On Feb 20, 7:12 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Feb 2011, at 13:13, benjayk wrote:
So we can say
things like, Sherlock Holmes lived at 10 Baker Street are true,
even
though Sherlock Holmes never existed.
Whether Sherlock Holmes existed is not a trivial question.
On Feb 18, 2:03 pm, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
Hi,
-Original Message-
From: 1Z
Sent: Friday, February 18, 2011 7:04 AM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its
false?
On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk
On Feb 18, 3:06 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 6:15 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Feb 18, 5:30 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Peter,
Correct me if I am wrong but I think we have established some things we
agree
On Feb 18, 3:07 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku
On Feb 18, 4:00 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
On Feb 17, 10:38 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
On 2/17/2011 12:27 PM, benjayk wrote:
Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
1Z wrote
On Feb 23, 4:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
On Feb 18, 3:07 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku
On Feb 23, 4:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
Then God does not exist as an actor in the world, but God does still exists
as an idea.
1Z wrote:
1Z wrote:
something existing or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
to use the word
On Feb 23, 3:02 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Feb 22, 2011 at 4:32 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Feb 18, 3:06 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 6:15 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Feb 18, 5:30 am, Jason Resch
On Feb 23, 9:46 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Feb 2011, at 22:14, benjayk wrote:
Molecules and Cells are formal things. Form is matter, in *some*
sense.
Form is not *primary* matter in any sense.
People having problem with numbers have been victim of a traumatic
If you have a UDA inside a physical universe, there is real physics
(qua physicalevents)
outside it, and there is a real study of physics outside it as well.
What goes on in a
virtualised environment is not real. You could feed virtualised people
false information
about the past, but that would
On Mar 4, 8:02 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Somehow. The fundamentality arrow is roughly like this: NUMBERS =
UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS = PHYSICAL LAWS = BIOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS.
On the other hand:
PHYSICS=COMPUTATION=CONSCIOUSNESS=NUMBERS
Shows how computationalism is
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be, ... it
is lacking in one important fundamental aspect, viz., the role of
consciousness [which] could in fact be considered the most
On Mar 4, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 15:13, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 03 Mar 2011, at 18:39, 1Z wrote:
If you have a UDA inside a physical universe,
I guess you mean a UD inside a physical
On Mar 6, 4:17 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/5/2011 4:04 PM, Pzomby wrote:
On Mar 5, 1:50 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote
, the
appearance of collapse, and, it increasingly appears, no where else. My
paper Logical Types in Quantum Mechanics
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/5554/ explains this in detail.
Andrew
On 04/03/11 16:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be,
... it
is lacking in one important
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Collapse appears to instruments as well as people - that's why we can
shared records of experiments and agree on them. I'm not sure what you
mean by account for collapse. At least one interpretation of QM,
advocated by Peres,
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on the
idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a perfectly
symmetrical emergent property of the
On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote: Collapse appears to instruments as
well as people
We don't have any evidence for that,
Of course we do
indeed, if we take either the
concept of Wigner's friend or Rovelli's RQM
On Mar 6, 1:14 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
the idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we
On Mar 6, 7:21 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious
at all in our terms. It could, provided enough
On Mar 7, 9:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong
On Mar 7, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with
consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology.
There is no human observation without consciousness.
There can be no observations without sense organs,
but it
On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
world except the virtual
On Mar 7, 8:48 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
snip
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
*elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
On Mar 7, 8:28 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote
On Mar 8, 1:02 am, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 8 March 2011 00:11, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are
not equivalent positions, for instance.
