date:20140110



On 09 Jan 2014, at 20:20, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Terren,

Receiving a prosthetic brain is a (probably insurmountable)  
technical problem. There could certainly be one functionally  
equivalent to mine but it wouldn't be mine because it wouldn't have  
the exact same history. If it did it would be mine in the first  
place rather than some prosthetic one.



I don't know what that statement about Bruno's UDA actually says,  
and I don't think it's relevant, because his axioms, and therefore  
his conclusions, apply to human rather than reality math. Bruno's  
comp is most certainly NOT my computational reality.




MY comp is he idea that the brain or the body is Turing emulable  
(the rest is derived from that assumption).
We have asked you if your theory allow someone to surivive with an  
artificial brainn but you never answered.
Also I asked you to develop what you mean by computational, as  
indeed it is clear that you are using the word computational in a  
non standard (and unknown) sense.


Lastly, it is self-evident that the physical world as we experience  
it IS computable.


How could that be self-evident? Also, with the standrad meaning of  
computable, this would entaill comp in my (standard) sense.





How else would it come about if it wasn't being computed by our minds?


Where does our mind come from?



That should be obvious..


Nothing is obvious.


Everything that exists, everything in the entire universe, is  
computable because it IS being computed.


Why?




Otherwise it would not exist

If that's what Bruno claims, it's dead wrong...


?

What is referred by that?

Bruno





Edgar



On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:51:07 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
Hi Edgar,

OK, so I think you are would say yes to the doctor who would save  
you from a life-threatening brain disorder by giving you a  
prosthetic brain that replicates your biological brain at some level.


If so, Bruno's UDA proves that the physical world as we experience  
it is not computable.


Terren



On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Terren,

First, it will only detract, not help, to try to shoehorn my  
theories into standard categories. It's an entirely new theory.


Yes, everything, including computers, Xperiences according to its  
actual form structure. A computer with sufficient self-monitoring  
and other human simulating forms would approximate organismic  
consciousness sufficient to satisfy a Turing test, including  
questions about how it felt and what it was sensing of its  
environment.


It's easy to understand by thinking of it this way. Imagine  
constructing a human biological robot piecewise by putting together  
all the actual purely inorganic chemicals of a human body in the  
right arrangements. Obviously the result would be a fully  
functioning human being with normal human consciousness and  
experience.


One doesn't need to add any mysterious metaphysical soul,  
consciousness or anything to that constructed biological robot to  
make it human. It is the actual physical components, acting together  
that gives it its humanness. Therefore any robot of sufficient  
complexity  with sufficient self-monitoring circuits will be  
conscious according to the design of its form structure, just as the  
human robot is, and just as WE are.


Edgar




On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:39:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
OK, that's actually pretty close to my own thinking on  
consciousness. FWIW I don't see all that big of a difference between  
what you've articulated regarding Xperience and what has been  
articulated by panpsychist philosophy. I agree with your point about  
the limitations of labels, but if they can help us categorize  
systems of thought they can be helpful. And I would certainly  
categorize your theory in the pansychist realm.


That aside, I gather that if you built a robot that had the proper  
mental simulation of its world, based on its own sensory apparatus,  
with the complex feedback systems necessary, that robot would  
EXperience as well?


Terren


On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net  
wrote:

Terren,

I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new  
and independent theory.


The way it works starting from the beginning:

At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally  
interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality  
of being.


Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it  
interacts via changes in its own form. At the generic non-organismic  
level I call this Xperience. In fact in this interpretation the  
universe can be said to consist of Xperience only. Things and events  
are a subsidiary distinction both included in the concept of  
Xperience.


To answer your question in this sense a rock does Xperience the  
interaction of its information forms with other information forms,  
as do all information forms that

Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:32, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear LizR,

There is an interdependency that should not be ignored between the
objects that express the quantities and relations that are
represented by the logic and arithmetic. A universe that does not
contain any persistent entities would not be capable of expressing
numbers or statements.

Yes. But arithmetic contains many relatively persistent beings.

See what I mean?
By Necessary Possibility

In which modal logic?

I am denoting the underlying (ontological) potential for objects to
interact and perform actions and for representations to be about
those objects, existence itself is featureless and without any
particular property. It is purely isness.

In whch theory?

Bruno

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:55 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 10 January 2014 03:04, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
wrote:

Dear Edgar,

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net
wrote:

Stephen,

I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as
everything that exists.

I denote everything that exist as 'the Total Universe' or simply
Existence. The key is that such is independent of any contingency
or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary
possibility, a definition which I find most useful.

That works for me, the only things that are necessarily possible
appear to be the rules of logic and arithmetic.

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is  
(locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit  
conversion factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value  
is arbitrary, like how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now  
an exact number in SI units.
Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to  
1.


So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution -  
namely the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP -  
we experience a universe compatible with our existence because such  
a universe has to drop out of the interations of conscious beings in  
Platonia?


It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA.  
(Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).


We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any  
TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any universal  
system taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same physics, at  
least for each pints of view. It gives the same theology, more  
generally, and physics is defined through it.


We can come back on this.

Bruno





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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is
 (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion
 factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like
 how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI
 units.

 Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

 So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely the
 one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a
 universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to drop
 out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?


 It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA.
 (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).

 Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light migvht have
appeared.


