Re: Selecting your future branch
On 17 Jul 2014, at 20:31, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 1:00 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: What difference do you se between comp and computationalism? Why ask me? Because you are the one pretending than comp is not computationalism. You're the one who felt that computationalism didn't adequately convey the idea you had and so you needed to invent a new word, a word used on this list and no place else. In your imagination only. For me and others the following are basically synonymous: - CTM (computationalist theory of mind, comp theory of mind) - comp - computationalism -Digital Mechanism - Mechanism (if the context is clear) -Putnam functionalism - functionalism (except in some context where Stathis used that term in a more general sense than Putnam). Comp, as I use the term is only more precise, as I take into account that a machine cannot know which machine she is, and thus comp asserts only the existence of a level of description such that we survive See the sane04 paper, or the posts for more detail. This should not be a problem, given that you have accepted step 0, 1, 2. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 17 Jul 2014, at 21:00, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: Whom do you anticipate performing the emulation? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of computation, we already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs the emulation. Then with comp, it can be shown that this is indeed done in a way such that you could not make the difference from your inside first person points of view. I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but emulation and computation are concept definable in arithmetic, or equivalent. It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science. Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thu, Jul 17, 2014 1:00 pm Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 17 Jul 2014, at 18:37, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is contradictory? No. Computationalism is not contradictory, but comp is. What difference do you se between comp and computationalism? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. You agreed on step 0, so that is enough to say that either you believe in comp, or that you find it enough plasuible to start reasoning assuming it, like in the UDA. I can understand that you don't believe in the *consequences* of comp given that you stop at the step 3 (without anyone understanding why though). To claim that comp is different from computationalism is ... weird. Tell me the difference. I doubt you will find anyone, except that I provide a weaker version than usual (through the existence of a substitution level, without putting any bound on it), and more precise, by defining computer with Church thesis. Got the feeling you never have read any papers I wrote. You might have judged before studying. You lost me completely in invoking a difference between comp and computationalism. (and it does contradict your agreement with step one, which by definition makes you understand what comp is). Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
So therefore, there is a 'pre-existing' program, embedded in comp, in maths, that emulates a 'conscious observer' or have I driven your explanation, into a ditch?? With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of computation, we already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs the emulation. Then with comp, it can be shown that this is indeed done in a way such that you could not make the difference from your inside first person points of view. I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but emulation and computation are concept definable in arithmetic, or equivalent. It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science. Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Fri, Jul 18, 2014 6:56 am Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 17 Jul 2014, at 21:00, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: Whom do you anticipate performing the emulation? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of computation, we already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs the emulation. Then with comp, it can be shown that this is indeed done in a way such that you could not make the difference from your inside first person points of view. I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but emulation and computation are concept definable in arithmetic, or equivalent. It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science. Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thu, Jul 17, 2014 1:00 pm Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 17 Jul 2014, at 18:37, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is contradictory? No. Computationalism is not contradictory, but comp is. What difference do you se between comp and computationalism? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. You agreed on step 0, so that is enough to say that either you believe in comp, or that you find it enough plasuible to start reasoning assuming it, like in the UDA. I can understand that you don't believe in the *consequences* of comp given that you stop at the step 3 (without anyone understanding why though). To claim that comp is different from computationalism is ... weird. Tell me the difference. I doubt you will find anyone, except that I provide a weaker version than usual (through the existence of a substitution level, without putting any bound on it), and more precise, by defining computer with Church thesis. Got the feeling you never have read any papers I wrote. You might have judged before studying. You lost me completely in invoking a difference between comp and computationalism. (and it does contradict your agreement with step one, which by definition makes you understand what comp is). Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 18 Jul 2014, at 16:54, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: So therefore, there is a 'pre-existing' program, embedded in comp, in maths, that emulates a 'conscious observer' or have I driven your explanation, into a ditch?? No, you are right, except that your way of talking might be misleading. All you need to accept is the axiom of Robinson arithmetic. Then the infinitely many programs and their executions exist in the same sense that prime numbers or relatively prime numbers exist. And the reasoning shows that we don't need any other notion of existence. So the physical laws emerge as appearances in machines' mind and consciousness, and this in a completely precise ay, making it possible to test the computationalist hypothesis. Bruno With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of computation, we already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs the emulation. Then with comp, it can be shown that this is indeed done in a way such that you could not make the difference from your inside first person points of view. I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but emulation and computation are concept definable in arithmetic, or equivalent. It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science. Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Fri, Jul 18, 2014 6:56 am Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 17 Jul 2014, at 21:00, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: Whom do you anticipate performing the emulation? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of computation, we already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs the emulation. Then with comp, it can be shown that this is indeed done in a way such that you could not make the difference from your inside first person points of view. I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but emulation and computation are concept definable in arithmetic, or equivalent. It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science. Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thu, Jul 17, 2014 1:00 pm Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 17 Jul 2014, at 18:37, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is contradictory? No. Computationalism is not contradictory, but comp is. What difference do you se between comp and computationalism? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. You agreed on step 0, so that is enough to say that either you believe in comp, or that you find it enough plasuible to start reasoning assuming it, like in the UDA. I can understand that you don't believe in the *consequences* of comp given that you stop at the step 3 (without anyone understanding why though). To claim that comp is different from computationalism is ... weird. Tell me the difference. I doubt you will find anyone, except that I provide a weaker version than usual (through the existence of a substitution level, without putting any bound on it), and more precise, by defining computer with Church thesis. Got the feeling you never have read any papers I wrote. You might have judged before studying. You lost me completely in invoking a difference between comp and computationalism. (and it does contradict your agreement with step one, which by definition makes you understand what comp is). Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You
Re: Selecting your future branch
Ok, thanks. Sounds very complex. It also comes to mind that perhaps, all equations, all axioms, all programs' exist on Platonic space, or the realm of discernible numbers. The easiest way for me to imagine this occurring would be a retrodiction universe, in which the future informs the past. John Cramer, professor emeritus, of the university of Washington is very big on this. If I remember correctly, so is Jack Sarfatti, but I don't know if his version is the same as Cramer's? The future, the distant future somehow influences the present. Maybe. if true, the future is and has always been, Platonic? A database of unimaginable sophistication. A database with 'live' agents to link relation to relation. No, you are right, except that your way of talking might be misleading. All you need to accept is the axiom of Robinson arithmetic. Then the infinitely many programs and their executions exist in the same sense that prime numbers or relatively prime numbers exist. And the reasoning shows that we don't need any other notion of existence. So the physical laws emerge as appearances in machines' mind and consciousness, and this in a completely precise ay, making it possible to test the computationalist hypothesis. Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Fri, Jul 18, 2014 12:24 pm Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 18 Jul 2014, at 16:54, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: So therefore, there is a 'pre-existing' program, embedded in comp, in maths, that emulates a 'conscious observer' or have I driven your explanation, into a ditch?? No, you are right, except that your way of talking might be misleading. All you need to accept is the axiom of Robinson arithmetic. Then the infinitely many programs and their executions exist in the same sense that prime numbers or relatively prime numbers exist. And the reasoning shows that we don't need any other notion of existence. So the physical laws emerge as appearances in machines' mind and consciousness, and this in a completely precise ay, making it possible to test the computationalist hypothesis. Bruno With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of computation, we already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs the emulation. Then with comp, it can be shown that this is indeed done in a way such that you could not make the difference from your inside first person points of view. I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but emulation and computation are concept definable in arithmetic, or equivalent. It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science. Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Fri, Jul 18, 2014 6:56 am Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 17 Jul 2014, at 21:00, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: Whom do you anticipate performing the emulation? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of computation, we already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs the emulation. Then with comp, it can be shown that this is indeed done in a way such that you could not make the difference from your inside first person points of view. I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but emulation and computation are concept definable in arithmetic, or equivalent. It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science. Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thu, Jul 17, 2014 1:00 pm Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 17 Jul 2014, at 18:37, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is contradictory? No. Computationalism is not contradictory, but comp is. What difference do you se between comp and computationalism? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. You agreed on step 0, so that is enough to say that either you believe in comp, or that you find it enough plasuible to start reasoning assuming it, like in the UDA. I can understand that you don't believe in the *consequences* of comp given that you stop at the step 3
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 16 Jul 2014, at 20:43, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 1:07 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: John Clark is NOT a comp believer. This contradicts the fact that you are OK with step 0, and step 1, and step 2. I'm not surprised. I've long ago forgotten what those steps were This might explains your difficulty. but I do know that If one starts with any contradictory concept, such as comp for example, Computationalism is contradictory? What is the contradiction? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
Computationalism is necessarily consistent, but may not be complete except in nearly infinite domains. Richard On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Jul 2014, at 20:43, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 1:07 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: John Clark is NOT a comp believer. This contradicts the fact that you are OK with step 0, and step 1, and step 2. I'm not surprised. I've long ago forgotten what those steps were This might explains your difficulty. but I do know that If one starts with any contradictory concept, such as comp for example, Computationalism is contradictory? What is the contradiction? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 17 Jul 2014, at 14:42, Richard Ruquist wrote: Computationalism is necessarily consistent, I am not sure we can know that, at least in any reasonably justifiable way. but may not be complete except in nearly infinite domains. It is incomplete with respect to arithmetical truth, and all geographical and historical (including the futures) truth, but it has to be complete, amazingly enough, on the physical truth, or if you prefer on the core non-geographical truth. Those are the same for all machine (and even a lot of non-machine) observer and is supposed to give the measure defined (or not) on the computations seen from the 1p view. I could add nuances, but that would be quickly very technical. complete can take different senses, even in mathematical logic alone, and it is harder to define with respect to reality or god or everything or whatever. Bruno Richard On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Jul 2014, at 20:43, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 1:07 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: John Clark is NOT a comp believer. This contradicts the fact that you are OK with step 0, and step 1, and step 2. I'm not surprised. I've long ago forgotten what those steps were This might explains your difficulty. but I do know that If one starts with any contradictory concept, such as comp for example, Computationalism is contradictory? What is the contradiction? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
What do you two say about this (year old) Science 2.0 article, in relation to the mathematical description of reality? The writer is or was a physicist at CERN. I have heard, Lord Rees, UK's astronomer royal, say the same thing. http://www.science20.com/quantum_diaries_survivor/physics_resurrection-105440 -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thu, Jul 17, 2014 11:29 am Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 17 Jul 2014, at 14:42, Richard Ruquist wrote: Computationalism is necessarily consistent, I am not sure we can know that, at least in any reasonably justifiable way. but may not be complete except in nearly infinite domains. It is incomplete with respect to arithmetical truth, and all geographical and historical (including the futures) truth, but it has to be complete, amazingly enough, on the physical truth, or if you prefer on the core non-geographical truth. Those are the same for all machine (and even a lot of non-machine) observer and is supposed to give the measure defined (or not) on the computations seen from the 1p view. I could add nuances, but that would be quickly very technical. complete can take different senses, even in mathematical logic alone, and it is harder to define with respect to reality or god or everything or whatever. Bruno Richard On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Jul 2014, at 20:43, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 1:07 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: John Clark is NOT a comp believer. This contradicts the fact that you are OK with step 0, and step 1, and step 2. I'm not surprised. I've long ago forgotten what those steps were This might explains your difficulty. but I do know that If one starts with any contradictory concept, such as comp for example, Computationalism is contradictory? What is the contradiction? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is contradictory? No. Computationalism is not contradictory, but comp is. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 17 Jul 2014, at 18:37, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is contradictory? No. Computationalism is not contradictory, but comp is. What difference do you se between comp and computationalism? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. You agreed on step 0, so that is enough to say that either you believe in comp, or that you find it enough plasuible to start reasoning assuming it, like in the UDA. I can understand that you don't believe in the *consequences* of comp given that you stop at the step 3 (without anyone understanding why though). To claim that comp is different from computationalism is ... weird. Tell me the difference. I doubt you will find anyone, except that I provide a weaker version than usual (through the existence of a substitution level, without putting any bound on it), and more precise, by defining computer with Church thesis. Got the feeling you never have read any papers I wrote. You might have judged before studying. You lost me completely in invoking a difference between comp and computationalism. (and it does contradict your agreement with step one, which by definition makes you understand what comp is). Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 1:00 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: What difference do you se between comp and computationalism? Why ask me? You're the one who felt that computationalism didn't adequately convey the idea you had and so you needed to invent a new word, a word used on this list and no place else. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
Whom do you anticipate performing the emulation? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thu, Jul 17, 2014 1:00 pm Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 17 Jul 2014, at 18:37, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism is contradictory? No. Computationalism is not contradictory, but comp is. What difference do you se between comp and computationalism? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. You agreed on step 0, so that is enough to say that either you believe in comp, or that you find it enough plasuible to start reasoning assuming it, like in the UDA. I can understand that you don't believe in the *consequences* of comp given that you stop at the step 3 (without anyone understanding why though). To claim that comp is different from computationalism is ... weird. Tell me the difference. I doubt you will find anyone, except that I provide a weaker version than usual (through the existence of a substitution level, without putting any bound on it), and more precise, by defining computer with Church thesis. Got the feeling you never have read any papers I wrote. You might have judged before studying. You lost me completely in invoking a difference between comp and computationalism. (and it does contradict your agreement with step one, which by definition makes you understand what comp is). Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 15 Jul 2014, at 16:35, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Of course there is. You know when in Helsinki, (as a comp believer) John Clark is NOT a comp believer. This contradicts the fact that you are OK with step 0, and step 1, and step 2. what do you expect about the evolution of your subjective life, There are now 2 , so which subjective life? Any one. like the one you describe in the personal diary There are now 2 diaries just as there are now 2 yous. Yes, in the 3-1 view, but each 1-view has noted only once city, and so we can know in advance that both we write in the diary: I see only once city. And so both conclude that the W M prediction was false, even if it stay correct in the 3-1 symmetrical view. For both survivors, that symmetry is 1p broken. The W-guy can asks itself why am I the one in W and not in M, and the M-guy can asks himself the corresponding question. Both got one bit of information, by getting W *or* M, and not both. And both are genuine descendent of the H-guy, and knows that H-guy was wrong in denying that life experience of getting one bit of information. Do you expect to die, or to vanish? No. that would contradict step 0. Why did Bruno Marchal use the personal pronoun you in the above sentence that attempts to explain the nature of personal identity? You made that annoying move repeatedly. The question is not about personal identity, but about pushing on a button, opening a door, and inscribing a result in a diary. Because otherwise the ideas expressed would be exposed as vacuous. If it becomes vacuously true, go to step 4. Bruno Marchal is simply asserting early in the proof what Bruno Marchal is attempting to prove. That is always the case in deductive argument. We make explicit in the theorem what is already implicit in the axiom. But if you are OK, just move to step 4. It might be slightly less obvious, perhaps. Her first person experience is [...] Which first person experience? You don't quote enough. I think you just NOT want to understand. You believe in comp Nobody believes in comp because nobody knows what it means, especially you. I see. You just play with me. I ridicule myself to discuss with you. Bruno UDA offers simple 3p definition of the 3p and 1p pronouns, Well good for uda. AUDA offers purely arithmetical definition Well good for auda and uda. for the 3p notion, and then take the Theaetetus' definition for the 1p notion Well good for Plato even though he was a ignoramus by today's standards; a hillbilly schoolboy knows more about how the world works. the question of prediction is always asked BEFORE we push on the button John Clark isn't interested in when the question was asked, and right now John Clark isn't even interested what the answer is. John Clark just wants to know exactly and unambiguously what the question is. if in Helsinki you (John Clark, the guy I send this post to, arriving at Helsinki by plane, etc.) predict I will [...] Why did Bruno Marchal use the personal pronoun I in the above sentence that attempts to explain the nature of personal identity? Because otherwise the ideas expressed would be exposed as vacuous. Bruno Marchal is simply asserting early in the proof what Bruno Marchal is attempting to prove. We have agree many times that both copies are genuine older helsinki man. Yes indeed that has been agreed to, but then in the next breath Bruno Marchal will say that according to comp even though the Helsinki Man will certainly see Moscow there is less than a 100% chance that the Helsinki man will see Moscow. And that is why John Clark doesn't understand what the Helsinki Man means and that is why even Bruno Marchal doesn't understand what comp means. from the 1p view, the view are unique, even if there are many 1p views, And that is the idea that is simply asserted into the proof, there is something mysterious that makes one and only one of those views unique ; so it's little wonder that in later steps it is proven. John Clark will admit that asserting what is attempted to be proven does leads to proofs that are simpler and shorter. Just ask John Clark to answer the 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24 - iterated multiplication experience. What can John Clark, before pushing the button, expect about the first person experience that John Clark will live John Clark will have 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24 first person experiences as viewed from the 1P and NONE OF THEM ARE UNIQUE, there is no such thing as *the* first person experience that John Clark will live. And there is another problem, ALL views are views of the present, nobody can view the future, guesses can be made about what things will happen but there is no future 1P. By definition of the first
