in the same deterministic simulation. 燭hen their perceptions should be identical. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Well if two people have the same mind and identity, then might they share the same soul (at least for a moment)? Jason On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion. The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and to him everybody must be different (have an individual monad= soul = identity= memory, etc. etc. etc. ). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] rclo...@verizon.net] 12/25/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-12-24, 11:13:17 *Subject:* Re: Re: Against Mechanism On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.netwrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason � 3p has multiple perspectives. That is the only multiworld theory that I can believe in. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark 爓rote: On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal 爓rote: In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future 1p view. Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. Then as I said,? there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is only a future 1p view. The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. Please note the use of the word and. that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been wrong. Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? ? The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? the Helsinki man will see both cities. In the 3p view, that's correct, And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not necessarily true. You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some progress. ? ? but fail to answer the question asked. Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal. Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than it is. Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate it' to simply 'I hate it'. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message
Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Roger, I appreciate your claim that all monads must be distinct and unique because that is the basis of my string consciousness theory. However, I have never read of leibniz saying that. So could you supply a link to him saying so? Richard On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion. The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and to him everybody must be different (have an individual monad= soul = identity= memory, etc. etc. etc. ). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/25/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-24, 11:13:17 Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason � 3p has multiple perspectives. That is the only multiworld theory that I can believe in. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark 爓rote: On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal 爓rote: In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future 1p view. Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. Then as I said,? there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is only a future 1p view. The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. Please note the use of the word and. that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been wrong. Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? ? The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? the Helsinki man will see both cities. In the 3p view, that's correct, And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not necessarily true. You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some progress. ? ? but fail to answer the question asked. Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal. Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than it is. Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate it' to simply 'I hate it'. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, 3p has multiple perspectives. That is the only multiworld theory that I can believe in. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future 1p view. Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. Then as I said,? there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is only a future 1p view. The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. Please note the use of the word and. that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been wrong. Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? ? The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? the Helsinki man will see both cities. In the 3p view, that's correct, And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not necessarily true. You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some progress. ? ? but fail to answer the question asked. Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal. Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than it is. Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate it' to simply 'I hate it'. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason 3p has multiple perspectives. That is the only multiworld theory that I can believe in. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future 1p view. Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. Then as I said,? there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is only a future 1p view. The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. Please note the use of the word and. that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been wrong. Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? ? The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? the Helsinki man will see both cities. In the 3p view, that's correct, And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not necessarily true. You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some progress. ? ? but fail to answer the question asked. Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal. Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than it is. Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate it' to simply 'I hate it'. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same external signals to them, e.g. from a camera at a particular location, and thus have 'the same' visual perspective. But I expect that their *perceptions* will still be quite different and you could do as well by just having them stand close together or look at the same TV screen. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 2:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.netwrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same external signals to them, e.g. from a camera at a particular location, and thus have 'the same' visual perspective. But I expect that their *perceptions* will still be quite different and you could do as well by just having them stand close together or look at the same TV screen. Put two identical uploaded minds each in the same deterministic simulation. Then their perceptions should be identical. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 22 Dec 2012, at 22:01, meekerdb wrote: On 12/22/2012 11:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem. I don't think so. If you are referring to his decision analysis, it only seems to work for simple binary choices - QM predicts probabilities that are often irrational numbers. Gleason's theorem goes part way but it depends on solving the einselection problem. So, is it not that everything is solved with both Gleason theorem (measure) and MW+comp (einselection)? Except the mind-body problem, of course, which needs to generalize both MW and Gleason on arithmetic, but the logic of self-reference already shows the shadow of a Gleason theorem for arithmetic and its inside views. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Sun, Dec 23, 2012 at 8:20 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: as I said, there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is only a future 1p view. But you have been duplicated. Yes. from your future person points of view In a world of duplicating machines there is no such thing as your future person point of view, there is only a future person point of view, and in none of those views can anybody in the present know much about. there will be only one future, Not for you in a world with duplicating machines. even if there both in the 3p view. How could they not be in the 3p? the question asked was on the future 1p as seen by the 1p, Philosophically I don't see how it matters but if you want to know if the question was answered correctly there is only one way to go about it 1) Waite for the future to arrive. 2) Find the future 1p men, that means finding anybody who remembers being the Helsinki Man. 3) Ask them what city they are now experiencing. A future 1p man will answer Washington AND a future 1p man will answer Moscow. If the Helsinki Man got the prediction right then fine, but if he didn't then who cares; regardless of the veracity of the prediction the important thing is that the Moscow man will still correctly believe he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man will still correctly believe he is the Helsinki Man and *both* are right that they are in one city, Yes. so that the 1p views becomes non symmetrical. Yes. The duplication has break the symmetry. Yes, and that is why in a world with duplicating chambers things would seem odd to us, we have become very accustomed to that symmetry so, although not paradoxical, it would definitely take some getting used to being without it. In fact some of us have become so accustomed to that symmetry that even though they know intellectually it has been broken and now things are profoundly different they just can't stop themselves from talking about the future 1p view and continue to use personal pronouns in exactly in the same way they always have as if nothing has been broken. the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? The chance of being which who from the 1p perspective. Well you tell me, what is the chance that the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington? I'd say that the chance of that happening must be pretty high, pretty damn high indeed! What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 3p view Ambiguous. Which word didn't you understand? it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not necessarily true. Sure. Thank you. Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked I am the one asking the question, so that remark makes not much sense. That's OK, Bruno Marchal wouldn't be the first one to ask a nonsensical question. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 20 Dec 2012, at 22:18, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Dec 20, 2012 at 5:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You are asking about the present first person point of view of someone, NO. read the question: it is about a future first personal event. That is totally false! The Helsinki man is informing you about his PRESENT first person state of mind, he may be preoccupied trying to guess about what his future state of mind could be but that doesn't change the fact that you cannot communicate with the future Helsinki man you can only ask questions to the present Helsinki man and regardless of the subject of his thoughts he can only tell you about his present state of mind. Bruno Marchal has said, and John Clark agrees, that both the Moscow Man and the Washington Man are the Helsinki Man, and so assuming that the Helsinki Man believed the same thing and is rational, then the conclusion is obvious, the Helsinki Man will say that the Helsinki man will see Washington AND Moscow. In the 3p view, Yes, and as I've said before if 2 things are identical in the 3p they are certainly identical in the 1p, although the reverse is not necessarily true. but the question is about the future 1p view In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future 1p view. Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. If they don't exist, you would die, and comp is false. The use the is just an emphasis on the fact that, although there are two such view, they are felt unique by the experimenter. For example: suppose the Washington Man said the Helsinki Man's prediction in the past about a hypothetical first person point of view that would occur in the future turned out to be wrong, would that mean that the Washington man would no longer feel in his gut that he was the Helsinki Man? Of course not! That's why to follow a chain of identity the way to go is from the present to the past not from the present to the future. But we have to do prediction to confirm or refute a theory on reality, which is the present case. Not with personal identity we don't! If you are like me and most people you have made predictions about what you will do that turn out to be wrong, but incorrect or not when that happens you still feel like you were the one that made the prediction. Exactly, and that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been wrong. This is just obviously wrong. It is correct in the 3p picture, but the question was about the 1p picture. And that's the problem right there, THERE IS NO THE 1P PICTURE, THERE IS ONLY A 1P PICTURE! And? And so in a world with duplicating machines asking about the future 1p picture is as silly as asking how long is a piece of string because it depends on the string. Then QM without collapse is refuted at once. It is not weird as it is only an indetermination on the person result after a self-duplication. the math are easy to do, It's not just the math, everything about it is easy; the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, like in QM- without-collapse, or in arithmetic. both remember being the Helsinki Man, so although different both ARE the Helsinki Man, Exactly, and that is why the question makes sense. So does the answer, the Helsinki man will see both cities. In the 3p view, that's correct, but fail to answer the question asked. If he was asked on the 3p view after the duplication. Apparently asking somebody something on the 3p is supposed to be different than just asking somebody, but I have no idea how. Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. The most probable experimenter 1p outcome, is I stay alive. When self-multiplication exist, the 1p and 3p difference play a big role, in both comp and Everett QM. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future 1p view. Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. Then as I said, there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is only a future 1p view. The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. Please note the use of the word and. that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been wrong. Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? the Helsinki man will see both cities. In the 3p view, that's correct, And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not necessarily true. but fail to answer the question asked. Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal. Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than it is. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future 1p view. Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. Then as I said, there is no such thing as the future 1p view, there is only a future 1p view. The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. Please note the use of the word and. that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been wrong. Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? the Helsinki man will see both cities. In the 3p view, that's correct, And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not necessarily true. You are misapplying this rule. This rule is most often comes up in philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness. That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person. This is plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some progress. but fail to answer the question asked. Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal. Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than it is. Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem. As Tegmark commented: The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate it' to simply 'I hate it'. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
I meant to write: On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 1:56 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any *difference in the*experimental outcome regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person. This is plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/22/2012 11:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem. I don't think so. If you are referring to his decision analysis, it only seems to work for simple binary choices - QM predicts probabilities that are often irrational numbers. Gleason's theorem goes part way but it depends on solving the einselection problem. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Thu, Dec 20, 2012 at 5:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You are asking about the present first person point of view of someone, NO. read the question: it is about a future first personal event. That is totally false! The Helsinki man is informing you about his PRESENT first person state of mind, he may be preoccupied trying to guess about what his future state of mind could be but that doesn't change the fact that you cannot communicate with the future Helsinki man you can only ask questions to the present Helsinki man and regardless of the subject of his thoughts he can only tell you about his present state of mind. Bruno Marchal has said, and John Clark agrees, that both the Moscow Man and the Washington Man are the Helsinki Man, and so assuming that the Helsinki Man believed the same thing and is rational, then the conclusion is obvious, the Helsinki Man will say that the Helsinki man will see Washington AND Moscow. In the 3p view, Yes, and as I've said before if 2 things are identical in the 3p they are certainly identical in the 1p, although the reverse is not necessarily true. but the question is about the future 1p view In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as the future 1p view. For example: suppose the Washington Man said the Helsinki Man's prediction in the past about a hypothetical first person point of view that would occur in the future turned out to be wrong, would that mean that the Washington man would no longer feel in his gut that he was the Helsinki Man? Of course not! That's why to follow a chain of identity the way to go is from the present to the past not from the present to the future. But we have to do prediction to confirm or refute a theory on reality, which is the present case. Not with personal identity we don't! If you are like me and most people you have made predictions about what you will do that turn out to be wrong, but incorrect or not when that happens you still feel like you were the one that made the prediction. This is just obviously wrong. It is correct in the 3p picture, but the question was about the 1p picture. And that's the problem right there, THERE IS NO THE 1P PICTURE, THERE IS ONLY A 1P PICTURE! And? And so in a world with duplicating machines asking about the future 1p picture is as silly as asking how long is a piece of string because it depends on the string. It is not weird as it is only an indetermination on the person result after a self-duplication. the math are easy to do, It's not just the math, everything about it is easy; the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? both remember being the Helsinki Man, so although different both ARE the Helsinki Man, Exactly, and that is why the question makes sense. So does the answer, the Helsinki man will see both cities. If he was asked on the 3p view after the duplication. Apparently asking somebody something on the 3p is supposed to be different than just asking somebody, but I have no idea how. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 16 Dec 2012, at 19:53, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Dec 16, 2012 at 7:34 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: it's true that after the duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of you and demands are made for one and only one answer. Of course, as the guy is duplicated, and the question is about a future first person points of view, That is incorrect and I'm surprised at such a elementary error in logic. This is rhetoric. The question is about a PRESENT first person point of view about what that person guesses a FUTURE first person point of view will be. That is not necessary. On the contrary, given the 3p meta-definition of 1p (content of the diary taken with in the annihilation box), the guess, and its solution (P = 1/2) makes sense at the 3p level. which is single With the stipulation that there can be one and only one correct answer, and that is also a error. Well, if you have a better answer. Keep in mind that you have to convince the majority of your copies, by the definition, and the protocol. You last answer (W M) was refuted by all copies. P(M) = 1 and P(W) = 1 are refuted for all copies except 2. Etc. John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. If you read the post you can see that I have no more use pronouns for a whole. I use H-man, W-man, M-man, The few times that was attempted it did not work because Bruno Marchal does not know who the Helsinki Man is. So if I use pronoun, you don't get it, and if I use H-man, etc. you don't get it, when all what counts in the reasoning is the 1-3 distinction. About half the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki Man the same way John Clark does, as anybody who remembers being the Helsinki Man; in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington in the future is 100%. This is just obviously wrong. It is correct in the 3p picture, but the question was about the 1p picture. By definition, you must anticipate that the copy in Moscow, will keep P(W) = 1 in his memory, and when comparing to the result of the experience (opening the box), will say I (me, the H-man, or the HM-man) remember P(W) = 1, yet I am not in W, so I was wrong to have bet on W when I was in Helsinki. You keep describing the 3p view, and not the future 1p view, which you know exisrs, by the comp assumption, and is an experience of being unique and entire in ONE city, as you did already agree. But the other half of the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki Man as someone who is currently experiencing Helsinki; Not at all. It is the same man. in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington in the future (or anything else for that matter) is 0% because in the future nobody will be experiencing Helsinki anymore. ? These definitions and not congruent, and if that wasn't bad enough under neither definition is the probability 50%. And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of view you should put feet into Wong. I told you: all of them. Good, then the probability Bruno Marchal will see Washington is 100% and the probability Bruno Marchal will see Moscow is 100%. The proba is on the 1p, not on where the 1p will be. W and M refers to the 1-p experience itself, not on their localisation. As such, as you have already agree, W and M are exclusive incompatible experience. So you have P(W)+P(M) = 1, in this protocol. But with your theory P(W) +P(M) = 2. Bruno You get stuck in the easy part of the derivation. If that was the part of the proof that was the clearest and most obviously true then I'm very glad I didn't try to read more. