subject:"RE\: COMP refutation paper \- finally out"

On Tue, Aug 9, 2011 at 5:14 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> **
> On 8/9/2011 1:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 9, 2011 at 2:13 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 8/9/2011 7:37 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Aug 9, 2011, at 1:38 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>  On 8/8/2011 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your
>>> theory
>>> is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would
>>> I
>>> believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way*
>>> (namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?
>>>
>>>
>> Ben,
>>
>> Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value even
>> though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or will ever (in
>> this universe at least) be conscious of it?  If I assert the digit happens
>> to be 8, would you agree that my assertion must be either true or false?  If
>> so, where does this truth exist?
>>
>> Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that its value
>> is inconsequential because that level of precision will never make a
>> difference in any equation we work with.  Euler's identity: e^(Pi * i) + 1 =
>> 0, would be false without each of the infinite digits of Pi having a
>> definite and certain value.  These values that are unknown to use, but
>> nonetheless must be there.
>>
>>
>> Mathematical existence isn't a matter of being "there", it's a matter of
>> satisfying, making true, a certain proposition.  So why does the putative
>> digit of pi have the value it does, because it satisfies certain
>> propositions which we infer from other propositions we are pleased to hold
>> hypothetically true as axioms.
>>
>>
>>  Then what is the ontological status of propositions that are true but
>> not provable in ones set of hypothetitcally held axioms?
>>
>>  In that case there is something that is true but not reachable through
>> chains of propositions.
>>
>>
>>  Why is that a problem.  There's a refrigerator in my kitchen.  I reach it
>> through a doorway, not a chain of propositions.
>>
>>
>  So you refridgerator exists, not because it is reachable through a
> doorway or not.  It's existence is independent of doorways in the same way
> mathematical truth is independent of axioms.
>
>
> Notice that you switched predicates from "exists" to "true".
>
>
The truth that "9 is composite" depends on the existence of its factor 3.


>
>
>
>>
>>
>>  Existence in the usual sense never enters into it.
>>
>>
>>  Do you think our universe is mathematical or magical?
>>
>>
>>  I think it's physical -- I'm just not sure what that means.
>>
>>
>  This is the crux of the issue.  What is different between a physical
> object as seen from the inside and a mathematical object as seen from the
> inside?
>
>
> It is not clear to me what it means to "see a mathematical object from the
> inside".
>
>
>
What I mean is: Assume there is an object in Plato's heaven which is
identical to the 4D structure of this physical universe.  Could the Brent
inside that object determine he is in an object in Plato's heaven, rather
than a physical universe?  If he can't then what additional information is
added by the label "physical"?


>
>
>>
>>
>>  If our universe can be understood mathematically then it is one example
>> of a mathematical object that has physical existence.
>>
>>
>>  Can understand that the number of dwarves is seven.  That doesn't mean
>> the Seven Dwarves exist.  "To understand mathematically" just means to have
>> a mathematical model that works.
>>
>>
>  Again, take into account what I asked above, on the difference between a
> perfect mathematical representation of our universe and a physical universe.
>  If there is no difference that makes a difference why consider them
> different?
>
>
> The physical one is here.
>

Maybe you are the Brent inside the object in Plato's heaven, and you are
confusing here for over there, where the real "physical" universe is.


>   There is no perfect representation of the universe and it is certainly
> not a given that such could exist.
>

How can something exist if it can't be represented in any theory by any one?


>
> What more evidence would you need to believe mathematical objects exist?
>>
>>
>>  I haven't seen any evidence yet.  Mathematical objects are inventions of
>> our minds dependent on language.
>>
>
>  Then what about the physical universe, it is a mathematical object.  Who
> invented it?
>
>
>>   They made be said to exist in Platonia or in some other way, but I think
>> it is a confusion to suppose they exist in the sense of physical objects.
>>
>>
>  This could make sense, if you can explain what is different between a
> "physical universe" and a "mathematical universe" having the same structure
> and properties.
>
>
>>
>>  QM shows the existence of perhaps an infinite number of solutions to the
>> wave func

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-09 Thread meekerdb


On 8/9/2011 1:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Aug 9, 2011 at 2:13 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 8/9/2011 7:37 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Aug 9, 2011, at 1:38 AM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:


On 8/8/2011 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk
mailto:benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>> wrote:



I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but
honestly your theory
is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why
on earth would I
believe in the truth of something that *can never be known
in any way*
(namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to
consciousness)?


Ben,

Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain
value even though we can never know what it is and no one has
ever or will ever (in this universe at least) be conscious of
it?  If I assert the digit happens to be 8, would you agree
that my assertion must be either true or false?  If so, where
does this truth exist?

Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that
its value is inconsequential because that level of precision
will never make a difference in any equation we work with. 
Euler's identity: e^(Pi * i) + 1 = 0, would be false without

each of the infinite digits of Pi having a definite and certain
value.  These values that are unknown to use, but nonetheless
must be there.


Mathematical existence isn't a matter of being "there", it's a
matter of satisfying, making true, a certain proposition.  So
why does the putative digit of pi have the value it does,
because it satisfies certain propositions which we infer from
other propositions we are pleased to hold hypothetically true as
axioms.


Then what is the ontological status of propositions that are true
but not provable in ones set of hypothetitcally held axioms?

In that case there is something that is true but not reachable
through chains of propositions.


Why is that a problem.  There's a refrigerator in my kitchen.  I
reach it through a doorway, not a chain of propositions.


So you refridgerator exists, not because it is reachable through a 
doorway or not.  It's existence is independent of doorways in the same 
way mathematical truth is independent of axioms.


Notice that you switched predicates from "exists" to "true".






Existence in the usual sense never enters into it.


Do you think our universe is mathematical or magical?


I think it's physical -- I'm just not sure what that means.


This is the crux of the issue.  What is different between a physical 
object as seen from the inside and a mathematical object as seen from 
the inside?


It is not clear to me what it means to "see a mathematical object from 
the inside".






If our universe can be understood mathematically then it is one
example of a mathematical object that has physical existence.


Can understand that the number of dwarves is seven.  That doesn't
mean the Seven Dwarves exist.  "To understand mathematically" just
means to have a mathematical model that works.


Again, take into account what I asked above, on the difference between 
a perfect mathematical representation of our universe and a physical 
universe.  If there is no difference that makes a difference why 
consider them different?


The physical one is here.  There is no perfect representation of the 
universe and it is certainly not a given that such could exist.






What more evidence would you need to believe mathematical objects
exist?


I haven't seen any evidence yet.  Mathematical objects are
inventions of our minds dependent on language.


Then what about the physical universe, it is a mathematical object. 
 Who invented it?


  They made be said to exist in Platonia or in some other way, but
I think it is a confusion to suppose they exist in the sense of
physical objects.


This could make sense, if you can explain what is different between a 
"physical universe" and a "mathematical universe" having the same 
structure and properties.




QM shows the existence of perhaps an infinite number of solutions
to the wave function.


It doesn't show that - it's consistent with an interpretation that
asserts that.


Everett's interpretation is the most preferable according to Occam's 
principle.  Do you have a reason to prefer the CI or some other 
interpretation?


By Occam's principle I would prefer Asher Peres or Roland Omnes.




 String theory has nothing in it which rules out other universes
with different physical laws.


Indeed.  But not having ruled out something is not the same as
ruling it in.


To rule something out requires additional information.  Consider that 
in a block of marble, it contains all possible statues insid

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On Tue, Aug 9, 2011 at 2:13 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> **
> On 8/9/2011 7:37 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Aug 9, 2011, at 1:38 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>  On 8/8/2011 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>  I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your
>> theory
>> is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would
>> I
>> believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way*
>> (namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?
>>
>>
> Ben,
>
> Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value even
> though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or will ever (in
> this universe at least) be conscious of it?  If I assert the digit happens
> to be 8, would you agree that my assertion must be either true or false?  If
> so, where does this truth exist?
>
> Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that its value
> is inconsequential because that level of precision will never make a
> difference in any equation we work with.  Euler's identity: e^(Pi * i) + 1 =
> 0, would be false without each of the infinite digits of Pi having a
> definite and certain value.  These values that are unknown to use, but
> nonetheless must be there.
>
>
> Mathematical existence isn't a matter of being "there", it's a matter of
> satisfying, making true, a certain proposition.  So why does the putative
> digit of pi have the value it does, because it satisfies certain
> propositions which we infer from other propositions we are pleased to hold
> hypothetically true as axioms.
>
>
>  Then what is the ontological status of propositions that are true but not
> provable in ones set of hypothetitcally held axioms?
>
>  In that case there is something that is true but not reachable through
> chains of propositions.
>
>
> Why is that a problem.  There's a refrigerator in my kitchen.  I reach it
> through a doorway, not a chain of propositions.
>
>
So you refridgerator exists, not because it is reachable through a doorway
or not.  It's existence is independent of doorways in the same way
mathematical truth is independent of axioms.


>
>
>  Existence in the usual sense never enters into it.
>
>
>  Do you think our universe is mathematical or magical?
>
>
> I think it's physical -- I'm just not sure what that means.
>
>
This is the crux of the issue.  What is different between a physical object
as seen from the inside and a mathematical object as seen from the inside?


>
>
>  If our universe can be understood mathematically then it is one example
> of a mathematical object that has physical existence.
>
>
> Can understand that the number of dwarves is seven.  That doesn't mean the
> Seven Dwarves exist.  "To understand mathematically" just means to have a
> mathematical model that works.
>
>
Again, take into account what I asked above, on the difference between a
perfect mathematical representation of our universe and a physical universe.
 If there is no difference that makes a difference why consider them
different?


>
>
>  What more evidence would you need to believe mathematical objects exist?
>
>
> I haven't seen any evidence yet.  Mathematical objects are inventions of
> our minds dependent on language.
>

Then what about the physical universe, it is a mathematical object.  Who
invented it?


>   They made be said to exist in Platonia or in some other way, but I think
> it is a confusion to suppose they exist in the sense of physical objects.
>
>
This could make sense, if you can explain what is different between a
"physical universe" and a "mathematical universe" having the same structure
and properties.


>
>  QM shows the existence of perhaps an infinite number of solutions to the
> wave function.
>
>
> It doesn't show that - it's consistent with an interpretation that asserts
> that.
>
>
Everett's interpretation is the most preferable according to Occam's
principle.  Do you have a reason to prefer the CI or some other
interpretation?


>
>   String theory has nothing in it which rules out other universes with
> different physical laws.
>
>
> Indeed.  But not having ruled out something is not the same as ruling it
> in.
>

To rule something out requires additional information.  Consider that in a
block of marble, it contains all possible statues inside it until
information is added, to whittle down from all possibility down to one
actuality.  Or consider that you are awaiting an e-mail message (perhaps
from me).  Until you receive that message, all possibilities exist for what
message I might send you.  Only the addition of the information determines
which of all possible messages I sent.  Information is not needed to create
possibilities, information eliminates possibilities.  If string theory
enables all possibilities, and contains no prohibition against their
reality, the default should be to consider those other universes implied by
the theory jus

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-09 Thread meekerdb


On 8/9/2011 7:37 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Aug 9, 2011, at 1:38 AM, meekerdb > wrote:



On 8/8/2011 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk 
> wrote:




I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly
your theory
is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on
earth would I
believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in
any way*
(namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?


Ben,

Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value 
even though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or will 
ever (in this universe at least) be conscious of it?  If I assert 
the digit happens to be 8, would you agree that my assertion must be 
either true or false?  If so, where does this truth exist?


Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that its 
value is inconsequential because that level of precision will never 
make a difference in any equation we work with.  Euler's identity: 
e^(Pi * i) + 1 = 0, would be false without each of the infinite 
digits of Pi having a definite and certain value.  These values that 
are unknown to use, but nonetheless must be there.


Mathematical existence isn't a matter of being "there", it's a matter 
of satisfying, making true, a certain proposition.  So why does the 
putative digit of pi have the value it does, because it satisfies 
certain propositions which we infer from other propositions we are 
pleased to hold hypothetically true as axioms.


Then what is the ontological status of propositions that are true but 
not provable in ones set of hypothetitcally held axioms?


In that case there is something that is true but not reachable through 
chains of propositions.


Why is that a problem.  There's a refrigerator in my kitchen.  I reach 
it through a doorway, not a chain of propositions.





