subject:"RE\: 1P\/3P CONFUSION again and again"

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-15 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Oct 9, 2015 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>  you have no knowledge of computer science and its history. Computation
> and computability have been discovered by mathematicians and they don't use
> any physical assumptions.
>

That is true, 
physical assumptions
 or assumptions of any sort are not needed to make a calculation, but
matter that obeys the laws of physics is.

> 
> INTEL is interested in physical computation,
>

INTEL is interested in computations period, if you know of a way to make
calculations that isn't physical INTEL would very much want to hear from
you!

>>
>> The only reason John Clark talks about "
>>  
>> physical computation
>> "
>>  and not just "computation" is that unlike John Clark  
>> Bruno Marchal
>> thinks there is a type of computation that isn't physical.
>>
>
> > 
> It is not me. It is everybody in the field. Just open any book on that
> subject.
>

It doesn't matter if it's open or closed, no book on that subject can make
a calculation.

> > 
> Avoid books written by physicalist metaphysician of course
>

And books by "
physicalist metaphysician
s" (whatever the hell that is) can't make a calculation either, but a
silicon microprocessor can, and that is why INTEL makes microprocessors and
not books.

 John K Clark

>
>

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-15 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Oct 9, 2015 at 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > 
>>> >> 
>>> Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal,
>>
>>
> >> 
>> But the proof or that can't compute one damn thing!
>>  
>> No proof can.
>
> > 
> That is false. Sigma_1 provability can compute
>

Then for god's sake stop blabbing about it and just do it!  Start the Sigma_1
Computer Corporation and drive INTEL into bankruptcy; they could never
compete with your zero manufacturing costs.

> > 
> No physical assumption is needed,
>

And no computation is performed.

> 
> By definition, if those computations did not exist in arithmetic, they
> would not exist in the physical reality either.
>

To hell with definitions they can't make calculations; if computations did
not exist in the physical world arithmetic would not exist!

 John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-09 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 06 Oct 2015, at 16:23, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation  
is not a physical notion,

No, John Clark does not agree with that.

Then your earlier explanation of what is computation in "physical  
computation" is senseless.

 > because he defines physical computation by a computation  
done in physics.

Because John Clark can find no evidence that computation NOT  
done in physics exists, 

This shows that you have no knowledge of computer science and its  
history. Computation and computability have been discovered by  
mathematicians and they don't use any physical assumptions.

and INTEL can't find any evidence for it either.

INTEL is interested in physical computation, but they have a good idea  
of what a computation is so as to implement them in a physical way.

The only reason John Clark talks about "physical computation 
" and not just "computation" is that unlike John Clark   
Bruno Marchal thinks there is a type of computation that isn't  
physical.

It is not me. It is everybody in the field. Just open any book on that  
subject. Avoid books written by physicalist metaphysician of course  
(like Deutsch in FOR, for example). At least Deutsch agrees that he is  
in opposition with *all* mathematicians and computer scientists on this.

Bruno

 John K Clark

On 05 Oct 2015, at 00:52, Kim Jones wrote:

On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark  wrote:

When I say "physical computation"  and you demand a definition of  
that and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and  
you demand a definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly  
acceptable for me to either get off the silly definition merry-go- 
round or to demand a definition of my own, a definition of definition.

You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you  
are. An academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the- 
arse straighto from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument  
only, not boldly explore consequences of interesting ideas. That is  
beyond you; you are a mental midget; the equivalent of someone who  
thinks its really smart to shoot a giraffe or a lion and then pose  
for a photo against the carcass. You just love it when people engage  
with you at all over anything at all because this allows you to  
indulge in this very sporting activity favourite. You are sick. This  
list might have moved on from this ridiculous bottleneck years ago  
but for you. There used to be a lively exchange of ideas going on  
here.

Academic? No need to insult people. The only thing which matters is  
that his argument are invalid. Not all academic are invalid when  
thinking on this subject, and very often non-academic can be  
invalid, which is normal as the TOE has to be highly counter- 
intuitive if it can manage both mind and matter, as the platonist  
understood well when creating theology, math and physics.

Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a  
computation is not a physical notion, because he defines physical  
computation by a computation done in physics. So he lost the point.  
Unfortunately we can expect the usual self-deny and the handwaving.

Bruno

Kim

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-09 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 07 Oct 2015, at 03:58, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:17 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal,

But the proof or that can't compute one damn thing! No proof  
can.

That is false. Sigma_1 provability can compute what any other  
universal system can compute, and even in the same way/algorithm.

> the problem is that in "computation done physically", what do  
you mean by computation?

As I've said over and over and over again. I mean the process  
of finding a specific answer to a specific problem.

That is "solving a problem", not computing a function. But that stoo  
can exist in arithmetic, and is a-handled more with the RE sets (the  
w_i), than with the phi_i. In that case, you still rely oin the purely  
mathematical theory. No physical assumption is needed, still less  
metaphysical materialist assumption.

> If you mean it in the usual standard sense, then

I mean the sort of computation that people are interested in,  
the sort they will pay money for, the sort of computations that  
INTEL does.

OK? but that is not the standard one.

> no Turing machine can aver distinguish an arithmetical  
computation from a physical one,

That's not all it can't do!  Unless the machine is made of matter  
that obeys the laws of physics no Turing machine can distinguish  
ANYTHING, and the blueprints of a 747 can flt you across the  
Atlantic either.

False. true only if you add physical as a quality for the result.

> without external clues.

In other word physical external clues can provide something pure  
mathematics can not.

If computationalism is correct, the physical is an epitsemological  
reality, not an ontological one.

>  I was talking on the computations in arithmetic.None of them  
are physical

There are no computations IN arithmetic, computations are always  
done TO arithmetic by physics.

Physical computations might do that. But arithmetical computations,  
which can emulate *all* computations (with Church-Turing thesis- does  
not assume anything physical.

> Arithmetic can simulate a silicon processor simulating a  
Turing machine,

You've got it exactly backwards. The simple must simulate the  
complex not the reverse, otherwise there would be no point in doing  
simulations. A silicon processor is vastly more complex than a  
Turing machine. 

All universal beings can simulate all universal beings when doing  
computations.

It go in both direction.

>> And yet for some strange reason INTEL still uses  
silicon and not diophantine degree four polynomial. How odd.

> No, that is not odd. INTEL sold machine for physical  
computations.

And INTEL makes machines like that because billions of people will  
happily pay trillions of dollars for physical computations, but they  
won't spend a nickle for a non-physical computation. Maybe those  
billions of people know something you don't.

By definition, if those computations did not exist in arithmetic, they  
would not exist in the physical reality either. INTEL needs both  
mathematicians and physical engineers. The notion of computation has  
just nothing to do with physics. read the book by Davis with the  
original papers for god sake.

Bruno

> You are the guy who has been shown believing that 0 = 1,  
remember?

No, I do not remember and that is surprising. Zero being equal to  
one would be big news and I would have thought I would have  
remembered that.

 John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-07 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 11:51 PM, Kim Jones  wrote:


> > 
> I don’t honestly see the point of this any more.


And yet you still post, therefore I can only conclude that 
you enjoy writing posts that have no point.

> 
>  I  recall you saying several eons ago that you would no longer respond to
> JC unless he got beyond Step 3.


I recall that too, and that is
yet another example of something Bruno said that turned out to be untrue.

 John K Clark

  

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-06 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2015-10-06 16:23 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

>
> On Tue, Oct 6, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> > 
>> John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation is not a
>> physical notion,
>
>
> No, John Clark does not agree with that.
>
>
>
>> > 
>> because he defines physical computation by a computation done in physics.
>
>
> Because John Clark can find no evidence that 
> computation *NOT* done in physics exists, and INTEL can't find any
> evidence for it either. The only reason John Clark talks about "
> physical computation
> "
>  and not just "computation" is that unlike John Clark  
> Bruno Marchal
> thinks there is a type of computation that isn't physical.
>

Then you have to define a computation *WITHOUT* using the mathematical
definition of a computation.. which you've not done...


> 
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> On 05 Oct 2015, at 00:52, Kim Jones wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark  wrote:

 When I say "physical computation"  and you demand a definition of that
 and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a
 definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to
 either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a
 definition of my own, a definition of definition.

>>>
>>> You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you are.
>>> An academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the-arse
>>> straighto from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument only, not
>>> boldly explore consequences of interesting ideas. That is beyond you; you
>>> are a mental midget; the equivalent of someone who thinks its really smart
>>> to shoot a giraffe or a lion and then pose for a photo against the carcass.
>>> You just love it when people engage with you at all over anything at all
>>> because this allows you to indulge in this very sporting activity
>>> favourite. You are sick. This list might have moved on from this ridiculous
>>> bottleneck years ago but for you. There used to be a lively exchange of
>>> ideas going on here.
>>>
>>
>> Academic? No need to insult people. The only thing which matters is that
>> his argument are invalid. Not all academic are invalid when thinking on
>> this subject, and very often non-academic can be invalid, which is normal
>> as the TOE has to be highly counter-intuitive if it can manage both mind
>> and matter, as the platonist understood well when creating theology, math
>> and physics.
>>
>> Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a
>> computation is not a physical notion, because he defines physical
>> computation by a computation done in physics. So he lost the point.
>> Unfortunately we can expect the usual self-deny and the handwaving.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Kim
>>>
>>> --
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>>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-06 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 10:38 AM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

>> >> 
>> Because John Clark can find no evidence that 
>> computation *NOT* done in physics exists, and INTEL can't find any
>> evidence for it either. The only reason John Clark talks about "
>> physical computation
>> "
>>  and not just "computation" is that unlike John Clark  
>> Bruno Marchal
>> thinks there is a type of computation that isn't physical.
>>
>
> > 
> Then you have to define a computation *WITHOUT* using the mathematical
> definition of a computation.. which you've not done...
>

I never said mathematics couldn't ask questions, another language, the
English language, can ask questions too such as; what is the 423rd prime
larger than 10^100^100? The question is clear as a bell but as far as is
know to answer it matter that obeys the laws of physics is going to be
needed, and perhaps more matter than exists in the entire universe will be
needed. If it's true that only matter can make a calculation and if it's
true that there just isn't enough matter to do so then it's not obvious to
me that it's meaningful to say the 4
23rd prime larger than 10^100^100
 exists.

But what about Euclid who proved there are an infinite number of primes?
Well, maybe mathematics doesn't get to have the last word on questions like
this, maybe physics does. Or maybe not, I don't know. 

 John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-06 Thread Kim Jones

> On 6 Oct 2015, at 8:34 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> 
> Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation 
> is not a physical notion, because he defines physical computation by a 
> computation done in physics. So he lost the point. Unfortunately we can 
> expect the usual self-deny and the handwaving.
> 
> Bruno

Bruno - he is never ever going to admit it. Even now you are predicting above 
that he won’t admit it. So what really is going on here? Have either of you two 
noticed yet how there is really only the two of you left in this conversation? 
Does that suggest anything? Insults aside, I don’t honestly see the point of 
this any more. I have never seen so much dancing up and down on one spot over 
anything in my life. It really is starting to look like neither can let the 
other sign-off on it. It is simply not true that he who has the last word has 
the final word. Some things can be put aside “to come back to later"….in 
addition, I  recall you saying several eons ago that you would no longer 
respond to JC unless he got beyond Step 3. 

Cheers,

Kim

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-06 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 06 Oct 2015, at 04:29, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 5, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>  I'm not dogmatic on the subject but I have  
grave doubts about the existence of computation in  
arithmetic; certainly nobody has ever seen even a hint  
of such a thing.

You are dead wrong here, as we don't need a hint, we have a proof,

A proof can't make a single calculation, but a silicon  
microprocessor can.  

Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal, and it can not only  
compute all computable functions, but compute them in any possible way.

> and it is in all textbook in mathematical logic.

And a textbook in mathematical logic can't make a single  
calculation either, but a silicon microprocessor can.  

> Unless you allude to a notion of "physical computation" which  
has not been defined.

Physical computation means just what it seems to mean,  
computation done physically; if you still find that response  
unsatisfactory then you need to define define.

No, the problem is that in "computation done physically", what do you  
mean by computation? If you mean it in the usual standard sense, then  
that is OK, but then all I say is that no Turing machine can aver  
distinguish an arithmetical computation from a physical one, without  
external clues.

>  physical existence of the physical implementation of  
arithmetical computation. That is possible.

I agree, I am certain that exists, I am far far less certain about  
the existence of the mathematical  implementation of  
physical computation.

But I was talking on the computations in arithmetic. None of them are  
physical a priori, because the physical will be an appearance emerging  
from the FPI statistics on *all* of them. Arithmetic can simulate a  
silicon processor simulating a Turing machine, but arithmetic might  
not been able to simulate exactly the silicon atom, as it cannot  
simulate 2^aleph_0 computations at once.

> You can emulate the (universal) computation even with only  
diophantine degree four polynomial.

And yet for some strange reason INTEL still uses silicon and  
not diophantine degree four polynomial. How odd.

No, that is not odd. INTEL sold machine for physical computations. But  
the point is that with computationalisme, we must justify the  
existence of the appearance of the physical computations from the  
arithmetical one, or from any Turing universal system.

> You are unaware of what is a computation in computer science.

It is finding a particular solution to a particular arithmetical  
problem

Hmm... Not quite close.

>> If you know how to do that then for God's sake stop  
talking about it and just do it, start the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware  
Corporation and change the world!

> Straw man.

Straw man my ass!! If somebody claims to be able to do something  
it is not unreasonable to ask to see them actually do it and not  
just talk about it.

You confuse "that physical entity can do this computation", with the  
arithmetical reality (a tiny part of the standard model of RA) emulate  
(in the sense of Church-Turing) this computation".

 If you are correct about arithmetic being able to make calculations  
without the help of physics I can see absolutely no why the Sigma  
1 PARA Hardware Corporation would't be a HUGE success, and yet  
nobody including you wants to start such a company. How odd.

> The notion of computation does not assume silicon, nor QM or  
anything like that.

If so then "the notion of computation" can't actually perform  
one single calculation, but a silicon microchip can.

lol

>>>  you accept comp,

>>I do not accept "comp".

> You do.

No I do not.

 >>> Comp is put for computationalism.

 >> No it is not. Over the years I have heard you say hundred 
s maybe thousands of times "according to comp this and  
according to comp that",
> Because that hs been proved, published, peer-reviewed, and  
accepted

It's certainly not accepted by Wikipedia, it lists 29  
passable meanings of "comp" and not one of them has anything to do  
with AI or consciousness or computations or anything you're talking  
about.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comp 

Google doesn't know what the hell you mean by "comp" either, try it  
for yourself.

Of course, I use that abbreviation only in this list. it is a private  
thing between us, to avoid typing something like "the computationalist  
theory of mind", or "the computationalist hypothesis in cognitive  
science".

>> I am still unable to form a coherent picture of  
what you're talking about; but I have a very clear  
understanding of computationalism so I know that whatever  
"comp" is it certainly isn't computationalism.

> Because you stop at step 3,

Because you made a blunder in step 3 that you won't or can't  
fix. Who in their right mind

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-06 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:17 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal,
>

But the proof or that can't compute one damn thing!

No proof can.

> > 
> the problem is that in "computation done physically", what do you mean by
> computation?
>

As I've said over and over and over again. I mean the process of finding
a specific answer to a specific problem.

> > 
> If you mean it in the usual standard sense, then
>

I mean the sort of computation that people are interested in, the sort
they will pay money for, the sort of computations that INTEL does.

> > 
> no Turing machine can aver distinguish an arithmetical computation from a
> physical one,
>

That's not all it can't do!  Unless the machine is made of matter that
obeys the laws of physics no Turing machine can distinguish ANYTHING, and
the blueprints of a 747 can flt you across the Atlantic either.

> > 
> without external clues.
>

In other word physical external clues can provide something pure
mathematics can not.

> > 
>  I was talking on the computations in arithmetic.None of them are physical
>

There are no computations IN arithmetic, computations are always done TO
arithmetic by physics.

> > 
> Arithmetic can simulate a silicon processor
>  s
> imulating a Turing machine,
>

You've got it exactly backwards. The simple must simulate the complex not
the reverse, otherwise there would be no point in doing simulations. A
silicon processor is vastly more complex than a Turing machine. 

>> >> 
>> And yet for some strange reason INTEL still uses silicon and not diophantine
>> degree four polynomial. How odd.
>
>
> > 
> No, that is not odd. INTEL sold machine for physical computations.
>

And INTEL makes machines like that because billions of people will happily
pay trillions of dollars for physical computations, but they won't spend a
nickle for a non-
physical computation
. Maybe those billions of people know something you don't.

> 
> You are the guy who has been shown believing that 0 = 1, remember?
>

No, I do not remember and that is surprising. Zero being equal to one
would be big news and I would have thought I would have remembered that.

 John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 05 Oct 2015, at 00:52, Kim Jones wrote:





On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark  wrote:

When I say "physical computation"  and you demand a definition of  
that and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and  
you demand a definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly  
acceptable for me to either get off the silly definition merry-go- 
round or to demand a definition of my own, a definition of  
definition.


You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you  
are. An academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the- 
arse straighto from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument  
only, not boldly explore consequences of interesting ideas. That is  
beyond you; you are a mental midget; the equivalent of someone who  
thinks its really smart to shoot a giraffe or a lion and then pose  
for a photo against the carcass. You just love it when people engage  
with you at all over anything at all because this allows you to  
indulge in this very sporting activity favourite. You are sick. This  
list might have moved on from this ridiculous bottleneck years ago  
but for you. There used to be a lively exchange of ideas going on  
here.


Academic? No need to insult people. The only thing which matters is  
that his argument are invalid. Not all academic are invalid when  
thinking on this subject, and very often non-academic can be invalid,  
which is normal as the TOE has to be highly counter-intuitive if it  
can manage both mind and matter, as the platonist understood well when  
creating theology, math and physics.


Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a  
computation is not a physical notion, because he defines physical  
computation by a computation done in physics. So he lost the point.  
Unfortunately we can expect the usual self-deny and the handwaving.


Bruno





Kim

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-06 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation is not a
> physical notion,


No, John Clark does not agree with that.



> > 
> because he defines physical computation by a computation done in physics.


Because John Clark can find no evidence that 
computation *NOT* done in physics exists, and INTEL can't find any
evidence for it either. The only reason John Clark talks about "
physical computation
"
 and not just "computation" is that unlike John Clark  
Bruno Marchal
thinks there is a type of computation that isn't physical.

 John K Clark







> On 05 Oct 2015, at 00:52, Kim Jones wrote:
>
>
>>
>> On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
>>> When I say "physical computation"  and you demand a definition of that
>>> and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a
>>> definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to
>>> either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a
>>> definition of my own, a definition of definition.
>>>
>>
>> You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you are. An
>> academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the-arse straighto
>> from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument only, not boldly explore
>> consequences of interesting ideas. That is beyond you; you are a mental
>> midget; the equivalent of someone who thinks its really smart to shoot a
>> giraffe or a lion and then pose for a photo against the carcass. You just
>> love it when people engage with you at all over anything at all because
>> this allows you to indulge in this very sporting activity favourite. You
>> are sick. This list might have moved on from this ridiculous bottleneck
>> years ago but for you. There used to be a lively exchange of ideas going on
>> here.
>>
>
> Academic? No need to insult people. The only thing which matters is that
> his argument are invalid. Not all academic are invalid when thinking on
> this subject, and very often non-academic can be invalid, which is normal
> as the TOE has to be highly counter-intuitive if it can manage both mind
> and matter, as the platonist understood well when creating theology, math
> and physics.
>
> Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a
> computation is not a physical notion, because he defines physical
> computation by a computation done in physics. So he lost the point.
> Unfortunately we can expect the usual self-deny and the handwaving.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>> Kim
>>
>> --
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>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> --
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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-05 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Oct 5, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 
>>  I'm not dogmatic on the subject but I have
>>  
>> grave
>>  
>> doubts
>>  
>> about
>>  
>> the existence of computation in arithmetic; certainly
>>  
>> nobody has ever seen
>>  
>> even a hint of
>>  
>> such a thing.
>
>
> You are dead wrong here, as we don't need a hint, we have a proof,
>

A proof can't make a single calculation, but a silicon microprocessor
can.  

> 
> and it is in all textbook in mathematical logic.
>

And a
textbook in mathematical logic
 can't make 
a single calculation either, but a silicon microprocessor can.  

> 
> Unless you allude to a notion of "physical computation" which has not been
> defined.
>

Physical
 computation
 means just what it seems to mean, computation done physically; if you
still find that response unsatisfactory then you need to define define. 

> > 
>  physical existence of the physical implementation of arithmetical
> computation. That is possible.
>

I agree, I am certain that exists, I am far far less certain about the
existence of the mathematical  
implementation of
physical
 computation.

> > 
> You can emulate the (universal) computation even with only diophantine
> degree four polynomial.
>

And yet for some strange reason INTEL still uses silicon and not diophantine
degree four polynomial. How odd.

> 
> You are unaware of what is a computation in computer science.
>

It is
finding a particular solution to a particular arithmetical problem

>> 
>> If you know how to do that then for God's sake stop talking about it
>> and just do it, start the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation 
>> and change the world!
>> 
>>
>

> 
> Straw man.
>

Straw man my ass!! If somebody claims to be able to do something it is not
unreasonable to ask to see them actually do it and not just talk about it. If
you are correct about arithmetic being able to make calculations without
the help of physics I can see absolutely no why the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware
Corporation would't be a *HUGE *success, and yet nobody including you wants
to start such a company. How odd.

> 
> The notion of computation does not assume silicon, nor QM or anything like
> that.
>

If so then "the
notion of computation
" can't actually perform one single calculation, but a silicon microchip
can.

> >
>> >>
>> 
>>  you accept comp,
>
> >>
> I do not accept "comp".
>
> > 
> You do.
>

No I do not.

> 
> >
> >>
> Comp is put for computationalism.

> >> 
> No it is not. Over the years I have heard you say hundred
> s
>  maybe thousands
> of times "according to comp this and according to comp th
> a
> t",
> > 
> Because that hs been proved, published, peer-reviewed, and accepted
>

It's certainly not accepted by Wikipedia, it lists
29
 passable meanings of "comp" and not one of them has anything to do with
AI or consciousness or computations or anything you're talking about.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comp 

Google doesn't know what the hell you mean by "comp" either, try it for
yourself.

>> 
>> I am
>> still 
>> unable to form a coherent picture of what
>> you're talking about
>> ;
>> but I have a
>> very 
>> clear understanding of
>>  
>> computationalism
>>  so I know that 
>> whatever "comp" is it certainly isn't computationalism.
>
>
> > 
> Because you stop at step 3,
>

Because you made a blunder in step 3 that you won't or can't fix. Who in
their right mind would keep reading a proof after they found a flaw?

>
>>> >>
>>> 
>>> You need a physical reality only to implement a physical computation.
>>> But that is trivial,
>>
>>
> >> 
>> Try telling the stockholders
>> 
>> and
>> 
>>  scientists
>> 
>> at
>> 
>>  INTEL it's trivial!
>
>
> > 
> Straw man again.
>

Try telling the stockholders

and

scientists

at

INTEL it's
a straw man!!

  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 03 Oct 2015, at 04:25, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wr rote

>  you seem to doubt that the existence of computation in arithmetic.

Yes, I'm not dogmatic on the subject but I have grave  
doubts about the existence of computation in arithmetic;  
certainly nobody has ever seen even a hint of such  
a thing.

You are dead wrong here, as we don't need a hint, we have a proof, and  
it is in all textbook in mathematical logic. Unless you allude to a  
notion of "physical computation" which has not been defined.

> your argument relies on a notion of physical computation.
Yes, I have no doubts whatsoever

about the existence of computation in physics.

I translate: ... physical existence of the physical implementation of  
arithmetical computation. That is possible. But that has nothing to do  
with the proven existence of computation in arithmetic. You can  
emulate the (universal) computation even with only diophantine degree  
four polynomial.

> When I ask what that is, your definition seems to be  
"implementation of computation (in the arithmetical sense) in a  
physical reality, which contradicts your statement that  
computation does not exist in arithmetic.

Arithmetical objects (like numbers) can be computed  
no doubt about, it but as far as we know not  
by arithmetic, only by physics.

As far as you know, I would say.

> which contradicts your statement that computation does not  
exist in arithmetic.

There is no contradiction, arithmetical objects can  
certainly be computed but the question is what is doing the  
computing,

The relative universal numbers, which exists like prime number exists.

is physics doing it or is arithmetic doing it to itself? I think  
physics is more likely.

Which explains a lot. You are unaware of what is a computation in  
computer science.

> you persist in confusing what is a computation in the CHurch- 
Turing sense,

If  "computation in the Church-Turing sense"  
doesn't mean finding a particular solution to a particular  
arithmetical problem then "computation in the Church-Turing  
sense"  INTEL would not find it interesting and neither would I.

The theory is born from reflexions in the foundation of math, if we  
except the work of Babbage.
The physical implementation has come later, and although interesting,  
is not reated to the theory. It needs another theory which assumes a  
physical reality, or derive it from the numbers, and the notion of  
physical computations is a different concept.

 > none of those theories can perform calculations, no theory  
can,

I agree

Actually theory are not necessarily supposed to be able to do that,

I agree. 

> only machine (in the mathematical sense) can do that.

 Only a machine (in the PHYSICAL sense) can  
do that.

Not at all. In the arithmetical sense, they do it too, and no machine  
can know from personal introspection if they are primitively run by  
the arithmetical reality of by a physical reality.

> Now, it happens that if a theory is sigma_1 complete, like RA  
and PA, they can do that, because such theories are universal machine

If you know how to do that then for God's sake stop talking about  
it and just do it, start the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation and  
change the world!

Straw man.

> Physical material can do that [computation]  in the physical  
world

Yes and only physical material can do that

Sure, but circular with computationalism as we have to explain mind  
and matter appearance from number relations. It works up to now.

, and I have a explanation of why that is so. You do not.

You don't read it, that's all. You said it so.

> but here we talk about the computation done in arithmetic.

No, here we talk about the computation done TO  
arithmetical objects (by physics).

No, we talk about computation done by universal number, through the  
Turing universal part of arithmetic.

Arithmetic is unchanging, nothing can be done in it;

The block universe is unchanging too. Time is an indexical in both  
arithmetic and some model of GR.

if you want to actually DO something and not just define  
something physics is needed.

You assume a physical universe, and I have explained this does not  
work if we are digitalizable machine.

> obviously, we cannot use them in any direct way, like we can do  
with a physical machine.

If mathematics is more fundamental than physics as you say

 then it's about as far from obvious as you can get to  
understand WHY we can't do calculations directly  
but must instead get our hands dirty and mess around  
with elements such as silicon.

The notion of computation does not assume silicon, nor QM or anything  
like that.

>  you accept comp,
I do not accept "comp".

You do. You only

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-04 Thread Kim Jones

> On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> When I say "physical computation"  and you demand a definition of that and 
> when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a 
> definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to 
> either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a definition 
> of my own, a definition of definition.

You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you are. An 
academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the-arse straighto 
from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument only, not boldly explore 
consequences of interesting ideas. That is beyond you; you are a mental midget; 
the equivalent of someone who thinks its really smart to shoot a giraffe or a 
lion and then pose for a photo against the carcass. You just love it when 
people engage with you at all over anything at all because this allows you to 
indulge in this very sporting activity favourite. You are sick. This list might 
have moved on from this ridiculous bottleneck years ago but for you. There used 
to be a lively exchange of ideas going on here.

Kim

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-02 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 01 Oct 2015, at 22:09, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> When I say "physical computation" and you demand a  
definition of that and when I respond with "a computation done with  
physics" and you demand a definition of that too then I believe it  
is perfectly acceptable for me to either get off the silly  
definition merry-go-round or to demand a definition of my own, a  
definition of definition.

> But this distracts us from what we should focus on.

I agree it's a silly waste of time, so why did you demand  
a definition of physical computation?

Because you seem to doubt that the existence of computation in  
arithmetic. But your argument relies on a notion of physical  
computation. When I ask what that is, your definition seems to be  
"implementation of computation (in the arithmetical sense) in a  
physical reality, which contradicts your statement that computation  
does not exist in arithmetic.

> A computation can be defined by what universal machines do.
But that universal machine can't do a

damn thing without the help of physics, therefore your  
definition is unimportant. 

It cannot do a damn thing in the physical reality indeed.

But that is not relevant to the fact that it can do a lot of thing in  
arithmetic, and indeed, eventually we show that the physical  
computations emerge as a first person plural views of the machine  
emulated in arithmetic.

> A universal machine is defined by a number u such that  
phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y).

You can define it however you like, but if that machine  
isn't  made of matter that obeys the laws of physics it's not  
going to be doing any calculations, and it's not going to be doing  
anything else either.

This is simply wrong, and I think it means you persist in confusing  
what is a computation in the CHurch-Turing sense, which does not  
assume anything physical, and an implementation of such a machine in a  
physical reality. In the context of the mind-body problem, that is a  
crucial difference that we have to take into account.

> None of those theories assume anything material.

And none of those theories can perform calculations, no theory can,

Actually theory are not necessarily supposed to be able to do that,  
only machine (in the mathematical sense) can do that. Now, it happens  
that if a theory is sigma_1 complete, like RA and PA, they can do  
that, because such theories are universal machine (again in the Turing  
sense).

only physical material can do that. 

Physical material can do that in the physical world, but here we talk  
about the computation done in arithmetic. obviously, we cannot use  
them in any direct way, like we can do with a physical machine. That  
does not change the fact that a tiny part of the arithmetical truth  
can emulate some computation (indeed all of them).

>> you use the term computation in the sense of Church-Turing.

>> I use the term "computation"  in the sense of actually  
finding a particular solution to a particular problem in arithmetic;  
and neither Church nor Turing were fools so they meant the same thing.

> Come on! You are the guy which pretend to accept  
computationalisme.

Why on earth would I pretend to accept computationalism if I did not?

Not only you accept comp, but you have often argued that we need to be  
stupid to not accept it. Actually, you are even someone saying yes to  
a doctor. All your post illustrates that you are a sort of comp  
believer. Comp is put for computationalism.

>> A Turing Machine is physical,

> Absolutely not. Turing made it looking like that because he wanted  
to capture the essence of what a human does when he compute a  
function with pencil and paper.
Turing wanted to capture the essence of what ANYTHING does when a  
calculation is actually made; not talked about, not theorized, not  
defined, but actually MADE.

Not at all. Please read Turing before ascribing things that he never  
said.

That computations exist in arithmetic (even in the small sigma_1  
complete part) is accepted by all experts in the field. There is  
absolutely no controverse about that. I have even been asled to  
suppress the explanation of this in my french Phd thesis (to avoid the  
beligian critics that I explain too much elementary material known by  
everybody).

 > he gave a purely mathematical definition

That's nice, but defining a calculation and making a calculation  
is not the same thing,

Of course. But once Turing defined calculation/computation, it has  
been proved that it exists in any model of arithmetic, a fortiori in  
the standard model.

just as "a fast red car" is NOT a fast red car. Definitions  
can't make calculations, only matter that obeys the laws of physics  
can do that.

Not at all. You need a physical reality only to implement a physical  
computation. But that is trivial,

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-02 Thread John Clark

O
n Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal  wr rote

>  you seem to doubt that the existence of computation in arithmetic.


Yes, I'm not dogmatic on the subject but I have
 
grave
 
doubts
 
about
 
the existence of computation in arithmetic; certainly
 
nobody has ever seen
 
even a hint of
 
such a thing.

> your argument relies on a notion of physical computation.

Yes, I have no doubts whatsoever
about
 the existence of computation in physics.

> When I ask what that is, your definition seems to be "implementation of
> computation (in the arithmetical sense) in a physical reality,
> 
> which contradicts your statement that computation does not exist in
> arithmetic.


Arithmetical objects
(like numbers) 
can be
 
computed
 
no doubt about
,
it
 
but
 
as far as we know
 
not by arithmetic, only by physics.

> 
> which contradicts your statement that computation does not exist in
> arithmetic.

There is no contradiction, a
rithmetical objects

can certainly be
computed

but the question is what is doing the computing, is physics doing it or
is arithmetic doing it to itself? I think physics is more likely.

