Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, October 31, 2018 at 6:15:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Oct 2018, at 11:34, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 4:30:00 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 3:44:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 29 Oct 2018, at 12:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical 
>>> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before 
>>> humans, 
>>> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of 
>>> time 
>>> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or 
>>> yesterday.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>
>> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers 
>> in the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a 
>> language that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
>>
>>
>> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) 
>> as true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
>>
>> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
>> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
>> which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call 
>> material reality …. 
>>
>>
>> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of 
>> any language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the 
>> combinatorical reality, which is independent of language too, but it 
>> might 
>> be harder to see this.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …)
>>
>>
>> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
>>
>> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or 
>> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact 
>> that 
>> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for 
>> centuries.
>>
>> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was 
>> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and 
>> perhaps 
>> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I 
>> doubt 
>> this too.
>>
>>
>>
>> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], 
>> written by Mark Balaguer [ 
>> http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ].
>>
>>
>>
>> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is 
>> prime that there is a moon.
>>
>> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a 
>> theory in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 
>>
>> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
>> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
>> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
>>
>> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are 
>> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary 
>> test, 
>> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The 
>> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum 
>> mechanics, 
>> is a normal happening in arithmetic.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in 
> mathematics at some level of language:
>
> *Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the 
> question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth 
> value, Rutgers, March 2013*
>
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/
>
> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as 
> "reduction to physics:
>
> *Against Fundamentalism*.(2018)
> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/
>
> *non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism:
>
> "Materialism is often associated 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 30 Oct 2018, at 11:34, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 4:30:00 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 3:44:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Oct 2018, at 12:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical 
> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before 
> humans, although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out 
> of time and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or 
> yesterday.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in 
> the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a 
> language that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
 
 Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as 
 true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
 
 Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
 fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
 which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
 
 
 
> 
> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
> reality …. 
 
 There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
 language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
 reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to 
 see this.
 
 
 
 
> 
> (sort of like, In the beginning was The Word …)
 
 That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
 
 I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or 
 physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that 
 those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for 
 centuries.
 
 Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was 
 contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps 
 some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I 
 doubt this too.
 
 
> 
> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ 
>  ], written 
> by Mark Balaguer [ http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer 
>  ].
 
 
 I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime 
 that there is a moon.
 
 To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory 
 in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 
 
 It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
 arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
 consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
 
 Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are 
 incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary 
 test, done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. 
 The multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum 
 mechanics, is a normal happening in arithmetic.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in 
 mathematics at some level of language:
 
 Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the 
 question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth 
 value, Rutgers, March 2013
 http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/
  
 
 
 As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as 
 "reduction to physics:
 
 Against Fundamentalism.(2018)
 http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/ 
 
 
 non-reductive materialism is in opposition to physicalism:
 
 "Materialism is often 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 30 Oct 2018, at 10:30, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 3:44:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Oct 2018, at 12:04, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical 
> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before 
> humans, although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out 
> of time and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or 
> yesterday.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in 
> the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a 
> language that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
 
 Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as 
 true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
 
 Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
 fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
 which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
 
 
 
> 
> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
> reality …. 
 
 There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
 language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
 reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to 
 see this.
 
 
 
 
> 
> (sort of like, In the beginning was The Word …)
 
 That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
 
 I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or 
 physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that 
 those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for 
 centuries.
 
 Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was 
 contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps 
 some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I 
 doubt this too.
 
 
> 
> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ 
>  ], written 
> by Mark Balaguer [ http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer 
>  ].
 
 
 I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime 
 that there is a moon.
 
 To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory 
 in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 
 
 It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
 arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
 consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
 
 Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are 
 incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary 
 test, done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. 
 The multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum 
 mechanics, is a normal happening in arithmetic.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in 
 mathematics at some level of language:
 
 Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the 
 question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth 
 value, Rutgers, March 2013
 http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/
  
 
 
 As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as 
 "reduction to physics:
 
 Against Fundamentalism.(2018)
 http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/ 
 
 
 non-reductive materialism is in opposition to physicalism:
 
 "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which the 
 objects or phenomena 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 4:30:00 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 3:44:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 29 Oct 2018, at 12:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical 
>> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before 
>> humans, 
>> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of 
>> time 
>> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or 
>> yesterday.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>
> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers 
> in the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a 
> language that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
>
>
> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) 
> as true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
>
> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
> which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
>
>
>
>
> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call 
> material reality …. 
>
>
> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of 
> any language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the 
> combinatorical reality, which is independent of language too, but it 
> might 
> be harder to see this.
>
>
>
>
>
> (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …)
>
>
> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
>
> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or 
> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact 
> that 
> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for 
> centuries.
>
> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was 
> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps 
> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I 
> doubt 
> this too.
>
>
>
> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], 
> written by Mark Balaguer [ 
> http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ].
>
>
>
> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is 
> prime that there is a moon.
>
> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a 
> theory in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 
>
> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
>
> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are 
> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary 
> test, 
> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The 
> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, 
> is a normal happening in arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in 
 mathematics at some level of language:

 *Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the 
 question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth 
 value, Rutgers, March 2013*

 http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/

 As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as 
 "reduction to physics:

 *Against Fundamentalism*.(2018)
 http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/

 *non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism:

 "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which 
 the objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they 
 are genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at 
 some other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. 
 Non-reductive 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 3:44:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Oct 2018, at 12:04, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical 
> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before 
> humans, 
> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time 
> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or 
> yesterday.
>
> Bruno
>
>

 As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers 
 in the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a 
 language that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.


 Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as 
 true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.

 Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
 fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
 which just means false (assuming Mechanism).




 If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call 
 material reality …. 


 There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
 language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
 reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to 
 see this.





 (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …)


 That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.

 I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or 
 physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that 
 those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for 
 centuries.

 Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was 
 contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps 
 some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I 
 doubt 
 this too.



 * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], 
 written by Mark Balaguer [ 
 http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ].



 I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime 
 that there is a moon.

 To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a 
 theory in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 

 It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
 arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
 consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.

 Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are 
 incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary 
 test, 
 done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The 
 multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, 
 is a normal happening in arithmetic.

 Bruno



>>> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in 
>>> mathematics at some level of language:
>>>
>>> *Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the 
>>> question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth 
>>> value, Rutgers, March 2013*
>>>
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/
>>>
>>> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as 
>>> "reduction to physics:
>>>
>>> *Against Fundamentalism*.(2018)
>>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/
>>>
>>> *non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism:
>>>
>>> "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which 
>>> the objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they 
>>> are genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at 
>>> some other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. 
>>> Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking 
>>> the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the 
>>> existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the 
>>> terms canonically used 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 29 Oct 2018, at 12:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical 
 reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before 
 humans, although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out 
 of time and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or 
 yesterday.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in 
 the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a 
 language that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
>>> 
>>> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as 
>>> true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
>>> 
>>> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
>>> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
>>> which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
 reality …. 
>>> 
>>> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
>>> language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
>>> reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to 
>>> see this.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 (sort of like, In the beginning was The Word …)
>>> 
>>> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
>>> 
>>> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or 
>>> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that 
>>> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for 
>>> centuries.
>>> 
>>> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was contradicted 
>>> by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps some notion of 
>>> “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I doubt this too.
>>> 
>>> 
 
 * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ 
  ], written 
 by Mark Balaguer [ http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer 
  ].
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime 
>>> that there is a moon.
>>> 
>>> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory in 
>>> physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 
>>> 
>>> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
>>> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
>>> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
>>> 
>>> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are 
>>> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary test, 
>>> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The 
>>> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, 
>>> is a normal happening in arithmetic.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in mathematics 
>>> at some level of language:
>>> 
>>> Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the 
>>> question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth 
>>> value, Rutgers, March 2013
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as "reduction 
>>> to physics:
>>> 
>>> Against Fundamentalism.(2018)
>>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/ 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> non-reductive materialism is in opposition to physicalism:
>>> 
>>> "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which the 
>>> objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they are 
>>> genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at some 
>>> other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. 
>>> Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 5:05:03 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



 There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical 
 reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before 
 humans, 
 although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time 
 and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday.

 Bruno


>>>
>>> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in 
>>> the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language 
>>> that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
>>>
>>>
>>> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as 
>>> true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
>>>
>>> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
>>> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
>>> which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
>>> reality …. 
>>>
>>>
>>> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
>>> language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
>>> reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to 
>>> see this.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …)
>>>
>>>
>>> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
>>>
>>> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or 
>>> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that 
>>> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for 
>>> centuries.
>>>
>>> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was 
>>> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps 
>>> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I doubt 
>>> this too.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], 
>>> written by Mark Balaguer [ 
>>> http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ].
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime 
>>> that there is a moon.
>>>
>>> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory 
>>> in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 
>>>
>>> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
>>> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
>>> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
>>>
>>> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are 
>>> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary test, 
>>> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The 
>>> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, 
>>> is a normal happening in arithmetic.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in 
>> mathematics at some level of language:
>>
>> *Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the 
>> question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth 
>> value, Rutgers, March 2013*
>>
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/
>>
>> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as 
>> "reduction to physics:
>>
>> *Against Fundamentalism*.(2018)
>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/
>>
>> *non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism:
>>
>> "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which 
>> the objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they 
>> are genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at 
>> some other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. 
>> Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking 
>> the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the 
>> existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the 
>> terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor 
>> influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and 
>> explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are invisible 
>> from the perspective of basic physics. A lot of vigorous literature has 
>> 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Oct 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical reality 
>>> and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before humans, 
>>> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time 
>>> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in 
>>> the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language 
>>> that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
>> 
>> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as 
>> true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
>> 
>> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
>> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
>> which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
>>> reality …. 
>> 
>> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
>> language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
>> reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to see 
>> this.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> (sort of like, In the beginning was The Word …)
>> 
>> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
>> 
>> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or physicalism. 
>> It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that those who 
>> harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for centuries.
>> 
>> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was contradicted 
>> by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps some notion of 
>> “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I doubt this too.
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ 
>>>  ], written 
>>> by Mark Balaguer [ http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer 
>>>  ].
>> 
>> 
>> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime that 
>> there is a moon.
>> 
>> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory in 
>> physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 
>> 
>> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
>> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
>> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
>> 
>> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are 
>> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary test, 
>> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The 
>> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, is 
>> a normal happening in arithmetic.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in mathematics 
>> at some level of language:
>> 
>> Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the question 
>> of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth value, Rutgers, 
>> March 2013
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as "reduction 
>> to physics:
>> 
>> Against Fundamentalism.(2018)
>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/ 
>> 
>> 
>> non-reductive materialism is in opposition to physicalism:
>> 
>> "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which the 
>> objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they are 
>> genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at some 
>> other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. Non-reductive 
>> materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking the material 
>> constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the existence of real 
>> objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the terms canonically 
>> used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor influentially argues 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 8:29:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical 
>>> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before humans, 
>>> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time 
>>> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>
>> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in 
>> the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language 
>> that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
>>
>>
>> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as 
>> true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
>>
>> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
>> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
>> which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
>> reality …. 
>>
>>
>> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
>> language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
>> reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to 
>> see this.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …)
>>
>>
>> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
>>
>> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or 
>> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that 
>> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for 
>> centuries.
>>
>> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was 
>> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps 
>> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I doubt 
>> this too.
>>
>>
>>
>> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], 
>> written by Mark Balaguer [ 
>> http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ].
>>
>>
>>
>> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime 
>> that there is a moon.
>>
>> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory 
>> in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 
>>
>> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
>> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
>> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
>>
>> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are 
>> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary test, 
>> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The 
>> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, 
>> is a normal happening in arithmetic.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in 
> mathematics at some level of language:
>
> *Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the 
> question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth 
> value, Rutgers, March 2013*
>
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/
>
> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as 
> "reduction to physics:
>
> *Against Fundamentalism*.(2018)
> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/
>
> *non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism:
>
> "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which the 
> objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they are 
> genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at some 
> other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. 
> Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking 
> the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the 
> existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the 
> terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor 
> influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and 
> explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are invisible 
> from the perspective of basic physics. A lot of vigorous literature has 
> grown up around the relation between these views."
> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism
>
> Materialism and physicalism are not the same thing.
>
>
> Indeed. Note that I use “materialism” in a weaker sense than usual. By 
> materialism, I mean the belief 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 26 Oct 2018, at 18:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical reality 
>> and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before humans, although 
>> this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time and space. 
>> It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in the 
>> first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language that 
>> has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
> 
> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as true, 
> and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
> 
> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
> which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
>> reality …. 
> 
> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
> language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
> reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to see 
> this.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> (sort of like, In the beginning was The Word …)
> 
> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
> 
> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or physicalism. 
> It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that those who 
> harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for centuries.
> 
> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was contradicted 
> by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps some notion of 
> “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I doubt this too.
> 
> 
>> 
>> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ 
>>  ], written by 
>> Mark Balaguer [ http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer 
>>  ].
> 
> 
> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime that 
> there is a moon.
> 
> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory in 
> physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 
> 
> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
> 
> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible 
> together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary test, done by 
> contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The multiplication 
> and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, is a normal 
> happening in arithmetic.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in mathematics 
> at some level of language:
> 
> Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the question 
> of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth value, Rutgers, 
> March 2013
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/
> 
> As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as "reduction 
> to physics:
> 
> Against Fundamentalism.(2018)
> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/
> 
> non-reductive materialism is in opposition to physicalism:
> 
> "Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which the 
> objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they are 
> genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at some 
> other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. Non-reductive 
> materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking the material 
> constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the existence of real 
> objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the terms canonically 
> used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor influentially argues 
> this view, according to which empirical laws and explanations in "special 
> sciences" like psychology or geology are invisible from the perspective of 
> basic physics. A lot of vigorous literature has grown up around the relation 
> between these views."
> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism
> 
> Materialism and physicalism are not the same thing.

Indeed. Note that I use “materialism” in a weaker sense than usual. By 
materialism, I mean the belief in primary matter. 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[John Clark]

On Thu, Oct 25, 2018 at 12:36 PM Philip Thrift 
wrote:

*>"2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language that has been
> created in which that sentence is labeled "true".*


If there were not at least 2 physical things in existence it would be
labeled neither true or false but gibberish; or at least it would be if
there was anybody around to do any labeling, which there wouldn't be.

John K Clark

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 9:50:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical 
>> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before humans, 
>> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time 
>> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>
> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in 
> the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language 
> that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.
>
>
> Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as 
> true, and send me the 1000.000 dollars.
>
> Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical 
> fictionalism, but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, 
> which just means false (assuming Mechanism).
>
>
>
>
> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
> reality …. 
>
>
> There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
> language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
> reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to 
> see this.
>
>
>
>
>
> (sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* …)
>
>
> That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.
>
> I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or 
> physicalism. It is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that 
> those who harbour doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for 
> centuries.
>
> Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was 
> contradicted by nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps 
> some notion of “primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I doubt 
> this too.
>
>
>
> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], 
> written by Mark Balaguer [ http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer 
> ].
>
>
>
> I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime 
> that there is a moon.
>
> To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory 
> in physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 
>
> It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an 
> arithmetical dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of 
> consciousness to a piece of rock. To be short.
>
> Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are 
> incompatible together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary test, 
> done by contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The 
> multiplication and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, 
> is a normal happening in arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
There is a sense we know now that there is no definite truth in mathematics 
at some level of language:

*Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the 
question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth 
value, Rutgers, March 2013*
http://jdh.hamkins.org/pluralism-in-mathematics-the-multiverse-view-in-set-theory-and-the-question-of-whether-every-mathematical-statement-has-a-definite-truth-value-rutgers-march-2013/

As physicalism has been defined in current philosophy writing as "reduction 
to physics:

*Against Fundamentalism*.(2018)
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/

*non-reductive* materialism is in opposition to physicalism:

"Materialism is often associated with reductionism, according to which the 
objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they are 
genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at some 
other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level. 
Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking 
the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the 
existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the 
terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor 
influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and 
explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are invisible 
from the perspective of basic physics. A lot of vigorous literature has 
grown up around the relation between these views."
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

Materialism and physicalism are not the same thing.


- pt



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For more 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Oct 2018, at 20:05, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/25/2018 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 24 Oct 2018, at 03:22, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/23/2018 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 23 Oct 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/22/2018 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that 
>> languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of 
>> their exploration.
> So how do you prove theorems without a language?
 Of course, proving a theorem requires a theory, and a language. I was 
 saying (see the quote) that the *arithmetical reality* does not require a 
 language.
 
 The arithmetical reality does not require a language more than dinosaurs 
 needed the word “dinosaur” to exist. The prime character of 17 does not 
 need a mathematician to assert it, or to think about.
 
 To prove a theorem requires a theory, which requires a language.  We can 
 only ope that our theory is in relation with truth, but the truth of 17 is 
 prime, assuming it true,  does not need a proof to be true. A proof is 
 neither necessary, nor sufficient. The arithmetical reality is independent 
 of the big-bang. It is more plausible than an event like the big-bang 
 requires some part of the arithmetical reality.
>>> But you are basing our shared reality in what is provable,
>> Absolutely not. I mean no more than any scientist, and I make clear my 
>> hypotheses.theory, without have ever claim any truth, like any sane 
>> scientist do. I am more exorcist: I base our shared reality on a mix of 
>> theory and experiences.
>> 
>> A theory is better identify with a being or a set of belief. I say that a 
>> machine believes A if the machine asserts A. I limit myself to what 
>> self-referentially correct machine can say, and not say, ...
> 
> But don't you identify "machine believes A" with "machine can prove A”?

Only because I am limiting myself to the theology of rational machine, which 
believe in some universal system. 




> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> which is therefore dependent on having language.  Right?
>> The reality itself does not depends on the language, even if the language 
>> will be itself a part of the reality.
> 
> Not the reality, but the proof depends on language.

The proof depends on language, yes. No problem with that. Actually the proof 
depends accidentally on the language but depends in a more important way on the 
theory. If the axiom is the Riemann conjecture, the proof will be very easy.

I identify machine, theories, hypotheses, (personal) beings, numbers, finite 
things, etc. That is enough to get very interesting conclusions, and we can 
introduce the nuances when needed later. Likewise I identify semantic, meaning, 
model, reality, divine, god... The interesting things happen in the relation of 
machine and meaning/reality.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> We need lanaguage to communicate about reality, including languages. We are 
>> ourselves words, written in the biochemical languages, and particles are 
>> words of some wort too. Now, the more a theory is lade independent of the 
>> language, or the even the theories,, the more is has a chance to be deep, 
>> and to help avoiding geographical prejudice on what is real or not.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Oct 2018, at 19:46, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/25/2018 9:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Now, when you say that there was no mathematics before writing, I am not 
>> sure. I think the incas have developed ways to compute (notably the position 
>> of the star in the sky) before writing. I think that arithmetic precede 
>> thought which precedes languages, and I can identify machines, words, 
>> numbers, finitely-describale-thing,  as opposed to the meaning which are 
>> usually infinite, but will belong to the machines/numbers mind.
> 
> People counted on their body parts, joints, fingers, etc long before there 
> was writing.  They're called “digits"
> for a reason.


Absolutely. 

Bruno



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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Oct 2018, at 18:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical reality 
> and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before humans, although 
> this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time and space. 
> It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in the 
> first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language that 
> has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true”.

Let me labelled the Rieman conjecture (a PI_1 arithmetical sentence) as true, 
and send me the 1000.000 dollars.

Wit mechanism, we could say that we arrive at a sort of physical fictionalism, 
but to be sure, only the primary character is “fictional”, which just means 
false (assuming Mechanism).



> 
> If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
> reality …. 

There is the notion of Turing universality, which is independent of any 
language. But is part of the arithmetical reality, or the combinatorical 
reality, which is independent of language too, but it might be harder to see 
this.




> 
> (sort of like, In the beginning was The Word …)

That was a good insight, yes. Again, when we assume mechanism.

I don’t think that there is any evidence for materialism and/or physicalism. It 
is just an habit of thinking, perhaps due to the fact that those who harbour 
doubt on this have been persecuted as heretic for centuries.

Note that if the logic Z1*, which I describe in my papers, was contradicted by 
nature, that would be an evidence for oracle, and perhaps some notion of 
“primary matter” would make sense, but to be honest, I doubt this too.


> 
> * [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], written 
> by Mark Balaguer [ http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ].


I am skeptical of their premises. I would believe more that 17 is prime that 
there is a moon.

To make sense of mathematical factionalism, I would like to see a theory in 
physics which does not assume elementary arithmetic. 

It is more easy to explain the “illusion” of primary matter to an arithmetical 
dreaming computer than to explain the “illusion” of consciousness to a piece of 
rock. To be short.

Anyway, what can be proved is that Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible 
together, and that we can test this, and the preliminary test, done by 
contemporary physics already lean in favour of mechanism. The multiplication 
and fusion of histoires, exemplified by quantum mechanics, is a normal 
happening in arithmetic.