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 1:07 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: John Clark is NOT a comp believer. This contradicts the fact that you are OK with step 0, and step 1, and step 2. I'm not surprised. I've long ago forgotten what those steps were but I do know that If one starts with any contradictory concept, such as comp for example, and starts manipulating it in a logical way there is no way it can avoid generating further contradictions. Or to put it more simply, garbage in garbage out. Bruno Marchal is simply asserting early in the proof what Bruno Marchal is attempting to prove. That is always the case in deductive argument. OK, I will now prove the Riemann hypothesis. Step 1: The Riemann hypothesis is true. Step 2: Therefore the Riemann hypothesis is true. QED John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Of course there is. You know when in Helsinki, (as a comp believer) John Clark is NOT a comp believer. what do you expect about the evolution of your subjective life, There are now 2 , so which subjective life? like the one you describe in the personal diary There are now 2 diaries just as there are now 2 yous. Do you expect to die, or to vanish? No. that would contradict step 0. Why did Bruno Marchal use the personal pronoun you in the above sentence that attempts to explain the nature of personal identity? Because otherwise the ideas expressed would be exposed as vacuous. Bruno Marchal is simply asserting early in the proof what Bruno Marchal is attempting to prove. Her first person experience is [...] Which first person experience? You believe in comp Nobody believes in comp because nobody knows what it means, especially you. UDA offers simple 3p definition of the 3p and 1p pronouns, Well good for uda. AUDA offers purely arithmetical definition Well good for auda and uda. for the 3p notion, and then take the Theaetetus' definition for the 1p notion Well good for Plato even though he was a ignoramus by today's standards; a hillbilly schoolboy knows more about how the world works. the question of prediction is always asked BEFORE we push on the button John Clark isn't interested in when the question was asked, and right now John Clark isn't even interested what the answer is. John Clark just wants to know exactly and unambiguously what the question is. if in Helsinki you (John Clark, the guy I send this post to, arriving at Helsinki by plane, etc.) predict I will [...] Why did Bruno Marchal use the personal pronoun I in the above sentence that attempts to explain the nature of personal identity? Because otherwise the ideas expressed would be exposed as vacuous. Bruno Marchal is simply asserting early in the proof what Bruno Marchal is attempting to prove. We have agree many times that both copies are genuine older helsinki man. Yes indeed that has been agreed to, but then in the next breath Bruno Marchal will say that according to comp even though the Helsinki Man will certainly see Moscow there is less than a 100% chance that the Helsinki man will see Moscow. And that is why John Clark doesn't understand what the Helsinki Man means and that is why even Bruno Marchal doesn't understand what comp means. from the 1p view, the view are unique, even if there are many 1p views, And that is the idea that is simply asserted into the proof, there is something mysterious that makes one and only one of those views unique ; so it's little wonder that in later steps it is proven. John Clark will admit that asserting what is attempted to be proven does leads to proofs that are simpler and shorter. Just ask John Clark to answer the 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24 - iterated multiplication experience. What can John Clark, before pushing the button, expect about the first person experience that John Clark will live John Clark will have 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24 first person experiences as viewed from the 1P and NONE OF THEM ARE UNIQUE, there is no such thing as *the* first person experience that John Clark will live. And there is another problem, ALL views are views of the present, nobody can view the future, guesses can be made about what things will happen but there is no future 1P. By definition of the first person, or experience, the verification is made by comparing the prediction [blah blah] And that is perhaps the most serious error of all, the idea the the sense of self has something to do with the success rate a theory has at predicting the future. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 13 July 2014 05:34, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If there are two (and there are) why didn't Bruno Marchal ask what cities John Clark will see from *a* 1p? That is the 3p view *on* the future 1-views. The? why not *a* future 1-view Because as you just agree above, there are 2 futures first person perspectives, If there are two (and there are) then *a* future first person perspective is Moscow AND *a* future first person perspective is Washington. If there are two (and there are) then there is no such thing as *the* future first person perspective. Are you not just contradicting yourself NO. The answer will be W and M. But that is specifically not what is asked to the guy in Helsinki. He is John Clark hates pronouns! Come on. He refers to the guy in Helsinki And exactly as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal continues to use the phrase the guy in Helsinki without explaining if that means someone who remembers bring in Helsinki and being a guy, or if it means a guy who is currently experiencing Helsinki. It seems to me you are just trying to trip Bruno up because his English isn't very good, rather than trying to find out what he is actually trying to say. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 12 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 July 2014 05:41, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 1:37 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: If the MWI is correct, the electron spin question is equivalent to the teleporter question. No it is not and I've given my reasons why it is not over and over and over and over again. If you disagree with my reasons then fine but don't act as if I've never responded to them before. Not to me. Perhaps you (or anyone) could supply a link to where you've given them? Link, anyone? Or a quote? ISTM... The spin guy measures the electron spin and splits, but continues to act as though there is one of him (he will predict that he has a 50% chance of seeing spin up, even though he may be convinced the MWI is correct). The teleporter guy presses the button and splits, but continues to act as though there is one of him (he will predict he has a 50% chance of seeing Moscow, even though he may know he's been through a duplicator rather than a teleporter). I can't see any obvious difference except in the details (the teleporter could even be linked to a spin measurement, and transport teleporter guy according to the result.) Can anyone tell me what I'm missing? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
Le 13 juil. 2014 12:42, LizR lizj...@gmail.com a écrit : On 12 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 July 2014 05:41, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 1:37 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: If the MWI is correct, the electron spin question is equivalent to the teleporter question. No it is not and I've given my reasons why it is not over and over and over and over again. If you disagree with my reasons then fine but don't act as if I've never responded to them before. Not to me. Perhaps you (or anyone) could supply a link to where you've given them? Link, anyone? Or a quote? ISTM... The spin guy measures the electron spin and splits, but continues to act as though there is one of him (he will predict that he has a 50% chance of seeing spin up, even though he may be convinced the MWI is correct). The teleporter guy presses the button and splits, but continues to act as though there is one of him (he will predict he has a 50% chance of seeing Moscow, even though he may know he's been through a duplicator rather than a teleporter). I can't see any obvious difference except in the details (the teleporter could even be linked to a spin measurement, and transport teleporter guy according to the result.) Can anyone tell me what I'm missing? The infinite bad faith of Liar Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 12 Jul 2014, at 19:34, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If there are two (and there are) why didn't Bruno Marchal ask what cities John Clark will see from *a* 1p? That is the 3p view *on* the future 1-views. The? why not *a* future 1-view Because as you just agree above, there are 2 futures first person perspectives, If there are two (and there are) then *a* future first person perspective is Moscow AND *a* future first person perspective is Washington. If there are two (and there are) then there is no such thing as *the* future first person perspective. Of course there is. You know when in Helsinki, (as a comp believer) that you will survive, and you expect (with that comp relative certainty) that you will drink a cup of coffee in some city, which can only be Moscow, or Washington. (I add to the protocol a free coffee in each city for the courageous teletransporter(s)). I guess that if you accept my invitation to Helsinki, the pronoun you will not make problem at least up to Helsinki. So in Helsinki, I might ask you just this: what do you expect when pushing the button, asking from what do you expect about the evolution of your subjective life, like the one you describe in the personal diary (futures diaries). Do you expect to die, or to vanish? No. that would contradict step 0. Do you expect feeling mysteriously in both cities, drinking a mixture of russian and american coffee? Can you be sure that, after having push the button, you will drink a russian coffee? Imagine that you are *sure* that you will drink a cup of coffee after pushing the button. Then you push the button, and I ask my colleague to interview the copy in washington. that copy has the memory of having been sure that after pushing the button, she would drink russian coffee. that copy has the memory of pushing the button, and opening the door, and getting american coffee. Her first person experience is the one of having bet on russian coffee, and experiencing now only american coffee. She can intellectually imagine and believe in her copy in Moscow, but that is not what she experienced, and given that the question was about that experience, she knows now that she was wrong. Are you not just contradicting yourself NO. The answer will be W and M. But that is specifically not what is asked to the guy in Helsinki. He is John Clark hates pronouns! Come on. He refers to the guy in Helsinki And exactly as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal continues to use the phrase the guy in Helsinki without explaining if that means someone who remembers bring in Helsinki and being a guy, or if it means a guy who is currently experiencing Helsinki. The context, that you avoid, made it clear. You try hard to misunderstand something that you understand very well, all this to avoid step 4. We have agree on all the use of pronouns. LIKE HELL WE HAVE! As you believe in comp [...] I do NOT believe in comp I don't even know what the damn thing means and you don't either, You believe in comp, as it is the step zero of the UDA. Don't confude comp and the consequence of comp that I try to explain to you. Your reason to be stuck in step 3 did not convince anybody, and are ridiculous, as you keep avoiding the 1/3 distinction at the precise palce you claim there is an ambiguity. your silly little homespun word has no consistent definition. You say it just means agreeing to be duplicated but then you insist that according to comp there is one and only one unique future that you have and its grand title is *The* future 1p. No. It is a plural. In the 10-iterated WM duplication, you get 2^10 unique future-1ps. The 1ps are all unique, in the 1p views, with their own personal diaries, with an explicit history like WMMWMM. No algorithm could have predicted that *personal subjective experience. You said I will live them all, but all of them, looking at their diary, refute that proposition. at the moment he makes the asked prediction, and thus before he pushes on the button. [...] you know that when you push on the button, you will [...] And exactly as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal is unable to speak about the nature of personal identity without using lots of personal pronouns even though the hypothetical situation involved was specifically designed to challenge conventional ideas of personal identity. UDA offers simple 3p definition of the 3p and 1p pronouns, that even kids understand. AUDA offers purely arithmetical definition for the 3p notion, and then take the Theaetetus' definition for the 1p notion, making it definable (or meta-definable) in arithmetical terms, and also prove it non definable by the machines. Then the goal is the prediction of event, like pushing a button, and making some measurement. Here
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 13 Jul 2014, at 12:37, LizR wrote: On 13 July 2014 05:34, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If there are two (and there are) why didn't Bruno Marchal ask what cities John Clark will see from *a* 1p? That is the 3p view *on* the future 1-views. The? why not *a* future 1-view Because as you just agree above, there are 2 futures first person perspectives, If there are two (and there are) then *a* future first person perspective is Moscow AND *a* future first person perspective is Washington. If there are two (and there are) then there is no such thing as *the* future first person perspective. Are you not just contradicting yourself NO. The answer will be W and M. But that is specifically not what is asked to the guy in Helsinki. He is John Clark hates pronouns! Come on. He refers to the guy in Helsinki And exactly as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal continues to use the phrase the guy in Helsinki without explaining if that means someone who remembers bring in Helsinki and being a guy, or if it means a guy who is currently experiencing Helsinki. It seems to me you are just trying to trip Bruno up because his English isn't very good, rather than trying to find out what he is actually trying to say. Well seen :) Very systematically. Is it a bot faking being human, or a human faking being a bot? John seems open minded, so its stuck at step 3 is a mystery. Why does he not even want to read the fourth step? Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 11 Jul 2014, at 19:41, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 1:37 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: If the MWI is correct, the electron spin question is equivalent to the teleporter question. No it is not and I've given my reasons why it is not over and over and over and over again. If you disagree with my reasons then fine but don't act as if I've never responded to them before. And we reply to all of your posts, showing that the point you make are either trivial and non relevant, or consists in just not answering the question, or playing a semantic game, like saying ambiguous instead of indeterminate. You say, that after the duplication the fist person is in both cities, but this, although true in the 3p view, is not what is described in *any* 1-view, and so you don't answer about what you (when you are still unique in Helsinki before the duplication) expect to *live* after pushing on the button. It cannot be W M: that prediction is refuted in BOTH diaries, which contains all the first person descriptions relevant for the question asked. Repeating an invalid argument over and over and over and over again does not make it valid. You could also study AUDA, Arithmetical UDA, which is the UD Argument without thought experiment, and it is the main subject of the thesis (in computer science). You really seem to be under influence, because you dismiss AUDA without ever giving *any* reason. UDA is AUDA for the babies, really. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 12 July 2014 05:41, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 1:37 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: If the MWI is correct, the electron spin question is equivalent to the teleporter question. No it is not and I've given my reasons why it is not over and over and over and over again. If you disagree with my reasons then fine but don't act as if I've never responded to them before. Not to me. Perhaps you (or anyone) could supply a link to where you've given them? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If there are two (and there are) why didn't Bruno Marchal ask what cities John Clark will see from *a* 1p? That is the 3p view *on* the future 1-views. The? why not *a* future 1-view Because as you just agree above, there are 2 futures first person perspectives, If there are two (and there are) then *a* future first person perspective is Moscow AND *a* future first person perspective is Washington. If there are two (and there are) then there is no such thing as *the* future first person perspective. Are you not just contradicting yourself NO. The answer will be W and M. But that is specifically not what is asked to the guy in Helsinki. He is John Clark hates pronouns! Come on. He refers to the guy in Helsinki And exactly as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal continues to use the phrase the guy in Helsinki without explaining if that means someone who remembers bring in Helsinki and being a guy, or if it means a guy who is currently experiencing Helsinki. We have agree on all the use of pronouns. LIKE HELL WE HAVE! As you believe in comp [...] I do NOT believe in comp I don't even know what the damn thing means and you don't either, your silly little homespun word has no consistent definition. You say it just means agreeing to be duplicated but then you insist that according to comp there is one and only one unique future that you have and its grand title is *The* future 1p. at the moment he makes the asked prediction, and thus before he pushes on the button. [...] you know that when you push on the button, you will [...] And exactly as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal is unable to speak about the nature of personal identity without using lots of personal pronouns even though the hypothetical situation involved was specifically designed to challenge conventional ideas of personal identity. Here we have a machine that can make exact copies of people and yet Bruno Marchal continues to use personal pronouns in exactly the same way as always as if the existence of such machines didn't call into question things that we don't need to give a second thought about today. And speaking of predictions John Clark predicts that when Bruno Marchal states the question in the next post it will be filled with words that are ambiguous in a world with duplicating machines, words like I and he and you. John Clark further predicts that it will contain phrases like the Helsinki Man without having made clear if that means remembering being a man in Helsinki or if it means a man currently experiencing Helsinki Unfair remark. I told you since the begining that the prediction is asked to the Helsinki man, when he is in Helsinki I don't care when you ask, I want to know who you're asking. I want to know what you mean by the Helsinki man. the confirmation of success of the prediction is asked to each copies (that is, the helsinki man, when he arrive at Moscow). To John Clark that sure sounds like the Helsinki man is anyone who remembers being a man in Helsinki; and Bruno Marchal has already said that he refers to the Helsinki man, therefore after the duplication Bruno Marchal cannot continue to refer to he without creating mountains of ambiguity. The algorithm is only asked to find a predictive algorithm on its first person experience. Forget finding the answer, as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal can't even explain exactly what the question is without using ambiguous personal pronouns. But prove John Clark wrong; after all pronouns were created for convenience not because they were absolutely necessary, so if they are not being used to state what is supposed to be proven as John Clark says then just stop using pronouns; just tell John Clark exactly what the question is without using all those goddamn personal pronouns. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
Le 12 juil. 2014 19:34, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com a écrit : On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If there are two (and there are) why didn't Bruno Marchal ask what cities John Clark will see from *a* 1p? That is the 3p view *on* the future 1-views. The? why not *a* future 1-view Because as you just agree above, there are 2 futures first person perspectives, If there are two (and there are) then *a* future first person perspective is Moscow AND *a* future first person perspective is Washington. If there are two (and there are) then there is no such thing as *the* future first person perspective. if there are two (and there are) then *a* future first person perspective is measuring spin up AND *a* future first person perspective is measuring spin down... and round and round we go with Liar Clark... Are you not just contradicting yourself NO. The answer will be W and M. But that is specifically not what is asked to the guy in Helsinki. He is John Clark hates pronouns! Come on. He refers to the guy in Helsinki And exactly as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal continues to use the phrase the guy in Helsinki without explaining if that means someone who remembers bring in Helsinki and being a guy, or if it means a guy who is currently experiencing Helsinki. We have agree on all the use of pronouns. LIKE HELL WE HAVE! As you believe in comp [...] I do NOT believe in comp I don't even know what the damn thing means and you don't either, your silly little homespun word has no consistent definition. You say it just means agreeing to be duplicated but then you insist that according to comp there is one and only one unique future that you have and its grand title is *The* future 1p. at the moment he makes the asked prediction, and thus before he pushes on the button. [...] you know that when you push on the button, you will [...] And exactly as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal is unable to speak about the nature of personal identity without using lots of personal pronouns even though the hypothetical situation involved was specifically designed to challenge conventional ideas of personal identity. Here we have a machine that can make exact copies of people and yet Bruno Marchal continues to use personal pronouns in exactly the same way as always as if the existence of such machines didn't call into question things that we don't need to give a second thought about today. And speaking of predictions John Clark predicts that when Bruno Marchal states the question in the next post it will be filled with words that are ambiguous in a world with duplicating machines, words like I and he and you. John Clark further predicts that it will contain phrases like the Helsinki Man without having made clear if that means remembering being a man in Helsinki or if it means a man currently experiencing Helsinki Unfair remark. I told you since the begining that the prediction is asked to the Helsinki man, when he is in Helsinki I don't care when you ask, I want to know who you're asking. I want to know what you mean by the Helsinki man. the confirmation of success of the prediction is asked to each copies (that is, the helsinki man, when he arrive at Moscow). To John Clark that sure sounds like the Helsinki man is anyone who remembers being a man in Helsinki; and Bruno Marchal has already said that he refers to the Helsinki man, therefore after the duplication Bruno Marchal cannot continue to refer to he without creating mountains of ambiguity. The algorithm is only asked to find a predictive algorithm on its first person experience. Forget finding the answer, as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal can't even explain exactly what the question is without using ambiguous personal pronouns. But prove John Clark wrong; after all pronouns were created for convenience not because they were absolutely necessary, so if they are not being used to state what is supposed to be proven as John Clark says then just stop using pronouns; just tell John Clark exactly what the question is without using all those goddamn personal pronouns. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 1:37 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: If the MWI is correct, the electron spin question is equivalent to the teleporter question. No it is not and I've given my reasons why it is not over and over and over and over again. If you disagree with my reasons then fine but don't act as if I've never responded to them before. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