snip
And reductive identity theorists say mind is a bunch
of micro
On Mar 8, 11:32 am, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 06/03/11 15:06, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
occurs. Certainly no coherent concept of how and why collapse
On Mar 8, 11:10 am, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 06/03/11 19:24, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:16, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp makes precise that saying to be a machine is equivalent with
saying that there is a
On Mar 8, 12:46 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/7/2011 4:15 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 8:28 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM
On Mar 8, 11:47 am, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 06/03/11 15:22, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote: Collapse appears to instruments
as well as people
We don't have any evidence
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
snip
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
*elimination*,
On Mar 8, 4:45 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/8/2011 6:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
Up to a point. But if the faking deviated very far from perceptions of
this world the BIV would no longer be able to process them. We casually
talk of white rabbits on this list, which
On Mar 8, 6:48 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/8/2011 9:36 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 4:45 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/8/2011 6:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
Up to a point. But if the faking deviated very far from perceptions of
this world
On Mar 8, 9:15 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 8 March 2011 12:16, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are uncontroversial examples of successful reduction, eg
the reduction of heat to molecular motion. In these cases
the reduced phenomenon still exists. There is still
On Mar 9, 1:03 am, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 8 March 2011 23:42, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
How can they fail to be composite when they include interactions,
structures and bindings? What ***are*** you on about?
Say there is a pile of bricks that, under some
On Mar 9, 7:24 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Mar 2011, at 15:54, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction
On Mar 9, 12:50 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
Peter, your comments appear to illustrate a basic confusion between
ontological and epistemological claims that makes me think that you
haven't taken on board the fundamental distinction entailed in Bruno's
original statement:
On Mar 9, 1:46 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 13:30, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Peter, this is too confusing, you seem to be debating a straw man.
Let's try to keep it simple: am I to assume that you don't agree that
ontological reduction entails
On Mar 9, 2:23 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 14:17, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Phlogiston was eliminated, heat was reduced. There's a difference
So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e.
not merely epistemologically
On Mar 9, 1:24 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 08/03/11 16:14, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew Soltau
wrote:
What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email Comp.
Granted that all possible states exist, what changes the point of the
On Mar 9, 3:06 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Mar 8, 2011 at 10:14 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:
On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email Comp.
Granted that all possible states exist,
On Mar 9, 4:30 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 09 Mar 2011, at 12:28, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 7:24 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Mar 2011, at 15:54, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David
On Mar 9, 4:47 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 4:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Peter, your comments appear to illustrate a basic confusion between
ontological and epistemological claims that makes me think that you
haven't taken on board the fundamental
On Mar 9, 3:25 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 14:39, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e.
not merely epistemologically) distinguishable from molecular motion?
No. I would say it is ontologically
On Mar 9, 5:56 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
In that sense all right. Comp is the theory which accept as axiom that
my brain/body is Turing emulable at some level.
But in that sense, comp is a theory of everything. Indeed, it even
makes elementary arithmetic a theory of
On Mar 9, 6:00 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 17:22, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
The point of eliminativism is that the eliminated thing doesn't exist
at all.
Just so. At a reduced ontological level, heat doesn't exist at all -
It does, because
On Mar 9, 5:15 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 5:30 AM, 1Z wrote:
Zombies are not a typical example of the problems of reduction,
they are an instance of the reduction being bought too cheaply:
the reductive materialist presents the off-the-peg conclusion
On Mar 9, 10:33 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 19:09, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Fine, Peter, have it your way. We can't seem to progress beyond
vocabulary difficulties to the substance.
Unfortunately non-vocabulary differences have to be expressed
On Mar 9, 7:28 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 8:49 AM, 1Z wrote:
If you have a theory of qualia using primitive matter, and coherent
with comp, then you should be able to use it to extract a flaw in the
UD Argument.
