Re: Autonomy?

On 06 Jul 2012, at 19:31, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote > This is a rephrasing which does not suppress in any way the fact that in Helsinki I am uncertain about the experience I will feel next. But that is ALWAYS true regardless of whether identity splitting or

Re: Autonomy?

On 7/6/2012 7:26 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 6 July 2012 22:55, Stephen P. King > wrote: We have to be very careful about this "assumed from the onset" stuff! Yes, it is necessary to assume things even for the sake of discussion of ideas, but to assume tha

Re: Autonomy?

On 6 July 2012 22:55, Stephen P. King wrote: We have to be very careful about this "assumed from the onset" stuff! Yes, > it is necessary to assume things even for the sake of discussion of ideas, > but to assume that they are de facto primitive and/or a priori is often a > fatal mistake. Let m

Re: Autonomy?

On 7/6/2012 5:18 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 6 July 2012 18:01, Bruno Marchal > wrote: /I am sure your analysis might help to better apprehend consciousness, and can perhaps better handle the amnesia situation. But you have not (yet) convinced me t

Re: Autonomy?

On 6 July 2012 18:01, Bruno Marchal wrote: *I am sure your analysis might help to better apprehend consciousness, and > can perhaps better handle the amnesia situation. But you have not (yet) > convinced me that it has to be termed into a new form of *assumed at the > outset* indeterminacy. The p

Re: Autonomy?

On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote > This is a rephrasing which does not suppress in any way the fact that in > Helsinki I am uncertain about the experience I will feel next. > But that is ALWAYS true regardless of whether identity splitting or duplicating chambers enter the picture; it's t

Re: Autonomy?

On 06 Jul 2012, at 15:07, David Nyman wrote: On 6 July 2012 10:27, Bruno Marchal wrote: In which structure is that relative-frequency defined, and to whom does it apply? How can we verify it? The structure, if you like, is the total state of knowledge of the "knower" (as you have charac

Re: Autonomy?

On 6 July 2012 10:27, Bruno Marchal wrote: *In which structure is that relative-frequency defined, and to whom does it apply? How can we verify it?* * * The structure, if you like, is the total state of knowledge of the "knower" (as you have characterised it in a post to Brent) which ex hypothes

Re: Autonomy?

On 05 Jul 2012, at 20:40, David Nyman wrote: On 5 July 2012 18:05, Bruno Marchal wrote: But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the relative first person perspective, from what is an entirely deterministic background. Hoyle wan't necessarily assuming comp (and nor do I

Re: Autonomy?

On 05 Jul 2012, at 22:14, meekerdb wrote: On 7/5/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. But this happens because my computational state in Helsinki has been duplicated, and the changes you talk about is the experience of self-localization. This is a rephrasing which does not suppress in

Re: Autonomy?

On 05 Jul 2012, at 21:53, meekerdb wrote: On 7/5/2012 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote: On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> if you duplicated the en

Re: Autonomy?

On 7/5/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. But this happens because my computational state in Helsinki has been duplicated, and the changes you talk about is the experience of self-localization. This is a rephrasing which does not suppress in any way the fact that in Helsinki I am uncertain

Re: Autonomy?

On 7/5/2012 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote: On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >> if you duplicated the entire city of

Re: Autonomy?

On 5 July 2012 18:05, Bruno Marchal wrote: *But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the relative > first person perspective, from what is an entirely deterministic background. > * Hoyle wan't necessarily assuming comp (and nor do I when talking in this way). But the point whic

Re: Autonomy?

On 05 Jul 2012, at 18:15, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > There is no sense to ask who is "really" me I'm glad to hear you say that. > what is asked is the probability of the specific events "seeing Washington ", or seeing "Moscow". That depends entirely on s

Re: Autonomy?

On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote: On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Ma

Re: Autonomy?

On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >> if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal

Re: Autonomy?

On 05 Jul 2012, at 15:47, David Nyman wrote: On 5 July 2012 08:25, Bruno Marchal wrote: The proof if by absurdo. Suppose there is an algorithm, or even just a God capable of predicting the specific outcome among "1)" and "2)". Suppose it is "1)", then the guy in Moscow refutes it, and

Re: Autonomy?