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 15 Dec 2012, at 04:25, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/14/2012 6:07 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote: Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times. Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2. This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen. But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, but only a quantification of ignorance. So there a different view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to Bruno_m. And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing happened every time. It only seemed like probability and randomness. Some people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and how could this theory be tested. But they were silenced by being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right. -- Hi, Great post! I would like to know how the sequence wmwwmwmmmww...mwm is recorded and passed along. There is a tacit assumption of a book keeper at infinity' here! No, each Bruno takes his notebook with him which get transported also and he just writes down where he arrived before heading back to Helsinki. Brent -- Hi Brent, OK, so the notebook gets copy and pasted too? ?? It is the only difference between 1p and 3p used in the UDA. For the 3p the diary are outside the teleportation boxes, and for the 1p, the diary are inside, and thus gets copy and pasted too. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 14 Dec 2012, at 21:54, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, alias comp), there are two first person points of view Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of you and demands are made for one and only one answer. Of course, as the guy is duplicated, and the question is about a future first person points of view, which is single (as the two copies can handled only one diary and put only a definite result in there). To confirm the probabilities, with such a definition of 1-view, you have to interview all copies. John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. If you read the post you can see that I have no more use pronouns for a whole. I use H-man, W-man, M-man, and you have agreed on the key points: - the M and W men are both the H-man - the M and W men are different. this gives sense to the first person indeterminacy lived by the H-man before the duplication. Your problem is that you keep the 3p view throughout the experience, in which case everything is deterministic, but this avoids the question asked, simply. The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into the nature of those aforesaid ideas. I have no more used pronouns, to help yopu, as this was pure red herring once you label them correctly with respect to the 1/3 distinctions. you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the shoes of the reconstituted person, And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of view you should put feet into Wong. I told you: all of them. It is easy, they all agree that they get a result that they was unable to predict, so the 1p-indeterminacy is a certainty for the original candidate. and which first person viewpoint you should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would be unnecessary. pfft You are discouraging as you don't even read the comments. You get stuck in the easy part of the derivation. Nobody can teach anything to people who does not the homework. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 15 Dec 2012, at 00:07, meekerdb wrote: On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote: Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again andit sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times. Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2. This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen. But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, but only a quantification of ignorance. So there a different view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to Bruno_m. And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing happened every time. It only seemed like probability and randomness. Some people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and how could this theory be tested. But they were silenced by being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right. -- Hi, Great post! I would like to know how the sequence wmwwmwmmmww...mwm is recorded and passed along. There is a tacit assumption of a book keeper at infinity' here! No, each Bruno takes his notebook with him which get transported also and he just writes down where he arrived before heading back to Helsinki. Exactly. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 15 Dec 2012, at 00:09, meekerdb wrote: On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent, I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one reason: if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference whether you will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' undisrupted self. However, if it goes into a multiple existence then - my problem is - what happens to the 'experience' of self1 while you consider yourself at self2 location? the self-s inadvertently diverge so you cannot be both (or more). In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. YOU are the ONE passing several locations - accumulating continual experience upon yourself (the 1) and if you happen to return to a former one, it will not be YOU. I think the conclusion is that there is no you in the sense of unique. But there is: the content of all diaries determined each time, in all situations, such a you. It's like talking about the dollar coin. If it's duplicated or multiplied it's not unique and you is ambiguous - which is what John Clark complains about. Because John introduce ambiguous to avoid indeterminate, but with the definition of the 1-view, there is no ambiguity at all, just indetermination. Ambiguity is taking care of by the 1-3 distinction. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Sun, Dec 16, 2012 at 7:34 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: it's true that after the duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of you and demands are made for one and only one answer. Of course, as the guy is duplicated, and the question is about a future first person points of view, That is incorrect and I'm surprised at such a elementary error in logic. The question is about a PRESENT first person point of view about what that person guesses a FUTURE first person point of view will be. which is single With the stipulation that there can be one and only one correct answer, and that is also a error. John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. If you read the post you can see that I have no more use pronouns for a whole. I use H-man, W-man, M-man, The few times that was attempted it did not work because Bruno Marchal does not know who the Helsinki Man is. About half the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki Man the same way John Clark does, as anybody who remembers being the Helsinki Man; in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington in the future is 100%. But the other half of the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki Man as someone who is currently experiencing Helsinki; in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington in the future (or anything else for that matter) is 0% because in the future nobody will be experiencing Helsinki anymore. These definitions and not congruent, and if that wasn't bad enough under neither definition is the probability 50%. And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of view you should put feet into Wong. I told you: all of them. Good, then the probability Bruno Marchal will see Washington is 100% and the probability Bruno Marchal will see Moscow is 100%. You get stuck in the easy part of the derivation. If that was the part of the proof that was the clearest and most obviously true then I'm very glad I didn't try to read more. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:25 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:18 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, and there are two of them and so there are 2 heres and 2 not theres. So what ONE and only ONE thing does John Clark the experimenter enter into the lab notebook?? You are hopeless. I've answered this at least 10 times. Avoided the question at least 10 times. Jason #1 says Washington and Jason #2 says Moscow, there is only one lab notebook and only one experimenter, so what one and only one check mark should the experimenter put in that one and only one lab notebook, the one next to the word Washington or the one next to the word Moscow? Can anyone (the 1 or 2 remaining John Clarks, being the only person (or people) left on Earth) say whether he was transported randomly to one of the two locations, or duplicated to two different locations? That depends on how much is known. Subjective probability depends on the amount of information, or lack of it, the person involved has; and if Many Worlds is correct then all probabilities are subjective. If you told me nothing about the machine and just said walk into the chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I would have no way of knowing that there was another John Clark in Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason existed. Well say you knew there was a 50% chance it would duplicate you and a 50% chance it would transport you. Are the one or two John Clark's any wiser following this protocol about which it was? If they aren't then subjectively duplication produces an experience indistinguishable from the random selection of a single course. Do you agree? My bet: you will find some excuse for not answering or merely ignore this question You loose. as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your comfort. Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most people want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all first person indeterminacy is, a pompous way of saying I dunno. It's more than simple ignorance though. Even with perfect knowledge you cannot know. Even if you are God you cannot know. This type of uncertainty only comes about in regards to first person duplication of minds, and is altogether unlike other forms of uncertainty (save perhaps quantum uncertainty, which may be related to or explained by it). And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how? I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you? And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how? I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you? Yes. First you start with the integers. Then you sit back and let their interrelations and connections build upon each other, and watch as some form infinitely recursive relations, some of which proceed for very long times if not indefinitely. Some of these numbers, with each iteration, develop internal patterns which multiply and divide themselves, some of those patterns through mostly random processes adapt to their local environment of more stable patterns in the series of numbers, some develop what we would call brains, some learn to build planes they call 747's, and some build networks of computers to communicate on e-mail lists and discuss the possible nature of reality. All of these things can be found among the relations between the integers. If pronouns are not ambiguous John Clark may or may not have the ability to provide answers, but at least John Clark will understand the question. Or if John Clark is uncomfortable with where he perceives the line of questions and reasoning to be heading be may make up some excuse about pronouns or answer a different question than was asked. Then simply call John Clark's bluff and stop using personal pronouns with abandon as it their meaning was as clear in a world with duplicating machines as it is in our world without them. So both are you but you only see through the eyes of one of them. So which one is blind. Neither is blind, but each sees through only one pair of eyes. OK. You (subjectively) survived Yes, and subjective survival is all I'm interested in, I'm not even sure what objective survival means. as one of them, One? Which one? if MWI is true in each universe there is one and only one photographic plate and one and only one spot on it; Not in the cosmological form of MWI. Bullshit. Then you ought to tell Anthony Aguirre and Max Tegmark what the error is in their paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066 As I said before, no information is gained unless you are the one who enters the duplication chamber. And that's the difference, a physicist doesn't have to personally squeeze through those
Re: Against Mechanism
On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 4:50 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. John Clark is happy to read that but is somewhat skeptical it is true. I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. As John Clark has said people just can not help themselves, in order to express vague flabby philosophical ideas personal pronouns simply must be used to hide their vacuous nature at their heart. John Clark is going to rephrase the above by excising the cancerous pronouns suppose Bruno is in Helsinki and Bruno steps into a transporter and it sends Bruno to Washington. Already much of the mystery is gone and things are much clearer, but there is still ambiguity about the nature of the transporter. If the transporter is a airplane then when Bruno goes to Washington Bruno is no longer in Helsinki, however if the transporter is a duplicating machine then when Bruno goes to Washington Bruno remains in Helsinki. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times. Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2. Brent Meeker just said that the machine would send Bruno to Washington AND Moscow many times, and then in the very next sentence Brent Meeker says that the machine would send Bruno to Washington OR Moscow; and if Bruno had seen wmwwmwmmmww...mwm then Bruno has certainly seen Washington AND Moscow. Of course this absurdity can be covered up, and that's where personal pronouns come in, although John Clark thinks the disguise doesn't work very well, lipstick can't brink a corpse back to life and personal pronouns can't give focus to bad ideas. And John Clark is confused about what direction Brent Meeker believes one should look to understand this issue, from the present to the past or from the present to the future. John Clark believes that the important thing is that no matter how many iterations are done all those Bruno's remember being Bruno in Helsinki long before Bruno had even seen a duplicating chamber, and that's why all of them, although different from each other, are all equally Bruno. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 3:16 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Subjective probability depends on the amount of information, or lack of it, the person involved has; and if Many Worlds is correct then all probabilities are subjective. If you told me nothing about the machine and just said walk into the chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I would have no way of knowing that there was another John Clark in Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason existed. Well say you knew there was a 50% chance it would duplicate you and a 50% chance it would transport you. So a coin would be flipped and if it was heads then Jason Resch would simply allow the duplicating machine to do it's work and John Clark would remain in Helsinki and John Clark would go to Washington, but if the coin was tails then one second after the machine finished its work Jason Resch would put a bullet into John Clark's brain in Helsinki. If John Clark knew all of this beforehand John Clark would conclude there is a 100% chance that John Clark will go to Washington and a 0% chance John Clark will remain in Helsinki. as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your comfort. Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most people want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all first person indeterminacy is, a pompous way of saying I dunno. It's more than simple ignorance though. Even with perfect knowledge you cannot know. John Clark knows with certainty that if something (like seeing Washington) causes John Clark to turn into the Washington Man then John Clark will see Washington and if something (like seeing Moscow) causes John Clark to turn into the Moscow Man then John Clark will turn into the Moscow Man. Not deep but true. So it all boils down to uncertainties in external environmental causes, and first person indeterminacy is just a pompous way of saying I dunno about what changes the external world will cause in John Clark. Even if you are God you cannot know. Which should give a hint that the question makes no sense. Tell me whether you disagree with the following and if so why: You open the door to emerge from a duplication chamber, observe the skyline and find it includes the Kremlin. The experimental setup says your duplicate in the other city found the skyline included the Washington monument. One of you saw the Kremlin and became the saw the Kremlin man and the other saw the Washington monument and became the saw the Washington monument man. Through the duplication and observance of something different, each duplicate has acquired the subjective feeling of observing a random unpredictable event. The subjective feeling would be depended entirely on the individual involved , I'm only a expert on John Clark and John Clark would say he saw the Kremlin because he's the Moscow man and he's the Moscow man because he saw the Kremlin and he did not see the Washington monument because then he's be the Washington man. And he's not. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