Bruno




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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 12:46:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/25/2018 9:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > Now, when you say that there was no mathematics before writing, I am 
> > not sure. I think the incas have developed ways to compute (notably 
> > the position of the star in the sky) before writing. I think that 
> > arithmetic precede thought which precedes languages, and I can 
> > identify machines, words, numbers, finitely-describale-thing,  as 
> > opposed to the meaning which are usually infinite, but will belong to 
> > the machines/numbers mind. 
>
> People counted on their body parts, joints, fingers, etc long before 
> there was writing.  They're called "digits" for a reason. 
>
> Brent 
>


One can argue though that *arithmetic* came with writing (Sumeria):

The Sumerians invented *arithmetic*.[12] 
 
People 
who added and subtracted volumes of grain every day used their arithmetic 
skills to count other things that were unrelated to volume measurements. 
Multiplication and division were done with multiplication tables baked in 
clay tablets.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_ancient_numeral_systems

- pt 

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/25/2018 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Oct 2018, at 03:22, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 10/23/2018 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Oct 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 10/22/2018 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that languages 
are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their exploration.

So how do you prove theorems without a language?

Of course, proving a theorem requires a theory, and a language. I was saying 
(see the quote) that the *arithmetical reality* does not require a language.

The arithmetical reality does not require a language more than dinosaurs needed 
the word “dinosaur” to exist. The prime character of 17 does not need a 
mathematician to assert it, or to think about.

To prove a theorem requires a theory, which requires a language.  We can only 
ope that our theory is in relation with truth, but the truth of 17 is prime, 
assuming it true,  does not need a proof to be true. A proof is neither 
necessary, nor sufficient. The arithmetical reality is independent of the 
big-bang. It is more plausible than an event like the big-bang requires some 
part of the arithmetical reality.

But you are basing our shared reality in what is provable,

Absolutely not. I mean no more than any scientist, and I make clear my 
hypotheses.theory, without have ever claim any truth, like any sane scientist 
do. I am more exorcist: I base our shared reality on a mix of theory and 
experiences.

A theory is better identify with a being or a set of belief. I say that a 
machine believes A if the machine asserts A. I limit myself to what 
self-referentially correct machine can say, and not say, ...


But don't you identify "machine believes A" with "machine can prove A"?






which is therefore dependent on having language.  Right?

The reality itself does not depends on the language, even if the language will 
be itself a part of the reality.


Not the reality, but the proof depends on language.

Brent


We need lanaguage to communicate about reality, including languages. We are 
ourselves words, written in the biochemical languages, and particles are words 
of some wort too. Now, the more a theory is lade independent of the language, 
or the even the theories,, the more is has a chance to be deep, and to help 
avoiding geographical prejudice on what is real or not.

Bruno







Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/25/2018 9:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Now, when you say that there was no mathematics before writing, I am 
not sure. I think the incas have developed ways to compute (notably 
the position of the star in the sky) before writing. I think that 
arithmetic precede thought which precedes languages, and I can 
identify machines, words, numbers, finitely-describale-thing,  as 
opposed to the meaning which are usually infinite, but will belong to 
the machines/numbers mind.


People counted on their body parts, joints, fingers, etc long before 
there was writing.  They're called "digits" for a reason.


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, October 25, 2018 at 11:03:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical 
> reality and a mathematical reality before human writing, and before humans, 
> although this is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time 
> and space. It is a category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday.
>
> Bruno
>
>

As the mathematical fictionalist* would deny the existence of numbers in 
the first place, "2+2=4" is only true in the sense that there is a language 
that has been created in which that sentence is labeled "true".

If there were some eternal language outside anything we we call material 
reality  

(sort of like, *In the beginning was The Word* ...)

* [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], written 
by Mark Balaguer [ http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mark-balaguer ].

- p 

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Oct 2018, at 03:22, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/23/2018 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 23 Oct 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/22/2018 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that 
 languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their 
 exploration.
>>> So how do you prove theorems without a language?
>> Of course, proving a theorem requires a theory, and a language. I was saying 
>> (see the quote) that the *arithmetical reality* does not require a language.
>> 
>> The arithmetical reality does not require a language more than dinosaurs 
>> needed the word “dinosaur” to exist. The prime character of 17 does not need 
>> a mathematician to assert it, or to think about.
>> 
>> To prove a theorem requires a theory, which requires a language.  We can 
>> only ope that our theory is in relation with truth, but the truth of 17 is 
>> prime, assuming it true,  does not need a proof to be true. A proof is 
>> neither necessary, nor sufficient. The arithmetical reality is independent 
>> of the big-bang. It is more plausible than an event like the big-bang 
>> requires some part of the arithmetical reality.
> 
> But you are basing our shared reality in what is provable,

Absolutely not. I mean no more than any scientist, and I make clear my 
hypotheses.theory, without have ever claim any truth, like any sane scientist 
do. I am more exorcist: I base our shared reality on a mix of theory and 
experiences.

A theory is better identify with a being or a set of belief. I say that a 
machine believes A if the machine asserts A. I limit myself to what 
self-referentially correct machine can say, and not say, ...



> which is therefore dependent on having language.  Right?

The reality itself does not depends on the language, even if the language will 
be itself a part of the reality.
We need lanaguage to communicate about reality, including languages. We are 
ourselves words, written in the biochemical languages, and particles are words 
of some wort too. Now, the more a theory is lade independent of the language, 
or the even the theories,, the more is has a chance to be deep, and to help 
avoiding geographical prejudice on what is real or not.

Bruno






> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Oct 2018, at 19:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, October 23, 2018 at 11:23:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > On 23 Oct 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker > 
> > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 10/22/2018 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that 
> >> languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their 
> >> exploration. 
> > 
> > So how do you prove theorems without a language? 
> 
> Of course, proving a theorem requires a theory, and a language. I was saying 
> (see the quote) that the *arithmetical reality* does not require a language. 
> 
> The arithmetical reality does not require a language more than dinosaurs 
> needed the word “dinosaur” to exist. The prime character of 17 does not need 
> a mathematician to assert it, or to think about. 
> 
> To prove a theorem requires a theory, which requires a language.  We can only 
> ope that our theory is in relation with truth, but the truth of 17 is prime, 
> assuming it true,  does not need a proof to be true. A proof is neither 
> necessary, nor sufficient. The arithmetical reality is independent of the 
> big-bang. It is more plausible than an event like the big-bang requires some 
> part of the arithmetical reality. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> People have debated (written books on)  arithmetical or mathematical realism 
> vs. fictionalism (and everything in between) until the cows come home (count 
> them!), but here is something I found recently:
> 
> https://twitter.com/philipthrift/status/1053537641420021761
> 
> It's about the Sumerian goddess Nisaba who turned out to be the goddess of 
> both writing and counting/arithmetic.
> 
> (There was no mathematics before writing.)

I think remembering that neurophysiologist have found very separate region in 
the brain for words treatment and numbers treatment. Some people can become 
aphasic and still compute easily, and vice versa. Don’t hesitate to verify this.

But words can be Turing universal, like with Post Production systems, or with 
any programming languages at some level. Words, numbers, combinators, 
game-of-life pattern , all you need is to fix one Turing universal system, and 
then we use it to make N into a combinatory algebra, but that is just steps 
toward addressing the" border of the universal mind introspecting itself", 
needed to formulate the mind-body problem, in particular the measure problem, 
in arithmetic.

The “problem” is that if we can ascribe a mind to a 3p describable thing, the 
1p cannot do that, and is determined by an infinity of computations (sigma_1 
sentences). That leads to a first person, and a first person plural, 
indeterminacy, from which physics is a part. The solution exists at the 
propositional level, where we get an entire" theology”. I have mentioned the 
reference. It includes the logic of the observable, so we can compare, and up 
to now, it fits, thanks to Quantum logic.

You cited very good papers, but most of what I say need only Boolos 1979. The 
Russian and Georgian have solved most complex unsolved conjectures from Boolos 
1979. See Boolos 1993. But the simpler Forever Undecided is a nice introduction 
to the logic G. Artemov+Becklemishev paper is quite interesting, a bit advanced.

Now, when you say that there was no mathematics before writing, I am not sure. 
I think the incas have developed ways to compute (notably the position of the 
star in the sky) before writing. I think that arithmetic precede thought which 
precedes languages, and I can identify machines, words, numbers, 
finitely-describale-thing,  as opposed to the meaning which are usually 
infinite, but will belong to the machines/numbers mind.

There was no physics before writing, also; but there was a physical reality and 
a mathematical reality before human writing, and before humans, although this 
is metaphorical, as the arithmetical reality is out of time and space. It is a 
category error to ask if 2+2=4 is true now or yesterday.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Martin Abramson]

I already published this elsewhere.


On Tue, Oct 23, 2018 at 9:22 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/23/2018 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 23 Oct 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 10/22/2018 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that
> languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their
> exploration.
> >> So how do you prove theorems without a language?
> > Of course, proving a theorem requires a theory, and a language. I was
> saying (see the quote) that the *arithmetical reality* does not require a
> language.
> >
> > The arithmetical reality does not require a language more than dinosaurs
> needed the word “dinosaur” to exist. The prime character of 17 does not
> need a mathematician to assert it, or to think about.
> >
> > To prove a theorem requires a theory, which requires a language.  We can
> only ope that our theory is in relation with truth, but the truth of 17 is
> prime, assuming it true,  does not need a proof to be true. A proof is
> neither necessary, nor sufficient. The arithmetical reality is independent
> of the big-bang. It is more plausible than an event like the big-bang
> requires some part of the arithmetical reality.
>
> But you are basing our shared reality in what is provable, which is
> therefore dependent on having language.  Right?
>
> Brent
>
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Martin Abramson]

Consciousness is IDENTITY like a fingerprint or voice print. Every
consciousness is unique but each needs something to be conscious OF like a
human body or perhaps a larger (virtual?) program (hologram?) It can be
stored on a database. That's as far as I've got.

On Tue, Oct 23, 2018 at 9:22 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/23/2018 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 23 Oct 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 10/22/2018 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that
> languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their
> exploration.
> >> So how do you prove theorems without a language?
> > Of course, proving a theorem requires a theory, and a language. I was
> saying (see the quote) that the *arithmetical reality* does not require a
> language.
> >
> > The arithmetical reality does not require a language more than dinosaurs
> needed the word “dinosaur” to exist. The prime character of 17 does not
> need a mathematician to assert it, or to think about.
> >
> > To prove a theorem requires a theory, which requires a language.  We can
> only ope that our theory is in relation with truth, but the truth of 17 is
> prime, assuming it true,  does not need a proof to be true. A proof is
> neither necessary, nor sufficient. The arithmetical reality is independent
> of the big-bang. It is more plausible than an event like the big-bang
> requires some part of the arithmetical reality.
>
> But you are basing our shared reality in what is provable, which is
> therefore dependent on having language.  Right?
>
> Brent
>
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/23/2018 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Oct 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 10/22/2018 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that languages 
are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their exploration.

So how do you prove theorems without a language?

Of course, proving a theorem requires a theory, and a language. I was saying 
(see the quote) that the *arithmetical reality* does not require a language.

The arithmetical reality does not require a language more than dinosaurs needed 
the word “dinosaur” to exist. The prime character of 17 does not need a 
mathematician to assert it, or to think about.

To prove a theorem requires a theory, which requires a language.  We can only 
ope that our theory is in relation with truth, but the truth of 17 is prime, 
assuming it true,  does not need a proof to be true. A proof is neither 
necessary, nor sufficient. The arithmetical reality is independent of the 
big-bang. It is more plausible than an event like the big-bang requires some 
part of the arithmetical reality.


But you are basing our shared reality in what is provable, which is 
therefore dependent on having language.  Right?


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, October 23, 2018 at 11:23:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 23 Oct 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 10/22/2018 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that 
> languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their 
> exploration. 
> > 
> > So how do you prove theorems without a language? 
>
> Of course, proving a theorem requires a theory, and a language. I was 
> saying (see the quote) that the *arithmetical reality* does not require a 
> language. 
>
> The arithmetical reality does not require a language more than dinosaurs 
> needed the word “dinosaur” to exist. The prime character of 17 does not 
> need a mathematician to assert it, or to think about. 
>
> To prove a theorem requires a theory, which requires a language.  We can 
> only ope that our theory is in relation with truth, but the truth of 17 is 
> prime, assuming it true,  does not need a proof to be true. A proof is 
> neither necessary, nor sufficient. The arithmetical reality is independent 
> of the big-bang. It is more plausible than an event like the big-bang 
> requires some part of the arithmetical reality. 
>
> Bruno 
>
>

People have debated (written books on)  arithmetical or mathematical 
realism vs. fictionalism (and everything in between) until the cows come 
home (count them!), but here is something I found recently:

https://twitter.com/philipthrift/status/1053537641420021761

It's about the Sumerian goddess Nisaba who turned out to be the goddess of 
both writing and counting/arithmetic.

(There was no mathematics before writing.)

- pt

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, October 23, 2018 at 11:13:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Oct 2018, at 19:33, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 22, 2018 at 8:54:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Oct 2018, at 14:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, October 22, 2018 at 6:05:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 Oct 2018, at 13:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It is generally not considered applying Rorty and or Derrida to 
>>> mathematical language, but mathematics is a language* too, like English. 
>>> (or programming languages for that matter).
>>>
>>>
>>> Mathematics is no more a language that physics. They use a mathematical 
>>> language, but the mathematical language is independent of the choice of a 
>>> theory (written in that mathematical language).
>>>
>>> We should always keep in mind the distinction between
>>> - a mathematical language (usually defined by some grammar which 
>>> determine the well formed formula)
>>> - a mathematical theory. (A precise choice of some formula)
>>> - a model of that mathematical theory (a structure satisfying the axioms 
>>> of a theory, with truth preserving inference rule).
>>> - a relation judged plausible between a model of a mathematical theory 
>>> and a portion or an aspect of some “reality".
>>>
>>> Exemple: take arithmetic: 
>>> - the mathematical language is given by -> f, E, A, “(“, “)”, x, y, z … 
>>> (logical symbols) with “s”, “0”, “+”, “*” (arithmetical symbols) + the 
>>> usual formation rule (if X and Y are formula, then X -> Y is a formula, 
>>> etc.)
>>> - an arithmetical theory: here the one by Robinson, with only 7 axioms 
>>> (chosen formula).
>>>
>>> 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
>>> 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
>>> 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
>>> 4) x+0 = x
>>> 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
>>> 6) x*0=0
>>> 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>>> + the inference rule of modus ponens
>>>
>>> - a model is given by any structure verifying (satisfying) the axioms 
>>> and truth preserving rule. The standard model is the set N together with 
>>> the usual addition and multiplication (but there are many models, not all 
>>> isomorphic to the standard model).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Mathematics, both pure and applied (e.g. physics), is a collection of 
>> paradigm-specific and domain-specific languages (PSLs, DSLs), just like 
>> programming languages.
>>
>>
>> I disagree. All programming languages are equivalent with respect of 
>> provability, and more or less equivalent when no induction axioms is added 
>> (in the first order theory of the total functions from N to N computed).
>>
>> But the theories all differ a lot. It is natural to measure the power of 
>> a theory by the magnitude of the set of computable functions that the 
>> theory can prove to be computable. For example Q (the theory above) proves 
>> the total-computability of a very small set of functions, Peano arithmetic 
>> (PA) proves a much larger set. ZF proves a very gigantic set, ZF + kappa 
>> proves an even greater set. You can guess this using incompleteness. For 
>> example ZF+kappa proves the arithmetical propositions which assert the 
>> consistency of ZF, and thus also all there consequences. 
>>
>> I look at the arithmetical reality like an ocean, except that it contains 
>> infinite water, and infinitely many holes in the bottom. For most all, you 
>> can explore them, without knowing if they have a bottom or not. In some 
>> case, you can prove that there is a bottom, but that need a very powerful 
>> theory (like ZF+kappa). 
>>
>> So the arithmetical is something that you can explore, and a theory, any 
>> theory, is just a lantern which provides some light in the neighbourhood.
>>
>> It is important to distinguish the arithmetical reality from any 
>> languages used to describe it, but it is also important to distinguish it 
>> from all theories, which are only “bodies” throwing light on something 
>> mainly unknown. 
>>
>> The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that 
>> languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their 
>> exploration.
>>
>> The language is the arm.
>> The theory is the arm pointing in a direction
>> The reality is the moon.
>>
>> And this is a metaphor, as, with mechanism, the “moon” is but an object 
>> in (infinities) of number’s dreams (computation seen from inside, I 
>> eventually defined this using Gödel numbers).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> For example ,quantum field theory can be expressed in Hilbert-space or 
>> path-integral dialects.
>> http://www.fuw.edu.pl/~kostecki/daniel_ranard_essay.pdf
>>
>>
>>
>> Like the notion of universal machine, many different theories and 
>> languages can be used to formulate QM.
>> Like Schrodinger/de Broglie Waves (equation/function), or Heisenger 
>> Matrix, or Feynman's summation. They are “easily” be shown equivalent (when 
>> discarding the collapse “hallucination”).
>> I guess this has to be the case with the relativistic 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Oct 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/22/2018 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that 
>> languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their 
>> exploration.
> 
> So how do you prove theorems without a language?

Of course, proving a theorem requires a theory, and a language. I was saying 
(see the quote) that the *arithmetical reality* does not require a language. 

The arithmetical reality does not require a language more than dinosaurs needed 
the word “dinosaur” to exist. The prime character of 17 does not need a 
mathematician to assert it, or to think about.

To prove a theorem requires a theory, which requires a language.  We can only 
ope that our theory is in relation with truth, but the truth of 17 is prime, 
assuming it true,  does not need a proof to be true. A proof is neither 
necessary, nor sufficient. The arithmetical reality is independent of the 
big-bang. It is more plausible than an event like the big-bang requires some 
part of the arithmetical reality. 

Bruno






> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 22 Oct 2018, at 19:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, October 22, 2018 at 8:54:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 22 Oct 2018, at 14:38, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, October 22, 2018 at 6:05:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 21 Oct 2018, at 13:55, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> It is generally not considered applying Rorty and or Derrida to 
>>> mathematical language, but mathematics is a language* too, like English. 
>>> (or programming languages for that matter).
>> 
>> Mathematics is no more a language that physics. They use a mathematical 
>> language, but the mathematical language is independent of the choice of a 
>> theory (written in that mathematical language).
>> 
>> We should always keep in mind the distinction between
>> - a mathematical language (usually defined by some grammar which determine 
>> the well formed formula)
>> - a mathematical theory. (A precise choice of some formula)
>> - a model of that mathematical theory (a structure satisfying the axioms of 
>> a theory, with truth preserving inference rule).
>> - a relation judged plausible between a model of a mathematical theory and a 
>> portion or an aspect of some “reality".
>> 
>> Exemple: take arithmetic: 
>> - the mathematical language is given by -> f, E, A, “(“, “)”, x, y, z … 
>> (logical symbols) with “s”, “0”, “+”, “*” (arithmetical symbols) + the usual 
>> formation rule (if X and Y are formula, then X -> Y is a formula, etc.)
>> - an arithmetical theory: here the one by Robinson, with only 7 axioms 
>> (chosen formula).
>> 
>> 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
>> 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
>> 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
>> 4) x+0 = x
>> 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
>> 6) x*0=0
>> 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>> + the inference rule of modus ponens
>> 
>> - a model is given by any structure verifying (satisfying) the axioms and 
>> truth preserving rule. The standard model is the set N together with the 
>> usual addition and multiplication (but there are many models, not all 
>> isomorphic to the standard model).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Mathematics, both pure and applied (e.g. physics), is a collection of 
>> paradigm-specific and domain-specific languages (PSLs, DSLs), just like 
>> programming languages.
> 
> I disagree. All programming languages are equivalent with respect of 
> provability, and more or less equivalent when no induction axioms is added 
> (in the first order theory of the total functions from N to N computed).
> 
> But the theories all differ a lot. It is natural to measure the power of a 
> theory by the magnitude of the set of computable functions that the theory 
> can prove to be computable. For example Q (the theory above) proves the 
> total-computability of a very small set of functions, Peano arithmetic (PA) 
> proves a much larger set. ZF proves a very gigantic set, ZF + kappa proves an 
> even greater set. You can guess this using incompleteness. For example 
> ZF+kappa proves the arithmetical propositions which assert the consistency of 
> ZF, and thus also all there consequences. 
> 
> I look at the arithmetical reality like an ocean, except that it contains 
> infinite water, and infinitely many holes in the bottom. For most all, you 
> can explore them, without knowing if they have a bottom or not. In some case, 
> you can prove that there is a bottom, but that need a very powerful theory 
> (like ZF+kappa). 
> 
> So the arithmetical is something that you can explore, and a theory, any 
> theory, is just a lantern which provides some light in the neighbourhood.
> 
> It is important to distinguish the arithmetical reality from any languages 
> used to describe it, but it is also important to distinguish it from all 
> theories, which are only “bodies” throwing light on something mainly unknown. 
> 
> The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that 
> languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their 
> exploration.
> 
> The language is the arm.
> The theory is the arm pointing in a direction
> The reality is the moon.
> 
> And this is a metaphor, as, with mechanism, the “moon” is but an object in 
> (infinities) of number’s dreams (computation seen from inside, I eventually 
> defined this using Gödel numbers).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> For example ,quantum field theory can be expressed in Hilbert-space or 
>> path-integral dialects.
>> http://www.fuw.edu.pl/~kostecki/daniel_ranard_essay.pdf 
>> 
> 
> 
> Like the notion of universal machine, many different theories and languages 
> can be used to formulate QM.
> Like Schrodinger/de Broglie Waves (equation/function), or Heisenger Matrix, 
> or Feynman's summation. They are “easily” be shown equivalent (when 
> discarding the collapse “hallucination”).
> I guess this has to be the case with the relativistic correction, and it is 
> of course an open problem for the unknown unified theory (marrying QM and 
> GR). 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/22/2018 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that 
languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of 
their exploration.