Existence in the usual sense never enters into it.


Do you think our universe is mathematical or magical?


I think it's physical -- I'm just not sure what that means.



If our universe can be understood mathematically then it is one 
example of a mathematical object that has physical existence.


Can understand that the number of dwarves is seven.  That doesn't mean 
the Seven Dwarves exist.  "To understand mathematically" just means to 
have a mathematical model that works.




What more evidence would you need to believe mathematical objects exist?


I haven't seen any evidence yet.  Mathematical objects are inventions of 
our minds dependent on language.  They made be said to exist in Platonia 
or in some other way, but I think it is a confusion to suppose they 
exist in the sense of physical objects.




QM shows the existence of perhaps an infinite number of solutions to 
the wave function.


It doesn't show that - it's consistent with an interpretation that 
asserts that.


 String theory has nothing in it which rules out other universes with 
different physical laws.


Indeed.  But not having ruled out something is not the same as ruling it in.



Why believe only the math of string theory has been blessed with 
phyical existence?


I don't believe that.


You might say because we cannot see those other universes.

This is not evidence against the theory because the theory explains 
why you would not observe them.


That's what my Christian friends say: "You rule out a supernatural God.  
And our theology explains why you can't observe Him."


Occam also fails here, for the proposition that all possible 
structures exist has fewer assumptions than the idea that only these 
structures exist and no others are possible.


The fine tuning of the universe confirms to a high probability that 
something is wrong with the following proposition:
There is only one set of physical laws with physical existence and 
these laws were not intelligently chosen.


So I ask you, where is the error in that statement?


First it assumes there is something called "fine tuning" (c.f. Vic 
Stenger's "The Fallacy of Fine Tuning").  Second physical laws are 
models we make up.  Third, all experience shows that improbable things 
happen all the time.




The only way to escape it is to say the idea of fine tuning itself is 
flawed, but this is a last ditch attempt to stick to the model of a 
single universe.  The bulk of evidence points strongly to the idea 
that intelligent life would not arise in the majority of possible 
structures.


Use baysian analysis to consider the following possibilities:
1. There is one set if laws not intelligently selected.
2. The laws were intelligently selected or there is more than one set 
of physical laws.


Since we have evaluated no other evidence at this time, let's assign a 
50% chance to each.


Now let's say we determine the probability of any given set of laws 
having the right properties for life is one in 100.  What would

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On Tue, Aug 9, 2011 at 1:09 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>
> You fail to explain how the truth of "17 is prime" depends on
> consciousness. You confuse the truth of "17 is prime" with the individual
> belief or knowledge that "17 is prime".  Mathematicians believes that "17 is
> prime" is far more objective than any other proposition like "the moon
> exists", or "the big bang exists".
> You should be the one explaining to me why "17 would no more be prime" in
> case humans or life disappear from the physical universe.
>
>
Indeed, nature discovered the primality of 13 and 17 (in the reproductive
cycles of the 13-year and 17-year cicadas).  I doubt nature or the cicadas
were ever conscious of this mathematical property, at least in the sense
that humans can be conscious of it.

Jason

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-09 Thread benjayk



Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your
>> theory
>> is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would
>> I
>> believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way*
>> (namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?
>>
>>
> Ben,
> 
> Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value even
> though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or will ever (in
> this universe at least) be conscious of it?  If I assert the digit happens
> to be 8, would you agree that my assertion must be either true or false? 
> If
> so, where does this truth exist?
Yeah, I think the 10^10^100th digit has certain value, and I agree we will
probably never know it explicitly. But I don't think that we could never
know it in any way. Consciousness just had no reason to focus on this digit
in particular. It wants to know itself as a whole, and not every specific of
the infinite abitrary facts about itself. It wants to compress everything
that can be known into an efficient "format" of perception. Because we know
the algorithm of determining the digits of PI, we already know all digits of
PI in an abstract way, as a potential of knowing. This sense of knowing is
included in what I meant with "in any way". Maybe I should have said
"conceived".

This is the difference. I conceive that there is a 10^10^100th digit of PI,
but I can't conceive of arithmetic without consciousness, because the very
act of conceiving needs consciousness.

benjayk
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On Aug 9, 2011, at 1:38 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/8/2011 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk > wrote:

I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your
theory
is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth
would I
believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any
way*

(namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?

Ben,

Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value
even though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or
will ever (in this universe at least) be conscious of it? If I
assert the digit happens to be 8, would you agree that my assertion
must be either true or false? If so, where does this truth exist?

Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that its
value is inconsequential because that level of precision will never
make a difference in any equation we work with. Euler's identity:
e^(Pi * i) + 1 = 0, would be false without each of the infinite
digits of Pi having a definite and certain value. These values
that are unknown to use, but nonetheless must be there.

Mathematical existence isn't a matter of being "there", it's a
matter of satisfying, making true, a certain proposition. So why
does the putative digit of pi have the value it does, because it
satisfies certain propositions which we infer from other
propositions we are pleased to hold hypothetically true as axioms.

Then what is the ontological status of propositions that are true but
not provable in ones set of hypothetitcally held axioms?

In that case there is something that is true but not reachable through
chains of propositions.

Existence in the usual sense never enters into it.

Do you think our universe is mathematical or magical?

If our universe can be understood mathematically then it is one
example of a mathematical object that has physical existence.

What more evidence would you need to believe mathematical objects exist?

QM shows the existence of perhaps an infinite number of solutions to
the wave function. String theory has nothing in it which rules out
other universes with different physical laws.

Why believe only the math of string theory has been blessed with
phyical existence? You might say because we cannot see those other
universes.

This is not evidence against the theory because the theory explains
why you would not observe them. Occam also fails here, for the
proposition that all possible structures exist has fewer assumptions
than the idea that only these structures exist and no others are
possible.

The fine tuning of the universe confirms to a high probability that
something is wrong with the following proposition:
There is only one set of physical laws with physical existence and
these laws were not intelligently chosen.

So I ask you, where is the error in that statement?

The only way to escape it is to say the idea of fine tuning itself is
flawed, but this is a last ditch attempt to stick to the model of a
single universe. The bulk of evidence points strongly to the idea
that intelligent life would not arise in the majority of possible
structures.

Use baysian analysis to consider the following possibilities:
1. There is one set if laws not intelligently selected.
2. The laws were intelligently selected or there is more than one set
of physical laws.

Since we have evaluated no other evidence at this time, let's assign a
50% chance to each.

Now let's say we determine the probability of any given set of laws
having the right properties for life is one in 100. What would
baysian analysis say of the new probability that proposition 1 is
correct?

Faced with proposition 2, would you be more likely to accept
intelligent design or the existence of other (or all) mathematical
structures?

Mathematical existence isn't sone fuzzy abstract form if existence.
Look around yourself. You are in it.

Jason

Brent
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-08 Thread meekerdb


On 8/8/2011 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk 
> wrote:




I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly
your theory
is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on
earth would I
believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way*
(namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?


Ben,

Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value even 
though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or will ever 
(in this universe at least) be conscious of it?  If I assert the digit 
happens to be 8, would you agree that my assertion must be either true 
or false?  If so, where does this truth exist?


Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that its 
value is inconsequential because that level of precision will never 
make a difference in any equation we work with.  Euler's identity: 
e^(Pi * i) + 1 = 0, would be false without each of the infinite digits 
of Pi having a definite and certain value.  These values that are 
unknown to use, but nonetheless must be there.


Mathematical existence isn't a matter of being "there", it's a matter of 
satisfying, making true, a certain proposition.  So why does the 
putative digit of pi have the value it does, because it satisfies 
certain propositions which we infer from other propositions we are 
pleased to hold hypothetically true as axioms.  Existence in the usual 
sense never enters into it.


Brent

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-08 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk wrote:

>
>
> I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your theory
> is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would I
> believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way*
> (namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?
>
>
Ben,

Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value even
though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or will ever (in
this universe at least) be conscious of it?  If I assert the digit happens
to be 8, would you agree that my assertion must be either true or false?  If
so, where does this truth exist?

Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that its value is
inconsequential because that level of precision will never make a difference
in any equation we work with.  Euler's identity: e^(Pi * i) + 1 = 0, would
be false without each of the infinite digits of Pi having a definite and
certain value.  These values that are unknown to use, but nonetheless must
be there.

Jason

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-08 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 07 Aug 2011, at 21:50, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and
>>> explains how
>>> consciousness emerges from numbers,
>> How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is
>> already
>> assumed at the start?
>
> In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at
> some
> level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories
> about its origin.
 That's true, but I think this is a different case. The moon seems to
 have a
 past, so it makes sense to say it emerged from its constituent
 parts. In the
 past, it was already there as a possibility.
>>>
>>> OK, I should say that it emerges arithmetically. I thought you did
>>> already understand that time is not primitive at all. More on this
>>> below.
>> Yeah, the problem is that "consciousness emerging from arithmetics"  
>> means
>> just that we manage to point to its existence within the theory.
> 
> Er well, OK. But arithmetic explains also why it exist, why it is  
> undoubtable yet non definable, how it brings matter in the picture, etc.
Well, if I try to interpret your words favourably I can bring myself to
agree. But I will insist that it only explains why it exists (ultimately
because of itself), and does not make sense without consciousness.

I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your theory
is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would I
believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way*
(namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> We have no
>> reason to suppose this expresses something more fundamental, that  
>> is, that
>> consciousness literally emerges from arithmetics. Honestly, I don't  
>> even
>> know how to interpret this literally.
>>
> 
> It means that the arithmetical reality "is full" of conscious entities  
> of many sorts, so that we don't have to postulate the existence of  
> consciousness, nor matter, in the ontological part of the TOE. We  
> recover them, either intuitively, with the non-zombie rule, or  
> formally, in the internal epistemology canonically associated to self- 
> referring numbers.
But what you do is assuming consciousness (you have to!) and then formulate
a theory that claims itself to be primary and ontologically real that
derives that consciousness is "just epistemlogically true", by virtue of
hiding the assumption that consciousness already exists!
It seems you are just bullshitting yourself by not mentioning consciousness
as an assumption in the theory and then claim it follows "without assuming"
it.

What you call ontological part of the theory are just the axioms you make
explicit. I don't see how this make them ontological, and the implicit
assumption epistemological. If anything, it would be the opposite. What is
implicit in everything, ie that which cannot be removed, is ontological, and
what can (apparently) be removed (or not mentioned) is epistemological. We
can be conscious without any notion of numbers, but there is no notion of
numbers without consciousness.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> OK. That would be a real disagreement. I just assume that the
>>> arithmetical relations are true independently of anything. For  
>>> example
>>> I consider the truth of Goldbach conjecture as already settled in
>>> Platonia. Either it is true that all even number bigger than 2 are  
>>> the
>>> sum of two primes, or that this is not true, and this independently  
>>> on
>>> any consideration on time, spaces, humans, etc.
>>> Humans can easily verify this for little even numbers: 4 = 2+2, 6 =
>>> 3+3, 8 = 3+5, etc. But we don't have found a proof of this, despite
>>> many people have searched for it.
>>> I can see that the expression of such a statement needs humans or  
>>> some
>>> thinking entity, but I don't see how the fact itself would depend on
>>> anything (but the definitions).
>> My point is subtle, I wouldn't necessarily completly disagree with  
>> what you
>> said. The problem is that in some sense everything is already there  
>> in some
>> form, so in this sense 1+1=2 and 2+2=4 is independently, primarily  
>> true, but
>> so is everything else.
> 
> The theory must explains why and how relative contingencies happen,  
> and it has to explain the necessities (natural laws), etc.
OK. It can theoretically explain that, no doubt about that. But from this it
doesn't follow that the means of explanation (numbers) are primary. I can
explain with words why humans have legs, this doesn't mean my words are the
reason that humans have legs.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Consciousness is required for any meaning to exist,
> 
> That is ambiguous. If

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-08 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Aug 2011, at 21:50, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:


Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and
explains how
consciousness emerges from numbers,

How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is
already
assumed at the start?


In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at
some
level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories
about its origin.

That's true, but I think this is a different case. The moon seems to
have a
past, so it makes sense to say it emerged from its constituent
parts. In the
past, it was already there as a possibility.


