Le 10-juil.-06, à 04:58, George Levy a écrit :
Stephen Paul King wrote:
little discussion has
been given to the implications of taking the 1st person aspect as
primary or
fundamental. Could you point me toward any that you have seen?
Hi Stephen
Alas, I am a mere engineer, not a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 18-juil.-06, à 18:42, 1Z a écrit :
and I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental
quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett
...).
Huh Electrons and photons are still matter...what *do* you mean ?
matter is
Le 18-juil.-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
It is far from obvious that a simulation even
contains 1stP POV's.
I agree with you. That is why I postulate comp to begin with.
In any case
that doesn't effect the logic: simulations
*might* be detectable, so they are not necessarily
Bruno Marchal wrote:
No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical
truth.
No, same problem. There's no more any phenomenality to be
found in maths than any substantiallity.
But there is no more any phenomenality to be found in physics,
Then we need
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism.
Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism
(whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational
thesis, that cognition is
Le 18-juil.-06, à 12:30, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux: Because if you were in a simulation and you have
managed to get out of it,
how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the
material
world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is
the real
Le 18-juil.-06, à 16:37, 1Z a écrit :
A computer simulation is obviously computable.
Not necessarily from the first person povs.
The word emerge is often used to hide magic.
I agree with you. Often, but not necessarily always.
What actually exists cannot emerge from mere truths.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 18-juil.-06, à 16:37, 1Z a écrit :
A computer simulation is obviously computable.
Not necessarily from the first person povs.
It is far from obvious that a simulation even
contains 1stP POV's. In any case
that doesn't effect the logic: simulations
*might* be
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit :
I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
justification.
So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist.
Now my problem is that a term like material is very vague in physics,
Huh ? Physics
Bruno and 1Z:
both of you write extraordinary wise remarks in
approx. 3-4 times as many words than I can attentively
folloow.
However - with mostly agreeing with the positions of
BOTH OF YOU - I may remark (hopefully in less words??)
*
I consider the epistemic development of our experience
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is
not
in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are
equally
likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work.
No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I
said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the
relative probability of different
1Z wrote:
Erratum:
http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/diagrams/time_growing.jpg
http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/met_time2.html
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit :
I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
justification.
So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist.
Now my problem is that a term like material is very vague in physics,
and I would say experimentally vague since
Le 11-juil.-06, 21:06, 1Z a crit :
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
See my work and this list for some path toward it.
To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
and vice-versa.
Le 12-juil.-06, à 02:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
BM (Bruno):
For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And
none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for
granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by
knocking a table when
Le 12-juil.-06, à 03:53, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Well, I don't think the world obeys mathematical laws because it is
causally
interacting with platonic forms, any more than I think the world obeys
the
law of noncontradiction because it is causally interacting with
platonic
laws of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-juil.-06, 21:06, 1Z a crit :
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
See my work and this list for some path toward it.
To have material existence is to have non-zero
Hi,
1Z wrote:
I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until
demostrated
otherwise.
This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that
Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary
reality does not exists ! It even doesn't mean
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
1Z wrote:
I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until
demostrated
otherwise.
This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that
Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary
reality does not
Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism.
Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism
(whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational
thesis, that cognition is computation).
If
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Deutsch uses this to explain objectivity, and argues, with such a
criteria due to Johnson, that math is objective. Perhaps some
materialist use this to define matter but then there need to define
kicking back, and thus interaction, etc.
Johnson' demonstration was
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
But it is a straw man to say everything-theories makes the
prediction
that
Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones,
because in
fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just
said
Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit :
It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain
a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change
to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes.
How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
First nobody
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit :
It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain
a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change
to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes.
How could a substantial world be' a modest
1Z wrote:
The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
as predicted by Platonic theories.
It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
it is falsified.
But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to
the view that every possible world or observer-moment
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it
explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty) explanation.
Today, physician
This discussion is very interesting to me. Not addressing anyone in
particular, I only have time to make a quick comment, and hope that I
can get time for later:
In my reading about Plato, it seems that Plato didn't have the answers
either. It might be helpful to remember that Plato not only
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
as predicted by Platonic theories.
It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
it is falsified.
But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to
the view that every
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it
explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty)
IZ wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
as predicted by Platonic theories.
It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
it is falsified.
But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe
to
Hi,
Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp,
giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.