Le 11 juil. 2014 19:41, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com a écrit : On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 1:37 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: If the MWI is correct, the electron spin question is equivalent to the teleporter question. No it is not and I've given my reasons why it is not over and over and over and over again. If you disagree with my reasons then fine but don't act as if I've never responded to them before. It is and your doppelganger argument is just playing dodgeball in kindergarten. Quentin John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
Now, I take some rest by answering an easy an rather clear post. On 10 Jul 2014, at 21:40, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 2:43 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I assume comp Well good for comp. I will push on the button, and I know I will not find myself in both city. Exactly. Only in one from my future first person perspective, There are 2 future first person perspectives. Exactly. If there are two (and there are) why didn't Bruno Marchal ask what cities John Clark will see from *a* 1p? That is the 3p view *on* the future 1-views. The? why not *a* future 1-view? Because as you just agree above, there are 2 futures first person perspectives, which both feel to be in front of one city. Are you not just contradicting yourself. The answer will be W and M. But that is specifically not what is asked to the guy in Helsinki. He is John Clark hates pronouns! Come on. He refers to the guy in Helsinki, in the preceding sentence, and of course at the moment he makes the asked prediction, and thus before he pushes on the button. questioned about what he John Clark hates pronouns! expects from his John Clark hates pronouns! future experience, as he knows John Clark hate pronouns! that he will not die, John Clark hates pronouns! in this case the future of the unique first person in Helsinki splits in two, and thus is indeterminate from its first person point of view. If it is asked Is this unmeasured electron spin up or spin down John Clark understands the question but it can't ve answered because before it is measured the electron's spin is indeterminate, but in this case John can't answer what city you will see because John doesn't understand the question. It is claimed that Bruno has discovered something called first person indeterminacy that makes it impossible to answer a certain question. Well, what is that question? John Clark needs to know EXACTLY because John Clark is willing to concede that a ambiguous question can not be answered, but Bruno wasn't the first to figure that out. The question is not ambiguous at all. We have agree on all the use of pronouns. As you believe in comp, you know that when you push on the button, you will survive in only ONE city, even if you will surivive in olny one city, in two cities at once *from a third person view. But yopu know that none of the copies have telepathoc power making hem aware of their doppelganger reconsistution, and can only imagine that third person view, as for both of them, they did get one bit of information. The following exercise is no more ambiguous. I repeat the WM- duplication 1000 times, evaluate your chance of having the first person experience of having been to Moscow 400 times exactly. And speaking of predictions John Clark predicts that when Bruno Marchal states the question in the next post it will be filled with words that are ambiguous in a world with duplicating machines, words like I and he and you. John Clark further predicts that it will contain phrases like the Helsinki Man without having made clear if that means remembering being a man in Helsinki or if it means a man currently experiencing Helsinki. Unfair remark. I told you since the begining that the prediction is asked to the Helsinki man, when he is in Helsinki, and the confirmation of success of the prediction is asked to each copies (that is, the helsinki man, when he arrive at Moscow). Only you have added ambiguity on this. It is already clean and clear in all my papers, that you insist not reading. The pronouns used are entirely clarified by the 1p and 3p distinctions, that only you eliminate and then complains about ambiguities. if I interview a sample of copies, the vast majority will confess not finding any prediction algorithm That's because no known algorithm can figure out exactly what the question was. The algorithm is only asked to find a predictive algorithm on its first person experience. We already know that even if it does not know the protocol, the majority of the copies answers will be No algorithm found or random or white noise. And if the algorithm is Löbian, he can even justifies that there is no algorithm for predicting the first person experience in self-duplication experience. You are only insulting yourself, John. You convince everybody only of your bad faith, or of your inability to dovetail a little bit in the mind of the two copies, enough to see that one will write W ~M, and the other will write M ~W in the respective diaries. if your read the next steps 4, 5, ... you should understand that we are lead to a precise and non ambiguous mathematical problem, albeit difficult. Then the thesis itself is mainly a partial solution to that problem. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Wed, Jul 9, 2014 at 2:43 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I assume comp Well good for comp. I will push on the button, and I know I will not find myself in both city. Exactly. Only in one from my future first person perspective, There are 2 future first person perspectives. If there are two (and there are) why didn't Bruno Marchal ask what cities John Clark will see from *a* 1p? That is the 3p view *on* the future 1-views. The? why not *a* future 1-view? The answer will be W and M. But that is specifically not what is asked to the guy in Helsinki. He is John Clark hates pronouns! questioned about what he John Clark hates pronouns! expects from his John Clark hates pronouns! future experience, as he knows John Clark hate pronouns! that he will not die, John Clark hates pronouns! in this case the future of the unique first person in Helsinki splits in two, and thus is indeterminate from its first person point of view. If it is asked Is this unmeasured electron spin up or spin down John Clark understands the question but it can't ve answered because before it is measured the electron's spin is indeterminate, but in this case John can't answer what city you will see because John doesn't understand the question. It is claimed that Bruno has discovered something called first person indeterminacy that makes it impossible to answer a certain question. Well, what is that question? John Clark needs to know EXACTLY because John Clark is willing to concede that a ambiguous question can not be answered, but Bruno wasn't the first to figure that out. And speaking of predictions John Clark predicts that when Bruno Marchal states the question in the next post it will be filled with words that are ambiguous in a world with duplicating machines, words like I and he and you. John Clark further predicts that it will contain phrases like the Helsinki Man without having made clear if that means remembering being a man in Helsinki or if it means a man currently experiencing Helsinki. if I interview a sample of copies, the vast majority will confess not finding any prediction algorithm That's because no known algorithm can figure out exactly what the question was. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
If the MWI is correct, the electron spin question is equivalent to the teleporter question. In the electron spin scenario, the scientist could reasonably answer I expect to see spin up with 50% probability, and spin-down with 50% probability, and everyone would know what he meant. But he *could* reply I expect to be duplicated, and to see spin-up in one branch of the multiverse, and spin-down in the other. The latter reply does seem a bit odd, even though it's true, because he's using the 3rd person view, which neither copy of him will experience. Only the total system could in theory experience both branches - but the total system doesn't have experiences (as far as we know!) Likewise, the guy who is about to teleport could say similar things about Moscow/Washington. But again, I would expect him to not take the 3p view, even if he knows that's what will happen, because it isn't something that either copy of him will actually experience. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Obviously if duplication is possible then singular pronouns become plural ones in the process. Yes, and yet Bruno still demands to know what one and only one city *you* will see. And things are not made clear if Bruno adds from *the* 1P as if there were only one. Quentin is right. You lie. I always insist that they are two 1p after the duplication. Then why does Bruno Marchal keep demanding to know what one and only one city *you* (which one?) will see from *the* (unique) 1p? If there are two (and there are) why didn't Bruno Marchal ask what cities John Clark will see from *a* 1p? And since there are clearly two and thus the referent to personal pronouns is ambiguous why does Bruno Marchal continue to use them despite numerous requests to stop? after reading Bruno's last few posts John Clark is no longer even sure what Bruno means by The Helsinki Man. What we have agree on, but you often change the definition, arguing it is arbitrary. Once we make the decision, you have to stick on it, even if the initial decision was arbitrary. Fine, so lets get our terms straight. Is The Helsinki Man someone who remembers being a man in Helsinki or is The Helsinki Man someone who is currently experiencing Helsinki? I can work with either definition, they are after all arbitrary, but as Bruno Marchal says whatever is decided it is necessary to stick with it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 09 Jul 2014, at 18:19, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jul 5, 2014 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Obviously if duplication is possible then singular pronouns
become plural ones in the process.
Yes, and yet Bruno still demands to know what one and only one
city *you* will see. And things are not made clear if Bruno adds
from *the* 1P as if there were only one.
Quentin is right. You lie.
I always insist that they are two 1p after the duplication.
Then why does Bruno Marchal keep demanding to know what one and only
one city *you* (which one?) will see from *the* (unique) 1p?
Because, as I assume comp, I know that I will survive not matter what,
in the usual clinical sense, and this in only once city from my future
perspective whatever it is.
I know it would be foolish to predict Washington, as I know that me
in Moscow will disagree, and it is foolish to predict Moscow, as me
in Washington will disagree.
I will push on the button, and I know I will not find myself in both
city. Only in one from my future first person perspective, with
probability one, as this unique city seeing will happens with
certainty in all the cities I (in the 3p sense) will get.
If there are two (and there are) why didn't Bruno Marchal ask what
cities John Clark will see from *a* 1p?
That is the 3p view *on* the future 1-views. The answer will be W and
M. But that is specifically not what is asked to the guy in Helsinki.
He is questioned about what he expects from his future experience, as
he knows that he will not die, just push a button, open a door and see
one city.
And since there are clearly two and thus the referent to personal
pronouns is ambiguous,
No, it is not. It is just thet in this case the future of the unique
first person in Helsinki splits in two, and thus is indeterminate from
its first person point of view. Quite similarly than an observer
looking at a particle in the 1/(sqrt(2))(up + down) state, in the base
{up, down}.
why does Bruno Marchal continue to use them despite numerous
requests to stop?
Imagine, the iterated duplication. The FPI is only the simple obvious
fact that if I interview a sample of copies, the vast majority will
confess not finding any prediction algorithm for what they are tryly
experiencing: a random sequence of W and M. This plays a crucial role
in understanding why we have to extend the Everett embedding of the
physicists in the quantum universal wave to the embedding of the
mathematicians in the arithmetical reality (like somehow Gödel begun).
after reading Bruno's last few posts John Clark is no longer even
sure what Bruno means by The Helsinki Man.
What we have agree on, but you often change the definition,
arguing it is arbitrary. Once we make the decision, you have to
stick on it, even if the initial decision was arbitrary.
Fine, so lets get our terms straight. Is The Helsinki Man someone
who remembers being a man in Helsinki or is The Helsinki Man
someone who is currently experiencing Helsinki?
I can work with either definition, they are after all arbitrary, but
as Bruno Marchal says whatever is decided it is necessary to stick
with it.
I stick with that definition since step one. It is made clear as we
agree that a man using classical teleportation survive, and thus
remains the same guy in the same sense that you remain the same guy
after a night sleep or after a cup of coffee.
Of course it happens also that the Helsinki guy is not just the man
who will remember that he was in Helsinki. At some moment, when we
ask the prediction, he* is* in Helsinki. But he will soon find itself
in some other city. In both of them in the 3p view, but in only one of
them in the 1p view. Look at the ciontext, as sometimes Helsinki man
refers actually to the moment where the giuy is in Helsinki, but all
along we accept that he will survive, indeed in both cities (in the 3-
view), and in only one of them, in each 1-view, which we take all into
consideration.
To see if the prediction, in the one shot experience, was successful,
we have to see the content of BOTH diaries in W and in M. and with the
definition given of W and M (the first person experience of which city
you feel to be in), it is easy to see that W or M was the best. W
and M the worst. and W and M are only partially correct/false.
Similarly for the n shot experiences, if n is big, the best prediction
is white noise.
Bruno
John K Clark
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Re: Selecting your future branch
On 03 Jul 2014, at 21:10, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 10:13 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The yes doctor thing says that if H-guy is destroyed in the process of being scanned prior to transmission, then he will see Then who will see? M or W (or both, depending on how you want to look at it. I don't want to get into pronouns at this point). There is no choice, you just used a personal pronoun at a crucial point so we HAVE to go into it. For the moment forget what your third grade English teacher may have said and answer the following question: in the above thought experiment is the pronoun he singular or plural? Bruno can never give a straight answer to that and that is why I flat out refuse to use the silly little provincial homemade term comp; it's claimed to just mean yes doctor but then Bruno's next utterance is according to comp *he* will see this but *he* will never see that and Bruno never even give a hint about who the hell is he is supposed to be. Wrong. It is you who keep ignoring that the W and the M guy are the same H-guy, and that both agree that they were not able to predict the actual lived fact of being in this (resp that) city. I am saying the factual 3p verifiable thing that almost all H-guys after surviving an iterated WM-duplication, never find an algorithm capable of predicting what they lived, other than random white noise. No pronouns are used in an ambiguous way, and in the duplicating case, I make clear if we talk on the 1p or 3p, as here things are quite different (for the 3p I, you are in both city, for the 1p I, you are always in only once city). You keep saying that you see an ambiguity, but you keep making it yourself by confusing the 1p and the 3p self notion, despite the simple 3p definition defined in the UDA. Dr McCoy worries that every time someone goes through the transporter, he's being murdered and a clone created which only thinks it's the same person. Thinking that I'm alive and am John Clark is plenty good enough for me! And I would be absolutely delighted to find out that I had been murdered yesterday because then that would mean that death is not nearly as big a deal as I had thought it was. I can't imagine hearing better news! What if you learn that he has ben tortured, and that he was reconstituted from some pirating the tele-transport channel. Will you still use the same channel? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 03 Jul 2014, at 21:51, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jun 30, 2014 at 11:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I predict that the H-guy will see Helsinki, unless you destroy him immediately after duplication That is indeed the case in the step 3 protocol. Fine, then currently nobody is seeing Helsinki. Sure, after the duplication. But the H-guy has not vanished. By comp he is in both W and M, although that for his (many now) points of view, he is in one city. in which case the H-guy will see absolutely nothing. Then the H-person dies already at step 1 and 0. It's just a matter of arbitrary definitions. But once chosen, we have to stick on the one chosen. Arbitrariness is not a problem, if we stay coherent in the reasoning. Is the H-person the guy currently seeing Helsinki or is he not? Why adding currently? We have already agreed that the Helsinki guy is the guy who is in Helsinki at the beginning of the experience, and we ask him to predict what he expect to see when later he will be pushing on the button and open the door. Then the Helsinki guy is in both cities, he multiplies. But not from his first person point of view where he is always entire and unique in inly once city, each time he does that experiment. If he is and nobody is currently seeing Helsinki then the Helsinki Man no longer exists You are changing the definition. By comp we agree that someone survive with an artficial guy, even if the original guy has vanished. The H- guy survives, indeed, in both W and M. But only in once of them, from each copies points of view. and the correct prediction of what the Helsinki man would see would be oblivion. However if the Helsinki man is anybody who remembers being the Helsinki Man Yes, that was the definition on which we agreed and is forced by comp. (a more useful definition in my opinion) In mine too. Since 40 years, and used all along UDA and AUDA. then BOTH the Moscow Man and the Washington Man are the Helsinki Man Right. and therefore the correct prediction about what the Helsinki Man would see would have been Moscow AND Washington. Right for the 3p description of the outcome. But that is not what the question was about. It was about which city you actually see when opening the door. As in Helsinki you know that in the 3p you will be both, but that in BOTH city, you will feel seeing only once city, you know in advance that you will see only one city, and that predicting it makes no sense, as it will be refuted by one copy on two in all cases. So here again, you don't answer to the question asked. You never do the thought experience. Once you are duplicated, you go out of your body, and see the two reconstitutions, and never put your shoes in any of them, when you have to do that for all of them, or at least some honest sample of them. You have come back to your favorite error. The 1-3 confusion about the question asked. Incidentally, this contradicts the fact that you have already agreed that both the W-person and the M-person are genuinely the H- person. As I say it all depends on what definition H-person has. The one you like above, which I have always used. You assume comp I don't assume it, I can't assume what I don't understand and your little homemade term comp is nonstandard and is used on this list and nowhere else. That is not an argument. I use comp in the sense of computationalism, and you have to find a flaw in the reasoning to criticize it, but you just stuck yourself in a deny about the difference between 1p and 3p in the question asked. You deny that if the H-guy, still in hlesinki, predict W and M, it is refuted in both W and M, given that they will write each W (and not M), or M (and not W). Like Kim said, 8th grade understand that. I discovered that about at that age. I have have never had any problem to explain this to reasonable people. But the time someone not completely stupid like you might explain the time needed for the mainstream to accept this. I don't insist, I have never submitted a publication. Just accepting command when people insist. On this list, I just have fun to chat with friends interested in the fundamental question and everything. I know what computationalism means but comp remains as big a mystery as all those vague personal pronouns, shifting definitions and peepee floating around. Then ask precise question about anything unclear. Except possible new bees no one has any problem with any this. Step 7 and step 8 are a bit more subtle. Calling the 1p-3p difference peepee will not help you and provides only information on your state of mind and attitude here. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 04 Jul 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote (to John Calrk) Well, perhaps. I'm no so sure I'd be happy that there is a duplicate of me who's OK if I'm facing death. How about a duplicate who split off from you a week ago? Would you be happy to be murdered knowing that he was alive and well, and thinks he's you? What if the duplicate split off millions years ago? Biological evolution implements our duplication since the beginning, arguably so. John seems to have difficulties to complete the thought experience. He sees from outside that he is in both city, but fail to see that in both city the copies write I see only one city, and that they are different, and that they could not have predicted it. In fact, if you agree (with me and John (!)), that indeed our 1p are instantiated in both place (W and M), then you can understand that we are already the same person in that sense; we are the amoeba who became every plant and animals. But this will appears as a theological non justifiable truth, and also, it is not usable in physics/ prediction, which ask for precise prediction of experiment, like pushing a button, opening a door, and noting a place. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Thu, Jul 3, 2014 at 9:31 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Obviously if duplication is possible then singular pronouns become plural ones in the process. Yes, and yet Bruno still demands to know what one and only one city *you* will see. And things are not made clear if Bruno adds from *the* 1P as if there were only one. Obviously our language isn't designed to cope with this possibility, which doesn't happen in real life (yet), hence the pronoun confusion. Exactly, and Bruno lacks the mental self discipline to just refuse to use personal pronouns in all thought experiments involving duplicating chambers. John Clark admits that not using personal pronouns can result in prose that is a bit clunky and lacking in poetry, but it's still clear and logical and if Bruno wishes to philosophize on these matters it simply must be done. Actually it's even worse than that, after reading Bruno's last few posts John Clark is no longer even sure what Bruno means by The Helsinki Man. Thinking that I'm alive and am John Clark is plenty good enough for me! And I would be absolutely delighted to find out that I had been murdered yesterday because then that would mean that death is not nearly as big a deal as I had thought it was. I can't imagine hearing better news! Well, perhaps. I'm no so sure I'd be happy that there is a duplicate of me Not even if you were that duplicate?! How about a duplicate who split off from you a week ago? A week is far too long for my taste, the thing I don't like about death is having a last thought, so I'd only be happy to face death if a copy of me was made right now. How long is now? About a second, maybe two. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 1:11 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: the H-guy has not vanished. That depends on what the H-guy means. By comp I don't give a rat's ass about comp. he is in both W and M, So the H-guy is in both W and M but the H-guy is not in W and M. Are you SURE you're a logician? We have already agreed that the Helsinki guy is the guy who is in Helsinki at the beginning of the experience I thought the Helsinki guy was the guy who remembered being in Helsinki, but definitions are arbitrary so fine, but then the Helsinki guy no longer exists at the end of the experience or even in the middle. And by the time you read this post the 15517042014 guy (aka John K Clark as he was at 1551 Universal Mean Time on July 4 2014) will no longer exists. By comp we agree that [...] We? I agree with nothing concerning comp because I believe that homemade word is just vague inconsistent mush. I use comp in the sense of computationalism No you do not, if you did you'd just call it computationalism instead of inventing a new word. that is not what the question was about. It was about which city you actually see when I HATE PRONOUNS!! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Mon, Jun 30, 2014 at 11:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I predict that the H-guy will see Helsinki, unless you destroy him immediately after duplication That is indeed the case in the step 3 protocol. Fine, then currently nobody is seeing Helsinki. in which case the H-guy will see absolutely nothing. Then the H-person dies already at step 1 and 0. It's just a matter of arbitrary definitions. Is the H-person the guy currently seeing Helsinki or is he not? If he is and nobody is currently seeing Helsinki then the Helsinki Man no longer exists and the correct prediction of what the Helsinki man would see would be oblivion. However if the Helsinki man is anybody who remembers being the Helsinki Man (a more useful definition in my opinion) then BOTH the Moscow Man and the Washington Man are the Helsinki Man and therefore the correct prediction about what the Helsinki Man would see would have been Moscow AND Washington. Incidentally, this contradicts the fact that you have already agreed that both the W-person and the M-person are genuinely the H-person. As I say it all depends on what definition H-person has. You assume comp I don't assume it, I can't assume what I don't understand and your little homemade term comp is nonstandard and is used on this list and nowhere else. I know what computationalism means but comp remains as big a mystery as all those vague personal pronouns, shifting definitions and peepee floating around. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
2014-07-03 21:51 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Mon, Jun 30, 2014 at 11:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I predict that the H-guy will see Helsinki, unless you destroy him immediately after duplication That is indeed the case in the step 3 protocol. Fine, then currently nobody is seeing Helsinki. in which case the H-guy will see absolutely nothing. Then the H-person dies already at step 1 and 0. It's just a matter of arbitrary definitions. Is the H-person the guy currently seeing Helsinki or is he not? If he is and nobody is currently seeing Helsinki then the Helsinki Man no longer exists and the correct prediction of what the Helsinki man would see would be oblivion. However if the Helsinki man is anybody who remembers being the Helsinki Man (a more useful definition in my opinion) then BOTH the Moscow Man and the Washington Man are the Helsinki Man and therefore the correct prediction about what the Helsinki Man would see would have been Moscow AND Washington. Incidentally, this contradicts the fact that you have already agreed that both the W-person and the M-person are genuinely the H-person. As I say it all depends on what definition H-person has. I predict liar Clark will see spin up AND spin down... because under MWI MR. LIAR CLARK HAS BEEN DUPLICATED (yes I know it's a nightmare). What does Liar Clark predict ? That he is a monkey arse ? (sorry for the monkeys) You assume comp I don't assume it, I can't assume what I don't understand and your little homemade term comp is nonstandard and is used on this list and nowhere else. I know what computationalism means but comp remains as big a mystery as all those vague personal pronouns, shifting definitions and peepee floating around. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 4 July 2014 07:10, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 10:13 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The yes doctor thing says that if H-guy is destroyed in the process of being scanned prior to transmission, then he will see Then who will see? Two copies of H-man will see... M or W (or both, depending on how you want to look at it. I don't want to get into pronouns at this point). There is no choice, you just used a personal pronoun at a crucial point so we HAVE to go into it. For the moment forget what your third grade English teacher may have said and answer the following question: in the above thought experiment is the pronoun he singular or plural? Bruno can never give a straight answer to that and that is why I flat out refuse to use the silly little provincial homemade term comp; it's claimed to just mean yes doctor but then Bruno's next utterance is according to comp *he* will see this but *he* will never see that and Bruno never even give a hint about who the hell is he is supposed to be. Obviously if duplication is possible then singular pronouns become plural ones in the process. What I meant was that H man will be duplicated, so after the duplication there will be two copies of him. Obviously our language isn't designed to cope with this possibility, which doesn't happen in real life (yet), hence the pronoun confusion. Dr McCoy worries that every time someone goes through the transporter, he's being murdered and a clone created which only thinks it's the same person. Thinking that I'm alive and am John Clark is plenty good enough for me! And I would be absolutely delighted to find out that I had been murdered yesterday because then that would mean that death is not nearly as big a deal as I had thought it was. I can't imagine hearing better news! Well, perhaps. I'm no so sure I'd be happy that there is a duplicate of me who's OK if I'm facing death. How about a duplicate who split off from you a week ago? Would you be happy to be murdered knowing that he was alive and well, and thinks he's you? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 4 Jul 2014, at 11:31 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Another bloviating blustering belligerent bellicose bunch of bollocks from Mr Clark follows: For the moment forget what your third grade English teacher may have said and answer the following question: For the moment maybe switch off your ego. That little lever down near your intelligence. Flip it. in the above thought experiment is the pronoun he singular or plural? Once they are emailed they are duplicated so he means they. However no person can experience more than one iteration of themselves. Even after 5 shots of Jäger Meister. That's the First Person Thing you hate, John. We have to use some bloody pronoun now don't we. hG : I propose that following duplication we now write 2he following the pushing of the teleporter button. Just so Mr Clark gets it. So, the problem is the fact that, once again, language is the greatest barrier to human communication. An even bigger problem than that may well be that others exist like Mr Clark who see this but think, as he does, that by denying it they can prolong some battle that they are determined to win because,hey, winning an argument is as good as contributing to a discussion, right? hB: Wrong. Contributing to a discussion is not about proving someone wrong however many thrills it gives you. Bruno can never give a straight answer to that and that is why I flat out refuse to use the silly little provincial homemade term comp; Then propose a better term. But you have to understand it first. it's claimed to just mean yes doctor but then Bruno's next utterance is according to comp *he* will see this but *he* will never see that and Bruno never even give a hint about who the hell is he is supposed to be. The FPI is plural. You have parallel selves. An enormous, unfathomably large number. Which one you are from moment to moment you cannot know. Language, which is the creation of lousy religious clerics doing bad theology, cannot express this. It is you who should forget what your 1st Grade English teacher told you. Liz: Obviously if duplication is possible then singular pronouns become plural ones in the process. What I meant was that H man will be duplicated, so after the duplication there will be two copies of him. Obviously our language isn't designed to cope with this possibility, which doesn't happen in real life (yet), hence the pronoun confusion. This is pretty much how I recently interpreted it for Grade 8 at a girls' private school where I work. They grokked it straight away. But then I guess girls in Grade 8 elite private schools daydream about having parallel lives these days. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 2 Jul 2014, at 12:46 pm, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Brent: I don't think that's true. I think differently than I did as a child. As a child one experiences many more things as new, fresh, surprising. Liz: OK, so you disagree with Kim (or my reading of Kim) on that. You're on different sides in the what is consciousness vs what are the contents of consciousness? debate. Or indeed the materialist vs comp debate, which come to the same conclusion (physicalism = we are nothing but our memories, predispositions etc - consciousness is not anything fundamental, it is just a user illusion, to quote Dan Dennett, a sort of glorified desktop created by the brain, with no user except itself. Comp = consciousness exists and is (more or less) fundamental.) Kim: I am a self that has not felt any different throughout its existence. I take from this that my self is one thing and then there is everything else, including the body. I have never identified me with anything material. I don't know what age I am. The self simply exists. It always did and it always will. I have died a multitude of times and will yet die a multitude of times. This is what life is. Death eternal. A brain simply hosts a self, best generalised as a mind. This might be the same as soul, but I'm not really into the supernatural, only a vastly expanded reality. I speak of phenomenon and noumenon. Brain is phenomenon. Mind is noumenon, to be perfectly Kant for a moment... K -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 7/2/2014 5:07 AM, Kim Jones wrote: On 2 Jul 2014, at 12:46 pm, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Brent: I don't think that's true. I think differently than I did as a child. As a child one experiences many more things as new, fresh, surprising. Liz: OK, so you disagree with Kim (or my reading of Kim) on that. You're on different sides in the what is consciousness vs what are the contents of consciousness? debate. Or indeed the materialist vs comp debate, which come to the same conclusion (physicalism = we are nothing but our memories, predispositions etc - consciousness is not anything fundamental, it is just a user illusion, to quote Dan Dennett, a sort of glorified desktop created by the brain, with no user except itself. Comp = consciousness exists and is (more or less) fundamental.) Kim: I am a self that has not felt any different throughout its existence. How could you know that if you is independent of your memory? I take from this that my self is one thing and then there is everything else, including the body. I have never identified me with anything material. I don't know what age I am. I'll bet you know how long ago your earliest memory is. The self simply exists. It always did and it always will. I have died a multitude of times and will yet die a multitude of times. This is what life is. Death eternal. A brain simply hosts a self, best generalised as a mind. This might be the same as soul, but I'm not really into the supernatural, only a vastly expanded reality. Based on assertions about your feelings? Brent I speak of phenomenon and noumenon. Brain is phenomenon. Mind is noumenon, to be perfectly Kant for a moment... K -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 3 Jul 2014, at 5:09 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: A brain simply hosts a self, best generalised as a mind. This might be the same as soul, but I'm not really into the supernatural, only a vastly expanded reality. Based on assertions about your feelings? Brent Yes. This is theology, remember. The feeling that there is something ageless and eternal about the self is a kind of religious assertion. I think it is possible to see this as a self-referentially correct (Löbian) statement, based only on 1P evidence. The religion you have when you are not using any formal, institutionalised religious framework. When you throw out all public religion, this does not mean that you have given away religion. Thomas Aquinas said the soul is naturally religious. Well, he said it in Latin. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 1 July 2014 17:38, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/30/2014 9:03 PM, LizR wrote: Well, that's quite straightforward. Brent is assuming the (so called) Aristotelean paradigm, and hence that his mother *is* her brain. I'm assuming (on some evidence) that she, her stream of consciousness, is what her brain does. For example, she remembers her childhood very clearly, better than the recent past (like whether or not she's told you about her childhood in the last two days). I don't see how this jibes with Kim's idea of poor reception. It *doesn't* jibe with it, that was his point. As far as I can see, Kim is suggesting that poor reception - the workings of memory, perception and so on - cause a consciousness which is basically unchanged to appear different to the outside world. As he (?) says, one doesn't feel that one's mind changes as one gets older, one feels that external things have changed - e.g. my memory may fail me more, but (on this view) that is an external thing, a piece of wetware, going wrong, rather than something about me that has changed. Apologies if I am misrepresenting Kim here, that was my reading. It seems like a particularly clear cut distinction between the Aristotle and Plato camps' views, which is why I tried to highlight that fact (if fact it be). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 7/1/2014 1:09 AM, LizR wrote: On 1 July 2014 17:38, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/30/2014 9:03 PM, LizR wrote: Well, that's quite straightforward. Brent is assuming the (so called) Aristotelean paradigm, and hence that his mother /is/ her brain. I'm assuming (on some evidence) that she, her stream of consciousness, is what her brain does. For example, she remembers her childhood very clearly, better than the recent past (like whether or not she's told you about her childhood in the last two days). I don't see how this jibes with Kim's idea of poor reception. It /doesn't/ jibe with it, that was his point. As far as I can see, Kim is suggesting that poor reception - the workings of memory, perception and so on - cause a consciousness which is basically unchanged to appear different to the outside world. As he (?) says, one doesn't feel that one's mind changes as one gets older, I don't think that's true. I think differently than I did as a child. As a child one experiences many more things as new, fresh, surprising. one feels that external things have changed - e.g. my memory may fail me more, but (on this view) that is an external thing, a piece of wetware, going wrong, rather than something about me that has changed. But I see this as denial of the simple fact that there is no sense to saying one is the same person without one's memories. My father died of Alzheimer's and he was definitely not the same person, in the sense of personality, when he had lost his memory. Of course he was the same person in the physical and legal sense of continuity. I think it's mere wishful thinking to suppose there is a you a soul that is independent of all your memories (including the unconscious ones). Brent Apologies if I am misrepresenting Kim here, that was my reading. It seems like a particularly clear cut distinction between the Aristotle and Plato camps' views, which is why I tried to highlight that fact (if fact it be). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 2 July 2014 05:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 1:09 AM, LizR wrote: On 1 July 2014 17:38, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/30/2014 9:03 PM, LizR wrote: Well, that's quite straightforward. Brent is assuming the (so called) Aristotelean paradigm, and hence that his mother *is* her brain. I'm assuming (on some evidence) that she, her stream of consciousness, is what her brain does. For example, she remembers her childhood very clearly, better than the recent past (like whether or not she's told you about her childhood in the last two days). I don't see how this jibes with Kim's idea of poor reception. It *doesn't* jibe with it, that was his point. As far as I can see, Kim is suggesting that poor reception - the workings of memory, perception and so on - cause a consciousness which is basically unchanged to appear different to the outside world. As he (?) says, one doesn't feel that one's mind changes as one gets older, I don't think that's true. I think differently than I did as a child. As a child one experiences many more things as new, fresh, surprising. OK, so you disagree with Kim (or my reading of Kim) on that. You're on different sides in the what is consciousness vs what are the contents of consciousness? debate. Or indeed the materialist vs comp debate, which come to the same conclusion (physicalism = we are nothing but our memories, predispositions etc - consciousness is not anything fundamental, it is just a user illusion, to quote Dan Dennett, a sort of glorified desktop created by the brain, with no user except itself. Comp = consciousness exists and is (more or less) fundamental.) one feels that external things have changed - e.g. my memory may fail me more, but (on this view) that is an external thing, a piece of wetware, going wrong, rather than something about me that has changed. But I see this as denial of the simple fact that there is no sense to saying one is the same person without one's memories. My father died of Alzheimer's and he was definitely not the same person, in the sense of personality, when he had lost his memory. Of course he was the same person in the physical and legal sense of continuity. I think it's mere wishful thinking to suppose there is a you a soul that is independent of all your memories (including the unconscious ones). This may well be true, but it isn't a simple fact. Or rather if it is, we can't know that it is, at least assuming the scientific method is correct. Bruno can probably fill in the details of whether comp posits a you separate from your memories etc better than I can. I suspect that it does, but I may be wrong. Needless to say I can see that either of these views may be correct - there is evidence for both, imho - or perhaps the answer is something completely different. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
Liz: Another way of looking at it Kim (interrupting in annoying fashion): There speaks a real thinker with precisely those words. Perception and observation is where we start. There is - wait for it - more than one way of viewing a bunch of data. It depends which glasses you have on your nose as to what you see when you look. Liz is wearing her Green Hat here (hG) - the search for alternatives; the foundation of creative thinking, which logically starts with perception. These are the other set of options you can access in terms of belief after looking at something other than the standard set. It takes effort to go to the trouble of looking at things differently. But there you are. That's not thinking yet. That's perception. I hear a bird. A Gloccamorra bird. Or something. is that if H guy is scanned and in the process destroyed, then recreated so that he is identical (below the substitution level -- e.g. this might mean atom for atom, which is where the Heisenberg compensators come into play :-) then his identity and consciousness is recreated with him, and they actually are his identity and consciousness, not just a copy which thinks it's him. You are all of these people. You can only experience one of these people. You or God can never know which one you will most likely experience 5 minutes from now let alone after a year's storage before being emailed to Uranus or Washington or Scotland. Hence there is a true randomness in the access you have to your various selves, moment to moment. You are these computational relations. They don't cease to exist so how could you? It may be this is why our individual lives are so ridiculously short compared to the age of the universe. It may be that We (the Royal 'We' have all of eternity to experience our self. Aubrey de Grey and Ray Kurzweil are complete wankers, you know that? They want to conquer death so they can live forever. Someone tell these two that they're wasting their time because it happens anyway. Liz: Yet another way of looking at it is that this sort of process goes on all the time as the cells of our bodies are gradually replaced, and our identity is preserved during cell replacement to the same extent that it is preserved by a hypothetical matter transmitter, whatever extent that might be. (PS This is all discussed quite cogently in the Star Trek novel Spock must die! by James Blish, in which Dr McCoy worries that every time someone goes through the transporter, he's being murdered and a clone created which only thinks it's the same person. Kim: This woman grew up on Star Trek, like I did Liz: It also has something very similar to Bruno's thought experiment happen except that the duplicate is in this case an evil twin due to having been mirrored in the process :- Kim: That's a great episode of Star Trek eh! and Leo Nimoy got to wear a moustache which makes him look very devilish. Conscious entities are infinite numbers of computations in the sense of the relations that naturally exist between the numbers, as Bruno says. Nothing is happening; everything just is. When numbers are considered real, numbers look a certain way to each other. The way numbers look to each other looks remarkably like what you look like when I look at you and when I look at the world in general and vice versa. Perception. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 29 Jun 2014, at 18:33, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: the H-guy cannot be sure about its future 1-view *from the unique 1-view Unique? That implies that there is one and only one correct answer to the question of what the Helsinki Man will see, so after the exparament is over there should be enough information to know what that one correct answer should have been. So what was it? Would that that one unique correct prediction have been Washington or Moscow? Before you flip a coin you don't know if the correct prediction is heads or tails, but at least after you flip it you know what the correct prediction would have been; but in your thought exparament even after all the dust has settled there still isn't one correct answer. The difference is that although the bodies of the Helsinki Man is duplicated there is still only one Helsinki Man until one copy sees something the other doesn't. The Helsinki Man only turns into the Moscow Man when he sees Moscow and not before; so the only unique correct prediction is that the Moscow man will be the Man who sees Moscow. What more could you expect? predict with certainlty the unique city you will see The city who will see? The H-guy. I predict that the H-guy will see Helsinki, unless you destroy him immediately after duplication That is indeed the case in the step 3 protocol. in which case the H-guy will see absolutely nothing. Then the H-person dies already at step 1 and 0. So you are showing that ~(step 3) - ~(step 0), that is: ~(step 3) implies not-comp, that is, comp implies step 3. You can move on step 4. Incidentally, this contradicts the fact that you have already agreed that both the W-person and the M-person are genuinely the H-person. You made an effort to do a different error, this time. I appreciate the effort. I further predict that Mr. You will see Moscow AND Washington because MR. YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. you forget also the question asked, which is about what you will live [...] What who will live? You, the H-guy, in the first person sense. The question is always asked to John Clark, before any duplication, when he is in the city of Helsinki. You know you will survive in only ONE city from any of your first person perspective of the continuation. You just cannot be sure of which one, as any prediction on which precise city you will see will be contradicted by the other guy in the other city. in the 1p sense from the 1p view and not any 3p view on where those unique 1-view appears. That's just a tad too much peepee for my taste. Then I can understand that you will never understand, because that is exactly what you should focus on. You are not answering the question asked. That's because the question asked is gibberish. You want to know which one of the 2 will see Moscow, but there is only one not two, there is no 2 until one sees Moscow and the other does not. The question is what you expect from your first person experience. W and M denotes feeling being at W (resp. M). The question is not about the body, nor where your first person experience will be instantiated, but about which city you will feel to be in when doing the experience of opening the door after having pushed the device button in Helsinki. You assume comp, and so you know that you (the H-guy) will survive, one and entire, in ONE city from the first person perspective. So (W M) is excluded: you know in advance in Helsinki that if you write the prediction (W M) in your diary, the inscription (W M) will be itself duplicated in both places, as by definition the first person discourse is the content of the diary that the experiencer take with him in the scanner-annihilation-duplication machine. But the copy in Moscow, when opening the door will see only Moscow, and so (M W) is refuted. from the first person perspective (on which the question is all about), M has been selected from M and W. He got one bit of information, and it is the same for the guy in W. One bit of information has been offered to him, from his first person perspective, as he will write W in his diary, contradicting his prediction in Helsinki. The Moscow Man will be the one who sees Moscow, what more do you want me to say for you to count it as a successful prediction? The prediction must be successful from the first person perspective of *all* copies. W v M is an example of always successful prediction (for that protocol). W M is always false. W and M are correct one have of the time. In the iterated case, the P(W) is given by the binomial coefficients, and the gaussian integral for big value of the number of iteration. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 6/30/2014 12:51 AM, Kim Jones wrote: You are all of these people. You can only experience one of these people. You or God can never know which one you will most likely experience 5 minutes from now let alone after a year's storage before being emailed to Uranus or Washington or Scotland. Hence there is a true randomness in the access you have to your various selves, moment to moment. You are these computational relations. They don't cease to exist so how could you? But not all computational relations are you. So the ones that are you can cease, as when you are under anesthesia. I put you in scare quotes because it refers to the stream of conscious thoughts - which is not the usual meaning of you. Much is made of observer-moments and their sequence, but I just got back from my mother's 100th birthday party. She's still relatively sharp and lives alone, but it's also clear that she's fading. Her sensory perceptions are weak and her thoughts are slower than they once were. I expect that one day she will just fade out altogether, as her mother did at age 99. So why imagine that the next observer-moment for her will be any different than the observer moment of a rock? If you want immortality, then I suppose you can imagine some ghost-in-arithmetic that will recur in some other place and time, but without you memories why suppose it's you? Brent If all else fails, immortality can always be assured by spectacular error. -- John Kenneth Galbraith -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 1 Jul 2014, at 4:57 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Much is made of observer-moments and their sequence, but I just got back from my mother's 100th birthday party. She's still relatively sharp and lives alone, but it's also clear that she's fading. Her sensory perceptions are weak and her thoughts are slower than they once were. I expect that one day she will just fade out altogether, as her mother did at age 99. So why imagine that the next observer-moment for her will be any different than the observer moment of a rock? I think the brain fades but not the self. The older I get the more bizarre the disparity between how young I feel and certain things that relate to the jouney of the body toward its inevitable demise. The self can only remain conerent insofar as the hosting apparatus is up to its job. Any apparent fuzziness of self with age is surely the result of loss of signal? The brain does start to go down the toilet after about 80 so one would expect interference or patchy signal strength. I have an elderly mother in precisely the same situation but not quite as old as your mum. She now feels trapped by her body because she feels young of spirit and can certainly pick an argument just like she used to. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
Well, that's quite straightforward. Brent is assuming the (so called) Aristotelean paradigm, and hence that his mother *is* her brain. Kim is assuming that it's possible the (so called) Platonic paradigm holds, and she may not be (and that something like comp may therefore be correct). I wonder who's right. I guess I'll find out eventually (or not). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 6/30/2014 9:03 PM, LizR wrote: Well, that's quite straightforward. Brent is assuming the (so called) Aristotelean paradigm, and hence that his mother /is/ her brain. I'm assuming (on some evidence) that she, her stream of consciousness, is what her brain does. For example, she remembers her childhood very clearly, better than the recent past (like whether or not she's told you about her childhood in the last two days). I don't see how this jibes with Kim's idea of poor reception. Brent Kim is assuming that it's possible the (so called) Platonic paradigm holds, and she may not be (and that something like comp may therefore be correct). I wonder who's right. I guess I'll find out eventually (or not). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 26 Jun 2014, at 22:27, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: We use the usual sense of self defined by the yes doctor. Nobody does that, even you don't do that to define yourself except when you're arguing philosophy on the internet. ? ! We use that all the time. I do it just now to reply to you. As I said, even you don't do that to define yourself, except when you're arguing philosophy on the internet. There is no choice, if probability is to be derived its got to be iterated, and no matter how often you iterate it Mr. You ALWAYS sees Moscow only AND Mr. You ALWAYS sees Washington only; This contradicts 2^n - 1 diaries It most certainly does NOT, because MR. YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED! The W-john Clark will be force to change its mind, Only if John Clark is a dimwit, I don't think he is but opinions vary. unless he confuse him [...] Quotation marks don't help, who the hell is Mr. Him ? him as the owner of this or that particular diary. Then Mr. Him is not the same as Mr. You, the original question was about Mr. You so why even talk to Mr. Him. Both the W-person and the M-person are the H-person, Yes, but the W-person is not the M-person. Exactly, so the H-guy cannot be sure about its future 1-view *from the unique 1-view that he will live with certainty (certain bears on unique here). In the 2 slit experiment it's always crystal clear who Mr. You is, I don't see that. In Everett, if I put you in the state M+W [...] That's a cool superpower you have there, but how do I know it's real? You claim to have done something spectacular but I still only see one person around here that looks like me, that's why in everyday life personal pronouns cause no problems and never will until duplicating machines are actually invented. you can't Who can't? The H-guy. predict with certainlty the unique city you will see The city who will see? The H-guy. Above you did agree that both copies are the H-guy. The 2 slit experiment is about what a observer will see, Bruno's thought experiment is about the sense of self of the observer. Wrong. It is about what an observer will see. You push a button, and open a door, and note which unique city you see Wrong. What the observer sees changes the sense of self, seeing Moscow is the one and only thing that changed the Helsinki man into the Moscow man and is the only thing that differentiates him from the Washington man, he saw a different city. Not that predictions are of the slightest importance in this matter but if we're talking about the Helsinki Man (aka the man currently seeing Helsinki) and the Helsinki Man is destroyed after the duplication then the correct prediction about what the Helsinki Man will see would obviously be absolutely nothing. that would contradict step one, and step 0, which you have accepted. Fortunately I've long ago forgotten what step 0 Unfortunately you forget also the question asked, which is about what you will live in the 1p sense, from the 1p view, and not any 3p view on where those unique 1-view appears. is but if Mr. Helsinki is the guy currently seeing Helsinki and you destroy the guy currently seeing Helsinki then obviously Mr. Helsinki is now seeing absolutely nothing, although Mr. You is doing just fine and is seeing Washington AND Moscow. Not simultaneously. You are stuck in your deny of the question asked. If on the other hand we're talking about what Mr. You will see (and yes from Mr. You's first person perspective) then the correct prediction would be Moscow AND Washington and perhaps Helsinki. Not from the 1-view. The? Who's 1-view? Of the H-guys (with a s as he is in both W and M). Both see only one city. I do provides the nuances needed (notably the 1/3 distinction) to avoid any ambiguity. Then why is Bruno Marchal so addicted to personal pronouns, why is Bruno Marchal incapable of expressing a single idea without the liberal use of them? Why not? There is no problem when you distinguish the 1-view from the 3-view (a distinction which is athe key at the base of the mind-body problem). And as I explained Bruno Marchal must already believe that both Mr. M and Mr. W are both Mr. You, otherwise there would be no point in interviewing them. Yes. this has been clear all long, and makes my point. That is why we have to interview them both. That makes no sense. If you want to answer the question are there any red marbles in this black bag? and you reach into the bad and pull out a red marble then it is not necessary to reach in again to answer the question. If the Moscow Man is Mr. You then the probability Mr. You will see Moscow is 1.0, Refuted at once by the W guy, given that the question is on the 1- view, from the 1-view. You keep talking on the 1-view seen by a putative mind
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 26 Jun 2014, at 03:58, LizR wrote: On 26 June 2014 03:06, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: And that one guy is Mr. You. Yes, it's perfectly true that other guys have seen different sequences and those other guys are not each other, but they are all Mr. You because they all remember being the Helsinki Man even if different things have happened to them after the duplication. But so what? As I keep saying this is a very odd situation because we're not accustomed with dealing with duplicating machines, but it is NOT a logical paradox because Mr. You HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. Is someone claiming this is a logical paradox? Indeed. No one did. Assuming duplicators are possible (or the MWI is correct) it seems fairly unparadoxical to me. Indeed. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: the H-guy cannot be sure about its future 1-view *from the unique 1-view Unique? That implies that there is one and only one correct answer to the question of what the Helsinki Man will see, so after the exparament is over there should be enough information to know what that one correct answer should have been. So what was it? Would that that one unique correct prediction have been Washington or Moscow? Before you flip a coin you don't know if the correct prediction is heads or tails, but at least after you flip it you know what the correct prediction would have been; but in your thought exparament even after all the dust has settled there still isn't one correct answer. The difference is that although the bodies of the Helsinki Man is duplicated there is still only one Helsinki Man until one copy sees something the other doesn't. The Helsinki Man only turns into the Moscow Man when he sees Moscow and not before; so the only unique correct prediction is that the Moscow man will be the Man who sees Moscow. What more could you expect? predict with certainlty the unique city you will see The city who will see? The H-guy. I predict that the H-guy will see Helsinki, unless you destroy him immediately after duplication in which case the H-guy will see absolutely nothing. I further predict that Mr. You will see Moscow AND Washington because MR. YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. you forget also the question asked, which is about what you will live [...] What who will live? in the 1p sense from the 1p view and not any 3p view on where those unique 1-view appears. That's just a tad too much peepee for my taste. You are not answering the question asked. That's because the question asked is gibberish. You want to know which one of the 2 will see Moscow, but there is only one not two, there is no 2 until one sees Moscow and the other does not. The Moscow Man will be the one who sees Moscow, what more do you want me to say for you to count it as a successful prediction? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
Le 29 juin 2014 18:33, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com a écrit : On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: the H-guy cannot be sure about its future 1-view *from the unique 1-view Unique? That implies that there is one and only one correct answer to the question of what the Helsinki Man will see, so after the exparament is over there should be enough information to know what that one correct answer should have been. So what was it? Would that that one unique correct prediction have been Washington or Moscow? Before you flip a coin you don't know if the correct prediction is heads or tails, but at least after you flip it you know what the correct prediction would have been; but in your thought exparament even after all the dust has settled there still isn't one correct answer. The difference is that although the bodies of the Helsinki Man is duplicated there is still only one Helsinki Man until one copy sees something the other doesn't. The Helsinki Man only turns into the Moscow Man when he sees Moscow and not before; so the only unique correct prediction is that the Moscow man will be the Man who sees Moscow. What more could you expect? predict with certainlty the unique city you will see The city who will see? The H-guy. I predict that the H-guy will see Helsinki, unless you destroy him immediately after duplication in which case the H-guy will see absolutely nothing. I further predict that Mr. You will see Moscow AND Washington because MR. YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. I predict liar Clark will see spin up AND spin down... because under MWI MR. LIAR CLARK HAS BEEN DUPLICATED (yes I know it's a nightmare). you forget also the question asked, which is about what you will live [...] What who will live? in the 1p sense from the 1p view and not any 3p view on where those unique 1-view appears. That's just a tad too much peepee for my taste. You are not answering the question asked. That's because the question asked is gibberish. You want to know which one of the 2 will see Moscow, but there is only one not two, there is no 2 until one sees Moscow and the other does not. The Moscow Man will be the one who sees Moscow, what more do you want me to say for you to count it as a successful prediction? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 30 June 2014 04:33, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: the H-guy cannot be sure about its future 1-view *from the unique 1-view Unique? That implies that there is one and only one correct answer to the question of what the Helsinki Man will see, so after the exparament is over there should be enough information to know what that one correct answer should have been. So what was it? Would that that one unique correct prediction have been Washington or Moscow? Before you flip a coin you don't know if the correct prediction is heads or tails, but at least after you flip it you know what the correct prediction would have been; but in your thought exparament even after all the dust has settled there still isn't one correct answer. The difference is that although the bodies of the Helsinki Man is duplicated there is still only one Helsinki Man until one copy sees something the other doesn't. The Helsinki Man only turns into the Moscow Man when he sees Moscow and not before; so the only unique correct prediction is that the Moscow man will be the Man who sees Moscow. What more could you expect? predict with certainlty the unique city you will see The city who will see? The H-guy. I predict that the H-guy will see Helsinki, unless you destroy him immediately after duplication in which case the H-guy will see absolutely nothing. I further predict that Mr. You will see Moscow AND Washington because MR. YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. The yes doctor thing says that if H-guy is destroyed in the process of being scanned prior to transmission, then he will see M or W (or both, depending on how you want to look at it. I don't want to get into pronouns at this point). This is counter-intuitive, but it assumes that being cut and pasted like this preserves personal identity. If you accept that yes doctor makes sense (which I have some trouble with myself - as Bruno says, it's a bet) then it follows logically that our moment-to-moment identity is only preserved to the extent that it would be if we were being constantly cut and pasted, like the characters in Star Trek when they go through the transporter. Another way of looking at it is that if H guy is scanned and in the process destroyed, then recreated so that he is identical (below the substitution level -- e.g. this might mean atom for atom, which is where the Heisenberg compensators come into play :-) then his identity and consciousness is recreated with him, and they actually *are* his identity and consciousness, not just a copy which thinks it's him. Yet another way of looking at it is that this sort of process goes on all the time as the cells of our bodies are gradually replaced, and our identity is preserved during cell replacement *to the same extent* that it is preserved by a hypothetical matter transmitter, whatever extent that might be. (PS This is all discussed quite cogently in the Star Trek novel Spock must die! by James Blish, in which Dr McCoy worries that every time someone goes through the transporter, he's being murdered and a clone created which only thinks it's the same person. It also has something very similar to Bruno's thought experiment happen except that the duplicate is in this case an evil twin due to having been mirrored in the process :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 25 Jun 2014, at 17:06, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jun 23, 2014 at 2:03 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Predictions are great for validating scientific theories but predictions, good bad or ugly, have absolutely nothing to do with establishing a sense of self. We use the usual sense of self defined by the yes doctor. Nobody does that, even you don't do that to define yourself except when you're arguing philosophy on the internet. ? We use that all the time. I do it just now to reply to you. If you made a prediction yesterday about what would happen today that turned out to be wrong you don't feel like you've ceased to exist, you just feel like you made a mistake and continue to believe you're Bruno Marchal because you still remember being Bruno Marchal yesterday. Exactly. But this amkes my point. There is no way to define yourself from the present into the future, you can only define yourself from the present into the past; you know who you were but you don't know who you will be. We need no more that to make sense to I survive this or that operation at the hospital. And not that it matters but even your prediction is wrong; each and every time you repeat your experiment Mr. You sees Moscow, not half the time, ALWAYS. Just iterate the experiences. There is no choice, if probability is to be derived its got to be iterated, and no matter how often you iterate it Mr. You ALWAYS sees Moscow only AND Mr. You ALWAYS sees Washington only; This contradicts 2^n - 1 diaries (which by definition are the first person discourses of the survivors). The W-john Clark will be force to change its mind, unless he confuse him see in the 3p view, and him as the owner of this or that particular diary. and a logician should know that this is not a paradox because Mr. You HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. It's your thought experiment and you're the one who invented the duplicating machine, but it's clear you haven't thought through what that really means. Once done the W-guy admits seeing only W and [ blah blah] There is no need for a and, you already know all you need to know. This entire exercise is about finding out what Mr. You will or will not see, if Mr. W is not Mr. You then there is no point of even asking what Mr. W sees, it's irrelevant. The fact that Bruno Marchal thinks it would be productive to ask Mr. W anything at all logically means that Bruno Marchal thinks that Mr. W is Mr. You; thus if Mr. W ALWAYS sees Washington then the probability Mr. You will see Washington is 1.0 not 0.5. Both the W-person and the M-person are the H-person, but the question was about what they can expect for there first person future, and here W M is refuted by both, and W v M is confirmed by both. Just look at was is written in the diaries. not M, and the M-guy admits having seen M, and not W. They wrote each a different letter than the doppelganger. If you iterate the experiences 10 times, only one guy among the 2^10 one will say that has the story MM. And that one guy is Mr. You. Yes, it's perfectly true that other guys have seen different sequences and those other guys are not each other, but they are all Mr. You because they all remember being the Helsinki Man even if different things have happened to them after the duplication. But so what? As I keep saying this is a very odd situation because we're not accustomed with dealing with duplicating machines, but it is NOT a logical paradox because Mr. You HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. No doubt you will come back and say that if there are difficulties in your theory the same ones exist in the MW interpretation of the 2 slit experiment but this is untrue for two reasons: 1) In the 2 slit experiment it's always crystal clear who Mr. You is, I don't see that. In Everett, if I put you in the state M+W, you are two persons in different simultaneous states. but in Bruno Marchal's thought experiment the pronouns You and he and I are thrown around like confetti (apparently Bruno just can't stop himself) without giving a single thought to who those personal pronouns refer to. On the contrary, by making clear the 1-3 difference, every references are crystal clear. And, yes, you can't predict with certainlty the unique city you will see, but that is not paradoxal. many students told me that they understood QM makes sense since they got the FPI. 2) The 2 slit experiment is about what a observer will see, Bruno's thought experiment is about the sense of self of the observer. Wrong. It is about what an observer will see. You push a button, and open a door, and note which unique city you see. ypu might even been unaware of the protocol. The majpority of copies will conclude they have no means to predict what they will see. It is an indeterminacy in a clear 3p deterministic situation, and which