 We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any TOE
 (that is any first order logical specification of any universal system
 taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same physics, at least for
 each pints of view. It gives the same theology, more generally, and physics
 is defined through it.


Remind me, which is step 7?


 We can come back on this.


Yes please. This is very interesting!

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear LizR,

That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.

It is answered, completely.

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 4:45 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is
(locally) Lorentz invariant. If it is, then c is just a unit
conversion factor between the + and - signature terms. It's value
is arbitrary, like how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now
an exact number in SI units.
Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to
1.

So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution -
namely the one we experience?

Only from what we have just experienced before. Comp does not predict
the existence of the moon, but should predict the physical laws, that
is, what is invariant for all observers/machines.

So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a universe
compatible with our existence because such a universe has to drop
out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?

As I said, comp uses only a conditional probability, not a bayesian
relation, which can still be used for geography and history. But the
physical laws are defined by the general measure on the computation,
which must exist with comp, and is given by the material points of
view (Bp Dt, mainly).

Bruno

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

This is a fascinating but difficult subject - is being or becoming more
mysterious? In a way becoming is stranger than positing something that is
merely eternally there, perhaps from logical necessity. It's hard for us as
time-bound beings to imagine a block universe - or multiverse - although
reading By his bootstraps by Robert Heinlein may help! He clearly got
the block universe concept, as was shown in his first published story
Lifeline as well as the wonderful (and slightly disturbing) All you
zombies - written in one day in 1958, iirc.

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:34, LizR wrote:

On 10 January 2014 06:50, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com 
 wrote:


(Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal  
simulation).
Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise  
arithmetical phenomenon of a type first person plural experience.


Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer! To obtain  
physics we need some means to define interactions and communications  
between multiple separable observers. This is a Bodies (plural)  
problem. Each observer can be shown to have FPI by your argument,  
but that is about it. Everything else requires more assumptions,  
like maybe some kind of ASSA.


I also agree with Stephen here. Comp does seem to imply solipsism, I  
think we've discussed  this before but I don't recall the answer -  
is it an open problem?


Normally, the Bp  Dt should evacuate individual solipsism. If the  
physics appears in Bp  Dt  p, we would get a first person plural  
solipsism. Comp is not solipsist per se, because arithmetic emulates  
all relations between all universal numbers, but the definite  
responses will depends on the physics that we derive from arithmetic,  
and so it is partially an open problem. We cannot exclude totally all  
form of solipsism, but what is usually called doctrinal solipsism is  
avoided by the realist stance on machines evolution in arithmetic, and  
by the fact that Bp  p (the intuionist first person attached to a  
machine) is NOT the criteria of what is real for the machine (which is  
in both Bp and p, but not in Bp  p).


Bruno







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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 10 Jan 2014, at 01:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Brent,

This is precisely why it is impossible to exactly clone a mind.


Then comp, in the very weak sense of the existence of a substitution  
level, is false, but then the mind is infinite and reality is  
infinite, contradicting your claim that reality if finite.


Bruno



Because you are always trying to hit a moving target. That was  
included in what I meant by saying the histories would not be the  
same.


Saying somebody is the 'same' person from day to day is just loose  
common speech using an imprecise definition which isn't really  
germane here.


As you point out everybody's thoughts and states of mind are always  
changing


Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 5:01:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote:

On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Terren,

I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but  
it's an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed  
out. You can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't  
actually physically possible and make a correct deduction about  
reality on that basis.


The no-cloning theorem means that if the correct substitution level  
is the quantum level (or below), then it is physically impossible  
for us to create a digital copy of a brain that creates the same  
state of consciousness, in which case the above objection is valid.


However, it isn't clear that this is the substitution level. Max  
Tegmark has suggested that the brain is essentially a classical  
computer (rather than quantum) which may in principle put the level  
above the quantum. If he's right, then making a copy of a brain at  
the right level becomes possible, albeit beyond present technology,  
and thought experiments may legitimately use that idea (because  
it's possible in principle). Personally I don't agree, I think that  
any copy made above the quantum level isn't guaranteed to be the  
same, while a quantum recreation is guaranteed by the laws of  
physics to be identical. So assuming the substitution level is the  
quantum level cuts out a host of possible objections.


But a lot depends on what you mean by the same. As Terren points  
out, no one is exactly the same from minute-to-minute or day-to- 
day.  They are similar enough that we denominate them the same  
person, even Gabby Gifford is still the same person to a pretty  
good approximation.


Brent

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 10 Jan 2014, at 01:51, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Liz and Terren,

I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on  
it. After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from  
moment to moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the  
'same' person, but I'm still me by all reasonable definitions.


OK, and that ois the point needed to make experimental science  
secure, and then we can use comp to derive physics from arithmetic;





Therefore assuming an exact momentary but SEPARATE clone, that clone  
would no doubt tell everyone it was me, but the still extant me  
would of course disagree.


Now assuming no 'ghost in the machine' or soul, for which no  
evidence exists, and that our mental states and consciousness are  
entirely a product of our biological bodies, then consider replacing  
various parts with exact copies. If say a leg was replaced with an  
exact copy (assuming instant healing to match the original) then I  
doubt 'I' would notice any difference. So my brain was (could be)  
instantaneously replaced with an exact copy with the exact neural  
circuitry and neural states then I suppose 'I' would still think I  
was me. I don't see why not.


