On 1/4/2012 12:34 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/4/2012 3:03 PM, meekerdb wrote:
In the MW interpretation there is no collapse, but there is a split into (almost)
orthogonal "worlds" or each person splits into orthogonal "minds". These are just
projections onto different quasi-classical subs
On 1/4/2012 3:03 PM, meekerdb wrote:
In the MW interpretation there is no collapse, but there is a split
into (almost) orthogonal "worlds" or each person splits into
orthogonal "minds". These are just projections onto different
quasi-classical subspaces corresponding to different measurement
On 04.01.2012 21:03 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/4/2012 10:55 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 03.01.2012 21:42 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/3/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012
On 1/4/2012 10:55 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 03.01.2012 21:42 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/3/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
...
Everet
On 03.01.2012 21:42 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/3/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
...
Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a ba
On 1/3/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
...
Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background time
and the state of the multiverse evol
On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
...
Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background time
and the state of the multiverse evolves in Hilbert space. This
evolution entails
On 2 January 2012 21:29, meekerdb wrote:
>> Elided: past participle, past tense of elide (Verb): Join together;
>> merge: "the two things elided in his mind".
>
>
> "Elide" only means to join together two things by leaving out stuff in
> between them. Its basic meaning is to leave out. That's w
On 1/2/2012 12:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 2 January 2012 18:56, meekerdb wrote:
You mean "confused" or "confounded"...not "elided"?
Elided: past participle, past tense of elide (Verb): Join together;
merge: "the two things elided in his mind".
"Elide" only means to join together two thing
On 2 January 2012 18:56, meekerdb wrote:
> You mean "confused" or "confounded"...not "elided"?
Elided: past participle, past tense of elide (Verb): Join together;
merge: "the two things elided in his mind".
>> If consciousness were simply timelessly identical with some
>> supervenience base, th
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:
...
David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when
I say "I" that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p
perspective. There is no separate exper
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:
...
David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when
I say "I" that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p
perspective. There is no separate experiencer. In UDA, it's simply
the notes in a 'd
On 1/2/2012 7:04 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 2 January 2012 05:54, meekerdb wrote:
I don't understand that? Are you saying all the experiences are at
different times so they can the experience of one soul that's traversing the
experiences in sequence? I'd say they all exist timelessly, or mor
On 02 Jan 2012, at 07:01, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing
up 1->>> p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I
only experience>>> myself on one branch at a time,
probabilistically according to
On 02 Jan 2012, at 01:59, Pierz wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing
up 1- >>> p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I
only experience >>> myself on one branch at a time,
probabilistically according to the >>> measure of computations.
The
On 01 Jan 2012, at 18:35, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 January 2012 02:04, meekerdb wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing
up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only
experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according
On 2 January 2012 05:54, meekerdb wrote:
> I don't understand that? Are you saying all the experiences are at
> different times so they can the experience of one soul that's traversing the
> experiences in sequence? I'd say they all exist timelessly, or more
> exactly time is inferred from the
On 01 Jan 2012, at 02:07, David Nyman wrote:
On 31 December 2011 23:35, Pierz wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up
1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only
experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according t
On 01 Jan 2012, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/31/2011 3:35 PM, Pierz wrote:
When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that
you think one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles
of computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any cons
On 01 Jan 2012, at 00:35, Pierz wrote:
When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that
you think one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles
of computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have
if you "jum
On 31 Dec 2011, at 21:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/31/2011 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As I've said we're on the same team with regards to primitive
materialism. But I have sympathy for the materialists on this
issue of
instantiation. After all, we need computers still, we can't rely on
the
On 31 Dec 2011, at 14:49, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote (in two posts):
On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:
On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbwrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote: You think it is ludicrous
that
On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1->>> p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience>>> myself on one
branch at a time, probabilistically according to the>>> measure of computations. There's no indiv
On 1/1/2012 9:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 January 2012 02:04, meekerdb wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
meas
>>> Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1- >>>
>>> p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience >>>
>>> myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the >>>
>>> measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just i
On 1 January 2012 02:04, meekerdb wrote:
>>> Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
>>> p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
>>> myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
>>> measure of computations. There'
On 31.12.2011 22:57 meekerdb said the following:
On 12/31/2011 1:33 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 31.12.2011 22:00 meekerdb said the following:
...
Completely!? How do you know that? The Mars Rover doesn't just
record a sensor value in its computer, it also remember the value
and at a later t
On 12/31/2011 5:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 31 December 2011 23:35, Pierz wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
mea
On 31 December 2011 23:35, Pierz wrote:
> Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
> p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
> myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
> measure of computations. There's no indi
On 12/31/2011 3:35 PM, Pierz wrote:
When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you think
one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles of
computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have if you "jumped to
th
> When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you think
> one's
> consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles of
> computation so there
> are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have if you
> "jumped to them".