On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > There is no sense to ask who is "really" me > I'm glad to hear you say that. > > what is asked is the probability of the specific events "seeing > Washington ", or seeing "Moscow". > That depends entirely on something outside of you, namely Washing

Re: Autonomy?

On 5 July 2012 08:25, Bruno Marchal wrote: The proof if by absurdo. Suppose there is an algorithm, or even just a God > capable of predicting the specific outcome among "1)" and "2)". Suppose it > is "1)", then the guy in Moscow refutes it, and comp invites us to listen > to him. If it is "2), t

Re: Autonomy?

On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington ex

Re: Autonomy?

On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno >> Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then >> there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington experience. >> > > > No problem with that. > I

Re: Autonomy?

On 7/3/2012 10:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: No matter what diary entry I come up with you keep saying it would not disprove your theory because of blah blah point of view blah blah, so I want you to tell me exactly what diary entry WOULD disprove your theory? I will feel to be in W. Confirmed

Re: Autonomy?

On 03 Jul 2012, at 18:02, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Suppose I send the same identical Email to both you and to Craig at the same identical time, you look at your copy and think " when John hit the send button on his computer he could not have predicte

Re: Autonomy?

On 3 July 2012 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > I'm pretty sure John understands the argument but he prefers to give > primacy to the objective/third-person viewpoint. > On the contrary, the first person subjective viewpoint is the most important thing in the universe, or at least it is in my opini

Re: Autonomy?

On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Suppose I send the same identical Email to both you and to Craig at the > same identical time, you look at your copy and think " when John hit the > send button on his computer he could not have predicted that I would get > this copy of the Email and

Re: Autonomy?

On 03 Jul 2012, at 12:05, David Nyman wrote: On 3 July 2012 08:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm pretty sure John understands the argument but he prefers to give primacy to the objective/third-person viewpoint. The first-person viewpoint involves an assumption that I am a single person trave

Re: Autonomy?

On 02 Jul 2012, at 22:17, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > The profound thing is that in Helsinki he does not know which one he will feel to be, so he is confronted with an indeterminacy Suppose I send the same identical Email to both you and to Craig at

Re: Autonomy?

On 3 July 2012 08:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm pretty sure John understands the argument but he prefers to give > primacy to the objective/third-person viewpoint. The first-person > viewpoint involves an assumption that I am a single person travelling > through time in the forward direction

Re: Autonomy?

On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 at 3:21 AM, David Nyman wrote: > On 2 July 2012 17:50, John Clark wrote: > > And one nanosecond after the copying when one receives sensory impulses that > originated in Moscow and the other receives sensory impulses that > originated in Washington neither would be in precis

Re: Autonomy?

On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > The profound thing is that in Helsinki he does not know which one he will > feel to be, so he is confronted with an indeterminacy > Suppose I send the same identical Email to both you and to Craig at the same identical time, you look at your copy a

Re: Autonomy?

Stephen, Right, this is all about wholeness. I suggest that 1. Wholeness can never be 100% independent of context. 2. Since consciousness is materially related in any definition of wholeness, I reason that... 3. There is not necessarily any possible method of extracting, teleporting, simula

Re: Autonomy?

On 02 Jul 2012, at 18:41, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote >> silly assumptions like there can be only one Bruno Marchal > That is not a silly assumptions. It is a consequence of computationalism. So you've proved that if "computationalism" is true then there

Re: Autonomy?

On 2 July 2012 17:50, John Clark wrote: *And one nanosecond after the copying when one receives sensory impulses that originated in Moscow and the other receives sensory impulses that originated in Washington neither would be in precisely the first-person position they were in before.* What do

Re: Autonomy?

On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 David Nyman wrote: > After Bruno has been copied each copy must be in precisely the > first-person position you describe. > And one nanosecond after the copying when one receives sensory impulses that originated in Moscow and the other receives sensory impulses that origi

Re: Autonomy?

On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote >> silly assumptions like there can be only one Bruno Marchal >> > > > That is not a silly assumptions. It is a consequence of > computationalism. > So you've proved that if "computationalism" is true then there can be only one Bruno Marchal, but for th

Re: Autonomy?