> you persist in confusing what is a computation in the CHurch-Turing sense,


If 

"
computation in the C
h
urch-Turing sense
" doesn't mean finding a particular solution to a particular arithmetical
problem then "
computation in the C
h
urch-Turing sense
"  INTEL would not find it interesting and neither would I.


> > 
> none of those theories can perform calculations, no theory can,

I agree

Actually theory are not necessarily supposed to be able to do that,


I agree. 


> 
> only machine (in the mathematical sense) can do that.



O
nl

y
a 
machine (in the
PHYSICAL
 sense) can do that.

> 
> Now, it happens that if a theory is sigma_1 complete, like RA and PA, they
> can do that, because such theories are universal machine


If you know how to do that then for God's sake stop talking about it and
just do it, start the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation 
and change the world!


> 
> Physical material can do that [computation]  in the physical world

Yes and only physical material can do that
,
and I have a explanation of why that is so. You do not.

> but here we talk about the computation done in arithmetic.


No
,
 
here we talk about the computation done *TO* arithmetical
 
objects
 
(

by physics). Arithmetic is unchanging, nothing can be done in it; if you
want to
 
actually
 
DO something and not just define something physics is needed.

> obviously, we cannot use them in any direct way, like we can do with a
> physical machine.

If mathematics is more fundamental than physics as you say
 
then it's about as far from obvious as you can get
 
to understand 

WHY we can't
 
do
 
calculations directly but must
 
instead get our hands dirty and

mess around with
 
elements such as silicon.

> 
>  you accept comp,

I do not accept "comp".

> > All your post illustrates that you are a sort of comp believer.

  None of my posts illustrates that

 I am a "comp" believer.

> Comp is put for computationalism.


No it is not. Over the years I have heard you say hundred
s
 maybe thousands
of times "according to comp this and according to comp th
a
t", but I am
still 
unable to form a coherent picture of what
you're talking about
;
but I have a
very 
clear understanding of
 
computationalism
 so I know that 
whatever "comp" is it certainly isn't computationalism.

>
> > 
> That computations exist in arithmetic (even in the small sigma_1 complete
> part) is accepted by all experts

And yet for some strange reason like you none of these experts have become
filthy rich by starting a computer hardware company that doesn't need to
manufacture hardware.
I find that very odd.

> Of course. But once Turing defined calculation/computation
>  [...]
>
If definitions could make calculations INTEL
 
would make definitions instead of silicon microchips because making
definitions is
one hell of a lot
 easier than making physical objects.

> 
> it has been proved that it exists in any model of arithmetic, a fortiori
> in the standard model.


Proofs are no more adept than definitions at making calculations.  


> 
> You need a physical reality only to implement a physical computation. But
> that is trivial,

Try telling the stockholders
and
 scientists
at
 INTEL it's trivial!

>> if you want to know a particular solution to a particular problem in
>> arithmetic because neither proofs nor theorems can make a calculation; for
>> that you need physics.
>
>

> Yes, but it happens that we are not interested in having a solution, but
> only in their existence,

Then you're not interested in computations
.

T
here is no disputing matters of taste but I am interested in computations
and so is INTEL.

 John K Clark










> How could a universal

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 30 Sep 2015, at 19:25, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Sep 30, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> And that my friends is exactly why examples are so superior  
to definitions, it avoids the absurd "define that word" endless loop  
that people always use when they're losing a debate.

> So by asking example when I give a definition, and asking a  
efinition when I give example is just to win the debate, and not to  
progress in understanding.

When I say "physical computation"  and you demand a definition  
of that and when I respond with "a computation done with physics"  
and you demand a definition of that too then I believe it is  
perfectly acceptable for me to either get off the silly definition  
merry-go-round or to demand a definition of my own, a definition of  
definition.

But this distracts us from what we should focus on.

 >> as of today there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can  
calculate anything without the help of physics;

> Because

Because? It doesn't matter why there is zero evidence  
that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of  
physics because whatever the reason is it doesn't change the  
fact that there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate  
anything without the help of physics. Excuses don't cut the  
mustard in science only evidence does.

But here I have a problem. A computation can be defined by what  
universal machines do. A universal machine is defined by a number u  
such that phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). The universal dovetailing is a  
example of non terminating computations, and it emulates all  
computations.

All you need is to believe in some Turing complete reality, and I  
hesitate since 40 years between the Diophantine polynomial of degree  
4, or just one of them, or the Turing machine, or the von Neuman  
Computer, or the combinators, or Robinson arithmetic. The choice of  
the theory does not matter, and I illustrated the ideas in many of  
them but usually with combinators, or lambda expression, or Lisp  
programs.

None of those theories assume anything material.

I can do that explicitly, but it is long, and well known by the  
theoreticians.

> you use the term computation in the sense of Church-Turing.

I use the term "computation"  in the sense of actually finding a  
particular solution to a particular problem in arithmetic; and  
neither Church nor Turing were fools so they meant the same thing.

Come on! You are the guy which pretend to accept computationalisme. By  
computation we mean the process made by any universal number that your  
brain seems to approximate well enough to make you conscious, or  
better allow your consciousness to manifest itself here and now. Such  
a u exists, by computationalism, and indeed it is the number that we  
sent to Moscow and Washington, awaiting using the local physical u' to  
be reimplemented locally to the third person observer.

In particular we are interested in non terminating computations, as  
much as on the terminating one.

Then by mentioning "solving a problem", you allude to solvation, which  
is related to computation, notably through the domain w_i of the  
phi_i, but at some point we must be careful in distinguishing those  
two, and relating them correctly.

There is a notion of universal problem, it is the creative (in the  
sense of post) set or number. u is creative if  W_u is creative in the  
set of Post. technically I use two different definition of  
universality, both given by Martin Davis. The 1956 definition allows a  
creative number to be a universal number, and the 1957 definition in  
which the creative number are not universal, which can be useful to  
get nice recursive equivalence relation of the extensional computable  
functions.

>They do not assume anything physical to define computation.

A Turing Machine is physical,

Absolutely not. Turing made it looking like that because he wanted to  
capture the essence of what a human does when he compute a function  
with pencil and paper. But he gave a purely mathematical definition,  
as did Church, Post, etc.

Those system can be specified in formal "set of beliefs", and that  
leads to the creative set, and the Gödel-Löbian one are those who  
reflects those facts. Gödel could arithmetize meta-arithmetic, because  
mathematical reasoning system can reason mathematically on themselves.

not that it matters a hoot in hell what Turing or Church assumed  
because the fact remains there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can  
calculate anything without the help of physics.

Zero evidence is enough when we prove a theorem!

I don't pretend it is simple to explain. It is already more or less  
explictly explained in Gödel 1931 paper, and the peak of that  
endeavour is perhaps in some chapter of Matiyazevic's book where he  
shows how diophantine polynomial emulates Turing machine.

> I say only that 0+ x = 0, and things like

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-30 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Sep 30, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 
>> And that my friends is exactly why examples are so superior to
>> definitions, it avoids the absurd "define that word" endless loop that
>> people always use when they're losing a debate.
>
>
> > 
> So by asking example when I give a definition, and asking a efinition when
> I give example is just to win the debate, and not to progress in
> understanding.
>

When I say "physical computation"  and you demand a definition of that
and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a
definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to
either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a
definition of my own, a definition of definition.

>
>> >> 
>> as of today there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything
>> without the help of physics;
>
> > 
> Because
>

Because? It doesn't matter why

there
is
zero
 evidence that arithmetic can

calculate anything without the help of physics

because whatever the reason is it doesn't change the fact that there
is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can

calculate anything without the help of physics
. Excuses don't cut the mustard in science only evidence does.

> > 
> you use the term computation in the sense of Church-Turing.
>

I use the term "computation"  in the sense of actually finding a
particular solution to a particular problem in arithmetic; and neither
Church nor Turing were fools so they meant the same thing.

> >
> They do not assume anything physical to define computation.
>

A Turing Machine is physical, not that it matters a hoot in hell what
Turing or Church assumed because the fact remains there
is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of
physics
.

> 
> I say only that 0+ x = 0, and things like that. I define computation and
> proof without assuming more.
>

In the entire history of the world nobody has ever seen a proof or a
definition make a calculation; as of September 30 2015 every calculation
ever observed has involved matter that obeys the laws of physics. No
exceptions, not a single one.

  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-30 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 29 Sep 2015, at 23:51, John Clark wrote:

snip

And that my friends is exactly why examples are so superior to  
definitions, it avoids the absurd "define that word" endless loop  
that people always use when they're losing a debate.

So by asking example when I give a definition, and asking a efinition  
when I give example is just to win the debate, and not to progress in  
understanding.

> The problem is that you give the impression that you believe  
that computation does not exist in, or be emulated by, arithmetic.

I'm sorry if I only gave a vague impression of that so let me say  
as flatly and directly as I can that as of today there is ZERO  
evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of  
physics;

Because you use the term computation in the sense of Church-Turing.  
They do not assume anything physical to define computation.

that situation could change tomorrow but that's how things are right  
now. 

 > I exploit the fact that sigma_1 complete provability is  
equivalent with universal computability.

Mathematical objects may or may not exist independently of  
physics, but mathematics proofs certainly do not; proofs are just a  
way humans have of discovering (or maybe inventing) those  
mathematical objects.  

I use "prove" in the purely mathematical sense of Gödel.

> Saying that there is a physical universe doing that is no  
better than saying God made it.

Saying that there is a mathematical universe is no better than  
saying there is a physical universe.

I say only that 0+ x = 0, and things like that. I define computation  
and proof without assuming more. Then I explain why the immaterial  
machine develop beliefs in matter, and why the math shows that such  
matter obey quantum logic, and how to derive physics.

Bruno

And the physical universe at the time of the Big Bang was far  
simpler that the universe is today, and was infinitely simpler than  
a omnipotent omniscient God. Bruno you're a logician so you tell me,  
if two logical systems produce the exact same conclusions but one  
starts out with fewer and simpler axioms than the other which one is  
superior?  I think William of Ockham made a pretty good razor,  
there is no point in adding wheels withing wheels if they're not  
needed. 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-29 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 28 Sep 2015, at 18:21, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Sep 27, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>> If you prove the existence of something in something  
else, you have that something,

>> Euclid proved 2500 years ago that there are infinitely  
many primes, so if what you say above is true you must have the  
423rd prime greater than 10^100^100.

> Now you equate existence with constructive existence,

What the hell?  You're the one that is equating those two things  
not me! I don't want you to answer the question "does the 423rd  
prime number greater than 10^100^100 exist?", I want you to tell me  
the answer to a completely different question, "what is the 423rd  
prime number greater than 10^100^100?".

So you are asking me a constructive existence of such a number, and  
even a consturctive in a not well defined physical sense.

But Computationalism, is at the start classical, not intutionist nor  
constructive. Some brnch of computer science are necessarily non  
constructive, and eventually we rediscover this in the epistemology of  
the machine.

The question was: does computation (in the original standard sense of  
Turing's or Church's definition of computability, using the  
intensional Church thesis (which says that not only all universal  
machines compute the same class of functions, but all universal  
machines can emulate all universal machine, that is, all universal  
machine can imitate exactly all digital processes starting from finite  
conditions (relatively or not to some oracle).

And the answer I gave was: I can prove (in RA, or let a theorem prover  
of RA prove ...) the existence of the  terminating computations, and  
of all the segments of the infinite computations.

This entails in particular that the computations are all emulated, or  
realized, in or by the usual "standard model" or arithmetic (N, 0, +,  
x) taught in high school.

So the relative computations, the sigma_1 arithmetical relations,  
exist in the usual 3p sense of asserting, for example, that the prime  
numbers, including those greater 100^(100^100).

Such existence should not be confuse with a stronger feasible  
existence (in which case we ask for an algorithm generating the  
existing object + the constraint to present it in some reasonable  
delay).
Nor, should that existence be confused with some notion of physical  
existence, especially in a context where we want explain the physical  
by something non-physical.

And to figure out what that number is and answer my question you are  
going to have perform a calculation. And to do that you are going to  
have to use matter that obeys the laws of physics. And there may not  
be enough matter in existence to do it. And if there isn't then the  
question "what is the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100?"  
is unanswerable.

I use computation is the mathematical sense of Alonzo Church, Emil  
Post, Stephen Kleene, Alan Turing, Matiyazevic, etc.

>>>  indeed a universal machine cannot distinguihs a  
physical computation from a non physical one,

>> I know, and that lack of ability is yet another example  
of something a non-physical machine can't do that a physical  
machine can. A physical machine, such as myself, has no  
difficulty whatsoever in making that distinction.

> Then you have magical abilities not shared by any Turing  
machine, physical or non physical.

Bullshit.

 > Please don't confuse the computation with anything we use to  
represent and communicate about that computation.

Gibberish. 

>> so just use immaterial computation to find the 423rd  
prime greater than 10^100^100 and tell me what it is and you have  
won this argument. How hard can that be?

> Just define what *you* mean by "physical computation"

It means computation using physics.

Computation in which sense? If it is the Turing sense, then that exist  
in arithmetic.

If by using physics you mean that there exist something which select  
one computation to make it more real, then that is using a god-of-the- 
gap to prevent the searching of a solution of the mind-body problem in  
the computationalist frame.

  Bruno, couldn't you have figured that out by yourself? Did you  
really need my help?

I figure that out since long, I mean ... that you restrict the  
standard sense of computation to their possible realization in the  
physical reality.

The problem is that you give the impression that you believe that  
computation does not exist in, or be emulated by, arithmetic. That has  
nothing to do with the question of the feasibility or of the physical  
realisability, especially in the context of the computational or  
digital thesis in philosophy of mind-matter.

Then I exploit the fact that sigma_1 complete provability is  
equivalent with universal computability.
And I interview machines having enough introspection power (in the  
standard Gödel sense) to know (in a technical

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-29 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Sep 29, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> >
>> >> 
>> 
>> Now you equate existence with constructive existence,
>>
>
> >> 
> What the hell?  You're the one that is equating those two things not me!
> I don't want you to answer the question "does the 423rd prime number
> greater than 10^100^100 exist?", I want you to tell me the answer to
> a
> completely different question, "what is the 423rd prime number greater
> than 10^100^100?".
>
> > 
> So you are asking me a constructive existence of such a number,
>

The question I am asking is precise, easy to understand, and impossible
for you to answer;  what is the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100?

 I know why I can't answer that question but you have no explanation why
you can't answer that question.

> > 
> and even a consturctive in a not well defined physical sense.
>

Oh for Christ's sake! I don't give a damn if it's in the Bozo the Clown
sense, just tell me what the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 is
or tell me why you can't figure it out. I can't figure it out because there
are not enough atoms in my brain that can be put into unique states that
can individually correspond with 10^100^100 numbers; but your mind doesn't
need matter that obeys the laws of physics to operate so I want to know why
you can't figure it out.

> > 
> But Computationalism, is
>  [blah blah blah blah]
>

Quit staling c
ut the
bafflegab
and just tell me

what the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 is or tell me why you
can't figure it out. You say computation doesn't need physics just numbers,
well you have access to numbers, so why can't you tell me what the

the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 is

?
 What are you lacking?

> 
> The question was: does computation (in the original standard sense of
> Turing's or Church's definition of computability, using the intensional
> Church thesis (which says that not only all universal machines compute the
> same class of functions, but all universal machines can emulate all
> universal machine, that is, all universal machine can imitate exactly all
> digital processes starting from finite conditions (relatively or not to
> some oracle).
>

*NO*, that wasn't the question at all! In fact the above doesn't even look
like a question. The question was "what the

the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 ?".

> 
> So the relative computations, the sigma_1 arithmetical relations, exist in
> the usual 3p sense of asserting, for example, that the prime numbers,
> including those greater 100^(100^100).
>

Well good for "
the relative computations, the sigma_1 arithmetical relations
", I'm very happy for them. And now let's get back to the topic at hand,
what
is 
the

the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 ?

> I use computation is the mathematical sense of Alonzo Church, Emil Post,
> Stephen Kleene, Alan Turing, Matiyazevic, etc.
>

That's nice good for you, then use use computation is the mathematical
sense of Alonzo Church, Emil Post, Stephen Kleene, Alan Turing and
Matiyazevic and tell me what what the 423rd prime number greater than
10^100^100 is.

> >
>>> >> 
>>> Just define what *you* mean by "physical computation"
>>
>>
> 
>> >> 
>> It means computation using physics.
>
> > 
> Computation in which sense?
>

Sense in which sense? And I can't answer your question until you define
"in". And then define "which".

And that my friends is exactly why examples are so superior to definitions,
it avoids the absurd "define that word" endless loop that people always use
when they're losing a debate.

> 
> The problem is that you give the impression that you believe that
> computation does not exist in, or be emulated by, arithmetic.
>

I'm sorry if I only gave a vague impression of that so let me say as
flatly and directly as I can that as of today there is ZERO evidence that
arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of physics; that
situation could change tomorrow but that's how things are right now. 

> > 
> I exploit the fact that sigma_1 complete provability is equivalent with
> universal computability.

Mathematical objects may or may not exist independently of physics, but
mathematics proofs certainly do not; proofs are just a way humans have of
discovering (or maybe inventing) those mathematical objects.  

> 
> Saying that there is a physical universe doing that is no better than
> saying God made it.
>

Saying that there is a
mathematical universe is no better than saying there is a
physical universe
. And the physical universe at the time of the Big Bang was far simpler
that the universe is today, and was infinitely simpler than a omnipotent
omniscient
God. Bruno you're a logician so you tell me, if two logical systems produce
the exact same conclusions but one starts out with fewer and simpler axioms
than the other which one is superior?  I think
William of Ockham
 made a pretty

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-28 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Sep 27, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> >
>> >>
>> 
>> If you prove the existence of something in something else, you have that
>> something,
>>
>
> 
> >> 
> Euclid proved 2500 years ago that there are infinitely many primes, so if
> what you say above is true you must have the 423rd prime greater than
> 10^100^100.
>
> > 
> Now you equate existence with constructive existence,
>

What the hell?  You're the one that is equating those two things not me! I
don't want you to answer the question "does the 423rd prime number greater
than 10^100^100 exist?", I want you to tell me the answer to
a completely different question, "what is the 423rd prime number greater
than 10^100^100?".

And to figure out what that number is and answer my question you are going
to have perform a calculation. And to do that you are going to have to use
matter that obeys the laws of physics. And there may not be enough matter
in existence to do it. And if there isn't then the question "what is the
423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100?" is unanswerable.

> >
>> >> 
>> 
>> indeed a universal machine cannot distinguihs a physical computation from
>> a non physical one,
>>
>
> 
> >> 
> I know, and that lack of ability is yet another example of something a
> non-physical machine can't do that a physical machine can. A physical
> machine, such as myself, has no difficulty whatsoever in making that
> distinction.
>
> > 
> Then you have magical abilities not shared by any Turing machine, physical
> or non physical.
>

Bullshit.

> > 
> Please don't confuse the computation with anything we use to represent and
> communicate about that computation.
>

Gibberish. 

>> 
>> so just use immaterial computation
>> to find 
>> the 423rd prime greater than 10^100^100
>>  and tell me what it is and you have won this argument. How hard can
>> that be?
>>
>
> > 
> Just define what *you* mean by "physical computation"
>

It means computation using physics.  Bruno, couldn't you have figured that
out by yourself? Did you really need my help?

  John K Clark

>
>

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 25 Sep 2015, at 19:47, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 1:25 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> I don't want proof of computations, I want  
computations!

> If you prove the existence of something in something else,  
you have that something,

Euclid proved 2500 years ago that there are infinitely many  
primes, so if what you say above is true you must have the 423rd  
prime greater than 10^100^100.

Now you equate existence with constructive existence, but that  
contradict your acceptance of the excluded middle principle. You have  
already agree that we can prove the existence of something without us  
being able to show an example. This is also needed to accept the  
classical Church-Turing thesis.

So tell me what it is! You can't because to have that example,  
that something, it would have to be calculated; and neither you nor  
Euclid can do that.

As you said, Euclid proves the existence of infinitely many prime  
numbers, so we (the classical mathematicians) knows that there is a  
prime bigger than 10^(100^100). No need to be able to give an example  
to believe in its existence independently of us.

> indeed a universal machine cannot distinguihs a physical  
computation from a non physical one,

I know, and that lack of ability is yet another example of  
something a non-physical machine can't do that a physical machine  
can. A physical machine, such as myself, has no difficulty  
whatsoever in making that distinction.

Then you have magical abilities not shared by any Turing machine,  
physical or non physical.

>> I can provide something much much better than a  
definition, I can give A EXAMPLE.

> I gave you an example of an immaterial computation too.

Somehow I must have missed that post, but if you did it once you  
can do it again,

KKK
K

I gave you another example, but the one above is simpler, and I expect  
the same non-sense from you. Please don't confuse the computation with  
anything we use to represent and communicate about that computation.

so just use immaterial computation to find the 423rd prime  
greater than 10^100^100 and tell me what it is and you have won  
this argument. How hard can that be?

Just define what *you* mean by "physical computation" without using  
the mathematical notion. You are the one using the term in highly non  
standard sense.

Bruno

  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-24 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 24 Sep 2015, at 01:26, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Sep 21, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> the existence of particular computations and emulations of  
computations by other computations can be proved already in Robinson  
Arithmetic.

I don't want proof of computations, I want computations!

If you prove the existence of something in something else, you have  
that something, in that something else.

If you want a physical computation, you need only to pray that a  
physical reality exist, and rich enough to be Turing complete, as it  
*looks* to be the case, and then you can build a computer, which can  
run physical computations. but that does not make the many non  
physical computation to continue to exist in arithmetic, and indeed a  
universal machine cannot distinguihs a physical computation from a non  
physical one, from its experience only: it needs to do 3p measurements.

>There is a continuous and a diecrete quantum teleportation  
technic

I don't know what that means. But I do know that Quantum Mechanics  
can't deal with distances smaller than 1.6*10^-35 meters; if  
distances smaller than that exist then Quantum Mechanics will need a  
MAJOR overhaul.

>>I'm just playing devil's advocate,  
unlike you I don't claim to have proven anything.

> Proving is my job. That is what I do. That is what  
mathematician does, in math or in applied theoretical field. When I  
say that RA proves the existence of the terminating computations, I  
am saying a standrd result.

Very standard indeed! Every mathematician knows that some  
computations terminate, and some computations don't terminate, and  
for some computations there is no way to know if they terminate or  
not and all you can do is watch it and see. 

Exactly, but that makes my point. Each time a computation terminates,  
RA can prove that facts; like the universal dovetailer can run on all  
terminating computations, although it has to dovetail on all  
computations, terminating or not, to get all the terminating one.

> You oppose this by introducing a notion of physical  
computation, which you have not yet define.

I can provide something much much better than a definition,  
I can give A EXAMPLE.

I gave you an example of an immaterial computation too.

> even if physics is quite important. the fundamental science  
is theoretical computer science

I do admit that sometimes physics papers about entropy and Black  
Holes look a lot like papers in computer science or information  
theory.

OK, and I think that computationalism suggest explanations for this  
since a long time.

Bruno

 John K Clark 

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-23 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Sep 21, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > 
> the existence of particular computations and emulations of computations by
> other computations can be proved already in Robinson Arithmetic.
>

I don't want proof of computations, I want computations!

>
> There is a continuous and a diecrete quantum teleportation technic
>

I don't know what that means. But I do know that Quantum Mechanics can't
deal with distances smaller than 1.6*10^-35 meters; if distances smaller
than that exist then Quantum Mechanics will need a *MAJOR *overhaul.

> >>
>> I'm just playing devil's advocate
>> ,
>>  
>> 
>> unlike
>>  you I don't claim to have proven anything
>> .
>>
>
> > 
> Proving is my job. That is what I do. That is what mathematician does, in
> math or in applied theoretical field. When I say that RA proves the
> existence of the terminating computations, I am saying a standrd result.
>

Very standard indeed! Every mathematician knows that some computations
terminate, and some computations don't terminate, and for some computations
there is no way to know if they terminate or not and all you can do is
watch it and see. 

> > 
> You oppose this by introducing a notion of physical computation, which you
> have not yet define.
>

I can provide something

much *much* better than a definition, I can give A EXAMPLE.

> > 
> even if physics is quite important. the fundamental science is theoretical
> computer science
>

I do admit that sometimes physics papers about entropy and Black Holes
look a lot like papers in computer science or information theory.

 John K Clark 

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-21 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 21 Sep 2015, at 02:49, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Sep 20, 2015 at  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Yes, arithmetic can simulates a Turing machine,

Arithmetic can't simulate anything unless it has access to  
something physical like a biological brain or a electronic  
microprocessor.  

You confuse the notion a universal machine a implement a universal b,  
with the notion of a physical universal machine c implements a  
universal machine b.

I don't assume a physical universe to start with, if only because it  
is one of the thing I want to have an explanation for (the appearance  
or the reality, as I am agnostic at the start).

the machine a implements the machine b is an arithmetical notion. It  
can be defined *in* arithmetic, and the existence of particular  
computations and emulations of computations by other computations can  
be proved already in Robinson Arithmetic.

> But a primary physical reality, well I have already not much  
clue what that can be,

It means physics is the most fundamental science and mathematics  
is just a tool humans have invented to help them figure out how  
nature in general and physics in particular works; I'm not saying  
that it true, I don't know if it is or not, I'm just saying that's  
what it means.  

I am OK with that epistemological version, no problem. And then what I  
say is that digital mechanism, or computationalism is incompatible  
with physics being the most fundamental science, even if physics is  
quite important. the fundamental science is theoretical computer  
science, alias mathematics, alias machine's (and other entities)  
"theologies" (the science by machines of what is bigger than  
themselves, like a "reality".

> if quantum field theory is correct, it is an analog imitation  
of the digital.

The first word of the name should have tipped you off, if  
QUANTUM field theory is correct then nothing is analog.

There is a continuous and a diecrete quantum teleportation technic,  
and the existence or not of a physical continuum is an open problem,  
both empirically (gravitation is not yet unified with the other  
forces) and computer-science theoretically, even if they are  
compelling argument for some continuum, if only the presence of some  
random oracle due to the global FPI.

> You need to make precise your theory of primary matter to  
proof that it can emulates all computations,

I'm just playing devil's advocate, unlike you  
I don't claim to have proven anything.

Proving is my job. That is what I do. That is what mathematician does,  
in math or in applied theoretical field. When I say that RA proves the  
existence of the terminating computations, I am saying a standrd result.
You oppose this by introducing a notion of physical computation, which  
you have not yet define.

You are using vague undefined notions to criticize standard result in  
the field.

I don't know if math or physics is more fundamental; you don't know  
either but you think you do. 

I know nothing. I give a deduction that IF computationalism is  
correct, then physics cannot be the fundamental science, and the proof  
is constructive and shows how to derive physics, and I have used this  
to derive the propositional logic of the observable, and it fits until  
now with the empirical facts.

Advantage: it explains both the quanta and the qualia. Which was the  
goal: to have a testable explanation of the appearance of a universe  
without eliminating conscious and person.

>>>  Physical water, like any physical stuff does not  
rely on one computations, but on an infinity of them,

>> Nobody knows if that is true or not, maybe only an  
astronomical number of calculations would be required to perfectly  
simulate water, but if you're right and a infinite amount of  
mathematics would be required to do what just a small amount of  
matter can do so effortlessly then it's game over and physics is  
more fundamental than mathematics, and mathematical models can  
never be more than just approximations of the real deal.

> Not at all, as this is *derived* without any phsyical  
assumption

You just assumed that any finite amount of mathematics can only  
approximate what matter does. So how can mathematics be more  
fundamental?

I prove this. I don't assume it. Matter is given by the FPI on all  
computations in arithmetic. That is a priori not Turing emulable, but  
for computationalism to remain coherent with the empirical facts, we  
have to derive that the digital brains and the finite pieces of  
mathematics can explain the local facts and allow for digital  
universal machine to be enough stable, or we would not even exist in a  
physical  mode at all.

Bruno

  John K Clark   

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-20 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Sep 20, 2015 at  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> Yes, arithmetic can simulates a Turing machine,
>

Arithmetic can't simulate anything unless it has access to something
physical like a biological brain or a electronic microprocessor.  

> > 
> But a primary physical reality, well I have already not much clue what
> that can be,
>

It means physics is the most fundamental science and mathematics is just a
tool humans have invented to help them figure out how nature in general and
physics in particular works; I'm not saying that it true, I don't know if
it is or not, I'm just saying that's what it means.  

> > 
> if quantum field theory is correct, it is an analog imitation of the
> digital.
>

The first word of the name should have tipped you off, 
if
*QUANTUM *
field theory is correct
 then nothing is analog.

> > 
> You need to make precise your theory of primary matter to proof that it
> can emulates all computations,
>

I'm just playing 
devil's advocate
,

unlike
 you I don't claim to have proven anything
.
I don't know if math or physics is more fundamental; you don't know either
but you think you do. 

> >
>> >> 
>> 
>> Physical water, like any physical stuff does not rely on one
>> computations, but on an infinity of them,
>>
>
> 
> >> 
> Nobody knows if that is true or not, maybe only an astronomical number of
> calculations would be required to perfectly simulate water, but if you're
> right and a infinite amount of mathematics would be required to do what
> just a small amount of matter can do so effortlessly then it's game over
> and physics is more fundamental than mathematics, and mathematical models
> can never be more than just approximations of the real deal.
>
>
> > 
> Not at all, as this is *derived* without any phsyical assumption
>

You just assumed that any finite amount of mathematics can only
approximate what matter does. So how can mathematics be more fundamental?

  John K Clark   

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 20 Sep 2015, at 03:17, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Sep 19, 2015 , Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> Theorems don't make calculations, physical microprocessor  
chips do.

> Physical computer are implementation, in the math sense, of  
turing universality by physical devices.

What makes you so certain that Turing machines aren't just man  
made descriptions (and approximate descriptions at that) of physical  
computational devises?

because they compute exactly the same thing that what you can compute  
assuming only classical logic and elementary arithmetic, or by  
assuming the identity axioms and Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz).

very different way to get the computable functions, with quite  
different assumpitions leads to the same class of functions.

Then there is the fact that the set of partial computable function is  
close for the diagonalization of Kleene, making arithmetic (and  
combinators, Turing machines ...) which makes that notion as much  
solid as the notion of natural numbers. So, as I don't think that the  
natural numbers is a human invention, I don't think the notion of  
Turing machine is a human invention. You can prove their existence  
from the K and S axioms given above, or from addition and  
multiplication + a bit of logic.

Usually the simpler thing simulates the more complex thing, but a  
physical computer is far more complex than a Turing Machine, so is a  
microprocessor implementing a Turing machine or is a Turing  
Machine implementing a microprocessor? 

Yes, arithmetic can simulates a Turing machine, a quantum computer,  
etc. It can, and it does, actually.
But a primary physical reality, well I have already not much clue what  
that can be, and if it behaves like the primary matter which should  
appear to exist with computationalism, then a priori, such matter can  
only approximate the real thing, not really simulate it.

> Does prime number needs paper to exist in the logico- 
mathematical sense of existence?

It doesn't matter, prime number don't make calculations,

I was just saying that the prime number, or the order relations, or  
the range of polynomila equation exist like the prime numbers, etc.

That prime number does not compute is not clear for me.Such a question  
might depend from Riemann hypothesis. If the Hilbet- Montgommery  
hypothesis is correct (that the zeta non trivlal zeroes describe a  
quantum spectrum, it might be that the prime numbers already emulates  
a quantum computer).

physical microprocessors do.

Locally, but if quantum field theory is correct, it is an analog  
imitation of the digital. You need to make precise your theory of  
primary matter to proof that it can emulates all computations, like  
arithmetic or the combinators. That is not an obvious question.

And all numbers may exist, but if the computational resources of the  
entire physical universe is finite then the set that contains all  
the prime numbers and only prime numbers may not. 

I don't believe in that type of God, to be sure. It does not work with  
either computationalism, nor quantum mechanics.

> a person can do a computation too, and they are not  
necessarily physical

In the history of the world a no person lacking a physical brain  
has ever made a calculation, and it is very easy to understand why  
if physics is more fundamental than mathematics. But if mathematics  
is more fundamental then that fact is quite odd.

You can prove in PA the existence of all terlminating computation, and  
the existence of many non terminating computations, and RA already  
emulates them all.

> you might read the book "Inexhaustibility" by Torket Franzen,  
which explains this with some details.

Books by Torket Franzen do not make calculations, physical  
microprocessors do.