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: We use the usual sense of self defined by the yes doctor. Nobody does that, even you don't do that to define yourself except when you're arguing philosophy on the internet. ? ! We use that all the time. I do it just now to reply to you. As I said, even you don't do that to define yourself, except when you're arguing philosophy on the internet. There is no choice, if probability is to be derived its got to be iterated, and no matter how often you iterate it Mr. You ALWAYS sees Moscow only AND Mr. You ALWAYS sees Washington only; This contradicts 2^n - 1 diaries It most certainly does NOT, because MR. YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED! The W-john Clark will be force to change its mind, Only if John Clark is a dimwit, I don't think he is but opinions vary. unless he confuse him [...] Quotation marks don't help, who the hell is Mr. Him ? him as the owner of this or that particular diary. Then Mr. Him is not the same as Mr. You, the original question was about Mr. You so why even talk to Mr. Him. Both the W-person and the M-person are the H-person, Yes, but the W-person is not the M-person. In the 2 slit experiment it's always crystal clear who Mr. You is, I don't see that. In Everett, if I put you in the state M+W [...] That's a cool superpower you have there, but how do I know it's real? You claim to have done something spectacular but I still only see one person around here that looks like me, that's why in everyday life personal pronouns cause no problems and never will until duplicating machines are actually invented. you can't Who can't? predict with certainlty the unique city you will see The city who will see? The 2 slit experiment is about what a observer will see, Bruno's thought experiment is about the sense of self of the observer. Wrong. It is about what an observer will see. You push a button, and open a door, and note which unique city you see Wrong. What the observer sees changes the sense of self, seeing Moscow is the one and only thing that changed the Helsinki man into the Moscow man and is the only thing that differentiates him from the Washington man, he saw a different city. Not that predictions are of the slightest importance in this matter but if we're talking about the Helsinki Man (aka the man currently seeing Helsinki) and the Helsinki Man is destroyed after the duplication then the correct prediction about what the Helsinki Man will see would obviously be absolutely nothing. that would contradict step one, and step 0, which you have accepted. Fortunately I've long ago forgotten what step 0 is but if Mr. Helsinki is the guy currently seeing Helsinki and you destroy the guy currently seeing Helsinki then obviously Mr. Helsinki is now seeing absolutely nothing, although Mr. You is doing just fine and is seeing Washington AND Moscow. If on the other hand we're talking about what Mr. You will see (and yes from Mr. You's first person perspective) then the correct prediction would be Moscow AND Washington and perhaps Helsinki. Not from the 1-view. The? Who's 1-view? I do provides the nuances needed (notably the 1/3 distinction) to avoid any ambiguity. Then why is Bruno Marchal so addicted to personal pronouns, why is Bruno Marchal incapable of expressing a single idea without the liberal use of them? And as I explained Bruno Marchal must already believe that both Mr. M and Mr. W are both Mr. You, otherwise there would be no point in interviewing them. Yes. this has been clear all long, and makes my point. That is why we have to interview them both. That makes no sense. If you want to answer the question are there any red marbles in this black bag? and you reach into the bad and pull out a red marble then it is not necessary to reach in again to answer the question. If the Moscow Man is Mr. You then the probability Mr. You will see Moscow is 1.0, and if the Moscow Man is not Mr. You then there is no point in asking him about anything. making them impossible to predict which one in particular, they will actually see. Which one?? Beforehand there is only one. The Moscow Man only becomes the Moscow Man when he sees Moscow, before that he was the Helsinki Man, therefore I predict the Moscow Man will be the Moscow Man. I'll bet my prediction will turn out to be correct. And if you ask I'll give you my prediction about the Washington man. Mr. You has written W in Mr. You's diary AND Mr. You has written M in Mr. You's diary; and if you don't believe me I can prove it, both diaries are right here. Exactly. It makes my point. None write W and M. Absolutely false, Mr. You wrote W and M plane as day and I've got the diaries to prove it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Mon, Jun 23, 2014 at 2:03 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Predictions are great for validating scientific theories but predictions, good bad or ugly, have absolutely nothing to do with establishing a sense of self. We use the usual sense of self defined by the yes doctor. Nobody does that, even you don't do that to define yourself except when you're arguing philosophy on the internet. If you made a prediction yesterday about what would happen today that turned out to be wrong you don't feel like you've ceased to exist, you just feel like you made a mistake and continue to believe you're Bruno Marchal because you still remember being Bruno Marchal yesterday. There is no way to define yourself from the present into the future, you can only define yourself from the present into the past; you know who you were but you don't know who you will be. And not that it matters but even your prediction is wrong; each and every time you repeat your experiment Mr. You sees Moscow, not half the time, ALWAYS. Just iterate the experiences. There is no choice, if probability is to be derived its got to be iterated, and no matter how often you iterate it Mr. You ALWAYS sees Moscow only AND Mr. You ALWAYS sees Washington only; and a logician should know that this is not a paradox because Mr. You HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. It's your thought experiment and you're the one who invented the duplicating machine, but it's clear you haven't thought through what that really means. Once done the W-guy admits seeing only W and [ blah blah] There is no need for a and, you already know all you need to know. This entire exercise is about finding out what Mr. You will or will not see, if Mr. W is not Mr. You then there is no point of even asking what Mr. W sees, it's irrelevant. The fact that Bruno Marchal thinks it would be productive to ask Mr. W anything at all logically means that Bruno Marchal thinks that Mr. W is Mr. You; thus if Mr. W ALWAYS sees Washington then the probability Mr. You will see Washington is 1.0 not 0.5. not M, and the M-guy admits having seen M, and not W. They wrote each a different letter than the doppelganger. If you iterate the experiences 10 times, only one guy among the 2^10 one will say that has the story MM. And that one guy is Mr. You. Yes, it's perfectly true that other guys have seen different sequences and those other guys are not each other, but they are all Mr. You because they all remember being the Helsinki Man even if different things have happened to them after the duplication. But so what? As I keep saying this is a very odd situation because we're not accustomed with dealing with duplicating machines, but it is NOT a logical paradox because Mr. You HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. No doubt you will come back and say that if there are difficulties in your theory the same ones exist in the MW interpretation of the 2 slit experiment but this is untrue for two reasons: 1) In the 2 slit experiment it's always crystal clear who Mr. You is, but in Bruno Marchal's thought experiment the pronouns You and he and I are thrown around like confetti (apparently Bruno just can't stop himself) without giving a single thought to who those personal pronouns refer to. 2) The 2 slit experiment is about what a observer will see, Bruno's thought experiment is about the sense of self of the observer. And please don't come back with your standard you confuse the 1p from the 3P, I am not confused , I am saying that both the 1P and the 3P are adjectives and I am saying that atoms are generic, so if the arrangement of atoms are duplicated the adjectives are duplicated too; in other words the machine duplicates the structure and ALL the perspectives also, first second and third. If you want to argue against my ideas then say no machine can duplicate the immortal soul, I think such an argument is wrong but at least it's coherent, but please don't tell me that although I'm a grown man and I'm smart enough to tie my shoes all by myself I have never before noticed that there is a difference between the first person and the third person point of view. From their first person point of view, the 2^10 - 1 others knows you were wrong No they do not, not if they're logical; they know that they are not the only Mr. You around and that although they personally may have seen only Moscow and not Washington the Helsinki man has seen both. But then again I was sick at home on the day my first grade English teacher explained the difference between the first person and the third so no doubt I'm confused about that. correct for the 3-view on the 1-views, but false for the 1-views as see from that 1-view. It is not false if the duplicating machine duplicates EVERYTHING including duplicating the points views, and the views of the views, and the views of the views of the views, and the ...All you need to do to win this argument is to tell me what law of physics prevents a
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 26 June 2014 03:06, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: And that one guy is Mr. You. Yes, it's perfectly true that other guys have seen different sequences and those other guys are not each other, but they are all Mr. You because they all remember being the Helsinki Man even if different things have happened to them after the duplication. But so what? As I keep saying this is a very odd situation because we're not accustomed with dealing with duplicating machines, but it is NOT a logical paradox because Mr. You HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. Is someone claiming this is a logical paradox? Assuming duplicators are possible (or the MWI is correct) it seems fairly unparadoxical to me. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 23 Jun 2014, at 18:29, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jun 23, 2014 at 3:02 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: according to you not believing in God is a variant of Christianity, and obviously believing in God is another variant of Christianity, therefore every human being who ever lived is a Christian except for those who don't believe in God AND don't don't believe in God. From this I conclude that one of the following statements must be true: 1) If ET exists then he's a Christian too. 2) Bruno Marchal is not a logician. Please focus on the logical point, and avoid ad hominem things. The fact that you believe a purely logical analysis is a ad hominem only reinforces my point. But prove me wrong, show me the error in my logic. Easy. You predict W M. But none of the W-guy can confirm, as they know they must write the city they see from their first person views after the duplication, and both sees only one city, so both refute your prediction. Your error consists in describing the 3-view on the 1- views, when the 1-views itself are concerned. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 19 Jun 2014, at 20:25, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That machine does not know in advance its future state, and that is what I meant. So a Turing Machine has free will. Not all turing machine, you need one which can guess that she does not know. There is nothing stopping Mrs Turing Machine from guessing if she will ever find the solution to the problem she's working on, but we've known for 85 years that there is no way for her to consistently guess correctly. And incidentally Human Beings are not one bit better at doing that than Mrs Turing Machine is, so either both of us have free will or neither of us do. you will beat the record of people not understanding step 3. That's because there is nothing in step 3 to understand. You have confuse the 1-view and the 3-view As I say you really need to get a rubber stamp made of that. The trouble with compatibilism is that it's entire purpose was to solve the free will problem but it never clearly explained what the free will problem was. There are many, according to your theology I took my own advice, I had a rubber stamp made of the following: Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12. and to your definition of free-will. There are only 2 definitions of free will that are not gibberish: 1) Free Will is a noise made by the mouth. 2) Free Will is the inability to always know what you will do next even in a stable predictable environment You can read the literature. There is no literature on theology or on Free Will, coloring books maybe but no literature. Oh yes I remember, according to your logic atheism is a branch of Christianity and thus John K Clark is a Christian. Yes. So it wasn't just my imagination, you really said it! atheism is a variant of Christianity. Like a recurring nightmare you said it yet again! So according to you not believing in God is a variant of Christianity, and obviously believing in God is another variant of Christianity, therefore every human being who ever lived is a Christian except for those who don't believe in God AND don't don't believe in God. From this I conclude that one of the following statements must be true: 1) If ET exists then he's a Christian too. 2) Bruno Marchal is not a logician. Please focus on the logical point, and avoid ad hominem things. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 2:24 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: there is a 1-3 confusion here (is it volontarily?). Oh yes, I always voluntarily strive to be confused because when one is presented with nonsense the only logical response is confusion. I predict only 0.5 in most diaries. Predictions are great for validating scientific theories but predictions, good bad or ugly, have absolutely nothing to do with establishing a sense of self. And not that it matters but even your prediction is wrong; each and every time you repeat your experiment Mr. You sees Moscow, not half the time, ALWAYS. The prediction is about the first person experience, The? as seen from the first person The? Are you talking about the first person in Helsinki, the first person in Moscow or the first person in Washington? which are the one writing either M, or W, And neither Mr. M or Mr. W or Mr. H or even Mr. You sees half a city. and never both in their histories. It's true that Mr. M doesn't see both cities, and Mr. W doesn't see both cities, but Mr. You does. You put your foot out of the shoes after the duplication. How on earth do I do that? Do you think that when I arrive in Washington (and Moscow) I can just say to myself I am no longer Mr. I with such intensity that I actually believe it ? It simply can't be done. Both the W-guy and the M-guy get one bit of information You can't make use of probabilities if you only have one bit of information to work with; the 2 slit experiment would tell you nothing if the only information you had is what happened when one lonely photon went through; you've got to send lots and lots of photons through the slits to learn anything, and the same is true of your thought experiment, it must be repeated many times. And no matter how often it's repeated Mr. You sees Washington AND Mr. You sees Moscow. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Mon, Jun 23, 2014 at 3:02 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: according to you not believing in God is a variant of Christianity, and obviously believing in God is another variant of Christianity, therefore every human being who ever lived is a Christian except for those who don't believe in God AND don't don't believe in God. From this I conclude that one of the following statements must be true: 1) If ET exists then he's a Christian too. 2) Bruno Marchal is not a logician. Please focus on the logical point, and avoid ad hominem things. The fact that you believe a purely logical analysis is a ad hominem only reinforces my point. But prove me wrong, show me the error in my logic. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 23 Jun 2014, at 18:17, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 2:24 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: there is a 1-3 confusion here (is it volontarily?). Oh yes, I always voluntarily strive to be confused because when one is presented with nonsense the only logical response is confusion. I predict only 0.5 in most diaries. Predictions are great for validating scientific theories but predictions, good bad or ugly, have absolutely nothing to do with establishing a sense of self. We use the usual sense of self defined by the yes doctor. It is equivalent with Parfit person-series. It is what you need to make sense of surviving any experience or happening. And not that it matters but even your prediction is wrong; each and every time you repeat your experiment Mr. You sees Moscow, not half the time, ALWAYS. Just iterate the experiences. Once done the W-guy admits seeing only W and not M, and the M-guy admits having seen M, and not W. They wrote each a different letter than the doppelganger. If you iterate the experiences 10 times, only one guy among the 2^10 one will say that has the story MM. From their first person point of view, the 2^10 - 1 others knows you were wrong (although trivially correct for the 3-view on the 1-views, but false for the 1-views as see from that 1-view. The prediction is about the first person experience, The? as seen from the first person The? Are you talking about the first person in Helsinki, the first person in Moscow or the first person in Washington? The prediction is done by the first person in Helsinki, before the duplication. You keep asking me this, when this is made clear in the paper, in the post, etc. which are the one writing either M, or W, And neither Mr. M or Mr. W or Mr. H or even Mr. You sees half a city. Exactly. That is why they each write W, or they write M, and never both, after one duplication. and never both in their histories. It's true that Mr. M doesn't see both cities, and Mr. W doesn't see both cities, but Mr. You does. In the 3p views, but as I said and explain with the diary, only mr M and mr W are interviewed. Mister You can see both, in his imagination, like he can imagine the universal wave (which multiply him) and like we can conceive all computational histories. You put your foot out of the shoes after the duplication. How on earth do I do that? Do you think that when I arrive in Washington (and Moscow) I can just say to myself I am no longer Mr. I with such intensity that I actually believe it ? It simply can't be done. But that is what make my point. You feel to be one in one city, and still be the guy you were in Helsinki. You write W, *or* M in your diary. In the 3-view of yourself, you can say that (the W-guy write M *and the M-guy write W), that's correct, but the statistics concerned the person view, and none write I see W and I see M in the diary, as it is asked to use see in the first person sense. You repeat your old refutation in which you confuse the 1-views and the 3-view on the 1-views at the last step. Both the W-guy and the M-guy get one bit of information You can't make use of probabilities if you only have one bit of information to work with; the 2 slit experiment would tell you nothing if the only information you had is what happened when one lonely photon went through; you've got to send lots and lots of photons through the slits to learn anything, and the same is true of your thought experiment, it must be repeated many times. And no matter how often it's repeated Mr. You sees Washington AND Mr. You sees Moscow. Never simultaneously from their first person view, which is what both comp and Everett QM are about. I don't know if it is bad faith, or why you systematically forget what the question was about. The question bears clearly on the relative histories. You say always M, what about the guy who see always W? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 21 June 2014 16:00, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 9:14 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: that doesn't actually alter the logic of the argument, which is only concerned with what he reports in his diary. He? 3 people are keeping a diary, one writes I'm still here in Helsinki and nothing has happened, maybe the matter transmitting machine broke down. Another writes in his diary I'm in Moscow and it's dark and snowing. And the third writes in his diary I'm in Washington and it's bright and sunny. So which one is Mr. He? They all are, surely? If so then the probability that Mr. He will see Moscow is 1.0 not 0.5 as Bruno says. I agree, but I don't see that it invalidates his argument. In practice Mr H and the quantum physicist both assign probabilities retroactively, and from that perspective 0.5 makes sense. Hence they both reason (incorrectly) that the probability must have been 0.5 beforehand, because they have what I suppose could be called a common sense intuition that they will only end up in one branch. This is wrong, according to the MWI, but it's very hard not to think like that. For example I know that the MWI says I will do all sorts of bizarre things in the next second, including spontaneously being teleported to Helsinki - but I act just as though I only have one future. However I don't see how any of this invalidates Bruno's argument. The probability assignment question is only a psychological matter, not something that has any fundamental importance to Bruno's thesis. As far as I can see Bruno is only using it to illustrate that duplication gives the effect of apparent indeterminacy, just as it does in the MWI. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Sat, Jun 21, 2014 at 6:29 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: I won't enter with you again on this debate Coward. Call him a coward johnnie boy OK I will ghibbsaboy. wot about you? At least I have enough courage to sign my real name, the name on my birth certificate is John K Clark, what's yours? I'm not reluctant to tell people my real name because I'm not ashamed of anything I wrote. Are you? I just went to that trouble to explain why your core reasoning about humans not 'seeing' consciousness does not equate with evolution and what it can 'see'. I assume you're talking about your June 18 post where you said: I would certain admit I'm not at a point of being willing to BEHAVE and/or be purely motivated by, an adequately detached/objective positioning regarding what took place in that thread, particularly toward the end. What I could promise but not be willing to provide or evidence of, is that already by the time that closing phase began, I had actually been through a process at my end, of regarding the overall thread as a failure, and been through and completing a process of analysing that, purely from the perspective (i.e. as a principle of the process) taking full responsibility. Not for some angelic purity, but because there were aspects in play there, involving goals, that are important to me to understand in terms of barriers and skills and competencies at my end. There can be no interest in what other people do wrong when there is commitment to a goal. And in that process I identified several - mostly occurring very early - strategies that I knew would create certain impressions, but that I felt would fall away once things became clearer. I was wrong..for large reasons nothing to do with individuals here (because that wouldn't be interesting either). Wrong because certain impressions can be very very 'sticky', particulary first ones. A case of a well known truth, missed due to a different and new context (for me). Do me a favor and read your above paragraph aloud, it's been several days since you wrote it so I'm curious, today can even YOU make any sense out of it? The reason I didn't respond is that if you put a gun to my head I couldn't say what the hell you're babbling about. However if you're talking about some other post, a more coherent one (have you really written any?) then I somehow missed it, please repeat it here. If it contains more than bafflegab and personal insults then I promise I will respond. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 19 Jun 2014, at 02:00, LizR wrote: PS I must say I find step 3 an odd place to attempt to refute comp. Presumably you've accepted the original assumptions and the first two steps. Most people either disagree with the original assumption(s), or go for the MGA (i.e. the reversal - the argument that we don't need a physical universe). Step 3, iirc, is just the demonstration of first person indeterminacy, which is I would think no more contraversial here than it is in Everett. Nice to hear this. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 19 Jun 2014, at 02:00, LizR wrote: PS I must say I find step 3 an odd place to attempt to refute comp. Presumably you've accepted the original assumptions and the first two steps. Most people either disagree with the original assumption(s), or go for the MGA (i.e. the reversal - the argument that we don't need a physical universe). I might add perhaps that the reversal appears already at the step seven (and this shows also what Tegmark missed, at least in some of its multiverse level protocol. But to conclude the comp reversal at this point, does not follow logically, by the small primitive universe assumption. Given that the math already gives the clues of a quantum reality, we can already believe that the small universe move is rather ad hoc, but what the step 8 (MGA) explains, is that the small universe move can protect physicalism + computationalism (without FPI on UD*), but only in still adding non Turing emulable quality to matter. This is just to help you for the step 8. Sometimes people put too much in step 8, like if I was saying that comp makes primitive matter logically impossible, when it only makes primitive matter into a God- of-the-gap or a stop-doing-research type of move. Step 3, iirc, is just the demonstration of first person indeterminacy, which is I would think no more contraversial here than it is in Everett. Yes. Quentin explained this point more than once to John Clark, without success. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 7:15 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: the probability that Mr. He will see Moscow is 1.0 not 0.5 as Bruno says. I agree, Good. but But? There is no but, Bruno predicted 0.5, we observe 1.0, game over. I don't see that it invalidates his argument. In practice Mr H and the quantum physicist both assign probabilities retroactively, Since they both involve probabilities the 2 experiments must be repeated many times to test the underlying theoretical predictions, the 2 slit experiment to test the MWI and Bruno's thought experiment to test his Universal Dance Association theory. When you repeat the 2 slit experiment you find that sometimes the electron went through slit X and sometimes it did not, but no matter how often you repeat Bruno's thought experiment you ALWAYS find that Mr. You (or Mrs. You) sees Moscow. The results of these experiments tell us that the MWI might be true but Bruno's Universal Dance Association theory is definitely wrong because it made the wrong prediction. I know that the MWI says I will do all sorts of bizarre things in the next second And Mrs. I will indeed do all sorts of bizarre things in the next second. including spontaneously being teleported to Helsinki True, although Mrs I also never saw Helsinki and was instead spontaneously being teleported to Moscow. This would be a very odd situation but it is NOT a logical paradox because Mrs. I HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. but I act just as though I only have one future. Acting as if you have only one future is not the same as having only one future, that's why the MWI isn't intuitively obvious to everybody. The probability assignment question is only a psychological matter Until about 90 years ago physicists would say that all probability is just a psychological matter, it's just a measure of our ignorance; then they said probability is inherent to the thing itself, but if the MWI turns out to be true then probability goes back to being subjective. Bruno is only using it to illustrate that duplication gives the effect of apparent indeterminacy, just as it does in the MWI. No, Bruno has said over and over that he has found some new sort of indeterminacy that is fundamentally different from Turing style indeterminacy or Heisenberg style indeterminacy, I say it's just the same old indeterminacy. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 19 Jun 2014, at 19:25, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 2:01 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You mean that you made many attempts to find a blunder, but we were more than three to show you that in each case, you were confusing 1-views and 3-views. That was your one and only retort in our debate, no explanation just a repeat of the mantra, you really should get a rubber stamp made of you're confusing 1-views and 3-views. And yet I would humbly submit that there is not a single person on planet Earth who confuses the 1-view from the 3-view; or at least nobody this side of a looney bin. I have never said that you confuse the 1-view and the 3-view all the time. I said that you ignore the definition I gave, and make the confusion, always once, at different places, in any of your refutation of step 3. Yes, it is easy notion, although in science we use precise definition (here provided by the diaries accompanying the teleportation), and then as it is easy, no one buy your refutation. a proof is built on the foundations of previous steps therefor it would be idiotic to keep reading a proof, any proof, after a mistake has been found. This means you don't suspect errors in the sequel. Nice. I have no idea if you made additional errors and I don't care, it doesn't matter how strong the walls of a skyscraper are if it's built on top of a mound of jello it's going to come crashing down. After an error has been made in a proof everything that follows is just gibberish. Each time we showed you where you made the 1-3 confusion, we get only insults as explanation. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 22 Jun 2014, at 19:49, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 7:15 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: the probability that Mr. He will see Moscow is 1.0 not 0.5 as Bruno says. I agree, Good. but But? There is no but, Bruno predicted 0.5, we observe 1.0, game over. OK. That would be a good exercise for Liz. Showing that there is a 1-3 confusion here (is it volontarily?). I predict only 0.5 in most diaries. The prediction is about the first person experience, as seen from the first person themselves, which are the one writing either M, or W, and never both in their histories. Bruno predicts 1.0 only in the 3p-diary. I told you before, you don't do the thought experience. You put your foot out of the shoes after the duplication. Both the W-guy and the M- guy get one bit of information from their first person experience. If a population of machines are duplicated, the FPI is locally third person sharable, like in QM. Bruno I don't see that it invalidates his argument. In practice Mr H and the quantum physicist both assign probabilities retroactively, Since they both involve probabilities the 2 experiments must be repeated many times to test the underlying theoretical predictions, the 2 slit experiment to test the MWI and Bruno's thought experiment to test his Universal Dance Association theory. When you repeat the 2 slit experiment you find that sometimes the electron went through slit X and sometimes it did not, but no matter how often you repeat Bruno's thought experiment you ALWAYS find that Mr. You (or Mrs. You) sees Moscow. The results of these experiments tell us that the MWI might be true but Bruno's Universal Dance Association theory is definitely wrong because it made the wrong prediction. I know that the MWI says I will do all sorts of bizarre things in the next second And Mrs. I will indeed do all sorts of bizarre things in the next second. including spontaneously being teleported to Helsinki True, although Mrs I also never saw Helsinki and was instead spontaneously being teleported to Moscow. This would be a very odd situation but it is NOT a logical paradox because Mrs. I HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. but I act just as though I only have one future. Acting as if you have only one future is not the same as having only one future, that's why the MWI isn't intuitively obvious to everybody. The probability assignment question is only a psychological matter Until about 90 years ago physicists would say that all probability is just a psychological matter, it's just a measure of our ignorance; then they said probability is inherent to the thing itself, but if the MWI turns out to be true then probability goes back to being subjective. Bruno is only using it to illustrate that duplication gives the effect of apparent indeterminacy, just as it does in the MWI. No, Bruno has said over and over that he has found some new sort of indeterminacy that is fundamentally different from Turing style indeterminacy or Heisenberg style indeterminacy, I say it's just the same old indeterminacy. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 23 June 2014 05:49, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 7:15 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: the probability that Mr. He will see Moscow is 1.0 not 0.5 as Bruno says. I agree, Good. but But? There is no but, Bruno predicted 0.5, we observe 1.0, game over. It isn't a prediction, as far as I can see, it's a description of how people think about probability. I don't see how anything hinges on what someone would intuitively predict about their future. I don't see that it invalidates his argument. In practice Mr H and the quantum physicist both assign probabilities retroactively, Since they both involve probabilities the 2 experiments must be repeated many times to test the underlying theoretical predictions, the 2 slit experiment to test the MWI and Bruno's thought experiment to test his Universal Dance Association theory. Yes. When you repeat the 2 slit experiment you find that sometimes the electron went through slit X and sometimes it did not, but no With the electron you find that it always appears to go through both slits, otherwise no interference fringes. matter how often you repeat Bruno's thought experiment you ALWAYS find that Mr. You (or Mrs. You) sees Moscow. The results of these experiments tell us that the MWI might be true but Bruno's Universal Dance Association theory is definitely wrong because it made the wrong prediction. It isn't an experiment, it's merely showing the same thing Everett did (as far as I can see). I know that the MWI says I will do all sorts of bizarre things in the next second And Mrs. I will indeed do all sorts of bizarre things in the next second. including spontaneously being teleported to Helsinki True, although Mrs I also never saw Helsinki and was instead spontaneously being teleported to Moscow. This would be a very odd situation but it is NOT a logical paradox because Mrs. I HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. Yes, I think we all agree on that. but I act just as though I only have one future. Acting as if you have only one future is not the same as having only one future, that's why the MWI isn't intuitively obvious to everybody. I agree. And I think the same applies to comp. The probability assignment question is only a psychological matter Until about 90 years ago physicists would say that all probability is just a psychological matter, it's just a measure of our ignorance; then they said probability is inherent to the thing itself, but if the MWI turns out to be true then probability goes back to being subjective. Yes, and comp parallels the MWI. OK. Bruno is only using it to illustrate that duplication gives the effect of apparent indeterminacy, just as it does in the MWI. No, Bruno has said over and over that he has found some new sort of indeterminacy that is fundamentally different from Turing style indeterminacy or Heisenberg style indeterminacy, I say it's just the same old indeterminacy. I agree, I think - comp indeterminacy is based on the same principle as Everettian indeterminacy (I'm not sure what Turing indeterminacy is, and I assume the Heisenberg type is genuine physical indeterminacy?) But I wasn't aware Bruno thought any differently. Are you sure this isn't just a semantic disagreement? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 23 June 2014 06:24, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Jun 2014, at 19:49, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 7:15 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: the probability that Mr. He will see Moscow is 1.0 not 0.5 as Bruno says. I agree, Good. but But? There is no but, Bruno predicted 0.5, we observe 1.0, game over. OK. That would be a good exercise for Liz. Showing that there is a 1-3 confusion here (is it volontarily?). Well, I have experienced this confusion myself when I think too hard about comp or the MWI. In both cases I know that I will experience all possible futures, in the sense that someone who is (in the jargon) fungible with me will experience them all. But I can't help myself thinking as though I will only experience one of them. When I look up the weather for tomorrow on-line, I plan to wear a raincoat and carry an umbrella (say - especially at this time of year) even though I know the met office is only giving me one of any number of futures, all equally real - freak sunshine, comets, cloudy with meatballs... I predict only 0.5 in most diaries. The prediction is about the first person experience, as seen from the first person themselves, which are the one writing either M, or W, and never both in their histories. Bruno predicts 1.0 only in the 3p-diary. If I knew for a fact that I was going through a duplicator, I might well put 1.0 in my diary, because I would know and accept what the 3p situation was. But retrospectively, I would say, well, it seems I ended up in Moscow! - as though there was a 0.5 chance that I would find myself here, being me, now, rather than over in W being the other me... However this is all psychological, if I know the situation then it's merely my inability to think 3p-aly, to misquote Back to the furture, that would make me think the chance was 0.5. In practice there is a 100% chance of me seeing both places, if I define me as me-before in that statement, because me-before ends up in both places, at least for a split second (before the copies diverge). But I have to admit that me-before will not see them both at the same time, or with the same eyes! (At this point I have to take my medicine and lie down in a dark room for a while...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Saturday, June 21, 2014 4:53:29 AM UTC+1, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Quentin Anciaux allc...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: I won't enter with you again on this debate Coward. Call him a coward johnnie boywot about you? :O) I just went to that trouble to explain why your core reasoning about humans not 'seeing' consciousness does not equate with evolution and what it can 'see'. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 4:52 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: And in the MWI how will YOU know if the 0.5 prediction was correct? And in the comp experiment how will YOU know [...] Just like Bruno Quentin Anciaux is incapable of expressing Quentin Anciaux's ideas without personal pronouns which do such a great job at hiding muddled thinking, And it's not just the pronoun in Bruno's mantra you confuse the 1-P and the 3-P that shows it's nonsense. Why *THE* 1-P and not *A* 1-P? There is more than one, so who's 1-P is Bruno talking about? if the 0.5 prediction was correct? YOU repeat the exeperiment many times and you write the result in a diary, and almost all YOU will arrive at the correct frequency *exactly* Frequency of what?? The entire point of the exercise is to determine if the prediction that Mr. You has a 0.5 probability of seeing Helsinki is correct, but why bother even asking the Helsinki Man about anything? It can only be because Quentin Anciaux believes that the Helsinki Man is Mr. You, If the Helsinki Man is not Mr. You then it would be irrelevant what the Helsinki Man did or did not see. And no matter how often Quentin Anciaux repeats Bruno's experiment the Helsinki Man ALWAYS says Helsinki was seen; therefore the correct probability prediction of Mr. You seeing Helsinki would have been 1.0 not 0.5. Of course Mr. You may also have not seen Helsinki and seen some other city instead, but this is just a odd situation and is not a logical paradox because MR. YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. in MWI, the same question arise... which YOU Yes it's exactly the same question, but unlike Bruno's thought experiment in the MWI the answer is unambiguous and crystal clear; Mr. You is the one and only person in sight who even claims to be Mr. You. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 8:53 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So if you ask Helsinki-man what he expects to see when he steps out of the matter transmitter At that point its no longer the Helsinki Man, the things seen after he steps out of the matter transmitter booth will transform the Helsinki Man into the Moscow Man AND the Washington Man. he says Well, I'll see both, of course, because I'll be duplicated! Yes. that doesn't actually alter the logic of the argument, which is only concerned with what he reports in his diary. He? 3 people are keeping a diary, one writes I'm still here in Helsinki and nothing has happened, maybe the matter transmitting machine broke down. Another writes in his diary I'm in Moscow and it's dark and snowing. And the third writes in his diary I'm in Washington and it's bright and sunny. So which one is Mr. He? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
You're so full of it... well I won't enter with you again on this debate... I've waited too much years... so ok. Byebye 2014-06-20 21:28 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 4:52 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: And in the MWI how will YOU know if the 0.5 prediction was correct? And in the comp experiment how will YOU know [...] Just like Bruno Quentin Anciaux is incapable of expressing Quentin Anciaux's ideas without personal pronouns which do such a great job at hiding muddled thinking, And it's not just the pronoun in Bruno's mantra you confuse the 1-P and the 3-P that shows it's nonsense. Why *THE* 1-P and not *A* 1-P? There is more than one, so who's 1-P is Bruno talking about? if the 0.5 prediction was correct? YOU repeat the exeperiment many times and you write the result in a diary, and almost all YOU will arrive at the correct frequency *exactly* Frequency of what?? The entire point of the exercise is to determine if the prediction that Mr. You has a 0.5 probability of seeing Helsinki is correct, but why bother even asking the Helsinki Man about anything? It can only be because Quentin Anciaux believes that the Helsinki Man is Mr. You, If the Helsinki Man is not Mr. You then it would be irrelevant what the Helsinki Man did or did not see. And no matter how often Quentin Anciaux repeats Bruno's experiment the Helsinki Man ALWAYS says Helsinki was seen; therefore the correct probability prediction of Mr. You seeing Helsinki would have been 1.0 not 0.5. Of course Mr. You may also have not seen Helsinki and seen some other city instead, but this is just a odd situation and is not a logical paradox because MR. YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. in MWI, the same question arise... which YOU Yes it's exactly the same question, but unlike Bruno's thought experiment in the MWI the answer is unambiguous and crystal clear; Mr. You is the one and only person in sight who even claims to be Mr. You. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 21 June 2014 07:45, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 8:53 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So if you ask Helsinki-man what he expects to see when he steps out of the matter transmitter At that point its no longer the Helsinki Man, the things seen after he steps out of the matter transmitter booth will transform the Helsinki Man into the Moscow Man AND the Washington Man. he says Well, I'll see both, of course, because I'll be duplicated! Yes. that doesn't actually alter the logic of the argument, which is only concerned with what he reports in his diary. He? 3 people are keeping a diary, one writes I'm still here in Helsinki and nothing has happened, maybe the matter transmitting machine broke down. Another writes in his diary I'm in Moscow and it's dark and snowing. And the third writes in his diary I'm in Washington and it's bright and sunny. So which one is Mr. He? They all are, surely? (Actually I think it's step 4 where the original doesn't get destroyed.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I won't enter with you again on this debate Coward. Byebye Byebye John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 9:14 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: that doesn't actually alter the logic of the argument, which is only concerned with what he reports in his diary. He? 3 people are keeping a diary, one writes I'm still here in Helsinki and nothing has happened, maybe the matter transmitting machine broke down. Another writes in his diary I'm in Moscow and it's dark and snowing. And the third writes in his diary I'm in Washington and it's bright and sunny. So which one is Mr. He? They all are, surely? If so then the probability that Mr. He will see Moscow is 1.0 not 0.5 as Bruno says. And don't call me Shirley. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 2:01 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You mean that you made many attempts to find a blunder, but we were more than three to show you that in each case, you were confusing 1-views and 3-views. That was your one and only retort in our debate, no explanation just a repeat of the mantra, you really should get a rubber stamp made of you're confusing 1-views and 3-views. And yet I would humbly submit that there is not a single person on planet Earth who confuses the 1-view from the 3-view; or at least nobody this side of a looney bin. a proof is built on the foundations of previous steps therefor it would be idiotic to keep reading a proof, any proof, after a mistake has been found. This means you don't suspect errors in the sequel. Nice. I have no idea if you made additional errors and I don't care, it doesn't matter how strong the walls of a skyscraper are if it's built on top of a mound of jello it's going to come crashing down. After an error has been made in a proof everything that follows is just gibberish. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