So what's the point? I forgot what it was...


OK, you said yes to the doctor, and agree with step zero. See the 8  
steps to see the point, here:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

or here, if the link is still working:
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014

Bruno



Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 5:01:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote:

On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Terren,

I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but  
it's an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed  
out. You can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't  
actually physically possible and make a correct deduction about  
reality on that basis.


The no-cloning theorem means that if the correct substitution level  
is the quantum level (or below), then it is physically impossible  
for us to create a digital copy of a brain that creates the same  
state of consciousness, in which case the above objection is valid.


However, it isn't clear that this is the substitution level. Max  
Tegmark has suggested that the brain is essentially a classical  
computer (rather than quantum) which may in principle put the level  
above the quantum. If he's right, then making a copy of a brain at  
the right level becomes possible, albeit beyond present technology,  
and thought experiments may legitimately use that idea (because  
it's possible in principle). Personally I don't agree, I think that  
any copy made above the quantum level isn't guaranteed to be the  
same, while a quantum recreation is guaranteed by the laws of  
physics to be identical. So assuming the substitution level is the  
quantum level cuts out a host of possible objections.


But a lot depends on what you mean by the same. As Terren points  
out, no one is exactly the same from minute-to-minute or day-to- 
day.  They are similar enough that we denominate them the same  
person, even Gabby Gifford is still the same person to a pretty  
good approximation.


Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 02:16, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:
Stephen,

There is no single observer that can take in all events I  
never said that and don't believe it.


However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a  
computational universe to work. That single universal processor  
cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur  
simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers,  
clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant  
presence of the computational space of reality.


There has to be a single processor computing the state of the  
universe?!


I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and  
all that,


I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor  
computing the state of the universe. In fact there is no such  
universe. The universe is an appearance emerging, from below the  
substitution level, on all computations going through our current  
state. A single computation can hardly do that a priori, although this  
is not excluded, but this would lead to a newtonian-like type of  
reality. Everett confirms that such a computation cannot be unique,  
which is the default stance in the comp theory, although we cannot  
avoid at this stage some possible conspiracy by numbers leading to a  
unique computable reality.


Bruno




but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it  
has 10^80 cores? :-)



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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 10 Jan 2014, at 02:22, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Liz,

No, I don't agree with that at all. As I've said on a number of  
occasions, reality is obviously computed because it exists.


So existence implies computability? Computability theory exists  
because we can distinguish existence from computable existence.




What more convincing proof could there be? If Bruno's comp claims  
reality is non-computable it's pure nonsense that is conclusively  
falsified by the very existence of reality.


Comp predicts that you cannot compute if you will be reconstituted in  
Washington or Moscow in the the self-duplication experiment, a bit  
like QM explains that you cannot predict which slits a photon will go  
through from your points of view when you look at it, in the  
experiment of Young.


Bruno





Edgar


On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:12:46 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 10 January 2014 13:51, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Liz and Terren,

I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on  
it. After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from  
moment to moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the  
'same' person, but I'm still me by all reasonable definitions.


Therefore assuming an exact momentary but SEPARATE clone, that clone  
would no doubt tell everyone it was me, but the still extant me  
would of course disagree.


Now assuming no 'ghost in the machine' or soul, for which no  
evidence exists, and that our mental states and consciousness are  
entirely a product of our biological bodies, then consider replacing  
various parts with exact copies. If say a leg was replaced with an  
exact copy (assuming instant healing to match the original) then I  
doubt 'I' would notice any difference. So my brain was (could be)  
instantaneously replaced with an exact copy with the exact neural  
circuitry and neural states then I suppose 'I' would still think I  
was me. I don't see why not.


So what's the point? I forgot what it was...

The point is that once you agree that your brain could in principle  
be replaced with a copy, Bruno's comp arguments follow, with  
various consequences (including reality being non-computable, I  
think - but check with Bruno).


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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 02:31, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Liz,

No, there is not a single universal processor, there is a single  
processor CYCLE. All information states are effectively their own  
processors, so the computational universe consists of myriads of  
processors, as many as there are information states (more or less).  
But all these myriads of processors all cycle their computations  
together in the same present moment, i.e. in the SAME computational  
space.


What is it?



Saying there is a universal present moment is effectively the same  
as saying there is a single computational space in which all the  
computations of the universe occur.


Yes, that exists, but out of time and space. that exists in a tiny  
part of the arithmetical reality.






If all computations occur in a single universal computational space  
there has to be a single universal present moment in that  
computational space that provides the happening for those  
computations to occur.


Occurrence is a relative notion. Something occur to universal numbers  
x relatively to others universal numbers y.


Bruno





Edgar



On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:16:03 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Stephen,

There is no single observer that can take in all events I  
never said that and don't believe it.


However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a  
computational universe to work. That single universal processor  
cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur  
simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers,  
clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant  
presence of the computational space of reality.


There has to be a single processor computing the state of the  
universe?!


I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and  
all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or  
maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-)



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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 10 January 2014 22:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor computing
 the state of the universe. In fact there is no such universe. The
 universe is an appearance emerging, from below the substitution level, on
 all computations going through our current state. A single computation can
 hardly do that a priori, although this is not excluded, but this would lead
 to a newtonian-like type of reality. Everett confirms that such a
 computation cannot be unique, which is the default stance in the comp
 theory, although we cannot avoid at this stage some possible conspiracy by
 numbers leading to a unique computable reality.