2012/12/15 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 3:16 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Subjective probability depends on the amount of information, or lack of it, the person involved has; and if Many Worlds is correct then all probabilities are subjective. If you told me nothing about the machine and just said walk into the chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I would have no way of knowing that there was another John Clark in Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason existed. Well say you knew there was a 50% chance it would duplicate you and a 50% chance it would transport you. So a coin would be flipped and if it was heads then Jason Resch would simply allow the duplicating machine to do it's work and John Clark would remain in Helsinki and John Clark would go to Washington, but if the coin was tails then one second after the machine finished its work Jason Resch would put a bullet into John Clark's brain in Helsinki. If John Clark knew all of this beforehand John Clark would conclude there is a 100% chance that John Clark will go to Washington and a 0% chance John Clark will remain in Helsinki. as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your comfort. Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most people want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all first person indeterminacy is, a pompous way of saying I dunno. It's more than simple ignorance though. Even with perfect knowledge you cannot know. John Clark knows with certainty that if something (like seeing Washington) causes John Clark to turn into the Washington Man then John Clark will see Washington and if something (like seeing Moscow) causes John Clark to turn into the Moscow Man then John Clark will turn into the Moscow Man. Not deep but true. So it all boils down to uncertainties in external environmental causes, and first person indeterminacy is just a pompous way of saying I dunno about what changes the external world will cause in John Clark. Even if you are God you cannot know. Which should give a hint that the question makes no sense. Tell me whether you disagree with the following and if so why: You open the door to emerge from a duplication chamber, observe the skyline and find it includes the Kremlin. The experimental setup says your duplicate in the other city found the skyline included the Washington monument. One of you saw the Kremlin and became the saw the Kremlin man and the other saw the Washington monument and became the saw the Washington monument man. Through the duplication and observance of something different, each duplicate has acquired the subjective feeling of observing a random unpredictable event. The subjective feeling would be depended entirely on the individual involved , I'm only a expert on John Clark and John Clark would say he saw the Kremlin because he's the Moscow man and he's the Moscow man because he saw the Kremlin and he did not see the Washington monument because then he's be the Washington man. And he's not. John K Clark So in your world, it is impossible to assign probabilities for subjective feeling in a duplication experiment, yet still in your vision, you can in a MWI context and you see absolutely no contradiction with that, agreed ? If you agree, then I think we can spare electrons from now on. Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/15/2012 9:50 AM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 4:50 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. John Clark is happy to read that but is somewhat skeptical it is true. I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. As John Clark has said people just can not help themselves, in order to express vague flabby philosophical ideas personal pronouns simply must be used to hide their vacuous nature at their heart. John Clark is going to rephrase the above by excising the cancerous pronouns suppose Bruno is in Helsinki and Bruno steps into a transporter and it sends Bruno to Washington. Already much of the mystery is gone and things are much clearer, but there is still ambiguity about the nature of the transporter. If the transporter is a airplane then when Bruno goes to Washington Bruno is no longer in Helsinki, however if the transporter is a duplicating machine then when Bruno goes to Washington Bruno remains in Helsinki. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times. Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2. Brent Meeker just said that the machine would send Bruno to Washington AND Moscow many times, Once for each start from Helsinki. and then in the very next sentence Brent Meeker says that the machine would send Bruno to Washington OR Moscow; I wrote, Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow. and if Bruno had seen wmwwmwmmmww...mwm then Bruno has certainly seen Washington AND Moscow. Of course this absurdity What's absurd about visiting Washington and Moscow many times, always starting from Helsinki. I'll bet there are several Finnish airline pilots who have done exactly that. I think you must be listening to voices in your head, instead reading what's written. can be covered up, and that's where personal pronouns come in, although John Clark thinks the disguise doesn't work very well, lipstick can't brink a corpse back to life and personal pronouns can't give focus to bad ideas. And John Clark is confused about what direction Brent Meeker believes one should look to understand this issue, from the present to the past or from the present to the future. John Clark believes that the important thing is that no matter how many iterations are done all those Bruno's remember being Bruno in Helsinki long before Bruno had even seen a duplicating chamber, and that's why all of them, although different from each other, are all equally Bruno. Did I say there was a duplicating chamber?? Brent John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2805 / Virus Database: 2634/5954 - Release Date: 12/12/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 13 Dec 2012, at 22:25, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:18 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, and there are two of them and so there are 2 heres and 2 not theres. So what ONE and only ONE thing does John Clark the experimenter enter into the lab notebook?? You are hopeless. I've answered this at least 10 times. Avoided the question at least 10 times. Jason #1 says Washington and Jason #2 says Moscow, there is only one lab notebook and only one experimenter, In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, alias comp), there are two first person points of view, and the question concerns them, not the 3p view. As J ason said, you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the shoes of the reconstituted person, as asked in the protocol. You stuck yourselves in the corner quasi deliberately, to avoid to proceed in the reasoning. Bruno so what one and only one check mark should the experimenter put in that one and only one lab notebook, the one next to the word Washington or the one next to the word Moscow? Can anyone (the 1 or 2 remaining John Clarks, being the only person (or people) left on Earth) say whether he was transported randomly to one of the two locations, or duplicated to two different locations? That depends on how much is known. Subjective probability depends on the amount of information, or lack of it, the person involved has; and if Many Worlds is correct then all probabilities are subjective. If you told me nothing about the machine and just said walk into the chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I would have no way of knowing that there was another John Clark in Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason existed. My bet: you will find some excuse for not answering or merely ignore this question You loose. as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your comfort. Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most people want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all first person indeterminacy is, a pompous way of saying I dunno. And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how? I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you? And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how? I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you? If pronouns are not ambiguous John Clark may or may not have the ability to provide answers, but at least John Clark will understand the question. Or if John Clark is uncomfortable with where he perceives the line of questions and reasoning to be heading be may make up some excuse about pronouns or answer a different question than was asked. Then simply call John Clark's bluff and stop using personal pronouns with abandon as it their meaning was as clear in a world with duplicating machines as it is in our world without them. So both are you but you only see through the eyes of one of them. So which one is blind. Neither is blind, but each sees through only one pair of eyes. OK. You (subjectively) survived Yes, and subjective survival is all I'm interested in, I'm not even sure what objective survival means. as one of them, One? Which one? if MWI is true in each universe there is one and only one photographic plate and one and only one spot on it; Not in the cosmological form of MWI. Bullshit. As I said before, no information is gained unless you are the one who enters the duplication chamber. And that's the difference, a physicist doesn't have to personally squeeze through those 2 tiny slits to do the experiment, that's the electrons job, nevertheless he can learn something from just watching it. Nothing is learned from watching Bruno's experiment. You measure the spin state of an electron on the x-axis and find it is left. MWI says your duplicate in the other branch found it was right. One of you saw the left-state and became the saw the left-state man and the other saw the right-state and became the saw the right-state man. Through the split, duplication, and observance of something different, each duplicate has acquired the subjective feeling of observing a random unpredictable event. Yes. Enough time and electrons have been wasted repeating ourselves. I agree, many free electrons have given their lives for this thread and there is not much to show for their sacrifice. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at
Re: Against Mechanism
So if there is a brain conjoined twin (Adam Ben) in Albuquerque and they are duplicated once in Buffalo and once in Cleveland, but in Cleveland something goes wrong and Adam does not get duplicated. What are you both saying happens to Adam Ben in Albuquerque and to Ben in Cleveland? Craig On Friday, December 14, 2012 3:54:44 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript: wrote: In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, alias comp), there are two first person points of view Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of you and demands are made for one and only one answer. John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into the nature of those aforesaid ideas. you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the shoes of the reconstituted person, And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of view you should put feet into and which first person viewpoint you should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would be unnecessary. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/LVlB2u5x3cMJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/14/2012 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, alias comp), there are two first person points of view Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of you and demands are made for one and only one answer. John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into the nature of those aforesaid ideas. you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the shoes of the reconstituted person, And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of view you should put feet into and which first person viewpoint you should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would be unnecessary. Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times. Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2. This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen. But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, but only a quantification of ignorance. So there a different view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to Bruno_m. And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing happened every time. It only seemed like probability and randomness. Some people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and how could this theory be tested. But they were silenced by being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right. Brent Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them where they cannot be seen. --- Stephen W. Hawking -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
If this were done in real life, my guess is that Bruno_w dies in the transporter (sorry Bruno), and a disoriented amnesiac identical twin is born at every transporter location. I don't know if these clones would even survive, I think they would be brain dead and lacking a heartbeat but maybe could be resuscitated as infants in adult bodies. They might have odd discoveries of recovered memories of a past life as Bruno. On Friday, December 14, 2012 4:50:45 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 12/14/2012 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript: wrote: In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, alias comp), there are two first person points of view Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of you and demands are made for one and only one answer. John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into the nature of those aforesaid ideas. you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the shoes of the reconstituted person, And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of view you should put feet into and which first person viewpoint you should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would be unnecessary. Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times. Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2. This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen. But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, but only a quantification of ignorance. So there a different view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to Bruno_m. And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing happened every time. It only seemed like probability and randomness. Some people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and how could this theory be tested. But they were silenced by being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right. Brent Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them where they cannot be seen. --- Stephen W. Hawking -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/YpjLE74XYDsJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote: Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times. Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2. This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen. But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, but only a quantification of ignorance. So there a different view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to Bruno_m. And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing happened every time. It only seemed like probability and randomness. Some people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and how could this theory be tested. But they were silenced by being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right. -- Hi, Great post! I would like to know how the sequence wmwwmwmmmww...mwm is recorded and passed along. There is a tacit assumption of a book keeper at infinity' here! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
Brent, I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one reason: if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference whether you will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' undisrupted self. However, if it goes into a multiple existence then - my problem is - what happens to the 'experience' of self1 while you consider yourself at self2 location? the self-s inadvertently diverge so you cannot be both (or more). In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. YOU are the ONE passing several locations - accumulating continual experience upon yourself (the 1) and if you happen to return to a former one, it will not be YOU. You can dismiss my problem by you did not follow the suvject. John M On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 4:50 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/14/2012 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, alias comp), there are two first person points of view Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of you and demands are made for one and only one answer. John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into the nature of those aforesaid ideas. you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the shoes of the reconstituted person, And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of view you should put feet into and which first person viewpoint you should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would be unnecessary. Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times. Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2. This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen. But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, but only a quantification of ignorance. So there a different view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to Bruno_m. And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing happened every time. It only seemed like probability and randomness. Some people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and how could this theory be tested. But they were silenced by being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right. Brent Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them where they cannot be seen. --- Stephen W. Hawking -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent, I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one reason: if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference whether you will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' undisrupted self. However, if it goes into a multiple existence then - my problem is - what happens to the 'experience' of self1 while you consider yourself at self2 location? the self-s inadvertently diverge so you cannot be both (or more). In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. YOU are the ONE passing several locations - accumulating continual experience upon yourself (the 1) and if you happen to return to a former one, it will not be YOU. I think the conclusion is that there is no you in the sense of unique. It's like talking about the dollar coin. If it's duplicated or multiplied it's not unique and you is ambiguous - which is what John Clark complains about. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/14/2012 6:07 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote: Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times. Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2. This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen. But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, but only a quantification of ignorance. So there a different view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to Bruno_m. And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing happened every time. It only seemed like probability and randomness. Some people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and how could this theory be tested. But they were silenced by being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right. -- Hi, Great post! I would like to know how the sequence wmwwmwmmmww...mwm is recorded and passed along. There is a tacit assumption of a book keeper at infinity' here! No, each Bruno takes his notebook with him which get transported also and he just writes down where he arrived before heading back to Helsinki. Brent -- Hi Brent, OK, so the notebook gets copy and pasted too? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/14/2012 6:09 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent, I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one reason: if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference whether you will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' undisrupted self. However, if it goes into a multiple existence then - my problem is - what happens to the 'experience' of self1 while you consider yourself at self2 location? the self-s inadvertently diverge so you cannot be both (or more). In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. YOU are the ONE passing several locations - accumulating continual experience upon yourself (the 1) and if you happen to return to a former one, it will not be YOU. I think the conclusion is that there is no you in the sense of unique. It's like talking about the dollar coin. If it's duplicated or multiplied it's not unique and you is ambiguous - which is what John Clark complains about. Brent -- Hi Brent, Isn't this the concept of fungibility that D. Deutsch goes on and on about? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: Your servitor: 1) Arithmetic (comp) :) Bruno To which I add: 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise to comp. OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for granted. Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence, are theorem in the tiny arithmetic. Tiny compared to what though? Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described. As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory- motor primitive, which has no possible explanation. First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them, if only to make sense of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor. Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation. Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of experiences Keep in mind that experiences is what I want explain. which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of frustration. In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness. It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers? Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't necessary in the first place. By postulating what we want to explain. There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense which persists in spite of having no arithmetic value. If you say so ... You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non- ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other beings in public space. You take the problem, and then say it is the solution. The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and solutions. Well, the cosmos is a problem with comp, and which makes comp interesting. That's the god- of-the-gap mistake. No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos - beneath all gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is sense itself. We don't even know if there is one. We have of course already discuss this. You are just saying don't search. You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the only answer that can ever be universally true. Hmm... It looks *you* are talking everything for granted at the start, in the theory. I take only sense for granted because sense cannot be broken down into any more primitive elements. Everything else can be broken down to sense. The CTM + classical theory of knowledge can explain that feeling. With the CTM ( a better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its consciousness) by the only two laws: Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) Laws? What are those? How do they govern? Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x. So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in eleimnainating the left parentheses): KKK = K. For the same reason KSK = S KSS = S K(S K) K = (S K) etc. For example SKK is an identity operator: SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation, = x, by the first equation. S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a Turing universal language/system/machine. Axioms are philosophical. They don't make things happen. Systems don't appear without some capacity to generate and participate in them which exists first. You presume that there is such a thing a Law, but when I ask what you mean by that, you give more details on this specific proposition. I'm asking about the proposition itself though? What Turing universal language allows S and K to 'behave', or to exist or to relate to each other? Any one, if you don't like combinators. But we have to start from
Re: Against Mechanism