Brains are material. Computers are material.
I think you
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence
is
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp,
giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.
Brains are material.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it
explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty)
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
no-once can say that
Brent Meeker wrote:
For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And
none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for
granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by
knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists.
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-juil.-06, à 17:15, Lennart Nilsson a écrit :
I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the
numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our
observations.
But why should we infer a substantial world? Substantial or primary
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Would you agree that this imaginary 'substantial
world' is a figment of our existing (math - comp
based) logic and with another one it would be 'that
way', not 'this way'? Inescabapbly!?
I guess you know that the sum of the 100 first odd numbers is 100^2.
If you
George Levy wrote:
Stephen Paul King wrote:
little discussion has
been given to the implications of taking the 1st person aspect as primary or
fundamental. Could you point me toward any that you have seen?
Hi Stephen
Alas, I am a mere engineer, not a philosopher. The only author I
Peter,
would you consider to identify the 'observer'?
(Maybe not as an O -moment...)
Many think of The Observer AS me or fellow humans
while there may be a broader view, like e.g. anything
catching info which comes closer to (my) 'conscious'
definition.
The observer seems so fundamental in the
John M wrote:
Peter,
would you consider to identify the 'observer'?
(Maybe not as an O -moment...)
No, I wouldn't care to. There are theories that talk
about observations, measurement and so on
(that's epistemology), but there aren't any that
tell you what an observer *is* ontologically.
Le 08-juil.-06, à 22:10, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am just saying that I have faith in the fact that the number 17 is
prime, independently of me.
That 17 is prime is true, independent of you?
Or that 17 exists, independent from you, as a a prime number. ?
A priori the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
A priori the first one: [17 is prime] is independent of me. But now
I accept also the first order predicate rule that if someone prove 17
is prime, he can infer Ex(x is prime), so that I can take the
proposition it exists a number which is prime as independent of me
Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Ämne: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 09-juil.-06, à 14:26, 1Z a écrit :
So how do insubstantial numbers generate a substantial world ?
I guess there is no substantial world and I explain in all details here
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal
--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 09-juil.-06, � 14:26, 1Z a �crit :
So how do insubstantial numbers generate a
substantial world ?
I guess there is no substantial world and I explain
in all details here
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ (and on this list)
why
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-juil.-06, à 14:26, 1Z a écrit :
So how do insubstantial numbers generate a substantial world ?
I guess there is no substantial world and I explain in all details here
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ (and on this list) why insubstantial
numbers generate
Stephen Paul King wrote:
little discussion has
been given to the implications of taking the 1st person aspect as primary or
fundamental. Could you point me toward any that you have seen?
Hi Stephen
Alas, I am a mere engineer, not a philosopher. The only author I can
point you to is John
George Levy writes:
StephenPaulKingwrote: Iwouldliketopointoutthatyoumayhaveinadvertentlyveeredinto theproblemthatIseeinthe"YesDoctor"belief!Itisentirely unverifiable. Itisunverifiablefromthe3rdpersonperspective.Fromthefirst personperspectiveitisperfectlyverifiable."I"willnotobserveany
Le 07-juil.-06, à 18:32, 1Z a écrit :
Why do you think the Curch thesis needs AR ?
There is a conceptual argument in favor of Church Thesis. It is the
closure of the (RE) set of partial recursive functions for the
diagonalization procedure. I will (re)explain in the solution of the
fourth
Hi George,
- Original Message -
From: George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2006 12:49 AM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
I would like to point out that you may have
Le 07-juil.-06, à 23:31, John M a écrit :
Bruno:
I speculated about my problems why I follow your (and
others') expressions with difficulty. I was capable to
understand concepts in diverse sciences and now I have
to reflect about fitting 'comp', 'UDA', 'YesDoctor',
even 'arithmetical
, July 08, 2006 1:19 PM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 07-juil.-06, à 23:31, John M a écrit :
Bruno:
I speculated about my problems why I follow your (and
others') expressions with difficulty. I was capable to
understand concepts in diverse sciences and now I have
to reflect
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am just saying that I have faith in the fact that the number 17 is
prime, independently of me.
That 17 is prime is true, independent of you?
Or that 17 exists, independent from you, as a a prime number. ?
I agree that there is no number in nature, but then I don't
Le 06-juil.-06, à 23:32, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism.
Your version does. Computationalism is standardly
the thesis that cognition is computation.