Here's one: minds can be computed
://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/12/entropy-and-artificial-life.html
On 09.03.2011 15:39 1Z said the following:
On Mar 9, 2:23 pm, David Nymanda...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 14:17, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Phlogiston was eliminated, heat was reduced. There's a
difference
So
On Mar 10, 2:16 am, stephenk stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On Mar 9, 11:33 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Mar 9, 1:24 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 08/03/11 16:14, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew
Soltau wrote:
What I am driving
On Mar 10, 8:57 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
To Evgeniy's train of thought I would attach another question (what you,
savants of Q-science may answer easily): if the universe expands (does it,
indeed?) do the interstitial spaces in an atom expand similarly, or they are
exempt and
On Apr 17, 11:32 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
Rex, Evgeniy and List:
Are we speaking about a mysterious 'free will' that is unrelated to the rest
of the world and depends only how we like it? In my view our 'likings' and
'not' depend on the concerning experience and genetic built
On Apr 19, 6:38 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 1:24 AM, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 12:24 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Th fact that you say that compatibilist free will is faux will or worst
On Apr 18, 5:24 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 15 Apr 2011, at 21:16, Rex Allen wrote:
On Fri, Apr 15, 2011 at 3:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 14 Apr 2011, at 22:25, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Hence Rex might well be right that the discussion here
On Apr 19, 7:26 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 1:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/18/2011 9:55 AM, Rex Allen wrote:
If there are commonalities in individuals who manifest certain
behaviors, then it makes sense to look at those
On Apr 19, 6:24 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 12:24 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 15 Apr 2011, at 21:16, Rex Allen wrote:
On Fri, Apr 15, 2011 at 3:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 14 Apr 2011, at 22:25, Evgenii
On Apr 19, 7:28 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Apr 2011, at 07:38, Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 1:24 AM, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 12:24 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Th fact that you say that
On Apr 19, 9:39 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
*Brent wrote:*
**
*I would point out that indeterminism can have two different sources.
One is internal, due to the occasional quantum random event that gets
amplified to quasi-classical action. The other, much more common, is the
On Apr 19, 11:28 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
assertion is forever open to
disproof by contrary evidence but by removing the need for
foundational support we deal with the problem of extreme skepticism
which leads to post modernist thinking and anti science ideology.
Sounds
(in math): Take ANY number... (puzzles).
On Tue, Apr 19, 2011 at 7:04 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Apr 19, 9:39 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
*Brent wrote:*
**
*I would point out that indeterminism can have two different sources.
One is internal, due
On Apr 22, 9:23 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
Peter,
if we 'free-up' our minds to think wider than our conventional sciences
based 'unconventionality' (as applied on this list frequently) and recognize
the unlimited Everything in the complexity of the wholeness we end up in
(my?)
vocabulary - the rest is
'stupid'.
Regards
John
n Thu, Apr 21, 2011 at 11:33 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Apr 20, 8:53 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
IZ wrote:
*Even stochastic rules? Science can easily explain how the appearance
of order emerges from randomness
On Jul 8, 12:59 am, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 10:12:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
One that happens to be incompatible with
theory that our minds are computer programs.
Can you explain that? It seems to be Bruno's central claim, but so
far as I
On Jul 8, 5:53 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Jul 2011, at 02:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/7/2011 4:59 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 10:12:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
One that happens to be incompatible with
theory that our minds are computer
On Jul 6, 12:44 pm, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Constantine, this is a rather trollish comment coming from an ignorant
position.
Let me put the following gedanken experiment - consider the
possibility that T. Rex might be either green or blue creatures, and
that either
On Jul 10, 2:20 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to produce
different molecules by
On Jul 11, 4:48 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
This philosophy has already shown great success for anything that stores,
transmits or processes information. Data can be stored as magnetic poles on
hard drives and tape, different levels of reflectivity on CDs and DVDs, as
On Jul 12, 11:50 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
My view of awareness is now subtractive and holographic (think pinhole
camera), so that I would read fading qualia in a different way. More
like dementia.. attenuating connectivity between different aspects of
the self, not
On Jul 20, 2:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Jul 2011, at 15:21, 1Z wrote:
On Jul 8, 5:53 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Jul 2011, at 02:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/7/2011 4:59 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 10:12:45PM -0700
On Jul 21, 8:23 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
1) if conventional physics gives an adequate causal account,does and
experience is explained
with New Physics, does that make experience epiphenomenal?