2014-06-19 19:25 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 2:01 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You mean that you made many attempts to find a blunder, but we were more than three to show you that in each case, you were confusing 1-views and 3-views. That was your one and only retort in our debate, no explanation just a repeat of the mantra, you really should get a rubber stamp made of you're confusing 1-views and 3-views. And yet I would humbly submit that there is not a single person on planet Earth who confuses the 1-view from the 3-view; or at least nobody this side of a looney bin. a proof is built on the foundations of previous steps therefor it would be idiotic to keep reading a proof, any proof, after a mistake has been found. This means you don't suspect errors in the sequel. Nice. I have no idea if you made additional errors and I don't care, it doesn't matter how strong the walls of a skyscraper are if it's built on top of a mound of jello it's going to come crashing down. After an error has been made in a proof everything that follows is just gibberish. Sure, but the only one repeating gibberish here is you... you accept 1/3 distinction in MWI despite *YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED*, yet you don't accept it in a simple classical duplication experiment... please do not come again with the I could meet my doppelganger crap. As usual, reject both or proceed with the argument. Quentin John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That machine does not know in advance its future state, and that is what I meant. So a Turing Machine has free will. Not all turing machine, you need one which can guess that she does not know. There is nothing stopping Mrs Turing Machine from guessing if she will ever find the solution to the problem she's working on, but we've known for 85 years that there is no way for her to consistently guess correctly. And incidentally Human Beings are not one bit better at doing that than Mrs Turing Machine is, so either both of us have free will or neither of us do. you will beat the record of people not understanding step 3. That's because there is nothing in step 3 to understand. You have confuse the 1-view and the 3-view As I say you really need to get a rubber stamp made of that. The trouble with compatibilism is that it's entire purpose was to solve the free will problem but it never clearly explained what the free will problem was. There are many, according to your theology I took my own advice, I had a rubber stamp made of the following: Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12. and to your definition of free-will. There are only 2 definitions of free will that are not gibberish: 1) Free Will is a noise made by the mouth. 2) Free Will is the inability to always know what you will do next even in a stable predictable environment You can read the literature. There is no literature on theology or on Free Will, coloring books maybe but no literature. Oh yes I remember, according to your logic atheism is a branch of Christianity and thus John K Clark is a Christian. Yes. So it wasn't just my imagination, you really said it! atheism is a variant of Christianity. Like a recurring nightmare you said it yet again! So according to you not believing in God is a variant of Christianity, and obviously believing in God is another variant of Christianity, therefore every human being who ever lived is a Christian except for those who don't believe in God AND don't don't believe in God. From this I conclude that one of the following statements must be true: 1) If ET exists then he's a Christian too. 2) Bruno Marchal is not a logician. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 7:50 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: If after saying whats wrong with Bruno's vacuous proof over and over and over and over and over and over again for 3 years and you still ask what is it then what would be the point of me repeating it yet again? If you've said it that many time then you shouldn't have a problem summarising it once more. Personal pronouns. Preferably you could start a new thread I'd rather eat ground glass. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 8:25 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That machine does not know in advance its future state, and that is what I meant. So a Turing Machine has free will. Not all turing machine, you need one which can guess that she does not know. There is nothing stopping Mrs Turing Machine from guessing if she will ever find the solution to the problem she's working on, but we've known for 85 years that there is no way for her to consistently guess correctly. And incidentally Human Beings are not one bit better at doing that than Mrs Turing Machine is, so either both of us have free will or neither of us do. you will beat the record of people not understanding step 3. That's because there is nothing in step 3 to understand. You have confuse the 1-view and the 3-view As I say you really need to get a rubber stamp made of that. The trouble with compatibilism is that it's entire purpose was to solve the free will problem but it never clearly explained what the free will problem was. There are many, according to your theology I took my own advice, I had a rubber stamp made of the following: Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12. and to your definition of free-will. There are only 2 definitions of free will that are not gibberish: 1) Free Will is a noise made by the mouth. 2) Free Will is the inability to always know what you will do next even in a stable predictable environment You can read the literature. There is no literature on theology or on Free Will, coloring books maybe but no literature. Oh yes I remember, according to your logic atheism is a branch of Christianity and thus John K Clark is a Christian. Yes. So it wasn't just my imagination, you really said it! atheism is a variant of Christianity. Like a recurring nightmare you said it yet again! So according to you not believing in God is a variant of Christianity, and obviously believing in God is another variant of Christianity, therefore every human being who ever lived is a Christian except for those who don't believe in God AND don't don't believe in God. From this I conclude that one of the following statements must be true: 1) If ET exists then he's a Christian too. 2) Bruno Marchal is not a logician. Your repeated attempts to frame what you extend into the absurd as Bruno's personal nonsense is not even a geographical cultural thing; even US scientists, as I've posted this before, find the definition perfectly reasonable (to lay to rest that this is some fancy Euro-Theology thing): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzSMC5rWvos But that cartoon you keep posting again and again: the guy at the end is a white humanist with Christian roots, still keeping with their prohibitions in law and justice system, although he sees himself as emancipated from their cause. Puhleez...PGC John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 1:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: you accept 1/3 distinction in MWI Forget MWI, EVERYBODY who is not in a padded cell accepts the 1/3 distinction. please do not come again with the I could meet my doppelganger crap. In MWI the laws of physics forbid Quentin Anciaux from ever meeting Quentin Anciaux's doppelganger so it's always clear who personal pronouns refer to, but in Bruno's thought experiment it's ridiculously easy for Quentin Anciaux to meet Quentin Anciaux's doppelganger, yet Bruno still insists on throwing around personal pronouns with abandon which makes a question like what will you see? be as nonsensical as how long is a piece of string?. John Clark understands that not using personal pronouns can make prose a little awkward, but if the ideas are clear that's all the trouble it makes; however Bruno is simply incapable of expressing Bruno's ideas without pronouns, and that is a sure sign that Bruno's ideas are muddled. Please explain why complaining about that is crap. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
2014-06-19 21:10 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 1:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: you accept 1/3 distinction in MWI Forget MWI, EVERYBODY who is not in a padded cell accepts the 1/3 distinction. please do not come again with the I could meet my doppelganger crap. In MWI the laws of physics forbid Quentin Anciaux from ever meeting Quentin Anciaux's doppelganger so it's always clear who personal pronouns refer to, No the I before measuring the spin, is as clear as the I pushing the button, no confusion... When I ask that I what is the probability he'll see spin up *UNDER MWI WHERE YOU'LL BE DUPLICATED DOING SUCH EXPERIMENT*, that I will answer 0.5 but when asking the same I who will push the button what is the probability he'll see washington *UNDER THE COMP DUPLICATION EXPERIMENT WHERE YOU'LL BE DUPLICATED DOING SUCH EXPERIMENT* he talks bullshit about doppelganger and invalid pronous use... well John... bullshit and bullshit again... do us a favor, reject MWI. Quentin but in Bruno's thought experiment it's ridiculously easy for Quentin Anciaux to meet Quentin Anciaux's doppelganger, yet Bruno still insists on throwing around personal pronouns with abandon which makes a question like what will you see? be as nonsensical as how long is a piece of string?. John Clark understands that not using personal pronouns can make prose a little awkward, but if the ideas are clear that's all the trouble it makes; however Bruno is simply incapable of expressing Bruno's ideas without pronouns, and that is a sure sign that Bruno's ideas are muddled. Please explain why complaining about that is crap. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 3:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: No the I before measuring the spin, is as clear as the I pushing the button, no confusion... When I ask that I what is the probability he'll see spin up *UNDER MWI WHERE YOU'LL BE DUPLICATED DOING SUCH EXPERIMENT*, that I will answer 0.5 And in the MWI how will YOU know if the 0.5 prediction was correct? YOU repeat the experiment many times, YOU write down the results and then YOU see if about half the time it was spin up and about half spin down. Pronouns cause no problem. But in Bruno's thought experiment how is it determined if the probabilistic prediction about which city YOU saw was correct or not, which YOU should I ask? Should I write down Moscow or Washington? If YOU say both then YOU saw Washington and Moscow and the probability is 1.0, if you say ask neither then YOU didn't see Washington AND YOU didn't see Moscow and the probability is 0.0, in neither case is it 0.5. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
2014-06-19 21:55 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 3:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: No the I before measuring the spin, is as clear as the I pushing the button, no confusion... When I ask that I what is the probability he'll see spin up *UNDER MWI WHERE YOU'LL BE DUPLICATED DOING SUCH EXPERIMENT*, that I will answer 0.5 And in the MWI how will YOU know if the 0.5 prediction was correct? And in the comp experiment how will YOU know if the 0.5 prediction was correct? YOU repeat the exeperiment many times and you write the result in a diary, and almost all YOU will arrive at the correct frequency *exactly* like almost all YOU in MWI wil arrive at 0.5. YOU repeat the experiment many times, YOU write down the results and then YOU see if about half the time it was spin up and about half spin down. Pronouns cause no problem. But in Bruno's thought experiment how is it determined if the probabilistic prediction about which city YOU saw was correct or not, which YOU should I ask? The same you as always *ALL OF THEM* like in MWI. Should I write down Moscow or Washington? If YOU say both then YOU saw Washington and Moscow and the probability is 1.0, if you say ask neither then YOU didn't see Washington AND YOU didn't see Moscow and the probability is 0.0, in neither case is it 0.5. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
2014-06-19 22:52 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com: 2014-06-19 21:55 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 3:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: No the I before measuring the spin, is as clear as the I pushing the button, no confusion... When I ask that I what is the probability he'll see spin up *UNDER MWI WHERE YOU'LL BE DUPLICATED DOING SUCH EXPERIMENT*, that I will answer 0.5 And in the MWI how will YOU know if the 0.5 prediction was correct? And in the comp experiment how will YOU know if the 0.5 prediction was correct? YOU repeat the exeperiment many times and you write the result in a diary, and almost all YOU will arrive at the correct frequency *exactly* like almost all YOU in MWI wil arrive at 0.5. YOU repeat the experiment many times, YOU write down the results and then YOU see if about half the time it was spin up and about half spin down. Pronouns cause no problem. But in Bruno's thought experiment how is it determined if the probabilistic prediction about which city YOU saw was correct or not, which YOU should I ask? So in MWI, the same question arise... which YOU, it's all of them in their respecting branch, almost all of them will arrive at the correct frequency of 0.5... In COMP, same, almost all of them will arrive at the correct frequency of 0.5 by looking their diaries. The same you as always *ALL OF THEM* like in MWI. Should I write down Moscow or Washington? If YOU say both then YOU saw Washington and Moscow and the probability is 1.0, if you say ask neither then YOU didn't see Washington AND YOU didn't see Moscow and the probability is 0.0, in neither case is it 0.5. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 20 June 2014 06:32, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 7:50 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: If after saying whats wrong with Bruno's vacuous proof over and over and over and over and over and over again for 3 years and you still ask what is it then what would be the point of me repeating it yet again? If you've said it that many time then you shouldn't have a problem summarising it once more. Personal pronouns. Ah, now something comes back to me. Is it just a question of whether the duplicates are the same I as the original? This is irrelevant to the argument of step 3, because that's defined using the diaries each person is supposed carry, and make notes of their experiences in. Whether they argue about who is the real successor to the original doesn't come into it, as far as I remember. Since you haven't mentioned the assignment of probabilities, I assume you don't think there's a problem with that? Preferably you could start a new thread I'd rather eat ground glass. Very dramatic (you aren't my 12 year old daughter under an alias, by any chance?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 20 June 2014 07:10, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 1:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: you accept 1/3 distinction in MWI Forget MWI, EVERYBODY who is not in a padded cell accepts the 1/3 distinction. OK, so there isn't any real problem then, only which pronoun to use. But technology often makes us revise our language, as in for example There's too much sex on the television. please do not come again with the I could meet my doppelganger crap. In MWI the laws of physics forbid Quentin Anciaux from ever meeting Quentin Anciaux's doppelganger so it's always clear who personal pronouns refer to, but in Bruno's thought experiment it's ridiculously easy for Quentin Anciaux to meet Quentin Anciaux's doppelganger, yet Bruno still insists on throwing around personal pronouns with abandon which makes a question like what will you see? be as nonsensical as how long is a piece of string?. However, this doesn't affect the argument. It's trivial to see what Bruno *means*, even if you don't agree with his use of personal pronouns. (Even I can see it, with a brain that is probably only 89% the size of yours.) What he means is exactly the same as a physicist who believes in the MWI would mean if they said the results they expect from a quantum experiment are... I expect to randomly see outcome A 50% of the time, and to see outcome B the other 50% of the time. So if you ask Helsinki-man what he expects to see when he steps out of the matter transmitter, he will probably say that he expects there's a 50% probability he'll see Washington, and 50% probability he'll see Moscow. He will obviously consider this to be trivially true if he doesn't actually *know* the MT is a duplicator. Suppose for the sake of argument he has used it a few times already, but been kept separate from his duplicates - that would give the illusion that it sends him to a randomly chosen destination. So now if we ask all the duplicates what they expect to see next time they use it, we'll get the above answer. Once he knows it's really a duplicator, that could make him uncertain of what answer to give - but he will still feel exactly as he did before when he appears in Moscow, just as the physicist still feels he's seen outcome A when he runs his experiment. But if he says Well, I'll see both, of course, because I'll be duplicated! that doesn't actually alter the logic of the argument, which is only concerned with what he reports in his diary. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 6:41 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote : I read the first 3 steps, Bruno made blunders in step 3; a proof is built on the foundations of previous steps therefor it would be idiotic to keep reading a proof, any proof, after a mistake has been found. That's fair enough. Obviously I missed the blunder in step 3 when I read it - what is it? If after saying whats wrong with Bruno's vacuous proof over and over and over and over and over and over again for 3 years and you still ask what is it then what would be the point of me repeating it yet again? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 16 Jun 2014, at 19:57, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jun 14, 2014 at 4:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If free will just means will then why stick on the free ? Because we believe that free does not add anything, Except bafflegab. Only because you quote an half sentence. except some emphasis on the needed existence of some degree of freedom. And here we go again, same old shit. What does freedom mean? Degree of freedom? it refers like in physics to a spectrum of possible move. The ability to make a choice. What does the ability to make a choice mean? Freedom. And round and round she goes and were she stops nobody knows. This is not relevant. That machine does not know in advance its future state, and that is what I meant. So a Turing Machine has free will. Not all turing machine, you need one which can guess that she does not know. An ability to hesitate and find solution to non computably or non tractably soluble conflict. I have never in my life said that first person indeterminacy does not exist, what I dismissed is that the discovery I sometimes don't know what I'm going to do or see next is profound and was first made by Bruno Marchal WONDERFUL! You act surprised but I've been saying the exact same thing over and over and over again for at least 3 years. You have confuse the 1-view and the 3-view at different places. yes, you will beat the record of people not understanding step 3. I am glad you agree now with the FPI. So you accept step 3. Other that the fact than your use of personal pronouns was inexcusably sloppy and inconsistent for a good logician, I have long since forgotten the details of your proof. But are you telling me that the grand conclusion of step 3 reached after pages of verbiage was I don't know? and you can not know, and you can know that you don't know, and this shows in a purely deterministic context (indeed arithmetic) the existence of an indeterminacy (indeed at step 8 you understand that it bears on all sigma_1 sentences). The first 2 steps must have been even more trivial, no wonder I stopped reading. So good! Step 3 is even less trivial than step 1 and 2? What about step 4? All steps in a proof, are supposed to be trivial, especially when the proof is general, and can be understood by a wide audience. Time for step 4, John. I hope it does not take you N years for step N! You: non compatibilist free will is non sense thus let us abandon all notion of free will. There is no notion of free will to abandon, all I'm saying that if members of the species Homo sapiens made the free will noise a little less often we could all live in a quieter environment. Me: non compatibilist free will is non sense thus let us abandon non compatibilism. The trouble with compatibilism is that it's entire purpose was to solve the free will problem but it never clearly explained what the free will problem was. There are many, according to your theology, and to your definition of free-will. You can read the literature. I agree with you, there is no such problem in comp. But to be fair non-compatibilists can't explaine what the free will problem is either so it's not surprising they haven't solved it. They made it insoluble at the start, unless with some non-comp theory (which today are the speculative one). You do the same error than with atheism: the christian literal God is non sense, so let us decree that all what the christian asserts on God is false. Oh yes I remember, according to your logic atheism is a branch of Christianity and thus John K Clark is a Christian. Well..., I will admit this, I am a Christian if and only if you are logical. Yes. If you look at theology from a platonist perspective, atheism is a variant of Christianity. Same creation and dogmatic materialism, same conception of God (just the sign differ). And same opposition to the idea that theology might be studied with the scientific method. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 13 Jun 2014, at 21:46, meekerdb wrote: On 6/13/2014 9:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Free-will or will are high level cognitive ability of machine having enough introspective ability. But not to much! :-) Indeed :-) Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 13 Jun 2014, at 21:53, meekerdb wrote: On 6/13/2014 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Jun 2014, at 01:00, meekerdb wrote: On 6/12/2014 6:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Actually Grim and another guy studied version of Gödel and Löb theorem in fuzzy logic (meaning that they use the closed interval [0, 1] has set of truth values. They illustrate that the truth values of most fixed points in self-reference logic describe chaotic trajectories (in the set of truth value). I don't understand what they a fixed points of, if not truth value? In the (classical) self-reference logic, they are sentences, and they are fixed point in the sense of being a solution of a self- reference. The self-reference x - ~[]x has solution the sentence f (beweisbar(0=1)). (Gödel 1931) The self-reference x - []x has solution the sentence t (or 0=0) (Löb 1955) The self-reference x - []~x has solution the sentence []f (beweisbar(0=0)) (Jeroslow, Smullyan) The self-reference x - ~[]~x has solution the sentence f (or 0=1). (Gödel) But in fuzzy logic, some of those fixed points are not fixed, and moves in the truth set in a chaotic way, with a variety of attractors. Ok, so it's some chaotic attractor that is fixed, not a point. I understood a fixed point to be the the value of f(x) where x=f(x) when the value exists in the sense of convergence in the limit of iterating f. OK. Just realize that x denote sentences, not numbers. In logic the variables are formula or sentences. But in Fuzzy logic, formula can have truth values in more complex structures, and here yes, we can say that the attractor is fixed. Hmmm OK. Should reread Grim for the official definition. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Selecting your future branch
On 18 Jun 2014, at 00:41, LizR wrote: On 18 June 2014 04:23, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Jun 16, 2014 at 5:55 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Other that the fact than your use of personal pronouns was inexcusably sloppy and inconsistent for a good logician, I have long since forgotten the details of your proof. But are you telling me that the grand conclusion of step 3 reached after pages of verbiage was I don't know? The first 2 steps must have been even more trivial, no wonder I stopped reading. You should read it, THEN criticise. (Although this seems to be a common mistake.) I read the first 3 steps, Bruno made blunders in step 3; a proof is built on the foundations of previous steps therefor it would be idiotic to keep reading a proof, any proof, after a mistake has been found. That's fair enough. Obviously I missed the blunder in step 3 when I read it - what is it? Glad you ask, but you did see how he answered, I guess. Some people are kind enough to assume that they have a point, and want to know them, and they don't take the opportunity to make it. Not only that, but they go to the insult mode. I think this means that they lose the battle, but for big ego reason (as witness by the insults) , cannot admit it. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