Craig, If in your theory sense is fundamental, a hence explains everything, how could your theory explain concepts like: Gravity Quantum mechanics Fine tuning It seems you need some formal laws and definitions concerning sense in order to build from it as a basis of understanding. What might those laws of sense be? Jason On Dec 13, 2012, at 7:51 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, December 13, 2012 5:22:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: Your servitor: 1) Arithmetic (comp) :) Bruno To which I add: 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise to comp. OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for granted. Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence, are theorem in the tiny arithmetic. Tiny compared to what though? Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described. But if the universe contains no K to begin with, then it is insurmountably un-tiny, no? As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory- motor primitive, which has no possible explanation. First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them, That's what I keep telling you though, I have already done this. Numbers cannot be assumed and they can be explained as epiphenomenal protocols within sense. if only to make sense of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor. Now sensory-motor really cannot be explained with less than sensory- motor. That's because it is the legitimate universal primitive. That's why 'seeing is believing' and 'there is no substitute for experience' and 'you had to be there' and 'it's lost in translation'. Experience is trans-rational. Logic arises from experience, not the other way around. It isn't numbers who dream, it is dreams who count. See? You are experiencing sensory-motor now - it is all that anything has ever experienced. All 'explanations' arise through it, from it, and to it as isomorphisms of sense- making. Juxtapostion of like experiences on different levels, from the concrete and personal to the abstract and generic. Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation. That's what I'm saying. In sense, everything has lots of explanations. New explanations all the time. Explanations are made of sense. Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of experiences Keep in mind that experiences is what I want explain. That's circular. Explanation is already an experience. You are trying to put the shoebox into the shoe. which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of frustration. In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness. Any machine that physically exists must be executed through some material which, on some level of description, has some level of awareness - molecules if nothing else. That doesn't mean though, if you make a walking machine out of PVC pipes (which are fantastic btw) that the walker as a whole hosts a unified awareness. Whatever awareness we project onto it is ultimately a reflection of our own sensory expectations and the sensory-motive intentions of the engineer(s) who created it. We watch TV, but the TV doesn't watch TV. We use a computer, but the computer doesn't use it's own computations to make sense. It reminds us very much of consciousness, but ultimately that reminder is a sculpture made of collections of metal pins and glassy films rather than living cells divided from a mammalian sexual syzygy event. It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers? Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't necessary in the first place. By postulating what we want to explain. There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense which persists in spite of
Re: Against Mechanism
On 13 Dec 2012, at 04:39, meekerdb wrote: On 12/12/2012 4:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations. Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and differentiated. Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum computer that is conscious. Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the conventional view says that conscious observers obey different laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we need a mind that usesquantum properties. In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not say which slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains undamaged. But why should I think this is possible? I'd like to see the actual mechanism or Hamiltonian that allows this. And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at it, if you see interference bands then the many world interpretation is correct. No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory is incorrect. It doesn't follow that MWI is correct. If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what does? Creating a record of it. I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen. And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI. MWI has the same problem as decoherence theory (except it tries to ignore it): How or what chooses the basis in which the reduced density matrix becomes approximately orthogonal and what is the significance of it not being exact. Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious. Decoherence theory hopes to show it is some objective feature of the experiment, e.g. the Schmidt decomposition and purification has been proposed http://ipg.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=en:courses:2009-2010:qit:lect5quantinfo0910.pdf Neither has really said how to deal with the inexactness of orthogonality, but once you assume you can ignore the off diagonal terms then QM just predicts probabilities, as Omnes says. That works FAPP. But there is no conceptual reason to ignore the off diagonal terms, given that they can play role physically testable. It is instrumentalist. If you define a world by the transitive closure of interactions, then the linearity of the SWE and the linearity of the tensor product entails the existence of the many worlds. The many worlds is just the literal reading of QM applied to our world including us. And I think QM itself, the wave, is already a literal reading of arithmetic by itself, ... but I can't convince people who believes in Something or Someone selecting their realities and not the others. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked to him about it. In the many worlds interpretation neither choice nor consciousness nor mind in general have anything to do with the way the laws of physics work, however in order to devise a experiment that attempts to prove that Many Worlds makes better predictions than other interpretations where mind is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind into the experiment. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/13/2012 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Dec 2012, at 04:39, meekerdb wrote: On 12/12/2012 4:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations. Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and differentiated. Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum computer that is conscious. Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the conventional view says that conscious observers obey different laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we need a mind that uses quantum properties. In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not say which slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains undamaged. But why should I think this is possible? I'd like to see the actual mechanism or Hamiltonian that allows this. And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at it, if you see interference bands then the many world interpretation is correct. No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory is incorrect. It doesn't follow that MWI is correct. If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what does? Creating a record of it. I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen. And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI. MWI has the same problem as decoherence theory (except it tries to ignore it): How or what chooses the basis in which the reduced density matrix becomes approximately orthogonal and what is the significance of it not being exact. Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious. Decoherence theory hopes to show it is some objective feature of the experiment, e.g. the Schmidt decomposition and purification has been proposed http://ipg.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=en:courses:2009-2010:qit:lect5quantinfo0910.pdf Neither has really said how to deal with the inexactness of orthogonality, but once you assume you can ignore the off diagonal terms then QM just predicts probabilities, as Omnes says. That works FAPP. But there is no conceptual reason to ignore the off diagonal terms, given that they can play role physically testable. It is instrumentalist. But MWI has the same problem. There are superpositions of conscious states too, but the cross trems are ignored FAPP just as in an instrumentalist interpretation. It essentially boils down to the problem of explaining the classical worlds emergence from the quantum. If you define a world by the transitive closure of interactions, then the linearity of the SWE and the linearity of the tensor product entails the existence of the many worlds. The many worlds is just the literal reading of QM applied to our world including us. How I define a world's in a model only effects the model. There is no 'literal reading' of QM that works in this world except FAPP. Maybe a successful theory of consciousness will change that, but so far I see CTM as relying on the same FAPP diagonalization of density matrices in a basis which is chosen - not predicted. Brent And I think QM itself, the wave, is already a literal reading of arithmetic by itself, ... but I can't convince people who believes in Something or Someone selecting their realities and not the others. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/13/2012 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked to him about it. In the many worlds interpretation neither choice nor consciousness nor mind in general have anything to do with the way the laws of physics work, however in order to devise a experiment that attempts to prove that Many Worlds makes better predictions than other interpretations where mind is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind into the experiment. Which agrees with my point that the experiment is only designed to test the Wigner theory that consciousness collapses the wave-function. Rejecting Wigner's interpretation (which he dropped later anyway) is not the same as proving MWI. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
2012/12/13 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 12/13/2012 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked to him about it. In the many worlds interpretation neither choice nor consciousness nor mind in general have anything to do with the way the laws of physics work, however in order to devise a experiment that attempts to prove that Many Worlds makes better predictions than other interpretations where mind is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind into the experiment. Which agrees with my point that the experiment is only designed to test the Wigner theory that consciousness collapses the wave-function. Rejecting Wigner's interpretation (which he dropped later anyway) is not the same as proving MWI. Brent Isn't that prove wrong any collapse explanations ? Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:18 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, and there are two of them and so there are 2 heres and 2 not theres. So what ONE and only ONE thing does John Clark the experimenterenter into the lab notebook?? You are hopeless. I've answered this at least 10 times. Avoided the question at least 10 times. Jason #1 says Washington and Jason #2 says Moscow, there is only one lab notebook and only one experimenter, so what one and only one check mark should the experimenter put in that one and only one lab notebook, the one next to the word Washington or the one next to the word Moscow? Can anyone (the 1 or 2 remaining John Clarks, being the only person (or people) left on Earth) say whether he was transported randomly to one of the two locations, or duplicated to two different locations? That depends on how much is known. Subjective probability depends on the amount of information, or lack of it, the person involved has; and if Many Worlds is correct then all probabilities are subjective. If you told me nothing about the machine and just said walk into the chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I would have no way of knowing that there was another John Clark in Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason existed. My bet: you will find some excuse for not answering or merely ignore this question You loose. as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your comfort. Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most people want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all first person indeterminacy is, a pompous way of saying I dunno. And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how? I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you? And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how? I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you? If pronouns are not ambiguous John Clark may or may not have the ability to provide answers, but at least John Clark will understand the question. Or if John Clark is uncomfortable with where he perceives the line of questions and reasoning to be heading be may make up some excuse about pronouns or answer a different question than was asked. Then simply call John Clark's bluff and stop using personal pronouns with abandon as it their meaning was as clear in a world with duplicating machines as it is in our world without them. So both are you but you only see through the eyes of one of them. So which one is blind. Neither is blind, but each sees through only one pair of eyes. OK. You (subjectively) survived Yes, and subjective survival is all I'm interested in, I'm not even sure what objective survival means. as one of them, One? Which one? if MWI is true in each universe there is one and only one photographic plate and one and only one spot on it; Not in the cosmological form of MWI. Bullshit. As I said before, no information is gained unless you are the one who enters the duplication chamber. And that's the difference, a physicist doesn't have to personally squeeze through those 2 tiny slits to do the experiment, that's the electrons job, nevertheless he can learn something from just watching it. Nothing is learned from watching Bruno's experiment. You measure the spin state of an electron on the x-axis and find it is left. MWI says your duplicate in the other branch found it was right. One of you saw the left-state and became the saw the left-state man and the other saw the right-state and became the saw the right-state man. Through the split, duplication, and observance of something different, each duplicate has acquired the subjective feeling of observing a random unpredictable event. Yes. Enough time and electrons have been wasted repeating ourselves. I agree, many free electrons have given their lives for this thread and there is not much to show for their sacrifice. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/13/2012 3:36 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/13/2012 11:46 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/12/13 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net On 12/13/2012 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked to him about it. In the many worlds interpretation neither choice nor consciousness nor mind in general have anything to do with the way the laws of physics work, however in order to devise a experiment that attempts to prove that Many Worlds makes better predictions than other interpretations where mind is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind into the experiment. Which agrees with my point that the experiment is only designed to test the Wigner theory that consciousness collapses the wave-function. Rejecting Wigner's interpretation (which he dropped later anyway) is not the same as proving MWI. Brent Isn't that prove wrong any collapse explanations ? No it just proves wrong theories that say the conscious knowledge of the quantum computer, which is not erased, collapses the wf. That's why I say I'd like to see the experimental setup or at least the theoretical Hamiltonian. Suppose the interference fringes are observed - then we say OK erasing the which-way, but keeping the some-way, information is possible. Suppose the interference fringes aren't observed - then we say it isn't really possible (with the given experiment anyway) to erase the which-way information and keep the some-way information. Although the AI doesn't know which-way, the information is 'out there' just like in the buckyball Young's slit experiment. Brent Hi Brent, Wait... For the the hypothetical quantum computer, what plays the role of the environment (that is an effectively infinite heat reservoir) that the IR radiation of the buckyball's couples to such that they (at some temp) behave classically? Here are a couples of on-line articles: http://www.julianvossandreae.com/Work/C60article/c60article.pdf http://www.flayrah.com/3351/physicist-mulls-double-slit-cat-cannon-experiment -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: Your servitor: 1) Arithmetic (comp) :) Bruno To which I add: 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise to comp. OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. With the CTM ( a better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its consciousness) by the only two laws: Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) or if you prefer: x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x *0 = 0 x*(y + 1) = x*y + x By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an unnecessary magic. I think, Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: Your servitor: 1) Arithmetic (comp) :) Bruno To which I add: 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise to comp. OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for granted. Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't necessary in the first place. You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non-ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other beings in public space. With the CTM ( a better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its consciousness) by the only two laws: Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) Laws? What are those? How do they govern? How do these formulas become perception, understanding, participation, and discovery? I know what sense is, because everything that I can experience makes some kind of sense with in some sensory experience or is itself a sensory experience. 'Two Laws' is an idea which makes intellectual sense but has no presence or effect without a participant who is in some way subject to that presence or effect. Being present and subject to an effect is sense. or if you prefer: x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x *0 = 0 x*(y + 1) = x*y + x By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an unnecessary magic. The perceiver does not have to be added, it is impossible to remove. You are looking at a blackboard in the sky and deciding that it is a doorway to a world in which actual experience comes from the idea of counting. Counting is an experience. Computing requires computers. Computers require sense. I continue to be, Craig I think, Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/oMZxsuwFfmsJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: Your servitor: 1) Arithmetic (comp) :) Bruno To which I add: 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise to comp. OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for granted. Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence, are theorem in the tiny arithmetic. Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't necessary in the first place. By postulating what we want to explain. You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non- ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other beings in public space. You take the problem, and then say it is the solution. That's the god- of-the-gap mistake. We have of course already discuss this. You are just saying don't search. It looks *you* are talking everything for granted at the start, in the theory. With the CTM ( a better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its consciousness) by the only two laws: Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) Laws? What are those? How do they govern? Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x. So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in eleimnainating the left parentheses): KKK = K. For the same reason KSK = S KSS = S K(S K) K = (S K) etc. For example SKK is an identity operator: SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation, = x, by the first equation. S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a Turing universal language/system/machine. How do these formulas become perception, understanding, participation, and discovery? By comp, it exist an SK- combinator which emulates my perception, understanding, participation and discovery. How? By explorartion, self- reference, memorisation, ... that kind of things. Why qualia? Perhaps by the fact that combinators, or numbers, machines, programs, when looking inward, get unjustifiable bunch of information, including unexpressible one. I know what sense is, because everything that I can experience makes some kind of sense with in some sensory experience or is itself a sensory experience. OK. But if we can use the directly obvious at the metalevel, does not mean we can't explain that very use from a simpler level. 'Two Laws' is an idea which makes intellectual sense but has no presence or effect without a participant who is in some way subject to that presence or effect. Being present and subject to an effect is sense. I can't agree more. I appreciate your intuition on the first person. What you say here is the base of defining knowledge of p by a belief in p in case p is true. Kp = Bp p, with p arithmetical, and B too. So any particular knowlegde will be arithmetical, despite Kp is not definable in one strike, in arithmetic. This entails that no machine can know who she really is. She can only give a 3p description of herself or a summary of it (like an identity card). or if you prefer: x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x *0 = 0 x*(y + 1) = x*y + x By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an unnecessary magic. The perceiver does not have to be added, it is impossible to remove. Keep is mind that I am a scientist, or if you prefer, I am simple minded. I expect a theory to be given by what we assume. The theorems will show what is emerging from what we have assumed. If you do not add the perceiver, then tell me precisely what you assume, and how you derive the perceiver from it. In such complex subject, it is very useful to put ALL the cards on the table. That is why I assume a bit of logic, the natural numbers, addition and multiplication, and then, using comp at the metalevel, I show that we need nothing more, and that adding anything more is a sort of treachery, which can deprive the natural quanta/qualia distinction to get derived from self-reference. You are looking at a blackboard in the sky and deciding that it is a doorway to a world in which actual experience comes from the idea of counting. Counting is an experience. Computing requires computers. Computers require sense. I continue to be, Craig You continue to be a good phenomenologist and a bad metaphysician, imo. I would not care so much if you didn't become a consciousness- eliminativist with respect to material and immaterial machines.