2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 31, 1:58 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 31, 2:22 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you
talk is like hey dude it's in the OS !... like the operating system was
not a software...
No, I'm saying
2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to
have
dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you want an
computational AI to interact
2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 30, 4:36 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
You always put that level confusion on the table
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
Matrix, why would there be any kind
2012/5/29 Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au
Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the
sentiments
It's 100,000 BCE. You are a
2012/5/29 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
2012/5/29 Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au
Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the
sentiments
2012/5/23 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/23/2012 4:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 May 2012, at 01:22, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/22/2012 6:01 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism
2012/5/22 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 5/21/2012 10:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/21/2012 3:49 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/21/2012 7:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012
2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/22/2012 10:56 AM, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 7:36 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
snip
Hi Russell,
I once thought that consistency, in
2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/22/2012 11:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 May 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 07:42:01AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/21/2012 12:33 AM, Russell
2012/5/23 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/22/2012 6:01 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any
particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do
2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/21/2012 1:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
No it's not a computation, it arises because at every step, computations
diverge into new sets of infinite computations, giving rise to the 1p
indeterminacy.
Quentin
Hi Quentin,
So could
2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/21/2012 7:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/21/2012 1:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
No it's not a computation, it arises because at every step, computations
diverge into new sets
2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/21/2012 3:49 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/21/2012 7:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/21/2012 1:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote
2012/5/20 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/20/2012 12:24 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, May 19, 2012 at 01:17:18PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
I finally found a good and accessible paperhttp://www.google.com/**
2012/5/20 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/20/2012 6:06 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
In Bruno's theory, the physical world is not computed by an algorithm,
the physical world is the limit of all computations going throught your
current state... what is computable is your current
2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 5/20/2012 4:39 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/20/2012 1:31 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
My point is that for there to exist an a priori given string of
numbers that is equivalent our universe there must exist a computation of
the homomorphies
2012/5/17 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On May 17, 12:01 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, May 16, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
wrote
I don't say that [the free will noise] means you're not
deterministic,
I would be glad to hear you
2012/5/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 5/9/2012 1:11 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 5/9/2012 12:09 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 5/9/2012 11:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/9 meekerdb meeke
2012/5/9 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
2012/5/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 5/9/2012 1:11 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 5/9/2012 12:09 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 5/9/2012 11:43 AM
2012/5/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 5/9/2012 2:15 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Maybe we need to number these:
(1)...an external agent directly injected chemicals or electrical
signals into your brain thereby causing a choice actually made by the
external agent.
To which you
2012/5/9 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 5/9/2012 2:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
So:
1- If someone is threatening me via my senses (via a weapons he holds, on
some forces he acts upon me... I still have free will, I've still the
ability to choose, some choices are more dangerous, I'm
2012/4/20 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Fri, Apr 20, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
fortunately they use things other than mind to explain how mind works.
Elimanating often the qualia and consciousness. Material explanation
explains only the behavior.
Only?! However
2012/4/8 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for neuroscience to
find zombies? We have some idea what it would mean to find a
2012/4/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You confuse consciousness of being here and now with consciousness
would be here and now.
How in the world could anybody be
2012/3/28 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my
symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the third
person point of view then it seems
2012/3/24 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Fri, Mar 23, 2012 at 5:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:
From a 3rd POV, there is no indeterminacy,
From a 3rd POV there is ALWAYS indeterminacy,
No in the f***ing though experiment you always want to change as you see
fit.
we
From a 3rd POV, there is no indeterminacy, we know there will be two you
after the duplication.
From your 1st POV, even if you know it, you'll (both you) still feel
singular, and the you who was asked before the experience what he expect to
feel after the duplication was unable to predict which
2012/3/17 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 3:34 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:
so according to you, we should throw pronouns in the toilet
Most of the time pronouns work just fine
No they are fine or not... If MWI is true What will *I* do in one
2012/3/17 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 3:34 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:
so according to you, we should throw pronouns in the toilet
Most of the time pronouns work just fine, but if you're discussing
personal identity and duplication chambers
2012/3/17 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 3:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The experience consists in being duplicated each day, for ten days in a
row.
Oh dear, Is this really necessary?
He is duplicated in two similar rooms, except for a big 1
2012/3/16 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 8:47 AM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
What is intended by the first person are no duplicable from their first
person point of view is just the mundane assumption that any subjective
point of view is always limited
2012/3/16 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
2012/3/16 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 8:47 AM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.comwrote:
What is intended by the first person are no duplicable from their
first person point of view is just the mundane assumption
Hi,
2012/3/14 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Tue, Mar 13, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
He can't feel the split in my symmetrical room thought experiment but he
can see it, he can see his copy as if in a mirror moving and talking just
as he does, and if you exchanged
2012/3/14 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Wed, Mar 14, 2012 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
What you're telling is that a question like what is the probabilty
that events happens to me in one second ? is not a legitimate question,
No, in this case that is a perfectly
2012/3/12 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 3/12/2012 3:49 AM, acw wrote:
On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote:
On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is
such that
2012/3/8 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 1:11 PM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
The 1-view from its own perspective can NEVER be plural.