Could you define or explain computation without believing that the
relations
Le 06-juil.-06, à 23:56, 1Z a écrit :
The Yes-Doctor scenario using Bruno-comp should really be
a case of saying yes to the proposal:
I'm just going to shoot you. I'm
not going to make the slightest effort to reconsitute you,
teleport you, computerise you, or anything else.
You already
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 06-juil.-06, à 23:32, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism.
Your version does. Computationalism is standardly
the thesis that cognition is computation.
Could you define or explain computation without
Hi Peter,
- Original Message -
From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2006 5:56 PM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
1Z wrote:
Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism.
Your version does
Bruno:
I speculated about my problems why I follow your (and
others') expressions with difficulty. I was capable to
understand concepts in diverse sciences and now I have
to reflect about fitting 'comp', 'UDA', 'YesDoctor',
even 'arithmetical Plationism' etc. into the flowing
considerations.
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
I would like to point out that you may have inadvertently veered into
the problem that I see in the Yes Doctor belief! It is entirely
unverifiable.
It is unverifiable from the 3rd person perspective. From the first
person perspective it is perfectly
others give their responses, like Quentin, and I
appreciate it because then I know I'm not the only one. 3rd person
plural is better than 3rd person. ;)
Tom
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 02-juil.-06, à 08:44, Tom Caylor a écrit :
My point is that of the thread title Only Existence is necessary
Tom Caylor wrote:
3rd person plural is better than 3rd person. ;)
Tom
Or as the wisest person in history wrote in his Ecclesiastes:
Two are better than one...A cord of three strands is not quickly
broken.
I think there is wisdom in looking at what the ancient intellects
wrote, and making
George Levy wrote:
Is the world fundamentally physical or can it be reduced to ideas? This
is an interesting issue. If a TOE exists then it would have to explain
the physics and the objects.
This reminds me of the Ether controversy. Is there a need for the Ether
for waves to propagate?
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi Bruno,
Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Dear Stephen,
Either we have a definition problem or I do not understand. For me relative
computations in platonia are not instantiated by definition as they are in
platonia. Being in platonia just
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism.
Your version does. Computationalism is standardly
the thesis that cognition is computation.
In other words, your argument really has two premises -- AR and
(standard) computationalism. You have bundled them together
1Z wrote:
Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism.
Your version does. Computationalism is standardly
the thesis that cognition is computation.
In other words, your argument really has two premises -- AR and
(standard) computationalism. You have bundled them together into
some distant intelligence in the universe evolved before we
did? In that case, did the existence of *eight*, say, spread
at the speed of light from the point where someone first thought
of it?
Lee
My point is that of the thread title Only Existence is necessary?
Not that observers
Stephen writes
In my previous post I tried to point out that *existence* is not a
first-order (or n-th order) predicate and thus does nothing to distinguish
one Form, Number, Algorithm, or what-have-you from another.
[LC]
I don't know about that; I do know that 34 and 3 are not the
Le 02-juil.-06, à 08:44, Tom Caylor a écrit :
My point is that of the thread title Only Existence is necessary?
Not that observers are necessary for existence, but that existence is
insufficient for meaning. I'm still holding out for Bruno to work the
rest of his diagonalization tricks
Tom writes
The difference between a quark and a lepton can be described with
mathematics, even though perhaps it's harder to pin down than the
difference between 3 and 34. I think most of us wouldn't have a
crucial problem with that. But alas the difference between 3 and 34 is
in the
Lee Corbin wrote:
Stephen writes
it seems that we have skipped
past the question that I am trying to pose: Where does distinguishability
and individuation follow from the mere existence of Platonic Forms, if
process is merely a relation between Forms (as Bruno et al claim)?!
In
Hi Lee,
- Original Message -
From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2006 1:02 AM
Subject: RE: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen writes
it seems that we have skipped
past the question that I am trying to pose: Where does
of the act of
observation...
Onward!
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2006 12:46 PM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
snip
Lee, Bruno, Stephen,
I think
Le 26-juin-06, à 23:09, Tom Caylor a écrit :
I also agree that the subject to which the Forms have meaning cannot
be a Form itself. But as my previous post(s) on this thread mentioned,
I see it as a recognition of what is there. I like to use the word
re-cogn-ize (again know). A year
Dear Bruno,
I would like to cut to a couple parts of your reply.