Starw man! Nobody said that a book makes computation. I said just that  
if you study that book you will grasp why computations are realized in  
the arithmetical reality, or any model of a Turing universal theory.

> Physical water, like any physical stuff does not rely on one  
computations, but on an infinity of them,

Nobody knows if that is true or not, maybe only an astronomical  
number of calculations would be required to perfectly simulate  
water, but if you're right and a infinite amount of mathematics  
would be required to do what just a small amount of matter can do so  
effortlessly then it's game over and physics is more fundamental  
than mathematics, and mathematical models can never be more than  
just approximations of the real deal.

Not at all, as this is *derived* without any phsyical assumption other  
that the physical can emulate locall the universal digital machine.

>> Definitions don't make calculations, physical  
microprocessors do.

>Definition does not but relation does.

Only if the relations are about the orientation of PHYSICAL  
things. 

In the

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-19 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Sep 19, 2015 , Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> >> 
>> Theorems don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do.
>
>
> > 
> Physical computer are implementation, in the math sense, of turing
> universality by physical devices.
>

What makes you so certain that Turing machines aren't just man made
descriptions (and approximate descriptions at that) of physical
computational devises? Usually the simpler thing simulates the more complex
thing, but a physical computer is far more complex than a Turing Machine,
so is a microprocessor implementing a Turing machine or is a

Turing Machine
 implementing a microprocessor? 

> 
> Does prime number needs paper to exist in the logico-mathematical sense of
> existence?
>

It doesn't matter, prime number don't make calculations, physical
microprocessors do. And all numbers may exist, but if the computational
resources of the entire physical universe is finite then the set that
contains all the prime numbers and only prime numbers may not. 

> > 
> a person can do a computation too, and they are not necessarily physical
>

In the history of the world a no person lacking a physical brain has ever
made a calculation, and it is very easy to understand why if physics is
more fundamental than mathematics. But if mathematics is more fundamental
then that fact is quite odd.   

> > y
> ou might read the book "Inexhaustibility" by Torket Franzen, which
> explains this with some details.
>

Books by 
Torket Franzen
 do not make calculations, physical microprocessors do.

> > 
> Physical water, like any physical stuff does not rely on one computations,
> but on an infinity of them,
>

Nobody knows if that is true or not, maybe only an astronomical number of
calculations would be required to perfectly simulate water, but if you're
right and a infinite amount of mathematics would be required to do what
just a small amount of matter can do so effortlessly then it's game over
and physics is more fundamental than mathematics, and mathematical models
can never be more than just approximations of the real deal.

>> 
>> Definitions 
>> don't make calculations, physical microprocessors do.
>>
>
> >
> Definition does not but relation does.
>

Only if the relations are about the orientation of PHYSICAL things. 

> > 
> Indeed a computation is a digital relation, and it does not depends on any
> physical assumption. Just read a book in theoretical computer science.
>

No book in theoretical computer science can make a calculation, but a
physical microprocessor chip can.

>
>> >> 
>> I don't assume anything but I do know 4 things for certain:
>> 
>> 1) Simulated water can *not* quench my thirst.
>>
>
>

> 
> That is ambiguous.
>

If that is ambiguous then EVERYTHING is ambiguous, and without contrast
words have no meaning  

> > 
>  you need to grasp step 3 before I can explain more on this.
>

There is nothing in step 3 to grasp, there is no there there.

> 
>> > 
>> Proofs don't make calculations,
>
>
> > 
> Sigma_1 proof and calculations are the same thing.
>

Then then I really *REALLY *don't understand why you don't start the Sigma_1
Proof Computer Hardware Corporation and become the richest man who ever
lived.

> > 
> Like fortran calculations are the same as algol calculations.
>

Yes, without physical hardware to run them on both FORTRAN and Algol are
indeed the same, both are just squiggles on paper. 

> 
> comp is a theology,
>

Maybe, but I no longer care what "comp" is.

> 
> When I prove the existence of a computation in the theory RA
>  [...]
>

I don't need the the theory RA
 to prove to me that computations exist, I already know that they do, what
I want is for the
theory RA
, or anything else,
to make a computation without the use of matter that obeys the laws of
physics. And I don't want a proof, and I don't want a axiom, and I don't
want a definition, and I don't want a book; *I want a computation.  *

> > 
> you need to get step 8 for this.
>

Until you fix step 3 any higher step is meaningless.

> 
> Their argument is that a physical computer can only be an approciamation
> of the mathematical one, like a physical circle can only approximate a
> mathematica circle.
>

A physical circle, like one drawn by hand with ink on paper, if far far
more complex than a mathematical circle; so you tell me, which is a
approximation of which?   

> >
>>> >>
>>> that prime number existence does not depend on its computation,
>>
>>
> >> 
>> I think maybe it does depend on the physical possibility of it
>> being computed in the universe, although I could be wrong.
>
> > 
> That would make Euclid's wrong,
>

If so he wouldn't be the first ancient Greek that was dead wrong.

> 
> Where John Clark is = where his body is,
>

So you think consciousness has a position, does consciousness have a
velocity too, or a temperature, or a pressure, or a mass,

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 10 Sep 2015, at 20:55, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> I will answer your next post if it contains something new.

Then I guess it contained something new.
>>> that can be emulated in arithmetic as all  
computations can be emulated

>> Bullshit.

> No, it is a theorem in computer science.

Theorems don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips  
do.

Physical computer are implementation, in the math sense, of turing  
universality by physical devices.

But number relations implement computations, in the sense of Turing.

> computations, emulation are used in the original mathematical  
sense of Turing.

Turing reduced a computer

A human computer, yes;

to it's essentials so we can understand how they work, no computer  
is simpler than a Turing Machine, but even a Turing Machine needs  
a tape made of matter and a read head that be changed by the  
physical tape and a write head that can make chances to that  
physical tape. 

Does prime number needs paper to exist in the logico-mathematical  
sense of existence?

If yes, you are using some non-standard definition different from the  
people working in the field.

If no, just notice that the computations in the sense of Turing exists  
in a sense similar to the existence of prime numbers.

> Those are arithmetical notion.

Arithmetical notions don't make calculations, physical  
microprocessor chips do.

Arithmetical relations does implement computations. Indeed all  
universal system do that, and we know today that Robinson arithmetic  
is Turing universal.

> The notion of physical computation is a different notion,

Yes they are different, lots of people have made physical  
computations but NOBODY has ever made a non-physical computation

Because BODY are physical. But a person can do a computation too, and  
they are not necessarily physical, and then number relations are not  
physical, and they can implement computations.

and there is zero evidence anybody ever could, although I can't  
prove nobody ever will.

You might read the book "Inexhaustibility" by Torket Franzen, which  
explains this with some details. The book of Matiyasevich shiws in all  
details how Dipohantine polynomials can simulate an arbitrary  
universal Turing machine.

>>There are levels in physical stuff like physical computer  
hardware, but there are no levels in computations!

> What? This is just wrong. In arithmetic you do have a  
simulation of a fortran program elumating an algol program emulating  
a quantum computer emulating the game of life emulating ... There  
are arbitrary long chain of such simulation,

And at the end of that long chain the answer you get when 2 is  
added to 2 is still 4, the exact same 4 you'd get if it was just  
calculated in your head; it's not a simulated 4 it's just 4 and it  
has all the properties of any other 4. But simulated water does NOT  
have all the properties of physical water and I'm still waiting for  
you to explain why not if arithmetic really is more fundamental than  
matter as you claim.

That is the whole point of the UDA. Physical water, like any physical  
stuff does not rely on one computations, but on an infinity of them,  
due to the First Person Indeterminacy. Once we look at ourselve or at  
our environment at a level below the substitution level, we find the  
*apparent* primary matter, which ca only emerge from those infinities,  
and a priori that is not emulable by a specific computer, although it  
has to be approximable, or we would not exist.

> I have given the definition already, reread them, or buy a  
book in computer science.

Definitions don't make calculations and neither do books 
, physical microprocessor chips do.

Definition does not but relation does. Indeed a computation is a  
digital relation, and it does not depends on any physical assumption.  
Just read a book in theoretical computer science.

>> Why can't a simulated water program get the computer wet?

> Because you can't create primitive matter,

A good answer or at least I can't think of a better one. If it's  
true then primitive matter must be more fundamental than arithmetic  
because it has something that numbers don't and can do things that  
numbers can't.

Numbers can share relations, and if we assume computationalism,  
numbers can share relations which implement any computation. So if  
computationalism is correct, the existence of the computation in your  
current brain which allows you to read this post is implemented an  
infinity of times through an infinity of number relations which exists  
in the same sense that the relation x < y exists. Then from your first  
person perspective you cannot distinguish, without doing experiments,  
if you are emulated in a block material universe (if that could exist)  
or in the block mindscape

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-10 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> I will answer your next post if it contains something new.

Then I guess it contained something new.

> >
>> >>
>> 
>> that can be emulated in arithmetic as all computations can be emulated
>>
>
> 
> >> 
> Bullshit.
>
> > 
> No, it is a theorem in computer science.
>

Theorems don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do.

> 
> computations, emulation are used in the original mathematical sense of
> Turing.
>

Turing
 reduced a computer to it's essentials so we can understand how they work,
no computer is simpler than a Turing Machine, but even a

Turing Machine
 needs a tape made of matter and a read head that be changed by the
physical tape and a write head that can make chances to that physical tape.

> 
> Those are arithmetical notion.

A
rithmetical
notions
don't make calculations,
physical 
microprocessor chips do.

> > 
> The notion of physical computation is a different notion,
>

Yes they are different, lots of people have made physical computations but
*NOBODY* has ever made a non-physical 
computation and there is zero evidence anybody ever could, although I
can't prove nobody ever will.

>>
>> There are levels in physical stuff like physical computer hardware, but
>> there are no levels in computations!
>
>
> > 
> What? This is just wrong. In arithmetic you do have a simulation of a
> fortran program elumating an algol program emulating a quantum computer
> emulating the game of life emulating ... There are arbitrary long chain of
> such simulation,
>

And at the end of that long chain the answer you get when 2 is added to 2
is still 4, the exact same 4 you'd get if it was just calculated in your
head; it's not a simulated 4 it's just 4 and it has all the properties of
any other 4. But simulated water does NOT have all the properties of
physical water and I'm still waiting for you to explain why not if
arithmetic really is more fundamental than matter as you claim.

> > 
> I have given the definition already, reread them, or buy a book in
> computer science.
>

Definitions 
don't make calculations
 and neither do books
,
physical 
microprocessor chips do.

>> 
>> Why can't a simulated water program get the computer wet?
>
>
> > 
> Because you can't create primitive matter,
>

A good answer or at least I can't think of a better one. If it's true
then primitive
matter must be more fundamental than arithmetic because it has something
that numbers don't and can do things that numbers can't.

>
> > 
> But Arithmetic can simulate water making wet a computer.
>

Yes, but a computer can't simulate all wet computers, it can't create a
wet computer made of real physical matter. OK now I'm going to do something
I shouldn't and argue against what I just said.

A simulated-simulated computer could go up a level and make a simulated
computer wet, after all neither involve physics (except that both are
running programs on the same physical computer). Some might say that what
looks like hardware to somebody on one level would look like software to
somebody on a higher level, but I don't think things are quite as clear cut
as that; a conscious simulated computer might create and start up a
simulated-simulated computer but it can't know what that simulated-simulated
computer will come up with anymore than we can know what our programs will
end up doing. So the simulated computer and the simulated-simulated
computer influence each other and there is no strict top to bottom ordering
as far as cause and effect is concerned. And yet no computer program
running on a real physical computer can make that real physical computer
wet.

But maybe I'm wrong
 about that
, a program could make a physical computer wet if it were running on the
right hardware, say a computer with water balloons inside set to burst if
the simulated computer performed action X. Some would say that would be
cheating and it would be UNLESS our entire universe is a computer
simulation, then to somebody in that level
of 
higher
reality 
than our own both the physical microprocessor and the physical water
balloons would just be
lines of program code. Of course the guy at that higher level would be
pondering the same math vs physics question that we are and wondering if he
wasn't a simulation too at an even higher level of reality.

You keep saying you don't believe in fundamental primitive matter but the
only way
you could be right about 
that is if there is a infinite (and not just astronomical) number of levels
above our own level each simulating the one below; because if there are
only a finite number then the one at the very top would have to play by
different rules and just accept the existence of matter as a brute fact
that numbers can never explain or reproduce.

>> 
>> if arithmetic really is more fundamental than physics I have
>> grave difficulties in understanding why that arithmetic

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 07 Sep 2015, at 19:11, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Sep 6, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> that can be emulated in arithmetic as all computations can be  
emulated

Bullshit.

No, it is a theorem in computer science. Keep in mind that computer  
(universal machine), computations, emulation are used in the original  
mathematical sense of Turing. Those are arithmetical notion. The  
notion of physical computation is a different notion, and is defined  
by assuming a physical reality and assuming that the physical reality  
can implement in some physical sense a computation in Turing sense.

>>> The fact that computations exist in arithmetic is a  
trivial theorem.

>> You keep saying that, and yet in spite of the fact that  
it would be trivial for you to do so you have been unable to  
explain why you have not started The Marchal Computer Hardware  
Company and you have been unable to explain why you are not a  
trillionare.

> This is frankly ridiculous, as the point is that hardware is  
a relative notion in arithmetic. You are again trying to confuse the  
level.

There are levels in physical stuff like physical computer  
hardware, but there are no levels in computations!

What? This is just wrong. In arithmetic you do have a simulation of a  
fortran program elumating an algol program emulating a quantum  
computer emulating the game of life emulating ... There are arbitrary  
long chain of such simulation, even circular one. The notion of level  
is defined at the start in computer science or in arithmetic (or in  
combinatr theory, etc.). I have given the definition already, reread  
them, or buy a book in computer science.

So I ask again, given the fact that unlike real water simulated  
computations have ALL the properties of non simulated computations  
and the two are absolutely indistinguishable, and if arithmetic  
really is more fundamental than physics then why can't you actually  
SHOW me a calculation made without using  matter and the laws of  
physics rather than just wave your hands and repeat over and over  
that it can be done?

?

I have just done it in the preceding post.

Ah! you even quote it below.

Why can't a simulated water program get the computer wet?

Because you can't create primitive matter, by definition of primitive  
matter. But Arithmetic can simulate water making wet a computer.

Why haven't you started The Marchal Computer Hardware Company and  
why aren't you a trillionare?

>Arithmetic can emulate the wetness of water for an emulated  
subject,

There are no levels in arithmetic, a simulated computer does not  
perform simulated arithmetic it just does arithmetic,

So wrong. But I know, you tell me you don't want open a book in  
computer science, so ...

and the arithmetic it performs is just as real as the  
arithmetic a non simulated computer performs or that a human  
does. And yet although a computer can use arithmetic to  
produce simulated water that simulated water is lacking some of the  
attributes that real water has;

Yes, as being primitive. But then you must assume primary matter,  
which is not only not part of computationalism, but is precisely what  
the argument shows to be epistemological impossible, or even logically  
impossible with the usual weak occam.

but if arithmetic really is more fundamental than physics I have  
grave difficulties in understanding why that arithmetic produced  
water should be lacking any attribute the physical water has, like  
the ability to quench my thirst.

It does not, except if you assume the existence of some primitive  
water, and some non Turing emulable property needed to qunech your  
thirst, but then you assume non-computationalism, by the very  
reasoning given.

So you beg the question.

  > But of course, we cannot make something physically wet   
[...]   To simulate hardware per se is so much impossible

I know it's impossible, I want you to tell me why.

By definition of primary matter or primary hardware. But nobody has  
ever given an evidence that such a thing exist. You argue like a  
creationist who would say that the theory of evolution is wrong as it  
does not expain how God made this in six days.

If physics is more fundamental, that is to say if a physical object  
has properties that numbers don't then it's easy to explain why, but  
if numbers are more fundamental it's far more difficult to explain  
why.

Indeed, that's the point: we have to explain the stability of the  
illusion, as the illusion itself is very easy to explain. What UDA and  
its translation in arithmetic shows is that such a problem can be  
translated itself in arithmetic, and we have extracted a quantum logic  
from that reformulation, and up to now, thanks to the QM-without- 
collapse, computationalism fits well with nature.

> that this is a part of the reason why I do not believe such  
"primary"

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-07 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Sep 6, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > 
> that can be emulated in arithmetic as all computations can be emulated
>

Bullshit.

> >
>> >>
>> 
>> The fact that computations exist in arithmetic is a trivial theorem.
>>
>
> 
> >> 
> You keep saying that, and yet in spite of the fact that it would be
> trivial for you to do so you have been unable to explain why you have not
> started The Marchal Computer Hardware Company and you have been unable to
> explain why you are not a trillionare.
>
> > 
> This is frankly ridiculous, as the point is that hardware is a relative
> notion in arithmetic. You are again trying to confuse the level.
>

There are levels in physical stuff like physical computer hardware, but
there are no levels in computations! So I ask again, given the fact that
unlike real water simulated computations have *ALL* the properties of non
simulated computations and the two are absolutely indistinguishable, and if
arithmetic really is more fundamental than physics then why can't you
actually* SHOW* me a calculation made without using  matter and the laws of
physics rather than just wave your hands and repeat over and over that it
can be done? Why can't a simulated water program get the computer wet? Why
haven't you started The Marchal Computer Hardware Company and
why aren't you a trillionare?

> >
> Arithmetic can emulate the wetness of water for an emulated subject,
>

There are no levels in arithmetic, a simulated computer does not perform
simulated

arithmetic
 it just does arithmetic, and the 
arithmetic
 it performs is just as real as the 
arithmetic
 a non simulated computer performs or that a human does. And yet although
a
 computer
 can use 

arithmetic
 to produce simulated water that simulated water is lacking some of
the attributes that real water has; but if arithmetic really is
more fundamental than physics I have grave difficulties in understanding
why that arithmetic produced water should be lacking any attribute the
physical water has, like the ability to quench my thirst.

>  >
> But of course, we cannot make something physically wet
>   [...]   
> To simulate hardware per se is so much impossible

I know it's impossible, I want you to tell me why. If physics is
more fundamental, that is to say if a physical object has properties that
numbers don't then it's easy to explain why, but if numbers are more
fundamental it's far more difficult to explain why.

> > 
> that this is a part of the reason why I do not believe such "primary"
> hardware exists
>

If primary computer hardware does not exist then why is it necessary to
perform a calculation, why don't you just emulate that hardware in
arithmetic?  

You certainly have accessed to arithmetic so what I really want to know is

why haven't you started The Marchal Computer Hardware Company and
why aren't you a trillionare
?

>> 
>> I don't want to google "Kleene predicate" and I don't want another
>> "proof" and I don't want a definition!!! I want an *EXAMPLE*, I want to
>> see you or anybody or anything else calculate 2 +2  without using matter!
>>
>
>
> > 
> Ah? Here is one, but please don't confuse what follows with the pixels
> which represent it on the screen:
> s(s(0)) + s(s(0))
> s(s(s(0)) +s(0))
> s(s(s(s(0) + 0)
> s(s(s(s(0
>

I see nothing
above 
performing any calculations, you're just writing first grade arithmetic
problems in a different notation, and your physical brain caused you to
write the above rather than 2+3= 2+1 or 4+0= 5. And those ARE pixels on a
screen, the only reason they have some meaning for me is that your physical
brain and my physical brain are similar in that we both are familiar with
that notation, to a

martian

with a different physical arrangement they would
 just be pixels on a screen and nothing more. If you use a more common
notation and write 2+2 =4 those ASCII characters are not performing a
calculation either, they're just reporting to me a calculation that your
physical brain has already made.

> > 
> here the computation is done in RA.
>

Don't tell me that, show me
 that
!

If calculations can really be done in RA then there is absolutely
positively
no reason you can't start the RA
Computer Hardware Company
and

 become
a trillionaire
.

>> 
>> I don't want to read any textbook
>> , I don't want to read
>> Gödel's original paper
>> ! 
>> I want
>> an *EXAMPLE*, I want 
>> to see you calculate 2 +2  without
>> using
>>  matter!
>
>

See above.
>

Why? You've written nothing relevant above. 

> > 
> This does not need any matter, like the existence of a prime number bigger
> than 1000^(1000^(1000^1000)) does not require matter.
>

But calculating that prime number most certainly *DOES* require matter.
And if the computational resources of the entire universe are insufficient
to produce that prime number even in theory then I'm not entirely certain
it would be

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-06 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 04 Sep 2015, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 10:53 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> If arithmetic is more fundamental than physics as you say  
then we should be able to write a program that would get the  
computer wet, and yet we can't and your theory can not give an  
adequate explanation of why not.

> you need to define what you mean by wet.

No I most certainly do not need to do that! Any definition of wet  
that I give would be made of words and I have no doubt you would  
then demand another definition of at least one of those words which  
I could only provide with yet more words and round and round we go.  
It would be much better if I gave an example not a definition, it  
would be much better if I threw a bucket of water at you then  
pointed at you and said "wet".

Oh, but then you refer to "wet---the 1p experiment", but that can be  
emulated in arithmetic as all computations can be emulated (and are  
actually emulated) in arithmetic.

But of course, we cannot make something physically wet (assuming  
something like that exists) in our relative computations by programming.

>> Computationalism postulates that the computations a  
PHYSICAL computer produce can create intelligent behavior and  
consciousness, but computationalism does NOT postulate that  
computations exist in arithmetic independent of physics.

> The fact that computations exist in arithmetic is a trivial  
theorem.

You keep saying that, and yet in spite of the fact that it would  
be trivial for you to do so you have been unable to explain why you  
have not started The Marchal Computer Hardware Company and you have  
been unable to explain why you are not a trillionare.

This is frankly ridiculous, as the point is that hardware is a  
relative notion in arithmetic. You are again trying to confuse the  
level. Arithmetic can emulate the wetness of water for an emulated  
subject, and that is how hardware can exists in the relative way. To  
simulate hardware per se is so much impossible that this is a part of  
the reason why I do not believe such "primary" hardware exists, and so  
you need to assume its existence to make your point, but then you are  
begging the question.

>> Show me a example of arithmetic all by itself making a  
calculation and you have won this argument, not a definition, not a  
proof, an EXAMPLE. Stop talking about it and just show me!

>  google a bit more on "Kleene predicate"

I don't want to google "Kleene predicate" and I don't want  
another "proof" and I don't want a definition!!! I want an EXAMPLE,  
I want to see you or anybody or anything else calculate 2 +2   
without using matter!

Ah? Here is one, but please don't confuse what follows with the pixels  
which represent it on the screen:

s(s(0)) + s(s(0))
s(s(s(0)) +s(0))
s(s(s(s(0) + 0)
s(s(s(s(0

here the computation is done in RA. Then, "the computation is done in  
RA" is itself capable of being done in RA, but the sequence above will  
have to be represented in RA, which will be something too long to fit  
in this post, but being a (representation of a) computation is still  
an arithmetical notion.

> Or read any textbook, or Gödel's original paper

I don't want to read any textbook, I don't want to read  
Gödel's original paper! I want an EXAMPLE, I want to see  
you calculate 2 +2  without using matter!

See above. This does not need any matter, like the existence of a  
prime number bigger than 1000^(1000^(1000^1000)) does not require  
matter.

>> Yes "you" will survive provided that "you" is defined as  
somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki,

> But that is ambiguous, because if the guy (who remembers  
being the man who was in Helsinki) is now in both city,

YES, and that is exactly precisely why asking what one and only  
one city "you" will see in a world with "you" duplicating machines  
in it is not a question at all, it is gibberish.

But that is exactly what is refuted by all copies. The copy having  
0111 in his diary is able to recognize "I was unable to predict  
that".

> You continue to introduce an ambiguity by ignoring the 1p/3p  
difference,

In the entire history of the world nobody, absolutely nobody, has  
ignored the difference between 1p and 3p.

You just did above.

> we must still take into account the content of the 1p  
experiences,

Who's 1p experience? Mr. You's. And who is Mr. You? The guy with  
THE 1p experience. And round and round we go.

We have admitted that we need to look at all the content of all  
diaries. They all describe one city, and as they can introspect, they  
all remember having known this in advance, and thus predicted the "(1  
and ~0) v (0 and ~1) for each pass, and they all confirmed that  
prediction for their experience content. Again, this is the same as in  
Everett. Your argument would refute as much MWI

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 03 Sep 2015, at 18:56, John Clark wrote:

Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Just one remark: we cannot make a piece of matter wet in  
arithmetic

I know, but why not? If arithmetic is more fundamental than  
physics as you say then we should be able to write a program that  
would get the computer wet, and yet we can't and your theory can not  
give an adequate explanation of why not.  

To do this, you need to define what you mean by wet. If it involve  
primary matter, then the theory explains  why arithmetic cannot  
produce that, as there is no primary matter. If you define wet without  
using primary matter, then it depends on the definition you will give  
of wet.

> but once we postulate computationalism, we can prove that all  
the piece of computations leading to the first person experience of  
feeling wet, or clenching your thirst, exist in arithmetic

Computationalism postulates that the computations a PHYSICAL  
computer produce can create intelligent behavior and consciousness,  
but computationalism does NOT postulate that computations exist in  
arithmetic independent of physics.

The fact that computations exist in arithmetic is a trivial theorem.  
You don't need to assume the "Yes Doctor" part of computationalism,  
but either Church's thesis, or Church's definition of computation, is  
enough to prove that.

Show me a example of arithmetic all by itself making a calculation  
and you have won this argument, not a definition, not a proof, an  
EXAMPLE. Stop talking about it and just show me!

This should help, if not google a bit more on "Kleene predicate"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kleene%27s_T_predicate

Or read any textbook, or Gödel's original paper which does this for an  
important subclass, (the primitive recursive function) and then you  
can conceive the generalization.

> I will please you and not use pronouns

Bruno Marchal just did.

> someone asked JC, before the duplication, what do you expect  
to live. JC remarked that "you" is ambiguous. Oh, but you agreed  
that you will survive,

And JC responded: "Yes "you" will survive provided that "you" is  
defined as somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki,

But that is ambiguous, because if the guy (who remembers being the man  
who was in Helsinki) is now in both city, it is still true that bith  
the 3-he  feels to be in one city from the 1p view.

You continue to introduce an ambiguity by ignoring the 1p/3p  
difference, where we have insisted that we have to make it to address  
the question asked.

but if that personal pronoun is defined in some other way

That never happens. But once we have defined it, we must still take  
into account the content of the 1p experiences, given that the  
question bears on that (future) content.

or, as often happens on this list, not defined at all then JC might  
have a different answer to "will you survive" or have no answer at  
all because gibberish has no answer".

That is eminently true, but you are the one aking the question  
gibberish by ignoring that when your body is in tow places, all your  
possible subjective experiences' content mention only one place.

>so you expect to live some experience, no?

Explain what that GODDAMN personal pronoun "you" means and JC  
will provide an answer!  Bruno's "I will please you and not use  
pronouns" promise sure didn't last long.

It did, as "you" is used before the duplication, and you have agreed  
there is no ambiguity at that moment.

Try better as you repeat the same old stuff which has been debunked by  
everyone since a long time.

Bruno

  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-04 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 10:53 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> >> 
>> If arithmetic is more fundamental than physics as you say then we should
>> be able to write a program that would get the computer wet, and yet we
>> can't and your theory can not give an adequate explanation of why not.
>
>   
> > 
> you need to define what you mean by wet.
>

No I most certainly do not need to do that! Any definition of wet that I
give would be made of words and I have no doubt you would then demand
another definition of at least one of those words which I could only
provide with yet more words and round and round we go. It would be much
better if I gave an example not a definition, it would be much better if I
threw a bucket of water at you then pointed at you and said "wet".

>> >> 
>> Computationalism
>>  postulates that the computations a* PHYSICAL* computer produce can
>> create intelligent behavior and consciousness, but computationalism does
>> *NOT* postulate that
>> computations exist in arithmetic
>> independent of physics.
>>
>
> > 
> The fact that computations exist in arithmetic is a trivial theorem.
>

You keep saying that, and yet in spite of the fact that it would be
trivial for you to do so you have been unable to explain why you have not
started The Marchal Computer Hardware Company and you have been unable to
explain why you are not a trillionare.

>
>> 
>> Show me a example of arithmetic all by itself making a calculation and
>> you have won this argument, not a definition, not a proof, an *EXAMPLE*.
>> Stop talking about it and just show me!
>
>
> > 
>  google a bit more on "Kleene predicate"
>

I don't want to google "Kleene predicate" and I don't want another
"proof" and I don't want a definition!!! I want an *EXAMPLE*, I want to see
you or anybody or anything else calculate 2 +2  without using matter!

> 
> Or read any textbook, or Gödel's original paper
>

I don't want to 
read any textbook
, I don't want to read
Gödel's original paper
! 
I want
an *EXAMPLE*, I want 
to see you calculate 2 +2  without
using
 matter!

>> 
>> Yes "you" will survive provided that "you" is defined as somebody who
>> remembers being a man in Helsinki,
>
>
> > 
> But that is ambiguous, because if the guy (who remembers being the man who
> was in Helsinki) is now in both city,
>

YES, and that is exactly precisely why asking what one and only one city
"you" will see in a world with "you" duplicating machines in it is not a
question at all, it is gibberish.

> > 
> You continue to introduce an ambiguity by ignoring the 1p/3p difference,
>

In the entire history of the world nobody, absolutely nobody, has ignored
the difference between 1p and 3p.

> > 
> we must still take into account the content of the 1p experiences,
>

Who's 1p experience? Mr. You's. And who is Mr. You? The guy with THE
1p experience
. And round and round we go.

> > 
> ignoring that when your body is in tow places, all your possible
> subjective experiences' content mention only one place.
>

Who's subjective experiences are only in one place?
Mr. You's. And who is .

  John K Clark

>

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 03 Sep 2015, at 02:31, chris peck wrote:

Bruno

>> And someone asked JC, before the duplication, what do you expect  
to live. JC remarked that "you" is ambiguous. Oh, but you agreed  
that you will survive, so you expect to live some experience, no?  
Let me ask you this how to you evaluate the chance to see 0 on the  
paper after opening the drawer.

'You' is ambiguous *because* we agree that 'you' will survive. If we  
agreed 'you' wouldn't survive then its meaning is clear. 'You'  
denotes just JC at Helsinki.

>> Surely, you can't be serious, as this is not a first experience.  
It is a list of first person experiences. "

Don't call me Shirley, and 'I will see 0 or I will see 1' is a list  
just as really as 'I will see 0 and I will see 1'. Whats your point?

"I will see 0 or I will see 1" *remains a true prediction for all  
continuations.

"I will see 0 and I will see 1" is 1-false for all continuations,  
althoughtrivially 3-1 true, but the question was about the next life  
experience, not a third person description of them.

>> After pushing the button, you will live only one realization of  
the experience just listed above.

This explicitly violates the agreement that 'you' survives in both  
rooms when duplicated.

I usually agree on this, but John Clark is used to make sense of it,  
and it is indeed what yoy get in the third person description talking  
about that"I" in the third person way. I void doing this, and do it  
only because John C makes that move. It is unecessary.

Also, its when you phrase things this way that it becomes clear that  
you are violating 'comp' because it is equivolent to saying that  
'you' survives in only one branch, that despite the copy being made  
at the right substitution level in both rooms, something else is  
carrying over to one or the other room that is not contained in the  
description. You're language makes it clear that you believe,  
implicitly if not explicitly, that the description is incomplete.

The whole magic comes from the fact that the level is right, and the  
evolution is 3p deterministic, but then this why the 1p evolution is  
not deterministic. The 0 v 1 is a necessarily non constructive OR.

There is no problem once you distinguish well if the question bear on  
the subjective experience, or on objective 3p communicable predicate.

>> you really maintain that the result of JC opening the drawer will  
be "0 and 1"?

yes in the following sense. I survive in both rooms. In both rooms I  
open the drawer. So I will 'live' the experience of 0 and I will  
'live' the experience of 1.

That is a 3p description of what you will live. But no continuations  
will live that from their 1p view. They will live only the experience  
of 0, or the experience of 1. Not both, as they are exclusive (John  
agrees that they are exclsuive).

>> So JC predicts "0 and 1". Then I interview JC-0. Did you observe  
"0 and 1". Yes, JC told me.

How come? JC -1 has not yet been reconstituted, may be ...