So how do you prove theorems without a language?

Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, October 22, 2018 at 8:54:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Oct 2018, at 14:38, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 22, 2018 at 6:05:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Oct 2018, at 13:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> It is generally not considered applying Rorty and or Derrida to 
>> mathematical language, but mathematics is a language* too, like English. 
>> (or programming languages for that matter).
>>
>>
>> Mathematics is no more a language that physics. They use a mathematical 
>> language, but the mathematical language is independent of the choice of a 
>> theory (written in that mathematical language).
>>
>> We should always keep in mind the distinction between
>> - a mathematical language (usually defined by some grammar which 
>> determine the well formed formula)
>> - a mathematical theory. (A precise choice of some formula)
>> - a model of that mathematical theory (a structure satisfying the axioms 
>> of a theory, with truth preserving inference rule).
>> - a relation judged plausible between a model of a mathematical theory 
>> and a portion or an aspect of some “reality".
>>
>> Exemple: take arithmetic: 
>> - the mathematical language is given by -> f, E, A, “(“, “)”, x, y, z … 
>> (logical symbols) with “s”, “0”, “+”, “*” (arithmetical symbols) + the 
>> usual formation rule (if X and Y are formula, then X -> Y is a formula, 
>> etc.)
>> - an arithmetical theory: here the one by Robinson, with only 7 axioms 
>> (chosen formula).
>>
>> 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
>> 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
>> 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
>> 4) x+0 = x
>> 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
>> 6) x*0=0
>> 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>> + the inference rule of modus ponens
>>
>> - a model is given by any structure verifying (satisfying) the axioms and 
>> truth preserving rule. The standard model is the set N together with the 
>> usual addition and multiplication (but there are many models, not all 
>> isomorphic to the standard model).
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Mathematics, both pure and applied (e.g. physics), is a collection of 
> paradigm-specific and domain-specific languages (PSLs, DSLs), just like 
> programming languages.
>
>
> I disagree. All programming languages are equivalent with respect of 
> provability, and more or less equivalent when no induction axioms is added 
> (in the first order theory of the total functions from N to N computed).
>
> But the theories all differ a lot. It is natural to measure the power of a 
> theory by the magnitude of the set of computable functions that the theory 
> can prove to be computable. For example Q (the theory above) proves the 
> total-computability of a very small set of functions, Peano arithmetic (PA) 
> proves a much larger set. ZF proves a very gigantic set, ZF + kappa proves 
> an even greater set. You can guess this using incompleteness. For example 
> ZF+kappa proves the arithmetical propositions which assert the consistency 
> of ZF, and thus also all there consequences. 
>
> I look at the arithmetical reality like an ocean, except that it contains 
> infinite water, and infinitely many holes in the bottom. For most all, you 
> can explore them, without knowing if they have a bottom or not. In some 
> case, you can prove that there is a bottom, but that need a very powerful 
> theory (like ZF+kappa). 
>
> So the arithmetical is something that you can explore, and a theory, any 
> theory, is just a lantern which provides some light in the neighbourhood.
>
> It is important to distinguish the arithmetical reality from any languages 
> used to describe it, but it is also important to distinguish it from all 
> theories, which are only “bodies” throwing light on something mainly 
> unknown. 
>
> The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that 
> languages are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their 
> exploration.
>
> The language is the arm.
> The theory is the arm pointing in a direction
> The reality is the moon.
>
> And this is a metaphor, as, with mechanism, the “moon” is but an object in 
> (infinities) of number’s dreams (computation seen from inside, I eventually 
> defined this using Gödel numbers).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> For example ,quantum field theory can be expressed in Hilbert-space or 
> path-integral dialects.
> http://www.fuw.edu.pl/~kostecki/daniel_ranard_essay.pdf
>
>
>
> Like the notion of universal machine, many different theories and 
> languages can be used to formulate QM.
> Like Schrodinger/de Broglie Waves (equation/function), or Heisenger 
> Matrix, or Feynman's summation. They are “easily” be shown equivalent (when 
> discarding the collapse “hallucination”).
> I guess this has to be the case with the relativistic correction, and it 
> is of course an open problem for the unknown unified theory (marrying QM 
> and GR). But attempts like String Theory shows this with a vengeance, as 
> they are many different formulation, mirroring each other in some ways (the 
> M 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 22 Oct 2018, at 14:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, October 22, 2018 at 6:05:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Oct 2018, at 13:55, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> It is generally not considered applying Rorty and or Derrida to mathematical 
>> language, but mathematics is a language* too, like English. (or programming 
>> languages for that matter).
> 
> Mathematics is no more a language that physics. They use a mathematical 
> language, but the mathematical language is independent of the choice of a 
> theory (written in that mathematical language).
> 
> We should always keep in mind the distinction between
> - a mathematical language (usually defined by some grammar which determine 
> the well formed formula)
> - a mathematical theory. (A precise choice of some formula)
> - a model of that mathematical theory (a structure satisfying the axioms of a 
> theory, with truth preserving inference rule).
> - a relation judged plausible between a model of a mathematical theory and a 
> portion or an aspect of some “reality".
> 
> Exemple: take arithmetic: 
> - the mathematical language is given by -> f, E, A, “(“, “)”, x, y, z … 
> (logical symbols) with “s”, “0”, “+”, “*” (arithmetical symbols) + the usual 
> formation rule (if X and Y are formula, then X -> Y is a formula, etc.)
> - an arithmetical theory: here the one by Robinson, with only 7 axioms 
> (chosen formula).
> 
> 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
> 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
> 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
> 4) x+0 = x
> 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> 6) x*0=0
> 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> + the inference rule of modus ponens
> 
> - a model is given by any structure verifying (satisfying) the axioms and 
> truth preserving rule. The standard model is the set N together with the 
> usual addition and multiplication (but there are many models, not all 
> isomorphic to the standard model).
> 
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Mathematics, both pure and applied (e.g. physics), is a collection of 
> paradigm-specific and domain-specific languages (PSLs, DSLs), just like 
> programming languages.

I disagree. All programming languages are equivalent with respect of 
provability, and more or less equivalent when no induction axioms is added (in 
the first order theory of the total functions from N to N computed).

But the theories all differ a lot. It is natural to measure the power of a 
theory by the magnitude of the set of computable functions that the theory can 
prove to be computable. For example Q (the theory above) proves the 
total-computability of a very small set of functions, Peano arithmetic (PA) 
proves a much larger set. ZF proves a very gigantic set, ZF + kappa proves an 
even greater set. You can guess this using incompleteness. For example ZF+kappa 
proves the arithmetical propositions which assert the consistency of ZF, and 
thus also all there consequences. 

I look at the arithmetical reality like an ocean, except that it contains 
infinite water, and infinitely many holes in the bottom. For most all, you can 
explore them, without knowing if they have a bottom or not. In some case, you 
can prove that there is a bottom, but that need a very powerful theory (like 
ZF+kappa). 

So the arithmetical is something that you can explore, and a theory, any 
theory, is just a lantern which provides some light in the neighbourhood.

It is important to distinguish the arithmetical reality from any languages used 
to describe it, but it is also important to distinguish it from all theories, 
which are only “bodies” throwing light on something mainly unknown. 

The mathematical reality has noting to do with languages, except that languages 
are needed if machine/people want to share the results of their exploration.

The language is the arm.
The theory is the arm pointing in a direction
The reality is the moon.

And this is a metaphor, as, with mechanism, the “moon” is but an object in 
(infinities) of number’s dreams (computation seen from inside, I eventually 
defined this using Gödel numbers).





> 
> For example ,quantum field theory can be expressed in Hilbert-space or 
> path-integral dialects.
> http://www.fuw.edu.pl/~kostecki/daniel_ranard_essay.pdf


Like the notion of universal machine, many different theories and languages can 
be used to formulate QM.
Like Schrodinger/de Broglie Waves (equation/function), or Heisenger Matrix, or 
Feynman's summation. They are “easily” be shown equivalent (when discarding the 
collapse “hallucination”).
I guess this has to be the case with the relativistic correction, and it is of 
course an open problem for the unknown unified theory (marrying QM and GR). But 
attempts like String Theory shows this with a vengeance, as they are many 
different formulation, mirroring each other in some ways (the M theory).

With mechanism, too, as we can take any first order presentation of a Turing 
universal system. 

I would say, and can argue, that when we give a theory in the first order logic 
language, we do not introduce any 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, October 22, 2018 at 6:05:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Oct 2018, at 13:55, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> It is generally not considered applying Rorty and or Derrida to 
> mathematical language, but mathematics is a language* too, like English. 
> (or programming languages for that matter).
>
>
> Mathematics is no more a language that physics. They use a mathematical 
> language, but the mathematical language is independent of the choice of a 
> theory (written in that mathematical language).
>
> We should always keep in mind the distinction between
> - a mathematical language (usually defined by some grammar which determine 
> the well formed formula)
> - a mathematical theory. (A precise choice of some formula)
> - a model of that mathematical theory (a structure satisfying the axioms 
> of a theory, with truth preserving inference rule).
> - a relation judged plausible between a model of a mathematical theory and 
> a portion or an aspect of some “reality".
>
> Exemple: take arithmetic: 
> - the mathematical language is given by -> f, E, A, “(“, “)”, x, y, z … 
> (logical symbols) with “s”, “0”, “+”, “*” (arithmetical symbols) + the 
> usual formation rule (if X and Y are formula, then X -> Y is a formula, 
> etc.)
> - an arithmetical theory: here the one by Robinson, with only 7 axioms 
> (chosen formula).
>
> 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
> 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
> 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
> 4) x+0 = x
> 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> 6) x*0=0
> 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> + the inference rule of modus ponens
>
> - a model is given by any structure verifying (satisfying) the axioms and 
> truth preserving rule. The standard model is the set N together with the 
> usual addition and multiplication (but there are many models, not all 
> isomorphic to the standard model).
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Mathematics, both pure and applied (e.g. physics), is a collection of 
paradigm-specific and domain-specific languages (PSLs, DSLs), just like 
programming languages.

For example ,quantum field theory can be expressed in Hilbert-space or 
path-integral dialects.
http://www.fuw.edu.pl/~kostecki/daniel_ranard_essay.pdf

A "deconstruction" of first-order logic gives theories which replace 
infinite models with finite ones:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2273942

A theory of physics  expressed with a mathematical language inherits the 
metaphysics of the language (e.g. space and time).

- pt


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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Oct 2018, at 15:40, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 7:57:02 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Oct 2018, at 00:55, Brent Meeker > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
 
 
 On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
 
 
 On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem 
 >>> unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
 >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
 >> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled 
 >> "primary matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you 
 >> believe in primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
 > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
 > “matter” is “primary matter”. 
 
 No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
 to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
 They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
 like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
 at all. 
 
 Brent 
 
  
 
 What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
 
 The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
 time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, 
 they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes 
 about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
>>> 
>>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is "primary", 
>>> that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He knows that 
>>> QM
>>>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
>>> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
>>> No.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> 
>>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll
>>> 
>>> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … about 
>>> the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
>>>  re: Realism about the Wave Function   
>>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/ 
>>> 
>>>  
 
 Every language has a metaphysics.
 
 - pt
 
>>> 
>>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
>>> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
>>> cannot propose a language for us to speak."
>>> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
>>> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about. 
> 
> Not correct. The language use some ontology (the alphabet, words), but the 
> language per se is independent of an ontology. It does not talk about 
> anything. For this you need to select some formula in the language, and 
> assume that they are talking about something, which is always assumed.
> 
> 
> 
>> But that doesn't mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno wants 
>> to criticize physicists for assuming there's something he calls "primitive 
>> matter”. 
> 
> Not at all. I criticise physicalist. Physicists, on the contrary, avoid 
> metaphysics. 
> 
> There is not an atom of critics from may part on physics. Only on 
> physicalism. 
> My work has not been criticised by any physicists member of the three jury 
> called to judge the work (for the PhD, the price, etc.).
> 
> Critics comes from non-agnostic atheists believer (christian radicals in 
> disguise). They are the one for which a primary universe is a dogma. 
> Physicists do not do that.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> But this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost uniformly assume 
>> that the stuff in their theories has some deeper explanation and is NOT 
>> primary. 
> 
> Yes, that is why they have appreciate my work, in general. The critics comes 
> only from “philosophers”, even only the materialist marxist one. Only. The 
> serious people see that I give a testable theory. I show that some point in 
> metaphysics are testable.
> 
> Please state a metaphysical principle or proposition, and the method for 
> testing it. AG 


My favorite one: the existence of primary matter, or physicalism itself. How to 
test it? By comparing the quantum logic extracted from arithmetical 
self-reference 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Oct 2018, at 13:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 3:04:35 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Oct 2018, at 06:47, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 5:55:46 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
 
 
 On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
 
 
 On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem 
 >>> unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
 >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
 >> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled 
 >> "primary matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you 
 >> believe in primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
 > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
 > “matter” is “primary matter”. 
 
 No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
 to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
 They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
 like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
 at all. 
 
 Brent 
 
  
 
 What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
 
 The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
 time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, 
 they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes 
 about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
>>> 
>>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is "primary", 
>>> that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He knows that 
>>> QM
>>>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
>>> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
>>> No.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> 
>>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll
>>> 
>>> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … about 
>>> the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
>>>  re: Realism about the Wave Function   
>>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/ 
>>> 
>>>  
 
 Every language has a metaphysics.
 
 - pt
 
>>> 
>>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
>>> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
>>> cannot propose a language for us to speak."
>>> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
>>> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about.  But that 
>> doesn't mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno wants to 
>> criticize physicists for assuming there's something he calls "primitive 
>> matter".  But this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost 
>> uniformly assume that the stuff in their theories has some deeper 
>> explanation and is NOT primary.  There's a difference between saying a 
>> metaphysics assumes things and saying that it assumes things which are 
>> "primary".
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> My point is that all physicists assume a metaphysics whenever they 
>> articulate or adopt a theory, because all theory is expressed in a language.
> 
> I am not sure of that. They do it like we all do it implicitly in our 
> everyday life, but I have no find a paper in physics, which use any 
> metaphysical hypothesis. It is only the materialist philosopher who does 
> that. Now, some physicists do make a bit of metaphysics after pension, or as 
> amateur, but then they are no more doing physics. They do 
> philosophy/metaphysics/theology.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Every physics paper (e.g. looking ones on arXiv) assume some metaphysics.

I doubt this. I agree most physicists might use one implicitly, but it does not 
appear as being used, except for the mind-brain identity thesis which is indeed 
used constantly, but in that case it is always Aristotle notion of primary 
physical object. This we use even when we do a cup of coffee.



> There is the English (the natural language) in the paper, but there is the 
> mathematical language present there too (technically today written in 
> LaTeX:Mathematics [ 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 7:57:02 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Oct 2018, at 00:55, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem 
>>> unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
>>> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
>>> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary 
>>> matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in 
>>> primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
>>> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>>> “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>>>
>>> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
>>> to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
>>> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
>>> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
>>> at all. 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>>
>> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
>> time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, 
>> they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes 
>> about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
>>
>>
>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is 
>> "primary", that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He 
>> knows that QM
>>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
>> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
>> No.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386
>
> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll
>
> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … about 
> the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
>  re: Realism about the Wave Function   
> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/
>  
>
>>
>> Every language has a metaphysics.
>>
>> - pt
>>
>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
> cannot propose a language for us to speak."
> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf
>
>
>
> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about. 
>
>
> Not correct. The language use some ontology (the alphabet, words), but the 
> language per se is independent of an ontology. It does not talk about 
> anything. For this you need to select some formula in the language, and 
> assume that they are talking about something, which is always assumed.
>
>
>
> But that doesn't mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno 
> wants to criticize physicists for assuming there's something he calls 
> "primitive matter”.  
>
>
> Not at all. I criticise physicalist. Physicists, on the contrary, avoid 
> metaphysics. 
>
> There is not an atom of critics from may part on physics. Only on 
> physicalism. 
> My work has not been criticised by any physicists member of the three jury 
> called to judge the work (for the PhD, the price, etc.).
>
> Critics comes from non-agnostic atheists believer (christian radicals in 
> disguise). They are the one for which a primary universe is a dogma. 
> Physicists do not do that.
>
>
>
>
> But this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost uniformly 
> assume that the stuff in their theories has some deeper explanation and is 
> NOT primary. 
>
>
> Yes, that is why they have appreciate my work, in general. The critics 
> comes only from “philosophers”, even only the materialist marxist one. 
> Only. The serious people see that I give a testable theory. I show that 
> some point in metaphysics are testable.
>

*Please state a metaphysical principle or proposition, and the method for 
testing it. AG *

>
>
> There's a difference between saying a metaphysics assumes things and 
> saying that it assumes things which are "primary”.
>
>
> Metaphysics, theology, search the primary things. A things is primary when 
> it HAS TO BE assumed. The universal machinery can be proved to be primary 
> in that sense. But the physicalist consider that only the physical 
> universal machineries are primary, and refuse the idea that the physical 
> appearance can be explained by simpler idea not involving an ontological 
> commitment in a physical universe.
>
> Somehow, you 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 3:04:35 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Oct 2018, at 06:47, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 5:55:46 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 



 On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem 
 unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
 >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
 theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary 
 matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in 
 primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
 > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea 
 that “matter” is “primary matter”. 

 No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
 to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
 They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been 
 physicists 
 like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
 at all. 

 Brent 

>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>>>
>>> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
>>> time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, 
>>> they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes 
>>> about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
>>>
>>>
>>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is 
>>> "primary", that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He 
>>> knows that QM
>>>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
>>> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
>>> No.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386
>>
>> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll
>>
>> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … 
>> about the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
>>  re: Realism about the Wave Function   
>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Every language has a metaphysics.
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
>> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
>> cannot propose a language for us to speak."
>> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
>> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf
>>
>>
>>
>> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about.  But that 
>> doesn't mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno wants to 
>> criticize physicists for assuming there's something he calls "primitive 
>> matter".  But this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost 
>> uniformly assume that the stuff in their theories has some deeper 
>> explanation and is NOT primary.  There's a difference between saying a 
>> metaphysics assumes things and saying that it assumes things which are 
>> "primary".
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> My point is that all physicists assume a metaphysics whenever they 
> articulate or adopt a theory, because all theory is expressed in a language.
>
>
> I am not sure of that. They do it like we all do it implicitly in our 
> everyday life, but I have no find a paper in physics, which use any 
> metaphysical hypothesis. It is only the materialist philosopher who does 
> that. Now, some physicists do make a bit of metaphysics after pension, or 
> as amateur, but then they are no more doing physics. They do 
> philosophy/metaphysics/theology.
>




Every physics paper (e.g. looking ones on arXiv) assume some metaphysics. 
There is the English (the natural language) in the paper, but there is the 
mathematical language present there too (technically today written in 
LaTeX:Mathematics [ https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/LaTeX/Mathematics ]). 
Applying Rorty ("contingency of language") and Derrida ("metaphysics of 
presence") reveals the (hidden) metaphysics in the combined 
(natural+mathematical) languages.

It is generally not considered applying Rorty and or Derrida to 
mathematical language, but mathematics is a language* too, like English. 
(or programming languages for that matter).

* technically, family of languages



>
>
>
>
>
>
> As for "primary matter" (in particular, the "primary" part)  this is all I 
> know about what that means:
>
> https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism
>
> 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Oct 2018, at 06:47, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 5:55:46 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware 
>>> >>> that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
>>> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
>>> >> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled 
>>> >> "primary matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you 
>>> >> believe in primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
>>> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>>> > “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>>> 
>>> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
>>> to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
>>> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
>>> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
>>> at all. 
>>> 
>>> Brent 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>>> 
>>> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
>>> time, of course. Even if they   adopt a theory that someone 
>>> else created, they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean 
>>> Carroll writes about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy 
>>> metaphysics.
>> 
>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is "primary", 
>> that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He knows that 
>> QM
>>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
>> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
>> No.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386 
>> 
>> 
>> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll
>> 
>> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … about 
>> the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
>>  re: Realism about the Wave Function   
>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/ 
>> 
>>  
>>> 
>>> Every language has a metaphysics.
>>> 
>>> - pt
>>> 
>> 
>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
>> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
>> cannot propose a language for us to speak."
>> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
>> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf 
>> 
> 
> 
> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about.  But that doesn't 
> mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno wants to criticize 
> physicists for assuming there's something he calls "primitive matter".  But 
> this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost uniformly assume that 
> the stuff in their theories has some deeper explanation and is NOT primary.  
> There's a difference between saying a metaphysics assumes things and saying 
> that it assumes things which are "primary".
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> My point is that all physicists assume a metaphysics whenever they articulate 
> or adopt a theory, because all theory is expressed in a language.