On 02 Jul 2012, at 16:06, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 1:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > You are, by definition asked to predict which one. If the person asking the question demands one and only one prediction then he has made the very silly logical assumption that there can

Re: Autonomy?

On 2 July 2012 15:06, John Clark wrote: > Not on a third person description of bodies nor on a third person > description of first person experiences, only on the first person > experience. > > The only first person experience I know directly is my own For heaven's sake re-read your own stateme

Re: Autonomy?

On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 1:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > You are, by definition asked to predict which one. > If the person asking the question demands one and only one prediction then he has made the very silly logical assumption that there can only be one Bruno Marchal. > Your two predictions:

Re: Autonomy?

On 01 Jul 2012, at 19:26, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> There are incompatible from the "1-pov" ONLY if you assume there can be only one Bruno Marchal > "1-pov" means "1-pov" from the 1-pov view. That's real nice, but the predictions written down in adva

Re: Autonomy?

On 02/07/2012, at 2:15 AM, John Clark wrote: > No, after the copying Bruno Washington and Bruno Moscow will both look at > their identical diary entries and both will conclude "I was right". And you, > the third party outside observer, will look at the behavior of both Bruno > Washington a

Re: Autonomy?

On 7/1/2012 10:26 AM, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >> There are incompatible from the "1-pov" ONLY if you assume there can be only one Bruno Marchal > "1-pov" means "1-pov" from the 1-pov view. That's real nice,

Re: Autonomy?

On 7/1/2012 9:15 AM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jun 30, 2012 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb > wrote: > Suppose you predict "I will be in Washinton." But if he was smart and knowledgeable of the situation (and the thought experiment would be useless if he was not) that wo

Re: Autonomy?

On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> There are incompatible from the "1-pov" ONLY if you assume there can be >> only one Bruno Marchal >> > > > "1-pov" means "1-pov" from the 1-pov view. > That's real nice, but the predictions written down in advance were: 1) I Bruno Marchal will write

Re: Autonomy?

On 01 Jul 2012, at 18:15, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jun 30, 2012 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb wrote: > Suppose you predict "I will be in Washinton." But if he was smart and knowledgeable of the situation (and the thought experiment would be useless if he was not) that would NOT be his predicti

Re: Autonomy?

On Sat, Jun 30, 2012 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb wrote: > Suppose you predict "I will be in Washinton." > But if he was smart and knowledgeable of the situation (and the thought experiment would be useless if he was not) that would NOT be his prediction, instead he would make 2 predictions: 1) I Bruno

Re: Autonomy?

On 30 Jun 2012, at 23:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc. My question

Re: Autonomy?

On 30 Jun 2012, at 21:57, meekerdb wrote: On 6/30/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Jun 2012, at 21:20, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How could we verify that prediction? Except by feeli

Re: Autonomy?

On 30 Jun 2012, at 19:28, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jun 30, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> As I said before if you really had complete information then you could make 2 predictions: 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington". 2) I

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/30/2012 9:56 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 6/30/2012 5:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functiona

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/30/2012 5:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, f

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'pr

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc. My question then is: C

Re: Autonomy?

It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc. My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/30/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Jun 2012, at 21:20, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How could we verify that prediction? Except by feeling to be one

Re: Autonomy?

On Sat, Jun 30, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> As I said before if you really had complete information then you could >> make 2 predictions: >> 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in >> Washington and only Washington". >> 2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I B

Re: Autonomy?

On 29 Jun 2012, at 21:20, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How could we verify that prediction? Except by feeling to be one of the W and M reconstituted person. And from their points of viex, the pr

Re: Autonomy?

On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How could we > verify that prediction? Except by feeling to be one of the W and M > reconstituted person. And from their points of viex, the prediction of > being in both place is simply refute

Re: Autonomy?

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 2:18 PM, meekerdb wrote: > I explains why people think, "I could have done otherwise." > Regardless of what they think the irrefutable fact remains that they did NOT do otherwise, and they did not do otherwise for a reason or they did not. > They could, due to random eve

Re: Autonomy?