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 4:29 AM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
snip
[SPK]
Pratt does not seek
Stephen writes
it seems that we have skipped
past the question that I am trying to pose: Where does distinguishability
and individuation follow from the mere existence of Platonic Forms, if
process is merely a relation between Forms (as Bruno et al claim)?!
In my previous post I
Dear Stephen,
snip
Comp, I am claiming requires more than just the mere a priori
existence
of AR (Platonic theory of Numbers), it requires a means to relate them
to
one another.
Numbers are related by addition and multiplication. With Church thesis
(+ Godel or Matiyasevich) that
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Dear Stephen,
snip
Comp, I am claiming requires more than just the mere a priori
existence
of AR (Platonic theory of Numbers), it requires a means to relate them
to
one another.
Numbers are related by addition and multiplication. With Church thesis
Dear Stephen,
We can go on and on about relations between states, numbers, UDs, or
whatever, but unless we have a consistent way to deal with the source
of
individuation and thus distinguishability, we are going nowhere...
The source of individuation could be personal memory I think.
Dear Bruno,
Thank you for this wonderful post! Interleaving...
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 1:43 PM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Dear Stephen,
We can go
Ah, waht is mathematics?
I suspect humans could spend their life-times pondering this profound
question and never fully understand.
I'm a mathematical realist in the sense that I think mathematical
entities are real objective properties of reality and not just human
inventions, but I've come
to discuss them with people well versed
in worldviews based on foundation of different knowledge-base 'sciences'.
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 5:56 AM
Subject: Re: Only Existence
Marc and John,
Interesting ideas. Don't have time to comment appropriately. But I
want to say one thing about my previous thought. Note that I said that
mathematics is *about* invariance; I didn't say that mathematics *is*
necessarily invariant. There's a big difference.
Tom
: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 12:25 PM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Marc and John,
Interesting ideas. Don't have time to comment appropriately. But I
want to say one thing about my previous thought
Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 11:14 PM
Subject: RE: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen writes
What properties do you have in mind that pure platonic algorithms
seem to lack? Anything, that is, besides *time* itself?
How about
Hal,
Do you have a reference for Moravec's examination of this idea?
Stathis Papaioannou
Now, if any
computation is implemented by any physical process, then if one physical
process exists, then all possible computations are implemented. I'll stop
at this point, although it is
Dear Stephen,
What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a
predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate.
Now implementation is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be
just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia.
Bruno
Le 22-juin-06,
Le 22-juin-06, à 03:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (in a reply to Stephen):
x-tad-bigger I am reminded of David Chalmer's paper recently mentioned by Hal Finney, Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?, which looks at the idea that any physical state such as the vibration of atoms
Hi Bruno,
Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Dear Stephen,
What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a
predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate.
Now implementation is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be
just a
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi Bruno,
Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Dear Stephen,
What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a
predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate.
Now implementation is a *process*. Again I agree.
Hi Quentin,
Le 22-juin-06, à 16:16, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Hi Bruno,
Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Dear Stephen,
What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is
a
predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate.
Now
Hi Stathis,
The paper is found
here:
http://consc.net/papers/rock.html
- Original Message -
From:
Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 9:55
PM
Subject: RE: Re: Only Existence is
necessary?
Stephen,I
:59 AM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Dear Stephen,
What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a
predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate.
Now implementation is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be
just a relative computations
/Invariant_%28mathematics%29
Onward!
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 12:13 PM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
snip
I've been thinking about Platonia lately
Hi Hal,
- Original Message -
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 10:55 PM
Subject: RE: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
snip
Now, if any
computation is implemented
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) this issue brings us
back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have
to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the
mind-body problem.
[SPK]
?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invariant_%28mathematics%29
Onward!
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 12:13 PM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary
Tom Caylor writes:
I'vebeenthinkingaboutPlatonialately.I'vejustfinishedreading JohnBarrow's"PiintheSky"book,andheseemstohavegottenwrapped aroundtheaxleinregardtomathematicsandPlatonia.Ithinkthat mathematicsisnotprimarilyaboutnumbers.Mathematicsisabout
Stathis,
I tried to expand on that a little in my last two posts (to Stephen) on
this thread, which somehow got disconnected. Here it is again:
Stephen,
I wrote the following before you wrote this post, but I think it
addresses it somewhat.
My two cents is again to say that mathematics is
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