I am not sure of that. They do it like we all do it implicitly in our everyday 
life, but I have no find a paper in physics, which use any metaphysical 
hypothesis. It is only the materialist philosopher who does that. Now, some 
physicists do make a bit of metaphysics after pension, or as amateur, but then 
they are no more doing physics. They do philosophy/metaphysics/theology.






> 
> As for "primary matter" (in particular, the "primary" part)  this is all I 
> know about what that means:
> 
> https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism
> 
> Hylomorphism, (from Greek hylē, “matter”; morphē, “form”), in philosophy, 
> metaphysical view according to which every natural body consists of two 
> intrinsic principles, one potential, namely, primary matter, and one actual, 
> namely, substantial form. 
> 
> Matter and form, however, are not bodies or physical entities that can exist 
> or act independently: they exist and act only within and by the composite. 
> Thus, they can be known only indirectly, by intellectual analysis, as the 
> metaphysical principles of bodies.
> 
> 
> What I call codicalism is basically a version of hylomorphism, except my 
> "form" is "language", and 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Oct 2018, at 00:55, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware 
>>> >>> that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
>>> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
>>> >> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled 
>>> >> "primary matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you 
>>> >> believe in primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
>>> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>>> > “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>>> 
>>> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
>>> to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
>>> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
>>> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
>>> at all. 
>>> 
>>> Brent 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>>> 
>>> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
>>> time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, 
>>> they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes 
>>> about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
>> 
>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is "primary", 
>> that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He knows that 
>> QM
>>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
>> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
>> No.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386 
>> 
>> 
>> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll
>> 
>> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … about 
>> the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
>>  re: Realism about the Wave Function   
>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/ 
>> 
>>  
>>> 
>>> Every language has a metaphysics.
>>> 
>>> - pt
>>> 
>> 
>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
>> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
>> cannot propose a language for us to speak."
>> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
>> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf 
>> 
> 
> 
> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about. 

Not correct. The language use some ontology (the alphabet, words), but the 
language per se is independent of an ontology. It does not talk about anything. 
For this you need to select some formula in the language, and assume that they 
are talking about something, which is always assumed.



> But that doesn't mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno wants 
> to criticize physicists for assuming there's something he calls "primitive 
> matter”. 

Not at all. I criticise physicalist. Physicists, on the contrary, avoid 
metaphysics. 

There is not an atom of critics from may part on physics. Only on physicalism. 
My work has not been criticised by any physicists member of the three jury 
called to judge the work (for the PhD, the price, etc.).

Critics comes from non-agnostic atheists believer (christian radicals in 
disguise). They are the one for which a primary universe is a dogma. Physicists 
do not do that.




> But this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost uniformly assume 
> that the stuff in their theories has some deeper explanation and is NOT 
> primary. 

Yes, that is why they have appreciate my work, in general. The critics comes 
only from “philosophers”, even only the materialist marxist one. Only. The 
serious people see that I give a testable theory. I show that some point in 
metaphysics are testable.


> There's a difference between saying a metaphysics assumes things and saying 
> that it assumes things which are "primary”.

Metaphysics, theology, search the primary things. A things is primary when it 
HAS TO BE assumed. The universal machinery can be proved to be primary in that 
sense. But the physicalist consider that only the physical universal 
machineries are primary, and refuse the idea that the physical appearance can 
be explained by simpler idea not involving an ontological commitment in a 
physical universe.

Somehow, you make my point 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Oct 2018, at 21:51, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker > >> > wrote: 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware 
>> >>> that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
>> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle theology" 
>> >> is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary matter". 
>> >> I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in primary 
>> >> matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
>> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>> > “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>> 
>> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
>> to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
>> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
>> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
>> at all. 
>> 
>> Brent 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>> 
>> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
>> time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, they 
>> are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes about 
>> the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
> 
> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is "primary", 
> that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He knows that QM
>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  No.

That is why they miss the explanation, and the consciousness problem. They are 
not aware of the difference between matter and primary matter, nor of the 
mind-body problem. Indeed they do physics, not metaphysics, nor fundamental 
cognitive science.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> Every language has a metaphysics.
>> 
>> - pt
>> 
>>  
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Oct 2018, at 17:33, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware 
 that we can doubt Aristotle theology.
>>> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle theology" 
>>> is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary matter". 
>>> I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in primary 
>>> matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??”
>> Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>> “matter” is “primary matter”.
> 
> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them. 

Which is how and why they miss the metaphysical puzzle. 


> They seek theories to explain phenomena. 

But with mechanism, they explanation is just not working at all, as they need 
to correlate the mind with the observation, and the UDA shows this cannot be 
done through any form of ontological commitment and mind/ontology identity 
thesis.



> They don't start by assuming some metaphysics. 

When they do physics. As ia her said many times, there is no problem with 
physics, only with physicalism.



> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists like 
> Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work at all.

That why question lead to the abandon of physicalism in case we assume 
mechanism. That is the point.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Oct 2018, at 09:23, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 1:32:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker > 
> > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware 
> >> that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
> > 
> > You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle theology" 
> > is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary matter". 
> > I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in primary 
> > matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
> 
> Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
> “matter” is “primary matter”. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'm not sure really what today's physicists think matter is, but of what I've 
> read - e.g. Sean Carroll and Max Tegmark - they seem confused: "It's just 
> information/math" or something like that.
> 
> Makes one want to kick something.
> 
> "After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of 
> Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, 
> and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though 
> we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I 
> never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his 
> foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it -- I 
> refute it thus."
> Boswell: Life
> 
> - pt

The physicists are not aware of the mind-body problem, even when andonning 
primary matter, they remain physicalist. The question is not so much about 
matter than about physics and its possible reduction to another realm. 
I too refute idealism a long time ago by kicking a stone, and said “I refute 
it”, but then I woke up!

Bruno



>  
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 5:55:46 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem 
>>> unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
>>> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
>>> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary 
>>> matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in 
>>> primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
>>> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>>> “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>>>
>>> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
>>> to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
>>> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
>>> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
>>> at all. 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>>
>> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
>> time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, 
>> they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes 
>> about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
>>
>>
>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is 
>> "primary", that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He 
>> knows that QM
>>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
>> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
>> No.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386
>
> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll
>
> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … about 
> the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
>  re: Realism about the Wave Function   
> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/
>  
>
>>
>> Every language has a metaphysics.
>>
>> - pt
>>
>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
> cannot propose a language for us to speak."
> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf
>
>
>
> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about.  But that 
> doesn't mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno wants to 
> criticize physicists for assuming there's something he calls "primitive 
> matter".  But this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost 
> uniformly assume that the stuff in their theories has some deeper 
> explanation and is NOT primary.  There's a difference between saying a 
> metaphysics assumes things and saying that it assumes things which are 
> "primary".
>
> Brent
>



My point is that all physicists assume a metaphysics whenever they 
articulate or adopt a theory, because all theory is expressed in a language.

As for "primary matter" (in particular, the "primary" part)  this is all I 
know about what that means:

https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism

*Hylomorphism, (from Greek hylē, “matter”; morphē, “form”), in philosophy, 
metaphysical view according to which every natural body consists of two 
intrinsic principles, one potential, namely, primary matter, and one 
actual, namely, substantial form. *

*Matter and form, however, are not bodies or physical entities that can 
exist or act independently: they exist and act only within and by the 
composite. Thus, they can be known only indirectly, by intellectual 
analysis, as the metaphysical principles of bodies.*


What I call *codicalism* is basically a version of *hylomorphism*, except 
my "form" is "language", and there is no potential/actual distinction. 

- pt

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[John Clark]

On Sat, Oct 20, 2018 at 2:23 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:


> >>If not by behavior then how do you determine intelligence in others?
>
>
> >I can’t,
>

Baloney. You can and you have judged the intelligence in others every
single day you've been alive.


> >*Trump might fake its stupidity,*
>

Then he's the greatest actor the world has ever known. Rocks might be
faking their stupidity too, but I doubt it.


> > *he is a great comedian,*
>

Trump might be OK in a  Dr. Strangelove type very dark comedy.


> >*but why claim that he is stupid.*
>

Because Trump writes stuff like this:


*"Why can’t we use nuclear weapons?" *

*"I think I am actually humble. I think I’m much more humble than you would
understand."*

*"I’m intelligent. Some people would say I’m very, very, very intelligent.”*

* "We won with poorly educated. I love the poorly educated."*

*"We should just cancel the election and just give it to Trump"*

*"**The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in
order to make US manufacturing non-competitive.'*

*"An "extremely credible source" has called my office and told me that
Barack Obama's birth certificate is a fraud."*

*"The worst thing a man can do is go bald. Never let yourself go bald."*

*“I have never seen a thin person drinking Diet Coke."*

* "Puerto Rico is an island surrounded by water, big water, ocean water."*

John K Clark

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker
 wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> I work with people who studied religion all the times.
You seem unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology.
>> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your
"Aristotle theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with
stick labelled "primary matter". I'll bet that if you ask a
100 physicists, "Do you believe in primary matter." you'll
get 99 answers of "What??”
> Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into
the idea that “matter” is “primary matter”.

No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them. They seek
theories
to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some
metaphysics.
They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been
physicists
like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why
equations work
at all.

Brent



What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions?

The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics
all the time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone
else created, they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory.
When Sean Carroll writes about the reality of the wave function,
that's some heavy metaphysics.


Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is
"primary", that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he
doesn't.  He knows that QM
 and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something
that explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing
is "primary"?  No.

Brent


https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386

Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll

    "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … 
about the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
     re: Realism about the Wave Function 
 http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/




Every language has a metaphysics.

- pt

"The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
cannot propose a language for us to speak."

-- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
[pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf



Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about.  But that 
doesn't mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno wants to 
criticize physicists for assuming there's something he calls "primitive 
matter".  But this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost 
uniformly assume that the stuff in their theories has some deeper 
explanation and is NOT primary.  There's a difference between saying a 
metaphysics assumes things and saying that it assumes things which are 
"primary".


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem 
>> unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
>> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
>> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary 
>> matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in 
>> primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
>> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>> “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>>
>> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
>> to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
>> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
>> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
>> at all. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>
>  
>
> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>
> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
> time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, 
> they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes 
> about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
>
>
> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is 
> "primary", that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He 
> knows that QM
>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
> No.
>
> Brent
>
>
https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386

Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll

"Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … about 
the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
 re: Realism about the Wave Function  
 http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/
 

>
> Every language has a metaphysics.
>
> - pt
>
> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
cannot propose a language for us to speak."
-- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
[pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf 

- pt
 

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker > wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You
seem unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology.
>> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle
theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled
"primary matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do
you believe in primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??”
> Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the
idea that “matter” is “primary matter”.

No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek
theories
to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.
They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been
physicists
like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations
work
at all.

Brent



What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions?

The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all 
the time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else 
created, they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean 
Carroll writes about the reality of the wave function, that's some 
heavy metaphysics.


Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is 
"primary", that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  
He knows that QM
 and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is 
"primary"?  No.


Brent



Every language has a metaphysics.

- pt

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem 
> unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary 
> matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in 
> primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
> “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>
> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
> to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
> at all. 
>
> Brent 
>

 

What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 

The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, 
they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes 
about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.

Every language has a metaphysics.

- pt

 

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware that we 
can doubt Aristotle theology.

You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle theology" is a straw man you invented to 
beat with stick labelled "primary matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you 
believe in primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??”

Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that “matter” 
is “primary matter”.


No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
at all.


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/19/2018 11:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No physicists tells his student to go read Einstein to learn relativity or to 
read Heisenberg to learn quantum mechanics.

That is false. Most scientist, in both logic and physics encourage the reading 
of the original papers. There are good selected papers books.


No, teachers encourage reading original papers later, after learning the 
modern form of the theories as a way of understanding how theories are 
developed.  Not to learn the theory.


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 1:32:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware 
> that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
> > 
> > You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary 
> matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in 
> primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
>
> Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
> “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>


I'm not sure really what today's physicists think matter is, but of what 
I've read - e.g. Sean Carroll and Max Tegmark - they seem confused: "It's 
just information/math" or something like that.

Makes one want to kick something.

"After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together 
of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of 
matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, 
that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to 
refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, 
striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he 
rebounded from it -- *I refute it thus*."
Boswell: Life

- pt
 

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:50, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/19/2018 12:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> The same way they judge anyone's intelligence, by their behavior.  Don't 
>>> you give tests to your students?  Do you never take tests?
>> 
>> I never judge the intelligence from the result of test. I can judge 
>> competence, but that is not intelligence, which is more a form of courage to 
>> be able to admit her been shown wrong when that is the case. Intelligence is 
>> needed to develop competence, but competence very often transform someone 
>> into an idiot incapable to evolve. I think stupidity is more or less 
>> "programmed by evolution”, as with this theory kids are intelligent, and 
>> adulthood is stupidity, as living requires some stupidity perhaps. Even lies 
>> have roles (already in arithmetic). Intelligence is a state of mind. 
>> Stupidity is mainly an insult. Useful when people lack arguments, as we can 
>> see in so many discussion (alas).
> 
> And when people lack answer's they evade the question by digressions into 
> some other topics.  You think jumping spiders are conscious, based on their 
> behavior.  But when I ask whether you can judge your student's inetlligence, 
> you throw up a fog of musings about stupidity and evolution.  If intelligence 
> is needed to develop competence, which can be measured by behavoir,  then the 
> inability to develop competence is a measure of intelligence.

OK. But judging an inability is difficult. For my civil service, I worked with 
people labeled as highly mentally disabled, but by using computer (which was 
new at that time), I was able to discern an ability to develop competence on 
many of them. Not all, but the experience showed that a new technology was able 
to help in that positive discernment.




> 
> Yes or no, can you judge someone's intelligence by their behavior.

I can appreciate their intelligence, but that is not saying much, as my 
criteria makes a pebble intelligent, even in a trivial way. You be stupid you 
need a lot of neurons, to build prejudices and become unable to change them.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware that 
>> we can doubt Aristotle theology.
> 
> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle theology" is 
> a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary matter". I'll 
> bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in primary matter." 
> you'll get 99 answers of "What??”

Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that “matter” 
is “primary matter”.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:40, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 For example, in the year 400 Hypatia was teaching both the Mathematics of 
 Diophantus, and the theology of Plotinus. That was very common.
>>> 
>>> Are we supposed to take these early thinkers as definitive? I'm with JKC on 
>>> this.  We've come a long way since Plotinus and his mystic opinions are 
>>> about as useful Grog the caveman’s.
>> 
>> 
>> Well this shows only you never read it. It shows that you think we have 
>> solved all the problem in philosophy of mind and in metaphysics. It shows 
>> that you take granted Aristotle theology. You are a believer in the physical 
>> universal, as the main explanation of consciousness.
>> 
>> There is no experimental evidence for that.
>> 
>> But there is a proof that arithmetic emulates all universal numbers, which 
>> makes a highly sort of Indra nets.
>> 
>> A physical universe? I am afraid it might not be my religion.
>> 
>> The ability of the digits to do prestidigitation seem far more plausible to 
>> me.
>> 
>> But as a scientist working in exactly that field, my opinion is of no value. 
>> I show the theory and the experiences.
> 
> Right.  And I assume you think you have advanced beyond Plato and Plotinus

I would not claim this. But Digital Mechanism allows to study mathematically 
introspection, and it confirms that Plato and Plotinus might be 
self-referentially correct in that regards, confirming some aspect of 
Mechanism, perhaps.



> who did not even know Goedel's theorem or the Church-Turing thesis.  

If you read the Ennead on Numbers, you might be surprised. Without the Church 
forbidding research in the domain, they might have discovered the universal 
machine. Leibniz was also very close.



> Yet you want us to read them. 

Just when people identify theology with superstition, which was already the 
“enemy” at that time. 



> No physicists tells his student to go read Einstein to learn relativity or to 
> read Heisenberg to learn quantum mechanics. 

That is false. Most scientist, in both logic and physics encourage the reading 
of the original papers. There are good selected papers books. 




> Referring back the founders texts is a mark of religion...not science.


I beg to differ on this. Pseudo-Religion submit reason to text, but they want 
us not doing the research. It is bad faith. I don’t believe they believe in the 
domain. They want us to believe we know the solution, which is unscientific at 
the start.

Bruno


> 
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> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Oct 2018, at 21:39, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Oct 19, 2018 at 3:09 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > I never judge the intelligence from the result of test. 
> 
> If not by behavior then how do you determine intelligence in others?


I can’t, unless locally when the other acts stupidly. But that would be a 
personal impression that I would keep to myself, and use for personal 
consumption, so to speak. 



> You must have some way because I am certain at some point in your life you 
> have met people you consider intelligent and people you have considered 
> stupid.

Yes, although not in any definitive way. But yes, some people do the same 
mistake again and again. Like Camus said “stupidity always persists”.



> 
>  > Intelligence is a state of mind. Stupidity is mainly an insult. 
> 
> If intelligence exists then its opposite stupidity does too. Nobody likes to 
> be called stupid but it is a objective fact, or at least a theory so strong 
> it can be effectively treated as one, that some people are stupider than 
> others. For example, Donald Trump is stupider than Carl Gauss was.

I am not sure we can compare them. Gauss was a big mathematician, and certainly 
more competent than Trump at it. Trump might fake its stupidity, he is a great 
comedian, but why claim that he is stupid. As far as I can see he is succeeding 
in its task (which I might not entirely appreciate, but that is different.

Bruno



> 
> John K Clark
> 
>> 
> 
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/19/2018 12:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The same way they judge anyone's intelligence, by their behavior.  
Don't you give tests to your students?  Do you never take tests?


I never judge the intelligence from the result of test. I can judge 
competence, but that is not intelligence, which is more a form of 
courage to be able to admit her been shown wrong when that is the 
case. Intelligence is needed to develop competence, but competence 
very often transform someone into an idiot incapable to evolve. I 
think stupidity is more or less "programmed by evolution”, as with 
this theory kids are intelligent, and adulthood is stupidity, as 
living requires some stupidity perhaps. Even lies have roles (already 
in arithmetic). Intelligence is a state of mind. Stupidity is mainly 
an insult. Useful when people lack arguments, as we can see in so many 
discussion (alas).


And when people lack answer's they evade the question by digressions 
into some other topics.  You think jumping spiders are conscious, based 
on their behavior.  But when I ask whether you can judge your student's 
inetlligence, you throw up a fog of musings about stupidity and 
evolution.  If intelligence is needed to develop competence, which can 
be measured by behavoir,  then the inability to develop competence is a 
measure of intelligence.


Yes or no, can you judge someone's intelligence by their behavior.

Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem 
unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology.


You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled 
"primary matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you 
believe in primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??"


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
For example, in the year 400 Hypatia was teaching both the 
Mathematics of Diophantus, and the theology of Plotinus. That was 
very common.


Are we supposed to take these early thinkers as definitive? I'm with 
JKC on this.  We've come a long way since Plotinus and his mystic 
opinions are about as useful Grog the caveman’s.



Well this shows only you never read it. It shows that you think we 
have solved all the problem in philosophy of mind and in metaphysics. 
It shows that you take granted Aristotle theology. You are a believer 
in the physical universal, as the main explanation of consciousness.


There is no experimental evidence for that.

But there is a proof that arithmetic emulates all universal numbers, 
which makes a highly sort of Indra nets.


A physical universe? I am afraid it might not be my religion.

The ability of the digits to do prestidigitation seem far more 
plausible to me.


But as a scientist working in exactly that field, my opinion is of no 
value. I show the theory and the experiences.


Right.  And I assume you think you have advanced beyond Plato and 
Plotinus who did not even know Goedel's theorem or the Church-Turing 
thesis.   Yet you want us to read them.  No physicists tells his student 
to go read Einstein to learn relativity or to read Heisenberg to learn 
quantum mechanics.  Referring back the founders texts is a mark of 
religion...not science.


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[John Clark]

On Fri, Oct 19, 2018 at 3:09 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> *I never judge the intelligence from the result of test. *


If not by behavior then how do you determine intelligence in others? You
must have some way because I am certain at some point in your life you have
met people you consider intelligent and people you have considered stupid.

 > *Intelligence is a state of mind. Stupidity is mainly an insult. *


If intelligence exists then its opposite stupidity does too. Nobody likes
to be called stupid but it is a objective fact, or at least a theory so
strong it can be effectively treated as one, that some people are stupider
than others. For example, Donald Trump is stupider than Carl Gauss was.

John K Clark


>

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Oct 2018, at 00:56, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 16 Oct 2018, at 03:50, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of science
> 
> Quite. What follows from Bruno is just Humpty Dumpty history and philosophy.