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations. Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and differentiated. Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum computer that is conscious. Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the conventional view says that conscious observers obey different laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we need a mind that uses quantum properties. In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not say which slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains undamaged. And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at it, if you see interference bands then the many world interpretation is correct. If you do not see interference bands then there are no worlds but this one and the conventional interpretation is correct. Deutsch is saying that in the Copenhagen interpretation when the results of a measurement enters the consciousness of an observer the wave function collapses, in effect all the universes except one disappear without a trace so you get no interference. In the many worlds model all the other worlds will converge back into one universe when the electrons hit the photographic film because the two universes will no longer be different (even though they had different histories), but their influence will still be felt. In the merged universe you'll see indications that the electron went through slot X only and indications that it went through slot Y only, and that's what causes interference. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: Your servitor: 1) Arithmetic (comp) :) Bruno To which I add: 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise to comp. OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for granted. Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence, are theorem in the tiny arithmetic. Tiny compared to what though? As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory-motor primitive, which has no possible explanation. Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of experiences which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of frustration. It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers? Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't necessary in the first place. By postulating what we want to explain. There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense which persists in spite of having no arithmetic value. You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non- ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other beings in public space. You take the problem, and then say it is the solution. The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and solutions. That's the god- of-the-gap mistake. No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos - beneath all gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is sense itself. We have of course already discuss this. You are just saying don't search. You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the only answer that can ever be universally true. It looks *you* are talking everything for granted at the start, in the theory. I take only sense for granted because sense cannot be broken down into any more primitive elements. Everything else can be broken down to sense. With the CTM ( a better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its consciousness) by the only two laws: Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) Laws? What are those? How do they govern? Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x. So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in eleimnainating the left parentheses): KKK = K. For the same reason KSK = S KSS = S K(S K) K = (S K) etc. For example SKK is an identity operator: SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation, = x, by the first equation. S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a Turing universal language/system/machine. Axioms are philosophical. They don't make things happen. Systems don't appear without some capacity to generate and participate in them which exists first. You presume that there is such a thing a Law, but when I ask what you mean by that, you give more details on this specific proposition. I'm asking about the proposition itself though? What Turing universal language allows S and K to 'behave', or to exist or to relate to each other? It's consistent within a particular frame of generalized truth but it has no proprietary traction. It doesn't move eyeballs and cross streets, it just equals or increments. How do these formulas become perception, understanding, participation, and discovery? By comp, it exist an SK- combinator which emulates my perception, understanding, participation and discovery. How? By explorartion, self- reference, memorisation, ... that kind of things. Why qualia? Perhaps by the fact that combinators, or numbers, machines, programs, when looking inward, get unjustifiable bunch of information, including unexpressible one. But this is what we
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations. Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and differentiated. Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum computer that is conscious. Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the conventional view says that conscious observers obey different laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we need a mind that uses quantum properties. In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not say which slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains undamaged. But why should I think this is possible? I'd like to see the actual mechanism or Hamiltonian that allows this. And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at it, if you see interference bands then the many world interpretation is correct. No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory is incorrect. It doesn't follow that MWI is correct. Brent If you do not see interference bands then there are no worlds but this one and the conventional interpretation is correct. Deutsch is saying that in the Copenhagen interpretation when the results of a measurement enters the consciousness of an observer the wave function collapses, in effect all the universes except one disappear without a trace so you get no interference. In the many worlds model all the other worlds will converge back into one universe when the electrons hit the photographic film because the two universes will no longer be different (even though they had different histories), but their influence will still be felt. In the merged universe you'll see indications that the electron went through slot X only and indications that it went through slot Y only, and that's what causes interference. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.2221 / Virus Database: 2634/5453 - Release Date: 12/12/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations. Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and differentiated. Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum computer that is conscious. Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the conventional view says that conscious observers obey different laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we need a mind that uses quantum properties. In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not say which slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains undamaged. But why should I think this is possible? I'd like to see the actual mechanism or Hamiltonian that allows this. And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at it, if you see interference bands then the many world interpretation is correct. No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory is incorrect. It doesn't follow that MWI is correct. If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what does? I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen. And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/12/2012 7:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote: If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what does? I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen. And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI. Jason Hi, It seems to me that we would not observe any sign of a collapse in a local sense even if there actually was one. We only observe the end result, no the process. No? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 12/12/2012 7:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote: If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what does? I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen. And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI. Jason Hi, It seems to me that we would not observe any sign of a collapse in a local sense even if there actually was one. We only observe the end result, no the process. No? Correct. But the CI says you can't learn the result of a measurement without the wave function collapsing. Actually it was never entirely defined when the collapse happened, or what did it, but it was supposed that for any observer to know a result it must have collapsed. For DD's experiment to work, there must be two definite results which are definitely measured and observed., since the collapse never occurred and yet the observer recalled measuring a definite result. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/12/2012 4:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations. Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and differentiated. Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum computer that is conscious. Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the conventional view says that conscious observers obey different laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we need a mind that uses quantum properties. In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not say which slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains undamaged. But why should I think this is possible? I'd like to see the actual mechanism or Hamiltonian that allows this. And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at it, if you see interference bands then the many world interpretation is correct. No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory is incorrect. It doesn't follow that MWI is correct. If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what does? Creating a record of it. I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen. And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI. MWI has the same problem as decoherence theory (except it tries to ignore it): How or what chooses the basis in which the reduced density matrix becomes approximately orthogonal and what is the significance of it not being exact. Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious. Decoherence theory hopes to show it is some objective feature of the experiment, e.g. the Schmidt decomposition and purification has been proposed http://ipg.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=en:courses:2009-2010:qit:lect5quantinfo0910.pdf Neither has really said how to deal with the inexactness of orthogonality, but once you assume you can ignore the off diagonal terms then QM just predicts probabilities, as Omnes says. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/12/2012 5:10 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 12/12/2012 7:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote: If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what does? I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen. And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI. Jason Hi, It seems to me that we would not observe any sign of a collapse in a local sense even if there actually was one. We only observe the end result, no the process. No? Correct. But the CI says you can't learn the result of a measurement without the wave function collapsing. Actually it was never entirely defined when the collapse happened, or what did it, but it was supposed that for any observer to know a result it must have collapsed. For DD's experiment to work, there must be two definite results which are definitely measured and observed., since the collapse never occurred and yet the observer recalled measuring a definite result. I'm not clear on what you mean by two definite results. In order to detect an interference pattern you need to send many particles through Young's slits. So I assume the two results must be an ensemble for which there was no which-way observation by the conscious AI and another ensemble for which the observation was made for each particle, but then quantum-erased. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all. What's not rational about it? I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give coherent reasons'. There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality. But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to keep the same speed, etc. Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention experience in experiment ...). Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already extrapolated. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. Only against theories which postulate objective indeterminacy (and what is that?) to avoid a simpler theory. The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't. That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as first person indeterminacy explains their appearance completely, in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 10 Dec 2012, at 19:54, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 3:08 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: From whose perspective is there a single unique result? From my perspective! Whenever I, the simple non-godlike experimenter, send a photon (or electron) through 2 slits and it hits a photographic I, the simple non-godlike experimenter, always see a single unique result. After the experiment I, the simple non- godlike experimenter, can always say the photon hit right there on the plate and it did not hit way over there on the other side of the plate. The outcome of the 2 slit experiment cannot be predicted precisely but once it is performed and the experimenter knows for certain if the left hand side of the plate box or the right hand side of the plate box should be checked in the lab notebook. After Bruno's experiment should the Washington or Moscow box be checked? Should the experimenter believe the Washington man or the Moscow man or both? If it's both then the experimenter has learned nothing. From the God's-eye view of reality, there certainly is not a single outcome. Perhaps, but I am not God; I applied but unfortunately did not get the job. Your issue is you use the God's-eye view for Bruno's experiment but not for the 2-slit experiment. No. In Bruno's experiment from my perspective, I the simple non- godlike experimenter, always see exactly the same thing, I the simple non-godlike experimenter always see 2 people who have a equal right to call themselves Bruno always check both the Washington box and the Moscow box and thus nothing is learned. And I don't care what God sees because this simple non-godlike experimenter does not believe in God. You need only to believe that both the W-man and the M-man have a first person experience. And both confirms that sometimes they see W, sometimes they see M, and never both. it says that in the 2 slit experiment the absolute value of the square of the value of the Schrodinger wave equation of a photon at a point on a photographic plate will be the classical probability of finding the photon at that point when you develop the plate. This prediction of Quantum Mechanics has been proven to be correct many many times and according to SUAC that's the end of the matter. But those predicted probabilities are more similar to those of Bruno's first person indeterminacy No it is not. Quantum Mechanics could have been disproved by actually performing the 2 slit experiment and obtaining a different probability distribution, but as it happens Quantum Mechanics predicted correctly. However there is no way to check Bruno's prediction about which city you will see due to the inconsistency of what you means, the experiment produces no result. In any case, what Tegmark shows is that when reality gets very big, stuff like QM becomes unavoidable. It doesn't matter. If our universe is big enough to have a exact copy of me in the way that Tegmark talks about then he is so far away that I can never meet him or detect him in any way, not even if I had a infinite (and I DON'T just mean very large) number of years to do it. Due to the expansion of the universe that other John Clark is already moving much much faster than the speed of light away from me, and due to the acceleration of the universe he is moving away even faster every day. If I remember correctly you are a Platonist. I prefer to think of Plato as being a Clarkist, and I don't understand why people keep saying I have a big head. Do you believe there are platonic objects containing patterns complex enough to be conscious? You can't fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747 they need to be implemented with matter, but matter is generic, one aluminum atom is as good as another so its the information that's important. Had QM not been found, it would be strong evidence against the CTM. It took me long time to figure out that acronym and I'm still not sure, I considered Computational Turing Machine but that seemed redundant, then with Google's help I thought about Central Texas Mountaineers and Children's Theater of Madison and Classic Tile and Mosaic, now my best guess is Computer Theory of Mind but I could be wrong. Say there are 2 computers and both are running the Microsoft Word program. I tell you that I am about to type the word red into one computer and the word green into the other computer. The two computers are never connected so each computer outputs a single definite result. Do you agree that there is a 100% chance that Microsoft Word will input the word red from a keyboard and display those ASCII characters on a screen and a 100% chance that Microsoft Word will input the word green from a keyboard and display those ASCII characters on a screen? Yes I do. But that explains things from the God's-eye view. Unfortunately I am
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all. What's not rational about it? I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give coherent reasons'. There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality. But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to keep the same speed, etc. And all those inferences were perfectly rational. The fact that later, more comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that. Rational is not the same as 'always right'. Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's extrapolations. (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention experience in experiment ...). Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already extrapolated. I agree. But the model of reality we build should comport with experience. We don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must include that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/11/2012 7:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. Only against theories which postulate objective indeterminacy (and what is that?) to avoid a simpler theory. The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't. That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as first person indeterminacy explains their appearance completely, It only 'explains' it by recasting the inherent probability into an ignorance of ensemble samples form, but with not possible way of resolving the ignorance, so that the two 'explanations' are strictly equivalent in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM. Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations. Brent Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.2221 / Virus Database: 2634/5450 - Release Date: 12/10/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:05 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all. What's not rational about it? I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give coherent reasons'. There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality. But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to keep the same speed, etc. And all those inferences were perfectly rational. The fact that later, more comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that. Rational is not the same as 'always right'. Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's extrapolations. (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention experience in experiment ...). Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already extrapolated. I agree. But the model of reality we build should comport with experience. We don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must include that. We don't (in this present) experience our conscious state of 5 minutes ago. Would you reject the idea that the universe is a 4-dimensional static structure with no objective present on this basis? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:09 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/11/2012 7:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. Only against theories which postulate objective indeterminacy (and what is that?) to avoid a simpler theory. The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't. That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as first person indeterminacy explains their appearance completely, It only 'explains' it by recasting the inherent probability into an ignorance of ensemble samples form, but with not possible way of resolving the ignorance, so that the two 'explanations' are strictly equivalent in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM. Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations. Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and differentiated. Talking about many worlds as a interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is like talking about dinosaurs as an interpretation of the fossil record. -- David Deutsch Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 12:23:08 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:05 AM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.netjavascript: wrote: On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.netjavascript: wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.netjavascript: wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all. What's not rational about it? I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give coherent reasons'. There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality. But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to keep the same speed, etc. And all those inferences were perfectly rational. The fact that later, more comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that. Rational is not the same as 'always right'. Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's extrapolations. (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention experience in experiment ...). Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already extrapolated. I agree. But the model of reality we build should comport with experience. We don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must include that. We don't (in this present) experience our conscious state of 5 minutes ago. Would you reject the idea that the universe is a 4-dimensional static structure with no objective present on this basis? We know by special relativity that there is no objective present. Simultaneity is relative. We do typically experience our conscious state of 5 minutes ago, unless we have Dementia or some other physiological condition which inhibits memory. The idea that the ordinary world which we experience of visible, tangible phenomena is an unexplained side-effect of an invisible, intangible set of formulas is in no way an improvement on even Cartesian dualism. Descartes, flawed as he was, was light years ahead of all of QM and Information Science in terms of explaining the actual world which we experience as living human beings. Craig (aka erroneously self-localized probabilistic flux parameter haunting the cardinality-vomiting multiverse) Jason -- You received this