 Surely a single computer could run the UD, at least until it wore out?

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 10 Jan 2014, at 02:53, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 14:22, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:
Liz,

No, I don't agree with that at all. As I've said on a number of  
occasions, reality is obviously computed because it exists. What  
more convincing proof could there be?


One that explains why that has to be so would be a good start.

If Bruno's comp claims reality is non-computable it's pure nonsense  
that is conclusively falsified by the very existence of reality.


The point is that certain assumptions lead to certain conclusions.  
If the conclusions invalidate the assumptions, then the correct  
response is to throw out the original assumptions as invalid. Bruno  
starts from the assumption that consciousness is a form of  
computation and draws certain inferences. This isn't what comp  
claims it's what the argument shows, given the assumptions. The  
only way to falsify it is to show that one of the assumptions is  
wrong, or that there is a flaw in the reasoning that leads to the  
conclusions.



Yes. At least if we want to do science and see the others criticizing  
the work. the problem of Edgar is that he believes that some things  
are obvious.


Bruno






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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 10 Jan 2014, at 03:34, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Liz,

No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show  
it doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done.


?



If you even assume a computational universe in the first place you  
have to assume (you are assuming) that it computes reality. The fact  
that reality exists is conclusive proof.


That a reality independent of my consciousness exists is not a fact.  
It is a prayer. Except for the reality of our own consciousness, but  
all content of consciousness (except that one) are doubtable.


Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and  
simple example is arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is  
computable (this is provable if you accept the Church Turing thesis).


Bruno





Edgar



On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:53:18 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 10 January 2014 14:22, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Liz,

No, I don't agree with that at all. As I've said on a number of  
occasions, reality is obviously computed because it exists. What  
more convincing proof could there be?


One that explains why that has to be so would be a good start.

If Bruno's comp claims reality is non-computable it's pure nonsense  
that is conclusively falsified by the very existence of reality.


The point is that certain assumptions lead to certain conclusions.  
If the conclusions invalidate the assumptions, then the correct  
response is to throw out the original assumptions as invalid. Bruno  
starts from the assumption that consciousness is a form of  
computation and draws certain inferences. This isn't what comp  
claims it's what the argument shows, given the assumptions. The  
only way to falsify it is to show that one of the assumptions is  
wrong, or that there is a flaw in the reasoning that leads to the  
conclusions.




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Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014-01-10 Thread Alberto G. Corona

2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

 On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear LizR,

   That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.

 It is answered, completely.


Stephen, LizR

From what I can understand, once cleared from
arithmetic-logic-metaphysic misticism,  the determination of the laws
from infinite competitive computations follow Solomonoff's theorem
of inductive inference.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff 's_theory_of_inductive_inference

Or it should. But the problem is that Bruno did not gives a weight for
each computation in order to stablish the outcome of what the pencil
does in the air. Neither the algorithmic complexity of each
computation (Solomonoff) nor any other. Therefore, it is  a complete
chaos cut by some magic 1p collapse of computations, following QM
fashion. And there is where the aritmetic-logic-metaphysic mysticism
does his job.

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 10 Jan 2014, at 03:38, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:
Liz,

No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show  
it doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even  
assume a computational universe in the first place you have to  
assume (you are assuming) that it computes reality. The fact that  
reality exists is conclusive proof.


That doesn't work for comp, however, which doesn't assume a  
computational universe. The assumptions it makes are a lot simpler  
than that. I believe they are


The Church-Turing thesis
Elementary arithmetic
That consciousness is a form of computation


I prefer to say, for the last assumption, that consciousness is  
invariant for some substitution done at some level. Strictly speaking  
(sorry for nit-picking) consciousness, which is a 1p, cannot be a  
computation, which is 3p. But comp associates them indeed.


Bruno






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Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014-01-10 Thread Alberto G. Corona

2014/1/10, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com:
 2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

 On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear LizR,

   That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.

 It is answered, completely.


 Stephen, LizR

 From what I can understand, once cleared from
 arithmetic-logic-metaphysic misticism,  the determination of the laws
 from infinite competitive computations follow Solomonoff's theorem
 of inductive inference.

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff 's_theory_of_inductive_inference

 Or it should. But the problem is that Bruno did not gives a weight for
 each computation in order to stablish the outcome of what the pencil
 does in the air. Neither the algorithmic complexity of each
 computation (Solomonoff) nor any other. Therefore, it is  a complete
 chaos cut by some magic 1p collapse of computations, following QM
 fashion. And there is where the aritmetic-logic-metaphysic mysticism
 does his job.


... Job that I do not know how it is possible if a computation that
does everithing OK until it convert the pencil in a fat female soprano
(with big algorithmic complexity) is equally compatible with all my 1p
observations until that moment,  is equally probable than the
computation with much less algorithmic complexity that does its job
right and moves the pencil gracefully without emitting molesting
noises.

So anything goes

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 10 Jan 2014, at 03:52, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Liz,

Your comp is obviously not my comp. Don't tell me what my comp does  
or doesn't do...


But then, please, define your comp. my comp is only a very weak form  
of computationalism; which implies all the know standard form of comp.
I am still not knowing what are your assumptions. This is more  
annoying given that you invoke obviousness, clear, we know that.