Tell me what is your metaphysics, then , and how you test it?

If have a better theory, than the greeks or the universal machine,

Bruno



> 
> Bruce
> 
> 
>> Not at all. Science is born with Plato, who understood that for having a 
>> fundamental science, we must believe in a reality, and that this need an act 
>> of faith. That reality is GOD, the object of religion.
>> Of course, the popular religion did have all sort of Gods, from turtles all 
>> the way down, to very personalised sort of reality. Now, when religion is 
>> done with the scientific attitude, which is what Plato did, 
>> it is named theology, and for one millenium it was a science. The Reality 
>> was mainly either Nature, or something else which would be deeper and non 
>> natural (“supernatural”). Plato called it the “world of ideas” (the Noùs). 
>> Plato’s world of idea was inspired by Pythagorus who taught it as being 
>> “only number”.
>> 
>> That theology has progressed and gave birth to Mathematics, which was seen 
>> as the alternative of physics. 
>> The (Neo)pythagorean and  the (Neo)platonist will pursue that line where the 
>> doubt was about the fundamental nature of reality was 
>> immaterial/mathematical. You might read Plotinus' ennead “On number”, to see 
>> how Plotinus foresaw Cantor, and the machine’s discourse. The term 
>> “mathematician” was used at that time to mean “rationalist sceptics about 
>> the fundamental nature of the physical reality”/ The original doubt was 
>> between mathematics and physics as fundamental science. Aristotle will side 
>> with Plato on this, but his interest in Nature will make him to influence 
>> people to opt the idea that physics might be directly about reality.
>> 
>> For example, in the year 400 Hypatia was teaching both the Mathematics of 
>> Diophantus, and the theology of Plotinus. That was very common. 
>> 
>> But, the christians will separated into intellectual, disputing if Plato or 
>> Aristotle were right, and integrist or radicals which will use religion to 
>> get power, and the history is that, despite Constantin (Roman emperor 
>> converted to Christianity) was rather close to the platonist intellectual, 
>> eventually the radicals will get the power. 
>> After 529, when the emperor Justinian did close Plato’s Academy, the Church 
>> will, by its action separate theology (the fundamental science of the greek 
>> per definition) from science.The result is that science will be associated 
>> more and more with Aristotle: that is: the belief in physical primary 
>> universe. Science itself became a psedo-religion, with a sort of dogma: 
>> Matter, and this up to the point that today, most people have completely 
>> forget that the original debate was never on the existence of the ONE (god) 
>> but on the existence of a primary (“physicalist”) Nature.
>> By separating religion-theology from science, religion will keep the popular 
>> superstition, and buried a millenium of science. Theology/religion will 
>> become more and more an instrument of politics (of the non democratic kind, 
>> of course).
>> The first attempt to separate religion from the state and politics, cale 
>> from religious people wanting to save religion/theology from politics (not 
>> for saving politics from religion!: that will come later).
>> 
>> Superstition was just popular, in all sciences before the greeks. A religion 
>> is only a conception of reality, and Plato understood that the belief in a 
>> reality cannot be rational (exactly what the universal machine explain all 
>> by themselves, by <>t -> ~[]<>t (<>t = consistency = a reality exist, by 
>> Gödel’s COMPLETENESS theorem).
>> 
>> The first superstition were on the ONE thing responsible for all the others, 
>> and it became, with Plato, the thing which we need to unify all sciences. 
>> Theology gave quickly birth to mathematics and physics, seen as alternative. 
>> In the 19th century, mathematical logic will born from a dispute between 
>> unionists (mostly mathematicians) and trinitarians (mostly clergyman, but 
>> still intellectual knowing well Plato, to attack his immaterial and non 
>> personal conception of the fundamental reality). 
>> 
>> Todays science is superstitious or dogmatic (or both) in making physics into 
>> the fundamental science, despite there has never been a shadow of evidence 
>> for primary matter. Indeed, we don’t even try to seek such evidences, 
>> contrary to the ancient who tried at least to find one. After 529, all those 
>> doubting the materialist dogma were banished or killed. Neoplatonism 
>> (scientific theology will still continue 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Oct 2018, at 21:29, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/18/2018 6:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 16 Oct 2018, at 19:28, John Clark >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 10:05 PM Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> >> you know for a fact you're not conscious all the time, you know you're 
>>> >> not conscious when you're sleeping or under anesthesia or before you 
>>> >> were born and, although you don't know for certain, you probably suspect 
>>> >> you won't be conscious after you're dead. And you may have also noticed 
>>> >> a pattern here, you seem to only be conscious when you have the ability 
>>> >> to behave intelligently.
>>> 
>>> > "Having the ability to behave intelligently" is not something I can know. 
>>> 
>>> I don't think very intelligently when I'm sleeping and I've known that for 
>>> as far back as I can remember. Are you any different?
>> 
>> 
>> How can you judge that you are thinking more intelligently when you are 
>> awake? 
>> Also, can you be sure that you are awake?
>> 
>> Can anyone judge its own intelligence?
> 
> The same way they judge anyone's intelligence, by their behavior.  Don't you 
> give tests to your students?  Do you never take tests?

I never judge the intelligence from the result of test. I can judge competence, 
but that is not intelligence, which is more a form of courage to be able to 
admit her been shown wrong when that is the case. Intelligence is needed to 
develop competence, but competence very often transform someone into an idiot 
incapable to evolve. I think stupidity is more or less "programmed by 
evolution”, as with this theory kids are intelligent, and adulthood is 
stupidity, as living requires some stupidity perhaps. Even lies have roles 
(already in arithmetic). Intelligence is a state of mind. Stupidity is mainly 
an insult. Useful when people lack arguments, as we can see in so many 
discussion (alas).

Bruno



> 
> Brent
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Oct 2018, at 00:20, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thu, Oct 18, 2018 at 9:21 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > the idea that there are moment where we are not conscious is very natural, 
> > but it is not a fact, it is a theory,
> 
> Then can you name something, anything, that IS a fact and not a theory?

Could you quote what you said before. Just to better understand. I was 
answering you.
An exemple of a fact is that  am conscious right now, then, we can take many 
observations as facts, like the presence of far away galaxies, Higgs boson, 
etc. I am OK to count the elementary arithmetical facts. I take as a fact that 
the sum of the inverse of the naturel numbers exponent some number s is the 
product of the inverse of the opposed of the inverse of the primes numbers, 
exponent that number. 
It is also a fact that elementary arithmetic emulate (in the sense of Turing, 
Church, Kleene, etc.) all computations. Even the tiny sigma_1 complete part of 
it.

But I am not sure how you could test that you have been unconscious. Some 
conscious experience are not memorisable, or hardly so.



> 
> > probably selected by evolution,
> 
> Evolution can't select for something it can't see and it can't see your 
> consciousness any better than I can, but I can see your intelligent behavior 
> and so can Evolution.  

OK. I meant selected through evolution.

Bruno



> 
> John K Clark
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Oct 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/18/2018 6:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 16 Oct 2018, at 03:50, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/15/2018 6:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 11 Oct 2018, at 19:26, John Clark  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 12:15 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>You can't do metaphysics with a scientific attitude, if you could it 
> >>wouldn't be metaphysics, it would just be physics. Metaphysics means 
> >>unscientific speculation about physics.
>  
> >That is why I prefer the term theology.
> 
> That's pretty silly, metaphysics is a vastly better word to use in 
> philosophical speculation. Both metaphysics and theology are unscientific 
> but theology necessarily implies God while metaphysics doesn't.  
 
 
 That is an opinion of radical pseudo-religious people. There is no 
 scientific domain. There is only a scientific attitude, and this can be 
 applied in any domain.
 
 The separation of religion from science is an invention by people wanting 
 to use religion to control people, and steal their money.
>>> 
>>> That's silly.  Religion existed long before science was developed.  
>>> Religion was invented, and believed, by people who wanted to understand and 
>>> control their fate in the world.  They understood other people who had 
>>> desires and motives and got angry and loved and hated, so they inferred 
>>> that the weather and seas and the volcano were agents like people only 
>>> bigger and more powerful.  So they sought to propitiate these gods and 
>>> demons by offering them what was precious; including the lives of their 
>>> children.  Shamans, priests, and kings took advantage of this by pretending 
>>> to be intermediaries to the gods and experts in their propitiation.  They 
>>> invented prayers and rituals and sacrifices.
>>> 
>>> The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of science
>> 
>> Not at all. Science is born with Plato,
> 
> No.  Science was born with Thales of Miletus. The pre-Socratics were limited 
> by their technology, so they didn't experimentally test their theories of the 
> elements.   But they did make measurements related to astronomy and estimated 
> the size of the Earth, the distance to the Sun and Moon.  They appreciated 
> that the senses could be deceived and Democritus warned that observation is 
> uncertain and must be evaluated by reason.  Plato went even further.  In his 
> parable of the cave he taught that perception was only of the shadow of 
> reality.  Reality was in the realm of ideas and could only be grasped by the 
> mind. 


Excellent summary.



> This devaluing of experience and more mystical approach to reality was 
> congenial to Christianity.

I would say it is congenial to all mysticisme. Plato describes this as a 
reminiscence, a remembering of some sort, and a discovery of a sort of internal 
congenial reality, like arithmetic, mathematics.

The devaluating of experimental experience is as bad as the devaluating of 
reason and personal experiences.



>   The Church fathers, Augustine and Aquinas, merged the ideas of Plato and 
> Aristotle into theology.

Yes, that is what I like with the christians, the Israelite and the muslims, 
they will keep a bit of platonism alive.
Note the corresponding divergence (materialism/idealism) in many continents.




>So ecclesiastical education included the physics of Aristotle. 

Indeed. Even the jews will succumb to Aristotle, which did not understood 
Plato. 



>   The writings of the pre-Socratics were not so congenial and were generally 
> not preserved.   This and other factors caused a long pause in the 
> advancement of science after the fall of the Roman Empire.  A pause we now 
> call The Dark Ages.  

The dark age is basically the consequence of having steel theology, and thus 
all science (at that time) to the academy, to impose it as a way to make an 
empire to begin with. That cannot work, not because of theology, but because 
any fields needs to be selected by critics to evolve.

Renaissance is half-enlightenment, all sciences have come back to the academy, 
except theology. We still tolerate the abuse of authority in the most complex 
and fundamental field (per definition).




> 
>> who understood that for having a fundamental science, we must believe in a 
>> reality, and that this need an act of faith. That reality is GOD, the object 
>> of religion.
> 
> Exactly "the object of religion" which bases belief on faith;


The faith that there is a reality. It is the faith needed to do research in the 
fundamental science. 
Difficulties are made by those who claims to know the truth.




> the opposite of science which renounces faith as a basis knowledge.


Not in metaphysics. Some scientists 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, October 19, 2018 at 12:08:10 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Oct 2018, at 17:26, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, October 18, 2018 at 9:00:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17 Oct 2018, at 00:38, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/16/2018 11:58 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 1:01:40 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/16/2018 1:14 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>> But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs. 
>>> information-oriented) paradigm*: *Experience cannot be represented: It 
>>> does not exist outside of its material instantiation.*
>>>
>>>
>>> But that's just an assertion that, not only am I giving up, but you must 
>>> give up too.  I'm defining "the hard problem" to be "the impossible 
>>> problem".
>>>
>>>  Most things don't exist outside of their material instantiation, 
>>> including intelligence.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>  
>>
>> With *representationalism*, one can run "intelligent" software on CPUs, 
>> GPUs, etc. made of basically any material (as long as the computing 
>> structure - "Turing-equivalence" - is the same). *Experientialism* 
>> (anti-representationalism) says it has to be particular materials [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry ].
>>
>>
>> I know what it says.  You've posted it many times.  But I haven't seen 
>> any reason to believe it.
>>
>>
>> I agree with you.
>>
>> []p (beweisbar(‘p’) is representational, 
>>
>> []p & p is provably not representational, due to its implicit invocation 
>> of the truth of p.
>>
>> Matter is usually conceive in the 3p, representational view, n and his 
>> itself a representational. But truth is not, and it is truth which play the 
>> important role for consciousness. 
>>
>> Matter is either primary ultra-inert matter, what made the original 
>> A-TOMOS of Democrat. Irreductivel material. Today we have broken atoms, and 
>> with enough energy we can broke proton, etc. Even if we find new ATOMOS, it 
>> is doubtful we could use them for something as “semantical” than 
>> consciousness. 
>>
>> But there is extreme originality of wanting this. I wait for an 
>> explanation for how to test that idea.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> The connection between experience (phenomenal material consciousness) 
>
>
> I don’t understand “material” in this setting. We agree that consciousness 
> is phenomenal, but material has to be phenomenal too if we assume that the 
> brain is Turing emulable (which is not that much to assume, as the 
> alternative is using ontological commitment. The adjective “material” is 
> like the adjective “divine”, without explaining what it means and how it 
> acts, it is eluding the problem more than clarifying it.
>
>
>
>
> and truth (experiential modal logic)
>
>
>
> Truth is, normally, beyond experience. The experience is true, but truth 
> extends far beyond all possible experience. (Again provably so with the 
> common use of mathematics when assuming computationalisme).
>
>
>
> would be that it is possible for there to be different kinds of 
> consciousness via alternative material substrates.
>
>
>
> All universal machine can emulate all universal machine. Consciousness is 
> a priori independent of the substrate at the ontological level, now, if by 
> “substrates” you mean the stable observable with smell and taste, sure all 
> universal machine can taste the difference between water and wine, letting 
> them know by sense the global difference and the universal goal (like help 
> yourself). With mechanism, the substrate are explained by a sort of 
> competition of universal machines. There are  infinitely many below the 
> substitution level, and finitely many above that you can count in your 
> neighbourhood (a lot, as not only there is the colleagues in the office, 
> but I would mention each bacteria in the room, and the flies).All that 
> might be emulated by Quarks and electrons, or branes and superstrings, but 
> that is basically y equivalent with caming with a u among the phi_i, 
> computing the “universe”, when mechanism explains, to get both the qualia 
> and the quanta, we need to extract the core physics from the 
> self-referential ability of the universal machine. 
>
> Any universal base would do. Chosing the initial universal machine defines 
> all the phi_i and associates a number to each machines. A universal machine 
> is a referential system for all machines, including itself.
>
> If the physicist comes up with a physical experimental uncomputable 
> constant, that would be like adding an oracle. This does not change the 
> “theology of the machine”, but despite this should be done only in last 
> resort.
>
> The key point perhaps, is that consciousness does not supervene on any 
> computation run by any universal machine. Consciousness supervenes on 
> infinity of computations, and its “textures” is associated by the proximity 
> structure of the 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Oct 2018, at 17:26, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, October 18, 2018 at 9:00:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 17 Oct 2018, at 00:38, Brent Meeker > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/16/2018 11:58 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 1:01:40 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/16/2018 1:14 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
 But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs. 
 information-oriented) paradigm*: Experience cannot be represented: It does 
 not exist outside of its material instantiation.
>>> 
>>> But that's just an assertion that, not only am I giving up, but you must 
>>> give up too.  I'm defining "the hard problem" to be "the impossible 
>>> problem".
>>> 
>>>  Most things don't exist outside of their material instantiation, including 
>>> intelligence.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>>  
>>> 
>>> With representationalism, one can run "intelligent" software on CPUs, GPUs, 
>>> etc. made of basically any material (as long as the computing structure - 
>>> "Turing-equivalence" - is the same). Experientialism 
>>> (anti-representationalism) says it has to be particular materials 
>>> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry 
>>>  ].
>> 
>> I know what it says.  You've posted it many times.  But I haven't seen any 
>> reason to believe it.
> 
> I agree with you.
> 
> []p (beweisbar(‘p’) is representational, 
> 
> []p & p is provably not representational, due to its implicit invocation of 
> the truth of p.
> 
> Matter is usually conceive in the 3p, representational view, n and his itself 
> a representational. But truth is not, and it is truth which play the 
> important role for consciousness. 
> 
> Matter is either primary ultra-inert matter, what made the original A-TOMOS 
> of Democrat. Irreductivel material. Today we have broken atoms, and with 
> enough energy we can broke proton, etc. Even if we find new ATOMOS, it is 
> doubtful we could use them for something as “semantical” than consciousness. 
> 
> But there is extreme originality of wanting this. I wait for an explanation 
> for how to test that idea.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The connection between experience (phenomenal material consciousness)

I don’t understand “material” in this setting. We agree that consciousness is 
phenomenal, but material has to be phenomenal too if we assume that the brain 
is Turing emulable (which is not that much to assume, as the alternative is 
using ontological commitment. The adjective “material” is like the adjective 
“divine”, without explaining what it means and how it acts, it is eluding the 
problem more than clarifying it.




> and truth (experiential modal logic)


Truth is, normally, beyond experience. The experience is true, but truth 
extends far beyond all possible experience. (Again provably so with the common 
use of mathematics when assuming computationalisme).



> would be that it is possible for there to be different kinds of consciousness 
> via alternative material substrates.


All universal machine can emulate all universal machine. Consciousness is a 
priori independent of the substrate at the ontological level, now, if by 
“substrates” you mean the stable observable with smell and taste, sure all 
universal machine can taste the difference between water and wine, letting them 
know by sense the global difference and the universal goal (like help 
yourself). With mechanism, the substrate are explained by a sort of competition 
of universal machines. There are  infinitely many below the substitution level, 
and finitely many above that you can count in your neighbourhood (a lot, as not 
only there is the colleagues in the office, but I would mention each bacteria 
in the room, and the flies).All that might be emulated by Quarks and electrons, 
or branes and superstrings, but that is basically y equivalent with caming with 
a u among the phi_i, computing the “universe”, when mechanism explains, to get 
both the qualia and the quanta, we need to extract the core physics from the 
self-referential ability of the universal machine. 

Any universal base would do. Chosing the initial universal machine defines all 
the phi_i and associates a number to each machines. A universal machine is a 
referential system for all machines, including itself.

If the physicist comes up with a physical experimental uncomputable constant, 
that would be like adding an oracle. This does not change the “theology of the 
machine”, but despite this should be done only in last resort.

The key point perhaps, is that consciousness does not supervene on any 
computation run by any universal machine. Consciousness supervenes on infinity 
of computations, and its “textures” is associated by the proximity structure of 
the (infinitely many) true provable and consistent extensions.

Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, October 18, 2018 at 8:16:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Oct 2018, at 03:50, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>  The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of 
> science 
>
>
> Not at all. Science is born with Plato, who understood that for having a 
> fundamental science, we must believe in a reality, and that this need an 
> act of faith. That reality is GOD, the object of religion.
> Of course, the popular religion did have all sort of Gods, from turtles 
> all the way down, to very personalised sort of reality. Now, when religion 
> is done with the scientific attitude, which is what Plato did, it is named 
> theology, and for one millenium it was a science. The Reality was mainly 
> either Nature, or something else which would be deeper and non natural 
> (“supernatural”). Plato called it the “world of ideas” (the Noùs). Plato’s 
> world of idea was inspired by Pythagorus who taught it as being “only 
> number”.
>
> That theology has progressed and gave birth to Mathematics, which was seen 
> as the alternative of physics. 
> The (Neo)pythagorean and  the (Neo)platonist will pursue that line where 
> the doubt was about the fundamental nature of reality was 
> immaterial/mathematical. You might read Plotinus' ennead “On number”, to 
> see how Plotinus foresaw Cantor, and the machine’s discourse. The term 
> “mathematician” was used at that time to mean “rationalist sceptics about 
> the fundamental nature of the physical reality”/ The original doubt was 
> between mathematics and physics as fundamental science. Aristotle will side 
> with Plato on this, but his interest in Nature will make him to influence 
> people to opt the idea that physics might be directly about reality.
>
> For example, in the year 400 Hypatia was teaching both the Mathematics of 
> Diophantus, and the theology of Plotinus. That was very common. 
>
> But, the christians will separated into intellectual, disputing if Plato 
> or Aristotle were right, and integrist or radicals which will use religion 
> to get power, and the history is that, despite Constantin (Roman emperor 
> converted to Christianity) was rather close to the platonist intellectual, 
> eventually the radicals will get the power. 
> After 529, when the emperor Justinian did close Plato’s Academy, the 
> Church will, by its action separate theology (the fundamental science of 
> the greek *per* *definition*) from science.The result is that science 
> will be associated more and more with Aristotle: that is: the belief in 
> physical primary universe. Science itself became a psedo-religion, with a 
> sort of dogma: Matter, and this up to the point that today, most people 
> have completely forget that the original debate was never on the existence 
> of the ONE (god) but on the existence of a primary (“physicalist”) Nature.
> By separating religion-theology from science, religion will keep the 
> popular superstition, and buried a millenium of science. Theology/religion 
> will become more and more an instrument of politics (of the non democratic 
> kind, of course).
> The first attempt to separate religion from the state and politics, cale 
> from religious people wanting to save religion/theology from politics (not 
> for saving politics from religion!: that will come later).
>
> Superstition was just popular, in all sciences before the greeks. A 
> religion is only a conception of reality, and Plato understood that the 
> belief in a reality cannot be rational (exactly what the universal machine 
> explain all by themselves, by <>t -> ~[]<>t (<>t = consistency = a reality 
> exist, by Gödel’s COMPLETENESS theorem).
>
> The first superstition were on the ONE thing responsible for all the 
> others, and it became, with Plato, the thing which we need to unify all 
> sciences. Theology gave quickly birth to mathematics and physics, seen as 
> alternative. In the 19th century, mathematical logic will born from a 
> dispute between unionists (mostly mathematicians) and trinitarians (mostly 
> clergyman, but still intellectual knowing well Plato, to attack his 
> immaterial and non personal conception of the fundamental reality). 
>
> Todays science is superstitious or dogmatic (or both) in making physics 
> into the fundamental science, despite there has never been a shadow of 
> evidence for primary matter. Indeed, we don’t even try to seek such 
> evidences, contrary to the ancient who tried at least to find one. After 
> 529, all those doubting the materialist dogma were banished or killed. 
> Neoplatonism (scientific theology will still continue up to 1258, where, 
> unfortunately Islam will decide to submit Reason to the Text (the Quran, 
> then) against Averroes, who defended the idea that the TEXT must be 
> submitted (interpreted) to Reason (which will influence the Renaissance).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> as a way of knowing what was fact and what was superstition.  
>
>
> Read Plato. They discuss this in deep. 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 16 Oct 2018, at 03:50, Brent Meeker > wrote:



The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of science


Quite. What follows from Bruno is just Humpty Dumpty history and philosophy.