>
Not to wish to pr
On 12/31/2011 1:33 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 31.12.2011 22:00 meekerdb said the following:
On 12/31/2011 5:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:
On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdb wr
On 31.12.2011 22:00 meekerdb said the following:
On 12/31/2011 5:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:
On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote: You
On 12/31/2011 5:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:
On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbwrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote: You think it is ludicrous
that a Mars Rover is pro
On 12/31/2011 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As I've said we're on the same team with regards to primitive
materialism. But I have sympathy for the materialists on this issue of
instantiation. After all, we need computers still, we can't rely on
the arithmetical platonia to predict the weather for
On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:
On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbwrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote: You think it is ludicrous
that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the state of its
battery, t
On 31 Dec 2011, at 03:37, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 31, 4:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Dec 2011, at 03:10, Pierz wrote:
This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience -
thank
you Joseph for your clarific
On 31 Dec 2011, at 01:44, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
Which computation? I don't see any computation in the projection of
the computation-movie. The Boolean graph nodes are broken. The light
patterns is exactly the same, with the boolea
On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
>
> > On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> >> On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
> >> You think it is ludicrous that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the
> >> state of its
> >> battery, the temperature of its mot
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
You think it is ludicrous that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the state
of its
battery, the temperature of its motors, the amount of memory available for
pictures, etc?
Brent
On Dec 31, 4:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 30 Dec 2011, at 03:10, Pierz wrote:
>
> > This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
> > the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience - thank
> > you Joseph for your clarification of the meaning of the term
On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Which computation? I don't see any computation in the projection of the
> computation-movie. The Boolean graph nodes are broken. The light patterns
> is exactly the same, with the boolean graph turned, or not, upside down.
> You argument
On 30 Dec 2011, at 16:18, David Nyman wrote:
On 30 December 2011 12:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
What is a consciousness apart from its content?
That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure
consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate
consciousness of
the
On 30 Dec 2011, at 03:10, Pierz wrote:
This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience - thank
you Joseph for your clarification of the meaning of the term and for
your succinct and clear summary of the MGA, and
On 30 December 2011 12:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> What is a consciousness apart from its content?
>
> That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure
> consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate consciousness of
> the pre-löbian universal machine. Of course we
On 30 Dec 2011, at 01:57, Pierz wrote:
Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we can
sense some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to
convey, and without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of
the "frank incoherence".
And you've been successf
On 30 Dec 2011, at 01:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 05:47:07PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
They both cannot supervene on the same physical state.
In my weak sense, they both supervene on the same physical state of
th
On 29 Dec 2011, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/29/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two
consciousness.
In this case we hav
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
> You think it is ludicrous that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the
> state of its
> battery, the temperature of its motors, the amount of memory available for
> pictures, etc?
>
> Brent
Let's not go down that bo
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
As I have remarked before, I don't think "the problem of consciousness" will be
solved, it
will just come to be seen as an uninteresting question. Instead we will talk
about how to
design the ethics module in a robot or what internal perceptions to provide.
On 12/29/2011 4:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
The critique was against your step of unfolding the multiverse into a
single universe by dovetailing. You then asserted that the
consciousness supervened on the dovetailer, which as we've been
through above, cannot be the case.
Of course, you may re
This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience - thank
you Joseph for your clarification of the meaning of the term and for
your succinct and clear summary of the MGA, and to David for the nice
clarification of the
>Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we can
>sense some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to
>convey, and without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of
>the "frank incoherence".
And you've been successful with the MGA? I am philosophically en
>As I have remarked before, I don't think "the problem of consciousness" will
>be solved, it
>will just come to be seen as an uninteresting question. Instead we will talk
>about how to
>design the ethics module in a robot or what internal perceptions to provide.
Well, I utterly disagree with th
On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 05:47:07PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
> >They both cannot supervene on the same physical state.
>
> In my weak sense, they both supervene on the same physical state of
> the room, or universe, or even arithmetic.
On 12/29/2011 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I was, unwillingly, more cruel. I exigate from my parents a proof, before going to bed,
that I will wake up being me, and not someone else. That 'consciousness swapping'
possibility terrified me, until I discover it makes no sense or it makes to much
On 28 Dec 2011, at 21:43, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 19:43, Bruno Marchal wrote:
What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of
primitive
matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly perhaps)
that physics
is branch of number theory/computer science (mo
On 12/29/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical activit
On 28 Dec 2011, at 06:28, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 05:47, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote:
The same problem arises in
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
> In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
> supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
> change them, we have t
On 28 December 2011 19:43, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of primitive
> matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly perhaps) that physics
> is branch of number theory/computer science (more precisely: of machine's
> theology). The phy
On 12/28/2011 11:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 18:17, meekerdb wrote:
Once one fixes seriously on computation as the
supervenience basis for "epistemological properties" (ignoring
crypto-eliminativist sophistries about "mere seeming") is one any
longer in a position to appeal t
On 28 Dec 2011, at 14:39, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 06:14, meekerdb wrote:
Consequently, it would have to be the case that any "physical
computer" (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
"epistemolog
On 28 December 2011 18:17, meekerdb wrote:
>> Once one fixes seriously on computation as the
>> supervenience basis for "epistemological properties" (ignoring
>> crypto-eliminativist sophistries about "mere seeming") is one any
>> longer in a position to appeal to the content of experience as the
On 12/28/2011 10:03 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 17:01, meekerdb wrote:
But as Peter D. Jones points out primitive matter isn't inconsequential.