Perhaps the question that needs to be asked of JC-H is whether he  
can expect to see 0 and 1 at precisely the same moment? Is that the  
question you are trying to formulate?

That is made explicit at step 4. in Step 3 the question is  
operational: you *will* push on the button, and open a drawer. What do  
you expect to live as experience. the comp answer is that I expect to  
see a 0, or a 1, and I don't expect to see a blurred combination of 0  
or 1. After the experience, both JC-0 and JC-1 will confirm that this  
is indeed verified.

Also, you have to be clear about how 'you' operates. It can track  
'you' backwards in time from JC-0 to JC-H and from JC-1 to JC-H, but  
it doesn't work well tracking duplicates across space at a  
particular time. So JC-0 can't track to JC-1. So, for example whilst  
it is true that JC-0-'you' is not JC-1-'you', both are JC-H-'you'.

No problem.

In otherwords, because JC-0 and JC-1's experiences are exclusive  
relative to one another, they are not exclusive relative to JC-H.

Right.

We have discuss this already. It means that personal identity is an  
intensional notion, or a modal notion, in which the Leibniz identity  
principle (a = b and a = c ->. b = c) is not valid. No problem, this  
is illustrated also in the math part, and indeed it explains why we  
can't avoid modal logic. But this does not refute the FPI, if that is  
what you were trying to do.

Bruno

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 19:40:16 +0200

On 31 Aug 2015, at 23:58, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>  
wrote:

>>Bruno Marchal  was alluding on how you predict your  
subjective experience when you do an experienc

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-03 Thread John Clark

Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > 
> Just one remark: we cannot make a piece of matter wet in arithmetic
>

I know, but why not? If arithmetic is more fundamental than physics as you
say then we should be able to write a program that would get the computer
wet, and yet we can't and your theory can not give an adequate explanation
of why not.

> > 
> but once we postulate computationalism, we can prove that all the piece of
> computations leading to the first person experience of feeling wet, or
> clenching your thirst, exist in arithmetic
>

C
omputationalism
 postulates that the computations a* PHYSICAL* computer produce can create
intelligent behavior and consciousness, but computationalism does *NOT*
postulate that
computations exist in arithmetic
independent of physics. Show me a example of arithmetic all by itself
making a calculation and you have won this argument, not a definition, not
a proof, an *EXAMPLE*. Stop talking about it and just show me!

> 
> I will please you and not use pronouns
> 
>

Bruno Marchal
just did.

> > 
> someone asked JC, before the duplication, what do you expect to live. JC
> remarked that "you" is ambiguous. Oh, but you agreed that you will survive,
>

And JC responded: "Yes "you" will survive provided that "you" is defined
as somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, but if that personal
pronoun is defined in some other way or, as often happens on this list, not
defined at all then JC might have a different answer to "will you survive"
or have no answer at all because gibberish has no answer".

> >
> so you expect to live some experience, no?
>

Explain what that *GODDAMN* personal pronoun "you" means and JC will
provide an answer!

 Bruno's "
I will please you and not use pronouns
" promise sure didn't last long.

  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-02 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 31 Aug 2015, at 23:58, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>>Bruno Marchal  was alluding on how you predict your  
subjective experience when you do an experience in physics  
where "you" has been duplicated and thus making that personal  
pronoun ambiguous.

>I have repeated many times that the question is always asked  
before the duplication.

And the question is about what one and only one thing will happen  
to YOU after YOU has been duplicated and becomes TWO. In other  
words the question was about gibberish.

I can't prove mathematics is more fundamental than physics and I  
can't prove it isn't, and as of September 30 2015 nobody else has  
been able to do any better. 

> If my body is a machine, then there is not much choice in the  
matter.

If we're dealing in philosophy and not everyday conversation and  
it my body is a machine then I don't know what "choice"  means.  
And if my body is not a machine I still don't know what "choice"  
means.

> You beg the question with respect to step 3.

There may be a question mark but there is no question. And I have  
no answer because gibberish has no answer.  

>> When I don't know I'm not afraid to say I don't know. 
> Then you contraidct yourself. By the way, your argument that  
there is no computation in arithmetic is isomorph to the argument  
that a simulated typhon cannot make someone wet, which I know you  
don't believe in.

A computer can make a simulated hurricane but because it uses only  
numbers to build the storm and numbers (probably) have no  
physical properties the simulated hurricane would always lack  
something the real hurricane had, the physical ability to get the  
computer wet.

However if it turned out that you're right and math is more  
fundamental than physics and numbers have everything physics has and  
more then a clever enough programmer could write a program that  
would cause the computer to actually get wet. I'm very skeptical  
that such a program is possible but I can't prove it's impossible so  
maybe you're right.

>> No it does not. What I said was that up to now nobody  
has ever made one single calculation without the use of physical  
hardware

> How do you know that?

Because every time a calculation is made something physical  
in a computer changes and if I change something physical in a  
computer the calculation changes.

> How do you know that there is physical hardware?

Because I can touch the hardware with my physical hand.

> If you don't know if math is or not the fundamental science,

Observations can be made regardless of it math or physics is the  
fundamental science. 

> But we know as a fact that elementary arithmetic (Robinson  
Arithmetic) contains all terminating computations, and all pieces on  
the non terminating computations.

Then computer chips would be unnecessary and Raphael M Robinson  
should be the principle stockholder of the Robinson computer  
corporation and be a trillionare, but I don't believe that is the  
case.

A physical brain or a physical computer can perform calculations  
that produce Robinson arithmetic, it can describe how a  
calculation was done, but Robinson

arithmetic can't actuality calculate a damn thing. .

>> why hasn't at least one of those numerous scientists started  
their own computer hardware company with zero manufacturing costs  
and become a trillionaire? This is not a rhetorical question, I'd  
really like an answer.

> For the same reason that nobody would drink simulated water,  
unless they are simulated themselves.

That is a very bad analogy because there is such a thing as  
simulated water but there is no such thing as simulated arithmetic;  
simulated water is different from physical water but arithmetic is  
always just arithmetic. I think we would both agree that when a  
simulated computer calculates 2+2 the 4 it produces is exactly the  
same as the 4 a  non-simulated computer would make when  
doing the same calculation, and the same would be true if the  
simulated computer itself simulated a computer. But we also  
agree that simulated water would not quench your thirst the way that  
physical water would, so if physical water has attributes that  
numbers can not produce, so you tell me if physics or  
mathematics is the more fundamental.

>>>> Convince the National Academy of Science or the  
Royal Society that you're not talking nonsense and have them make  
you a member; and then convince the International Congress of  
Mathematicians and have them award you the Fields Metal and announce  
it all here.

>>> You are basically making an argument by authority  
here,

>>> And your multiple statements that I have not convinced  
anybody else on this list is not an argument from authority??

>No, it is not. It is a simple observation that anybody can

RE: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-09-02 Thread chris peck

Bruno

>> And someone asked JC, before the duplication, what do you expect to live. JC 
>> remarked that "you" is ambiguous. Oh, but you agreed that you will survive, 
>> so you expect to live some experience, no? Let me ask you this how to you 
>> evaluate the chance to see 0 on the paper after opening the drawer.

'You' is ambiguous *because* we agree that 'you' will survive. If we agreed 
'you' wouldn't survive then its meaning is clear. 'You' denotes just JC at 
Helsinki.

>> Surely, you can't be serious, as this is not a first experience. It is a 
>> list of first person experiences. "

Don't call me Shirley, and 'I will see 0 or I will see 1' is a list just as 
really as 'I will see 0 and I will see 1'. Whats your point?

>> After pushing the button, you will live only one realization of the 
>> experience just listed above.

This explicitly violates the agreement that 'you' survives in both rooms when 
duplicated. Also, its when you phrase things this way that it becomes clear 
that you are violating 'comp' because it is equivolent to saying that 'you' 
survives in only one branch, that despite the copy being made at the right 
substitution level in both rooms, something else is carrying over to one or the 
other room that is not contained in the description. You're language makes it 
clear that you believe, implicitly if not explicitly, that the description is 
incomplete.

>> you really maintain that the result of JC opening the drawer will be "0 and 
>> 1"?

yes in the following sense. I survive in both rooms. In both rooms I open the 
drawer. So I will 'live' the experience of 0 and I will 'live' the experience 
of 1.

>> So JC predicts "0 and 1". Then I interview JC-0. Did you observe "0 and 1". 
>> Yes, JC told me. 
How come? JC -1 has not yet been reconstituted, may be ... 

Perhaps the question that needs to be asked of JC-H is whether he can expect to 
see 0 and 1 at precisely the same moment? Is that the question you are trying 
to formulate? 

Also, you have to be clear about how 'you' operates. It can track 'you' 
backwards in time from JC-0 to JC-H and from JC-1 to JC-H, but it doesn't work 
well tracking duplicates across space at a particular time. So JC-0 can't track 
to JC-1. So, for example whilst it is true that JC-0-'you' is not JC-1-'you', 
both are JC-H-'you'. In otherwords, because JC-0 and JC-1's experiences are 
exclusive relative to one another, they are not exclusive relative to JC-H. 
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 19:40:16 +0200

On 31 Aug 2015, at 23:58, John Clark wrote:On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 4:30 AM, 
Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>>Bruno Marchal  was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience 
when you do an experience in physics where "you" has been duplicated and thus 
making that personal pronoun ambiguous.
>I have repeated many times that the question is always asked before the 
duplication.
And the question is about what one and only one thing will happen to YOU after 
YOU has been duplicated and becomes TWO. In other words the question was about 
gibberish.  
I can't prove mathematics is more fundamental than physics and I can't prove 
it isn't, and as of September 30 2015 nobody else has been able to do any 
better. 
> If my body is a machine, then there is not much choice in the matter.
If we're dealing in philosophy and not everyday conversation and it my body is 
a machine then I don't know what "choice"  means. And if my body is not a 
machine I still don't know what "choice" means. > You beg the question with 
respect to step 3.
There may be a question mark but there is no question. And I have no answer 
because gibberish has no answer.  >> When I don't know I'm not afraid to 
say I don't know. > Then you contraidct yourself. By the way, your argument 
that there is no computation in arithmetic is isomorph to the argument that a 
simulated typhon cannot make someone wet, which I know you don't believe in.

A computer can make a simulated hurricane but because it uses only numbers to 
build the storm and numbers (probably) have no physical properties the 
simulated hurricane would always lack something the real hurricane had, the 
physical ability to get the computer wet.

However if it turned out that you're right and math is more fundamental than 
physics and numbers have everything physics has and more then a clever enough 
programmer could write a program that would cause the computer to actually get 
wet. I'm very skeptical that such a program is possible but I can't prove it's 
impossible so maybe you're right.  

>> No it does not. What I said was that up to now nobody has ever made one 
single calculation wit

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-31 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>>
>> Bruno Marcha
>> l
>> was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience when you do an
>> experience in physics
>>  
>> where "you" has been duplicated and thus making that personal pronoun
>> ambiguous.
>
>
> >
> I have repeated many times that the question is always asked before the
> duplication.
>

And the question is about what one and only one thing will happen to YOU
after YOU has been duplicated and becomes TWO. In other words the question
was about gibberish.

I can't prove mathematics is more fundamental than physics and I can't
>> prove it isn't, and as of September 30 2015 nobody else has been able to do
>> any better. 
>
>
> > 
> If my body is a machine, then there is not much choice in the matter.
>

If we're dealing in philosophy and not everyday conversation and it my
body is a machine then I don't know what "choice" 

means. And if my body is not a machine I still don't know what "choice"
means.

> > 
> You beg the question with respect to step 3.
>

There may be a question mark but there is no question. And I have no
answer because gibberish has no answer.  

> >> 
>> When I don't know I'm not afraid to say I don't know. 
>
> > 
> Then you contraidct yourself. By the way, your argument that there is no
> computation in arithmetic is isomorph to the argument that a simulated
> typhon cannot make someone wet, which I know you don't believe in.
>

A computer can make a simulated hurricane but because it uses only numbers
to build the
storm
 and numbers (probably) have no physical properties the simulated hurricane
would always lack something the real hurricane had, the physical ability to
get the computer wet.

However if it turned out that you're right and math is more fundamental
than physics and numbers have everything physics has and more then a
clever enough programmer *could *write a program that would cause the
computer to actually get wet. I'm very skeptical that such a program
is possible but I can't prove it's impossible so maybe you're right.

>> 
>> No it does not. What I said was that up to now nobody has ever made
>> one single calculation without the use of physical hardware
>
>
> > 
> How do you know that?
> 
>

Because every time a calculation is made something physical in
a 
computer changes and if I change something physical in a computer the
calculation changes.

> 
> >
> How do you know that there is physical hardware?
>

Because I can touch the hardware with my physical hand.

> > 
> If you don't know if math is or not the fundamental science,
>

Observations can be made regardless of it math or physics is
the fundamental science. 

> 
> But we know as a fact that elementary arithmetic (Robinson Arithmetic)
> contains all terminating computations, and all pieces on the non
> terminating computations.
>

Then computer chips would be unnecessary and Raphael M Robinson should be
the principle stockholder of the Robinson computer corporation and be a
trillionare
, but I don't believe that is the case.

A physical brain or a physical computer can perform calculations that
produce

Robinson

arithmetic

, it can describe how a calculation was done
,
but Robinson
arithmetic

can't actuality calculate a damn thing. .

> >> 
>> why hasn't at least one of those numerous scientists started their own
>> computer hardware company with zero manufacturing costs and become a
>> trillionaire? This is not a rhetorical question, I'd really like an answer.
>>
>
> > 
> For the same reason that nobody would drink simulated water, unless they
> are simulated themselves.
>

That is a very bad analogy because there is such a thing as simulated water
but there is no such thing as simulated arithmetic; simulated water is
different from physical water but arithmetic is always just arithmetic. I
think we would both agree that when a simulated computer calculates 2+2 the
4 it produces is exactly the same as the 4 a

non-
si
mulated computer would make when doing the same calculation, and the same
would be true if the simulated computer itself simulate
d
a computer. But we also agree that simulated water would not quench your
thirst the way that physical water would, so if physical water has
attributes that numbers can not produce
, so
you tell me if physics or mathematics is
the 
more fundamental.

> >>
>> >>
>> Convince the National Academy of Science or the Royal Society that
>> you're not talking nonsense and have them make you a member; and then
>> convince the International Congress of Mathematicians and have them award
>> you the Fields Metal and announce it all here.
>
>
>>
>> >
>> >>
>> 
>> You are basically making an argument by authority here,
>
>
> 
> >>> 
> And your multiple statements that I have not convinced anybody else on
> this list is not an argument from authority??
>
> >
> No, it is not. It is

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-31 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 30 Aug 2015, at 19:04, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 6:09 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> I saw several question marks in the last post but I saw  
no questions. Ask me any question and I'll give you an answer or say  
I don't know, but I can't respond to gibberish.

> I was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience  
when you do an experience in physics

That is true but only part of the truth, Bruno Marchal  
was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience when you  
do an experience in physics where "you" has been duplicated and  
thus making that personal pronoun ambiguous.

I have repeated many times that the question is always asked before  
the duplication. In this case the question is asked to anybody in a  
physical universe where a universal dovetailer is executed.

> you said that you were open to the idea that mathematics  
could be more fundamental than physics.

I can't prove mathematics is more fundamental than physics and I  
can't prove it isn't, and as of September 30 2015 nobody else has  
been able to do any better. 

If my body is a machine, then there is not much choice in the matter.  
You beg the question with respect to step 3.

When I don't know I'm not afraid to say I don't know. 

Then you contraidct yourself. By the way, your argument that there is  
no computation in arithmetic is isomorph to the argument that a  
simulated typhon cannot make someone wet, which I know you don't  
believe in.

> This contradict your use of primitive "hardware" to pretend  
that a computation needs to be run physically to exist.

No it does not. What I said was that up to now nobody has ever  
made one single calculation without the use of physical hardware

How do you know that?

How do you know that there is physical hardware?

If you don't know if math is or not the fundamental science, then you  
cannot refer to primary hardware physical hardware in your argument.

and that statement is 100% correct.

Adding this show how much you are not sure.

There is some evidence that physics is more fundamental but it falls  
far short of a proof. It could still go either way.

But we know as a fact that elementary arithmetic (Robinson Arithmetic)  
contains all terminating computations, and all pieces on the non  
terminating computations.
That is already a reason to be skeptical with ontological physical  
universe. But then if you could progress a little bit in the argument,  
you would see that any invocation of an ontological physical reality  
is equivalent with a non-computationalist god-of-the-gap type of  
argument.

> This is even more astonishing, given that everybody in the  
filed knows that [...]

And it is even more astonishing given that here is zero evidence  
that anybody in any field would know anything at all without  
physical hardware.  

The fact that nature obeys to the physical hypostases is a strong  
evidences that the notion of hardware is an internal and relative  
arithmetical notion. Of course you need to stop at some step in the UD  
Argument to deny this.

> [...] computations and computability are provably  
arithmetical notion

And up to now nobody has been able to perform one single  
arithmetical operation without the use of physical hardware.  
And up to now nobody has ever had a "notion" without physical  
hardware either.

As you said above, you don't know if there is physical hardware. You  
continue to contradict yourself.

> If you have heard of some scientist having both read the  
work, and disagree with it, just give me a name, as I have never  
encouter one.

If they are so common then please answer just one question, why  
hasn't at least one of those numerous scientists started their own  
computer hardware company with zero manufacturing costs and become a  
trillionaire? This is not a rhetorical question, I'd really like an  
answer.  

For the same reason that nobody would drink simulated water, unless  
they are simulated themselves. The math ^part of the theory explain  
why hardware seems to exist, in the same phenomenological way that  
Everett explains why a collapse seems to exists, despite it doesn't.

>> Convince the National Academy of Science or the Royal  
Society that you're not talking nonsense and have them make you a  
member; and then convince the International Congress of  
Mathematicians and have them award you the Fields Metal and announce  
it all here.

> You are basically making an argument by authority here,

And your multiple statements that I have not convinced anybody  
else on this list is not an argument from authority??

No, it is not. It is a simple observation that anybody can verify.

If you're going to make an argument from authority it's best to  
have a good authority, and I think the average member of the  
National Academy of Science or

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-30 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 29 Aug 2015, at 18:59, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Aug 29, 2015 at 3:19 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 You don't even quote the entire sentence.

 You mean the one where you said  I will no more comment 
 ?


Yes.




 You don't even quote and answer any of the question asked in  
any of the last post.


I saw several question marks in the last post but I saw no  
questions. Ask me any question and I'll give you an answer or say I  
don't know, but I can't respond to gibberish.


I was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience when you  
do an experience in physics in a robust universe (running a universal  
dovetailer).






 your systematic and local opportunistic 1p/3p confusion.

I don't know about systematic and local opportunistic  
but there is not one person on the planet who suffers from 1p/3p  
confusion, however EVERYBODY on the planet suffers from 1-1p/ 
1p confusion and 3-1p/3p confusion, and the most  
confused of all is Bruno Marchal.


None of the members of any of the three juries who have study the  
proof has had any problem with that.


Only materialist philosophers have had a problem, and not even with  
this, but with the conclusion, and those wre philosophers having  
already harrass students daring to say that people like Everett or  
Gödel were interesting (sic).






 Convince just one person (on or out of line) and ask him/her  
to expose it here.


Convince the National Academy of Science or the Royal Society that  
you're not talking nonsense and have them make you a member; and  
then convince the International Congress of Mathematicians and have  
them award you the Fields Metal and announce it all here.


I never thought on that. Actually, I have *never* submitted anything.  
I just sometimes publish when some people invite me to publish.


Tha math part is not enough to be proposed to Fields Medals, as it is  
to simple (yet origianl) theorems and less simple open problems (one  
of which has been solved since).


You are basically making an argument by authority here, and you  
confess that you don't take my work seriously only because you think  
it is a startling result (thanks!) and that  it would not have be  
admitted by the scientific communauty.


But it is admitted by all scientists, and analytical philosophers,  
having read the work. And only one of them has changes his mind,  
indeed on step 3, but I know no-one having read his argument without  
sighing or laughing, and suggesting me to not answer it, as it is  
grossly self-defeating (like your post actually, to which I answer as  
I am interested in the bad-faith phenomenon (I encouter it also in  
antisemitisme and antisionnisme propaganda, and the whole wars on  
drug, and more recently wars on terror).


Now, as it bears also on philosophy and theology, it is true that some  
religiously-minded materialists philosophers does not like at all the  
type of reality that computationalism is leading to. Crazily enough,  
they believe that, by being philosophers, it is enough to argue from  
personal conviction. (But this illustrates some key point that I  
derive from self-reference, and which indeed shows that a part of the  
academical philosophy is just using philosophy to keep alive their  
favorite dogma in that field).


Focus on the point. Tell me if you critics makes still sense at step  
4. Stop faking to have problem with the vocabulary, as I have been  
able to show to everybody that you do understand the definition (and  
even vindicate them), so the last non-understanding are indeed 100%  
opportunist.


Also, by the way, you said that you were open to the idea that  
mathematics could be more fundamental than physics. This contradict  
your use of primitive hardware to pretend that a computation needs  
to be run physically to exist. This is even more astonishing, given  
that everybody in the filed knows that computations and computability  
are provably arithmetical notion (assuming Church or Turing's theses).


If you have heard of some scientist having both read the work, and  
disagree with it, just give me a name, as I have never encouter one.  
Suggest them to make the remark here, or to publish a refutation, or  
to send it to me. The most negative statements I have ever heard are  
of the type The mind-body problem is not my expertise.


And what you said on Plato proves that it is not really your cup of  
tea either, isn't it?


Bruno




  John K Clark



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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-30 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 6:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 
 I saw several question marks in the last post but I saw no questions.
 Ask me any question and I'll give you an answer or say I don't know, but I
 can't respond to gibberish.


  
 I was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience when you do
 an experience in physics


That is true but only part of the truth, 
Bruno Marchal
 
was alluding on how *you* predict *your *subjective experience when *you*
do an experience in physics
 where *you* has been duplicated and thus making that personal pronoun
ambiguous.


  
 you said that you were open to the idea that mathematics could be more
 fundamental than physics.


I can't prove mathematics is more fundamental than physics and I can't
prove it isn't, and as of September 30 2015 nobody else has been able to do
any better. 

When I don't know I'm not afraid to say I don't know. 


  
 This contradict your use of primitive hardware to pretend that a
 computation needs to be run physically to exist.


No it does not. What I said was that up to now nobody has ever made one
single calculation without the use of physical hardware and that statement
is 100% correct. There is some evidence that physics is
more fundamental but it falls far short of a proof. It could still go
either way.


  
 This is even more astonishing, given that everybody in the filed knows that
  [...]



And it is even more astonishing given that
here is zero evidence that anybody in any field would know anything
at all 
without physical hardware.


 [...] 
 computations and computability are provably arithmetical notion


And 
up to now nobody 
has been able to perform one single 
arithmetical
 operation without the use of physical hardware. And up to now nobody has
ever had a notion without physical hardware either.


  
 If you have heard of some scientist having both read the work, and
 disagree with it, just give me a name, as I have never encouter one.


If they are so common then please answer just one question, why hasn't at
least one of those numerous scientists started their own computer hardware
company with zero manufacturing costs and become a trillionaire? This is
not a rhetorical question, I'd really like an answer.
 



 
 Convince the National Academy of Science or the Royal Society that you're
 not talking nonsense and have them make you a member; and then convince the
 International Congress of Mathematicians and have them award you the Fields
 Metal and announce it all here.



 
 You are basically making an argument by authority here,


And your multiple statements that I have not convinced anybody else on
this list is not an argument from authority?? If you're going to make an
argument from authority
 it's best to have a good authority, and I think the average member of
the National Academy of Science or the Royal Society
 has a higher scientific reputation than the average member of this list.

 John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-29 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 28 Aug 2015, at 19:47, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 , Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 All here is pure rhetorical tricks which have already been  
debunked many times, by many people.


Bullshit.


Sure.




 I will no more comment

Coward.


You don't even quote the entire sentence.

You don't even quote and answer any of the question asked in any of  
the last post.


I don't think anyone find sense in your refutation, and if they did,  
I invite them to expose and defend it. But it is clear that your  
ambiguity comes from your systematic and local opportunistic 1p/3p  
confusion. Convince just one person (on or out of line) and ask him/ 
her to expose it here. Your own arguments is like in this post, just a  
sequence of insults, which are not a valid way to clarify a point.


Bruno





  John K Clark



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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-29 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Aug 29, 2015 at 3:19 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 
 You don't even quote the entire sentence.



You mean the one where you said 
 
I will no more comment
 ?


  
 You don't even quote and answer any of the question asked in any of the
 last post.


I saw several question marks in the last post but I saw no questions. Ask
me any question and I'll give you an answer or say I don't know, but I
can't respond to gibberish.



  
 your systematic and local opportunistic 1p/3p confusion.


I don't know about


systematic and local opportunistic
 but there is not one person on the planet who suffers from 
1p/3p confusion
, however *EVERYBODY* on the planet suffers from 1
-1p
/1p confusion and
3

-1
p/3p
 confusion, and the most confused of all is Bruno Marchal.


  
 Convince just one person (on or out of line) and ask him/her to expose it
 here.


Convince the National Academy of Science or the Royal Society that you're
not talking nonsense and have them make you a member; and then convince the
International Congress of Mathematicians and have them award you the Fields
Metal and announce it all here.

  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-28 Thread Bruno Marchal


John,

All here is pure rhetorical tricks which have already been debunked  
many times, by many people.

I will no more comment those ad hominem spurious trolling posts.

Bruno


On 21 Aug 2015, at 19:26, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 Nobody will have two 1p from an 1p pov.

If Ed remains somebody even after Ed is duplicated then somebody  
will have two 1p from a 1p pov. However John Clark is reluctant to  
say what will happen to you until Bruno Marchal gives a much  
better explanation about what that personal pronoun means in a world  
with you duplicating machines.


 We have agreed that both are you.

Yes, and so you will be in Washington AND Moscow, and from that  
Bruno Marchal concludes that you will see only one city. And all  
the peepee in the world can't sweep that logical contradiction under  
the rug.


 That is even the reason why we listen to both copies, and  
both comfirm the W v M prediction, and both refute the W  M  
prediction


We must listen to both copies because the prediction was about  
you and because both are you and both CONFIRM the W AND M  
prediction. Not that predictions, correct or incorrect have anything  
to do with the continuous feeling of a unique self.


  if the guy in Helsinki is a fool he could predict  
monkeys will fly out of his ass. But I'm more interested in what  
will happen that in what some jackass believes will happen. 


 In that case you change the subject, which is not what will  
happen, but what will be experienced (assuming the person believes  
or assumes computationalism).


What the hell are you talking about?? What will happen IS what  
will be experienced and it doesn't matter one bit if the person  
assumes computationalism or not!


  Definitions are made of words and those words also have  
definitions also made of words and round and round we go; the only  
thing that breaks us out of that infinite loop is usage. Where do  
you think lexicographers got the information to write their  
dictionaries? Only one place, usage.


 In science we use axiomatics,

Yes, you say computationalism is an axiom and then you  
use it in a proof that you claim proves this and that, but you're  
like a geometer what says that a Euclidean axiom is that 2 parallel  
lines never meet and then in a direct Euclidean proof starts  
talking about point X where 2 parallel lines meet. Usage beats  
definitions every time.


 you are just playing with word

AKA thinking. 

 as you have agreed that you is not ambiguous before the  
duplication.


And you is ambiguous after the duplication which is what the  
prediction was about. So why doesn't Bruno just substitute Ed for  
you and end this you controversy? Because Ed contains no  
ambiguity and thus Bruno would have no place to hide sloppy  
thinking.   


 I don't think anybody understand your point,

Yes, I'm the only one on the planet who failed to recognize the  
brilliance of your proof, and that is why you won the Nobel Prize.  
Oh wait 


 Come on, you don't even try to answer a precise question  
asked in my last post.


If I ever find a precise question in one of your posts I will  
answer it or say I don't know, but gibberish is not a question even  
if it has a question mark at the end.


  John K Clark






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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-28 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 , Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 
 All here is pure rhetorical tricks which have already been debunked many
 times, by many people.


Bullshit.


  
 I will no more comment


Coward.

  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-21 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Aug 2015, at 21:21, John Clark wrote:



On Thu, Aug 20, 2015 at 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 the only way John Clark knows how to interpret 
What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p is that  
the 1p does not happen after duplication in which case John Clark  
has no idea what 1p means.


 No the 1p happens in the two places.

The? A 1p happens in two places, and there is nothing very  
unusual in 2 diferent things, like 2 different things that go by  
the name you, occupying 2 different places except that due to  
technological limitations (not scientific ones) you duplicating  
machines haven't been invented yet. But it's coming.   


 When I say that the question is about the 1p, it means the  
content of the 1p. That is a subjective happening.


Obviously, otherwise it would be 3p unless you've suddenly changed  
your homemade peepee notation. 
 After duplication, both copies will have a (single,  
definite) subjective experience.


 Sure.

So both will have a 1p and neither will have THE 1p because THE 1p  
does not exist.



Each will have the 1p he was attempting to predict in Helsinki. Nobody  
will have two 1p from an 1p pov.








  after the duplication, both know very well who they are,

They both say that they are Bruno Marchal and if Bruno Marchal  
is rational neither would dispute the other's claim. As for deciding  
if one or both or neither is you that depends entirely on what  
you means in a world that has you duplicating machines in it.


We have agreed that both are you.

That is even the reason why we listen to both copies, and both comfirm  
the W v M prediction, and both refute the W  M prediction (with W and  
M refering to the 1p experiences, see the preceding post if you have  
forgotten this).








 computationalism entails it can only be W, or M.

The above depends entirely on what the referent to it is.  
Goddamn pronouns!


 The guy in Helsinki knows that in advance, and so can predict  
P(W v M) = 1, and P(W  M) = 0.


Sure that's possible, if the guy in Helsinki is a fool he could  
predict monkeys will fly out of his ass. But I'm more interested in  
what will happen that in what some jackass believes will happen. 


In that case you change the subject, which is not what will happen,  
but what will be experienced (assuming the person believes or assumes  
computationalism).






I don't assume comp, remember?

 Sorry, but you accepted the step 0 and the step 1, which  
means that by definition you assume or accept computationalism


I accepted computationalism when I was about 16 and can find no  
reason to think differently today.


OK, but we don't philosophy. The point is that comp entails step 3.





  abbreviated by comp.

That is no abbreviation!


It is.




  As I've said, the way you use your baby talk word comp has  
little or nothing to do with computationalism.


Then what am I using in step 0, 1, and 2? You have agreed on those  
steps. You only mean that computationalism does not entail step 3, but  
fail to find a reason why not, except by either confusing 1p and 3p,  
or your by changing the question.








  Usage is always more important that definitions.

 Not in science.

In everything. Definitions are made of words and those words also  
have definitions also made of words and round and round we go; the  
only thing that breaks us out of that infinite loop is usage. Where  
do you think lexicographers got the information to write their  
dictionaries? Only one place, usage.


In science we use axiomatics, and you can replace each word by ANY  
words. It will change absolutely nothing, except it will look like  
jargon. You forget that the WHOLE argument is entirely translated in  
arithmetic. part two needs only the believe in elmentary arithmetic, +  
at the meta level the thesis by Church-Turing.






 Because you put step 3 in comp,

I have never put anything in comp.


Then you accept that comp is just an abbreviation of computationalism.




 but step 3 is not part of comp.

I don't care if step 3 is part of comp or not.

 It is up to you to show which of the 2 people after the  
duplication who go by the name of you is THE One True YOU, the  
only you that is relevant in determining if the prediction made in  
Helsinki was correct or not.


 This is ridiculous. There are no TRUE you,

John Clark is glad Bruno Marchal agrees, but if there is no  
TRUE you then Bruno Marchal has no business using that  
ambiguous personal pronoun in thought experiments. However there is  
a TRUE Ed, two in fact, so that word should be used instead.


 comp entails that [...]

I don't care what comp entails.

 Ed is in W and Ed in M is not the same as Ed feels to be in W  
and in M.


So Ed is in W but Ed does not feel to be in W and the duplication  
has turned Ed into a zombie who feels nothing. Perhaps that is what  
comp

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-21 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  
 Nobody will have two 1p from an 1p pov.


If Ed remains somebody even after Ed is duplicated then somebody will have
two 1p from a 1p pov. However John Clark is reluctant to say what will
happen to you until Bruno Marchal gives a much better explanation about
what that personal pronoun means in a world with you duplicating
machines.