We know nothing, but can propose theory and reason in them, and  
compare with the facts, or with other theories.


Bruno





Edgar



On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:38:47 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Liz,

No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show  
it doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even  
assume a computational universe in the first place you have to  
assume (you are assuming) that it computes reality. The fact that  
reality exists is conclusive proof.


That doesn't work for comp, however, which doesn't assume a  
computational universe. The assumptions it makes are a lot simpler  
than that. I believe they are


The Church-Turing thesis
Elementary arithmetic
That consciousness is a form of computation


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Re: The One

OK, John. I was aware that you took some distance with Rosen anti- 
mechanism. Rosen made good points, but is unaware that the machines  
agree with such points. It is related with the fact that the first  
person associated to a machine, does not feel at all like being a  
machine, nor even anything 3p describable. That is why comp is  
necessarily highly counter-intuitive. Not obvious at all, even if the  
alternative can be considered as even less obvious.


Bruno

On 10 Jan 2014, at 04:11, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno and Brent,
please do not paint me as a Robert Rosen imitation. I have esteem  
for his mind, but tried to go on from SOME of his thoughts in my own  
way.  He was a mathematician and a biologist, I am none of those.  
His untimely death cut his thoughts and I believe there would have  
been more to it if he continues and publishes not only what may be  
compatible with a reductionist audience, but ventures into  
agnosticism himself, beyond his 'model' limited to the presently(?)  
knowbles.
At best I am a 'heretic' Rosenite, as I am a 'heretic Marchallite  
(if I may say so).


Brent may be right with his leading nowhere, which may be the  
itinery of our present ignorance.


John M


On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 7:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/8/2014 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi John,

On 07 Jan 2014, at 23:20, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno, you made my day.

 Reminds me of a Hungarian humorous author (P. Howard) who wrote  
about a blind philosopher (The Sleepy Elephant) and his assistant  
living in the deep Sahara - showing the Elephant's Life Oeuvre in  
a BIG book, the assistant was supposed to write as the old Blind  
Elephant dictated. It was all empty and the assistant asked  
somebody to inscribe: I cannot write, but it makes him so happy  
when I pretend... -


Lol




When reading your remarks I wonder what REALLY mean 'machine',   
'comp',  'universal', and some more of your words I got used to  
over the past 2 decades, yet are not clear(??) enough in my mind  
to automatically click-in when used.
Do you have a glossary I could download, to refresh those (brief!)  
meanings?


I have no glossary. Maybe I should do that. I use each term in the  
most standard sense used by the expert in the field. Computable is  
made ultra-standard, if I can say, thanks to the Church thesis.


Let me try an explanation, below,  for the notions mentioned above.

(I am aware that you appreciate Robert Rosen critics of Church  
Thesis, but as you know I have some reservation that it is really a  
critics of Church thesis, as a critic of possible misuse of  
Church's thesis).


I'd take Rosen as a cautionary example of holism leading nowhere.

Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 10 Jan 2014, at 04:13, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Stephen,

Your error here is assuming the computations take place in a single
wide physical dimensional space. They don't. They take place in a
purely computational space prior to the existence of physical
dimensional spacetime. Physical dimensional spacetime is a product
of the computations. They don't exist within it. Therefore there is
no spacetime separation between computations. They exist in a purely
logical space prior to dimensionalization which they compute.

Does this not contradict your statement that the present moment is
prior to the computations, as I think you just said?

bruno

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 10:06:33 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King
wrote:

Dear Edgar,

You wrote: there is not a single universal processor, there is a
single processor CYCLE. All information states are effectively their
own processors, so the computational universe consists of myriads of
processors, as many as there are information states (more or less).
But all these myriads of processors all cycle their computations
together in the same present moment, i.e. in the SAME computational
space.

As someone deeply involved in studying distributed computation
from the inside and the outside, I have to tell you, there is no
difference between a single computer and a myriad of processors
that all cycle their computations together. That is a difference
that does not make a difference. Unless you take concurrency into
account (and it does not seem that you do) there is no distiction
between a single processor running the universe as a computation
or a huge number of processors running in parallel as you describe.

The problem is that if the distribution of physical processors is
wide enough in space and the processors have different associated
velocities in their motions, there is no such a thing as a single
frame of simultaneity for them all to be said to be cycling
together in the same present moment. Nope.

Add to that simultaneity problem the problem of resource
allocation and one has a real mess! (Forget about the intractability
issues...) There seems to be a lot of bad thinking when it comes to
what exactly is a computation. Let me try a definition of
computation:

Any transformation of information.

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 9:28 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Stephen,

There is NO such requirement. See my response to Liz..

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:45:40 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King
wrote:

Dear LizR,

Exactly. That requirement of a single computer is deeply
troublesome for me.

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:16 PM, LizR liz...@gmail.com wrote:
On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Stephen,

There is no single observer that can take in all events I
never said that and don't believe it.

However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a
computational universe to work. That single universal processor
cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur
simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers,
clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant
presence of the computational space of reality.

There has to be a single processor computing the state of the
universe?!

I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and
all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or
maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-)

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 10 Jan 2014, at 04:16, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Liz,

So? I'm not really interested in Bruno's comp as I don't think it  
actually applies to reality. I'll stick with my computational  
reality for the time being at least...