OK, I should say that it emerges arithmetically. I thought you did
already understand that time is not primitive at all. More on this
below.
Yeah, the problem is that "consciousness emerging from arithmetics"  
means

just that we manage to point to its existence within the theory.


Er well, OK. But arithmetic explains also why it exist, why it is  
undoubtable yet non definable, how it brings matter in the picture, etc.





We have no
reason to suppose this expresses something more fundamental, that  
is, that
consciousness literally emerges from arithmetics. Honestly, I don't  
even

know how to interpret this literally.



It means that the arithmetical reality "is full" of conscious entities  
of many sorts, so that we don't have to postulate the existence of  
consciousness, nor matter, in the ontological part of the TOE. We  
recover them, either intuitively, with the non-zombie rule, or  
formally, in the internal epistemology canonically associated to self- 
referring numbers.






Bruno Marchal wrote:




But consciousness as such has no past, so what would it mean that it
emerges
from numbers? Emerging is something taking place within time.
Otherwise we
are just saying we can deduce it from a theory, but this in and of
itself
doesn't mean that what is derived is prior to what it is derived  
from.


To the contrary, what we call numbers just emerges after
consciousness has
been there for quite a while. You might argue that they were there
before,
but I don't see any evidence for it. What the numbers describe was
there
before, this is certainly true (or you could say there were  
implicitly

there).


OK. That would be a real disagreement. I just assume that the
arithmetical relations are true independently of anything. For  
example

I consider the truth of Goldbach conjecture as already settled in
Platonia. Either it is true that all even number bigger than 2 are  
the
sum of two primes, or that this is not true, and this independently  
on

any consideration on time, spaces, humans, etc.
Humans can easily verify this for little even numbers: 4 = 2+2, 6 =
3+3, 8 = 3+5, etc. But we don't have found a proof of this, despite
many people have searched for it.
I can see that the expression of such a statement needs humans or  
some

thinking entity, but I don't see how the fact itself would depend on
anything (but the definitions).
My point is subtle, I wouldn't necessarily completly disagree with  
what you
said. The problem is that in some sense everything is already there  
in some
form, so in this sense 1+1=2 and 2+2=4 is independently, primarily  
true, but

so is everything else.


The theory must explains why and how relative contingencies happen,  
and it has to explain the necessities (natural laws), etc.





Consciousness is required for any meaning to exist,


That is ambiguous. If you accept that some proposition can be true  
independently of us, it can mean that some meanings are true  
independently of us. If not you need some one to observe the big bang  
to make it happen, or the numbers to make them existing.




and ultimately is equivalent to it (IMO), so we derive from the  
meaning in

numbers that meaning exist. It's true, but ultimately trivial.


No, we derive from numbers+addition+multiplication a theory of  
meaning, consciousness, matter. You should not confuse a theory, and  
its meaning, interpretation, etc.
I happens that we can indeed explain how numbers develop meanings for  
number relations, etc.






Either everything is independently true, which doesn't really seem  
to be the
case, or things are generally interdependent. 1+1=2 is just true  
because
2+2=4 and I can just be conscious because 1+1=2, but 1+1=2 is just  
true
because I am conscious, and 1+1=2 is true because my mouse pad is  
blue,

etc...

This view makes sense to me, because it is so simple. One particular
statement true statement is true, only because every particular  
statement
true statement is true, and because what is true is true. In this  
sense

every statement is true because of every other statement. If we derive
something, we just explain how we become aware of the truth (of a
statement). There is no objective hierarchy of emergence (but  
apparently
necessarily a subjective progression, we will first under

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-08 Thread benjayk



John Mikes wrote:
> 
> benjayk wrote:
> 
> *"Sorry, I can't follow you... You do not accept the concept of
> consciousness
> **and then want an origin for it?"*
> 
> I see you did not follow me... I asked for some identification to that
> mystical noumenon we are talking about exactly* to make it acceptable for
> discussion*.  T H E N  -  I F it turns out to BE acceptable, we may well
> contemplate an origination for it - if???...
> Better followable now?
> Sorry for not having been clearer.
Ah, OK. As I see it, (what I mean when I say) consciousness is simply
self-evident, obvious - you might even say it's obviousness itself. There
can be no remotely exact definition of it, as it is too simple (it can't be
cut into analyzable pieces) and complex (it has many different facets) for
that. It is that in which definitions arise. Just as one sentence in a book
cannot capture the whole book, no definition can capture consciousness.
To define consciousness and talk about it's properties means labeling and
representing it. It's not wrong, but we should clear that it's ultimately
undefinable and not even understandable.

If you ask me what consciousness is, then I can just invite you too look at
what already is obvious. In order to become more aware of how obvious it
really is, it might be useful to not conceptualize it, and not jump to the
conclusion "It's trivial that I am conscious.". If we always search for
consciousness as something concretely graspable (by the mind) we will miss
the obvious fact that we simply are conscious and that the mind can't really
grasp it. 

You might say that if we don't know what exactly we are talking about it
makes no sense to talk about it. But I don't think that's necessarily true.
When we first learn about something, we don't know what exactly we talk
about and then learn more about it through asking questions, or
contemplating.


John Mikes wrote:
> 
> BTW I never said that I do not accept the term consciousness - if it is
> identified in a way that makes sens (to me). I even worked on it (>1992)
> to
> apply the word to something *more general* than e.g. awareness or similar
> 'human' peculiarities.
When I say consciousness I just mean ability to experience (in the broadest
sense).

benjayk
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread John Mikes

benjayk wrote:

*"Sorry, I can't follow you... You do not accept the concept of
consciousness
**and then want an origin for it?"*

I see you did not follow me... I asked for some identification to that
mystical noumenon we are talking about exactly* to make it acceptable for
discussion*.  T H E N  -  I F it turns out to BE acceptable, we may well
contemplate an origination for it - if???...
Better followable now?
Sorry for not having been clearer.

BTW I never said that I do not accept the term consciousness - if it is
identified in a way that makes sens (to me). I even worked on it (>1992) to
apply the word to something *more general* than e.g. awareness or similar
'human' peculiarities. This is how I first formulated my ID for
it:*"Acknowledgement of and response to information"
*. During these 2 decades I attempted to clear the words into newer terms of
advanced meaning (changing to and extending them beyond our limits of
knowledge in my agnosticism like 'relations' etc.)

John M

On Sun, Aug 7, 2011 at 4:01 PM, benjayk wrote:

>
>
> John Mikes wrote:
> >
> > Dear "benjamin" if this is your name (benjayk?)
> >
> Yep.
>
>
> John Mikes wrote:
> >
> > I believe this post is not 'joining' the chorus of the debate. Or is it?
> > Benjayk wrote:
> > "*Consciousness is simply a given"*
> > OK, if you just disclose ANYTHING about it as you formulate that 'given'.
> > Your(?) logic seems alright that if it is 'originated' upon numbers then
> > the
> > * 'consciousness-based' *numbers are a consequence of a consequence (or
> > prerequisite to a prerequisite).
> >  I am not decrying the 'origin' of consciousness, rather its entire
> > concept
> > - what it may contain, include, act with, by, for, result in, - or else
> we
> > may not even know about today..
> > Then I may stipulate about an origin for it.
> Sorry, I can't follow you... You do not accept the concept of consciousness
> and then want an origin for it?
>
>
> John Mikes wrote:
> >
> > * ---"EXISTS?"---* as WHAT?
> > I volunteered on many discussion lists a defining generalization:*
> > response
> > to relations, *
> > (originally: *to information*, which turned out to be a loose cannon). In
> > such general view it is not restricted to animates, in-animates, physical
> > objects, ideas, or more, since the 'relations' are quite ubiquitous even
> > beyond the limited circle of our knowledge. In such sense:* it exists*,
> > indeed.
> > Not (according to me) in *THOSE *systems, but everywhere.
> ???
>
> benjayk
>
> --
> View this message in context:
> http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p32213960.html
> Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread benjayk



John Mikes wrote:
> 
> Dear "benjamin" if this is your name (benjayk?)
> 
Yep.


John Mikes wrote:
> 
> I believe this post is not 'joining' the chorus of the debate. Or is it?
> Benjayk wrote:
> "*Consciousness is simply a given"*
> OK, if you just disclose ANYTHING about it as you formulate that 'given'.
> Your(?) logic seems alright that if it is 'originated' upon numbers then
> the
> * 'consciousness-based' *numbers are a consequence of a consequence (or
> prerequisite to a prerequisite).
>  I am not decrying the 'origin' of consciousness, rather its entire
> concept
> - what it may contain, include, act with, by, for, result in, - or else we
> may not even know about today..
> Then I may stipulate about an origin for it.
Sorry, I can't follow you... You do not accept the concept of consciousness
and then want an origin for it?


John Mikes wrote:
> 
> * ---"EXISTS?"---* as WHAT?
> I volunteered on many discussion lists a defining generalization:*
> response
> to relations, *
> (originally: *to information*, which turned out to be a loose cannon). In
> such general view it is not restricted to animates, in-animates, physical
> objects, ideas, or more, since the 'relations' are quite ubiquitous even
> beyond the limited circle of our knowledge. In such sense:* it exists*,
> indeed.
> Not (according to me) in *THOSE *systems, but everywhere.
???

benjayk

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and
> explains how
> consciousness emerges from numbers,
 How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is
 already
 assumed at the start?
>>>
>>> In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at  
>>> some
>>> level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories
>>> about its origin.
>> That's true, but I think this is a different case. The moon seems to  
>> have a
>> past, so it makes sense to say it emerged from its constituent  
>> parts. In the
>> past, it was already there as a possibility.
> 
> OK, I should say that it emerges arithmetically. I thought you did  
> already understand that time is not primitive at all. More on this  
> below.
Yeah, the problem is that "consciousness emerging from arithmetics" means
just that we manage to point to its existence within the theory. We have no
reason to suppose this expresses something more fundamental, that is, that
consciousness literally emerges from arithmetics. Honestly, I don't even
know how to interpret this literally.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>> But consciousness as such has no past, so what would it mean that it  
>> emerges
>> from numbers? Emerging is something taking place within time.  
>> Otherwise we
>> are just saying we can deduce it from a theory, but this in and of  
>> itself
>> doesn't mean that what is derived is prior to what it is derived from.
>>
>> To the contrary, what we call numbers just emerges after  
>> consciousness has
>> been there for quite a while. You might argue that they were there  
>> before,
>> but I don't see any evidence for it. What the numbers describe was  
>> there
>> before, this is certainly true (or you could say there were implicitly
>> there).
> 
> OK. That would be a real disagreement. I just assume that the  
> arithmetical relations are true independently of anything. For example  
> I consider the truth of Goldbach conjecture as already settled in  
> Platonia. Either it is true that all even number bigger than 2 are the  
> sum of two primes, or that this is not true, and this independently on  
> any consideration on time, spaces, humans, etc.
> Humans can easily verify this for little even numbers: 4 = 2+2, 6 =  
> 3+3, 8 = 3+5, etc. But we don't have found a proof of this, despite  
> many people have searched for it.
> I can see that the expression of such a statement needs humans or some  
> thinking entity, but I don't see how the fact itself would depend on  
> anything (but the definitions).
My point is subtle, I wouldn't necessarily completly disagree with what you
said. The problem is that in some sense everything is already there in some
form, so in this sense 1+1=2 and 2+2=4 is independently, primarily true, but
so is everything else. Consciousness is required for any meaning to exist,
and ultimately is equivalent to it (IMO), so we derive from the meaning in
numbers that meaning exist. It's true, but ultimately trivial.

Either everything is independently true, which doesn't really seem to be the
case, or things are generally interdependent. 1+1=2 is just true because
2+2=4 and I can just be conscious because 1+1=2, but 1+1=2 is just true
because I am conscious, and 1+1=2 is true because my mouse pad is blue,
etc...