In my view, physics, experience, and the underlying relation between
On Jul 21, 9:54 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:35 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 11, 4:51 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
automatic consequences which
arise unbidden from from relations that are defined
On Jul 21, 11:55 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the existence
of
number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
matter
On Jul 22, 1:53 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 7:43 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 21, 11:55 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Assume both matter and number
On Jul 22, 4:08 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch
On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch
On Jul 22, 3:59 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
relations between the bits.
And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems
On Jul 22, 3:49 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
There is no objective quality of resemblance without a
subjective intepreter
says who?
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On Jul 22, 10:55 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some other progressive brain wasting
disease.
Functionally equivalent means functionally equivalence. You
are effectively saying
On Jul 22, 11:05 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Are you positing a universal substance of resemblance? How does it
work?
No. I am proposing that things have properties, as an objective
fact,and that different things can have the same properties,
also as an objective fact.
On Jul 23, 2:35 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 22, 6:25 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But that's contradicting your assumption that the pegs are transparent
to the neural communication:
If the living
cells are able to talk to each other well through the
On Jul 23, 4:52 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Muscles aren't moved by neurons, muscles move themselves in sympathy
with neuronal motivation.
Says who?
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To post to this
On Jul 23, 1:27 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 12:14 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Where does the badness come from? The afferent neurons?
It comes from the diminishing number of real neurons
On Jul 23, 5:23 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 5:53 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
A sculpture (non moving, dead)? Or a zombie? (behavior is preserved)
I would not call it 'behavior' unless that is understood to exclude
agency.
Does the presence
On Jul 23, 5:52 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 11:06 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 22, 10:55 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some
On Jul 23, 6:05 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 11:11 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 22, 11:05 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Are you positing a universal substance of resemblance? How does it
work?
No. I am proposing
On Jul 23, 6:17 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 11:40 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 2:35 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Think of them like sock puppet/bots multiplying in a closed social
network. If you have 100 actual
On Jul 23, 6:22 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 11:43 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 4:52 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Muscles aren't moved by neurons, muscles move themselves in sympathy
with neuronal motivation.
Says
On Jul 23, 6:36 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 12:02 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 1:27 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 12:14 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote
On Aug 3, 1:54 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is
a property of the subject. The subject's perception determines the
degree to which one complex of phenomena can be distinguished from
another. Ontologically,
On Aug 3, 9:14 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Aug 3, 1:35 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Aug 3, 1:54 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is
a property of the subject
On Dec 22 2011, 12:18 pm, alexalex alexmka...@yahoo.com wrote:
Hello, Everythinglisters!
The below text is a philosophical essay on what qualia may represent.
I doubt you'll manage to finish reading it (it's kind of long, and
translated from anoter language), but if you do I'll be happy to
On Jan 31, 4:44 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
When we close our eyes, we still see visual noise, even in total
darkness. If qualia were based on computation, we should expect that
no sensory input should equate to total blackness, since there is no
information to report.
On Feb 3, 11:13 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Feb 3, 4:16 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
Photoshop can paint a smooth image therefore computers can never be
intelligent or conscious. Of course, I see the light at last, its all so
obvious now that you
On Feb 6, 12:12 pm, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote:
arXiv:1202.0720v1 [physics.hist-ph]
Abstract
It is argued that it is possible to give operational meaning to free
will and
the process of making a choice without employing metaphysics.
comments?
On Feb 6, 4:55 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Informational laws and physical laws are, in my mind, closely
related. Laws related to information seem to supercede physical law.
For example, the impossibility of encoding information in fewer
symbols or trying to send more over
On Feb 6, 6:39 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 7:12 AM, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote:
An agent in possession of free will is able to perform an action that was
possible to predict by nobody but the agent itself.
There are a number of things wrong
On Feb 6, 9:48 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Feb 6, 7:12 am, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote:
arXiv:1202.0720v1 [physics.hist-ph]
Abstract
It is argued that it is possible to give operational meaning to free
will and
the process of making a choice without
On Feb 7, 5:52 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Feb 6, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
More seriously, in the chinese room experience, Searle's error can be
seen also as a confusion of level. If I can emulate Einstein brain,
I can answer all question
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