Re: Against Mechanism
On 11 Dec 2012, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote: On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all. What's not rational about it? I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give coherent reasons'. There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality. But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to keep the same speed, etc. And all those inferences were perfectly rational. The fact that later, more comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that. Rational is not the same as 'always right'. OK. But I was pointing of the fact that there was a pattern in the mistake, which consists in extrapolating from our experience. Progress along the path Galileo, Einstein, Everett always come from a better distinction between what is, and how it can appear to us. Then in the search of a TOE, we need to use coherent reasons, but we need also a coherent big picture. I agree I tend to use rational is an unusually restricted sense: going from the earth look flat to the earth looks round is rational. Going from the earth looks flat to the earth *is* round is irrational. Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's extrapolations. OK. That is what I meant. (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention experience in experiment ...). Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already extrapolated. I agree. But the model of reality we build should comport with experience. We don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must include that. But we do experience many worlds. We see those interference that we can see, and without collapse, that we don't see, this is a sort of experiencing the many worlds. Like we do experience the roundness of the earth, through travel, media, pictures, etc. If not, we never experience anything physical to start with. We are just more and more conscious of the assumptions we make. Being rational we prefer to explain the complex from the simple than the simple from the complex.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 12:48 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 10:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't. How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse? It seems you need to give up not only determinism, but also locality. Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's proposed experiment: In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right'). The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal probability. I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information (which I think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or otherwise) will leave the atom in an up/down state. Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows? Quantum erasure requires that the which-way information be eliminated from the world. Once an AI consciousness gets the result I think that implies entanglement with the world and after that the result can't be quantum erased. What theory of consciousness are you operating under? CTM or something else? I know Deutsch supposes a quantum computer AI can 'know' there was which-way information even though the which-way information was quantum erased. But I find that doubtful. And even if it's true, the 'reversal' may bring the atom back to 'left'. That is the proposed result that would prove MWI. If the left state is restored always then the universe never collapsed, it split a difference was observed, and a record of observing that difference was stored, then all information pertaining to the result is erased such that the two universes recombine (the split was undone, even though it should have collapsed because the difference was observed). Why do you think it is impossible for a conscious process learn the result and then have that result erased as in the quantum eraser experiment? Because I think consciousness must be quasi-classical. Consciousness needs stable memory and it needs to interact with its environment - together I think that implies it must be essentially classical as a computer. In this case it has stable memory, and is able to interact with its environment, but then all traces of its memory of the which-way result are erased. We operate with unstable memories and forget things, and yet are still conscious. That's one of my reservations about Bruno's oft repeated assertion that he has proven that matter doesn't exist. He says matter exists, but that it is not primitive. It can be explained in terms of something
Re: Against Mechanism
On 11 Dec 2012, at 18:09, meekerdb wrote: On 12/11/2012 7:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. Only against theories which postulate objective indeterminacy (and what is that?) to avoid a simpler theory. The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't. That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as first person indeterminacy explains their appearance completely, It only 'explains' it by recasting the inherent probability into an ignorance of ensemble samples form, It is only realist on what our best theories describe. Both QM-Everett and CTM cannot avoid those ensembles. And they are not just ensemble. In QM Everett its is a universal wave, a solution of the SWE (or Dirac, or deWitt-Wheeler, ...), and in CTM it is a tiny part of the arithmetical reality (which after Gödels appears as something *very* big, and structured in many-ways, with many different inside views. but with not possible way of resolving the ignorance, so that the two 'explanations' are strictly equivalent CTM illustrates the contrary. It is made testable, and up to now the two quantum logic resemble enough. of course it might be a coïncidence, but it is a strong point, imo, that where the UDA tells a quantum probability should appear, we get indeed an arithmetical quantization making something quite quantum like, formally, where we expected it to be, by UDA. in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM. Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations. I disagree on this, despite most would agree with you. But perhaps not Everett itself who talks only about a formulation. And indeed Everett's main contribution in QM is the formulation of a new QM which is just the old QM without the collapse postulate. Everett explains why the observers, in any base in which they can have memories, will believe in probabilities, until they explain this by the wave itself, and a notion of first person (called Subjective by Everett). Then my point is just that if CTM is correct, we have to pursue that move in the whole arithmetic, not just the wave, which is itself selected through a similar self-selection process. I show that it works, thanks to incompleteness, which both makes equivalent all the points of view, p, Bp, Bp p, Bp Dt, Bp Dt p, yet prevent the machines to ever know that, which makes the logics behaving very differently, and giving different views on arithmetical truth, from arithmetical truth. Look at the progress in conceptual elegance of those different theories of reality: Old QM: 1) Wave 2) collapse 3) Unintelligible theory of mind Everett: 1) Wave 2) Arithmetic (comp) Your servitor: 1) Arithmetic (comp) :) Bruno Brent Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.2221 / Virus Database: 2634/5450 - Release Date: 12/10/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/11/2012 9:23 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:05 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all. What's not rational about it? I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give coherent reasons'. There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality. But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to keep the same speed, etc. And all those inferences were perfectly rational. The fact that later, more comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that. Rational is not the same as 'always right'. Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's extrapolations. (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention experience in experiment ...). Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already extrapolated. I agree. But the model of reality we build should comport with experience. We don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must include that. We don't (in this present) experience our conscious state of 5 minutes ago. Would you reject the idea that the universe is a 4-dimensional static structure with no objective present on this basis? No, but I would expect a theory of conscious experience to include that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: Your servitor: 1) Arithmetic (comp) :) Bruno To which I add: 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise to comp. :) Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/pO1qqawKdosJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM. Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations. Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and differentiated. Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum computer that is conscious. If there is a form of the experiment in which the 'a definite up/down value was measured' is recorded objectively but the atom still comes out pointing 'left' then I'd say it's a theory; although I don't see how that would necessitate multiple worlds. It would just be a refutation of the idea that consciousness collapses the wave function. Is there any explicit calculation of how this quantum computer would work, and why it would matter whether it was conscious? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/11/2012 9:53 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 12:48 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 10:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't. How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse? It seems you need to give up not only determinism, but also locality. Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's proposed experiment: In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right'). The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal probability. I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information (which I think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or otherwise) will leave the atom in an up/down state. Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows? Quantum erasure requires that the which-way information be eliminated from the world. Once an AI consciousness gets the result I think that implies entanglement with the world and after that the result can't be quantum erased. What theory of consciousness are you operating under? CTM or something else? I know Deutsch supposes a quantum computer AI can 'know' there was which-way information even though the which-way information was quantum erased. But I find that doubtful. And even if it's true, the 'reversal' may bring the atom back to 'left'. That is the proposed result that would prove MWI. It doesn't prove MWI, it disproves consciousness causes collapse; which is a theory no one holds anymore. If the left state is restored always then the universe never collapsed, it split a difference was observed, and a record of observing that difference was stored, then all information pertaining to the result is erased such that the two universes recombine (the split was undone, even though it should have collapsed because the difference was observed). Only in a Wignerian theory of collapse where 'observed' means
RE: Against Mechanism
Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already extrapolated. Bruno has it down! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:40:58 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote: Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already extrapolated. Bruno has it down! Agreed, but experiencing a single reality is not the same as experiencing qualities of realism - which are a significant aspect of our experience and one which is not supported by a universe of arithmetic phantoms. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/HenDl2YTWD4J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 10 Dec 2012, at 07:32, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, We will never find a common sense interpretation of the sphericity of the Earth. He'd have been right; we didn't, instead we changed 'common sense'. I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). Bruno Brent As to the fable that there are Antipodes, that is to say, men on the opposite side of the earth where the sun rises when it sets to us, men who walk with their feet opposite ours, that is on no ground credible. Even if some unknown landmass is there, and not just ocean, there was only one pair of original ancestors, and it is inconceivable that such distant regions should have been peopled by Adam's descendants. --- St. Augustine -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 12:32 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, We will never find a common sense interpretation of the sphericity of the Earth. He'd have been right; we didn't, instead we changed 'common sense'. I don't know, I think Sagan's explanation fits most people's common sense: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jwr8CLX3NJAt=1m19s I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. It is worse than that. From: http://lesswrong.com/lw/q7/if_manyworlds_had_come_first/ All right, says Nohr. He sighs. Look, if this theory of yours were actually true—if whole sections of the wavefunction just instantaneously vanished—it would be... let's see. The only law in all of quantum mechanics that is non-linear, non-unitary, non-differentiable and discontinuous. It would prevent physics from evolving locally, with each piece only looking at its immediate neighbors. Your 'collapse' would be the only fundamental phenomenon in all of physics with a preferred basis and a preferred space of simultaneity. Collapse would be the only phenomenon in all of physics that violates CPT symmetry, Liouville's Theorem, and Special Relativity. In your original version, collapse would also have been the only phenomenon in all of physics that was inherently mental. Have I left anything out? The page also asks: But suppose that decoherence and macroscopic decoherence had been realized immediately following the discovery of entanglement, in the 1920s. And suppose that no one had proposed collapse theories until 1957. Would decoherence now be steadily declining in popularity, while collapse theories were slowly gaining steam? I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. MWI follows directly from a literal reading of the equations, which contain no mention of collapse or only applying only at certain scales. Even better, the Born rule falls out as Everett himself noticed. If anyone is performing a stretch (postulating new things), it is those in the collapse camp who add new conjectures to the theory in an unjustified effort to preserve the notion of a single universe. The theory itself explains why the other universes are not observed, so pretending we have to augment the theory by adding new postulates (observers, collapse, born rule) to make it agree with our observations is somewhat absurd. In the history of science efforts to keep humanity on the center stage seem to always fail ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o8GA2w-qrcg ). I think that very reason, to keep the Earth near the center of the
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all. What's not rational about it? I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give coherent reasons'. There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:25 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all. What's not rational about it? I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give coherent reasons'. There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality. It is as rational as clinging to geocentric theories on the basis that we don't feel the Earth moving when Newtonian mechanics fully explains not only the motions of the planets but also why we don't feel the Earth move. Everett argued this point best http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/manyworlds/orig-02.html : A crucial point in deciding on a theory is that one does not accept or reject the theory on the basis of whether the basic world picture it presents is compatible with everyday experience. Rather, one accepts or rejects on the basis of whether or not the experience which is predicted by the theory is in accord with actual experience. Let me clarify this point. One of the basic criticisms leveled against the Copernican theory was that the mobility of the earth as a real physical fact is incompatible with the common sense interpretation of nature. In other words, as any fool can plainly see the earth doesn't really move because we don't experience any motion. However, a theory which involves the motion of the earth is not difficult to swallow if it is a complete enough theory that one can also deduce that no motion will be felt by the earth's inhabitants (as was possible with Newtonian physics). Thus, in order to decide whether or not a theory contradicts our experience, it is necessary to see what the theory itself predicts our experience will be. Now in your letter you say, the trajectory of the memory configuration of a real physical observer, on the other hand, does not branch. I can testify to this from personal introspection, as can you. I simply do not branch. I can't resist asking: Do you feel the motion of the earth? In another place: ...Everett's theory contains all possible branches in it at the same time. In the real physical world we must be content with just one branch. Everett's world and the real physical world are therefore not isomorphic. Yet another: But the real world does not branch, and therein lies the flaw in Everett's scheme. I must confess that I do not see this branching process as the vast contradiction that you do. The theory is in full accord with our experience (at least insofar as ordinary quantum
Re: Against Mechanism