This view makes sense to me, because it is so simple. One particular
statement true statement is true, only because every particular statement
true statement is true, and because what is true is true. In this sense
every statement is true because of every other statement. If we derive
something, we just explain how we become aware of the truth (of a
statement). There is no objective hierarchy of emergence (but apparently
necessarily a subjective progression, we will first understand some things
and later some other things).
That's why it makes little sense to me to say consciousness as such arises
out of numbers. Subjectively we first need consciousness to make sense of
numbers. But certainly understanding of numbers can lead us to become more
conscious.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Yet, consciousness is not assumed as
>>> something primitive in the TOE itself.
>> But this doesn't really matter, as we already assume that it's  
>> primitive,
>> because we use it before we can even formulate anything.
> 
> We already assumed it exists, sure. But why would that imply that it  
> exists primitively? It exist fundamentally: in the sense that once you  
> have all the true arithmetical relation, consciousness exists. So,  
> consciousness is not something which appears or emerges in time or  
> space, but it is not primitive in the sense that its existence is a  
> logical consequence of arithmetical truth (provably so when we assume  
> comp and accept some definition).
> 
> Sometimes I sketch this in the followi

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread John Mikes

Dear "benjamin" if this is your name (benjayk?) if the unsigned text is
yours, of course:
I believe this post is not 'joining' the chorus of the debate. Or is it?
Benjayk wrote:
"*Consciousness is simply a given"*
OK, if you just disclose ANYTHING about it as you formulate that 'given'.
Your(?) logic seems alright that if it is 'originated' upon numbers then the
* 'consciousness-based' *numbers are a consequence of a consequence (or
prerequisite to a prerequisite).
 I am not decrying the 'origin' of consciousness, rather its entire concept
- what it may contain, include, act with, by, for, result in, - or else we
may not even know about today..
Then I may stipulate about an origin for it.

* ---"EXISTS?"---* as WHAT?
I volunteered on many discussion lists a defining generalization:* response
to relations, *
(originally: *to information*, which turned out to be a loose cannon). In
such general view it is not restricted to animates, in-animates, physical
objects, ideas, or more, since the 'relations' are quite ubiquitous even
beyond the limited circle of our knowledge. In such sense:* it exists*,
indeed.
Not (according to me) in *THOSE *systems, but everywhere.
 John M

(PS please excuse me if I pond on open doors in a discussion the ~100 long
posts of which I barely studied. I wanted to keep out and just could not
control my mouse. JM)

On Sat, Aug 6, 2011 at 5:14 PM, benjayk wrote:

>
> Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in
> general),
> so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't take it as
> total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am just not in
> the mood at the moment to discuss complex topics at length.
>


>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and explains
> how
> > consciousness emerges from numbers,
> How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is already
> assumed at the start?
> It's a bit like assuming A, and because B->A is true if A is true, we can
> claim for any B that B is the reason that A true.
>
> Consciousness is simply a given. Every "explanation" of it will just
> express
> what it is and will not determine its origin, as its origin would need to
> be
> independent of it / prior to it, but could never be known to be prior to
> it,
> as this would already require consciousness.
>
> The only question is what systems are able to express that consciousness
> exists, and what place consciousness has in those systems.
>
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>
> 
> 
>  Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent
> > picture of
> > almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and
> > this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
>  I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes
>  the
>  possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically
>  it may
>  be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but
>  then we can
>  represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an
>  encoding
>  scheme, still we wouldn't call "." a theory of everything.
>  So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.
> >>>
> >>> Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are
> >>> enough, and very simple (despite mysterious).
> >> They are enough, but they are not the only way to make a theory of
> >> everything. As you say, we can use everything as powerful as
> >> numbers, so
> >> there is an infinity of different formulations of theories of
> >> everything.
> >
> > For any theory, you have infinities of equivalent formulations. This
> > is not a defect. What is amazing is that they can be very different
> > (like cellular automata, LISP, addition+multiplication on natural
> > numbers, quantum topology, billiard balls, etc.
> I agree. It's just that in my view the fact that they can be very different
> makes them ultimately different theories, only theories about the same
> thing. Different theories may explain the same thing, but in practice, they
> may vary in their efficiency to explain it, so it makes sense to treat them
> as different theories.
> In theory, even one symbol can represent every statement in any language,
> but still it's not as powerful as the language it represents.
>
> Similarily if you use just natural numbers as a TOE, you won't be able to
> directly express important concepts like dimensionality.
> --
> View this message in context:
> http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p32209984.html
> Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegro

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Aug 2011, at 15:50, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 06 Aug 2011, at 23:14, benjayk wrote:



Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in
general),
so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't
take it as
total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am just
not in
the mood at the moment to discuss complex topics at length.


There is no problem, Ben. I hope you will not mind if I comment your
post.

Of course not, I am interested in your comments. I just wanted to  
make clear

why I responded briefly.


OK. Thanks for letting me know. I have to brief also, because I am  
overwhelmed by summer  work. I enjoy very much your attempt to  
understand what I try to convey.



Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:


Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and
explains how
consciousness emerges from numbers,

How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is
already
assumed at the start?


In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at  
some

level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories
about its origin.
That's true, but I think this is a different case. The moon seems to  
have a
past, so it makes sense to say it emerged from its constituent  
parts. In the

past, it was already there as a possibility.


OK, I should say that it emerges arithmetically. I thought you did  
already understand that time is not primitive at all. More on this  
below.






But consciousness as such has no past, so what would it mean that it  
emerges
from numbers? Emerging is something taking place within time.  
Otherwise we
are just saying we can deduce it from a theory, but this in and of  
itself

doesn't mean that what is derived is prior to what it is derived from.

To the contrary, what we call numbers just emerges after  
consciousness has
been there for quite a while. You might argue that they were there  
before,
but I don't see any evidence for it. What the numbers describe was  
there

before, this is certainly true (or you could say there were implicitly
there).


OK. That would be a real disagreement. I just assume that the  
arithmetical relations are true independently of anything. For example  
I consider the truth of Goldbach conjecture as already settled in  
Platonia. Either it is true that all even number bigger than 2 are the  
sum of two primes, or that this is not true, and this independently on  
any consideration on time, spaces, humans, etc.
Humans can easily verify this for little even numbers: 4 = 2+2, 6 =  
3+3, 8 = 3+5, etc. But we don't have found a proof of this, despite  
many people have searched for it.
I can see that the expression of such a statement needs humans or some  
thinking entity, but I don't see how the fact itself would depend on  
anything (but the definitions).








Bruno Marchal wrote:



It's a bit like assuming A, and because B->A is true if A is true,
we can
claim for any B that B is the reason that A true.


This confirms you are confusing two levels. The level of deduction in
a theory, and the level of implication in formal logic.
I am not saying it's the same. I just don't see that because we can  
formally

deduce A from B, this mean that A in reality emerges from B.


What I say is more subtle. I will make an attempt to be clearer below.






Bruno Marchal wrote:




Consciousness is simply a given. Every "explanation" of it will just
express
what it is and will not determine its origin, as its origin would
need to be
independent of it / prior to it, but could never be known to be
prior to it,
as this would already require consciousness.


In the comp theory it can be explained why machine takes  
consciousness

as a given, and that from their first person points of view, they are
completely correct about this.

OK.



Bruno Marchal wrote:


Yet, consciousness is not assumed as
something primitive in the TOE itself.
But this doesn't really matter, as we already assume that it's  
primitive,

because we use it before we can even formulate anything.


We already assumed it exists, sure. But why would that imply that it  
exists primitively? It exist fundamentally: in the sense that once you  
have all the true arithmetical relation, consciousness exists. So,  
consciousness is not something which appears or emerges in time or  
space, but it is not primitive in the sense that its existence is a  
logical consequence of arithmetical truth (provably so when we assume  
comp and accept some definition).


Sometimes I sketch this in the following manner. The arrows are logico- 
arithmetical deduction:


NUMBERS => CONSCIOUSNESS => PHYSICAL REALITY => HUMANS => HUMANS'  
NUMBERS




You can't just
ignore what you already know, by not making your assumptions  
explicit in

your theory.


It is just not an assumption in the theory, but a derived existence.  
With comp, consciousness is implicit in the arithmetical trut

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 06 Aug 2011, at 23:14, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>> Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in  
>> general),
>> so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't  
>> take it as
>> total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am just  
>> not in
>> the mood at the moment to discuss complex topics at length.
> 
> There is no problem, Ben. I hope you will not mind if I comment your  
> post.
> 
Of course not, I am interested in your comments. I just wanted to make clear
why I responded briefly.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and  
>>> explains how
>>> consciousness emerges from numbers,
>> How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is  
>> already
>> assumed at the start?
> 
> In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at some  
> level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories  
> about its origin.
That's true, but I think this is a different case. The moon seems to have a
past, so it makes sense to say it emerged from its constituent parts. In the
past, it was already there as a possibility.

But consciousness as such has no past, so what would it mean that it emerges
from numbers? Emerging is something taking place within time. Otherwise we
are just saying we can deduce it from a theory, but this in and of itself
doesn't mean that what is derived is prior to what it is derived from.

To the contrary, what we call numbers just emerges after consciousness has
been there for quite a while. You might argue that they were there before,
but I don't see any evidence for it. What the numbers describe was there
before, this is certainly true (or you could say there were implicitly
there).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> It's a bit like assuming A, and because B->A is true if A is true,  
>> we can
>> claim for any B that B is the reason that A true.
> 
> This confirms you are confusing two levels. The level of deduction in  
> a theory, and the level of implication in formal logic.
I am not saying it's the same. I just don't see that because we can formally
deduce A from B, this mean that A in reality emerges from B.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>> Consciousness is simply a given. Every "explanation" of it will just  
>> express
>> what it is and will not determine its origin, as its origin would  
>> need to be
>> independent of it / prior to it, but could never be known to be  
>> prior to it,
>> as this would already require consciousness.
> 
> In the comp theory it can be explained why machine takes consciousness  
> as a given, and that from their first person points of view, they are  
> completely correct about this.
OK.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  Yet, consciousness is not assumed as  
> something primitive in the TOE itself.
But this doesn't really matter, as we already assume that it's primitive,
because we use it before we can even formulate anything. You can't just
ignore what you already know, by not making your assumptions explicit in
your theory.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>



 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent
>>> picture of
>>> almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included,  
>>> and
>>> this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
>> I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes
>> the
>> possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories.  
>> Theoretically
>> it may
>> be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but
>> then we can
>> represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an
>> encoding
>> scheme, still we wouldn't call "." a theory of everything.
>> So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of  
>> everything.
>
> Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are
> enough, and very simple (despite mysterious).
 They are enough, but they are not the only way to make a theory of
 everything. As you say, we can use everything as powerful as
 numbers, so
 there is an infinity of different formulations of theories of
 everything.
>>>
>>> For any theory, you have infinities of equivalent formulations. This
>>> is not a defect. What is amazing is that they can be very different
>>> (like cellular automata, LISP, addition+multiplication on natural
>>> numbers, quantum topology, billiard balls, etc.
>> I agree. It's just that in my view the fact that they can be very  
>> different
>> makes them ultimately different theories, only theories about the same
>> thing.
> 
> And proving the same things, with equivalent explanation.
Sure, we can write indistinguishable programs (to the user) with different
pro

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Aug 2011, at 23:14, benjayk wrote:



Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in  
general),
so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't  
take it as
total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am just  
not in

the mood at the moment to discuss complex topics at length.


There is no problem, Ben. I hope you will not mind if I comment your  
post.






Bruno Marchal wrote:


Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and  
explains how

consciousness emerges from numbers,
How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is  
already

assumed at the start?


In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at some  
level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories  
about its origin.




It's a bit like assuming A, and because B->A is true if A is true,  
we can

claim for any B that B is the reason that A true.


This confirms you are confusing two levels. The level of deduction in  
a theory, and the level of implication in formal logic.






Consciousness is simply a given. Every "explanation" of it will just  
express
what it is and will not determine its origin, as its origin would  
need to be
independent of it / prior to it, but could never be known to be  
prior to it,

as this would already require consciousness.


In the comp theory it can be explained why machine takes consciousness  
as a given, and that from their first person points of view, they are  
completely correct about this. Yet, consciousness is not assumed as  
something primitive in the TOE itself. You can define it by the  
number's first person belief in some reality, like you can explain the  
belief in matter by a sort of border of that belief. From this the  
math explains the qualia and the quanta as completely as any possible  
theory can ever explain (perhaps not correctly, because comp might be  
false, but then comp is refutable/scientific).






The only question is what systems are able to express that  
consciousness

exists,


And the comp answer is machine, or number, or universal numbers, or  
Löbian universal numbers.






and what place consciousness has in those systems.