On 28 Jun 2012, at 18:16, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > comp allows self-duplication. That is the key point. OK. >> If you really had complete information then you could make 2 predictions: 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am no

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/28/2012 9:31 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: > I think the claim that, "It's either determined or random." is misleading. Thoughts and actions may be determined in the sense of constrained to a fairly narrow probability

Re: Autonomy?

On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 meekerdb wrote: > I think the claim that, "It's either determined or random." is > misleading. Thoughts and actions may be determined in the sense of > constrained to a fairly narrow probability distribution, and yet random. > it is a deterministic certainty that a coin fli

Re: Autonomy?

On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > comp allows self-duplication. That is the key point. > OK. >> If you really had complete information then you could make 2 >> predictions: 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am >> now in Washington and only Washington" .2) I B

Re: Autonomy?

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 1:51 AM, John Clark wrote: > If you really had complete information then you could make 2 predictions: > > 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in > Washington and only Washington". > > 2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal

Re: Autonomy?

On 27 Jun 2012, at 19:57, meekerdb wrote: On 6/27/2012 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Not counting quantum randomness the only reason the many diaries will be different is that the many authors of those many diaries, you, end up in different environments. Specifically due to the fact tha

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/27/2012 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Not counting quantum randomness the only reason the many diaries will be different is that the many authors of those many diaries, you, end up in different environments. Specifically due to the fact that comp allows self-duplication. That is the key p

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/27/2012 8:51 AM, John Clark wrote: >Mot plausibly two minds because complex self-reference is chaotic and mind state diverge from very little difference. Maybe, but I doubt if it's like the butterfly effect, I doubt if its quite as sensitive as that, otherwise we would not be ob

Re: Autonomy?

On 27 Jun 2012, at 17:51, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jun 26, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > Step 2 is that the diary of the one teleported does not mention the delays of reconstitution in absence of third person clue. Obviously true. > Step 3, is that no machine can predict the content of i

Re: Autonomy?

On Tue, Jun 26, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > Step 2 is that the diary of the one teleported does not mention the > delays of reconstitution in absence of third person clue. > Obviously true. > Step 3, is that no machine can predict the content of its personal future > diaries content in self-mu

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/26/2012 10:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Jun 2012, at 21:01, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to step 4. I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observatio

Re: Autonomy?

On 25 Jun 2012, at 21:19, meekerdb wrote: On 6/25/2012 12:01 PM, John Clark wrote: > or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different environment, If they were in different environments then the machines would not be identical or even functionally identical and

Re: Autonomy?

On 25 Jun 2012, at 21:01, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to step 4. I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we don't know what we're going to do, or was that step

Re: Autonomy?

On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 Jason Resch wrote: > It's not that we don't know what we are going to do, but we don't know > what we are going to experience > A distinction without a difference, experiencing something is doing something. > it is impossible to have complete information about one's envi

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/25/2012 3:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 2:01 PM, John Clark > wrote: On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to step 4.

Re: Autonomy?

On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 2:01 PM, John Clark wrote: > On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to >> step 4. >> > > I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we don't > know what we're going to do, o

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/25/2012 12:01 PM, John Clark wrote: > or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different environment, If they were in different environments then the machines would not be identical or even functionally identical and their associated minds would be differe

Re: Autonomy?

On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to step > 4. > I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we don't know what we're going to do, or was that step 2? > You ignore that we can test inequalities, e

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/25/2012 2:29 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 6/25/2012 10:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: For the reasoning, we don't have to attribute two first person povs to one 3-viewed machine, but to attribute one first person povs to two different 3-viewed machine, and eventually number relations. It looks li

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/25/2012 10:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: For the reasoning, we don't have to attribute two first person povs to one 3-viewed machine, but to attribute one first person povs to two different 3-viewed machine, and eventually number relations. It looks like you want me to believe that the rela

Re: Autonomy?

On 25 Jun 2012, at 18:24, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > The first person indeterminacy is a fact, with respect to comp. First person indeterminacy is a fact with respect to ANYTHING, sometimes you don't know what you're going to do till you do it. I find

Re: Autonomy?