Bruce


Not at all. Science is born with Plato, who understood that for having 
a fundamental science, we must believe in a reality, and that this 
need an act of faith. That reality is GOD, the object of religion.
Of course, the popular religion did have all sort of Gods, from 
turtles all the way down, to very personalised sort of reality. Now, 
when religion is done with the scientific attitude, which is what 
Plato did, it is named theology, and for one millenium it was a 
science. The Reality was mainly either Nature, or something else which 
would be deeper and non natural (“supernatural”). Plato called it the 
“world of ideas” (the Noùs). Plato’s world of idea was inspired by 
Pythagorus who taught it as being “only number”.


That theology has progressed and gave birth to Mathematics, which was 
seen as the alternative of physics.
The (Neo)pythagorean and  the (Neo)platonist will pursue that line 
where the doubt was about the fundamental nature of reality was 
immaterial/mathematical. You might read Plotinus' ennead “On number”, 
to see how Plotinus foresaw Cantor, and the machine’s discourse. The 
term “mathematician” was used at that time to mean “rationalist 
sceptics about the fundamental nature of the physical reality”/ The 
original doubt was between mathematics and physics as fundamental 
science. Aristotle will side with Plato on this, but his interest in 
Nature will make him to influence people to opt the idea that physics 
might be directly about reality.


For example, in the year 400 Hypatia was teaching both the Mathematics 
of Diophantus, and the theology of Plotinus. That was very common.


But, the christians will separated into intellectual, disputing if 
Plato or Aristotle were right, and integrist or radicals which will 
use religion to get power, and the history is that, despite Constantin 
(Roman emperor converted to Christianity) was rather close to the 
platonist intellectual, eventually the radicals will get the power.
After 529, when the emperor Justinian did close Plato’s Academy, the 
Church will, by its action separate theology (the fundamental science 
of the greek /per/ /definition/) from science.The result is that 
science will be associated more and more with Aristotle: that is: the 
belief in physical primary universe. Science itself became a 
psedo-religion, with a sort of dogma: Matter, and this up to the point 
that today, most people have completely forget that the original 
debate was never on the existence of the ONE (god) but on the 
existence of a primary (“physicalist”) Nature.
By separating religion-theology from science, religion will keep the 
popular superstition, and buried a millenium of science. 
Theology/religion will become more and more an instrument of politics 
(of the non democratic kind, of course).
The first attempt to separate religion from the state and politics, 
cale from religious people wanting to save religion/theology from 
politics (not for saving politics from religion!: that will come later).


Superstition was just popular, in all sciences before the greeks. A 
religion is only a conception of reality, and Plato understood that 
the belief in a reality cannot be rational (exactly what the universal 
machine explain all by themselves, by <>t -> ~[]<>t (<>t = consistency 
= a reality exist, by Gödel’s COMPLETENESS theorem).


The first superstition were on the ONE thing responsible for all the 
others, and it became, with Plato, the thing which we need to unify 
all sciences. Theology gave quickly birth to mathematics and physics, 
seen as alternative. In the 19th century, mathematical logic will born 
from a dispute between unionists (mostly mathematicians) and 
trinitarians (mostly clergyman, but still intellectual knowing well 
Plato, to attack his immaterial and non personal conception of the 
fundamental reality).


Todays science is superstitious or dogmatic (or both) in making 
physics into the fundamental science, despite there has never been a 
shadow of evidence for primary matter. Indeed, we don’t even try to 
seek such evidences, contrary to the ancient who tried at least to 
find one. After 529, all those doubting the materialist dogma were 
banished or killed. Neoplatonism (scientific theology will still 
continue up to 1258, where, unfortunately Islam will decide to submit 
Reason to the Text (the Quran, then) against Averroes, who defended 
the idea that the TEXT must be submitted (interpreted) to Reason 
(which will influence the Renaissance).


--
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"Everything List" group.
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to 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[John Clark]

On Thu, Oct 18, 2018 at 9:21 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

*> the idea that there are moment where we are not conscious is very
> natural, but it is not a fact, it is a theory,*


Then can you name something, anything, that *IS* a fact and not a theory?

> *probably selected by evolution,*


Evolution can't select for something it can't see and it can't see your
consciousness any better than I can, but I can see your intelligent
behavior and so can Evolution.

John K Clark







>
>

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/18/2018 6:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Oct 2018, at 19:28, John Clark > wrote:




On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 10:05 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:





>> you know for a fact you're not conscious all the time, you
know you're not conscious when you're sleeping or under
anesthesia or before you were born and, although you don't
know for certain, you probably suspect you won't be conscious
after you're dead. And you may have also noticed a pattern
here, you seem to only be conscious when you have the ability
to behave intelligently.


> /"Having the ability to behave intelligently" is not something
I can know. /


I don't think very intelligently when I'm sleeping and I've known 
that for as far back as I can remember. Are you any different?



How can you judge that you are thinking more intelligently when you 
are awake?

Also, can you be sure that you are awake?

Can anyone judge its own intelligence?


The same way they judge anyone's intelligence, by their behavior. Don't 
you give tests to your students?  Do you never take tests?


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/18/2018 6:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Oct 2018, at 10:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:




On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 8:50:57 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of
science as a way of knowing what was fact and what was
superstition.  Science was testing beliefs and holding them only
provisionally.

Brent



They had myths. We have models.

"As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of 
science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in 
the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually 
imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries -- not by 
definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits 
comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. Let me interject 
that for my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects 
and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to 
believe otherwise. *But in point of epistemological footing the 
physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. *


Sufficiently great difference in degree amounts to a difference in kind, 
e.g. between reality and dream.  Which is why Quine can live by his 
beliefs in one but not the other.


Brent


*Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural 
posits.* The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior 
to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a 
device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience."

-- Willard Van Orman Quine



Very good.

Let us notice that Plato already exchange the god of Homer, for a 
reality amenable to science (the worlds of idea). Xeusippes considered 
that this was akin to mathematics, if not mathematics. Xeusippes 
thought that Plato should have banished Aristotle from the academy, 
with his propensity to treat Nature and Matter as something that we 
can take for granted. The dream argument shows that this moves is 
invalid in general.


Bruno





"It's models almost all the way up and all the way down."
-- Ronald Giere
- pt


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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/18/2018 6:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Oct 2018, at 03:50, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/15/2018 6:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Oct 2018, at 19:26, John Clark > wrote:



On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 12:15 PM Bruno Marchal > wrote:


>>You can't do metaphysics with a scientific attitude, if you
could it wouldn't be metaphysics, it would just be
physics.Metaphysics means unscientific speculation about
physics.

/>That is why I prefer the term theology./


That's pretty silly, metaphysics is a vastly better word to use in 
philosophical speculation. Both metaphysics and theology are 
unscientific but theology necessarily implies God while metaphysics 
doesn't.



That is an opinion of radical pseudo-religious people. There is no 
scientific domain. There is only a scientific attitude, and this can 
be applied in any domain.


The separation of religion from science is an invention by people 
wanting to use religion to control people, and steal their money.


That's silly.  Religion existed long before science was developed.  
Religion was invented, and believed, by people who wanted to 
understand and control their fate in the world.  They understood 
other people who had desires and motives and got angry and loved and 
hated, so they inferred that the weather and seas and the volcano 
were agents like people only bigger and more powerful.  So they 
sought to propitiate these gods and demons by offering them what was 
precious; including the lives of their children.  Shamans, priests, 
and kings took advantage of this by pretending to be intermediaries 
to the gods and experts in their propitiation.  They invented prayers 
and rituals and sacrifices.


The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of science


Not at all. Science is born with Plato,


No.  Science was born with Thales of Miletus. The pre-Socratics were 
limited by their technology, so they didn't experimentally test their 
theories of the elements.   But they did make measurements related to 
astronomy and estimated the size of the Earth, the distance to the Sun 
and Moon.  They appreciated that the senses could be deceived and 
Democritus warned that observation is uncertain and must be evaluated by 
reason.  Plato went even further.  In his parable of the cave he taught 
that perception was only of the shadow of reality.  Reality was in the 
realm of ideas and could only be grasped by the mind.  This devaluing of 
experience and more mystical approach to reality was congenial to 
Christianity.  The Church fathers, Augustine and Aquinas, merged the 
ideas of Plato and Aristotle into theology.   So ecclesiastical 
education included the physics of Aristotle.   The writings of the 
pre-Socratics were not so congenial and were generally not preserved.   
This and other factors caused a long pause in the advancement of science 
after the fall of the Roman Empire.  A pause we now call The Dark Ages.


who understood that for having a fundamental science, we must believe 
in a reality, and that this need an act of faith. That reality is GOD, 
the object of religion.


Exactly "the object of religion" which bases belief on faith; the 
opposite of science which renounces faith as a basis knowledge.


Of course, the popular religion did have all sort of Gods, from 
turtles all the way down, to very personalised sort of reality. Now, 
when religion is done with the scientific attitude, which is what 
Plato did, it is named theology, and for one millenium it was a 
science. The Reality was mainly either Nature, or something else which 
would be deeper and non natural (“supernatural”). Plato called it the 
“world of ideas” (the Noùs). Plato’s world of idea was inspired by 
Pythagorus who taught it as being “only number”.


Yes, ideas they believed on faith.  Did they test their ideas?  Did they 
ever have a theory they tested and found to be false?




That theology has progressed and gave birth to Mathematics, which was 
seen as the alternative of physics.


It was never "an alternative".  It started as geometry...the measurement 
of the Earth, now a branch of physics.  And counting, which was just a 
matter of enumerating similar objects, like sheep.



The (Neo)pythagorean and  the (Neo)platonist will pursue that line 
where the doubt was about the fundamental nature of reality was 
immaterial/mathematical. You might read Plotinus' ennead “On number”, 
to see how Plotinus foresaw Cantor, and the machine’s discourse. The 
term “mathematician” was used at that time to mean “rationalist 
sceptics about the fundamental nature of the physical reality”/ The 
original doubt was between mathematics and physics as fundamental 
science. Aristotle will side with Plato on this, but his interest in 
Nature will make him to influence people to opt the idea that physics 
might be directly about reality.


For 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, October 18, 2018 at 9:00:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Oct 2018, at 00:38, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/16/2018 11:58 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 1:01:40 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/16/2018 1:14 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs. 
>> information-oriented) paradigm*: *Experience cannot be represented: It 
>> does not exist outside of its material instantiation.*
>>
>>
>> But that's just an assertion that, not only am I giving up, but you must 
>> give up too.  I'm defining "the hard problem" to be "the impossible 
>> problem".
>>
>>  Most things don't exist outside of their material instantiation, 
>> including intelligence.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>  
>
> With *representationalism*, one can run "intelligent" software on CPUs, 
> GPUs, etc. made of basically any material (as long as the computing 
> structure - "Turing-equivalence" - is the same). *Experientialism* 
> (anti-representationalism) says it has to be particular materials [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry ].
>
>
> I know what it says.  You've posted it many times.  But I haven't seen any 
> reason to believe it.
>
>
> I agree with you.
>
> []p (beweisbar(‘p’) is representational, 
>
> []p & p is provably not representational, due to its implicit invocation 
> of the truth of p.
>
> Matter is usually conceive in the 3p, representational view, n and his 
> itself a representational. But truth is not, and it is truth which play the 
> important role for consciousness. 
>
> Matter is either primary ultra-inert matter, what made the original 
> A-TOMOS of Democrat. Irreductivel material. Today we have broken atoms, and 
> with enough energy we can broke proton, etc. Even if we find new ATOMOS, it 
> is doubtful we could use them for something as “semantical” than 
> consciousness. 
>
> But there is extreme originality of wanting this. I wait for an 
> explanation for how to test that idea.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
The connection between experience (phenomenal material consciousness) and 
truth (experiential modal logic) would be that it is possible for there to 
be different kinds of consciousness via alternative material substrates.

- pt

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 17 Oct 2018, at 00:38, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/16/2018 11:58 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 1:01:40 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/16/2018 1:14 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs. 
>>> information-oriented) paradigm*: Experience cannot be represented: It does 
>>> not exist outside of its material instantiation.
>> 
>> But that's just an assertion that, not only am I giving up, but you must 
>> give up too.  I'm defining "the hard problem" to be "the impossible problem".
>> 
>>  Most things don't exist outside of their material instantiation, including 
>> intelligence.
>> 
>> Brent
>>  
>> 
>> With representationalism, one can run "intelligent" software on CPUs, GPUs, 
>> etc. made of basically any material (as long as the computing structure - 
>> "Turing-equivalence" - is the same). Experientialism 
>> (anti-representationalism) says it has to be particular materials 
>> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry 
>>  ].
> 
> I know what it says.  You've posted it many times.  But I haven't seen any 
> reason to believe it.

I agree with you.

[]p (beweisbar(‘p’) is representational, 

[]p & p is provably not representational, due to its implicit invocation of the 
truth of p.

Matter is usually conceive in the 3p, representational view, n and his itself a 
representational. But truth is not, and it is truth which play the important 
role for consciousness. 

Matter is either primary ultra-inert matter, what made the original A-TOMOS of 
Democrat. Irreductivel material. Today we have broken atoms, and with enough 
energy we can broke proton, etc. Even if we find new ATOMOS, it is doubtful we 
could use them for something as “semantical” than consciousness. 

But there is extreme originality of wanting this. I wait for an explanation for 
how to test that idea.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Oct 2018, at 20:56, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/16/2018 6:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> As long as there is no evidence for a notion of primary matter (à-la 
>> Aristotle), the idea of a primitively material universe, or ontological 
>> universe is premature.
> 
> How can there be evidence for something being ontologically primitive except 
> that it be the ontologically primitive ground of a successful theory of 
> everything? 

But since Plato we know that physics is doomed in that respect. Physics can 
account and predict very well the material reality, but fail since long on 
consciousness. The Mind-Body problem is NOT solved, that is why Chalmers called 
it hard. Unfortunately Chalmers believe in a primary nature, and get dualist, 
which makes things even harder.


> So far there is no successful theory of everything.  However, physics is a 
> successful theory of lots of things, far more than other theories.

Yes, it is a formidable science in his domain. But it fails on everything, even 
restricted to its domain, as the two main theories, quantum physics and general 
relativity, are not compatible. Maybe they will succeed in unifying them, but 
for consciousness, the reason why we can seriously doubt physicalism will 
succeeded is that it has no mean to even address the mind-body problem. Now, 
the quantum theory looks really like what we need for the “matter problem” in 
arithmetic: a statistics on first person plural view, which is what Everett has 
done (and QM does when we abandon the “superstition” of a wave collapse, which 
is pure coquetry, the idea that we are alone in front of the mirror.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Oct 2018, at 20:01, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/16/2018 1:14 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs. 
>> information-oriented) paradigm*: Experience cannot be represented: It does 
>> not exist outside of its material instantiation.
> 
> But that's just an assertion that, not only am I giving up, but you must give 
> up too.  I'm defining "the hard problem" to be "the impossible problem".
> 
>  Most things don't exist outside of their material instantiation,


Most thing, not all? Good, there is hope. Perhaps you are OK that 2+2=4 is true 
independly of any material manifestation. Then, when you understand that all 
computations are emulated in arithmetic, you can understand why we can doubt 
about matter. Computer science re-enacts the dream argument in a very price and 
solid manner, mainly thanks to Church/Turing or Kleene/Post thesis.



> including intelligence.

If mechanism is true, that exist already in arithmetic. No need of matter, and 
actually, adding matter to the picture makes the hard problem having NO 
solution if we assume Mechanism.

Bruno 




> 
> Brent
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Oct 2018, at 19:56, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/16/2018 1:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 8:50:57 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of science as a 
>> way of knowing what was fact and what was superstition.  Science was testing 
>> beliefs and holding them only provisionally.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> They had myths. We have models.
>> 
>> "As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as 
>> a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past 
>> experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as 
>> convenient intermediaries -- not by definition in terms of experience, but 
>> simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of 
>> Homer. Let me interject that for my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in 
>> physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific 
>> error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the 
>> physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in 
>> kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. 
>> The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that 
>> it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a 
>> manageable structure into the flux of experience."
>> -- Willard Van Orman Quine
>> 
>> "It's models almost all the way up and all the way down." 
>> -- Ronald Giere
> 
> That misses the point.  Of course religions and science have models.  The 
> difference is that science test the models.  Science isn't a body of beliefs, 
> it's an attitude.

An attitude born in theology, with Plato. That attitude was the attitude of the 
rationalist theologian for a millenium, but even “under the Church”, most 
theologian will be aware of this, and like the soviet dissidents, will continue 
to share deep thought in the field, usually unknown by the clergy, or 
dismissed, or attacked violently. 

To make theology coming back to science consists simply in encouraging that 
attitude in the fundamental question. But of course the pope will say that 
“doubt is the devil”, and the atheist (of the strong kind) says exactly the 
same thing with nature, and equate fundamental science with the belief in the 
god “matter”. They just use more sophisticate tools to silent the doubter; more 
efficacious. After all being burned alive makes too much advertising to the 
idea of the one burned alive. 

Like you say, we must confront the idea with the facts and change our theories 
accordingly. Today, the fact is that mechanism explain far better both matter 
and consciousness existence than any physical theory. Naturalist, when enough 
rigorous, like Dennett or the neurophilosophers, have to eliminate 
consciousness, but they don’t succeed (for an obvious reason).

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> Science has questions that may never be answered.  Religion has answers that 
> may never be questioned.
>   --- Bob Zanelli
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Oct 2018, at 19:28, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 10:05 PM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> >> you know for a fact you're not conscious all the time, you know you're not 
> >> conscious when you're sleeping or under anesthesia or before you were born 
> >> and, although you don't know for certain, you probably suspect you won't 
> >> be conscious after you're dead. And you may have also noticed a pattern 
> >> here, you seem to only be conscious when you have the ability to behave 
> >> intelligently.
> 
> > "Having the ability to behave intelligently" is not something I can know. 
> 
> I don't think very intelligently when I'm sleeping and I've known that for as 
> far back as I can remember. Are you any different?


How can you judge that you are thinking more intelligently when you are awake? 
Also, can you be sure that you are awake?

Can anyone judge its own intelligence?