And the comp answer is "monumental". Universal number consciousness is  
at the origin of the laws of physics, even if it looks like a  
selection/projection inan richer arithmetical reality. This really  
needs to be understood by yourself.  I guess it makes no sense without  
understanding, because it *is* counterintuitive.

We might come back on this once you are in the mood again.







Bruno Marchal wrote:






Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:


And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent
picture of
almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included,  
and

this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.

I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes
the
possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories.  
Theoretically

it may
be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but
then we can
represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an
encoding
scheme, still we wouldn't call "." a theory of everything.
So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of  
everything.


Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are
enough, and very simple (despite mysterious).

They are enough, but they are not the only way to make a theory of
everything. As you say, we can use everything as powerful as
numbers, so
there is an infinity of different formulations of theories of
everything.


For any theory, you have infinities of equivalent formulations. This
is not a defect. What is amazing is that they can be very different
(like cellular automata, LISP, addition+multiplication on natural
numbers, quantum topology, billiard balls, etc.
I agree. It's just that in my view the fact that they can be very  
different

makes them ultimately different theories, only theories about the same
thing.


And proving the same things, with equivalent explanation.





Different theories may explain the same thing, but in practice, they
may vary in their efficiency to explain it, so it makes sense to  
treat them

as different theories.


But the goal here is a conceptual understanding, not direct practical  
application.




In theory, even one symbol can represent every statement in any  
language,


That does not make sense for me. (or it is trivia).




but still it's not as powerful as the language it represents.

Similarily if you use just natural numbers as a TOE, you won't be  
able to

directly express important concepts like dimensionality.



Why? If you prove this, I abandon comp immediately. From comp you can  
derive the whole of physics, and this should be easy to understand if  
you get the UDA1-7. Comp remains incomplete on God, consciousness and  
souls, and can explain why, but physics, including

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-06 Thread benjayk


Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in general),
so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't take it as
total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am just not in
the mood at the moment to discuss complex topics at length.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and explains how  
> consciousness emerges from numbers,
How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is already
assumed at the start?
It's a bit like assuming A, and because B->A is true if A is true, we can
claim for any B that B is the reason that A true.

Consciousness is simply a given. Every "explanation" of it will just express
what it is and will not determine its origin, as its origin would need to be
independent of it / prior to it, but could never be known to be prior to it,
as this would already require consciousness. 

The only question is what systems are able to express that consciousness
exists, and what place consciousness has in those systems.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent
> picture of
> almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and
> this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
 I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes  
 the
 possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically
 it may
 be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but
 then we can
 represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an
 encoding
 scheme, still we wouldn't call "." a theory of everything.
 So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.
>>>
>>> Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are
>>> enough, and very simple (despite mysterious).
>> They are enough, but they are not the only way to make a theory of
>> everything. As you say, we can use everything as powerful as  
>> numbers, so
>> there is an infinity of different formulations of theories of  
>> everything.
> 
> For any theory, you have infinities of equivalent formulations. This  
> is not a defect. What is amazing is that they can be very different  
> (like cellular automata, LISP, addition+multiplication on natural  
> numbers, quantum topology, billiard balls, etc.
I agree. It's just that in my view the fact that they can be very different
makes them ultimately different theories, only theories about the same
thing. Different theories may explain the same thing, but in practice, they
may vary in their efficiency to explain it, so it makes sense to treat them
as different theories.
In theory, even one symbol can represent every statement in any language,
but still it's not as powerful as the language it represents.

Similarily if you use just natural numbers as a TOE, you won't be able to
directly express important concepts like dimensionality.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-06 Thread meekerdb


On 8/6/2011 12:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 06 Aug 2011, at 07:04, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/5/2011 9:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Comp already shows that it take the form of an uncertainty calculus 
on computations. From comp it is easy to derive 
indeterminacy/uncertainty, non locality, non clonability of the 
apparent primitive matter. From comp + the classical theory of 
knowledge you get also symmetry at the observable bottom (the laws 
are reversible, and 'particles' comes from invariance from such 
symmetries).


How does comp imply non-locality?  I don't even see that it implies a 
limited speed of signaliing.


?

Comp is not local from the first person point of view, because if a 
Boltzmann brain, for example, generates a "next state" of myself out 
of my light cone, I have still to take it into account to predict what 
I will experience in the next second. The presence of the UD makes 
that worst. Of course the generated physical reality can still be 
local, but this would need a justification. Formally comp is not local 
because the comp-physics (given by the Z1* and X1* logics) satisfies 
(most plausibly) an abstract Bell-like inequality (very plausibly: not 
enough people have verified the argument.


Satisfying a Bell-inequality implies consistency with locality?   Did 
you mean to write "violates an abstract Bell-like inequality"?


Brent


I used the theorem prover for G* to assist the derivation).
It is a form of logical, conditional, non locality, given that we have 
not yet a notion of space, still less of speed.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Aug 2011, at 07:04, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/5/2011 9:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Comp already shows that it take the form of an uncertainty calculus  
on computations. From comp it is easy to derive indeterminacy/ 
uncertainty, non locality, non clonability of the apparent  
primitive matter. From comp + the classical theory of knowledge you  
get also symmetry at the observable bottom (the laws are  
reversible, and 'particles' comes from invariance from such  
symmetries).


How does comp imply non-locality?  I don't even see that it implies  
a limited speed of signaliing.


?

Comp is not local from the first person point of view, because if a  
Boltzmann brain, for example, generates a "next state" of myself out  
of my light cone, I have still to take it into account to predict what  
I will experience in the next second. The presence of the UD makes  
that worst. Of course the generated physical reality can still be  
local, but this would need a justification. Formally comp is not local  
because the comp-physics (given by the Z1* and X1* logics) satisfies  
(most plausibly) an abstract Bell-like inequality (very plausibly: not  
enough people have verified the argument. I used the theorem prover  
for G* to assist the derivation).
It is a form of logical, conditional, non locality, given that we have  
not yet a notion of space, still less of speed.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-05 Thread meekerdb


On 8/5/2011 9:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Comp already shows that it take the form of an uncertainty calculus on 
computations. From comp it is easy to derive 
indeterminacy/uncertainty, non locality, non clonability of the 
apparent primitive matter. From comp + the classical theory of 
knowledge you get also symmetry at the observable bottom (the laws are 
reversible, and 'particles' comes from invariance from such symmetries). 


How does comp imply non-locality?  I don't even see that it implies a 
limited speed of signaliing.


Brent

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-05 Thread Bruno Marchal




On 04 Aug 2011, at 20:38, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 31 Jul 2011, at 19:31, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:




The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.


A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
Of course it should be able to predict everything which is
predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which  
can
predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that  
you

will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.

OK. But what is predictable may be quite limited in the end.


Predicting is not the goal of the TOE. It is just a little obligation
to be accepted as a scientific theory, so as to be refutable.
The goal is more like searching a bigger picture, rational, and which
help, first in formulating the mind-body problem, and then in solving
it as far as possible.

OK.



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Is there a
result showing that it is possible at all to derive precise physical
laws
from COMP and a bet on our substitution level?


Yes. And you don't need to know the substitution level, although a
comparison of the physics derived from comp, and the physics inferred
from measurement might suggest higher bounds for our substitution  
level.

Alright. So which form would the physics derived from COMP take?


Comp already shows that it take the form of an uncertainty calculus on  
computations. From comp it is easy to derive indeterminacy/ 
uncertainty, non locality, non clonability of the apparent primitive  
matter. From comp + the classical theory of knowledge you get also  
symmetry at the observable bottom (the laws are reversible, and  
'particles' comes from invariance from such symmetries).




I can
hardly imagine that one / a few equation describes the physics for  
all of

the omniverse.


Why? That is a bet also done by many physicists, and comp shows the  
necessity of the existence of such an equation. Newton's laws already  
explains a lot, and the quantum laws seems to be universal.  
Empirically this is plausible, but again comp shows that it has to be  
like that. Only geography and history can be very different, and needs  
some amount of non trivial, and non deductible, purely contingent,  
information.
I am not sure you are aware of how much QM (and Hamilton, or Maxwell)  
already explains things.




There would probably be an infinity of laws with approximate
and local validity. How could this be formulated (let alone derived,  
but I

probably would understand none of your explanations regarding that?).


You need to study a minimal amount of mathematical logic and  
theoretical computer science. But with UDA alone, you can understand  
all the points above, except the symmetry and what comes from the  
classical theory of knowledge.







Bruno Marchal wrote:






Bruno Marchal wrote:



So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there  
being

a gap.


OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory  
of

almost everything.

Well, but the part that is unexplainable doesn't seem to be small at
all.
Frankly it explains almost nothing (which is the most we will ever
explain,
as there is infinitely much to explain!).


Well, you have admitted not having study the details, but normally it
explains a lot: indeed God, belief, knowledge, observation and
sensation, and all this including all reason why we cannot completely
understand what happens to be introspectively unexplainable. Ad
normally, in principle, it explains the origin of the physical laws,
without assuming anything physical.
Well, OK, saying it explains almost nothing might be too harsh.  
There is
probably no objective way to say how much it explains, as the  
unexplainable

part is (largly?) unmeasurable. But I don't see why it would be almost
nothing, so it's not a TOAE either.


I would say that comp explains almost everything. The only things  
which it does not explain is not explainable in *any* theory. It is  
the existence of numbers, and the befuddling aspect of consciousness.  
But it explains why consciousnes must be befuddling, and why and how  
machines get befuddled by it. In a (paradoxical) sense, the soul of  
the machine will correctly NOT believe she is a machine, and perhaps  
even correctly believe she is not a machine (once she identifies  
herself with the 'inner god').







Bruno Marchal wrote:



Which is quite an astounding result, don't get me wrong, but let's
not make
the mistake of adjusting to the immodesty of the reductionist
materialists.
This way you may not be taken as seriously, but being modest and
honest
seems more important to me.


The modesty is in the reiterared act of faith of saying "yes" to the
doctor, and accepting the classical Church thesis. All the rest
follows from that: from the explainable to the ineffable.
It seems to me we postulate the ineffeable at the start by saying  
"yes", and
so it

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-04 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 31 Jul 2011, at 19:31, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
 The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
 theory that can be used to predict everything.
>>>
>>> A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
>>> Of course it should be able to predict everything which is
>>> predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which can
>>> predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that you
>>> will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.
>> OK. But what is predictable may be quite limited in the end.
> 
> Predicting is not the goal of the TOE. It is just a little obligation  
> to be accepted as a scientific theory, so as to be refutable.
> The goal is more like searching a bigger picture, rational, and which  
> help, first in formulating the mind-body problem, and then in solving  
> it as far as possible.
OK.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Is there a
>> result showing that it is possible at all to derive precise physical  
>> laws
>> from COMP and a bet on our substitution level?
> 
> Yes. And you don't need to know the substitution level, although a  
> comparison of the physics derived from comp, and the physics inferred  
> from measurement might suggest higher bounds for our substitution level.
Alright. So which form would the physics derived from COMP take? I can
hardly imagine that one / a few equation describes the physics for all of
the omniverse. There would probably be an infinity of laws with approximate
and local validity. How could this be formulated (let alone derived, but I
probably would understand none of your explanations regarding that?).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 So no theory
 can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being
 a gap.
>>>
>>> OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory of
>>> almost everything.
>> Well, but the part that is unexplainable doesn't seem to be small at  
>> all.
>> Frankly it explains almost nothing (which is the most we will ever  
>> explain,
>> as there is infinitely much to explain!).
> 
> Well, you have admitted not having study the details, but normally it  
> explains a lot: indeed God, belief, knowledge, observation and  
> sensation, and all this including all reason why we cannot completely  
> understand what happens to be introspectively unexplainable. Ad  
> normally, in principle, it explains the origin of the physical laws,  
> without assuming anything physical.
Well, OK, saying it explains almost nothing might be too harsh. There is
probably no objective way to say how much it explains, as the unexplainable
part is (largly?) unmeasurable. But I don't see why it would be almost
nothing, so it's not a TOAE either.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Which is quite an astounding result, don't get me wrong, but let's  
>> not make
>> the mistake of adjusting to the immodesty of the reductionist  
>> materialists.
>> This way you may not be taken as seriously, but being modest and  
>> honest
>> seems more important to me.
> 
> The modesty is in the reiterared act of faith of saying "yes" to the  
> doctor, and accepting the classical Church thesis. All the rest  
> follows from that: from the explainable to the ineffable.
It seems to me we postulate the ineffeable at the start by saying "yes", and
so it's not really a conclusion of the theory, but we just give it a place
in a theoretical framework.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent  
>>> picture of
>>> almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and
>>> this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
>> I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes the
>> possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically  
>> it may
>> be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but  
>> then we can
>> represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an  
>> encoding
>> scheme, still we wouldn't call "." a theory of everything.
>> So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.
> 
> Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are  
> enough, and very simple (despite mysterious).
They are enough, but they are not the only way to make a theory of
everything. As you say, we can use everything as powerful as numbers, so
there is an infinity of different formulations of theories of everything.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  The many more powerful theories are internal views *in* the number realm,
> but strictly  
> speaking they are introducing the complexity, and should be compared  
> to event taken "place" in the number realm.
How do you know the more powerful theories are just internal views, and not
implicit in the "yes" (consciousness)? We might just get what we
(implicitly) assume at the st

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-01 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 31 Jul 2011, at 19:31, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:




The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.