  
 We have agreed that both are you.


Yes, and so you will be in Washington AND Moscow, and from that Bruno
Marchal concludes that you will see only one city. And all the peepee in
the world can't sweep that logical contradiction under the rug.


  
 That is even the reason why we listen to both copies, and both comfirm the
 W v M prediction,
  
 and both refute the W  M prediction


We must listen to both copies because the prediction was about you and
because both are you and both CONFIRM the W AND M prediction. Not that
predictions, correct or incorrect have anything to do with the continuous
feeling of a unique self.



  
 if the guy in Helsinki is a fool he could predict monkeys will fly out of
 his ass. But I'm more interested in what will happen that in what some
 jackass believes will happen. 


  
 In that case you change the subject, which is not what will happen, but
 what will be experienced (assuming the person believes or assumes
 computationalism).


What the hell are you talking about?? What will happen *IS *what will be
experienced and

it doesn't matter one bit if the person
 assumes computationalism
 or not!


  
 Definitions are made of words and those words also have definitions also
 made of words and round and round we go; the only thing that breaks us out
 of that infinite loop is usage. Where do you think lexicographers got
 the information to write their dictionaries? Only one place, usage.


  
 In science we use axiomatics,



Yes, you say
 
computationalism
 is an axiom and then you use it in a proof that you claim proves this
and that, but you're like a geometer what says that a Euclidean axiom is
that 2 parallel lines never meet and then in a direct Euclidean proof
starts talking about point X where 2 parallel lines meet. Usage
beats definitions every time.

 
 you are just playing with word


AKA thinking. 



  
 as you have agreed that you is not ambiguous before the duplication.


And you *is* ambiguous after the duplication which is what the
prediction was about. So why doesn't Bruno just substitute Ed for you
and end this you controversy? Because Ed contains no ambiguity and thus
Bruno would have no place to hide sloppy thinking.   


  
 I don't think anybody understand your point,


Yes, I'm the only one on the planet who failed to recognize the brilliance
of your proof, and that is why you won the Nobel Prize. Oh wait 

 
 Come on, you don't even try to answer a precise question asked in my last
 post.


If I ever find a precise question in one of your posts I will answer it
or say I don't know, but gibberish is not a question even if it has a
question mark at the end.

  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 18 Aug 2015, at 23:19, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Aug 18, 2015  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the  
1p.
 What! So whatever really does happen to Bruno Marchal  
after the duplication there will be no 1p?


 Why would I ask you to predict the 1p if there were none?

No idea, but John Clark is not required to explain Bruno Marchal 
's actions.


 Why do you say this?

Because the only way John Clark knows how to interpret  What  
does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p is that the  
1p does not happen after duplication in which case John Clark has no  
idea what 1p means.



No the 1p happens in the two places. When I say that the question is  
about the 1p, it means the content of the 1p. That is a subjective  
happening. Other post have shown you did understand this, so again I  
have that feeling that you are just playing with word, or just doing  
the stable confusion between, the 3-1p, and the 1p itself.









After the duplication Bruno Marchal will have no  
subjective experience?? 


 After duplication, both copies will have a (single, definite)  
subjective experience.


And BOTH are Bruno Marchal from their subjective point of  
view.


Sure.



John Clark makes no claim that either of them is or is not you  
because John Clark does not know what one and only one thing that  
personal pronoun means in a world with you duplicating machines.



You omit that after the duplication, both know very well who they are,  
and computationalism entails it can only be W, or M.


The guy in Helsinki knows that in advance, and so can predict P(W v M)  
= 1, and P(W  M) = 0.
(Where W and M refer to the 1p experiences, not the 3p description of  
those experiences (the 3-1p).










 We assume comp, remember?

I don't assume comp, remember?


Sorry, but you accepted the step 0 and the step 1, which means that by  
definition you assume or accept computationalism (abbreviated by comp).






 Rhetroical trick. comp is computationalism. By definition.

Usage is always more important that definitions.


Not in science.



I don't care about your homemade definition of your homemade baby  
talk word, I care about your usage of the word, and from usage  I  
conclude that comp has little or nothing to do with  
computationalism.


Because you put step 3 in comp, but step 3 is not part of comp. You  
just confuse people with this.








 It is up to you to show what is gibberish.

It is up to you to show which of the 2 people after the  
duplication who go by the name of you is THE One True YOU, the  
only you that is relevant in determining if the prediction made in  
Helsinki was correct or not.



This is ridiculous. There are no TRUE you, or if you prefer the TRUE  
you is at BOTH places. But comp entails that BOTH feels to be at one  
place, and this makes the probability calculus easy.








But of course prediction, correct or incorrect, have nothing to do  
with consciousness or the continuous feeling of personal identity.


Of course, but 100% irrelevant.





  if we asked what will happen to Ed after the duplication?  
then that question would not be gibberish and if Ed were rational Ed  
could correctly answer it.


 What will happen in this context is ambiguous. It can mean  
what will happen from the 1p view, or what will happen from the  
3p view.


To hell with viewing peepee!



See below.




To avoid ambiguity after the duplication simply ask the man, or  
rather the men, are you Ed? and if they say yes that that ends  
the matter, they are Ed. Therefore if Ed were rational back in  
Helsinki Ed would predict that Ed would see Moscow AND Ed would see  
Washington. And Ed's prediction would turn out to have been correct.



Ed is in W and Ed in M is not the same as Ed feels to be in W and in M.

For the billionth time, you give me the correct 3-1 prediction, but  
the question is about the future 1p that you will live, and that  
future 1p does not, with P = 1, contain the W  M experience.


By saying the hell with viewing peepee, is like saying the hell  
with the question you asked, but then why take some much pain in  
criticizing the answer I give to that question if you are not  
interested in that question.






However after the duplication if Bruno Marchal asked John Clark  
are you you in the 1p view or are you you in the 3p view John  
Clark wouldn't have any idea how to respond to such a silly question.


Indeed, very silly question. I can't agree more. But that question has  
never been asked by me or anyone on this list, except you.




Therefore what one and only one thing will *you* see after the  
duplication?


The question is more how you evaluate the chance of seeing Moscow  
(say). If you say P = 1, then in the iterated case you must predict  
MMM... and the chance of this diminish like 2^n, as almost all  
copies confirm.





has no answer

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-18 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Aug 18, 2015  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 
 
 What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p.

  
 What! So whatever really does happen to Bruno Marchal
  after the duplication there will be no 1p?


  
 Why would I ask you to predict the 1p if there were none?


No idea, but John Clark is not required to explain Bruno
Marchal
's actions.


 
 Why do you say this?


Because the only way John Clark knows how to interpret  
What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p
 is that the 1p does not happen after duplication in which case John
Clark has no idea what 1p means.


 
 After the duplication
  
 Bruno Marchal
  will have no subjective experience?? 


  
 After duplication, both copies will have a (single, definite) subjective
 experience.


And BOTH are 

Bruno Marchal
 from their subjective point of view. John Clark makes no claim that
either of them is or is not you because John Clark does not know what one
and only one thing that personal pronoun means in a world with you
duplicating machines.


  
 We assume comp, remember?


I don't assume comp, remember?


 
 Rhetroical trick. comp is computationalism. By definition.


Usage is always more important that definitions. I don't care about your
homemade definition of your homemade baby talk word, I care about your
usage of the word, and from usage  I conclude that comp has little or
nothing to do with computationalism.


  
 It is up to you to show what is gibberish.


It is up to you to show which of the 2 people after the duplication who go
by the name of you is THE One True YOU, the only you that
is relevant in determining if the prediction made in Helsinki was correct
or not. But of course prediction, correct or incorrect, have nothing to do
with consciousness or the continuous feeling of personal identity.



  
 if we asked what will happen to Ed after the duplication? then that
 question would not be gibberish and if Ed were rational Ed
 could correctly answer it.


  
 What will happen in this context is ambiguous. It can mean what will
 happen from the 1p view, or what will happen from the 3p view.


To hell with viewing peepee! To avoid ambiguity after the
duplication simply ask the man, or rather the men, are you Ed? and if
they say yes that that ends the matter, they are Ed. Therefore if Ed were
rational back in Helsinki Ed would predict that Ed would see Moscow AND Ed
would see Washington. And Ed's prediction would turn out to have been
correct.

However
after the duplication if
Bruno Marchal
 asked John Clark are you you in the 1p view or are you you in the 3p
view John Clark wouldn't have any idea how to respond to such a silly
question. Therefore what one and only one thing will *you* see after the
duplication? has no answer because it is not a question at all, it is just
gibberish with a question mark at the end.

  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-18 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 17 Aug 2015, at 18:31, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Aug 17, 2015  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 First of all what somebody expects to happen has no bearing  
on this matter,only what does happen is important .


 NOT AT ALL.

Bruno Marchal expects one thing to happen, John Clark expects  
another thing to happen and Ed expects a third, we can't all be  
right but we can all be wrong.


You don't quote what I said. I don't understand what you say here.





 What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p.

What! So whatever really does happen to Bruno Marchal after the  
duplication there will be no 1p?


Why would I ask you to predict the 1p if there were none? Why do you  
say this?




After the duplication Bruno Marchal will have no subjective  
experience?? 


After duplication, both copies will have a (single, definite)  
subjective experience.






 You just change the question asked.

No I didn't change a question, I changed gibberish into a  
question. 



Rhetorical trick. You did change the question.





   And secondly the entire question is what will happen to  
you AFTER YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED?.


 AFTER, yes. But the question is asked before.

To answer the question what one and only one thing will happen to  
you AFTER the duplication? there must be a clear understanding of  
what one and only one thing YOU will be AFTER the duplication when  
YOU is no longer one and has become TWO.



But from the 1p view, we never become two, we don't even feel the  
split. We assume comp, remember?





And a clear understanding of gibberish



You beg the question. It is up to you to show what is gibberish.



can never happen so there is no answer because there is no question.  
However if we asked what will happen to Ed after the duplication?  
then that question would not be gibberish and if Ed were rational Ed  
could correctly answer it.



What will happen in this context is ambiguous. It can mean what  
will happen from the 1p view, or what will happen from the 3p view.







 And comp makes this predictable in advance.

I don't care what comp does.

 I know what computationalism is, and countless  
times on this list I've seen according to comp this will happen  
but  according to comp that will not happen; so I know that comp  
and computationalism are not the same thing and are not even  
close, but what comp actually is remains a mystery to me.


 Comp means computationalism

I know what computationalism is, and countless times on  
this list I've seen according to comp this will happen but  
according to comp that will not happen; so I know that comp and  
computationalism are not the same thing and are not even close,  
but what comp actually is remains a mystery to me.



Rhetroical trick. comp is computationalism. By definition. All what  
you say is that the question is gibbersih, but that is what you were  
supposed to say.


So in this post you are unclear, + two rhetorical tricks.

Bruno






  John K Clark






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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-17 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 16 Aug 2015, at 22:24, John Clark wrote:



On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 12:08 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 You again! John Clark expects that Bruno Marchal  
will continue to use words in the proof that implicitly assumes  
the very thing it's trying to prove.  


 Are you joking or what?

I'm not joking so I guess it's what.

YOU told me that YOU is not ambiguous BEFORE the duplication,

Yes.


OK, so you agree on this important thing. Let us see where is the  
problem, then...






 which is when the question What do you expect...  is asked.

First of all what somebody expects to happen has no bearing on  
this matter,



Look again at the paper or the post. The question in step 3 bears  
explicitly on what somebody expect to live subjectively.


This is your other frequent maneuver: you change the question asked.





only what does happen is important .


NOT AT ALL. What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p.

You just change the question asked.




And secondly the entire question is what will happen to you AFTER  
YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED?.


AFTER, yes. But the question is asked before.




And the answer to that question has no single answer because YOU HAS  
BEEN DUPLICATED.


Absolutely correct ... if we were asked what will happen, and not, as  
in step 3, what we expect to live subjectively.




To maintain that only one thing can happen to two things is just  
silly.


False. When we interview the two copies, they both confirm that they  
live only one thing (W or M) happening. And comp makes this  
predictable in advance. You just keep taking about the 3p, but that is  
NOT was is asked at the step 3.








 It is like when you say you don't know what comp is, when by  
definition comp is used for the indexical version I gave of  
computationalism


I know what computationalism is, and countless times on  
this list I've seen according to comp this will happen but   
according to comp that will not happen; so I know that comp and  
computationalism are not the same thing and are not even close,  
but what comp actually is remains a mystery to me.


Comp means computationalism, and if you believe something is wrong in  
comp = step 3, it is up to you to just show the flaw. Not just  
chnaging the 1p into 3p in the question.


But you illustrate that you got the point here, as you are forced to  
change the step 3 question to maintain your point, but that is  
logically equivalent to a proof by a reductio ad absurdum of my point.


You have just brilliantly show that when you try to avoid making a  
blatant logical error in the attempt of a refutation that COMP entails  
STEP 3, you are FORCED to change the question.


So come back to the question which is explicitly on what the guy in  
Helsinki can expect to happen subjectively. Once you keep in mind the  
question asked, P(W v M)= 1  is trivial, and P(W  M) = 0 is false.


So your error, or better, your maneuver in this post has consisted in  
changing the 1p notion used in the question by the 3p. It is no more a  
confusion between 1p and 3p, it is a direct change of the 1p of the  
question into a 3p.


That is hardly equivalent with finding a flaw. Try better, or just  
stop denying that you get the point, and move on step 4.


Bruno


PS got a lot of work. My comment might be delayed a bit.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-17 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Aug 17, 2015  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 
 First of all what somebody expects to happen has no bearing on this
 matter,only what does happen is important .



 
 NOT AT ALL.


Bruno Marchal
 expects one thing to happen, John Clark expects another thing to happen
and Ed expects a third, we can't all be right but we can all be wrong.


  
 What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p.


What! So whatever really does happen to 
Bruno Marchal
 after the duplication there will be no 1p? After the duplication
 
Bruno Marchal
 will have no subjective experience?? 


  
 You just change the question asked.


No I didn't change a question, I changed gibberish into a question. 


   
 And secondly the entire question is what will happen to you AFTER YOU
 HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED?.


  
 AFTER, yes. But the question is asked before.


To answer the question what one and only one thing will happen to you
AFTER the duplication? there must be a clear understanding of what one
and only one thing YOU will be AFTER the duplication when YOU is no longer
one and has become *TWO*. And a clear understanding of gibberish can never
happen so there is no answer because there is no question. However if we
asked what will happen to Ed after the duplication? then that question
would not be gibberish and if Ed were rational Ed could correctly answer
it.

 
 And comp makes this predictable in advance.


I don't care what comp does.

 
 I know what computationalism
  is, and countless times on this list I've seen according to comp this
 will happen but  according to comp that will not happen; so I know that
 comp and
 computationalism
 are not the same thing and are not even close, but what comp actually
 is remains a mystery to me.


  
 Comp means computationalism


I know what computationalism
 is, and countless times on this list I've seen according to comp this
will happen but according to comp that will not happen; so I know that
comp and
computationalism
are not the same thing and are not even close, but what comp actually is
remains a mystery to me.


  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-16 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Aug 2015, at 23:50, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Aug 14, 2015 at 6:03 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 And the question is on the pure 1-view, like in what do  
you expect [...]


You again! John Clark expects that Bruno Marchal will continue  
to use words in the proof that implicitly assumes the very thing  
it's trying to prove.  



Are you joking or what?

YOU told me that YOU is not ambiguous BEFORE the duplication, which  
is when the question What do you expect...  is asked.


Sorry John, this is too gross. Come up with an argument, not  
ridiculous opportunist rhetorical maneuver.


It is like when you say you don't know what comp is, when by  
definition comp is used for the indexical version I gave of  
computationalism, which actually implies all the other versions, and  
that you agree on, given that you go at least up to step 2 (and  
actually arguably practice, as you know).


You just disbelieve that comp - step 3, but that's different.

Then you have fail to show an error in the reasoning, and actually  
your rhetorical maneuvers can only confuse people and become extremely  
boring.


Try harder, in case you really miss the point, but avoid *all* your  
rhetorical tricks, as they have all been debunked, by a majority of  
people participating in this list.


From now on, I will answer only *arguments*, and put the post with  
rhetorical maneuvers in the trash.


Bruno









 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again and again ...

Not one person on planet Earth is or has ever been confused by the  
difference between 1p and 3p, but EVERYBODY on planet Earth  
(especially Bruno Marchal)  is confused about what the hell  
1-1p and the 3-1p is supposed to mean. 


 everyone will asks themselves how you were unable to grasp  
the FPI,


And not one person on planet Earth has failed  to realize that  
sometimes they don't know what the future will bring.


 I never use comp and never will until I know what it  
means and I don't and neither do you.


 See the definition in any of my paper, or in the archive.

I'm not interested in your definition, usage is always vastly  
more important than definitions and I have been unable to extract  
one particle of consistent meaning from the usage of your homemade  
word comp


 Comp is the doctrine according to which the brain is turing  
emulable


 That's computationalism not comp. I don't know what  
comp means but I do know that if it means anything at all it's  
certainly not computationalism.


 STOP USING PRONOUNS!!

 Show me why I can't use pronoun, WITHOUT ABSTRACTING YOURSELF  
FROM PERSONS POV!


That would be very very difficult, but why is it John Clark's  
responsibility? John Clark is not the one who claims to have made  
new and profound discoveries about the nature of consciousness and  
personal identify, and if Bruno Marchal can't write the proof  
without using words that already assume what is supposed to be  
proven then Bruno Marchal hasn't made any new profound discoveries  
on this subject either.


 after the duplication, Ed is in both W and M, Ed, in both  
place,


Then obviously the prediction that Ed would see both places  
turned out to be correct.


 both Ed are forced to realize that, after all, they see only  
(W xor M). Ed-M and Ed-W bitterly regret not having have had the  
foresight on this


The prediction was that Ed would see both places and that  
prediction was correct. The prediction was that Ed-w would see  
Washington and that prediction was correct.The prediction was that  
Ed-m would see Moscow and that prediction was correct.  
Exactly what prediction was incorrect?


 There is no unanimity on how to interpret the quantum wave or  
matrix equation


It doesn't matter because they both make exactly the same  
predictions, and they both give probabilities not certainties.


  John K Clark 


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-16 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 12:08 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 
 You again! John Clark expects that Bruno Marchal
  
 will continue to use words in the proof that implicitly assumes the
 very thing it's trying to prove.  



  
 Are you joking or what?


I'm not joking so I guess it's what.


 YOU told me that YOU is not ambiguous BEFORE the duplication,


Yes.


  
 which is when the question What do you expect...  is asked.


First of all what somebody expects to happen has no bearing on this
matter, only what does happen is important . And secondly the entire
question is what will happen to you *AFTER* YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED?.
And the answer to that question has no single answer because *YOU *HAS
BEEN DUPLICATED. To maintain that only one thing can happen to two things
is just silly.

 
 It is like when you say you don't know what comp is, when by definition
 comp is used for the indexical version I gave of computationalism


I know what 
computationalism
 is, and countless times on this list I've seen according to comp this
will happen but  according to comp that will not happen; so I know that
comp and
computationalism
are not the same thing and are not even close, but what comp actually is
remains a mystery to me.


 You just disbelieve that comp - step 3, but that's different.


I neither believe nor disbelieve in comp.

 John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-15 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Aug 14, 2015 at 6:03 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  
 And the question is on the pure 1-view, like in what do you expect
  [...]


You again! John Clark expects that
Bruno Marchal

will continue to use words in the proof that implicitly assumes the very
thing it's trying to prove.  


 
 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again and again ...


Not one person on planet Earth is or has ever been confused by the
difference between 1p and 3p, but EVERYBODY on planet Earth (especially
Bruno Marchal
)
 is confused about what the hell
1-1p and the 3-1p
 is supposed to mean. 

 
 everyone will asks themselves how you were unable to grasp the FPI,


And not one person on planet Earth has failed  to realize
that sometimes they don't know what the future will bring.

 
 I never use comp and never will until I know what it means and I don't
 and neither do you.


  
 See the definition in any of my paper, or in the archive.


I'm not interested in your definition, usage is always vastly more
important than definitions and I have been unable to extract one particle
of consistent meaning from the usage of your homemade word comp


  
 Comp is the doctrine according to which the brain is turing emulable



That's 
computationalism
 not comp.
I don't know what comp means but I do know that if it means anything at
all it's certainly not 
computationalism
.

 
 STOP USING PRONOUNS!!


  
 Show me why I can't use pronoun, WITHOUT ABSTRACTING YOURSELF FROM PERSONS
 POV!


That would be very very difficult, but why is it John Clark's
responsibility? John Clark is not the one who claims to have made new and
profound discoveries about the nature of consciousness and personal
identify, and if Bruno Marchal can't write the proof without using words
that already assume what is supposed to be proven then Bruno Marchal hasn't
made any new profound discoveries on this subject either.


  
 after the duplication, Ed is in both W and M, Ed, in both place,


Then obviously the prediction that Ed would see both places turned out to
be correct.



  
 both Ed are forced to realize that, after all, they see only (W xor M).
 Ed-M and Ed-W bitterly regret not having have had the foresight on this


The prediction was that Ed would see both places and that prediction was
correct. 
The prediction was that Ed
-w would see Washington 
and that prediction was correct.The prediction was that Ed
-m
would see
Moscow 
and that prediction was correct.
Exactly what prediction was incorrect?


  
 There is no unanimity on how to interpret the quantum wave or matrix
 equation


It doesn't matter because they both make exactly the same predictions, and
they both give probabilities not certainties.

  John K Clark 

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 13 Aug 2015, at 22:28, John Clark wrote:

People can believe all sorts of foolish things, but if a person  
enters a person duplicating machine that person will still have a  
unique past but will NOT have a unique future. Yes that is odd, but  
odd things happen when a person is duplicated.



Nothing odd happens if we remind ourselves that we assume  
computationalisme. You have two futures in the 3-1 view, like you have  
many one in the MWI. But you have only one future in the 1-view, and  
that if confirmed by the two persons.


As long as you dismiss the 1-3 difference, you will see odd things  
happening, which in fact never happpens.




Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Aug 2015, at 07:48, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 at 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 after the door is opened there is no such thing as the 1- 
view.


 I have explained why this is directly refuted by all copies.

So is THE 1-view a view of Moscow or of Washington?

  a natural confusion between 3-1 views and 1-views.

Confusion naturally arises because Bruno Marchal can not  
explain what the 3-1 views



I explained it, so I will look at your critics below.



is supposed to mean without lots of personal pronouns that are all  
rendered meaningless in a world with people duplicating machines.


you have failed to show any problem with the name and pronouns. Each  
time you equivocate the 1p and the 3p, or the 1-1p and the 3-1p, etc.









 See below for more.

Why? There is little of substance below.


I hope that this is not the critics.




 they all feel to be different from the others

  Yes, and that's exactly why there are 7.1 billion  
1ps and not just one.


 Sure, in the 3-1 view. But [...]

To hell with the but, unless you're a solipsist and believe  
there are 7.1 billion  zombies on the Earth not people then the are  
7.1 billion 1ps on this planet, and there are no buts about it.



Stathis answered this recently, and others did regularly since, and  
your critics consists just in avoiding the question by avoiding the  
1-3 nuances.


Some scientist believe that we cannot talk on the 1p in science, but  
they do an level confusion error. We cannot use 1p in a proof, but we  
can use proof about 1p, once we have a good 3p definition of it, which  
is given in the UD Argument. With the diary (but of course your  
comment was the hell of the diary ...).









 Those damn diaries again! The diaries are useless after  
the duplication unless the person who wrote them could be  
unambiguously identified and you can't do that;


 False. (Easy exercise, done many times).

Somehow I missed that so please do that exercise one more time and  
point to THE one and only one person who wrote the diary now that  
the duplication has been made. Or if you think pointing is impolite  
just tell me if he lives in Washington or Moscow.


I have answered that question many times.

In the 3-1 view, you will exist in W and in M.
From the 1-1 view, you will feel to be in one city.

And the question is on the pure 1-view, like in what do you expect  
to live as experience.







 There is no purely logical reason to make coffee or not  
to make coffee, but people who enjoy being alive and are good  
at hypothesizing what the future will be like are more likely  
to pass more of their genes into the next generation than people  
who  don't enjoy life and aren't good at making plans for the  
future. So you prepared that coffee because you have some of those  
genes.


 You make my point,

Glad to be of service. 

 and explicitly contradict yours.

Where? Show me!



Stathis just did that. You say that yhe subjective first person  
experience that we denote by W and M are incompatibe subjective  
experience, but you keep talking like if P(W  M) ≠ 0..






 Search on Searle in the archive for more.

 Why should I search for more idiocy? Searle is a moron and  
his Chinese room is imbecilic.



Searles argument is invalid to refute comp. We agree on that.





 What remains un-predicted?

 The personal experience that the candidate in Helsinki can  
expect to live.


If The Helsinki Man's name is Ed and if Ed is logical and if Ed  
expects to be duplicated then Ed would expect that there would not  
be just one answer to that question there would be two because  
that's what happens when people are duplicated.



In the fairy tales. But after a duplication, subjectively, ypu don't  
feel the split, cannot even be' sure there has been one, except by  
believing the protocol.


1P/3P CONFUSION again and again and again ...





Yes that seems unusual but it's not illogical and it's only  
unusual because we haven't seen it yet , and we haven't seen it yet  
for technological reasons and not for scientific, logical or  
philosophical reasons. A few decades from now this entire debate  
will seem as quaint as a butterchurn.


yes, everyone will asks themselves how you were unable to grasp the  
FPI, which will be lived by all possible experiencer (or digital  
mechanism is false).







 By reasoning, and using comp,

I never use comp and never will until I know what it means and I  
don't and neither do you.


See the definition in any of my paper, or in the archive. Comp is the  
doctrine according to which the brain is turing emulable at some level  
so that we can accept an artificial brain, or do teleportation as  
described in our thought experiment, etc.


Your unwillingness to accept that definition might say long on your  
state of mind. You really looks like someone dreaming to refute an

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-13 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Aug 12, 2015  Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:



  if that definition of you is used then the question What one and
 only one city did you end up seeing? has no answer because it is not a
 question at all, it is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of
 which happens to be a question mark.



  
 You might argue that it is false,


If it's a question how can it be false? And if it is a question what is
the answer?

 
 but not that it is meaningless.


I have 2 cupcakes one red and one blue, what is *the* one color of *the*
one and only cupcake that I have? That is another example of something that
is not a question but is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of
which is a question mark.


  
 Each observer moment believes they are a unique individual with a unique
 past and a unique future.


People can believe all sorts of foolish things, but if a person enters a
person duplicating machine that person will still have a unique past but
will NOT have a unique future. Yes that is odd, but odd things happen when
a person is duplicated.

 John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-13 Thread Bruce Kellett


 On 14 Aug 2015, at 12:38 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 On 14 August 2015 at 06:28, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 On Wed, Aug 12, 2015  Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
 
  if that definition of you is used then the question What one and 
 only one city did you end up seeing? has no answer because it is not a 
 question at all, it is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of which 
 happens to be a question mark.
 
   You might argue that it is false,
 
 If it's a question how can it be false? And if it is a question what is the 
 answer?
 
 The answer that you saw one and only one city is false if there are multiple 
 versions of you. 
 
  but not that it is meaningless.
 
 I have 2 cupcakes one red and one blue, what is the one color of the one 
 and only cupcake that I have? That is another example of something that is 
 not a question but is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of which 
 is a question mark.
 
 The question is if there are two versions of you, one with a red cupcake and 
 one with a blue cupcake, which cupcake will you see? The nature of our minds 
 is such that, even if we know as a matter of fact that there are multiple 
 versions of us, it seems that there is only one version. 

Maybe the conclusion is that things are not always the way they seem.

Bruce


   
  Each observer moment believes they are a unique individual with a unique 
 past and a unique future.
 
 People can believe all sorts of foolish things, but if a person enters a 
 person duplicating machine that person will still have a unique past but 
 will NOT have a unique future. Yes that is odd, but odd things happen when a 
 person is duplicated. 
 
 And both versions of that duplicated person - even if it's John Clark, who 
 knows very well the facts of the matter - will feel that they are the unique 
 continuation of the original. It's a question about psychology, not physics.

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On 14 August 2015 at 12:45, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


  On 14 Aug 2015, at 12:38 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
  On 14 August 2015 at 06:28, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 
  On Wed, Aug 12, 2015  Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
 
   if that definition of you is used then the question What one
 and only one city did you end up seeing? has no answer because it is not a
 question at all, it is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of
 which happens to be a question mark.
 
    You might argue that it is false,
 
  If it's a question how can it be false? And if it is a question what
 is the answer?
 
  The answer that you saw one and only one city is false if there are
 multiple versions of you.
 
   but not that it is meaningless.
 
  I have 2 cupcakes one red and one blue, what is the one color of the
 one and only cupcake that I have? That is another example of something that
 is not a question but is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of
 which is a question mark.
 
  The question is if there are two versions of you, one with a red cupcake
 and one with a blue cupcake, which cupcake will you see? The nature of our
 minds is such that, even if we know as a matter of fact that there are
 multiple versions of us, it seems that there is only one version.

 Maybe the conclusion is that things are not always the way they seem.


Of course not - but how things seem is important and worth careful
consideration.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On 14 August 2015 at 06:28, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Wed, Aug 12, 2015  Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:


 
  if that definition of you is used then the question What one and
 only one city did you end up seeing? has no answer because it is not a
 question at all, it is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of
 which happens to be a question mark.



  
 You might argue that it is false,


 If it's a question how can it be false? And if it is a question what is
 the answer?


The answer that you saw one and only one city is false if there are
multiple versions of you.

 
 but not that it is meaningless.


 I have 2 cupcakes one red and one blue, what is *the* one color of *the*
 one and only cupcake that I have? That is another example of something that
 is not a question but is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of
 which is a question mark.


The question is if there are two versions of you, one with a red cupcake
and one with a blue cupcake, which cupcake will you see? The nature of our
minds is such that, even if we know as a matter of fact that there are
multiple versions of us, it seems that there is only one version.


  
 Each observer moment believes they are a unique individual with a unique
 past and a unique future.


 People can believe all sorts of foolish things, but if a person enters a
 person duplicating machine that person will still have a unique past but
 will NOT have a unique future. Yes that is odd, but odd things happen when
 a person is duplicated.


And both versions of that duplicated person - even if it's John Clark, who
knows very well the facts of the matter - will feel that they are the
unique continuation of the original. It's a question about psychology, not
physics.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-13 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 at 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 
 after the door is opened there is no such thing as *the* 1-view.


  
 I have explained why this is directly refuted by all copies.


So is *THE* 1-view a view of Moscow or of Washington?


  
  a natural confusion between 3-1 views and 1-views.


Confusion naturally arises because
Bruno Marchal
 can not explain what the 
3-1 views
 is supposed to mean without lots of personal pronouns that are all
rendered meaningless in a world with people duplicating machines.



  
 See below for more.


Why? There is little of substance below.

 
 
 they all feel to be different from the others


 
   
 Yes, and that's exactly why there are 
 7.1 billion 1ps and not just one.

  
 Sure, in the 3-1 view. But
  [...]


To hell with the but, unless you're a solipsist and believe there are
7.1 billion  zombies on the Earth not people then the are 7.1 billion 1ps
on this planet, and there are no buts about it.

 
 see above.


Why? There is little of substance
 above.



  
 Those damn diaries again! The diaries are useless after the duplication
 unless the person who wrote them could be unambiguously identified and you
 can't do that;


  
 False. (Easy exercise, done many times).


Somehow I missed that so please do that exercise one more time and point
to *THE* one and only one person who wrote the diary now that the
duplication has been made. Or if you think pointing is impolite just tell
me if he lives in Washington or Moscow.



  
 There is no purely logical reason to make coffee or not to make coffee,
 but
 people who enjoy being alive
 and
 are good
 at
 hypothesizing what the future will be
  
 like are more likely to pass more of their genes into the next generation
 than people who  don't enjoy life and aren't good at making plans for the
 future. So you prepared that coffee because you have some of those genes.



 
 You make my point,


Glad to be of service. 



  
 and explicitly contradict yours.


Where?

Show me!

 
 Search on Searle in the archive for more.


 Why should I search for more idiocy? Searle is a
moron
 and his
Chinese 
room
 is imbecilic.