Bruno



> 
> >> Structurally the difference between you and you're recently deceased twin 
> >> brother is at only one point, your unfortunate sibling has a hole in his 
> >> heart and you do not, but you're still more similar to your twin than you 
> >> are to me, and yet I bet you believe I am more conscious than your brother 
> >> because one of us can still behave intelligently and one can't.  
> 
> > Really??
> 
> Yes really.
> 
> >  Ever heard of decay?
> 
> Yes, that's why I said recently deceased.
> 
> > And why only "structure"?  What happened to chemistry, neurons, 
> > hormones,...?
> 
> Nothing happened to them because neurons and hormones also have structure as 
> do all complex objects, about the only things that don't (as far as we know) 
> are electrons, positrons, photons, neutrinos and possibly quarks and Black 
> Holes. 
> > I don't know what any of that has to do with my similarity to other human 
> > beings providing evidence that they are conscious.  Octopuses act 
> > intelligently too, 
> 
> Yes.
> 
> > but this bit of evidence in favor of their consciousness is missing.  
> 
> The Genetic Code that the octopuses uses is not similar to the one you use it 
> is IDENTICAL to it, and both you and the octopus rely on the same laws of 
> organic chemistry. Oh and the octopus is squishy and so is a human brain. 
> 
> > So I'm a little less sure that they are conscious.
> 
> As a practical matter it will make no difference if you think a super 
> intelligent computer is conscious but it will make a huge difference if the 
> intelligent computer thinks you are conscious because nothing can feel 
> empathy for something they don't think is conscious and in the future it will 
> be the computer who is in the position of power not the human.
> 
> > As I said neither you nor other people act that way [intelligently] all the 
> > time
> 
> > No, what you said was they are conscious when they know they can act 
> > intelligently.
> 
> Yes, because everybody knows they don't act intelligently all the time, not 
> when they're sleeping or under anesthesia, and those times correspond to the 
> times they know they are not conscious. 
> 
> >>If evolution found it easier to make a conscious intelligent being than a 
> >>non-conscious intelligent being why would human engineers find the exact 
> >>opposite to be true?
>  
> > Possibly because human engineers can start from scratch 
> 
> I don't see your point. Evolution also started from scratch, simple amino 
> acids and nucleotides.
> 
> > and don't have to evolve their solution from pre-conscious biology.  
> 
> I don't think you intended it but you seem to be arguing that human engineers 
> would find it even easier to build a conscious mind than evolution did, but I 
> don't understand that argument either because engineers had to start with the 
> pre-conscious physics of silicon atoms.
> 
> > Your point isn't wrong, but it's only weak evidence.
> 
> I admit it's not proof, we'll never have that, but its enormously powerful 
> evidence. And whatever people say when they're philosophizing, in everyday 
> life whatever its shortcomings may be intelligent behavior is the ONLY tool 
> they have for distinguishing between conscious matter and non-conscious 
> matter. 
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Oct 2018, at 10:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 8:50:57 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of science as a 
> way of knowing what was fact and what was superstition.  Science was testing 
> beliefs and holding them only provisionally.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> They had myths. We have models.
> 
> "As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as 
> a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past 
> experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as 
> convenient intermediaries -- not by definition in terms of experience, but 
> simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of 
> Homer. Let me interject that for my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in 
> physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific 
> error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the 
> physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both 
> sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of 
> physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved 
> more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable 
> structure into the flux of experience."
> -- Willard Van Orman Quine


Very good.

Let us notice that Plato already exchange the god of Homer, for a reality 
amenable to science (the worlds of idea). Xeusippes considered that this was 
akin to mathematics, if not mathematics. Xeusippes thought that Plato should 
have banished Aristotle from the academy, with his propensity to treat Nature 
and Matter as something that we can take for granted. The dream argument shows 
that this moves is invalid in general.

Bruno



> 
> "It's models almost all the way up and all the way down." 
> -- Ronald Giere
>  
> - pt 
> 
>  
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Oct 2018, at 09:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 8:36:01 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 1:17 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
> >As I have proposed, information processing alone will not lead to 
> >consciousness. Experience processing 
> > must be 
> >the basis. 
> 
> An experience is not a simple thing so whatever produces it can't be simple 
> either. If it's complex then it must be made of parts. If even the parts are 
> complex then they must be made of sub-parts. If we continue doing this then 
> after a finite number of iterations we'll come to a part that can't get any 
> simpler because it can change in only one way, from a 1 to a 0 for example. 
> And we have arrived at information processing.   
>   
> >So if one defines intelligence such that an entity can't be actually 
> >intelligent unless it is conscious, then all the AI work in the 
> >information-oriented paradigm today will never lead to actual intelligence.
> 
> But computers have already lead to intelligence, unless you keep moving the 
> goalpost and define intelligence as whatever a computer can't do YET.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
>  
> 
> Whatever one defines intelligence to be, for something (or some being, as 
> some might prefer) to be conscious (for those who think it is real)  is a 
> more certain thing. 

We agree on this. Consciousness is indubitable. May be it is the only thing 
which we cannot doubt, and the reason would be that we need consciousness to 
genuinely doubt.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Oct 2018, at 16:34, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Oct 14, 2018 at 10:53 PM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> > The reason for not doubting that other human beings are conscious is that 
> > (1) I am conscious and
> 
> But you know for a fact you're not conscious all the time, you know you're 
> not conscious when you're sleeping or under anesthesia or before you were 
> born and, although you don't know for certain, you probably suspect you won't 
> be conscious after you're dead. And you may have also noticed a pattern here, 
> you seem to only be conscious when you have the ability to behave 
> intelligently.



How do you know that?

How could you know that?

Sure the brain made us forgetting quickly our REM dreams, and even more quickly 
our consciousness in the Slow Sleep. 

Yet, the idea that there are moment where we are not conscious is very natural, 
but it is not a fact, it is a theory, probably selected by evolution, and so 
hard to doubt, but it is still a theory. Descartes doubted it, and I would say 
that with mechanism, it might be possible that Descartes was right. “I am 
unconscious” is non sensical, but “I was unconscious” is mot much more sensical.

My point here is just that the idea that we are not conscious all the time is 
not a fact, but a theory.

Bruno





>  
> > (2) other human beings are made of the same stuff in approximately the same 
> > way that I am
> 
> There is a lot of wiggle room in that "approximately", what difference is 
> important and what is just incidental? Maybe men are conscious and women are 
> not, maybe white people are conscious and black people are not, maybe right 
> handers are conscious and left handers are not. Maybe, but I doubt it. 
> 
> Structurally the difference between you and you're recently deceased twin 
> brother is at only one point, your unfortunate sibling has a hole in his 
> heart and you do not, but you're still more similar to your twin than you are 
> to me, and yet I bet you believe I am more conscious than your brother 
> because one of us can still behave intelligently and one can't.  
>  
> > and (3) they behave the same way in relation to what I am conscious of, 
> > e.g. they jump at a sudden loud sound.
> 
> As I said neither you nor other people act that way all the time, only when 
> they have the ability to behave intelligently.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
>  
> 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Oct 2018, at 03:50, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/15/2018 6:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Oct 2018, at 19:26, John Clark >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 12:15 PM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> >>You can't do metaphysics with a scientific attitude, if you could it 
>>> >>wouldn't be metaphysics, it would just be physics. Metaphysics means 
>>> >>unscientific speculation about physics.
>>>  
>>> >That is why I prefer the term theology.
>>> 
>>> That's pretty silly, metaphysics is a vastly better word to use in 
>>> philosophical speculation. Both metaphysics and theology are unscientific 
>>> but theology necessarily implies God while metaphysics doesn't.  
>> 
>> 
>> That is an opinion of radical pseudo-religious people. There is no 
>> scientific domain. There is only a scientific attitude, and this can be 
>> applied in any domain.
>> 
>> The separation of religion from science is an invention by people wanting to 
>> use religion to control people, and steal their money.
> 
> That's silly.  Religion existed long before science was developed.  Religion 
> was invented, and believed, by people who wanted to understand and control 
> their fate in the world.  They understood other people who had desires and 
> motives and got angry and loved and hated, so they inferred that the weather 
> and seas and the volcano were agents like people only bigger and more 
> powerful.  So they sought to propitiate these gods and demons by offering 
> them what was precious; including the lives of their children.  Shamans, 
> priests, and kings took advantage of this by pretending to be intermediaries 
> to the gods and experts in their propitiation.  They invented prayers and 
> rituals and sacrifices.
> 
> The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of science

Not at all. Science is born with Plato, who understood that for having a 
fundamental science, we must believe in a reality, and that this need an act of 
faith. That reality is GOD, the object of religion.
Of course, the popular religion did have all sort of Gods, from turtles all the 
way down, to very personalised sort of reality. Now, when religion is done with 
the scientific attitude, which is what Plato did, it is named theology, and for 
one millenium it was a science. The Reality was mainly either Nature, or 
something else which would be deeper and non natural (“supernatural”). Plato 
called it the “world of ideas” (the Noùs). Plato’s world of idea was inspired 
by Pythagorus who taught it as being “only number”.

That theology has progressed and gave birth to Mathematics, which was seen as 
the alternative of physics. 
The (Neo)pythagorean and  the (Neo)platonist will pursue that line where the 
doubt was about the fundamental nature of reality was immaterial/mathematical. 
You might read Plotinus' ennead “On number”, to see how Plotinus foresaw 
Cantor, and the machine’s discourse. The term “mathematician” was used at that 
time to mean “rationalist sceptics about the fundamental nature of the physical 
reality”/ The original doubt was between mathematics and physics as fundamental 
science. Aristotle will side with Plato on this, but his interest in Nature 
will make him to influence people to opt the idea that physics might be 
directly about reality.

For example, in the year 400 Hypatia was teaching both the Mathematics of 
Diophantus, and the theology of Plotinus. That was very common. 

But, the christians will separated into intellectual, disputing if Plato or 
Aristotle were right, and integrist or radicals which will use religion to get 
power, and the history is that, despite Constantin (Roman emperor converted to 
Christianity) was rather close to the platonist intellectual, eventually the 
radicals will get the power. 
After 529, when the emperor Justinian did close Plato’s Academy, the Church 
will, by its action separate theology (the fundamental science of the greek per 
definition) from science.The result is that science will be associated more and 
more with Aristotle: that is: the belief in physical primary universe. Science 
itself became a psedo-religion, with a sort of dogma: Matter, and this up to 
the point that today, most people have completely forget that the original 
debate was never on the existence of the ONE (god) but on the existence of a 
primary (“physicalist”) Nature.
By separating religion-theology from science, religion will keep the popular 
superstition, and buried a millenium of science. Theology/religion will become 
more and more an instrument of politics (of the non democratic kind, of course).
The first attempt to separate religion from the state and politics, cale from 
religious people wanting to save religion/theology from politics (not for 
saving politics from religion!: that will come later).

Superstition was just popular, in all sciences before the greeks. A religion is 
only a 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 12:56:56 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/16/2018 1:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 8:50:57 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of science as 
>> a way of knowing what was fact and what was superstition.  Science was 
>> testing beliefs and holding them only provisionally.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
> They had myths. We have models.
>
> "As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science 
> as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of 
> past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the 
> situation as convenient intermediaries -- not by definition in terms of 
> experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, 
> to the gods of Homer. Let me interject that for my part I do, qua lay 
> physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I 
> consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. *But in point of 
> epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in 
> degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as 
> cultural posits.* The myth of physical objects is epistemologically 
> superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as 
> a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience."
> -- Willard Van Orman Quine
>
> "It's models almost all the way up and all the way down." 
> -- Ronald Giere
>
>
> That misses the point.  Of course religions and science have models.  The 
> difference is that science test the models.  Science isn't a body of 
> beliefs, it's an attitude.
>
> Brent
> Science has questions that may never be answered.  Religion has answers 
> that may never be questioned.
>   --- Bob Zanelli
>



It's true that myths aren't tested, but models are (in general) tested.

But there are some scientists (e.g. @skdh ) who 
say that some scientists' models are myths.

Stephen Hawking says that myth may be needed in the final TOE in his final 
book:

"to a large extent we shall have to rely on mathematical beauty and 
consistency to find the ultimate theory of everything" -- Stephen Hawking 
("Brief Answers To The Big Questions")


- pt

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, October 17, 2018 at 12:19:35 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/16/2018 9:55 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 5:43:51 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/16/2018 12:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 12:52:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/16/2018 12:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>> Whatever one defines intelligence to be, for something (or some *being*, 
>>> as some might prefer) to be conscious (for those who think it is real)  is 
>>> a more certain thing. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Intelligence is something observable, as here:
>>>
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZerUbHmuY04
>>>
>>> You seem to take it as fairly certain that we can make intelligent 
>>> machines; which you think will not be conscious.  That implies that there 
>>> is nothing observable about consciousness.  So how can it be a "more 
>>> certain thing"?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Consciousness the the one thing we observe that we are sure of existing. 
>>
>>
>> I can be sure that *I* am conscious.  But that along doesn't imply 
>> anything about matter or other people being conscious.  Observing their 
>> intelligent behavior however does.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
> I am sure I am conscious, and knowing (pretty much knowing) someone I'm 
> talking to is made of *the same kind of molecules* as I am  (basically 
> biological material like me), I think they are conscious too.
>
>
> I've heard that some talk to dead people.
>
> Brent
>


If I start seeing red door knobs, then I'll worry ...

https://screenmuse.wordpress.com/2012/11/03/colour-symbolism-red-in-the-sixth-sense/

- pt
 

>
>
> But if I were talking to Sophia [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sophia_(robot) ] ("the first non-human to 
> be given any United Nations title") some years from now after years of more 
> development, and knowing what her molecular makeup was, I would probably 
> not think so, no matter how impressively chatty she was.
>
> - pt
>
>
>
>

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/16/2018 9:55 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 5:43:51 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 10/16/2018 12:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 12:52:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 10/16/2018 12:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

Whatever one defines intelligence to be, for something (or
some /being/, as some might prefer) to be conscious (for
those who think it is real)  is a more certain thing. 


Intelligence is something observable, as here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZerUbHmuY04


You seem to take it as fairly certain that we can make
intelligent machines; which you think will not be conscious. 
That implies that there is nothing observable about
consciousness.  So how can it be a "more certain thing"?

Brent




Consciousness the the one thing we observe that we are sure of
existing.


I can be sure that /*I*/ am conscious.  But that along doesn't
imply anything about matter or other people being conscious. 
Observing their intelligent behavior however does.

Brent


I am sure I am conscious, and knowing (pretty much knowing) someone 
I'm talking to is made of *the same kind of molecules* as I am  
(basically biological material like me), I think they are conscious too.


I've heard that some talk to dead people.

Brent



But if I were talking to Sophia 
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sophia_(robot) ] ("the first non-human 
to be given any United Nations title") some years from now after years 
of more development, and knowing what her molecular makeup was, I 
would probably not think so, no matter how impressively chatty she was.


- pt



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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 5:43:51 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/16/2018 12:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 12:52:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/16/2018 12:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> Whatever one defines intelligence to be, for something (or some *being*, 
>> as some might prefer) to be conscious (for those who think it is real)  is 
>> a more certain thing. 
>>
>>
>> Intelligence is something observable, as here:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZerUbHmuY04
>>
>> You seem to take it as fairly certain that we can make intelligent 
>> machines; which you think will not be conscious.  That implies that there 
>> is nothing observable about consciousness.  So how can it be a "more 
>> certain thing"?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> Consciousness the the one thing we observe that we are sure of existing. 
>
>
> I can be sure that *I* am conscious.  But that along doesn't imply 
> anything about matter or other people being conscious.  Observing their 
> intelligent behavior however does.
>
> Brent
>
>
I am sure I am conscious, and knowing (pretty much knowing) someone I'm 
talking to is made of *the same kind of molecules* as I am  (basically 
biological material like me), I think they are conscious too.

But if I were talking to Sophia 
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sophia_(robot) ] ("the first non-human to 
be given any United Nations title") some years from now after years of more 
development, and knowing what her molecular makeup was, I would probably 
not think so, no matter how impressively chatty she was.

- pt



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Re: The hard problem of matter

[John Clark]

On Tue, Oct 16, 2018 at 6:13 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>>Nothing happened to them because neurons and hormones also have structure
>> as do all complex objects, about the only things that don't (as far as we
>> know) are electrons, positrons, photons, neutrinos and possibly quarks
>> and Black Holes.
>
>
> * >OK, and the change of those structures is what makes one deceased. *
>

Correct, so a very small change in structure can cause a HUGE change in
behavior, like the difference in behavior between the living and the dead.
But how do you know the deceased are not conscious? Because they don't
behave intelligently. And so structural similarity is a very poor indicator
of consciousness, unless of course you believe cadavers are conscious.

* >The genetic code used by a yeast cell is also identical to the one you
> use.  And you and a fermenting vat of beer rely on the same laws of organic
> chemistry*
>

Yes.


> .> Hence your intelligence is the same.
>

No.

 > *You are arguing that there is no difference in the degree of similarity
between humans and between a human and an octopus.*

NO. I am arguing there is more similarity between you and a live octopus
than you and a dead human because regardless of structural similarity one
certainly has the ability to behave intelligently and one certainly does
not, and therefore it is reasonable to conclude that one is conscious and
one is not.

>> As a practical matter it will make no difference if you think a super
>> intelligent computer is conscious but it will make a huge difference if the
>> intelligent computer thinks you are conscious because nothing can feel
>> empathy for something they don't think is conscious and in the future it
>> will be the computer who is in the position of power not the human.
>
>
>
> * >Did anyone ask for your opinion on this point...which you interject as
> a diversion from time to time?*
>

If you are able to logically refute what said above please do so, you'd be
doing me a great service by pointing out an error that I overlooked;  but
lets get one thing crystal clear, I don't need your permission before I can
express myself on this list.


> >>Yes, because everybody knows they don't act intelligently all the time,
>> not when they're sleeping or under anesthesia, and those times correspond
>> to the times they know they are not conscious.
>
>

> *I see, it's when they know they are not conscious they know they don't
> act intelligently.  That seems to be a lot of knowing for one who is
> unconscious.*
>

This is getting silly, I know I was not conscious last night at 3 am and I
know I didn't do anything intelligent last night at 3 am.

>>I don't see your point. Evolution also started from scratch, simple amino
>> acids and nucleotides.
>
>
> * >It started from scratch to produce life...intelligence was just one
> small effect.  Engineers already have life.*
>

So engineers will have an easier time making a conscious mind than
Evolution did and do it a lot faster.

>>I don't think you intended it but you seem to be arguing that human
>> engineers would find it even easier to build a conscious mind than
>> evolution did, but I don't understand that argument either because
>> engineers had to start with the pre-conscious physics of silicon atoms.
>
>
> >Well, they build airplanes in less that fifty years of trying...and they
> used non-flying atoms.  How long did evolution take?
>

A bit more than 50 years, about 3 billion. So we can conclude that
intelligent design is much much faster than random mutation and natural
selection, and thus human engineers will have an easier time making a
conscious mind than Evolution did and do it a lot faster.


> >>I admit it's not proof, we'll never have that, but its enormously
>> powerful evidence.
>
>
> * >What?  Now you think my similarity to other humans is enormously
> powerful evidence that they are conscious in the way I know I am? *
>

No. I think the fact that Evolution can see intelligence but not
consciousness and thus cannot select for it but nevertheless managed to
produce at least one conscious being (me) and probably many more is
enormously powerful evidence that consciousness is a inevitable byproduct
of intelligence. And I find it difficult to believe you simply
misinterpreted what I said, I think you are being disingenuous.


> *> I'm glad to see you reverse your position that it's as fallacious as
> assuming my similarity to a dead person means were both intelligent.*


This is getting sillier and sillier. Your structural similarity to a dead
person shows that structural similarity is *NOT* a good indicator of
intelligent behavior nor of consciousness. For your benefit I'm going to
repeat that, it's *NOT* a good indicator.


>>And whatever people say when they're philosophizing, in everyday life
>> whatever its shortcomings may be intelligent behavior is the *ONLY* tool
>> they have for distinguishing between conscious matter and non-conscious
>> matter.
>
>
> >Back to 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/16/2018 12:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 12:52:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 10/16/2018 12:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

Whatever one defines intelligence to be, for something (or some
/being/, as some might prefer) to be conscious (for those who
think it is real) is a more certain thing. 


Intelligence is something observable, as here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZerUbHmuY04


You seem to take it as fairly certain that we can make intelligent
machines; which you think will not be conscious.  That implies
that there is nothing observable about consciousness.  So how can
it be a "more certain thing"?

Brent




Consciousness the the one thing we observe that we are sure of existing.


I can be sure that /*I*/ am conscious.  But that along doesn't imply 
anything about matter or other people being conscious.  Observing their 
intelligent behavior however does.


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/16/2018 11:58 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 1:01:40 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 10/16/2018 1:14 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs.
information-oriented) paradigm*: /Experience cannot be
represented: It does not exist outside of its material
instantiation./


But that's just an assertion that, not only am I giving up, but
you must give up too.  I'm defining "the hard problem" to be "the
impossible problem".

 Most things don't exist outside of their material instantiation,
including intelligence.

Brent


With *representationalism*, one can run "intelligent" software on 
CPUs, GPUs, etc. made of basically any material (as long as the 
computing structure - "Turing-equivalence" - is the same). 
*Experientialism* (anti-representationalism) says it has to be 
particular materials [ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry ].


I know what it says.  You've posted it many times.  But I haven't seen 
any reason to believe it.


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/16/2018 10:28 AM, John Clark wrote:



On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 10:05 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:





>> you know for a fact you're not conscious all the time, you
know you're not conscious when you're sleeping or under
anesthesia or before you were born and, although you don't
know for certain, you probably suspect you won't be conscious
after you're dead. And you may have also noticed a pattern
here, you seem to only be conscious when you have the ability
to behave intelligently.


> /"Having the ability to behave intelligently" is not something I
can know. /


I don't think very intelligently when I'm sleeping and I've known that 
for as far back as I can remember. Are you any different?


You've never known it when you were sleeping, have you?



>> Structurally the difference between you and you're recently
deceased twin brother is at only one point, your unfortunate
sibling has a hole in his heart and you do not, but you're
still more similar to your twin than you are to me, and yet I
bet you believe I am more conscious than your brother because
one of us can still behave intelligently and one can't. 



> /Really?? /


Yes really.

/>  Ever heard of decay? /


Yes, that's why I said recently deceased.


One is not deceased until the metabolic pathways are starved of oxygen.