A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
Of course it should be able to predict everything which is
predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which can
predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that you
will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.

OK. But what is predictable may be quite limited in the end.


Predicting is not the goal of the TOE. It is just a little obligation  
to be accepted as a scientific theory, so as to be refutable.
The goal is more like searching a bigger picture, rational, and which  
help, first in formulating the mind-body problem, and then in solving  
it as far as possible.





Is there a
result showing that it is possible at all to derive precise physical  
laws

from COMP and a bet on our substitution level?


Yes. And you don't need to know the substitution level, although a  
comparison of the physics derived from comp, and the physics inferred  
from measurement might suggest higher bounds for our substitution level.








Bruno Marchal wrote:



I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much
sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be
predicted
precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?


The exact contrary. Comp is not just a change in
'perspective' (Aristotle -> Plato), but the discovery of a creative
bomb (the UM).
With comp we begin to know that we don't know what we are doing. We
can (machines can) understand that by trying to control it, we make  
it

less controllable. A bit like a mother with a baby. That is not
something entirely new, but here it appears in the 3-theories.

Right. That's why we could almost say COMP is an anti-TOE.


Comp leads first to a ROE (Realm of everything: the ontologic part of  
the TOE, which here is given by the truth of elementary (sigma_1)  
statements).


Then it shows that we can only scratch the truth, concerning that ROE.
Concerning the UMs and the LUMs, they are born universal dissident:  
they can refute *all* theories about themselves, unless they are too  
fuzzy (which makes them allergic to fuzzy theories too).







Bruno Marchal wrote:



So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being
a gap.


OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory of
almost everything.
Well, but the part that is unexplainable doesn't seem to be small at  
all.
Frankly it explains almost nothing (which is the most we will ever  
explain,

as there is infinitely much to explain!).


Well, you have admitted not having study the details, but normally it  
explains a lot: indeed God, belief, knowledge, observation and  
sensation, and all this including all reason why we cannot completely  
understand what happens to be introspectively unexplainable. Ad  
normally, in principle, it explains the origin of the physical laws,  
without assuming anything physical.




If anything, it shows there is an
infinite hierarchy of ever more efficient theories.


Theories, or machines. Those are terrestrial finite creatures. It is  
he tree of arithmetical life, if you want. It is transfinite, very big.



Which is quite an astounding result, don't get me wrong, but let's  
not make
the mistake of adjusting to the immodesty of the reductionist  
materialists.
This way you may not be taken as seriously, but being modest and  
honest

seems more important to me.


The modesty is in the reiterared act of faith of saying "yes" to the  
doctor, and accepting the classical Church thesis. All the rest  
follows from that: from the explainable to the ineffable.







Bruno Marchal wrote:


But *that* fact, that there are mysteries, is no more a mystery.
At the cost that the very foundation of our theory is mysterious! We  
use a
mystery to explain that there are more mysteries. Which is the best  
we can

ever do - how exciting!


You are right. It is like that. Numbers hides and partially single out  
a very deep mystery.






Bruno Marchal wrote:


And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent  
picture of

almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and
this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.

I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes the
possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically  
it may
be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but  
then we can
represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an  
encoding

scheme, still we wouldn't call "." a theory of everything.
So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.


Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are  
enough, and very

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 31 Jul 2011, at 18:24, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
 Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it.
 All other
 universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number
 relations exist
 and all else is an "epistemological view" on that is a very narrow
 interpretation.
>>>
>>> Arithmetical truth contains fortranic truth, lispic truth,
>>> combinatoric truth, etc.
>>> It does not contains theological truth, nor physical truth, except in
>>> the 'epistemological' points of view of the creature they have all.
>> How exactly do we know that these epistemological truths are  
>> secondary / not
>> ontological? I don't really see how COMP does tell us that, as it  
>> could well
>> be that the assumptions COMP makes (including "consciousness  
>> exists", in
>> order to say "yes, doctor") are in some sense equivalent to the
>> "epistemological" points of view whose existence we "derive" from the
>> assumptions of COMP. I can't prove this (I don't think it can be  
>> proven),
>> but for me it seems like this is the case.
> 
> It is just that we don't need to assume them. It is like the invisible  
> horses pulling a car.
> 

True, but consciousness is there without being assumed. The theory cannot
just ignore that.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
>> The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
>> theory that can be used to predict everything.
> 
> A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
> Of course it should be able to predict everything which is  
> predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which can  
> predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that you  
> will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.
OK. But what is predictable may be quite limited in the end. Is there a
result showing that it is possible at all to derive precise physical laws
from COMP and a bet on our substitution level?



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much  
>> sense. Even
>> current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be  
>> predicted
>> precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
>> distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?
> 
> The exact contrary. Comp is not just a change in  
> 'perspective' (Aristotle -> Plato), but the discovery of a creative  
> bomb (the UM).
> With comp we begin to know that we don't know what we are doing. We  
> can (machines can) understand that by trying to control it, we make it  
> less controllable. A bit like a mother with a baby. That is not  
> something entirely new, but here it appears in the 3-theories.
Right. That's why we could almost say COMP is an anti-TOE.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> So no theory
>> can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being  
>> a gap.
> 
> OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory of  
> almost everything.
Well, but the part that is unexplainable doesn't seem to be small at all.
Frankly it explains almost nothing (which is the most we will ever explain,
as there is infinitely much to explain!). If anything, it shows there is an
infinite hierarchy of ever more efficient theories.
Which is quite an astounding result, don't get me wrong, but let's not make
the mistake of adjusting to the immodesty of the reductionist materialists.
This way you may not be taken as seriously, but being modest and honest
seems more important to me.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> But *that* fact, that there are mysteries, is no more a mystery.
At the cost that the very foundation of our theory is mysterious! We use a
mystery to explain that there are more mysteries. Which is the best we can
ever do - how exciting!


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent picture of  
> almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and  
> this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes the
possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically it may
be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but then we can
represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an encoding
scheme, still we wouldn't call "." a theory of everything.
So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-31 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 31 Jul 2011, at 18:24, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it.
All other
universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number
relations exist
and all else is an "epistemological view" on that is a very narrow
interpretation.

Arithmetical truth contains fortranic truth, lispic truth,
combinatoric truth, etc.
It does not contains theological truth, nor physical truth, except in
the 'epistemological' points of view of the creature they have all.
How exactly do we know that these epistemological truths are
secondary / not
ontological? I don't really see how COMP does tell us that, as it
could well
be that the assumptions COMP makes (including "consciousness
exists", in

order to say "yes, doctor") are in some sense equivalent to the
"epistemological" points of view whose existence we "derive" from the
assumptions of COMP. I can't prove this (I don't think it can be
proven),

but for me it seems like this is the case.

It is just that we don't need to assume them. It is like the invisible
horses pulling a car. You can reify the epistemological truth in some
ontology, but there is no need to do that, and it makes the MB problem
more difficult. In science, you can never proof that a theory is
wrong, by changing ad-hocly the way you interpret the data. The
epistemological view are secondary because they are recovered by the
way machine looks at the arithmetical reality. The simplest ontology
are the numbers, and the internal view, including the physical, are
given by the arithmetical modalities, like Bp and Bp & Dp, or the less
arithmetical one, like Bp & p, Bp & Dp & p, etc. At least in the toy
theology based on the Theaetetus definition of knowledge (justified
opinion which happens to be God's opinion (I mean which happens to be
true)).

Bruno

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
>> Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it.  
>> All other
>> universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number  
>> relations exist
>> and all else is an "epistemological view" on that is a very narrow
>> interpretation.
> 
> Arithmetical truth contains fortranic truth, lispic truth,  
> combinatoric truth, etc.
> It does not contains theological truth, nor physical truth, except in  
> the 'epistemological' points of view of the creature they have all.  
How exactly do we know that these epistemological truths are secondary / not
ontological? I don't really see how COMP does tell us that, as it could well
be that the assumptions COMP makes (including "consciousness exists", in
order to say "yes, doctor") are in some sense equivalent to the
"epistemological" points of view whose existence we "derive" from the
assumptions of COMP. I can't prove this (I don't think it can be proven),
but for me it seems like this is the case.
-- 
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-31 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 31 Jul 2011, at 16:14, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:



OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order  
logical

specification of any universal machine, will do.

Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't really exist.
You
"just" have a theory that manages to state this very clearly, and
logically.



You might try to take literally what I say. I was saying that each
universal numbers (like FORTRAN, Conway's game of life, LISP, prolog,
Robinson arithmetic, etc.) are TOE. To fix the things I have chosen
Robinson Arithmetic.

The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and  
the

axioms:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Another one is mainly

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

That gives rich ontologies in which internal observers "project
realities". With comp we have to embed the mathematician (the little
ego!) in arithmetics, and the laws of mind and matter does not depend
on the choice of the first initial universal system.
All computations contains all computations by all universal systems,
that is why the tehological matter (including physics) does not  
depend

on the initial choice. It does not mean that there is no TOE. Only a
lot, which are equivalent  for the fundamental matter. They lead all
to the same hypostases, once you accept the classical theory of
knowledge (Theaetetus).



We can debate the terms.


OK.




I think calling universal systems a TOE is a bit of
a stretch.



Just to be precise, the TOE is not the universal system, but some  
first order classical logic, with equality, extension of the chosen  
universal system. OK. (the UMs and the LUMs are more like hero and  
heroin in the dramas the TOE allows)






The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.


A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
Of course it should be able to predict everything which is  
predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which can  
predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that you  
will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.





I don't think this can be
done through universal systems. It appears to me COMP allows for
uncomputable, and therefore unpredictable phenomena.


A lot. All surprises hide surprises.



I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much  
sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be  
predicted

precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?


The exact contrary. Comp is not just a change in  
'perspective' (Aristotle -> Plato), but the discovery of a creative  
bomb (the UM).
With comp we begin to know that we don't know what we are doing. We  
can (machines can) understand that by trying to control it, we make it  
less controllable. A bit like a mother with a baby. That is not  
something entirely new, but here it appears in the 3-theories.






COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which  
really

means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable.


Absolutely so (assuming comp). comp = CT + "yes doctor". CT subsumes  
arithmetic.





So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being  
a gap.


OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory of  
almost everything.


But, you know, it is more than the necessity for a gap, it is the  
discovery that the gap 'kick back', it has a geometry, it is  
"something" and machines have access to it, they can point  
mathematical telescope on it, also.


Comp leads to a generalization of Everett's idea to apply QM to the  
observer. Comp applies arithmetic and meta-arithmetic (a part of  
arithmetic by Post, Gödel, Kleene & Co.) to the 'body' of the  
mathematician, or at least the one who say yes doctor to a doctor  
which serendipitously opts for the correct level, in a mathematical  
precise sense: in this case it inherits of the hypostases, and the  
logic of it determine the views you can have from inside. But the  
simplest thing you can say on those views is that they all make us  
more ignorant. The "concrete" relative Löbian machines get interesting  
on the border of the computable and non computable, where very deep  
sharable histories develop, in all case, from all views some mysteries  
subsists, and some key mystery, the gap, have a quasi life of its own.  
But *that* fact, that there are mysteries, is no more a mystery. And  
in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent picture of  
almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and  
this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.