 
 What remains un-predicted?


  
 The personal experience that the candidate in Helsinki can expect to live.


If The Helsinki Man's name is Ed and if Ed
is logical and if Ed expects to be duplicated then Ed would expect that
there would not be just one answer to that question there would be
two because that's what happens when people are duplicated. Yes that
seems unusual but it's not illogical and it's only unusual because
we haven't seen it yet , and we haven't seen it yet for technological
reasons and not for scientific, logical or philosophical reasons. A few
decades from now this entire debate will seem as quaint as a butterchurn.

 
 By reasoning, and using comp,


I never use comp and never will until I know what it means and I don't
and neither do you.


 
 
 
 And ask if you will be that M guy or that W guy.


 
   
 You you and you! Even at this late stage Bruno Marchal just can't stop
 using that god damn ambiguous personal pronoun!

  
 Because it was just made clear that the question was asked in Helsinki,
 and you have recently, and more than once, accepted that the pronoun was
 not ambiguous in Helsinki (i.e. before the duplication).


Yes, but to confirm or reject the prediction THE one and only you must
be found and interviewed *AFTER* the duplication. It would be easy to
find Bruno
Marchal after the duplication and easy to find Ed, but it would be
impossible to find you because people duplicating machines have made that
personal pronoun ambiguous. And that is exactly why Bruno Marchal loves
personal pronouns, only by liberally using them can Bruno Marchal state
a ambiguous theory of personal identity.


  the ambiguity of pronouns is in your head only, as most of us have shown
 to you more than once.


Then prove me wrong by giving The Helsinki Man a name and stop using those
stupid pronouns! But of course Bruno Marchal will never do that.

 
 I was in Helsinki, and did not know if I would have become the W or the M
 guy,


And even after the duplication I still doesn't know if I is the W guy
or the M guy because that personal pronoun has become meaningless by people
duplicating machines, and that is why Bruno Marchal loves them so much,
ambiguous words come in very handy in describing ambiguous ideas.


  
 given that I become both of them in the 3-1 description of the protocol.


But unfortunately nobody, including
Bruno Marchal
, knows what the 3-1 description is supposed to mean.


  
 Yet, after pushing the button, I get the personal, private, and non
 justifiable feeling that I am the one in W,
 and not the one, in M


And I gets the personal, private, and non justifiable feeling that I
 am the one in M and not the one in W. Use the man's name and

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 12 Aug 2015, at 02:46, John Clark wrote:



On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Oh no, now we have the two 3-1 p view!

 We have this since the beginning.

That explains your profound confusion. 









 You can say that both copies have the 1-view of the H-guy,

Regardless of how many bodies there are after duplication before  
the door of the duplicating chamber is opened and they start to  
experience different things there is only one person so naturally  
there is only one first person view; after the door is opened  
there are many persons and a corresponding number of views. 


Yes, but none can be lived simultaneously, so when you do the  
prediction on your future personal experience you need to replace the  
(3-1p)  AND by a XOR, as you have agreed that the M and W experiences  
are incompatible from each 1p view available.







 but none of the copies have the 1-view of the two copies, as  
you agree they are incompatible.


Because after the door is opened there is no such thing as the 1- 
view.


I have explained why this is directly refuted by all copies. It is  
simpler in the iterated case, as it shows better a natural confusion  
between 3-1 views and 1-views. See below for more.


Read this with the mind state maybe I miss something, and not let  
me try to find a critics.







  your peepee notation really sucks.. Ascribed by   
who?


 By anyone,

By any third party, in other words the third party view.  I  
don't understand the difference between  3p view and 3-1 view.



That is why, I usually use only the 3p terminology. I use 3-1 for  
people like you who insist that they talk about the 1-views of the  
copies, when saying P(W  M) = 1. But to ascribe an 1-view to a number  
of persons different from oneself-or not, it can only be when we  
ascribe 1p views to third person object of description, that is, to  
other than oneself subjectively, as opposed to the 1p person that we  
can live (and can have direct local access to memory). So 3p is a 3p  
description of the locus or object to which we can ascribe a first  
person point of view, intellectually, that means without living them,  
like both copies can do for their doppelgangers, or like we do more or  
less for our human fellows.


3-1p belongs to the 3p description. Consciousness, soul, first person  
does not admit 3p description, but can be ascribed to 3p object, like  
a body or a machine. 3-1p is just the case where we describe in the 3p  
way, first person attributed to other people (including oneself). We  
use I for both in Natural Language, and someone can say before the  
duplication that:


I can predict that tomorrow I will be in Washington and I will be in  
Moscow but I can predict that tomorrow I will feel being in  
Washington or I will feel being in Moscow.


Of course, you can always step back, and say, no I will feel to be in  
Washington and I will will to be in Moscow, as you did sometimes  
agoo, and precisely that is the 3-1 versus 1 confusion.


At least you avoided, contrary to my prediction (!), to fall in the  
trap of the 3-3-1 versus 1 confusion.


The complete disambiguition is:

Tomorrow 3-1-I will be in the two cities, but 1-I will feel being in  
only one of them.






 If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the  
3 view,


 No, because we cannot see or measure or have any direct  
access to an 1-view.


If we had such access there would be no difference between  
objective and subjective and it would all just be 1-view, but since  
we can't a different name is required and it's called, in your  
homemade terminology, 3p view. And I still don't understand the  
difference between 3p view and  3-1 view. Do you?


 So 3-1 means that it is something considered from a non owner  
of the diary,


In other words the 3 view.

 which nevertheless is interpreted as an 1-view,

In other words the 3 view.

 but not necessarily our own.

In other words a non-solipsistic interpretation. And I still  
don't understand the difference between the 3 view and the 3-1  
view.


 3-1 is when we talk of the 1-view of someone else.

Aka the 3 view.

 Like when we say that the guy survived in both W and M. That  
is true


That may or may not be true depending on what you mean by the  
guy, you change it so often it's difficult to keep track.


 (assuming comp).

I do not assume comp.



Lie.






 But they all feel to be different from the others

Yes, and that's exactly why there are 7.1 billion 1ps and  
not just one.


Sure, in the 3-1 view. But all those T billions 1p views, can  
experience only one, like all copies confirmed all the time, in all  
situation. You just fake to never listen to them.







 So here, you do confuse the 3-1 views and the 1-views, which  
is a particular case of 3p/1p confusion.


Don't be ridiculous, nobody on planet Earth is confused by the  
difference

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-11 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 11 Aug 2015, at 01:43, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 there will be only one 1-view from any of the two 3-1 p view

Oh no, now we have the two 3-1 p view!


We have this since the beginning.




3-JC is refers to the bodies which in this case are in the two cities.

OK, or in non-peepee notation the objective actions of John  
Clark's body or bodies.


+ the first person ascribed to the (two) persons (here: the copies).






 3-1 refers to the subjecyive experience

In non-peepee notation the subjective experience.  


Considered ascribed to some person. It is not the 1p view *itself*.  
This is capital to grasp to get the result.









  of frst person view

That is redundant because the first person is the only type of  
subjective experience there is.



That is why the 1-view = the 1-1-view = the 1-1-1view. But this is  
different of the 3-1 view. You can say that both copies have the 1- 
view of the H-guy, but none of the copies have the 1-view of the two  
copies, as you agree they are incompatible.








 ascribed to both bodies, which is different from the 1p view  
lived by the person attached to such bodies.


I have no idea what that means and think your peepee notation  
really sucks.. Ascribed by who?


By anyone, and to make things more complex, that includes any copies,  
as they can ascribe the 1p view of the Helsinki (himself) to its  
doppeganger. Tha pee-pee notation has been introduced to invalidate  
your point that both 1-views, of both 3-copies exists, but that is a  
description from outside of bodies, to which indeed we can ascribe a 1- 
view of the H-guy.





If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the 3 view,



No, because we cannot see or measure or have any direct access to an 1- 
view. So 3-1 means that it is something considered from a non owner of  
the diary, which nevertheless is interpreted as an 1-view, but not  
necessarily our own. I needed to introduce it only to invalidate the  
point you made that even if we consider the 1-view, there are both in  
W and M, but that is a view from outside (the boxes) and does not  
answer the question asked; which is about a personal expectation of a  
personal experience.


With the math, where the povs (1-view, 3-view, 3-1 view ...) this is  
given by the multimodal logic mixing the
[1]p = []p  p, with []p. The 1-views are (up to a technical nuance  
beyond the scope of this post) given by [1]A, The 3view by []A, the  
3-1 view by [][1]A, etc.




and if it's the first person then the 3-1 view is just the 1  
view.  


3-1 is when we talk of the 1-view of someone else.

Like when we say that the guy survived in both W and M. That is true  
(assuming comp).


But the 1-views themselves can only W or M, as you have agreed that  
those 1-views have differentiated and become incompatible. We cannot  
feel to be in both city simultaneously.
So in the 3-1 view, you can say I will survive in both city, but this  
entails that in the future 1-views (or 1-1-views) I will feel to be in  
only one of those 2 cities.






 1p are always single solitary

Are? It should be 1p is always solitary but I think the  
idea and not just the grammar is wrong. I can't prove it but I have  
a hunch that solipsism is untrue, so right now I think there are  
about 7.1 billion 1ps on planet earth and maybe more if animals  
are conscious and many probably are.


But they all feel to be different from the others, and that is needed  
to predict what can happen to a self-duplicating person, or to the  
self-superposing also. That is why we have an FPI in computationalism,  
and we have still statistics in the QM without collapse.


So here, you do confuse the 3-1 views and the 1-views, which is a  
particular case of 3p/1p confusion.






 In the math translation, eventually, we get a meta-definition  
of the 1p-you, more precise than the one who remember .


Regardless of how advanced the mathematics precision is not  
achieved if the symbols used (like the 3-1you) don't mean anything.


the is not need in the math part, and makes an easy sense with the  
definition of the views based on the diaries (entering or not the  
boxes).






 if you agree it bifurcates

Of course I agree that the subjective experience bifurcates  
when looking along the timeline in one direction, and it unites  
when looking along the opposite direction. And that is why  
personal identity can only be defined by looking toward the past and  
not the future.


Then how do you justify that someone prepares a cup of coffee, if it  
is not because he associates a personal satisfaction to its future  
self drinking the coffee. It is enough that anyone makes and drink  
that coffee, which is absurd. Without that 1p-prediction, the notion  
of experimental verification of any laws would no more make any sense.  
It is made implicitly in the whole of

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-11 Thread Pierz

 

So here's an excerpt from this paper: h
ttp://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9609006v1.pdf, which was recently linked in 
response to a question I asked about MWI. This seems to echo *exactly* your 
concerns about identity/pronouns in the duplication experiment, and to 
resolve them, even though this is of course talking about MWI. You can just 
substitute Washington for |up⟩, and Helsinki man for neutron, duplicator 
for beam splitter etc. What this shows is that you are exactly in the 
position of the neutron that knows about MWI when evaluating Bruno's 
scenario. You are simply refusing to take the sleeping pill.


It is more difficult to define a concept of probability for those 
experimenters and those neutrons who know MWI. They understand that the 
belief of the neutron (it might be more correct to say “the belief of both 
neutrons”), that there is just one world, is an illusion. There are two 
worlds in parallel: one with the neutron in the state |up⟩ and the other 
with the neutron in the state |down⟩. Thus, the phrase “the probability for 
the neutron to be found at D1” seems senseless. Indeed, it is not clear 
what “the neutron” in this phrase means, and it seems that whatever neutron 
we consider, we cannot obtain |α|2 for the probability. For the neutron 
passing through a beam splitter the probability to end up at D1 as opposed to 
D2 is meaningless because this neutron becomes two neutrons. The two new 
neutrons are identified with the old one: the neutron detected by D1 and 
the neutron detected by D2 both entered the beam splitter. The new neutrons 
have no identity problem; the neutron at D1 has the direct experience of 
being at D1 as opposed to D2, but it seems that the probability for that 
neutron to be at D1 is just 1. We cannot assign any other number to this 
probability, but the neutron can. Suppose that the neutron (not enjoying 
beam splitters) took a sleeping pill and slept until it reached a detector. 
Now, if it awakes inside the detector but has not yet opened its eyes, the 
neutron (an expert in quantum mechanics) can say: “I have a probability |α|2 
to find myself in D1”. This is an “ignorance-type” probability. We, like 
any external system, cannot be ignorant about the location of the neutron 
since we identify it using its location, while each sentient neutron does 
not need information to identify itself.4 The second new neutron, the one 
at D2, before opening his eyes has exactly the same belief: “I have a 
probability |α|2 to find myself in D1”. The neutron entering the 
beam-splitter converts into two neutrons which have the same belief about 
probability. This allows us to associate the probability for the neutron 
entering the beam-splitter to end up at D1 as the probability of its 
ancestors to end up there. 

On Wednesday, August 12, 2015 at 10:46:54 AM UTC+10, John Clark wrote:


 On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript: wrote:

 
  
 Oh no, now we have the two 3-1 p view
 !


  
 We have this since the beginning.


 That explains your profound confusion. 
  

  
 You can say that both copies have the 1-view of the H-guy,


 Regardless of how many bodies there are after duplication before the 
 door of the duplicating chamber is opened and they start to experience 
 different things there is only one person so naturally there is only one 
 first person view;
  
 after the door is opened there are many persons and a corresponding 
 number of views. 

  
 but none of the copies have the 1-view of the two copies, as you agree 
 they are incompatible.


 Because after the door is opened there is no such thing as *the* 
 1-view.
  

  
  
 your peepee notation really sucks.. Ascribed by 
  
 who?


  
 By anyone, 


 By any third party, in other words the third party view. 
  I don't understand the difference between  3p view and 3-1 view. 

  
 If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the 3 view, 


  
 No, because we cannot see or measure or have any direct access to an 
 1-view.


 If we had such access there would be no difference between objective 
 and subjective and it would all just be 1-view, but since we can't a 
 different name is required and it's called, in your homemade terminology, 
 3p view. And I still don't understand the difference between 3p view 
 and  3-1 view. Do you?
  

  
 So 3-1 means that it is something considered from a non owner of the diary,


 In other words the 3 view.
  

  
 which nevertheless is interpreted as an 1-view,


 In other words the 3 view.
  

  
 but not necessarily our own. 


 In other words a non-solipsistic interpretation. And I still don't 
 understand the difference between the 3 view and the 3-1 view.

  
 3-1 is when we talk of the 1-view of someone else.


 Aka the 3 view.
  

  
 Like when we say that the guy survived in both W and M. That is true 


 That may or may not be true depending on what you mean by the guy,

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-11 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  
 Oh no, now we have the two 3-1 p view
 !


  
 We have this since the beginning.


That explains your profound confusion. 


  
 You can say that both copies have the 1-view of the H-guy,


Regardless of how many bodies there are after duplication before the door
of the duplicating chamber is opened and they start to experience different
things there is only one person so naturally there is only one first person
view;

after the door is opened there are many persons and a corresponding number
of views. 

 
 but none of the copies have the 1-view of the two copies, as you agree
 they are incompatible.


Because after the door is opened there is no such thing as *the* 1-view.



  
 your peepee notation really sucks.. Ascribed by
  
 who?


  
 By anyone,


By any third party, in other words the third party view. 
 I don't understand the difference between  3p view and 3-1 view.

 
 If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the 3 view,


  
 No, because we cannot see or measure or have any direct access to an
 1-view.


If we had such access there would be no difference between objective
and subjective and it would all just be 1-view, but since we can't a
different name is required and it's called, in your homemade terminology,
3p view. And I still don't understand the difference between 3p view
and  3-1 view. Do you?


  
 So 3-1 means that it is something considered from a non owner of the diary,


In other words the 3 view.


  
 which nevertheless is interpreted as an 1-view,


In other words the 3 view.


  
 but not necessarily our own.


In other words a non-solipsistic interpretation. And I still don't
understand the difference between the 3 view and the 3-1 view.

 
 3-1 is when we talk of the 1-view of someone else.


Aka the 3 view.


 
 Like when we say that the guy survived in both W and M. That is true


That may or may not be true depending on what you mean by the guy, you
change it so often it's difficult to keep track.


  
 (assuming comp).


I do not assume comp.


  
 But they all feel to be different from the others


Yes, and that's exactly why there are 
7.1 billion 1ps and not just one.


  
 So here, you do confuse the 3-1 views and the 1-views, which is a
 particular case of 3p/1p confusion.


Don't be ridiculous, nobody on planet Earth is confused by the difference
between the first person and the third person, but everybody on planet
Earth is confused by the difference
 between the 3 view and the 3-1 view
, and nobody is more confused than Bruno Marchal.




  
 the is not need in the math part, and makes an easy sense with the
 definition of the views based on the diaries


Those damn diaries again! The diaries are useless after the duplication
unless the person who wrote them could be unambiguously identified and you
can't do that; and even if you could it would only tell you if a prediction
turned out to be right or not, it would tell you nothing about the nature
of consciousness.


  Of course I agree that the subjective experience

  bifurcates
  when looking along the timeline in one direction, and it unites when
 looking along the opposite direction. And that is why personal identity
 can only be defined by looking toward the past and not the future.


  
 Then how do you justify that someone prepares a cup of coffee, if it is
 not because he associates a personal satisfaction to its future self
 drinking the coffee.


There is no purely logical reason to make coffee or not to make coffee,
but
people who enjoy being alive
and
are good
at
hypothesizing what the future will be like
 are more likely to
 pass more of their genes into the next generation than people who
don't enjoy life and aren't good at making plans for the future. So you
prepared that coffee because you have some of those genes.


  
 Not true the outcome is perfectly predictable. The guy who intercepts a
 photon from Moscow will turn into the guy who experiences Moscow and the guy
 who intercepts a photon from
 Washington
  will turn into the guy who experiences
 Washington. I honestly don't know what more needs to be predicted. 


  
 The guy in M sees M, sure, and the guy in W sees W. Nobody doubt this: it
 is tautological.


I agree it most certainly is, but
tautologies

are always true, 
so what's the problem? What remains un-predicted?
 


  
 But the prediction is asked in Helsinki.


Yes, and more important the answer was given in Helsinki too, if the
question was asked in Moscow the answer would be different. The Moscow Man
did not see Washington, but the Helsinki Man did, The Washington Man did
not see Moscow, but the Helsinki Man did. 



 
And ask if you will be that M guy or that W guy.

You you and you! Even at this late stage Bruno Marchal just can't stop
using that god damn ambiguous personal

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-10 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 09 Aug 2015, at 22:53, John Clark wrote:


On Sun, Aug 9, 2015  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  would be silly to ask the amoeba before the division if  
*you* will swim to the left or to the right after the division,  
almost as silly as asking which of the 2 amoebas was THE one true  
original amoeba that had THE 1p you.


 But no-one in this list has ever pretend than there is only  
one such the.


Someone on this list has. In nearly every post Bruno  
Marchal says that from THE 1p *you* will see this but from THE  
1p*you* will not see that; but if there is more than one then the  
statement becomes meaningless.



Not at all. Because the question is on the 1-p you, and you know (in  
advance, in Helsinki) that there will be only one 1-view from any of  
the two 3-1 p view available. You look like trying to be wrong on  
purpose.






 We always use 3-you or 1-you, or we use 1-JC and 3-JC, or 3-1- 
JC.


So in Bruno's unusual peepee notation 1-JC is John Clark's  
subjective  experience  and 3-JC is John Clark's objective actions,  
but what the hell is 3-1-JC and how does it differ from regular  
old 3-JC?


3-JC is refers to the bodies which in this case are in the two cities.  
3-1 refers to the subjecyive experience, of frst person view ascribed  
to both bodies, which is different from the 1p view lived by the  
person attached to such bodies. 1p are always single solitary and  
definite.







 3-you can be in W and M. But 1-you cannot.

Maybe maybe not,  it all depends on what you means,  but   
neither JC nor 3-JC  nor 3-1JC nor 1-3-1JC knows what Bruno  
Marchal means by that pronoun, and by now it's pretty obvious that  
Bruno Marchal doesn't either.



In the math translation, eventually, we get a meta-definition of the  
1p-you, more precise than the one who remember .., but for the UDA  
reversal, the first definition is quite enough.







  if you argue that 1-you can be in both place, it means you  
talk about the 3-1-you.


Is  Bruno Marchal you, or the 1-you, or the 3-you, or the 3-1- 
you?


For *any* creature, you can consider its you in the 1p sense, or the  
3-1p sense, or the 3p sense, etc.


If Bruno Marchal has an headache, this is pure 1p, if he send a mail,  
that is 3p (at first). Much later, if we ever arrive there, we will  
see that the body is not really a 3p thing, but an 1p-plural object,  
but this is not relevant here(it is relevant for after-life type of  
question, though, but useless and confusing to accept at this stage,  
despite QM suggests it (but we can't use QM).






 you have the following belief: I will [...]

The word will implies the future and if you thinks that  
computationalism is true, that is to say that you is rational, then  
you thinks that the subjective future will bifurcate.


That is the point.

And if you agree it bifurcates, a simple reasoning (that we have done  
many times) shows that you are unable to predict the 1p outcomes of  
that bifurcation.





If you is not rational then you could believe anything, but you's  
beliefs in what will happen, true or false, will in no way effect  
what will in fact happen.


 push the button, open a door and see [...]

What I believes I will see depends entirely on what I means  
by I when dealing with the future in a world with I duplicating  
machines.


But as we assume computationalism, there is no ambiguity at all, and  
the result depends only on the maning of I or you on which we have  
already agreed, but of course we need to take into account the 1p/3p  
nuances to get the answer right, given that the question bears on that  
1p perspective.





The English language in general and in person pronouns in particular  
was never designed with this sort of thing in mind .


Sure, but computationalism makes what happens crystal clear, unless  
you forget that the question bears on the subjective experiences.






 your argument suppress the indeterminacy in Everett QM.

I though you were the guy who kept saying that Everett's MWI was  
deterministic.


In the 3p view, but for the 1p (and here 1p-plural) we have to derive  
and use the Born probability rule, like in the WM-duplication we have  
to use the P(W v M) = 1 and P(W  M) = 0 rule.






 Nobody can figure out what your theory predict

 Computationalism predicts that after the bodies have  
been duplicated photons from Moscow will turn the Helsinki Man into  
the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing photons from Moscow (aka The  
Moscow Man). And computationalism says that after the bodies  
have been duplicated photons from Washington will turn the Helsinki  
Man into the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing photons from  
Washington (aka The Washington Man). What remains indeterminate?


The experience that the guy will who undergone such duplication can  
expect to live. Obviously, given the protocol he must expect to wake  
up in W or in M, and not in both.

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-10 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  
 there will be only one 1-view from any of the two 3-1 p view


Oh no, now we have
the two 3-1 p view
!


 3-JC is refers to the bodies which in this case are in the two cities.


OK, or in non-peepee notation the objective actions of John Clark's body
or bodies.  


  
 3-1 refers to the subjecyive experience


In non-peepee notation the subjective experience.  


  
 of frst person view


That is redundant because the first person is the only type of subjective
experience there is.



  
 ascribed to both bodies, which is different from the 1p view lived by the
 person attached to such bodies.


I have no idea what that means and think your peepee notation really
sucks.. Ascribed by who? If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is
just the 3 view, and if it's the first person then the 3-1 view is just the
1 view.  


  
 1p are always single solitary


Are?
I
t should be 1p is always solitary but
I think the idea and not just the grammar is wrong. I can't prove it but I
have a hunch that solipsism is untrue, so right now I think there are about
7.1 billion 1ps on planet earth and maybe more if animals are conscious
and many probably are.



  
 In the math translation, eventually, we get a meta-definition of the
 1p-you, more precise than the one who remember .


Regardless of how advanced the mathematics precision is not achieved if
the symbols used (like *the* 3-1you) don't mean anything.   


 
  if you agree it bifurcates


Of course I agree that the subjective experience
 bifurcates
 when looking along the timeline in one direction, and it unites when
looking along the opposite direction. And that is why personal identity
can only be defined by looking toward the past and not the future.

 
 a simple reasoning (that we have done many times) shows that you are
 unable to predict the 1p outcomes of that bifurcation.


Not true the outcome is perfectly predictable. The guy who intercepts a
photon from Moscow will turn into the guy who experiences Moscow and the
guy who intercepts a photon from
Washington
 will turn into the guy who experiences
Washington. I honestly don't know what more needs to be predicted. 

  
 I though you were the guy who kept saying that Everett's MWI was
 deterministic.



  
 In the 3p view, but for the 1p (and here 1p-plural)
  
 we have
  [...]


I REALLY don't understand your homemade peepee notation! You just said 
1p are always single solitary
. 



  
 What your computational theory of mind fails to predict is the outcome of
 the result of pushing on the button from the first person perspective


That is gibberish. In looking toward the future in a world with person
duplicating machines there is no such thing as *THE* the first person
perspective; such a term is only meaningful in looking toward the past
because things bifurcate going in one direction and converges going in
the opposite direction.

 John K Clark




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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-09 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Aug 9, 2015  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  
 would be silly to ask the amoeba before the division if **you** will
 swim to the left or to the right after the division, almost as silly as
 asking which of the 2 amoebas was *THE* one true original amoeba that
 had *THE* 1p you.


  
 But no-one in this list has ever pretend than there is only one such the.


Someone on this list has. In nearly every post 
Bruno Marchal
 says that from *THE *1p *you* will see this but from *THE* 1p*you* will
not see that; but if there is more than one then the statement becomes
meaningless.

 
 We always use 3-you or 1-you, or we use 1-JC and 3-JC, or 3-1-JC.


So in Bruno's unusual peepee notation
1-JC is John Clark's subjective  experience  and 3-JC is John Clark's
objective actions, but what the hell is 
3-1-JC
 and how does it differ from regular old 3-JC?


  
 3-you can be in W and M. But 1-you cannot.


Maybe maybe not,  it all depends on what you means,  but  neither JC
nor 3-JC

nor 3-1JC nor 1-3-1JC knows what
Bruno Marchal
 means by that pronoun, and by now it's pretty obvious that
Bruno Marchal
 doesn't either.



  
 if you argue that 1-you can be in both place, it means you talk about the
 3-1-you.


Is
 Bruno Marchal
 you, or *the* 1-you, or *the *3-you, or *the* 3-1-you?

   
 you say that the laws of physics only allow you to see one universe.


   
 Yes, or to say the same thing with different words, MWI says that the laws
 of physics treats conscious observers in EXACTLY the same way as it
 treats non-conscious stuff. Or to use still different language, MWI has
 nothing specific to say about consciousness.

  
 False. The MWI invoke the computationalist theory of consciousness.

The MWI is perfectly compatible with  the computationalist theory of
consciousness so you can stick it on if you want but it is not necessary
,
the MWI works just fine without it or without any theory of consciousness
 at all
.

 
 Assuming comp


John Clark does not assume comp.


  
 you have the following belief: I will
  [...]


The word will implies the future and if you thinks that computationalism
is true, that is to say that you is rational, then you thinks that the
subjective future will bifurcate. If you is not rational then you
could believe anything, but you's beliefs in what will happen, true or
false, will in no way effect what will in fact happen.


  
 push the button, open a door and see
  [...]


What I believes I will see depends entirely on what 
I means by I when dealing with the future in a world with I duplicating
machines. The English language in general and in person pronouns in
particular was never designed with this sort of thing in mind .


  
 your argument suppress the indeterminacy in Everett QM.


I though you were the guy who kept saying that Everett's MWI was
deterministic.


 
 Nobody can figure out what your theory predict



C
omputationalism

predicts
 that after the bodies have been duplicated photons from Moscow will turn
the Helsinki Man into the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing photons from
Moscow (aka The Moscow Man). And c
omputationalism
says that after the bodies have been duplicated photons from Washington
will turn the Helsinki Man into the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing
photons from Washington (aka The Washington Man). What remains
indeterminate? What has the computational theory of mind failed to predict?

  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-09 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 09 Aug 2015, at 01:00, John Clark wrote:


On Sat, Aug 8, 2015  Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:

 If you're an amoeba and you divide, there are now two amoebas  
who remember having been you (if amoebas had memories).


Yes, and it would be silly to ask the amoeba before the division  
if *you* will swim to the left or to the right after the division,  
almost as silly as asking which of the 2 amoebas was THE one true  
original amoeba that had THE 1p you.



But no-one in this list has ever pretend than there is only one such  
the. On the cntrary, we have insisted that to get the statistics of  
the 1p we have to accept that the verification is done on all copies.


It is annoying how much you use the straw man trick, criticizing  
stupid idea like if someone was defending them.








 you say that the laws of physics only allow you to see one  
universe.


Yes, or to say the same thing with different words, MWI says that  
the laws of physics treats conscious observers in EXACTLY the same  
way as it treats non-conscious stuff. Or to use still different  
language, MWI has nothing specific to say about consciousness.  


False. The MWI invoke the computationalist theory of consciousness.






 In Bruno's formulation it's not the laws of physics but the  
definition of the observer as comprised in the digital state of some  
machine,


But definitions are exactly the problem. In Bruno's thought  
experiment what is the definition of you? One some days Bruno says  
it's the man who remembers being a man in Helsinki and that's fine,  
but on other days Bruno adds the mysterious proviso in THE 1p and  
on still other days the definition of you must include in the 3p.  
So what the hell is the definition of you?


Because we take into account the difference of perspective of any  
person.


We don't use you, nor JC.

We always use 3-you or 1-you, or we use 1-JC and 3-JC, or 3-1-JC.

3-you can be in W and M. But 1-you cannot. Or, if you argue that 1-you  
can be in both place, it means you talk about the 3-1-you.
1-you can't be in both place, as 1-you refer to the content of the  
subjective experience lived by those having the memory of Helsinki,  
and fater the duplication and differentiation, such 1-you have 1- 
incompatible experience: as no person can open a door and feel  
personally to see the two cities, as you have agreed often.






  

 Admittedly Bruno does say THE 1p you but unfortunately  
always neglects to mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say THE  
1p you who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no  
good because after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the  
one guy who wrote all that stuff in the diary.  


 Don't be daft. There are two people writing in diaries after  
the duplication, and Bruno knows it. You've misunderstood the claim.


If John doesn't understand Bruno but Pierz says he does then  
Pierz should be able to tell John exactly what THE 1p you means in  
a world with people duplicating machines. I'm all ears!


If you did the thought experiment, you would get the answer to this.

Assuming comp you have the following belief: I will push the button,  
open a door and see once city among W and M, and never both. So THE  
future experience means THE experience of the one city that I will  
feel personally to live (and given comp and the protocole, it will be  
either W or M (and never both). Then by reading BOTH diaries, we get  
that this is confirmed by both copies (and W  M is refuted by both  
copies).












 But it is not irrelevant to the question of  
pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with  
pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics  
ensure that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not  
the case with people duplicating machines. Stage magicians use  
pretty assistants to distract the audience from 
their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns.  Bruno says  
that computationalism can't predict what YOU will see next so  
there must be some aspect of consciousness that the computational  
theory of mind can not explain,


 Say what? Say WHAT? Bruno's argument is based purely on a  
computational theory of mind!


Bruno argument is that if the computational theory of mind is  
correct (and only a fool would say it is not) then it should be  
able to determine the future state of a conscious observer 
, but Bruno says it cannot and indeterminacy remains so  
computationalism can't be the entire story. However Bruno is  
incorrect, computationalism precisely determines that the  
Moscow man will be the man who sees photons from Moscow because a  
photons from Moscow is the very thing that turns the Helsinki man  
into the Moscow man, and a corresponding thing happens to the  
Washington man.


Then again, your argument suppress the indeterminacy in Everett QM.  
As, exactly what you say here applies in the term of

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-08 Thread Pierz



On Saturday, August 8, 2015 at 5:09:49 AM UTC+10, John Clark wrote:

 On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz pie...@gmail.com javascript: 
 wrote:


  
 My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand it and how it 
 leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a completely determined system.
  
 Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion 


 It's either an illusion or it is not
  
 and peepee is not involved. 


And you wonder why people think you're a troll.
 

 And it is an experimental fact that 
 Bell's inequality
  is violated therefore we know for certain that if things really are 
 deterministic then even stranger things must be true; either things are not 
 realistic (an electron is not spinning clockwise or 
 counterclockwise until it is measured, nothing exists until it is observed) 
 or non-local (forget the butterfly effect, a hurricane arrived in Miami 
 today because one year in the **future** a butterfly in Australia will 
 flap his wings). 
  So we know for sure that Einstein's idea that 
 things
  are realistic
 ,
 local
 ,
 and deterministic can
  not
 be correct
 , at least one of them must be false and all 3 could be.