But, please, define it. Nobody has the slightest idea of what you are  
talking about. Computation is a standard term in mathematical logic,  
and refer to the Church thesis.


You can use a word with a different meaning, but then you have to  
provide the meaning that you are using. We cannot guess it.


Also, reality is what we search, starting from statement on which we  
can agree (if only momentarily).
You talk all the time like if yo, or we,  knew what is reality. We  
don't. That's why we do research.


Bruno





Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 10:05:03 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
Well, that's OK then.

Now we've cleared that up, I can repeat my original point:

On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Liz,

No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show  
it doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even  
assume a computational universe in the first place you have to  
assume (you are assuming) that it computes reality. The fact that  
reality exists is conclusive proof.


That doesn't work for [Bruno's] comp, however, which doesn't assume  
a computational universe. The assumptions it makes are a lot simpler  
than that. I believe they are


The Church-Turing thesis
Elementary arithmetic
That consciousness is a form of computation


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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is  
(locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit  
conversion factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value  
is arbitrary, like how many feet in a mile, which is why it is  
now an exact number in SI units.
Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?)  
to 1.


So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution -  
namely the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP  
- we experience a universe compatible with our existence because  
such a universe has to drop out of the interations of conscious  
beings in Platonia?


It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only  
RSSA. (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).


Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light migvht  
have appeared.


We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it.  
Any TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any  
universal system taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same  
physics, at least for each pints of view. It gives the same  
theology, more generally, and physics is defined through it.


Remind me, which is step 7?


In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we are  
unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change the  
probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true for the  
change between physical implementation and physical virtual  
implementation.


In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing a  
never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six, except  
that the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize then that  
to predict (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any first person  
experience you can have, like when doing a pizza, you need to apply  
the probability calculus on all your reconstitutions in the UD*  
(the complete running of the UD). So physics is reduced to that  
probability calculus on all your computations. OK?







We can come back on this.

Yes please. This is very interesting!


Thanks. tell me if you (re)saw the step 7 point.

Bruno






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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 10:34, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 22:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor  
computing the state of the universe. In fact there is no such  
universe. The universe is an appearance emerging, from below the  
substitution level, on all computations going through our current  
state. A single computation can hardly do that a priori, although  
this is not excluded, but this would lead to a newtonian-like type  
of reality. Everett confirms that such a computation cannot be  
unique, which is the default stance in the comp theory, although we  
cannot avoid at this stage some possible conspiracy by numbers  
leading to a unique computable reality.


Surely a single computer could run the UD, at least until it wore out?


Yes; but the UD is not the physical reality. A priori the physical  
reality is not emulated by the UD, although infinitely many  
approximations are emulated. But the real (first person observable)  
physical reality is defined by the statistical sum on all  
computations,including all those UD-approximations, which might be or  
not Turing emulable (a priori not, but there are technical nuances,  
which I prefer not to explain right now).



Bruno




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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 09 Jan 2014, at 20:39, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


Bruno:
Sorry but I do not understood point seven when I read it and I do not
understand you now.


No problem. I am here to explain (or discover a flaw!).




I understand Solomonoff theorem about inductive inference that involve
infinite computations and probabilities, but Solomonoff  has a
selection criteria : the algoritmic complexity theorem uses the
algorithmic complexity as the weight or probability of each
computation and it has a clear formula for the probability of the
next step in a sequence, that is, to make an induction by means of
competing computations.


This does not work, as that type of informùation suppress all the  
redundancies existing in the arithmetical computations.






The metaphisics of solomonoff say something like: the world is
governed by laws as simple as possible compatible with the phenomena
observed, but we must take into account unobserved phenomena that may
demand more complex algorithms so we apply a decreasing but not null
probability to all computations that predict the known facts


That's what we need to do in comp, and it works, but only thanks to  
the redundancy of the UD work, or arithmetic.
(this is related to the creative/productive pairs of Emil Post, as  
opposd to the simple/immune pairs, by the same Emil Post, and later  
rediscovered by Chaitin).
The algorithmic information suppresses the natural weight (the one  
given by the FPI) on the computations.






For a moment I though that yours is a kind of solomonoff inductive
inference


It works with all kind of inductive inference. I use the general  
theory by Blum, Case and Smith. Explicitely so in conscience and  
mecanism, but it is very easy, so I am quick on this on this list. I  
can say more on this, but sometimes it is more distracting than  
informative.





translated into a numerical mysticism, as substance of
things instead as a method of induction or discovery of laws.


Just follow the reasoning. It is not a theory of inductive inference,  
but the (unique) machine (ideally correct one) theology, testable as  
it contains the physics.





But I do
not see your selection criteria


Your own consciousness. That is already the case in step 3. I do not  
see what you don't see.





among infinite computations and no
procedure, no formula.



Quote my latest explanation to you or Edgar, or Stephen.  Then AUDA  
gives the precise equations and the formula. But UDA gives the  
complete (less constructive) explanations, even the theoretical  
procedure to predict the behavior of a falling pen. What don't you  
understand? Are you sure you get well the first six steps?




And moreover, I do not understand your
metaphysics.


Which metaphysics? AR, or yes doctor ? Please try to make a specific  
critics.
There is no metaphysics, actually, only a precise assumption on the  
relation between consciousness and computation.