And the point is not that this is true, but that this is testable.
Comp, not so much unlike salvia perhaps,

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
> 
> 
>>> OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
>>> What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order logical
>>> specification of any universal machine, will do.
>> Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't really exist.  
>> You
>> "just" have a theory that manages to state this very clearly, and  
>> logically.
> 
> 
> You might try to take literally what I say. I was saying that each  
> universal numbers (like FORTRAN, Conway's game of life, LISP, prolog,  
> Robinson arithmetic, etc.) are TOE. To fix the things I have chosen  
> Robinson Arithmetic.
> 
> The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and the  
> axioms:
> 
> 0 ≠ s(x)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
> x+0 = x
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> x*0=0
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> 
> Another one is mainly
> 
> Kxy = x
> Sxyz = xz(yz)
> 
> That gives rich ontologies in which internal observers "project  
> realities". With comp we have to embed the mathematician (the little  
> ego!) in arithmetics, and the laws of mind and matter does not depend  
> on the choice of the first initial universal system.
> All computations contains all computations by all universal systems,  
> that is why the tehological matter (including physics) does not depend  
> on the initial choice. It does not mean that there is no TOE. Only a  
> lot, which are equivalent  for the fundamental matter. They lead all  
> to the same hypostases, once you accept the classical theory of  
> knowledge (Theaetetus).
> 

We can debate the terms. I think calling universal systems a TOE is a bit of
a stretch. The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything. I don't think this can be
done through universal systems. It appears to me COMP allows for
uncomputable, and therefore unpredictable phenomena. 
I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be predicted
precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?

COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which really
means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable. So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being a gap.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
> 
> 
>>> OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
>>> What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order logical
>>> specification of any universal machine, will do.
>> Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't really exist.  
>> You
>> "just" have a theory that manages to state this very clearly, and  
>> logically.
> 
> 
> You might try to take literally what I say. I was saying that each  
> universal numbers (like FORTRAN, Conway's game of life, LISP, prolog,  
> Robinson arithmetic, etc.) are TOE. To fix the things I have chosen  
> Robinson Arithmetic.
> 
> The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and the  
> axioms:
> 
> 0 ≠ s(x)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
> x+0 = x
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> x*0=0
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> 
> Another one is mainly
> 
> Kxy = x
> Sxyz = xz(yz)
> 
> That gives rich ontologies in which internal observers "project  
> realities". With comp we have to embed the mathematician (the little  
> ego!) in arithmetics, and the laws of mind and matter does not depend  
> on the choice of the first initial universal system.
> All computations contains all computations by all universal systems,  
> that is why the tehological matter (including physics) does not depend  
> on the initial choice. It does not mean that there is no TOE. Only a  
> lot, which are equivalent  for the fundamental matter. They lead all  
> to the same hypostases, once you accept the classical theory of  
> knowledge (Theaetetus).
> 

We can debate the terms. I think calling universal systems a TOE is a bit of
a stretch. The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything. I don't think this can be
done through universal systems. It appears to me COMP allows for
uncomputable, and therefore unpredictable phenomena. 
I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be predicted
precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?

COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which really
means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable. So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being a gap.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
> 
> 
>>> OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
>>> What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order logical
>>> specification of any universal machine, will do.
>> Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't really exist.  
>> You
>> "just" have a theory that manages to state this very clearly, and  
>> logically.
> 
> 
> You might try to take literally what I say. I was saying that each  
> universal numbers (like FORTRAN, Conway's game of life, LISP, prolog,  
> Robinson arithmetic, etc.) are TOE. To fix the things I have chosen  
> Robinson Arithmetic.
> 
> The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and the  
> axioms:
> 
> 0 ≠ s(x)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
> x+0 = x
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> x*0=0
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> 
> Another one is mainly
> 
> Kxy = x
> Sxyz = xz(yz)
> 
> That gives rich ontologies in which internal observers "project  
> realities". With comp we have to embed the mathematician (the little  
> ego!) in arithmetics, and the laws of mind and matter does not depend  
> on the choice of the first initial universal system.
> All computations contains all computations by all universal systems,  
> that is why the tehological matter (including physics) does not depend  
> on the initial choice. It does not mean that there is no TOE. Only a  
> lot, which are equivalent  for the fundamental matter. They lead all  
> to the same hypostases, once you accept the classical theory of  
> knowledge (Theaetetus).
> 

We can debate the terms. I think calling universal systems a TOE is a bit of
a stretch. The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything. I don't think this can be
done through universal systems. It appears to me COMP allows for
uncomputable, and therefore unpredictable phenomena. 
I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be predicted
precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?

COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which really
means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable. So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being a gap.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 26 Jul 2011, at 19:11, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:


Hi benjayk,

I might comment other paragraphs later, but for reason of time and
business, I will just go on some points.

No problem, comment on what you want and when you feel like doing it.


OK.





Bruno Marchal wrote:


You can expect that a theory which unify all force will not be  
*that*
simple. Now, with comp, if you like simplicity, you should like  
that

the theory is a little theory of numbers (and that the observers is
that same theory + the induction axioms). All what I explain in the
quote can be defined precisely in that theory.

It's interesting, but I can't wrap my head around it so easily and I
am just
too lazy to study it. I don't think it would be much use for me.


The whole approach is not instrumental.
OK, but this has not much too do with whether studying the theory  
feels

useful for me personally.


There are different level of use. A return to Plato and scientific   
might indirectly help physician and pharmaceutics coming back to  
seriousness in medicine, and that might save your life. The practice  
of comp might be used to explore the galaxy, and the whole theory give  
a reservoir to counterexample for invalid use of Gödel and the quantum  
in philosophy of mind. I think that there is a lot of things there  
which can be enjoyed both by your little ego and your higher self (if  
that makes sense).
But it is fundamental science: the main use if for the fun when we are  
interested in such questions.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


Shit happens, provably so in the comp theory. We can practice harm
reduction, but we cannot eliminate the bad. And, indeed it has its
role in the big picture.
Yep. But harm reduction often does not work that well. You know,  
like

reducing harm by illegalizing drugs. It easily leads to
authoritarianism.
And it may easily be anti-progress. Progress means also great new
dangers.


The harm-reduction philosophy comes from anti-prohibitionism. The  
idea
is to inform people. It really comes from, I think, the fact that  
oral

tobacco is much safer that smoking tobacco, which was hard to accept
for those who are 'religiously' against tobacco. It is known that it
is prohibition which makes the drug dangerous, so harm reduction
really means the stopping of prohibition, and sending strongly
addicted people to the hospital instead of jail (like we do with
alcohol).
Basically HARM REDUCTION = ANTI-PROHIBITION.

Sure, from your and my perspective this is clear.


Harm reduction is not a personal label. It is a label used again those  
who want to eliminate the roots of the harm, instead of ameliorating  
the condition of those who are in contact with such harmful things. It  
is an approach like putting security belt in cars, filter on  
cigarette, given clean needles to heroin user, and basically to stop  
prohibition of drugs, which is recognized by the experts are much more  
harmful than the drugs. They do not advocate explicitly anti- 
prohibition, because they try to be more concrete than that and to  
teach by examples. You can look at:


http://www.harmreduction.org/section.php?id=62

or the journal

http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/

(Harm Reduction Journal is an open access, peer-reviewed, online  
journal whose focus is on the prevalent patterns of psychoactive drug  
use, the public policies meant to control them, and the search for  
effective methods of reducing the adverse medical, public health, and  
social consequences associated with both drugs and drug policies. We  
define 'harm reduction' as 'policies and programs which aim to reduce  
the health, social, and economic costs of legal and illegal  
psychoactive drug use without necessarily reducing drug consumption'.)





But from some people's
perspective, it's seems clear we need prohibtion to save people from
themselves.


This is harm elimination philosophy: the opposite of harm reduction,  
which consists in helping people instead of condemning them for their  
behavior (unless they harm other people).




The point is, we can never really be sure if harm reduction
really reduces harm. We never know.


We know that immediately. It is the difference between going in jail  
and going in a center for helping you.





Harm reduction is especially critical in this respect because some  
form of
"harm reduction" may be extremely catastrophic. Some people might  
say we
need to stop technological progress for reducing harm, and indeed  
their are
some relatively plausible arguments that technological progress may  
create
massive harm. But it may equally be true that technology may create  
heaven
on earth and solve many absolutely critical problems, and without  
it, we are

doomed. In this case stopping progress would create disastrous harm.


Harm reduction has no long run strategies. It is a pragmatic concern  
for helping suffering people here and now.







Bruno Marchal wrote:



But

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 27 Jul 2011, at 15:36, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:

Yes. A tiny part of arithmetic is already sufficiently rich to
implement (in the original mathematical sense) very complex
emulation
bearing entities much powerfull than that tiny arithmetical
entities,

and those can become lucid on the web of arithmetical dream, which
will be, as seen from inside (the points of view), terribly
complex,
so that paradoxically, the whole of mathematics can only scratch
the

arithmetical truth. Analytical truth and physical truth are
simplification of the arithmetical truth by arithmetical creatures.

I think you confuse arithmetical truth with TRUTH.

That is a consequence of comp. If "we" are machine at some level,
then

it is absolutely undecidable if there is anything more than
arithmetical truth.
The analytical truth and the physical truth and the theological truth
can be seen as internal "epistemological views". In arithmetic there
are defined by Bp, or variants, or by by scheme B_n x & x (x
arithmetical formula, B_n being some other Löbian machine, for
example)
My point is that this truth has little to do with arithmetic in
particular.

Indeed, any first order specification of a universal system will do.
They are "ontologically" equivalent: with the combinators you have the
numbers, and with the numbers, you have the combinators. So
combinatoric truth and arithmetical truth, and Conway-game-of-life
truth are all the same truth, with different shape or implementations.

Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it.
All other
universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number
relations exist

and all else is an "epistemological view" on that is a very narrow
interpretation.

Arithmetical truth contains fortranic truth, lispic truth,
combinatoric truth, etc.
It does not contains theological truth, nor physical truth, except in
the 'epistemological' points of view of the creature they have all.
So, arithmetic is made into a theory of everything, and arithmetical
truth does play the role of the big unameable things. If you take
fortran programs as ontology, exactly the same can be said. Once you
search a theory of everything, comp does confuse truth and
arithmetical truth, or Truth and fortranic truth, etc. When number
relation exist, all other universal system exist in a similar
ontological sense. In arithmetical truth the fortranic truth is
automatically given, you don't need to introduce points of view,
unlike the analytical and the physical, for which you need the
epistemology (to interview the fortran program or the numbers).

Bruno

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 27 Jul 2011, at 15:50, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:


Well, bad luck. Then you have to play this game until you get  
tired

of it.


If that can happen.

I hope so! Playing is great, but every particular game is boring at
some
point.



Not the infinite games. In infinite games (like Conway's game of  
life,

or like with programming computers, or plausibly other life and big
bangs ...) there are always new participants, and unexpected
situations. It is both fun and scary. (leading to the unavoidable
conflict between security and freedom).
I think both Conway's game of life and convential computer  
progamming will

become boring at some point. The insights gained through them and most
importantly, their fun, are quite limited. I cannot imagine having  
boundless

creative blissful fun with Conway's game of life or C++, and I think
boundless creative bliss is where we want to go, and will go.

Conway's game is just too mechanical. There are much better/ 
efficient views
on the computations that Conway's game can represent then Conway's  
game

itself.


OF course. In that sense you are right. But I count as "Conway's game"  
the games that you can represent in in*one* infinite game, like  
biological life is usually seen as chemistry.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-27 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
> 
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 Well, bad luck. Then you have to play this game until you get tired
 of it.
>>>
>>> If that can happen.
>> I hope so! Playing is great, but every particular game is boring at  
>> some
>> point.
> 
> 
> Not the infinite games. In infinite games (like Conway's game of life,  
> or like with programming computers, or plausibly other life and big  
> bangs ...) there are always new participants, and unexpected  
> situations. It is both fun and scary. (leading to the unavoidable  
> conflict between security and freedom).
I think both Conway's game of life and convential computer progamming will
become boring at some point. The insights gained through them and most
importantly, their fun, are quite limited. I cannot imagine having boundless
creative blissful fun with Conway's game of life or C++, and I think
boundless creative bliss is where we want to go, and will go.