  
 If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum 
 indeterminacy, but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy 
 independent of both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and 
 I don't think he has. 


  
 To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI.


 MWI says everything that can happen 
 to you will happen to you, so you can see everything that can happen; the 
 only way these 2 things can be consistent with experience is if there are 
 lots and lots of yous but the laws of physics only allow an observer (or 
 a you) to see one of them. And that is why Bruno loves pronouns and that is 
 why despite the criticism Bruno insists on continuing to use the word 
 you; pronouns like that disguise the fact that you is not singular, it 
 is plural. 


Bruno knows that observer or 'you' is plural, and in fact that plurality is 
the basis of the first person indeterminacy. If you're an amoeba and you 
divide, there are now two amoebas who remember having been you (if amoebas 
had memories). That's it. Post duplication there's an illusion of 
indeterminacy about which amoeba 'you' became, but the pronoun here is just 
a figure of speech. I'm starting to think from this and the statements 
below that you actually have misunderstood what Bruno is claiming. In the 
above statement you say that the laws of physics only allow you to see one 
universe. In Bruno's formulation it's not the laws of physics but the 
definition of the observer as comprised in the digital state of some 
machine, that has now been replicated. Obviously such a duplicated observer 
can't observe the other machine's environment or internal state, so the 
same separation has been achieved as the laws of physics achieve in MWI. No 
'peepee' involved.
 


 Admittedly Bruno does say THE 1p you but unfortunately always neglects 
 to mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say 
 THE 1p you
  who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no good because 
 after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the one guy who wrote all 
 that stuff in the diary.  
  


Don't be daft. There are two people writing in diaries after the 
duplication, and Bruno knows it. You've misunderstood the claim.
 

  
 If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about his idea of 
 FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought of it first.


 Everett said nothing about consciousness and didn't need to, one great 
 strength of Many Worlds is that unlike some other quantum interpretations 
 it doesn't need to explain what consciousness is or how it works because 
 consciousness has nothing to do with it. Bruno's great discovery is in 
 finding out that sometimes you doesn't know what you will see next, but 
 I think Og The Caveman beat him to the punch on that by a few years.

 
You have the wit of a Wilde. 

  

  
 Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person indeterminacy 
 occurring in a context of computationally defined observers (whether in a 
 physical machine, a duplication experiment, or pure mathematics) rather 
 than the multiverse, but that context is irrelevant to the question of the 
 validity of the logic 


 But it is not 
 irrelevant to the question
  of pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with 
 pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics ensure 
 that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not the case with 
 people duplicating machines. 
 Stage magicians use pretty 
 assistants
 to distract 
 the audience
  
 from
 their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns.
  
 Bruno says that c
 omputationalism 
 can't predict what *YOU* will see next so there must be some aspect of 
 consciousness that the 
 computational theory of

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-08 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Aug 2015, at 21:09, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:

 My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand  
it and how it leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a  
completely determined system. Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion


It's either an illusion or it is not and peepee is not  
involved. And it is an experimental fact that Bell's inequality  
is violated therefore we know for certain that if things really are  
deterministic then even stranger things must be true; either things  
are not realistic (an electron is not spinning clockwise or  
counterclockwise until it is measured, nothing exists until it is  
observed) or non-local (forget the butterfly effect, a hurricane  
arrived in Miami today because one year in the *future* a butterfly  
in Australia will flap his wings).  So we know for sure that  
Einstein's idea that things are realistic, local, and  
deterministic can not be correct, at least one of them must  
be false and all 3 could be.


 If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum  
indeterminacy, but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of  
indeterminacy independent of both the quantum type and also of the  
Godel/Turing type and I don't think he has.


 To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI.

MWI says everything that can happen to you will happen to you,  
so you can see everything that can happen; the only way these 2  
things can be consistent with experience is if there are lots and  
lots of yous but the laws of physics only allow an observer (or a  
you) to see one of them. And that is why Bruno loves pronouns and  
that is why despite the criticism Bruno insists on continuing to use  
the word you; pronouns like that disguise the fact that you is  
not singular, it is plural.


It is plural in the 3-1 view, but it remains singular in the 1-view.  
The JC who sees M can only say: I see M and not W. The JC who sees W  
can only say I see W and not M.







Admittedly Bruno does say THE 1p you but unfortunately always  
neglects to mention which 1p you.


Why do you still say that? Did I not insist that we need to interview  
*all* copies?





Well OK Bruno does say THE 1p you who wrote all that stuff in the  
diary, but that does no good because after the duplication Bruno is  
unable to point to the one guy who wrote all that stuff in the  
diary.  


Why do you still say that. You have repeated this many times, and I  
have always told you that the one guy, being, from the 3p-view, in  
both W *and* M, must be very naturally interviewed in both W and M,  
and indeed both confirms the prediction that they saw only one city, - 
and were unable to predict which one in advance.






 If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about  
his idea of FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought  
of it first.


Everett said nothing about consciousness and didn't need to, one  
great strength of Many Worlds is that unlike some other quantum  
interpretations it doesn't need to explain what consciousness is or  
how it works because consciousness has nothing to do with it.


Everett talk about consciousness or subjective experience, and what is  
nice, use computationalism, but then he fails to see that the  
indterminacy, a priori, get larger than the one given by the universal  
wave, and so, if we want savev both comp and QM, we will have to  
justify the QM by the same type of phenomenology used by Everett to  
justofy the collapse. With comp, both the collapse and the wave  
becomes machine's phenomenology.





Bruno's great discovery is in finding out that sometimes you  
doesn't know what you will see next, but I think Og The Caveman  
beat him to the punch on that by a few years.


OK, you oscillate again. Tell me if Og the Caveman has gone as far as  
step 4, and 5, and 6, ...


You are the only one insisting that step 3 already deserves the Nobel  
Prize ...










 Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person  
indeterminacy occurring in a context of computationally defined  
observers (whether in a physical machine, a duplication experiment,  
or pure mathematics) rather than the multiverse, but that context is  
irrelevant to the question of the validity of the logic


But it is not irrelevant to the question of pronouns and  
Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with pronouns.


You are quite unfair. Not only I have given presentation, just for  
you, without pronouns (and others have done that too), but we have  
explained why pronouns are not problematic, once you put the 1 or  
3 or '3-1 in front of them.


You do point on a difficulty which plays an important role in the  
mathematical translation. Indeed, once you defined a machine or person  
by its set of beliefs, the 1-you can be proved to be undefinable, like  
truth or consciousness.


But UDA has been constructed to

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-08 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Aug 8, 2015  Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:


  
 If you're an amoeba and you divide, there are now two amoebas who remember
 having been you (if amoebas had memories).


Yes, and it would be silly to ask the amoeba before the division if **you**
will swim to the left or to the right after the division, almost as silly
as asking which of the 2 amoebas was *THE* one true original amoeba that
had *THE* 1p you.


  
 you say that the laws of physics only allow you to see one universe.


Yes, or to say the same thing with different words, MWI says that the laws
of physics treats conscious observers in EXACTLY the same way as it treats
non-conscious stuff. Or to use still different language, MWI has nothing
specific to say about consciousness.  



  
 In Bruno's formulation it's not the laws of physics but the definition of
 the observer as comprised in the digital state of some machine,


But definitions are exactly the problem. In Bruno's thought experiment
what is the definition of you? One some days Bruno says it's the man who
remembers being a man in Helsinki and that's fine, but on other days Bruno
adds the mysterious proviso in THE 1p and on still other days the
definition of you must include in the 3p. So what the hell is the
definition of you?   


  
 Admittedly Bruno does say THE 1p you but unfortunately always neglects
 to mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say
 THE 1p you
  who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no good because
 after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the one guy who wrote all
 that stuff in the diary.  


  
 Don't be daft. There are two people writing in diaries after the
 duplication, and Bruno knows it. You've misunderstood the claim.


If John doesn't understand Bruno but Pierz says he does then Pierz should
be able to tell John exactly what *THE* 1p you means in a world with
people duplicating machines. I'm all ears!

 
 But it is not 
 irrelevant to the question
  of pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with
 pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics ensure
 that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not the case with
 people duplicating machines.
 Stage magicians use pretty
 assistants
 to distract
 the audience

 from
 their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns.
  
 Bruno says that c
 omputationalism
 can't predict what *YOU* will see next so there must be some aspect of
 consciousness that the
 computational theory of mind
  can not explain,


  
 Say what? Say WHAT? Bruno's argument is based purely on a computational
 theory of mind!


Bruno argument is that if the computational theory of mind is correct
(and only a fool would say it is not) 
then it should be able to determine the future state of
a 
conscious
 observer,
but
Bruno says 
it cannot and indeterminacy remains so computationalism can't be the entire
story.
However
Bruno is incorrect, computationalism precisely determines that
t
he Moscow man will be the man who sees photons from Moscow because a
photons from Moscow is the very thing that turns the Helsinki man into the
Moscow
 man
, and a corresponding thing happens to the Washington man.


C
omputationalism
tells you that you will be duplicated and one you will see Moscow and one
you will see Washington. Will the you who sees Moscow and not Washington
be surprised?
Will the you who sees
Washington
and not
Moscow
 be surprised?
No, not
 if you is rational, it's exactly what you
, a believer in c
omputationalism
,

predicted

would
happen. 

John Clark of course know what the response to this will be, You forgot
*THE* peepee! What about *THE *peepee? In the future what will **YOU**see
in the peepee?. There is no answer to that because unfortunately Bruno
never specifies in whose peepee, Bruno doesn't have a consistent definition
of you.


  
 Bruno's argument needs no pronouns to go through.


Then why does Bruno throw around pronouns like a drunken sailor throws
around money in ever post Bruno writes? And why does Bruno talk about *THE *X
even when X is clearly plural?

 John K Clark  








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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-07 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Aug 6, 2015  smitra smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

 
 You can just define personal identity as a single observer moment, which
 includes any memories of the outcomes of the duplication experiments, so
 the string of the W's and M'should be included in the definition of
 you.


OK.

 
 But there is not problem here if you just take the formal description of
 any conscious being as defining its personal identity.


But if that definition of you is used then the question What one and
only one city did you end up seeing? has no answer because it is not a
question at all, it is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of
which happens to be a question mark.

 John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-07 Thread Pierz



On Friday, August 7, 2015 at 1:41:51 PM UTC+10, chris peck wrote:

 @ Pierz

   If he refuses to  
  acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then  
  fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that  
  effect.

 but isn't John's point that pro-nouns do not cause much trouble when 
 duplicates end up in separate universes? Thats a fair point right? 


Is it? To be honest I can't make sense of his objection and the so-called 
trouble caused by pronouns. To me step 3 is obvious, as it seems to be to 
most people. Bruno's argument could just as easily run: person A ends up in 
universe 1 and person B ends up in universe 2, or two different simulations 
which do not allow either copy to meet again. What relevance does this have 
to the logic of the situation? Would JC then say, oh well that's OK then! 
Now they of course will experience indeterminacy! Of course he won't, and 
he can't if he's to be consistent.
 

 So, Im not sure he feels his concerns are relevent to Everett. Ive never 
 seen Bruno respond adequately to that point. 

 All this 'troll' baiting reminds me of when I first came into contact with 
 step 3. Bruno and a bunch of others were mocking John for saying that 1 
 person could experience being in moscow and washington at the same time. I 
 thought it was odd that someone like John would think that, so I looked up 
 what he had actually written and lo and behold Bruno and co. were just 
 lying. lying out of their lazy fat academic arses! lol. 


lol? Whatever you might think of his ideas, I've never known Bruno to be 
intellectually dishonest and deliberately misrepresent someone's position. 
Mockery is not part of his standard polemical armoury either AFAICT. The 
problem is that what John is actually arguing is unclear, and therefore 
easily misunderstood. It seemed to me early in this interminable debate 
that he was indeed saying that the person could experience Moscow and 
Washington simultaneously. That was from reading his words, not Bruno's. In 
that case the problem *was* pronouns, because it is both true and untrue to 
say that I will experience both Moscow and Washington simultaneously if I 
am duplicated in those cities. True in Bruno's 3p sense, and false in the 
1p sense. 
 

 He'ld said nothing of the sort. So you have to be careful to read what 
 John says rather than rely what Bruno says John says. The two can be very 
 different.

 --
 Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 17:59:25 -0700
 From: pie...@gmail.com javascript:
 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:
 Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again



 On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 8:06:31 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote: 

  Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that   
  started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep   
  taking the troll bait Bruno? 

 Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the   
 person who have a problem with this are troll. 



  JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he   
  understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy. 

 See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this,   
 but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the   
 goal of answering) that he is a troll. 





  He just loves tormenting you. 

 Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say I was wrong? 

 I try to understand such bad faith as this might make the difference   
 between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next   
 century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner   
 we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans. 



  You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves   
  deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI?   
  I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to   
  multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of   
  the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to   
  acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then   
  fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that   
  effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of   
  its error. 

 John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between   
 accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it   
 is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on   
 the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the   
 next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows   
 prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of. 

 Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago,   
 and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist.   
 But then some scientist decided that it was philosophy, and hired some   
 (non-analytical

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Aug 2015, at 19:23, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 5:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:
  the nuance is not in the name or in the pronouns, but in  
the 1p/3p difference, or in the 1-1p/3-1p difference.
 In a world with people duplicating machines what  
exactly is the difference betweenTHE1p and the 3p  
difference and the difference between THE 1-1p  
and the 3-1p difference? And whose 1p is it anyway? 


 It is the difference between what is written in a diary of a  
person, and what an outsider can describe


If after the duplication Bruno Marchal can point to the one and  
only person that unambiguously wrote all that stuff in that diary  
then it will have been proven that there really is such a thing as  
*THE* 1P, if not then Bruno Marchal is talking gibberish.
 Expects? That depends entirely on who the Helsinki guy  
is, as interminable posts on this subject have conclusively shown  
John Clark and Bruno Marchal expect very different things.


 But we do agree on who the guy is. He is the guy who remember  
Helsinki.


But today is thursday so we don't agree.



Lie.






 But why is this even relevant?

 You would read step 4, 5, ... you would have a pretty clear  
idea why it is relevant


If step 4 is built on the foundations of step 3 then it would  
be pointless to read step 4 until the blunders in step 3 are  
repaired, and if it is not built on those foundations then it was  
unnecessary and foolish to include step 3 at all in your proof. 



Lol.









 The Helsinki guy will have whatever future subjective  
experience he has


 The point is that there are more than one which is available.

So you agree the Helsinki guy will have a future subjective  
experience of Moscow and you agree the Helsinki guy will  
have a future subjective experience of Washington


Yes, in the 3p view.


but insist the Helsinki guy will not experience Moscow and  
Washington in the future.



Yes, in the 1p view.





Are you sure you're a logician? 



Yes, you do just for the bilionth time the 1p-3p confusion.






 and his expectations, correct or incorrect, have absolutely  
positively NOTHING to do with it.


?

Which word didn't you understand?


I have no clue to what it is referring.







 we have agreed on: both the M and W men are  
the same person as the H-man


 Yes the Moscow man and the Washington man are the  
Helsinki man, but it's important to remember that the  
Washington man is NOT the Moscow man; and that's why personal  
identity can only be traced from the past to the present, never  
from the present to the future.


 Your own copies in W and M refute this immediately.

Bullshit. W says I remember seeing Washington one minute ago,  
and M says I remember seeing Moscow one minute ago, so W is NOT M .


Correct.




But both W and M say I remember seeing Helsinki one hour ago so both  
W and M are H.


Correct.

But you don't give any clue explaining why this prevents any of the  
copies to refute that we can predict what will happen in the future.




 Until a city was spotted John Clark would know that  
John Clark had NOT been duplicated, although John Clark's body may  
or may not have been.


 So you say that at a time he might know what happened. Pure  
nonsense.


Until different outside stimulation is received,  
like seeing a different city, both brains would be running  
identical programs in parallel, so John Clark would have only  
one conscious experience regardless of how many identical brains  
were involved.


True, but what is the relevance? The differentiation *has* already  
occurred.






 He should just never expect experiencing being in two cities,  
and the point is that the guy cannot see the difference, unless  
telepathy


Telepathy?? Oh for christ sake!


Ok, nice. No telepathy, but then you are the one who seem to imply  
that we can distinguish a simple teleportation from a duplication- 
differentiation. If that is not telepathy ... Of course comp disallow  
such telepathy, thus you can't distinguish a simple teleportation from  
a duplication, and thus my point in the preceding post was not refuted.


Try again,

Bruno







  John K Clark



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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Aug 2015, at 19:38, smitra wrote:


You can just define personal identity as a single observer moment,


That is dangerous talk, but i see what you mean.


which includes any memories of the outcomes of the duplication  
experiments, so the string of the W's and M'should be included  
in the definition of you.


That is implied by the definition: content of the diary taken by the  
experiencer in the teleportation box. OK.






You can also invent a machine that creates a consciousness that has  
false memories of having been Bruno and also John Clark in the past,  
but such that these memories are inconsistent with each other. E.g.  
it has the memory of having been at Brussels, but also in New York  
at the same time.


But there is not problem here if you just take the formal  
description of any conscious being as defining its personal identity.


Yes, but usually we prefer to avoid the term conscious too early. In  
fact, I agree on this last sentence, but only because we recover that  
when we translate the 3p self by the arithmetical provability (Gödel's  
beweisbar) predicate []A, and the 1p self by the conjunction of the  
provability and truth ([]p  p). Here we get an explanation of a  
difficulty which is hidden in step 3 (but withoit making the reasoning  
invalid as it is not used thanks to the 3p definition of the 1p), and  
which is that the 1p cannot be defined by the machine. This is  
coherent with introspection, with duplication, with the fact that  
consciousness is not definable (like truth), and with the greek  
notion of inner God (which does play the role of the universal first- 
person, the one described by the logic of []p  p (S4Grz1).


Thanks for the suggestion, but I am not sure that any help can change  
John Clark's behavior. I am not sure he believes himself that his  
prose is related to the subject.


Bruno







Saibal


On 06-08-2015 11:27, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:37, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the
other.
 Thta's the point, and that is why they both get one bit of
information,

No new information has been received. Long before the duplication
button was pressed John Clark already knew that one John Clark would
receive a W bit and one John Clark would get a M bit. No new
information was generated. 
You go ou of your body to get the 3-1 view, but forget that from the
copies perspective, it does look like they are in only one place, and
looking at which one, they do get 1 bit of information.
So, what you say is that in the 3-view, there is no new information.
Indeed the 3-view is the protocol itself.
But the question was about the expected 1p experience, and both
confirm that they got one bit of information. The result of pushing
on the button and deciding which cities is behind is always either W
or M, and never both.

 You
[
Chris
Peck
] seem to just persist ignoring the question like John
Clark.

Ignore isn't the right word, there is no question to ignore;
there is just a sequence of personal pronouns, none of which has a
referent but all are liberally spiced with peepee and with a
question mark at the very end. A question needs more than a
question mark.

The question is what do you expect to live, and every one grasp,
without any trouble, that it can only be W, or M, and never both.  
W 

M is never written in any copies' diary, except when they describe
the 3-1 view that they *imagine* correct instead of the 1p-experience
that they directly live (which was what the question is all about).
Sorry John, but your hand-waving does not succeed in hiding that you
avoid the question asked. We have agreed on all definitions, but you
keep talking like if someone can distinguish, directly from its
subjective experience, the difference between a simple teleportation
and a duplication. So you need some magic to get your point
meaningful. But mechanism does not allow it. Without magic, both
copies see only one city, and cannot decide if there is or not a
doppelganger in the other city.
Bruno

 John K Clark
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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Aug 2015, at 02:59, Pierz wrote:




On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 8:06:31 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote:

 Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that
 started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep
 taking the troll bait Bruno?

Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the
person who have a problem with this are troll.



 JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he
 understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy.

See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this,
but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the
goal of answering) that he is a troll.





 He just loves tormenting you.

Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say I was wrong?

I try to understand such bad faith as this might make the difference
between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next
century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner
we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans.



 You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves
 deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI?
 I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to
 multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of
 the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to
 acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then
 fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that
 effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of
 its error.

John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between
accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it
is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on
the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the
next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows
prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of.

Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago,
and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist.
But then some scientist decided that it was philosophy, and hired some
(non-analytical) philosopher who pretended that the FPI does not
exist. As I have never been able to met them, I felt frustated (for 40
years)

I see, I think. JC is a proxy for the guy who robbed you of your  
prize, and you're still hoping for a victory of logic over malice.


Actually, that is what I try to see. I am still not sure. Sometimes  
ago there was a guy named digital physics. That was a proxy if not  
one of the main guy, perhaps push by his own colleagues.







You're still trying to deal with your hurt.


Certainly. But not to ease the hurting (I know very good medication  
for that), but to grasp where such malice comes from, as eventually,  
those people only advertize their own dumbness (and then are forced to  
not deviate from it as they thought that would it more publicly  
palpable).


But, yes, when I got the price, I really thought that this was the end  
of 20 years of harassment. But then the price has only spread the  
harrasment in other countries.


Once that kind of things happens, it concerns no more just me, but  
everyone. It means we are confronted with either bandits (like in the  
health politics) or a dangerous form of fundamentalism.







In Australia we have a term for what John is doing; it's considered  
a national pastime: cutting down the tall poppies. Whenever someone  
sticks their head up above the crowd with a claim to greatness or  
originality, somebody will try to lop their head off out of jealousy  
and small-mindedness. John tries to act as if it's all about the  
logic, but his nastiness and sarcasm give away the underlying  
emotional motivations of a thwarted embittered person who hasn't  
achieved the recognition he craves and so feels compelled to cut  
down anyone who dares to stand out with a claim for attention.


I am afraid you are right.






so I still try to see where is the problem: and JC helps a lot
in showing that the problem is simply its inability, or unwillingness,
to take the 1p/3p difference into account in the question and
verification. But he has show to grasp the difference, so it is
probably just unwillingness.
Then the question remains: why such unwillingness? I'm afraid it is
just jealousy or something of that type. each post by JC confirms
that, and it *might* someday help people to understand how
obscurantist people can be on this subject.
Then JC, like Jean-Paul Delahaye, makes me think that maybe the FPI
does deserve the Nobel Prize after all. If it is that subtle to grasp
for grown up, it might be worth to make clearer. After all, all the
rest of the work exploit that FPI.  Tegmark and Schmidhuber missed it,
as Tegmark confirms by rediscovering it in his book (as Jason Resch
quoted some times ago).

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-07 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:


 
 My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand it and how it
 leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a completely determined system.
  
 Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion


It's either an illusion or it is not

and peepee is not involved. And it is an experimental fact that
Bell's inequality
 is violated therefore we know for certain that if things really are
deterministic then even stranger things must be true; either things are not
realistic (an electron is not spinning clockwise or
counterclockwise until it is measured, nothing exists until it is observed)
or non-local (forget the butterfly effect, a hurricane arrived in Miami
today because one year in the **future** a butterfly in Australia will flap
his wings).
 So we know for sure that Einstein's idea that
things
 are realistic
,
local
,
and deterministic can
 not
be correct
, at least one of them must be false and all 3 could be.

 
 If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum indeterminacy,
 but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy independent of
 both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and I don't think
 he has.


  
 To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI.


MWI says everything that can happen
to you will happen to you, so you can see everything that can happen; the
only way these 2 things can be consistent with experience is if there are
lots and lots of yous but the laws of physics only allow an observer (or
a you) to see one of them. And that is why Bruno loves pronouns and that is
why despite the criticism Bruno insists on continuing to use the word
you; pronouns like that disguise the fact that you is not singular, it
is plural.

Admittedly Bruno does say THE 1p you but unfortunately always neglects to
mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say
THE 1p you
 who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no good because
after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the one guy who wrote all
that stuff in the diary.  


  
 If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about his idea of
 FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought of it first.


Everett said nothing about consciousness and didn't need to, one great
strength of Many Worlds is that unlike some other quantum interpretations
it doesn't need to explain what consciousness is or how it works because
consciousness has nothing to do with it. Bruno's great discovery is in
finding out that sometimes you doesn't know what you will see next, but
I think Og The Caveman beat him to the punch on that by a few years.


  
 Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person indeterminacy
 occurring in a context of computationally defined observers (whether in a
 physical machine, a duplication experiment, or pure mathematics) rather
 than the multiverse, but that context is irrelevant to the question of the
 validity of the logic


But it is not 
irrelevant to the question
 of pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with
pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics ensure
that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not the case with
people duplicating machines.
Stage magicians use pretty
assistants
to distract
the audience

from
their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns.
 
Bruno says that c
omputationalism
can't predict what *YOU* will see next so there must be some aspect of
consciousness that the
computational theory of mind
 can not explain, 
but in reality what 
c
omputationalism
 (or anything else) can't explain is what the hell Bruno means by you.

  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Aug 2015, at 00:57, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:
 Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have  
no difficulty in complying to the request of substituting  John  
Clark for the personal pronoun you.
 We did this already, but you came up with non sense again.  
More than one person did this. It changes nothing, as the nuance is  
not in the name or in the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p difference, or  
in the 1-1p/3-1p difference.


In a world with people duplicating machines what exactly is the  
difference between THE1p and the 3p difference  
and the difference between THE 1-1p and the 3- 
1p difference? And whose 1p is it anyway? 



It is the difference between what is written in a diary of a person,  
and what an outsider can describe as exclusive content of a collection  
of diaries. It is the difference , in this case, between the semantic  
of I open the door and saw M (resp W) and the list I open the door  
and saw M + I opened the door and saw M.

In this case the difference is the difference between and and or.




 you kept confusing the 1p and the 3p,

In short, YCT1PAT3P. And it's true, John Clark is very confused  
about which 1p Bruno Marchal is talking about, although probably not  
as confused as Bruno Marchal.


 as comp explains that NO copies at all will *live* all  
experiences.


John Clark is profoundly uninterested in comp and does not  
believe that comp can explain anything at all.


Computationalism is used only to formulate the problem, to get the  
shape of the solution (the reversal), and to motivate for the  
technical definitions and the mathematical solution (the Arithmetical  
UDA, alias the machine's interview, where the pronouns are defined  
with the technic exposed in Smullyan's Forever Undecided, notably.







 Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has  
one question, there are two first person experiences, which one  
is Bruno talking about?


 The one the Helsinki guy expect to live subjectively,

Expects? That depends entirely on who the Helsinki guy is, as  
interminable posts on this subject have conclusively shown John  
Clark and Bruno Marchal expect very different things.


But we do agree on who the guy is. He is the guy who remember Helsinki.



But why is this even relevant?


You would read step 4, 5, ... you would have a pretty clear idea why  
it is relevant (of course).





The Helsinki guy will have whatever future subjective experience he  
has


The point is that there are more than one which is available.


and his expectations, correct or incorrect, have absolutely  
positively NOTHING to do with it.


?




That's why trying to define personal identity by looking to the  
future rather than the past is just nuts.



Yes, but that has not been done.






 we have agreed that both the Moscow man and the Washington  
man is the Helsinki man.


What day is itlets see... it's Wednesday, so yes today we  
agree on that. Tomorrow we won't.


You should try to not show so much clearly that you are a troll, as I  
will lose credits just by answering such remark.







 we have agreed on: both the M and W men are the same  
person as the H-man


Yes the Moscow man and the Washington man are the Helsinki man,  
but it's important to remember that the Washington man is  
NOT the Moscow man; and that's why personal identity can only be  
traced from the past to the present, never from the present to the  
future.


Your own copies in W and M refute this immediately. You confirms (if  
that was necessary) that you never complete the thought experience.  
You don't interview the copies. You don't put your shoes in their shoes.








 which explains why the H-man can only be uncertain if he (the  
1p, well defined in H) will live the W or the M experience.


The only uncertainty is who he is.


We have agreed that he is the guy remembering pushing the button. We  
have agreed that he will find himself in bioth city, and we have  
agreed that in both cities both live an experience logically  
incompatible with their doppelganger experience, and thus live W or M  
(even W xor M).





If he is the guy experiencing Helsinki today then he will  
experience NEITHER Washington nor Moscow tomorrow. However if he  
is the guy who remembers experiencing Helsinki today (or if he is   
Bruno Marchal) then he will experience Washington AND Moscow  
tomorrow.


That will never happen. Nobody will experience W and M tomorrow or any  
day. Both experience will occur, but a couple of incompatible  
experience is NOT an experience. It is only two experience of  
different person, who happen to be both the H-guy.


I think you have stabilized on the first/third person pov.





 In Helsinki, we decide with a coin between the alternative  
described just below, but we don't let you know the result:

- tail : you are

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:37, John Clark wrote:


On Wed, Aug 5, 2015  PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the other.

 Thta's the point, and that is why they both get one bit of  
information,


No new information has been received. Long before the duplication  
button was pressed John Clark already knew that one John Clark would  
receive a W bit and one John Clark would get a M bit. No new  
information was generated. 


You go ou of your body to get the 3-1 view, but forget that from the  
copies perspective, it does look like they are in only one place, and  
looking at which one, they do get 1 bit of information.


So, what you say is that in the 3-view, there is no new information.  
Indeed the 3-view is the protocol itself.


But the question was about the expected 1p experience, and both  
confirm that they got one bit of information. The result of pushing  
on the button and deciding which cities is behind is always either W  
or M, and never both.






 You [Chris Peck] seem to just persist  
ignoring the question like John Clark.


Ignore isn't the right word, there is no question to ignore; there  
is just a sequence of personal pronouns, none of which has a  
referent but all are liberally spiced with peepee and with a  
question mark at the very end. A question needs more than a  
question mark.


The question is what do you expect to live, and every one grasp,  
without any trouble, that it can only be W, or M, and never both. W   
M is never written in any copies' diary, except when they describe  
the 3-1 view that they *imagine* correct instead of the 1p-experience  
that they directly live (which was what the question is all about).


Sorry John, but your hand-waving does not succeed in hiding that you  
avoid the question asked. We have agreed on all definitions, but you  
keep talking like if someone can distinguish, directly from its  
subjective experience, the difference between a simple teleportation  
and a duplication. So you need some magic to get your point  
meaningful. But mechanism does not allow it. Without magic, both  
copies see only one city, and cannot decide if there is or not a  
doppelganger in the other city.


Bruno










  John K Clark





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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote:

Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that  
started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep  
taking the troll bait Bruno?


Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the  
person who have a problem with this are troll.




JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he  
understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy.


See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this,  
but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the  
goal of answering) that he is a troll.







He just loves tormenting you.


Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say I was wrong?

I try to understand such bad faith as this might make the difference  
between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next  
century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner  
we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans.




You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves  
deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI?  
I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to  
multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of  
the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to  
acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then  
fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that  
effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of  
its error.


John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between  
accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it  
is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on  
the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the  
next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows  
prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of.


Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago,  
and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist.  
But then some scientist decided that it was philosophy, and hired some  
(non-analytical) philosopher who pretended that the FPI does not  
exist. As I have never been able to met them, I felt frustated (for 40  
years) so I still try to see where is the problem: and JC helps a lot  
in showing that the problem is simply its inability, or unwillingness,  
to take the 1p/3p difference into account in the question and  
verification. But he has show to grasp the difference, so it is  
probably just unwillingness.
Then the question remains: why such unwillingness? I'm afraid it is  
just jealousy or something of that type. each post by JC confirms  
that, and it *might* someday help people to understand how  
obscurantist people can be on this subject.
Then JC, like Jean-Paul Delahaye, makes me think that maybe the FPI  
does deserve the Nobel Prize after all. If it is that subtle to grasp  
for grown up, it might be worth to make clearer. After all, all the  
rest of the work exploit that FPI.  Tegmark and Schmidhuber missed it,  
as Tegmark confirms by rediscovering it in his book (as Jason Resch  
quoted some times ago).


So, the FPI is certainly very simple, but the 1p/3p difference is not  
that simple for some physicists and philosophers (sic), as the way JC  
and some part of the academical world have illustrated since long.


Another problem, is that his post confused people, so we have to  
answer them for possible new bees.


Now, anyone can ask more interesting question, or discuss other  
points... It is not difficult to filter the thread if annoyed by the  
admittedly boring repetition of Clarks last attempt to ridicule the  
notion.