It's consequent is realization. Being material is the property of existing
in contrast to those things that don't exist. Of course
On 28 December 2011 17:01, meekerdb wrote:
> But as Peter D. Jones points out primitive matter isn't inconsequential.
> It's consequent is realization. Being material is the property of existing
> in contrast to those things that don't exist. Of course this is not a
> popular view on an "Every
On 12/28/2011 5:39 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Consequently, it would have to be the case that any "physical
>> computer" (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
>> experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
>> "epistemological properties" before it could begin
On 28 December 2011 06:14, meekerdb wrote:
>> Consequently, it would have to be the case that any "physical
>> computer" (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
>> experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
>> "epistemological properties" before it could begin
On 12/27/2011 4:59 AM, David Nyman wrote:
The "frank incoherence" comment was directed towards the case where,
rejecting any form of dualism, one grasps the "single primitive" horn
of the dilemma in the form of a primitively-physical monism, rather
than the arithmetical alternative. But for tho
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 26 Dec 2011, at 05:47, Joseph Knight wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> The same problem arises in *Part 2*. Bruno claims that we ar
On 27 Dec 2011, at 13:59, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 December 2011 10:42, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we
can sense
some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to convey,
and
without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to co
On 27 December 2011 10:42, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we can sense
> some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to convey, and
> without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of the "frank
> incoherence".
The "frank
On 26 Dec 2011, at 23:49, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:34:52AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to
handle
multiversal supervenience.
You might make this precise, because I don't see the point. But the
best ans
On 26 Dec 2011, at 23:37, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 01:08:25PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
Good analog
On 26 Dec 2011, at 23:00, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/26/2011 1:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinberg
wrote:
> Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive.
My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of
the
computational theory of mind,
On 26 Dec 2011, at 22:45, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinberg
wrote:
Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive.
My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of the
computational theory of mind, and the various ways in which this is
general
On 26 Dec 2011, at 20:49, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/26/2011 11:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdb wrote:
Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing
the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or
particles.
Yes, pe
On 26 Dec 2011, at 18:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/26/2011 2:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.
Not in the us
On 26 Dec 2011, at 18:35, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eli
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:34:52AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >
> >It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to handle
> >multiversal supervenience.
>
> You might make this precise, because I don't see the point. But the
> best answer to your concrete multiverse argument, i
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 01:08:25PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
> >>
> >>>Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tom
On 12/26/2011 1:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Not if the sense of dualism*is* the primitive.
My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of the
computational theory of mind, and the various ways in which this is
generally in
On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive.
My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of the
computational theory of mind, and the various ways in which this is
generally interpreted. Do bear in mind that consciousness
On 26 December 2011 19:49, meekerdb wrote:
>> ISTM that in Bruno's schema, the "physical" computations are to be
>> seen as emerging from (or being filtered by) the "mental" ones.
>
>
> He's often taken that way. But I think I now understand Bruno's idea that
> consciousness still supervenes on
On Dec 26, 12:35 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>
> But once the central ontological distinction is made between "qua
> materia" and "qua computatio", a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing that
> either there are two "primitives" in play here or only one. If the
> former, then a dualism of some kind must b
On 12/26/2011 11:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdb wrote:
Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or particles.
Yes, perhaps, but then what precisely is the word "neut
On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdb wrote:
> Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the same
> data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or particles.
Yes, perhaps, but then what precisely is the word "neutral" supposed
to signify here? Can one di
On 12/26/2011 5:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standish wrote:
>> I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.
>>
>
> This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
> "primitiveness" is defined, or comes into the argument. M
On 12/26/2011 2:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If a low level emulate a high level, and if something does not supervene on the low
level X *when doing that emulation*, it will not supervene on the higher level too.
That's why once we can say yes to the doctor for a correct level, we can automatical
On 12/26/2011 2:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.
Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-p
On 26 December 2011 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On reflection,
>> this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
>> distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
>> are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
>> consciousness, or
On 26 Dec 2011, at 14:50, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standish
wrote:
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.
This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
"primitiveness" is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin'
On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standish wrote:
>> I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.
>>
>
> This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
> "primitiveness" is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
> argument is about regular supervenience
On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concretenes
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>
> >>>The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
> >>>otherwise of the supervened
On 25 Dec 2011, at 23:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:25:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sorry - perhaps static is the wrong word. I meant there is only one
UD, like there is only one number 1, so there's no way the UD
could be
different in the case of difference con
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.
Maudlin uses "supervenience" for "physical supervenience", like Kim
and most "
On 26 Dec 2011, at 05:47, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote:
The same problem arises in Part 2. Bruno claims that we are forced
to accept that Alice’s consciousness supervenes on the film.
No
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:25:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >Sorry - perhaps static is the wrong word. I meant there is only one
> >UD, like there is only one number 1, so there's no way the UD could be
> >different in the case of difference consious states.
>
>
> This is ambiguous. There ar
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