On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > The first person indeterminacy is a fact, with respect to comp. > First person indeterminacy is a fact with respect to ANYTHING, sometimes you don't know what you're going to do till you do it. I find your theoretical prediction of this less than impr

Re: Autonomy?

On 25 Jun 2012, at 01:08, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 01:29:31PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass 9.10938291×10^-31 kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask for

Re: Autonomy?

On 24 Jun 2012, at 22:29, meekerdb wrote: On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass 9.10938291×10-31kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask for something else. Well if you do it by luck... But of course I

Re: Autonomy?

On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 01:29:31PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass > >9.10938291×10^-31 kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew > >that, and ask for something else. > > Well if you do it by lu

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass 9.10938291×10^-31 kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask for something else. Well if you do it by luck... But of course I'd be very impressed if you could calculate it

Re: Autonomy?

On 24 Jun 2012, at 17:16, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> You don't think the electron is primitive, so show me how to derive its mass, spin, and electrical charge from something simpler. > We must first derive its existence/appearance. But

Re: Autonomy?

On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> You don't think the electron is primitive, so show me how to derive its >> mass, spin, and electrical charge from something simpler. >> > > > We must first derive its existence/appearance. > But that was exactly what I asked you to do! If

Re: Autonomy?

On 23 Jun 2012, at 18:02, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > Something is not primitive if you can derive it from something simpler. You don't think the electron is primitive, so show me how to derive its mass, spin, and electrical charge from something simple

Re: Autonomy?

On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Something is not primitive if you can derive it from something simpler. > You don't think the electron is primitive, so show me how to derive its mass, spin, and electrical charge from something simpler. John K Clark -- You received this message

Re: Autonomy?

On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 Stephen P. King wrote: > > This quantization of time is easily seen as problematic when we consider > that SR tells us that any granulation of time is equivalent to a grnulation > of space which has observable effect. > All physicists agree that neither Special Relativity

Re: Autonomy?

On 22 Jun 2012, at 20:24, meekerdb wrote: On 6/22/2012 12:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 2) The fact that there is no algorithm to decide if a program compute some function does not ential that we cannot recognize what do some program. You mean there is no algorithm that, given any program

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/22/2012 4:11 PM, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jun 21, 2012 Stephen P. King > wrote: I think that we agree that [time] transitions are occurring! Maybe time changes as a smooth transition, maybe it's a series of discrete jumps, it would look the same to us

Re: Autonomy?

On Thu, Jun 21, 2012 Stephen P. King wrote: I think that we agree that [time] transitions are occurring! > Maybe time changes as a smooth transition, maybe it's a series of discrete jumps, it would look the same to us either way, and even if our best instruments were a billion trillion trillion

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/22/2012 12:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 2) The fact that there is no algorithm to decide if a program compute some function does not ential that we cannot recognize what do some program. You mean there is no algorithm that, given any program, the algorithm can always answer "yes" or "no" t

Re: Autonomy?

On 20 Jun 2012, at 20:23, Stephen P. King wrote: On 6/20/2012 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jun 2012, at 19:41, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jun 19, 2012 at 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Unlike the proton and neutron nobody has found any experimental evidence that the electron has

Re: Autonomy?

On 20 Jun 2012, at 19:37, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> It's true that if you knew the numerical value of Chaitin's Constant then you would know that if a 100 bit program had not stopped after a Turing Machine had run n number of finite opera

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/21/2012 11:41 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 Stephen P. King > wrote: > Do you [Bruno] stand by that implication, that "matter is primitive" = "not explainable from non material relation"? This implies that: "matter is not primitive"

Re: Autonomy?

On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 Stephen P. King wrote: > Do you [Bruno] stand by that implication, that "matter is primitive" = > "not explainable from non material relation"? This implies that: "matter > is not primitive" = "explainable from non material relation". > That implies nothing of the sort, i

Re: Autonomy?

John, Stephen, I am quite busy today. I will comment your last posts asap. Thanks for your patience. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to

Re: Autonomy?

On 6/20/2012 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jun 2012, at 19:41, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jun 19, 2012 at 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal > wrote: >> Unlike the proton and neutron nobody has found any experimental evidence that the electron has a inner structure

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