Conway's game is just too mechanical. There are much better/efficient views
on the computations that Conway's game can represent then Conway's game
itself.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-27 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>>
>>> Yes. A tiny part of arithmetic is already sufficiently rich to
>>> implement (in the original mathematical sense) very complex emulation
>>> bearing entities much powerfull than that tiny arithmetical entities,
>>> and those can become lucid on the web of arithmetical dream, which
>>> will be, as seen from inside (the points of view), terribly complex,
>>> so that paradoxically, the whole of mathematics can only scratch the
>>> arithmetical truth. Analytical truth and physical truth are
>>> simplification of the arithmetical truth by arithmetical creatures.
>> I think you confuse arithmetical truth with TRUTH.
> 
> That is a consequence of comp. If "we" are machine at some level, then  
> it is absolutely undecidable if there is anything more than  
> arithmetical truth.
> The analytical truth and the physical truth and the theological truth  
> can be seen as internal "epistemological views". In arithmetic there  
> are defined by Bp, or variants, or by by scheme B_n x & x (x  
> arithmetical formula, B_n being some other Löbian machine, for example)
My point is that this truth has little to do with arithmetic in particular.
Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it. All other
universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number relations exist
and all else is an "epistemological view" on that is a very narrow
interpretation.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:



Yes. A tiny part of arithmetic is already sufficiently rich to
implement (in the original mathematical sense) very complex emulation
bearing entities much powerfull than that tiny arithmetical entities,
and those can become lucid on the web of arithmetical dream, which
will be, as seen from inside (the points of view), terribly complex,
so that paradoxically, the whole of mathematics can only scratch the
arithmetical truth. Analytical truth and physical truth are
simplification of the arithmetical truth by arithmetical creatures.

I think you confuse arithmetical truth with TRUTH.


That is a consequence of comp. If "we" are machine at some level, then  
it is absolutely undecidable if there is anything more than  
arithmetical truth.
The analytical truth and the physical truth and the theological truth  
can be seen as internal "epistemological views". In arithmetic there  
are defined by Bp, or variants, or by by scheme B_n x & x (x  
arithmetical formula, B_n being some other Löbian machine, for example)






Arithmetics just is able
to point to what is beyond it,


You mean PA? OK. That is just a LUM, or Plotinus man.




so from this perspective you can call it
arithmetical truth.


The LUM itself cannot. The LUM will call it God (and get rather  
miserable for that blasphem).





But you could call it german truth as well, because
german can be used to do this as well (obviously, because it can state
everything arithmetic can).


Err.. Yes, but computationalism makes it reciprocal.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:



Exercise:
1) show that 1 has 8 clothes. (easy) example of clothes for 1
(1^2+0^2+0^2+0^2, 0^2+1^2+0^2+0^2, (-1)^2+0^2+0^2+0^2, ...)
2) show that 2 has 24 clothes (easy but longer)
3) show that all numbers have clothes (very difficult)
4) well Jacobi result: show that the male's number of clothes is 8
times the number of their divisors, and show that the female's  
number

of clothes is, well a bit more complex, it is 24 times the number of
their *male* divisors.  (super extremely difficult).
I recall male number = odd number, and female number = even number.

Take it easy. Jacobi' result illustrates beautiful number's pattern.
Its proof lead to the notion of modular form, which are really crazy
object in math, and physics. They play a key role in Wiles proof of
Fermat theorem.

That poetry reminds us that the very little numbers like 0, 1, 2,  
are

very important.
Interesting. I'm not really interested in mathematical excercise  
right now.
I just finished my exams (including math) and just want to relax  
from this

stuff ;).


And I just sent two mathematical theories! Apology. Relax. I wish you  
good Holiday.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


And once the observer is defined by the LUM (Löbian universal
machine), we can extract from addition and multiplication, the whole
UP-theology (GOD, NOÙS and UNIVERSAL SOUL, and the down-theology:
INTELLIGIBLE MATTER and SENSIBLE MATTER. This gives indirectly a
theory of consciousness,  matter and qualia. It is "scientific" in  
the

sense of being testable, by comparing our observable matter, and the
matter that machines can observe in arithmetic. It is elegant, I dare
to say, because we can take as TOE elementary arithmetic (already
taught in school!), and then everything else including GOD and why  
GOD

has no name (Oops!), appears (not in time, by logic and arithmetic.
OK. It seems to be elegant, indeed. Not sure how useful it'll be,  
though.

Extracting laws of physics out of it seems to me like computing the
mandelbrot on a pocket calculator.
Just looking and using empirical science seems to be more practical  
to me

(even though we won't get that exact results this way).


It is not a question of being useful, but a question of being  
consequent with the assumption we do.
Comp does not needed to be used to study the physical (except Everett  
uses it, note, but don't mind this), but it makes computer science  
capable of explaining where the physical laws come from, and by the  
Solovay G/G* splitting and the intensional variants we get the picture  
already at a testable level, and it already explains some "weird"  
quantum features. That is my job, you don't need to be interested.


Would I have search all that would I have discovered salvia in my  
youth? Perhaps. I have a craving for reasoning from hypothesis  
(arguing).


I think that in the long run, being serious (and thus modest) in  
theology is the best remedy against fundamentalism and authoritarism.  
Now, being serious here might consisted in recognizing the incredible  
machine's theology (a branch of computer science), and even number  
theory.


... but we are not even serious on health ... 

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-26 Thread meekerdb


On 7/26/2011 10:11 AM, benjayk wrote:

Peace really only comes when you get
comfortable with falling


As an old motorcycle racer, I agree completely.

Brent

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:



OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order logical
specification of any universal machine, will do.
Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't really exist.  
You
"just" have a theory that manages to state this very clearly, and  
logically.



You might try to take literally what I say. I was saying that each  
universal numbers (like FORTRAN, Conway's game of life, LISP, prolog,  
Robinson arithmetic, etc.) are TOE. To fix the things I have chosen  
Robinson Arithmetic.


The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and the  
axioms:


0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Another one is mainly

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

That gives rich ontologies in which internal observers "project  
realities". With comp we have to embed the mathematician (the little  
ego!) in arithmetics, and the laws of mind and matter does not depend  
on the choice of the first initial universal system.
All computations contains all computations by all universal systems,  
that is why the tehological matter (including physics) does not depend  
on the initial choice. It does not mean that there is no TOE. Only a  
lot, which are equivalent  for the fundamental matter. They lead all  
to the same hypostases, once you accept the classical theory of  
knowledge (Theaetetus).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:



Well, bad luck. Then you have to play this game until you get tired
of it.


If that can happen.
I hope so! Playing is great, but every particular game is boring at  
some

point.



Not the infinite games. In infinite games (like Conway's game of life,  
or like with programming computers, or plausibly other life and big  
bangs ...) there are always new participants, and unexpected  
situations. It is both fun and scary. (leading to the unavoidable  
conflict between security and freedom).


Ah! benjayk!  I can understand your reticence for betting on a theory.
Someone said that there is only two certainties in life: taxes and  
death.

Comp is the understanding that there is only one certainty: taxes.

But this does not concern you (the higher self) at all. It concerns  
only you (the ego). Infinite games have exit doors too, but "taxes" is  
the price of any of its local relative incarnations.


What we can try is a slow persistent decrease of taxes, by genuine  
realist investment and speculation.

Harm reduction again. We can tend to zero taxes, for some period.

What would be even more helpful for all "little ego", would be a  
reappraisal of the "spiritual values", but this will take the time  
needed for the heart to recover reason, and for the reason to recover  
the heart. This needs a complex mixture of security and freedom, and,  
on earth, is a problem with billions of unknowns. It is an infinite  
game by itself.


I would appreciate a bigger respect for contemplation, and meditation,  
and even sleep and holiday, but I am realist: we are living the  
prohibition era, human fears themselves still to much and many  
politicized or romanticize spiritual values. As long as drugs are  
prohibited, I can't help myself to think we are partially, but  
internationally  governed by mafia, that is: not democratic state. And  
confusing democracy with that power, gives it power. I think.


To kill the little ego, and coming back, you need to give it not just  
love, but food and water too. Not coming back is the usual clinical  
death.


Bruno


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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-26 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Hi benjayk,
> 
> I might comment other paragraphs later, but for reason of time and  
> business, I will just go on some points.
No problem, comment on what you want and when you feel like doing it.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>> You can expect that a theory which unify all force will not be *that*
>>> simple. Now, with comp, if you like simplicity, you should like that
>>> the theory is a little theory of numbers (and that the observers is
>>> that same theory + the induction axioms). All what I explain in the
>>> quote can be defined precisely in that theory.
>> It's interesting, but I can't wrap my head around it so easily and I  
>> am just
>> too lazy to study it. I don't think it would be much use for me.
> 
> The whole approach is not instrumental.
OK, but this has not much too do with whether studying the theory feels
useful for me personally.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Shit happens, provably so in the comp theory. We can practice harm
>>> reduction, but we cannot eliminate the bad. And, indeed it has its
>>> role in the big picture.
>> Yep. But harm reduction often does not work that well. You know, like
>> reducing harm by illegalizing drugs. It easily leads to  
>> authoritarianism.
>> And it may easily be anti-progress. Progress means also great new  
>> dangers.
> 
> The harm-reduction philosophy comes from anti-prohibitionism. The idea  
> is to inform people. It really comes from, I think, the fact that oral  
> tobacco is much safer that smoking tobacco, which was hard to accept  
> for those who are 'religiously' against tobacco. It is known that it  
> is prohibition which makes the drug dangerous, so harm reduction  
> really means the stopping of prohibition, and sending strongly  
> addicted people to the hospital instead of jail (like we do with  
> alcohol).
> Basically HARM REDUCTION = ANTI-PROHIBITION.
Sure, from your and my perspective this is clear. But from some people's
perspective, it's seems clear we need prohibtion to save people from
themselves. The point is, we can never really be sure if harm reduction
really reduces harm. We never know.
Harm reduction is especially critical in this respect because some form of
"harm reduction" may be extremely catastrophic. Some people might say we
need to stop technological progress for reducing harm, and indeed their are
some relatively plausible arguments that technological progress may create
massive harm. But it may equally be true that technology may create heaven
on earth and solve many absolutely critical problems, and without it, we are
doomed. In this case stopping progress would create disastrous harm.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
 But the ultimate soul (God), does
 not fall, as in a accident. It falls, because this it what it always
 does.
 It falls into itself.
>>>
>>> All right. But not always, only one half eternity (so to speak,  
>>> again).
>> Hm... When exactly does he not fall?
> 
> When heart and reason makes peace.
I am not sure if this works. Peace really only comes when you get
comfortable with falling - otherwise you will only feel at peace when you
feel (potentially illusorily) safe.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
 In my mind the creatures are God,
>>>
>>> [you are probably not supposed to say this. Enlightened people  
>>> already
>>> know, and lost souls cannot grasp]
>>>
>>> You can say things like "I love logic", or I love this or that  
>>> plant".
>> I think you are a bit too anxious about saying the forbidden things.  
>> But you
>> are right, it won't really help. But then, a soul that's really lost  
>> cannot
>> be helped. It has to find it's way on its own.
> 
> It is worst than that. By telling incommunicable truth, you aggravate  
> the situation of the soul, or you make it fall.
This may be true. But then, it's critical souls that souls learn not to
believe what other people say and trust themselves. So it really does not
ultimately matter what you say. The more they believe a thing you said that
they really shouldn't believe, the more they will realize the consequences
of blind faith.
I acknowledge that this may be used to justify saying anything, and I am
okay with that.
Telling "incommunicable" truth may still inspire people to find what the
communcation hints at. I can't communicate the feeling at looking at my
screen, but I can still say "I see a screen. Do you see the screen in front
of your eyes, too?"


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Well, in my mind "inconsistent" things are just labels that we can't  
>> attach
>> some precise meaning to. If I say 1+1=3 is true in the usual natural
>> numbers, you just don't know what I mean. You might say I am  
>> "wrong". But
>> maybe I just have another conception of the usual natural numbers as  
>> you do,
>> or pretend so.  :P We can always play this game of relativizing
>> descriptions.
> 
> Yes, like you can always visit France with a map of Germany.
> Inconsistency is a Löbian mac

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out