Why?
After duplication there are two people,
One person.
each of whom must possess a singular perspective.
2012/3/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 3/6/2012 8:12 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 March 2012 23:50, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
It's unclear as to whom you and your refers to.
Let me suggest a heuristic. Assume that any given instance of
experience (by which I mean just
2012/3/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 3/6/2012 9:27 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/3/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 3/6/2012 8:12 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 March 2012 23:50, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
It's unclear as to whom you and your refers to.
Let me
2012/2/29 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not
completely Turing emulable.
But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes
to replace some part of your
It's the first.
2012/2/28 marty684 marty...@bellsouth.net
The sentence underlined below can be read in two ways: Which is correct?
1. You can no longer believe that ...etc.
2. (Idiomatic) You can no more believe ...computation at some level *than
you can believe...*
2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 2/28/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Feb 2012, at 20:02, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/27/2012 12:26 PM, ronaldheld wrote:
What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify
COMP?
Hi,
Any measurement of a
2012/2/28 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
substituted for a digital brain.
What if you
2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
substituted for a digital brain.
Hi Quentin,
OK
2012/2/28 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
the you
before is no more.
That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death.
No... tell me where is the you of 1 second ago ? When I say no more.. I
mean
2012/2/24 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 23, 9:41 pm, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Let us suppose you're right and... but hold on! We can't do that. That
would be circular. That would be sneaking in the assumption that
you're right from the outset. That would be shifty',
2012/2/23 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 23, 1:09 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
The yes doctor scenario considers the belief that if you are issued
with a computerised brain you will feel just the same. It's equivalent
to the yes barber scenario: that if
2012/2/23 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 23, 4:32 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 23 Feb 2012, at 06:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 22, 6:10 pm, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
'Yes doctor' is merely an establishment of the assumption of comp.
Saying yes
2012/2/23 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 23, 9:26 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
I understand that is how you think of it, but I am pointing out your
unconscious bias. You take consciousness for granted from the start.
Because it is... I don't know/care
2012/2/23 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 23, 9:26 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
I understand that is how you think of it, but I am pointing out your
unconscious bias. You take consciousness for granted from the start.
Because it is... I don't know/care
2012/2/23 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 23, 12:57 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/2/23 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
Comp has no ability to contradict itself,
You say so.
Is it not true?
no it is not true.. for example, proving
2012/2/21 Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com
Bruno and others,
Here's a thought experiment that for me casts doubt on the notion that
consciousness requires 1p indeterminacy.
Imagine that we have scanned my friend Mary so that we have a complete
functional description of her brain (down
2012/2/21 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com
On Feb 20, 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/2/20 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com
He said and I quote and emphasis: Now comp makes **almost all** (not
any)
UMs' physics identical.
Note that there will still be an infinite variety
2012/2/16 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 2/16/2012 1:16 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK]
2012/2/16 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 2/16/2012 11:15 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility
that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It would be
helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine
2012/2/16 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 2/16/2012 11:38 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/2/16 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 2/16/2012 11:15 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility
that the brain can be emulated
2012/2/14 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 2/14/2012 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Feb 2012, at 03:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
The idea of a measure that Bruno talks about is just another way of
talking about this same kind of optimization problem without tipping his
2012/2/14 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 2/14/2012 10:25 AM, Joseph Knight wrote:
[SPK]
The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence
of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts
that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly
2012/2/14 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 2/14/2012 10:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence
of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts
that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly
2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 10, 7:25 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/2/10 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
How does a gear or lever have an opinion?
The problems with gears and levers is dumbness.
Does putting
2012/2/9 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 8, 10:14 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Whatever. If you subjectivise it completely. it is no longer
of interest.
That's because you aren't taking subjectivity seriously.
If I am very cold and I walk
into a room
2012/2/7 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 6, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
More seriously, in the chinese room experience, Searle's error can be
seen also as a confusion of level. If I can emulate Einstein brain,
I can answer all question you ask to Einstein,
2012/2/7 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 7, 3:08 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/2/7 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 6, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
More seriously, in the chinese room experience, Searle's error can
2012/2/3 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 1, 11:06 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
acw a...@lavabit.com wrote:
A digital or analog camera would get similar amounts of noise as the
eye, actually
2012/2/3 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 3, 8:01 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
.