> /And why only "structure"?  What happened to chemistry, neurons,
hormones,...?
/


Nothing happened to them because neurons and hormones also have 
structure as do all complex objects, about the only things that don't 
(as far as we know) are electrons, positrons, photons, neutrinos and 
possibly quarks and Black Holes.


OK, and the change of those structures is what makes one deceased. So 
one who is deceased is very different from one who is alive, even if 
they are genetic identical.



/> I don't know what any of that has to do with my similarity to
other human beings providing evidence that they are conscious. 
Octopuses act intelligently too, /


Yes.

/> but this bit of evidence in favor of their consciousness is
missing. /


The Genetic Code that the octopuses uses is not similar to the one you 
use it is IDENTICAL to it, and both you and the octopus rely on the 
same laws of organic chemistry.


The genetic code used by a yeast cell is also identical to the one you 
use.  And you and a fermenting vat of beer rely on the same laws of 
organic chemistry.  Hence your intelligence is the same.  You are 
arguing that there is no difference in the degree of similarity between 
humans and between a human and an octopus...because that's what it would 
take for the similarity of two humans to not count as evidence for them 
having the same degree of consciousness.



Oh and the octopus is squishy and so is a human brain.

> /So I'm a little less sure that they are conscious./


As a practical matter it will make no difference if you think a super 
intelligent computer is conscious but it will make a huge difference 
if the intelligent computer thinks you are conscious because nothing 
can feel empathy for something they don't think is conscious and in 
the future it will be the computer who is in the position of power not 
the human.


Did anyone ask for your opinion on this point...which you interject as a 
diversion from time to time?




> As I said neither you nor other people act that way
[intelligently] all the time


> /No, what you said was they are conscious when they know they
can act intelligently./


Yes, because everybody knows they don't act intelligently all the 
time, not when they're sleeping or under anesthesia, and those times 
correspond to the times they know they are not conscious.


I see, it's when they know they are not conscious they know they don't 
act intelligently.  That seems to be a lot of knowing for one who is 
unconscious.




>>If evolution found it easier to make a conscious intelligent
being than a non-conscious intelligent being why would human
engineers find the exact opposite to be true?

/> Possibly because human engineers can start from scratch /


I don't see your point. Evolution also started from scratch, simple 
amino acids and nucleotides.


It started from scratch to produce life...intelligence was just one 
small effect.  Engineers already have life.




/> and don't have to evolve their solution from pre-conscious
biology. /


I don't think you intended it but you seem to be arguing that human 
engineers would find it even easier to build a conscious mind than 
evolution did, but I don't understand that argument either because 
engineers had to start with the pre-conscious physics of silicon atoms.


Well, they build airplanes in less that fifty years of trying...and they 
used non-flying atoms.  How long did evolution take?

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 12:52:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/16/2018 12:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> Whatever one defines intelligence to be, for something (or some *being*, 
> as some might prefer) to be conscious (for those who think it is real)  is 
> a more certain thing. 
>
>
> Intelligence is something observable, as here:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZerUbHmuY04
>
> You seem to take it as fairly certain that we can make intelligent 
> machines; which you think will not be conscious.  That implies that there 
> is nothing observable about consciousness.  So how can it be a "more 
> certain thing"?
>
> Brent
>



Consciousness the the one thing we observe that we are sure of existing. 

(something Philip Goff has said)

- pt

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, October 16, 2018 at 1:01:40 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/16/2018 1:14 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs. 
> information-oriented) paradigm*: *Experience cannot be represented: It 
> does not exist outside of its material instantiation.*
>
>
> But that's just an assertion that, not only am I giving up, but you must 
> give up too.  I'm defining "the hard problem" to be "the impossible 
> problem".
>
>  Most things don't exist outside of their material instantiation, 
> including intelligence.
>
> Brent
>
 

With *representationalism*, one can run "intelligent" software on CPUs, 
GPUs, etc. made of basically any material (as long as the computing 
structure - "Turing-equivalence" - is the same). *Experientialism* 
(anti-representationalism) says it has to be particular materials [ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry ].

 - pt

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/16/2018 6:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As long as there is no evidence for a notion of primary matter (à-la 
Aristotle), the idea of a primitively material universe, or 
ontological universe is premature.


How can there be evidence for something being ontologically primitive 
except that it be the ontologically primitive ground of a successful 
theory of everything?  So far there is no successful theory of 
everything.  However, physics is a successful theory of lots of things, 
far more than other theories.


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/16/2018 1:14 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
But here is the thesis I think of the experience-oriented (vs. 
information-oriented) paradigm*: /Experience cannot be represented: It 
does not exist outside of its material instantiation./


But that's just an assertion that, not only am I giving up, but you must 
give up too.  I'm defining "the hard problem" to be "the impossible 
problem".


 Most things don't exist outside of their material instantiation, 
including intelligence.


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/16/2018 1:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 8:50:57 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of
science as a way of knowing what was fact and what was
superstition.  Science was testing beliefs and holding them only
provisionally.

Brent



They had myths. We have models.

"As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of 
science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the 
light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported 
into the situation as convenient intermediaries -- not by definition 
in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, 
epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. Let me interject that for my 
part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in 
Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe 
otherwise. *But in point of epistemological footing the physical 
objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts 
of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits.* The myth of 
physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has 
proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a 
manageable structure into the flux of experience."

-- Willard Van Orman Quine

"It's models almost all the way up and all the way down."
-- Ronald Giere


That misses the point.  Of course religions and science have models.  
The difference is that science test the models.  Science isn't a body of 
beliefs, it's an attitude.


Brent
Science has questions that may never be answered.  Religion has answers 
that may never be questioned.

  --- Bob Zanelli

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/16/2018 12:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
Whatever one defines intelligence to be, for something (or some 
/being/, as some might prefer) to be conscious (for those who think it 
is real)  is a more certain thing. 


Intelligence is something observable, as here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZerUbHmuY04

You seem to take it as fairly certain that we can make intelligent 
machines; which you think will not be conscious.  That implies that 
there is nothing observable about consciousness.  So how can it be a 
"more certain thing"?


Brent

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[John Clark]

On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 10:05 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:




>> you know for a fact you're not conscious all the time, you know you're
>> not conscious when you're sleeping or under anesthesia or before you were
>> born and, although you don't know for certain, you probably suspect you
>> won't be conscious after you're dead. And you may have also noticed a
>> pattern here, you seem to only be conscious when you have the ability to
>> behave intelligently.
>
>
> > *"Having the ability to behave intelligently" is not something I can
> know. *


I don't think very intelligently when I'm sleeping and I've known that for
as far back as I can remember. Are you any different?

>> Structurally the difference between you and you're recently deceased
>> twin brother is at only one point, your unfortunate sibling has a hole in
>> his heart and you do not, but you're still more similar to your twin than
>> you are to me, and yet I bet you believe I am more conscious than your
>> brother because one of us can still behave intelligently and one can't.
>
>
> > *Really?? *


Yes really.

*>  Ever heard of decay? *


Yes, that's why I said recently deceased.

>
> *And why only "structure"?  What happened to chemistry, neurons,
> hormones,...?*


Nothing happened to them because neurons and hormones also have structure
as do all complex objects, about the only things that don't (as far as we
know) are electrons, positrons, photons, neutrinos and possibly quarks and
Black Holes.

> *> I don't know what any of that has to do with my similarity to other
> human beings providing evidence that they are conscious.  Octopuses act
> intelligently too, *


Yes.

*> but this bit of evidence in favor of their consciousness is missing.  *


The Genetic Code that the octopuses uses is not similar to the one you use
it is IDENTICAL to it, and both you and the octopus rely on the same laws
of organic chemistry. Oh and the octopus is squishy and so is a human
brain.

> *So I'm a little less sure that they are conscious.*


As a practical matter it will make no difference if you think a super
intelligent computer is conscious but it will make a huge difference if the
intelligent computer thinks you are conscious because nothing can feel
empathy for something they don't think is conscious and in the future it
will be the computer who is in the position of power not the human.

> As I said neither you nor other people act that way [intelligently] all
>> the time
>
>
> > *No, what you said was they are conscious when they know they can act
> intelligently.*


Yes, because everybody knows they don't act intelligently all the time, not
when they're sleeping or under anesthesia, and those times correspond to
the times they know they are not conscious.

>>If evolution found it easier to make a conscious intelligent being than a
>> non-conscious intelligent being why would human engineers find the exact
>> opposite to be true?
>
>

*> Possibly because human engineers can start from scratch *


I don't see your point. Evolution also started from scratch, simple amino
acids and nucleotides.

*> and don't have to evolve their solution from pre-conscious biology.  *


I don't think you intended it but you seem to be arguing that human
engineers would find it even easier to build a conscious mind than
evolution did, but I don't understand that argument either because
engineers had to start with the pre-conscious physics of silicon atoms.

*> Your point isn't wrong, but it's only weak evidence.*


I admit it's not proof, we'll never have that, but its enormously powerful
evidence. And whatever people say when they're philosophizing, in everyday
life whatever its shortcomings may be intelligent behavior is the *ONLY*
tool they have for distinguishing between conscious matter and
non-conscious matter.

John K Clark

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Oct 2018, at 19:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, October 11, 2018 at 11:19:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Oct 2018, at 20:18, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, October 9, 2018 at 9:05:27 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Oct 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, October 7, 2018 at 10:35:07 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 7 Oct 2018, at 15:55, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Matter is a mystery. Some think that there's a hard problem of 
>>>> consciousness [1]. But actually, there's a hard problem of matter [2,3].
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness 
>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness>
>>>> [2] 
>>>> https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/opinion/consciousness-isnt-a-mystery-its-matter.html
>>>>  
>>>> <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/opinion/consciousness-isnt-a-mystery-its-matter.html>
>>>> [3] http://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/is-matter-conscious 
>>>> <http://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/is-matter-conscious> :
>>>> 
>>>> When we look at what physics tells us about the brain, we actually just 
>>>> find software—purely a set of relations—all the way down.
>>> 
>>> Are you not confusing the theories (which can be see as a sort of software, 
>>> although not necessarily computable) and what the theories are supposed to 
>>> be about, which might be some “ontological real field” of something?
>>> 
>>> Mechanism assumes we can truncate the “all the way down” so as to be able 
>>> to “save our soul” temporarily on a disk. This salvation is relative to 
>>> some reality/computation(s).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> And consciousness is in fact more like hardware, because of its distinctly 
>>>> qualitative, non-structural properties. For this reason, conscious 
>>>> experiences are just the kind of things that physical structure could be 
>>>> the structure of.
>>> 
>>> I see your point, but find it very weird. You make consciousness into an 
>>> inert sort of substance. I don’t think this solves the hard problem of 
>>> consciousness nor the hard problem of matter. It identify again the too, 
>>> without justifying where that come from.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Given this solution to the hard problem of matter, the hard problem of 
>>>> consciousness all but dissolves. There is no longer any question of how 
>>>> consciousness arises from non-conscious matter, because all matter is 
>>>> intrinsically conscious. There is no longer a question of how 
>>>> consciousness depends on matter, because it is matter that depends on 
>>>> consciousness—as relations depend on relata, structure depends on 
>>>> realizer, or software on hardware.
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> With mechanism, the mind-body problem is reduced to the problem of 
>>> justifying the appearance of matter from the statistics on all computations 
>>> going through your local and actual (indexically defined, and thus 
>>> relative) computational state. The math has been done, and this provides a 
>>> quantum logic for the “probability one” first person (plural) events. The 
>>> world would have been Newtonian, we would have good reason to suspect 
>>> Mechanism to be false, but quantum mechanics seems, up to now, to look very 
>>> like the computationalist solution of the mind body problem.
>>> 
>>> Then, consciousness is only a semantical fixed point of all machines. It 
>>> is, from the first person point of view of the machine, something felt as 
>>> immediately true, indubitable, non justifiable, and non definable.
>>> 
>>> I can somehow make sense of what you say, because here the theory of 
>>> consciousness is mainly the modal logic G1*, and the theory of matter is 
>>> Z1*, and it appears that they are bisimilar: so, matter and consciousness 
>>> are not just two modes of arithmetical self-knowledge, but they are 
>>> faithful representation of each other. Now, that is not entirely true, 
>>> because the “indubitability” need a slight different t

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 10:49:44 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/15/2018 5:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 6:45:11 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/14/2018 11:13 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, October 14, 2018 at 9:53:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/14/2018 2:48 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> >*And there are sound reasons for doubting the consciousness of 
 computers -*

>>>  
>>> Name one of them that could not also be used to doubt the consciousness 
>>> of your fellow human beings.
>>>
>>>
>>> The reason for not doubting that other human beings are conscious is 
>>> that (1) I am conscious and (2) other human beings are made of the same 
>>> stuff in approximately the same way that I am and (3) they behave the same 
>>> way in relation to what I am conscious of, e.g. they jump at a sudden loud 
>>> sound.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> The thought crossed my mind yesterday: I was helping a young man applying 
>> for a Ph.D. program in chemical engineering with his application, and we 
>> were talking about chemistry and consciousness*, and I mentioned a type of 
>> zombie - a being that could converse (like an advanced Google Assistant or 
>> Sophie Robot) but not be conscious - and I thought it was *possible* he was 
>> a zombie.
>>
>> * cf. 
>> *Experience processing*
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>>
>>
>> I suppose you've read Scott Aaronson's take down of Tononi's theory.  So 
>> I wonder why you would reference Tononi.
>>
>> One problem with the "experience is primary" theory is that there's no 
>> way for it to evolve.  If it's a property of matter why are organized 
>> information processing lumps of matter more capable of experience than 
>> unorganized lumps of the same composition...the obvious answer is that the 
>> former process information, and processing information is something natural 
>> selection can work on.  Smart animals reproduce better.  Animals with 
>> experiences...who cares?
>>
>> “Emotional-BDI agents are BDI agents whose behavior is guided not only by 
>> beliefs, desires and intentions, but also by the role of emotions in 
>> reasoning and decision-making."  This makes a false assumption that 
>> emotions are something independent of beliefs, desire, intentions, 
>> reasoning, and decision making.  But this says nothing about the 
>> satisfaction and thwarting of desires and intentions.  Why are those enough 
>> to explain emotions.  I agree that emotions are necessary for reasoning in 
>> the sense that emotions are the value-weights given to events, including 
>> those imagined by foresight, and that some values are primitive.  
>>
>> I think it is false that "Purely informational processing, which includes 
>> intentional agent programming (learning from experience, self-modeling), 
>> does not capture all true experiential processing (phenomenal 
>> consciousness). "  It is a cheat to put in "purely".  In fact all learning 
>> and intentional planning must include weighing alternatives and assigning 
>> value/emotion to them.  I don't see any need for a further primitive 
>> modality.  For example, a feeling of dizziness is a failure to maintain 
>> personal spacial orientation which is a value at a very low (subconscious) 
>> level.  Sure there are feelings and emotions...but I think they are all 
>> derivative from more primitive values that are derivative from evolution.
>>
>> I think the reason you are attracted to this idea is that it is closed 
>> within the computer/information/program frame.  And that is why I use the 
>> example of the AI Mars Rover.  Sure, emotion cannot be derived within a 
>> computer.  Emotion is something useful to a robot, an AI that works and 
>> strives within an external world which also acts on it.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
> I'll include the reference to
>
>*Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The Unconscious 
> Expander)*
>https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
>
> Since I say that IIT is still in the *information-oriented paradigm *and 
> not in the *experience-oriented paradigm*, Aaronson's post helps my case.
>
> I don't quite follow the rest. A person may feel pleasure (a modality) 
> without reasoning "I need to feel pleasure now."
>
>
> It's not a question of what it's possible to feel, but whether that it can 
> be accounted for by information processing.  "I feel pleasure now." may 
> well be a function of specific perceptions, values, and reasoning about 
> them.  I don't see any attempt to prove this cannot be the case.  It seems 
> that helping yourself to a primitive "experience" built into matter is just 
> baseless speculation unless you have some project to measure or 
> characterize this experience and show how it interacts with 
> information...because we certainly know that information can give pain or 
> pleasure.
>
> Brent
>

 

Information can give 

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 8:50:57 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> The "separation" of science from religion was the invention of science as 
> a way of knowing what was fact and what was superstition.  Science was 
> testing beliefs and holding them only provisionally.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
They had myths. We have models.

"As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science 
as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of 
past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the 
situation as convenient intermediaries -- not by definition in terms of 
experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, 
to the gods of Homer. Let me interject that for my part I do, qua lay 
physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I 
consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. *But in point of 
epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in 
degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as 
cultural posits.* The myth of physical objects is epistemologically 
superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as 
a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience."
-- Willard Van Orman Quine

"It's models almost all the way up and all the way down." 
-- Ronald Giere
 
- pt 

 

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 8:36:01 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 1:17 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *>As I have proposed, information processing alone will not lead to 
>> consciousness. Experience processing 
>>  must 
>> be the basis. *
>>
>
> An experience is not a simple thing so whatever produces it can't be 
> simple either. If it's complex then it must be made of parts. If even the 
> parts are complex then they must be made of sub-parts. If we continue doing 
> this then after a finite number of iterations we'll come to a part that 
> can't get any simpler because it can change in only one way, from a 1 to a 
> 0 for example. And we have arrived at information processing.   
>   
>
>> *>So if one defines intelligence such that an entity can't be actually 
>> intelligent unless it is conscious, then all the AI work in the 
>> information-oriented paradigm today will never lead to actual intelligence.*
>>
>
> But computers have already lead to intelligence, unless you keep moving 
> the goalpost and define intelligence as whatever a computer can't do YET. 
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>  
>

Whatever one defines intelligence to be, for something (or some *being*, as 
some might prefer) to be conscious (for those who think it is real)  is a 
more certain thing. 

- pt

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/15/2018 5:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, October 15, 2018 at 6:45:11 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 10/14/2018 11:13 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, October 14, 2018 at 9:53:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 10/14/2018 2:48 PM, John Clark wrote:


>/And there are sound reasons for doubting the
consciousness of computers -/

Name one of them that could not also be used to doubt the
consciousness of your fellow human beings.


The reason for not doubting that other human beings are
conscious is that (1) I am conscious and (2) other human
beings are made of the same stuff in approximately the same
way that I am and (3) they behave the same way in relation to
what I am conscious of, e.g. they jump at a sudden loud sound.

Brent



The thought crossed my mind yesterday: I was helping a young man
applying for a Ph.D. program in chemical engineering with his
application, and we were talking about chemistry and
consciousness*, and I mentioned a type of zombie - a being that
could converse (like an advanced Google Assistant or Sophie
Robot) but not be conscious - and I thought it was *possible* he
was a zombie.

* cf.
*Experience processing*
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/



I suppose you've read Scott Aaronson's take down of Tononi's
theory.  So I wonder why you would reference Tononi.

One problem with the "experience is primary" theory is that
there's no way for it to evolve.  If it's a property of matter why
are organized information processing lumps of matter more capable
of experience than unorganized lumps of the same composition...the
obvious answer is that the former process information, and
processing information is something natural selection can work
on.  Smart animals reproduce better.  Animals with
experiences...who cares?

“Emotional-BDI agents are BDI agents whose behavior is guided not
only by beliefs, desires and intentions, but also by the role of
emotions in reasoning and decision-making." This makes a false
assumption that emotions are something independent of beliefs,
desire, intentions, reasoning, and decision making.  But this says
nothing about the satisfaction and thwarting of desires and
intentions.  Why are those enough to explain emotions.  I agree
that emotions are necessary for reasoning in the sense that
emotions are the value-weights given to events, including those
imagined by foresight, and that some values are primitive.

I think it is false that "Purely informational processing, which
includes intentional agent programming (learning from experience,
self-modeling), does not capture all true experiential processing
(phenomenal consciousness). "  It is a cheat to put in "purely". 
In fact all learning and intentional planning must include
weighing alternatives and assigning value/emotion to them.  I
don't see any need for a further primitive modality.  For example,
a feeling of dizziness is a failure to maintain personal spacial
orientation which is a value at a very low (subconscious) level. 
Sure there are feelings and emotions...but I think they are all
derivative from more primitive values that are derivative from
evolution.

I think the reason you are attracted to this idea is that it is
closed within the computer/information/program frame. And that is
why I use the example of the AI Mars Rover. Sure, emotion cannot
be derived within a computer.  Emotion is something useful to a
robot, an AI that works and strives within an external world which
also acts on it.

Brent




I'll include the reference to

*Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The Unconscious 
Expander)*

   https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799

Since I say that IIT is still in the /information-oriented paradigm 
/and not in the /experience-oriented paradigm/, Aaronson's post helps 
my case.


I don't quite follow the rest. A person may feel pleasure (a modality) 
without reasoning "I need to feel pleasure now."




It's not a question of what it's possible to feel, but whether that it 
can be accounted for by information processing.  "I feel pleasure now." 
may well be a function of specific perceptions, values, and reasoning 
about them.  I don't see any attempt to prove this cannot be the case.  
It seems that helping yourself to a primitive "experience" built into 
matter is just baseless speculation unless you have some project to 
measure or characterize this experience and show how it interacts with 
information...because we certainly know that information can give pain 
or pleasure.


Brent

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