On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't. How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse? It seems you need to give up not only determinism, but also locality. Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's proposed experiment: In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right'). The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal probability. If the Everett approach is correct then the atom will be in the same state that it was in before the measurement, it will still have a 'left' spin. --- http://www.thestargarden.co.uk/EvidenceOfParallelWorlds.html Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/10/2012 5:41 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 12:32 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, We will never find a common sense interpretation of the sphericity of the Earth. He'd have been right; we didn't, instead we changed 'common sense'. I don't know, I think Sagan's explanation fits most people's common sense: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jwr8CLX3NJAt=1m19s http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jwr8CLX3NJAt=1m19s I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. It is worse than that. From: http://lesswrong.com/lw/q7/if_manyworlds_had_come_first/ All right, says Nohr. He sighs. Look, if this theory of yours were actually true—if whole sections of the wavefunction just instantaneously vanished—it would be... let's see. The only law in all of quantum mechanics that is non-linear, non-unitary, non-differentiable and discontinuous. It would prevent physics from evolving locally, with each piece only looking at its immediate neighbors. Your 'collapse' would be the only fundamental phenomenon in all of physics with a preferred basis and a preferred space of simultaneity. Collapse would be the only phenomenon in all of physics that violates CPT symmetry, Liouville's Theorem, and Special Relativity. In your original version, collapse would also have been the only phenomenon in all of physics that was inherently mental. Have I left anything out? The page also asks: But suppose that decoherence and macroscopic decoherence had been realized immediately following the discovery of entanglement, in the 1920s. And suppose that no one had proposed collapse theories until 1957. Would decoherence now be steadily declining in popularity, while collapse theories were slowly gaining steam? I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. MWI follows directly from a literal reading of the equations, which contain no mention of collapse or only applying only at certain scales. No it doesn't. It is no more than decoherence, which means that in a selected basis the reduced density matrix becomes approximately diagonal. At that point Everett says the different diagonal eigenvalues are the
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't. How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse? It seems you need to give up not only determinism, but also locality. Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's proposed experiment: In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right'). The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal probability. I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information (which I think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or otherwise) will leave the atom in an up/down state. You keep asking me about 'collapse', but Copenhagen's physical collapse is not the same as Omnes epistemic collapse. Brent If the Everett approach is correct then the atom will be in the same state that it was in before the measurement, it will still have a 'left' spin. --- http://www.thestargarden.co.uk/EvidenceOfParallelWorlds.html Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.2221 / Virus Database: 2634/5449 - Release Date: 12/10/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Dec 10, 2012, at 12:54 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 3:08 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: From whose perspective is there a single unique result? From my perspective! Whenever I, the simple non-godlike experimenter, send a photon (or electron) through 2 slits and it hits a photographic I, the simple non-godlike experimenter, always see a single unique result. As do the duplicates. After the experiment I, the simple non-godlike experimenter, can always say the photon hit right there on the plate and it did not hit way over there on the other side of the plate. And each duplicate can say I ended up here and not there. The outcome of the 2 slit experiment cannot be predicted precisely but once it is performed and the experimenter knows for certain if the left hand side of the plate box or the right hand side of the plate box should be checked in the lab notebook. After Bruno's experiment should the Washington or Moscow box be checked? It depends which duplicate you are. Should the experimenter believe the Washington man or the Moscow man or both? You forget, the experimenter is the one duplicated. He listens only to his local self, after the duplication. Just as you check the box corresponding to where the photon was observed in your local history. If it's both then the experimenter has learned nothing. It's not, each duplicate has only one local self to listen to. From the God's-eye view of reality, there certainly is not a single outcome. Perhaps, but I am not God; I applied but unfortunately did not get the job. Maybe you did but forgot. Your issue is you use the God's-eye view for Bruno's experiment but not for the 2-slit experiment. No. In Bruno's experiment from my perspective, I the simple non- godlike experimenter, always see exactly the same thing, The experimenter is duplicated. Sometimes he finds himself in Moscow other times Washington. I the simple non-godlike experimenter always see 2 people who have a equal right to call themselves Bruno always check both the Washington box and the Moscow box and thus nothing is learned. That's the third person omniscient view. Pretend there is only one person in the world, John Clark, and he is duplicated. What would that experience seem like? Could you rule out whether you were randomly transported to either Washington or Moscow or if you were duplicated to both (without looking for your duplicate at the other location)? And I don't care what God sees because this simple non-godlike experimenter does not believe in God. it says that in the 2 slit experiment the absolute value of the square of the value of the Schrodinger wave equation of a photon at a point on a photographic plate will be the classical probability of finding the photon at that point when you develop the plate. This prediction of Quantum Mechanics has been proven to be correct many many times and according to SUAC that's the end of the matter. But those predicted probabilities are more similar to those of Bruno's first person indeterminacy No it is not. Quantum Mechanics could have been disproved by actually performing the 2 slit experiment and obtaining a different probability distribution, but as it happens Quantum Mechanics predicted correctly. However there is no way to check Bruno's prediction about which city you will see due to the inconsistency of what you means, the experiment produces no result. In any case, what Tegmark shows is that when reality gets very big, stuff like QM becomes unavoidable. It doesn't matter. If our universe is big enough to have a exact copy of me in the way that Tegmark talks about then he is so far away that I can never meet him or detect him in any way, not even if I had a infinite (and I DON'T just mean very large) number of years to do it. Due to the expansion of the universe that other John Clark is already moving much much faster than the speed of light away from me, and due to the acceleration of the universe he is moving away even faster every day. So far away duplication leads to definite results? That's good you think so. Uue those two far away locations (instead of W and M) and you make step 3 work for yourself. Now you can go on to step 4. If I remember correctly you are a Platonist. I prefer to think of Plato as being a Clarkist, and I don't understand why people keep saying I have a big head. Do you believe there are platonic objects containing patterns complex enough to be conscious? You can't fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747 they need to be implemented with matter, but matter is generic, one aluminum atom is as good as another so its the information that's important. And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how? Had QM not been found, it would be strong evidence
Re: Against Mechanism
On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't. How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse? It seems you need to give up not only determinism, but also locality. Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's proposed experiment: In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right'). The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal probability. I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information (which I think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or otherwise) will leave the atom in an up/down state. Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows? Why do you think it is impossible for a conscious process learn the result and then have that result erased as in the quantum eraser experiment? You keep asking me about 'collapse', but Copenhagen's physical collapse is not the same as Omnes epistemic collapse. I am sorry. I don't feel I have a good understanding of what the distinction is. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/10/2012 10:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical reality). That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't. How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse? It seems you need to give up not only determinism, but also locality. Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's proposed experiment: In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right'). The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal probability. I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information (which I think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or otherwise) will leave the atom in an up/down state. Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows? Quantum erasure requires that the which-way information be eliminated from the world. Once an AI consciousness gets the result I think that implies entanglement with the world and after that the result can't be quantum erased. I know Deutsch supposes a quantum computer AI can 'know' there was which-way information even though the which-way information was quantum erased. But I find that doubtful. And even if it's true, the 'reversal' may bring the atom back to 'left'. Why do you think it is impossible for a conscious process learn the result and then have that result erased as in the quantum eraser experiment? Because I think consciousness must be quasi-classical. Consciousness needs stable memory and it needs to interact with its environment - together I think that implies it must be essentially classical as a computer. That's one of my reservations about Bruno's oft repeated assertion that he has proven that matter doesn't exist. When pressed he allows that it may exist, but only derivatively within the computations of the UD. But it seems to me likely that it, or something very like it, must exist (derivatively of not) in order that consciousness exist; that 'matter' is necessary for consciousness of a human kind to exist. You keep asking me about 'collapse', but Copenhagen's physical collapse is not the same as Omnes epistemic collapse. I am sorry. I don't feel I have a good understanding of what the distinction is. Omnes looks at it as a mathematical operation
Re: Against Mechanism
On 09 Dec 2012, at 02:23, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: People change over time and the meaning of the pronoun associated with that changing person will change over time too, and the meaning of the pronoun will change even more suddenly if a duplicating chamber is used. But both remember the protocol, and make sense of the P=1/2, and use it correctly in future iterated experiences. I suppose P=1/2 comes from an implicit symmetry. But that's not analogous to probabilities in QM which and take a range of real values. And that's one of the problems with Everett's MWI - it implies that when there are two equi-probable choices then there must be two orthogonal worlds which by symmetry have probability 1/2, but if the two outcomes have probabilities 0.5+x and 0.5-x where x is some transcendental number then infinitely many parallel worlds must come into existence to instantiate the right measure, even though x is very small. In QM+CTM, the probabilities are given by P = A^2 (with A the amplitude of the wave, and it gives the relative measure, always on an infinite sets of worlds). I know this can be debated (and infinities can be replaced by big numbers in some discrete physics, but they contradict CTM). In pure CTM, you can manage to have any proportion you want in any iteration, if only by killing some consistent extensions. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 12:37 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If I understand your point correctly the deciding factor of an experiment's value is whether there is a result obtained not known before the experiment is conducted. If a experiment produces nothing surprising then nothing is learned, and ever time Bruno's experiment is preformed the result is always the same, every box that can be checked in the lab notebook will be checked. Further, you argue that in the case of QM (under the MWI), or in the case of duplicating entire Hubble volumes there is a definite result MWI is just something to help to figure out what a theory means, but it doesn't effect the numbers obtained for a experiment so forget it, in fact forget the theory too, forget Quantum mechanics; the 2-slit experiment always produces a unique result and one that can not be predicted beforehand. From whose perspective is there a single unique result? From the God's-eye view of reality, there certainly is not a single outcome. Your issue is you use the God's-eye view for Bruno's experiment but not for the 2-slit experiment. And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. it says that in the 2 slit experiment the absolute value of the square of the value of the Schrodinger wave equation of a photon at a point on a photographic plate will be the classical probability of finding the photon at that point when you develop the plate. This prediction of Quantum Mechanics has been proven to be correct many many times and according to SUAC that's the end of the matter. But those predicted probabilities are more similar to those of Bruno's first person indeterminacy than the strict 100% for all possibilities that your reasoning seems to predict. Someone with assumptions would have a pretty easy time disproving the MWI of QM, but you not only do not reject MWI, but appear to favor it. Thus there is a contradiction somewhere. It is why I keep returning to the MWI in this thread. because those who observe different results cannot communicate with each other. This suggests the value of the experiment is in some part determined by how far apart the duplicates are separated. One can always say that the results of a experiment could be invalidated if new information is obtained, but in the case of the 2-slit experiment this new information is not only unavailable it is in another universe and so can never be available even in theory. Perhaps then 10^1000 light years is sufficient? Such duplicates who could prove us wrong may in fact exist far far away. Max Tegmark has calculated that due to the limited number of quantum states a fixed volume can be in that statistically there is a duplicate exactly identical to you less than 10^10^28 meters away and 10^10^118 meters away there is an entire Hubble volume exactly identical to ours. Yes, assuming the universe is much much much much bigger than anything we will ever be able to observe, assuming that the universe is perfectly flat and so doesn't curve around and form a finite multidimensional sphere before it is allowed to get that big. And at present there is little evidence to support that view and little evidence to refute it. It's true that recently it has been found, from closely measuring the cosmic microwave background radiation, that the universe is pretty flat so we know for sure it's much bigger than what we can see, but we don't know for sure that it's anywhere close to being big enough for what Tegmark is talking about. This reminded me a bit of The Presumptuous Philosopher thought experiment: It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a theory of everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories, T1 and T2 (using considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to T1 the world is very, very big but finite, and there are a total of a trillion trillion observers in the cosmos. According to T2, the world is very, very, very big but finite, and there are a trillion trillion trillion observers. The super-duper symmetry considerations seem to be roughly indifferent between these two theories. The physicists are planning on carrying out a simple experiment that will falsify one of the theories. Enter the presumptuous philosopher: Hey guys, it is completely unnecessary for you to do the experiment, because I can already show to you that T2 is about a trillion times more likely to be true than T1 (whereupon the philosopher runs the God’s Coin Toss thought experiment and explains Model 3)! One suspects the Nobel Prize committee to be a bit hesitant about awarding the presumptuous philosopher the big one for this contribution. In any case, what Tegmark shows is that when
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: This reminded me a bit of The Presumptuous Philosopher thought experiment: It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a theory of everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories, T1 and T2 (using considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to T1 the world is very, very big but finite, and there are a total of a trillion trillion observers in the cosmos. According to T2, the world is very, very, very big but finite, and there are a trillion trillion trillion observers. The super-duper symmetry considerations seem to be roughly indifferent between these two theories. The physicists are planning on carrying out a simple experiment that will falsify one of the theories. Enter the presumptuous philosopher: Hey guys, it is completely unnecessary for you to do the experiment, because I can already show to you that T2 is about a trillion times more likely to be true than T1 (whereupon the philosopher runs the God’s Coin Toss thought experiment and explains Model 3)! One suspects the Nobel Prize committee to be a bit hesitant about awarding the presumptuous philosopher the big one for this contribution. Which is why the anthropic principle is useless until you have something else determine the ontology. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), That's not an interpretation at all. Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it. Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The shut up and calculate mindset can be translated as don't ask embarrassing questions, it is the antithesis of scientific thinking. Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun? Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so shut up and calculate! Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer. So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world. It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself. To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, We will never find a common sense interpretation of the sphericity of the Earth. He'd have been right; we didn't, instead we changed 'common sense'. I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations. But why isn't It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule. a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities deterministic in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement. Brent As to the fable that there are Antipodes, that is to say, men on the opposite side of the earth where the sun rises when it sets to us, men who walk with their feet opposite ours, that is on no ground credible. Even if some unknown landmass is there, and not just ocean, there was only one pair of original ancestors, and it is inconceivable that such distant regions should have been peopled by Adam's descendants. --- St. Augustine -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 07 Dec 2012, at 18:33, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Doing the experience yourself Which one is yourself after duplication? One of them with P = 1/2. That neatly sums up the entire problem, Indeed. the insistence that there is only one correct answer to the question what city will you see? even though you have been duplicated; Because with the CTM, you can't feel the split. You remain one and unique from any or your first person b-view after the duplication, as both copies can confirmed. and the probability figure is worse than useless. Not really, but you have to proceed in the reasoning to see this. AFTER a good experiment has been performed nothing has a probability of 1/2, everything has a probability of 1 or 0. But evaluation of future result of an experiment is done before. After the experiment both will claim to be yourself Rightly so by CTM. and a third party would agree with both of them because a third party could not find any reason to accept one claim and reject the other. OK, but we were specifically NOT asking for the 3-view after duplication, but for the 1-views. And both confirmed a specific city, and no ability to have been able to predict which one. And I have NOT forgotten that each will see one city and one city only, and I have not forgotten that Bruno Marchal's question which one will see Moscow? is a silly question. The question is not which one will see Moscow. that's a silly question indeed. the question is asked before, to the H-man, and the question is how do you evaluate the chance of living the Moscow (or Washington) experience. Seeing Moscow is the one and only thing that turns the Helsinki man into the man who sees Moscow, so the man who sees Moscow will be the Moscow man and the Moscow man will be the man that sees Moscow. That is not deep, tautologies seldom are, but you've built your philosophy on top of it. Trivially, but again you elude the question asked. I can think of examples where you and another are identical in the 3p and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical in the 1p but not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you and another are identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you? Yes, with identical in the sense that I am identical with me in the morning. In other words in no sense whatsoever, you are different from what you were this morning in the 3p view and thus obviously in the 1-p view. This contradicts the fact that you ahev agreed that both the M-man and the W-man can identify themselves with the H-man, but not with their respective doppelganger after the duplication. You remember being Bruno Marchal this morning even though you're different, I am different, I feel different, but I am the same person. and Moscow is different from what it was this morning too but it's convenient to use the same word for both. People change over time and the meaning of the pronoun associated with that changing person will change over time too, and the meaning of the pronoun will change even more suddenly if a duplicating chamber is used. But both remember the protocol, and make sense of the P=1/2, and use it correctly in future iterated experiences. You forget that a unique person can be in many different states. And I hope I never remember it because that is nonsense, if there are different versions of something then it's not unique. Then you die at each instant, and CTM becomes meaningless. There is no more sense at all for the word survive. Even for a heart operation. he is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his (unique) diary, open the door, and write I see both W and M. He is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his (unique) diary, open the door, and write I see W or M. I meant he will push on the button. I ill probably write only W, or only M. This makes the W or M prediction correct, by definition of or. But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki) which city each of them is seeing right now Each of them? In Helsinki there is no each of them for the Helsinki man to pick out, there is only one person. A person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment. I don't understand what you're trying to say because that is not a complete sentence. What about a person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment? It is the H-man, before the experience. He know s with certainty (by CTM, right level, etc.) that he will survive one and entiore in a unique city. Both can confirmed that after. None can confirm W and M. The Helsinki man can say the one that sees Moscow will be the Moscow man That does not help. It does not help what? I admit it doesn't help picking the man who will see Moscow Again, the question is not in picking the