Bruno




2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:


On 09 Jan 2014, at 18:50, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear Bruno,

I have to agree with Alberto on this point.





Alberto was only missing step seven. You can comment my answer to
Alberto.






On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all
possible laws will be produced.


Where?

AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it
can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how
Alberto's claim is false!


See my answer to Alberto, or reread the UDA.











What is what makes our physical laws
unique determined by COMP?'

That happens already at the step seven.

Could you be more specific as to how?



I assume there that you, here and now, live in a physical universe
which run a universal dovetailer, without ever stopping.

Assuming comp, how do you predict exactly, after step six,  the
experience of dropping a pen in the air?
What is the probability that you will see falling on the ground?

I think that Alberto is considering the character of physical laws,
not probability distributions of particular processes that obey such
laws.


It is computation. that are not physical processes at all.

To avoid the consequence that physics is uniquely defined in
arithmetic for all universal machine, you need to reify matter and
mind with non computable attributes.









You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) that
your next immediate future first person state is determined by the
FPI on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD*
(the complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely many
computations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science:
all functions are implemented by infinitely many programs).
To compute the exact probability of the event the pen fall on the
ground, you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computation

Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 10:43, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:


On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear LizR,

 That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.


It is answered, completely.



Stephen, LizR

From what I can understand, once cleared from
arithmetic-logic-metaphysic misticism,  the determination of the laws
from infinite competitive computations follow Solomonoff's theorem
of inductive inference.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff  
's_theory_of_inductive_inference


Or it should. But the problem is that Bruno did not gives a weight for
each computation in order to stablish the outcome of what the pencil
does in the air.


I can't. Nobody can't. But the UD does it. And we must derive the  
weight from computer science and arithmetic ONLY, if not we are just  
doing physics, but the UDA points is that we cannot do that. We can  
only derive the weight by the logic of self-reference, and that is  
begin in the AUDA part.





Neither the algorithmic complexity of each
computation (Solomonoff) nor any other.


The algorithmic complexity has to fail, as, as I just said, it  
elmiminates the redundancy, which is the only thing given the weight,  
by the FPI.




Therefore, it is  a complete
chaos cut by some magic 1p collapse of computations, following QM
fashion.


No, following only self-duplication/multiplication. Then it is like  
Everett QM, without collapse, only local first person consciousness of  
result of measurement.





And there is where the aritmetic-logic-metaphysic mysticism
does his job.


You dont' seem to do the hard work. The only mysticism in play is what  
is formalized by the G*/G difference, unavoidable by machine  
incompleteness, and used only to separate what the machine can  
communicate, and what she cannot communicate but still access as true  
for her. That is not used in the UDA, only in the math part (AUDA). In  
the UDA, the only mysticism used is the belief that we can survive  
with a digital brain/body.


Bruno




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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 10:52, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


2014/1/10, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com:

2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:


On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear LizR,

 That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.


It is answered, completely.



Stephen, LizR

From what I can understand, once cleared from
arithmetic-logic-metaphysic misticism,  the determination of the laws
from infinite competitive computations follow Solomonoff's theorem
of inductive inference.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff  
's_theory_of_inductive_inference


Or it should. But the problem is that Bruno did not gives a weight  
for

each computation in order to stablish the outcome of what the pencil
does in the air. Neither the algorithmic complexity of each
computation (Solomonoff) nor any other. Therefore, it is  a complete
chaos cut by some magic 1p collapse of computations, following QM
fashion. And there is where the aritmetic-logic-metaphysic mysticism
does his job.



... Job that I do not know how it is possible if a computation that
does everithing OK until it convert the pencil in a fat female soprano
(with big algorithmic complexity) is equally compatible with all my 1p
observations until that moment,  is equally probable than the
computation with much less algorithmic complexity that does its job
right and moves the pencil gracefully without emitting molesting
noises.

So anything goes


Yes, that is the white rabbit problem. Most of my earlier posts on  
this list has consisted in explaining why algorithmic complexity  
cannot work. It surely plays some role, but we have to extract it from  
the redundancy, no imposed it, as this would mock the consciousness  
invariance, and the FPI invariance which follows from comp.
Of course, if you think you can eliminate the white rabbit with only  
algorithmic complexity, please do, but you will have to explain why  
the 'non algorithmically simple programs' do no more interfere with  
the FPI global indeterminacy, and by the delay invariance for the 1p  
experiences, that does not seem obvious at all.

You do seem close to grasp the problem.

Bruno





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Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014-01-10 Thread Alberto G. Corona

2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

On 10 Jan 2014, at 10:52, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

2014/1/10, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com:
2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear LizR,

That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.

It is answered, completely.

Stephen, LizR

From what I can understand, once cleared from
arithmetic-logic-metaphysic misticism, the determination of the laws
from infinite competitive computations follow Solomonoff's theorem
of inductive inference.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff
's_theory_of_inductive_inference

Or it should. But the problem is that Bruno did not gives a weight
for
each computation in order to stablish the outcome of what the pencil
does in the air. Neither the algorithmic complexity of each
computation (Solomonoff) nor any other. Therefore, it is a complete
chaos cut by some magic 1p collapse of computations, following QM
fashion. And there is where the aritmetic-logic-metaphysic mysticism
does his job.