No that's not what comp predict. Comp predict that what you see is what
you
see.
Oh, comp predicts direct perception and not indirect representational
quaia? Do tell.
Comp
2012/1/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
When we close our eyes, we still see visual noise, even in total
darkness. If qualia were based on computation, we should expect that
no sensory input should equate to total blackness, since there is no
information to report.
??
WTF ?
2012/1/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Jan 31, 11:46 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/1/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
When we close our eyes, we still see visual noise, even in total
darkness. If qualia were based on computation, we should expect
2012/1/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Jan 31, 12:45 pm, acw a...@lavabit.com wrote:
A digital or analog camera would get similar amounts of noise as the
eye, actually probably less than the eye.
Why do you say that? Have you ever taken a photo with the lens cap on?
I just
2012/1/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Jan 31, 2:11 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
A conscious program should involves deep computation and self reflection,
visual qualia inputs are not only from visual sensors but also from
internal parts like in human.
Also
2012/1/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Jan 31, 2:52 pm, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:
Craig,
The movie The Matrix is essentially about comp. What is it about that
movie's premise that seems impossible to you?
It's possible to simulate a world for a person but
2012/1/31 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 1/31/2012 11:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Also when you close your eyes, your sensor still receive stimuli from the
eyes. Only in total blackness would you see black, but you'll still receive
information from other senses and parts of your brain
2012/1/14 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is
impossible to create something that acts
2012/1/16 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Jan 15, 3:07 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/1/14 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot
2011/12/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 21 Dec 2011, at 14:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty.
Its the only way to get
2011/12/17 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Dec 17, 7:30 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
N- you can build a machine that implements and can only run 3 but that
can't handle counterfactual, but as the computation is the same as 3, it
must be as conscious as when
2011/12/17 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Dec 17, 11:24 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2011/12/17 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Dec 17, 7:30 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
N- you can build a machine that implements and can only run 3
2011/12/8 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to
2011/12/8 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my
favorite
mystery is acceptable).
This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your
2011/12/6 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely on the substitution being
*then* there is a *perfect* level of
substitution.
2011/12/6 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
2011/12/6 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk
2011/12/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.
It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that
interact
2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
never
be.
That would contradict the digital and correct level
2011/11/17 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Actually mechanism as such seems to me to be just a
metaphor, even though it may be trivially true if every computation
[can]
belong to every experience, which appears to be true to me (since
experiences are
2011/11/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 12 Nov 2011, at 23:11, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/11/12 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 10 Nov 2011, at 14:51, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/11/10 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Spudboy100 wrote:
In a message dated 11
2011/11/13 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
On Sun, Nov 13, 2011 at 11:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:
2011/11/13 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 12 Nov 2011, at 23:11, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/11/12 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 10 Nov 2011, at 14:51
2011/11/12 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 10 Nov 2011, at 14:51, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/11/10 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Spudboy100 wrote:
In a message dated 11/9/2011 7:27:48 AM Eastern Standard Time,
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com writes:
Probably
2011/11/10 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Spudboy100 wrote:
In a message dated 11/9/2011 7:27:48 AM Eastern Standard Time,
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com writes:
Probably the one that is most convincing is direct experience. Try
meditation (my favorite is just doing
2011/11/10 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/11/10 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Spudboy100 wrote:
In a message dated 11/9/2011 7:27:48 AM Eastern Standard Time,
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com writes:
Probably
2011/11/6 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
Quentin,
On 30 Oct 2011, at 23:51, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
benjayk:
On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
consciousness, considering that the I is just a psychosocial
construct/illusion anyway. We don't find an actual I
2011/11/3 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
You picture consciousness as something inherently personal. But you can
be
conscious without there being any sense of personhood, or any experience
related to a particular person (like in meditation). So
2011/11/3 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/11/3 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
You picture consciousness as something inherently personal. But you
can
be
conscious without there being any sense
2011/11/2 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/11/1 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk
2011/11/1 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Nick Prince-2 wrote:
This is similar to my
2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Nick Prince-2 wrote:
This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gstq=homomorphic#c49c3aa24c265a4b
where I
2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Nick Prince-2 wrote:
This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
2011/10/28 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Oct 28, 8:10 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 6:13 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
wrote:
Let's say that I watch a football game on TV and describe what I see.
Is there now a direct
2011/10/16 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 16 Oct 2011, at 04:22, Terren Suydam wrote (answering Craig):
Exactly. I think that it can be better understood as a phenomenon
which is not only an emergent property of ensembles of neurons, but
granular properties in the moment of an
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