It is holiday. The list is quite, so take this as a little snack,  
like an attempt to understand the psychology of trolls and harassers,  
or just skip those posts, and enjoy the sun and the beach :)



Bruno




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RE: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-06 Thread chris peck

@ Pierz

  If he refuses to  
 acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then  
 fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that  
 effect.

but isn't John's point that pro-nouns do not cause much trouble when duplicates 
end up in separate universes? Thats a fair point right? So, Im not sure he 
feels his concerns are relevent to Everett. Ive never seen Bruno respond 
adequately to that point. 

All this 'troll' baiting reminds me of when I first came into contact with step 
3. Bruno and a bunch of others were mocking John for saying that 1 person could 
experience being in moscow and washington at the same time. I thought it was 
odd that someone like John would think that, so I looked up what he had 
actually written and lo and behold Bruno and co. were just lying. lying out of 
their lazy fat academic arses! lol. He'ld said nothing of the sort. So you have 
to be careful to read what John says rather than rely what Bruno says John 
says. The two can be very different.

Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 17:59:25 -0700
From: pier...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again



On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 8:06:31 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote:



 Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that  

 started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep  

 taking the troll bait Bruno?



Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the  

person who have a problem with this are troll.







 JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he  

 understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy.



See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this,  

but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the  

goal of answering) that he is a troll.











 He just loves tormenting you.



Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say I was wrong?



I try to understand such bad faith as this might make the difference  

between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next  

century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner  

we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans.







 You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves  

 deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI?  

 I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to  

 multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of  

 the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to  

 acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then  

 fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that  

 effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of  

 its error.



John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between  

accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it  

is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on  

the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the  

next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows  

prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of.



Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago,  

and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist.  

But then some scientist decided that it was philosophy, and hired some  

(non-analytical) philosopher who pretended that the FPI does not  

exist. As I have never been able to met them, I felt frustated (for 40  

years) 
I see, I think. JC is a proxy for the guy who robbed you of your prize, and 
you're still hoping for a victory of logic over malice. You're still trying to 
deal with your hurt. In Australia we have a term for what John is doing; it's 
considered a national pastime: cutting down the tall poppies. Whenever someone 
sticks their head up above the crowd with a claim to greatness or originality, 
somebody will try to lop their head off out of jealousy and small-mindedness. 
John tries to act as if it's all about the logic, but his nastiness and sarcasm 
give away the underlying emotional motivations of a thwarted embittered person 
who hasn't achieved the recognition he craves and so feels compelled to cut 
down anyone who dares to stand out with a claim for attention. so I still try 
to see where is the problem: and JC helps a lot  

in showing that the problem is simply its inability, or unwillingness,  

to take the 1p/3p difference into account in the question and  

verification. But he has show to grasp the difference, so it is  

probably just unwillingness.

Then the question remains: why such unwillingness? I'm afraid it is  

just jealousy or something of that type. each post by JC confirms  

that, and it *might* someday help people to understand how  

obscurantist people can be on this subject.

Then JC, like Jean-Paul Delahaye

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-06 Thread Pierz



On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 11:39:47 AM UTC+10, John Clark wrote:

 On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 8:39 PM, Pierz pie...@gmail.com javascript: 
 wrote:
  

  
 if the quantum state evolves deterministically 


 The wave function most certainly evolves deterministically but that's 
 not important because the wave function is not observable, I want to know 
 if the actual physical state evolves deterministically. The answer is far 
 from obvious. If everything that can happen does happen then did anything 
 determine one particular branch of the multiverse?  


My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand it and how it 
leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a completely determined system. 
Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion, to use Bruno's detested terminology. I 
don't understand your last sentence/question. The laws of the physics 
determined every branch, and none of them are privileged in any way. 
 

  

  
  
 where does randomness come from according to MWI? I'd like to hear JC's 
 answer to that. If he says it's due to multiple versions of the observer 
 ending up in different branches of the multiverse, he's shown he 
 understands.


 Of course I understands that! 


I know you do - because who could fail to understand it?
 

 If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum indeterminacy, 
 but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy independent of 
 both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and I don't think 
 he has. 


To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI. i.e., the 
duplication or branching of an observer leads to the appearance of 
randomness from the perspective of that observer, even though the objective 
situation contains no indeterminacy. If Bruno is claiming there is some 
striking originality about his idea of FPI then I'd point to Everett and 
say, that guy thought of it first. Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises 
this first-person indeterminacy occurring in a context of computationally 
defined observers (whether in a physical machine, a duplication experiment, 
or pure mathematics) rather than the multiverse, but that context is 
irrelevant to the question of the validity of the logic of FPI, which is 
entirely abstractable from the context in which it occurs. If you can see 
how indeterminacy works *logically* in MWI, you have agreed with the *logic* of 
step 3. If that is not the case, you need to explain how the situations are 
logically different, because AFAICT the only difference between the two 
cases is the nature of the duplicator. Perhaps you can explain why it 
matters whether the duplicator is the multiverse or a teleportation device?
 

 I think he's just rehashing the sort indeterminacy first discovered about 
 90 years ago.

 OK, so Bruno is an upstart! A pompous ass! An incompetent fewl! And what's 
worse, these dorks on the Everything List treat his damnfool ideas with 
respect, stroke his bloated ego and foster his pretensions to genius! Let's 
face it, that's what gets your goat and why you will never in a million 
years admit that step 3 is valid even though you admit to the validity of 
Everett's identical logic.
 

 
  Why do you keep taking the troll bait Bruno?


 Clearly a troll, Bruno and you are so brilliant nobody could really 
 disagree, they can only pretend to disagree for some obscure but 
 undoubtedly sinister reason.

  
The motivations of trolls are not obscure and yours are no exception. 

 


  John K Clark  
  




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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-06 Thread Pierz



On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 8:06:31 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote: 

  Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that   
  started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep   
  taking the troll bait Bruno? 

 Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the   
 person who have a problem with this are troll. 



  JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he   
  understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy. 

 See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this,   
 but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the   
 goal of answering) that he is a troll. 





  He just loves tormenting you. 

 Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say I was wrong? 

 I try to understand such bad faith as this might make the difference   
 between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next   
 century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner   
 we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans. 



  You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves   
  deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI?   
  I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to   
  multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of   
  the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to   
  acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then   
  fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that   
  effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of   
  its error. 

 John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between   
 accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it   
 is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on   
 the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the   
 next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows   
 prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of. 

 Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago,   
 and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist.   
 But then some scientist decided that it was philosophy, and hired some   
 (non-analytical) philosopher who pretended that the FPI does not   
 exist. As I have never been able to met them, I felt frustated (for 40   
 years) 


I see, I think. JC is a proxy for the guy who robbed you of your prize, and 
you're still hoping for a victory of logic over malice. You're still trying 
to deal with your hurt. In Australia we have a term for what John is doing; 
it's considered a national pastime: cutting down the tall poppies. Whenever 
someone sticks their head up above the crowd with a claim to greatness or 
originality, somebody will try to lop their head off out of jealousy and 
small-mindedness. John tries to act as if it's all about the logic, but his 
nastiness and sarcasm give away the underlying emotional motivations of a 
thwarted embittered person who hasn't achieved the recognition he craves 
and so feels compelled to cut down anyone who dares to stand out with a 
claim for attention.
 

 so I still try to see where is the problem: and JC helps a lot   
 in showing that the problem is simply its inability, or unwillingness,   
 to take the 1p/3p difference into account in the question and   
 verification. But he has show to grasp the difference, so it is   
 probably just unwillingness. 
 Then the question remains: why such unwillingness? I'm afraid it is   
 just jealousy or something of that type. each post by JC confirms   
 that, and it *might* someday help people to understand how   
 obscurantist people can be on this subject. 
 Then JC, like Jean-Paul Delahaye, makes me think that maybe the FPI   
 does deserve the Nobel Prize after all. If it is that subtle to grasp   
 for grown up, it might be worth to make clearer. After all, all the   
 rest of the work exploit that FPI.  Tegmark and Schmidhuber missed it,   
 as Tegmark confirms by rediscovering it in his book (as Jason Resch   
 quoted some times ago). 

 So, the FPI is certainly very simple, but the 1p/3p difference is not   
 that simple for some physicists and philosophers (sic), as the way JC   
 and some part of the academical world have illustrated since long. 

 Another problem, is that his post confused people, so we have to   
 answer them for possible new bees. 

 Yes. The western scientific mindset has become so conditioned to think 
only in terms of 3p, that it is difficult for some people to think any 
other way. These are the same people who fail to grasp the hard problem.
 

 Now, anyone can ask more interesting question, or discuss other   
 points... It is not difficult to filter the thread if annoyed by the   
 admittedly boring repetition of Clarks last attempt to ridicule the   
 notion. 


Oh

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-06 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 5:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

   
 the nuance is not in the name or in the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p
 difference, or in the 1-1p/3-1p difference.

  
 In a world with people duplicating machines what exactly is the
 difference between
 *THE*
 1p
  and the
 3p difference
  and

 the difference between 
 *THE*
 1-1p
  and the
 3-
 1
 p difference
 ? And whose 1p is it anyway? 
 


  
 It is the difference between what is written in a diary of a person,
  
 and what an outsider can describe


If after the duplication
 Bruno Marchal
 can point to the one and only person that unambiguously wrote all that
stuff in that diary then it will have been proven that there really is such
a thing as **THE** 1P, if not then 
Bruno Marchal
 is talking gibberish.

  
 Expects? That depends entirely on who the Helsinki guy is, as
 interminable posts on this subject have conclusively shown John Clark and
 Bruno Marchal expect very different things.

  
 But we do agree on who the guy is. He is the guy who remember Helsinki.


But today is thursday so we don't agree.

 
 But why is this even relevant?



 
 You would read step 4, 5, ... you would have a pretty clear idea why it is
 relevant


If step 4 is built on the foundations of

step 3 then it would be pointless to read step 4 until
the blunders in step 3
are repaired, and if it is not built on those foundations then it was
unnecessary and foolish to include step 3 at all in your proof. 


  
 The Helsinki guy will have whatever future subjective experience he has


  
 The point is that there are more than one which is available.



So you agree the Helsinki guy will have a

future subjective experience
 
of Moscow and you agree
 
the Helsinki guy will have a future subjective experience
 
of Washington but insist the Helsinki guy
 
will not experience Moscow and Washington in the future.
 Are you sure you're a logician? 

 
 and his expectations, correct or incorrect, have absolutely positively 
 *NOTHING
 *to do with it.


 ?


Which word didn't you understand?


 
 
 
 w
 
 e have agreed on: both the M and W men are the same person as the H-man


 
  
 Yes the Moscow man and the Washington man are the Helsinki man, but it's
 important to remember that 
 t
 he Washington man
 is *NOT* the Moscow man; and that's why personal identity can only be
 traced from the past to the present, never from the present to the future.


  
 Your own copies in W and M refute this immediately.


Bullshit. W says I remember seeing Washington one minute ago, and M says
I remember seeing Moscow one minute ago, so W is *NOT* M . But both W and M
say I remember seeing Helsinki one hour ago so both W and M *are* H.

  
 Until a city was spotted John Clark would know that John Clark had NOT
 been duplicated, although John Clark's body may or may not have been.

  
 So you say that at a time he might know what happened. Pure nonsense.


Until

 different
 
outside stimulation
 is received
, like seeing
a 
different
city
, both brains would be running identical programs in parallel
,
so John Clark would have only one conscious experience regardless of how
many identical brains were involved.

 
 He should just never expect experiencing being in two cities, and the
 point is that the guy cannot see the difference, unless telepathy


Telepathy?? Oh for christ sake!


  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-06 Thread smitra

You can just define personal identity as a single observer moment, which 
includes any memories of the outcomes of the duplication experiments, so 
the string of the W's and M'should be included in the definition of 
you.


You can also invent a machine that creates a consciousness that has 
false memories of having been Bruno and also John Clark in the past, but 
such that these memories are inconsistent with each other. E.g. it has 
the memory of having been at Brussels, but also in New York at the same 
time.


But there is not problem here if you just take the formal description of 
any conscious being as defining its personal identity.


Saibal


On 06-08-2015 11:27, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:37, John Clark wrote:


On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the
other.

 Thta's the point, and that is why they both get one bit of
information,


No new information has been received. Long before the duplication
button was pressed John Clark already knew that one John Clark would
receive a W bit and one John Clark would get a M bit. No new
information was generated. 

You go ou of your body to get the 3-1 view, but forget that from the
copies perspective, it does look like they are in only one place, and
looking at which one, they do get 1 bit of information.

So, what you say is that in the 3-view, there is no new information.
Indeed the 3-view is the protocol itself.

But the question was about the expected 1p experience, and both
confirm that they got one bit of information. The result of pushing
on the button and deciding which cities is behind is always either W
or M, and never both.


 You
[
Chris
Peck
] seem to just persist ignoring the question like John
Clark.


Ignore isn't the right word, there is no question to ignore;
there is just a sequence of personal pronouns, none of which has a
referent but all are liberally spiced with peepee and with a
question mark at the very end. A question needs more than a
question mark.


The question is what do you expect to live, and every one grasp,
without any trouble, that it can only be W, or M, and never both. W 
M is never written in any copies' diary, except when they describe
the 3-1 view that they *imagine* correct instead of the 1p-experience
that they directly live (which was what the question is all about).

Sorry John, but your hand-waving does not succeed in hiding that you
avoid the question asked. We have agreed on all definitions, but you
keep talking like if someone can distinguish, directly from its
subjective experience, the difference between a simple teleportation
and a duplication. So you need some magic to get your point
meaningful. But mechanism does not allow it. Without magic, both
copies see only one city, and cannot decide if there is or not a
doppelganger in the other city.

Bruno


 John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

. We  
don't ask an intellectual description, which indeed follows trivially  
from the protocols, we ask about you you expect to live, and all  
copies, they get that unique experience that they were not able to  
predict in advance. They guy who get the sequence (in the iterated  
duuplication) MWWMMWW say: no I could not have predicted that,  
and most people get something similar.






You can't have it both ways Bruno. If THE 1p of W is not THE 1p of  
M, and clearly they are not, then equally neither THE 1p of W or THE  
1p of M are THE 1p of H.


You continue to use the Leibiz identity rule where eeven John Clark is  
aware this makes no sense.


Bruno








Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:47:57 -0400
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
From: johnkcl...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com


On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with  
this topic John Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the  
following simple changes in future correspondence with John Clark:

1) Substitute John Clark for the personal pronoun you.

 We have explained to you that the key is in the difference  
between 1-Clark and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me.


Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no  
difficulty in complying to the request of substituting  John Clark  
for the personal pronoun you.


 it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but  
about the first person experience


 There are two first person experiences, which one is  
Bruno talking about?


 We have shown that P((W  ~M) v (M  ~W)) = 1, for the exact  
same reason that P(coffee) = 1. So you can be sure (modulo the  
hypothesis and the protocole) that you will have a unique experience  
of seeing a unique city after pushing the button. The refers to  
that unique experience. unique from the 1-pov, of course, as from  
the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the 1- 
pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes  
sense to refer to it.


Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one  
question, there are two first person experiences, which one is  
Bruno talking about?


 You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live  
after pushing the button.


 Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said  
clear as a bell that  depends on who you is. John Clark would  
know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the  
Washington Man would see Washington.  [...] And I [John Clark]  
also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get  
his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons  
from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal  would expect John  
Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or  
incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of  
consciousness or the unique feeling of self.


 You make my point by avoiding the question again and again  
and again. I think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically  
the question. You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The  
question is what do you expect to live as first person experience?


That depends on who you is. John Clark  would expect that  
in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man  
would see Washington. And John Clark would also know  
which one would be which, the Moscow Man would get photons from  
Moscow and the Washington Man would get photons from Washington.  
What Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares  
because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing  
to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of  
self.


 You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question  
is what do you expect to live as first person experience?

- I expect to die.
- I expect to feel myself in two cities at once.
- I expect to feel myself in only one city.

I, that is to say John Clark in Helsinki, would expect that  
tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Moscow, and I would expect  
that tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Washington. I would  
further expect that from *THE* 1P John Clark will not experience  
anything at all. John Clark would not expect *THE* 1P to exist at  
all because John Clark expects John Clark to be duplicated. What  
Bruno Marchal would expect in a similar situation only Bruno Marchal  
knows, not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have  
anything to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique  
feeling of self.


 I recall you that we have agreed on the identity criterion

We only agree on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, on the other days  
we disagree except for Sunday, on Sunday I don't know if we agree or  
disagree.


 John K Clark



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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 04 Aug 2015, at 19:47, John Clark wrote:



On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with  
this topic John Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the  
following simple changes in future correspondence with John Clark:

1) Substitute John Clark for the personal pronoun you.

 We have explained to you that the key is in the difference  
between 1-Clark and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me.


Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no  
difficulty in complying to the request of substituting  John Clark  
for the personal pronoun you.




We did this already, but you came up with non sense again. More than  
one person did this. It changes nothing, as the nuance is not in the  
name or in the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p difference, or in the 1-1p/ 
3-1p difference.


For a period of time, I have no more use pronouns, but you kept  
confusing the 1p and the 3p, and we get the same non-sense, at it  
comes exclusively from that confusion.


It is not the pronoun, or the name, or the person where you are  
ambiguous, it is on the point of view.


The question is what can *anyone* expect to *live* (to be conscious  
of, first person, subjective experience) in the (iterated, for a  
change) self-duplication?


All sequences? No, as comp explains that NO copies at all will *live*  
all experiences.
An arbitrary sequence of W and M? yes, as all copies will confirmed  
that they have indeed live a precise particular sequence, and the stat  
shows indeed that most look quite arbitrary.





 it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but  
about the first person experience


 There are two first person experiences, which one is  
Bruno talking about?


 We have shown that P((W  ~M) v (M  ~W)) = 1, for the exact  
same reason that P(coffee) = 1. So you can be sure (modulo the  
hypothesis and the protocole) that you will have a unique experience  
of seeing a unique city after pushing the button. The refers to  
that unique experience. unique from the 1-pov, of course, as from  
the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the 1- 
pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes  
sense to refer to it.


Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one  
question, there are two first person experiences, which one is  
Bruno talking about?



The one the Helsinki guy expect to live subjectively, which is either  
W or M, but cannot be both, nor none.






 You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live  
after pushing the button.


 Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said  
clear as a bell that  depends on who you is. John Clark would  
know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the  
Washington Man would see Washington.  [...] And I [John Clark]  
also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get  
his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons  
from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal  would expect John  
Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or  
incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of  
consciousness or the unique feeling of self.


 You make my point by avoiding the question again and again  
and again. I think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically  
the question. You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The  
question is what do you expect to live as first person experience?


That depends on who you is.


No, it works with anybody, even robots, as the 1p definition is 3p  
sharable (unlike in the math part which gives a more precise  
definition---but it is not needed for grasping the Universal  
Dovetailer Argument).





John Clark  would expect that in the future the Moscow Man  
would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington.



Ok, but we have agreed that both the Moscow man and the Washington man  
is the Helsinki man. Your use of Moscow-man hides the indeterminacy  
when the H-guy differentiate into the H-M-guy and the H-W-guy, so that  
they personally become either the H-M-guy, OR the H-W-guy.
here you talk like if the Moscow-man was a new person: but we have  
agreed that he is the H-man. Indeed both are, which explains why the H- 
man can only be uncertain if he (the 1p, well defined in H) will live  
the W or the M experience.


Here you suppress pronouns just to avoid the question, by abstracting  
from the definition we have agreed on: both the M and W men are the  
same person as the H-man, despite the W-man and the M-man are now  
different persons. But they remains both the H-guy, and that is why  
the pronouns are not ambiguous.


The only ambiguity is if the question bears on the 1p personal future  
subjective experience (guarantied to exist by the mechanist  
assumption) or a 3p description of those experience. But that

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-05 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 8:39 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:


  
 if the quantum state evolves deterministically


The wave function most certainly evolves deterministically but that's not
important because the wave function is not observable, I want to know if
the actual physical state evolves deterministically. The answer is far from
obvious. If everything that can happen does happen then did anything
determine one particular branch of the multiverse?


  
 where does randomness come from according to MWI? I'd like to hear JC's
 answer to that. If he says it's due to multiple versions of the observer
 ending up in different branches of the multiverse, he's shown he
 understands.


Of course I understands that! If the multiverse really exists then that
explains quantum indeterminacy, but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of
indeterminacy independent of both the quantum type and also of the
Godel/Turing type and I don't think he has. I think he's just rehashing the
sort indeterminacy first discovered about 90 years ago.


  Why do you keep taking the troll bait Bruno?


Clearly a troll, Bruno and you are so brilliant nobody could really
disagree, they can only pretend to disagree for some obscure but
undoubtedly sinister reason.

 John K Clark  

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-05 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  
 Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in
 complying to the request of substituting  John Clark for the personal
 pronoun you.

  
 We did this already, but you came up with non sense again. More than one
 person did this. It changes nothing, as the nuance is not in the name or in
 the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p difference, or in the 1-1p/3-1p difference.


In a world with people duplicating machines what exactly is the
difference between

*THE*
1p
 and the
3p difference
 and

the difference between 
*THE*
1-1p
 and the
3-
1
p difference
? And whose 1p is it anyway? 


  
 you kept confusing the 1p and the 3p,


In short, YCT1PAT3P. And it's true, John Clark is very confused about
which 1p Bruno Marchal is talking about, although probably not as confused
as Bruno Marchal.

 
 as comp explains that NO copies at all will *live* all experiences.


John Clark is profoundly uninterested in comp and does not believe that
comp can explain anything at all.


  
 Well now that's all very nice but 
 John Clark still has one question,
 t
 here are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about?


  
 The one the Helsinki guy expect to live subjectively,


Expects? That depends entirely on who the Helsinki guy is, as interminable
posts on this subject have conclusively shown John Clark and Bruno Marchal
expect very different things. But why is this even relevant? The Helsinki
guy will have whatever future subjective experience he has and his
expectations, correct or incorrect, have absolutely positively *NOTHING *to
do with it. That's why trying to define personal identity by looking to the
future rather than the past is just nuts.

 
 we have agreed that both the Moscow man and the Washington man is the
 Helsinki man.


What day is itlets see... it's Wednesday, so yes today we agree on
that. 
Tomorrow we won't.

 
 w
 
 e have agreed on: both the M and W men are the same person as the H-man


Yes the Moscow man and the Washington man are the Helsinki man, but it's
important to remember that 
t
he Washington man
is *NOT* the Moscow man; and that's why personal identity can only be
traced from the past to the present, never from the present to the future.


  
 which explains why the H-man can only be uncertain if he (the 1p, well
 defined in H) will live the W or the M experience.


The only uncertainty is who he is. If he is the guy experiencing
Helsinki today then he will experience *NEITHER *Washington nor Moscow
tomorrow. However if he is the guy who remembers experiencing Helsinki
today (or if he is  Bruno Marchal) then he will experience Washington
*AND* Moscow tomorrow.


  I
 n Helsinki, we decide with a coin between the alternative described just
 below, but we don't let you know the result:
 - tail : you are duplicated in M and W
 - head: you are not duplicated, but teleported to one of the city (also
 chosen with a coin)


This time John Clark would have less information to work with so not
surprisingly John Clark would not know what to expect, maybe one city maybe
two. Not that expectations, correct or incorrect, have any bearing on the
question at hand.

 
 So you don't know if you will be simply teleported in one of the two city,
 or be duplicated in both, once you push the button.
 The question is: do you think that without external clue you could know
 which one of the alternative has been realized after pushing the button?


Until a city was spotted John Clark would know that John Clark had NOT
been duplicated, although John Clark's body may or may not have been.


John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-05 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Aug 5, 2015  PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 
 But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the other.


  
 Thta's the point, and that is why they both get one bit of information,


No new information has been received. Long before the duplication button
was pressed John Clark already knew that one John Clark would receive a W
bit and one John Clark would get a M bit. No new information was generated.



  
 You
 [
 C
 hris
 P
 eck
 ] 
 seem to just persist ignoring the question like John Clark.


Ignore isn't the right word, there is no question to ignore; there is just
a sequence of personal pronouns, none of which has a referent but all are
liberally spiced with peepee and with a question mark at the very end. A
question needs more than a question mark.


  John K Clark

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-05 Thread Pierz

Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that started burning 
in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep taking the troll bait 
Bruno? JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he 
understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy. He just loves tormenting 
you. You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves 
deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI? I'd like to 
hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to multiple versions of the 
observer ending up in different branches of the multiverse, he's shown he 
understands. If he refuses to acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his 
pronoun concerns, then fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to 
that effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of its 
error. 

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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-04 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 03 Aug 2015, at 18:51, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 5:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:  


  Then you die with the simple teleportation.

 Then who will die in the simple teleportation?

 You, when you are in Helsinki.

For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this  
topic John Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the  
following simple changes in future correspondence with John Clark:


1) Substitute John Clark for the personal pronoun you.


We have explained to you that the key is in the difference between 1- 
Clark and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me. not in the  
use of names and pronouns.




2) Keep in mind that after the duplication there is no such thing as  
*THE* 1p that John Clark will experience in the future. Thank you  
for your cooperation.


Yes, but we have refuted this. Indeed all your copies refute that  
prediction, as anyone able to read can see.


You are continuing your rhetorical tricks.








 it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the  
first person experience


There are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno  
talking about?


We have shown that P((W  ~M) v (M  ~W)) = 1, for the exact same  
reason that P(coffee) = 1.


So you can be sure (modulo the hypothesis and the protocole) that you  
will have a unique experience of seeing a unique city after pushing  
the button. The refers to that unique experience. unique from the  
1-pov, of course, as from the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they  
$are* unique from the 1-pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov  
prediction, it makes sense to refer to it.






 that you will live (again, with that non ambiguous definition  
of identity that we have agree on).


The definition John Clark agreed on is you is somebody who  
remembers being a man in Helsinki. On Monday Wednesday and Friday  
Bruno agrees with this definition, on Tuesday Thursday and Saturday  
Bruno does not, and on Sunday Bruno is a bit confused.


Lies. The same definition is used for the person. The difference you  
see is when we address the question, we need to emphasize the 1p  
refered to in the question.






 You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live  
after pushing the button.


Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said clear  
as a bell that  depends on who you is. John Clark  would know  
that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the  
Washington Man would see Washington.  [...] And I [John  
Clark] also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man  
would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get  
his photons from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal  would  
expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations,  
correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the  
continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self.


You make my point by avoiding the question again and again and again.  
I think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically the question.


You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do  
you expect to live as first person experience?


- I expect to die.
- I expect to feel myself in two cities at once.
- I expect to feel myself in only one city.

I recall you that we have agreed on the identity criterion  
(remembering Helsinki and the personal pushing on the button), and the  
definition of the first person experience (here it is just remembering  
it and its description in the personal diary). This leads, assuming  
computationalism of course (or more general), only one option above  
open, as the diaries of both copies confirmed (for people able to read).


Bruno










    you and Peck are the only one having a problem here.

Then Peck and Clark are the only ones here who can think  
rationally on this subject.


 You are just playing with word.

And you are using words like a naive child not like a logician  
with a disciplined mind.


John K Clark 



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-04 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  
 For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this topic John
 Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the following simple
 changes in future correspondence with John Clark:
 1) Substitute John Clark for the personal pronoun you.


  
 We have explained to you that the key is in the difference between 1-Clark
 and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me.


Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in
complying to the request of substituting  John Clark for the personal
pronoun you.


 
 it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first
 person experience




  
 There are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking
 about?


  
 We have shown that P((W  ~M) v (M  ~W)) = 1, for the exact same reason
 that P(coffee) = 1.
  
 So you can be sure (modulo the hypothesis and the protocole) that you will
 have a unique experience of seeing a unique city after pushing the button.
 The refers to that unique experience. unique from the 1-pov, of course,
 as from the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the
 1-pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes sense to
 refer to it.


Well now that's all very nice but 
John Clark still has one question,
t
here are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about?

 
 You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after
 pushing the button.



 
 Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said clear as a bell
 that  depends on who you is. John Clark would know that in the future
 the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see
 Washington.  [...] And I [John Clark]
  
 also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his
 photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons from
 Washington. [...]
  
 what Bruno Marchal  would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares
 because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do
 with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self.



 
 You make my point by avoiding the question again and again and again. I
 think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically the question. You
 are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you
 expect to live as first person experience?



That depends on who you is. John Clark
 would
expect
 that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man
would see Washington. And
John Clark 
would 
also
know 
which one would be which, the Moscow Man would get photons from Moscow and
the Washington Man would get photons from Washington.
W
hat Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because
expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the
continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self.




  
 You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you
 expect to live as first person experience?

- I expect to die.
 - I expect to feel myself in two cities at once.
 - I expect to feel myself in only one city.


I, that is to say John Clark in Helsinki, would expect that tomorrow John
Clark will feel to be in Moscow, and I would expect that tomorrow John
Clark will feel to be in Washington. I would further expect that from **THE**
1P John Clark will not experience anything at all. John Clark would not
expect **THE** 1P to exist at all because John Clark expects John Clark to
be duplicated. What Bruno Marchal would expect in a similar situation
only Bruno
Marchal knows, not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have
anything to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling
of self.



  
 I recall you that we have agreed on the identity criterion


We only agree on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, on the other days we
disagree except for Sunday, on Sunday I don't know if we agree or disagree.

 John K Clark

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RE: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-08-04 Thread chris peck

@ Bruno

  You forget that you and Peck are the only one having a problem here. 

 Im not sure thats true. True, there is a fair amount of uncritical support, 
but from what I see people kind of give you the benefit of the doubt at step 3 
agreeing that there is something wishy washy about it. People kind of accept 
there would be a continuity of consciousness from H to W and from H to M, and 
they believe that is the important thing, then they blindly succer into the 
idea that because W and M only see one city this has some baring on how H 
should calculate his 'expectancies'. They make a fundamental and understandable 
error, and you push them very hard to make that error.

 The truth is that if you knew you were going to be duplicated you would bet on 
W very differently than if you know you have been duplicated and havent opened 
the door yet. Knowing you have been duplicated is a very different situation 
from knowing you are going to be. 

I can imagine my subjective view evolving seamlessly from H to W, and also 
imagine my view evolving seamlessly from H to M. But to ask which one will be 
me asks me to suppose that one evolution over the other is THE valid evolution 
of the subjective view. But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the 
other. So to bet one which one I will be is a stupid thing to do. You try to 
get away from that fact by torturing semantics. You ask 'which one will you 
live to be' and what have you, but really, the question is just silly. BUT, 
They are both *A* valid evolution. So it is possible to talk sensibly about 
them both being valid evolutions of a 1P view and that H can expect both.

You can't have it both ways Bruno. If THE 1p of W is not THE 1p of M, and 
clearly they are not, then equally neither THE 1p of W or THE 1p of M are THE 
1p of H. 

Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:47:57 -0400
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
From: johnkcl...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com


On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this topic John 
Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the following simple changes in 
future correspondence with John Clark: 
1) Substitute John Clark for the personal pronoun you.
 We have explained to you that the key is in the difference between 1-Clark 
and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me.
Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in 
complying to the request of substituting  John Clark for the personal pronoun 
you.
 it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first 
person experience  There are two first person experiences, which one is 
Bruno talking about? 
 We have shown that P((W  ~M) v (M  ~W)) = 1, for the exact same reason 
that P(coffee) = 1. So you can be sure (modulo the hypothesis and the 
protocole) that you will have a unique experience of seeing a unique city after 
pushing the button. The refers to that unique experience. unique from the 
1-pov, of course, as from the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* 
unique from the 1-pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it 
makes sense to refer to it.
Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one question, there 
are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about?
 You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after pushing 
the button.  Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said 
clear as a bell that  depends on who you is. John Clark would know that in 
the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see 
Washington.  [...] And I [John Clark] also knew which one would be which, I 
knew the Moscow Man would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man 
would get his photons from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal  would expect 
John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or 
incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the 
unique feeling of self.
  You make my point by avoiding the question again and again and again. I 
think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically the question. You are in 
Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you expect to live 
as first person experience?
That depends on who you is. John Clark  would expect that in the future 
the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. 
And John Clark would also know which one would be which, the Moscow Man 
would get photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get photons from 
Washington. What Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor 
cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do 
with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. You 
are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you

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