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/8/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: People change over time and the meaning of the pronoun associated with that changing person will change over time too, and the meaning of the pronoun will change even more suddenly if a duplicating chamber is used. But both remember the protocol, and make sense of the P=1/2, and use it correctly in future iterated experiences. I suppose P=1/2 comes from an implicit symmetry. But that's not analogous to probabilities in QM which and take a range of real values. And that's one of the problems with Everett's MWI - it implies that when there are two equi-probable choices then there must be two orthogonal worlds which by symmetry have probability 1/2, but if the two outcomes have probabilities 0.5+x and 0.5-x where x is some transcendental number then infinitely many parallel worlds must come into existence to instantiate the right measure, even though x is very small. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Doing the experience yourself Which one is yourself after duplication? One of them with P = 1/2. That neatly sums up the entire problem, the insistence that there is only one correct answer to the question what city will you see? even though you have been duplicated; and the probability figure is worse than useless. AFTER a good experiment has been performed nothing has a probability of 1/2, everything has a probability of 1 or 0. After the experiment both will claim to be yourself and a third party would agree with both of them because a third party could not find any reason to accept one claim and reject the other. And I have NOT forgotten that each will see one city and one city only, and I have not forgotten that Bruno Marchal's question which one will see Moscow? is a silly question. Seeing Moscow is the one and only thing that turns the Helsinki man into the man who sees Moscow, so the man who sees Moscow will be the Moscow man and the Moscow man will be the man that sees Moscow. That is not deep, tautologies seldom are, but you've built your philosophy on top of it. I can think of examples where you and another are identical in the 3p and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical in the 1p but not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you and another are identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you? Yes, with identical in the sense that I am identical with me in the morning. In other words in no sense whatsoever, you are different from what you were this morning in the 3p view and thus obviously in the 1-p view. You remember being Bruno Marchal this morning even though you're different, and Moscow is different from what it was this morning too but it's convenient to use the same word for both. People change over time and the meaning of the pronoun associated with that changing person will change over time too, and the meaning of the pronoun will change even more suddenly if a duplicating chamber is used. You forget that a unique person can be in many different states. And I hope I never remember it because that is nonsense, if there are different versions of something then it's not unique. he is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his (unique) diary, open the door, and write I see both W and M. He is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his (unique) diary, open the door, and write I see W or M. But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki) which city each of them is seeing right now Each of them? In Helsinki there is no each of them for the Helsinki man to pick out, there is only one person. A person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment. I don't understand what you're trying to say because that is not a complete sentence. What about a person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment? The Helsinki man can say the one that sees Moscow will be the Moscow man That does not help. It does not help what? I admit it doesn't help picking the man who will see Moscow because in Helsinki there is nothing to pick from due to the fact that the man who sees Moscow won't exist until there is a man who sees Moscow, so I can't pick the man who sees Moscow in Helsinki. Not deep but true. If Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle did not exist then the world would be different, I could measure both the position and velocity of a particle with infinite accuracy, and that's how I know it's talking about something real. Suppose, just suppose that this 1-P indeterminacy stuff of yours did not exist, how would the world be different? Computationalism would be false. So if indeterminacy of the 1-P sort did not exist then computationalism, a purely deterministic process, could not exist. That does not compute. hard to say how this can look. Hard indeed, and you've hit the nail exactly on the head. It doesn't matter if 1-P indeterminacy exists or not because with or without it even AFTER the experiment (forget about using it to make predictions) things would look exactly the same. With or without it there would still be 2 people insisting that they were yourself and a third party could still find no reason to think that one claim was stronger than the other. And so 1-P indeterminacy joins luminiferous aether as something that doesn't exist or makes no difference if it does. Without 1-P indeterminacy how would the Helsinki man respond to the question what city will you see? You tell me. You are the one assuming that such a thing is possible. I'm not assuming anything, I'm showing that it makes no difference if 1-P indeterminacy exists or not, so busy men should do other things with their time than obsess over it. So without 1-p indeterminacy, please tell me how you predict, and how you confirm. More exactly how this is confirmed from the first person points of view. I will tell you as soon as you
Re: Against Mechanism
On 05 Dec 2012, at 16:32, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: a observer who did not want to play games and honestly wanted to convey the maximum amount of information would NOT say from a first person view I saw W or M. And I meant that me would say I saw M AND me would say I saw W. This is not relevant. The question is about confirming a prediction made before the duplication. And Bruno's prediction was that somebody by the mane of me would say I saw W or M, Wrong. See previous explanations. but nobody said that, certainly not me. This entire problem is caused by the inability of some to realize that in a world that has working duplicating chambers and pronouns are still used with abandon just like they are in our world without duplicating chambers then the end result can only be tautologies or gibberish. If they are identical the one in W does not even know if he's in W or M, and the same is true of the one in M. So when the W-man look around and see W, he does not know it is W? If the W-man looks around and the M-man does not then they are no longer identical, and if nobody looks around then there is no W man or M man regardless of where they are, there is just one man, the Helsinki man in a box. Irrelevant. but now they have differentiated. Yes but not at the instant of duplication, at the instant one sees something the other does not. ? Which word didn't you understand? The ? was for Does John ever listen to what is asked to the guy in Helsinki? he is asked to evaluate the chance to see W after pushing the box *and* opening the box? He believes in comp so he agree he will survive. He knows in advance that he can feel himself surviving only in one city, as it is the case for all possible eventualities. One will write only W in the diary, and the other will write only M. And the question beared on that accessible first person experience which concerns the result after differentiation. You continue to avoid the question. It looks like you fake to not understand it. When you drink vodka in Moscow, and drink whisky in Washington. You are still the same H-man Yes. but yet have different 1p view, as vodka taste differently than whisky. Yes and now a third party would now find a difference between the two men too. OK. Other example I am the same guy now, as I was this morning when teaching math. But my 1p now is quite different than from this morning. In this case a conscious being is different in the 3 p and the 1p. I can think of examples where you and another are identical in the 3p and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical in the 1p but not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you and another are identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you? Yes, with identical in the sense that I am identical with me in the morning. And the W-man and M-man are both not identical between themselves, yet identical with the H-man. There is no paradox, the H- man has been duplicated. But that is why he is indeterminated on its future 1-views in such cases. he cannot predict I will feel to be in W with certainty, as he knows (being computationalist) that the one in Moscow will have to acknowlegde he was wrong. You should not conflate being the same person with being the same 3p body or same 1p mind. You admit that it's impossible to have 2 brains identical from the 3p but not from the 1p; and yet you confidently state the above. It does not compute. You forget that a unique person can be in many different states. It is typical for the same person to change its mind. And if you've changed your mind then you've changed your brain too, you've changed the state of your brain because mind is what the brain does. you can't use Leibniz rule for identity. I duplicate you. You and your identical copy are in 2 identical sealed boxes. I instantaneously exchange the position of you and the copy. A third person cannot tell that anything has happened. You can not tell that anything has happened. The copy can not tell that anything has happened. So unless you can find a difference that is neither objective nor subjective then there is no difference between you and the copy. But we have agreed that even after opening the box, and differentiated they are the same man, That is NOT what I agreed to! After opening that box and seeing different things they are no longer each other, Yes. But they are still the same man as the H-guy. they are separate people and different from each other from BOTH the 3p and the 1P view, and this in no way contradicts the fact that they both retain the right to be called the H-man because THE H-MAN HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. So, how could the H-man be sure he will end up as the W-man? he is certain of one thing, he will not push
Re: Against Mechanism
On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: a observer who did not want to play games and honestly wanted to convey the maximum amount of information would NOT say from a first person view I saw W or M. And I meant that me would say I saw M AND me would say I saw W. This is not relevant. The question is about confirming a prediction made before the duplication. And Bruno's prediction was that somebody by the mane of me would say I saw W or M, but nobody said that, certainly not me. This entire problem is caused by the inability of some to realize that in a world that has working duplicating chambers and pronouns are still used with abandon just like they are in our world without duplicating chambers then the end result can only be tautologies or gibberish. If they are identical the one in W does not even know if he's in W or M, and the same is true of the one in M. So when the W-man look around and see W, he does not know it is W? If the W-man looks around and the M-man does not then they are no longer identical, and if nobody looks around then there is no W man or M man regardless of where they are, there is just one man, the Helsinki man in a box. but now they have differentiated. Yes but not at the instant of duplication, at the instant one sees something the other does not. ? Which word didn't you understand? Only in the 3-sense [...] Only in the 3-sense? ONLY?! I repeat my request yet again, without invoking the supernatural please give a example of 2 beings identical from the 3p but not from the 1p You keep asking me that. It is impossible, Then why do you keep complaining that I've answered the question only in the 3-sense?!?? When you drink vodka in Moscow, and drink whisky in Washington. You are still the same H-man Yes. but yet have different 1p view, as vodka taste differently than whisky. Yes and now a third party would now find a difference between the two men too. Other example I am the same guy now, as I was this morning when teaching math. But my 1p now is quite different than from this morning. In this case a conscious being is different in the 3 p and the 1p. I can think of examples where you and another are identical in the 3p and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical in the 1p but not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you and another are identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you? You should not conflate being the same person with being the same 3p body or same 1p mind. You admit that it's impossible to have 2 brains identical from the 3p but not from the 1p; and yet you confidently state the above. It does not compute. It is typical for the same person to change its mind. And if you've changed your mind then you've changed your brain too, you've changed the state of your brain because mind is what the brain does. you can't use Leibniz rule for identity. I duplicate you. You and your identical copy are in 2 identical sealed boxes. I instantaneously exchange the position of you and the copy. A third person cannot tell that anything has happened. You can not tell that anything has happened. The copy can not tell that anything has happened. So unless you can find a difference that is neither objective nor subjective then there is no difference between you and the copy. But we have agreed that even after opening the box, and differentiated they are the same man, That is NOT what I agreed to! After opening that box and seeing different things they are no longer each other, they are separate people and different from each other from BOTH the 3p and the 1P view, and this in no way contradicts the fact that they both retain the right to be called the H-man because THE H-MAN HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. You try hard to avoid the question asked. I try hard to understand the question asked, but in the middle of a ambiguous pronoun blizzard it is very hard indeed. But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki) which city each of them is seeing right now Each of them? In Helsinki there is no each of them for the Helsinki man to pick out, there is only one person. The Helsinki man can say the one that sees Moscow will be the Moscow man and becomes the Moscow man by seeing Moscow, and the one that sees Washington will be the Washington man and becomes the Washington man by seeing Washington. I don't understand what more you expect the poor Helsinki man to say. If Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle did not exist then the world would be different, I could measure both the position and velocity of a particle with infinite accuracy, and that's how I know it's talking about something real. Suppose, just suppose that this 1-P indeterminacy stuff of yours did not exist, how would the world be different? Without 1-P indeterminacy how would the Helsinki man respond to the question what city will you see? and even more important how could we confirm
Re: Against Mechanism
On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 1:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wheeler%27s_delayed_choice_experiment:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wheeler%27s_delayed_choice_experiment If the experimenters know which slit it goes through, the photon will behave as a particle. If they do not know which slit it goes through, the photon will behave as if it were a wave when it is given an opportunity to interfere with itself. That's why you need to read the technical papers I did read them but apparently you just skimmed them because in the very paper that you recommended I found the following quotes in black and white and plain as day: QM predicts that without which-path information, photons arriving from either A or B should interfere and distribute themselves one-by-one according to the statistical distribution of interfering waves. Mind you, if we *did* have which-path information, the results should be quite different. In that case, QM would predict the clumping pattern typical of particle motion. And this: QM predicts that if which-path information is not available at the time of measurement, the pattern will be an interference pattern, as though wave-like photons passed through both slits and interfered with themselves to produce the distinctive interference pattern of hits. And this: Because which-path information is not available for photons registered at D0 even after a joint detection at the post-erasure detectors D1 and D2, we learn nothing new about the detections that have occurred at D0 and so QM predicts that R01 and R02 will exhibit this interference pattern in counting photon hits at D0. And this: QM also predicts that if which-path information is available at the time of measurement, the pattern will be a clumping, as though particle-like photons passed through a slit and on to a detector in a more-or-less straight line. Because which-path information is available for photons registered at D0 once a joint detection has been indicated at the pre-erasure detectors D3 and D4, QM predicts that R03 and R04 will exhibit this clumping pattern. And this: To be sure the interference pattern disappears when which-path information is obtained. But it reappears when we erase (quantum erasure) the which-path information. And it is this last quote that explains what the entire experiment is about. Everybody agrees that if which-way information exists then photons (or electrons) will NOT produce a interference pattern, but if which way information does NOT exist then the photons WILL produce a interference pattern; The delayed choice experiment that you're talking about asked a different question, what would happen if you recorded which slit the photons went through but in the time it took for the photons to move from the slits to the photographic plate (or electronic detector) that information was quantum erased? It was found that in that case there was a interference pattern just as QM predicted. It's a very non-intuitive result, you'd think the photon or electron went through slot X or it went through slot Y and erasing the information on which slot it was AFTER it had already gone through the slits (but before it hit the detector) should have no effect, but QM says it will have a effect and if human beings find that odd then tough. And now the delayed choice experiment has been performed and we find that QM was right and human intuition was wrong. instead of Wikipedia. I didn't just quote Wikipedia I quoted 3 other papers and now I've quoted a fourth and it's from the very paper you recommended. The above is correct when there are just photons going through one pair of slits. But in the Delayed Quantum Eraser experiment there are *two* entangled photons one of which goes through slits and one of which *could be detected and give which-way information*. Yes that other photon could give which-way information and if it still exists when its twin hits the photographic plate (or electronic detector) no interference pattern will form. But if quantum erasure is used to destroy the which-way information the photon has then its twin WILL construct a interference pattern. You're confusing the photon that contains which way information about its brother photon (information that may or may not be erased before its brother hits the detector at the whim of the experimenter) from the photon that will or will not (depending on if that which way information is erased or not) actually produce the interference pattern. What is crystal clear is that if which way information still exists when the photon hits the detector the photon behaves like a particle and there is no interference pattern but if that which way information is erased, even if it's erased 10 years after it went through the slits and one nanosecond before it hits the photographic plate (or electronic detector) the photon behaves like a wave and a interference pattern is produced. Yes it's