... Job that I do not know how it is possible if a computation that
does everithing OK until it convert the pencil in a fat female soprano
(with big algorithmic complexity) is equally compatible with all my 1p
observations until that moment, is equally probable than the
computation with much less algorithmic complexity that does its job
right and moves the pencil gracefully without emitting molesting
noises.

So anything goes

Yes, that is the white rabbit problem. Most of my earlier posts on
this list has consisted in explaining why algorithmic complexity
cannot work. It surely plays some role, but we have to extract it from
the redundancy, no imposed it, as this would mock the consciousness
invariance, and the FPI invariance which follows from comp.
Of course, if you think you can eliminate the white rabbit with only
algorithmic complexity, please do, but you will have to explain why
the 'non algorithmically simple programs' do no more interfere with
the FPI global indeterminacy, and by the delay invariance for the 1p
experiences, that does not seem obvious at all.
You do seem close to grasp the problem.

In any case the problem is in your theory. QM predict a infinite small
probability for white rabbits, while yours infer a decent amount of
them until some cut criteria emerges. And that is not my work, but
yours.

What is FPI? Although it often seems so, this is not a group devoted
to obtaining a certification on Bruno Marchall comp theories. You
have to be more didactic and can not rely on your writings when asking
concrete questions. If the number of acronyms + theology, logic and
psychologic concepts mixed in single statements grows when the
conversation gets more concrete, then it is no surprise that people
don´t understand you. There are many didactic tricks that you refuse
to use like metaphors and examples. And this gives to me the
impression that you are hiding consciously or uncosnciously a great
flaw.

And my observation is that no one understand you in what is original
in your theory. Apart from the brilliant and interesting first steps.
That is why I read you with attention.

But until now I don´t find a satisfactory explanation and you confess
that there is not, for the abundance of white rabbits in your theory.
You simply say: the fact that we have no fat soprano singers and white
rabbits aroud, and the fact that comp is true (sorry, it is a theory
that all of us must assume if we are gong to talk in this list) means
that comp have no such flaw and is a task of everyone to find how.

No . It is a task of yourself.

From my side, I have my own explanation of why algorithmic complexity
plays a role in solomonoff theory of universal induction, without
taking it as an axiom .. And this is the computational nature of life.
That is not the immaterial computation of yours, but the material
computation subject to resource limits of biological systems. I did my
job.

http://ilevolucionista.blogspot.com.es/2008/06/ockham-razor-and-genetic-algoritms-life.html

I simply ask for yours.

Bruno

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


Liz,

I think Edgar's computational reality can be consistent with the  
computational theory of mind if you somehow constrain reality to be  
small and finite.


The moment you let the universe be very big (eternal inflation) then  
you also get an infinite number of computers built by aliens in  
distant galaxies, any of which might be simulating you, and the same  
consequences Bruno points out apply.


My question to Edgar is why do you believe reality is finite? This  
seems to contradict a number of current scientific theories.


Also, when do you believe reality was created?  And how do you explain  
it's origins?


Jason

On Jan 9, 2014, at 10:35 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:


On 10 January 2014 17:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/9/2014 7:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational  
space that enables computations to take place since something has  
to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the  
processor cycle for computations.


You seem to be nit picking...

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
No you spent them telling me what it does. I'd like to know what it  
is.



On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and  
Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself...


I don't know why there is this concern about Edgar's computations.   
It's seems very much like Bruno's, except Bruno's Universal computer  
is running all possible programs (by dovetailing). The time that  
appears on clocks is a computed ordering relation which is conjugate  
to the conserved quantity called energy.


Bruno's dovetailer is supposedly running (if that's the word) in an  
abstract space, while Edgar's processor units are, as far as one can  
tell, intended to be in some sense physical. It's clear what Bruno's  
ontology is based on, he makes it explicit in his axioms. It isn't  
clear what Edgar's ontology is based on - he seems to be assuming  
that time and some form of computation are fundamental properties of  
the universe, but not what those computers are running on (by Turing  
equivalence, I assume they COULD be running on a desktop PC in some  
other universe) or what his universal present moment consists of -  
is it a linear dimensio, say? But then it appears to be quantised,  
since it only supports discrete computational steps. Can time be  
quantised? What are the implications? Do things like the Landauer  
limit come into his theory?


The concern is, I suspect, due to...

a) a lack of rigour, either logical or mathematical, in describing  
the theory
b) a lack of testable results, or indications of how one gets from  
the theory to the observed reality

c) a bad attitude


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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Bruno,

It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only
one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the
infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
experience.

Terren


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:28 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is
 (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion
 factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like
 how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI
 units.

 Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

 So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely
 the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience
 a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to
 drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?


 It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA.
 (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).

 Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light migvht have
 appeared.


 We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any TOE
 (that is any first order logical specification of any universal system
 taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same physics, at least for
 each pints of view. It gives the same theology, more generally, and physics
 is defined through it.


 Remind me, which is step 7?


 In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we are
 unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change the
 probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true for the
 change between physical implementation and physical virtual
 implementation.

 In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing a
 never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six, except that
 the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize then that to predict
 (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any first person experience you can
 have, like when doing a pizza, you need to apply the probability calculus
 on all your reconstitutions in the UD* (the complete running of the UD).
 So physics is reduced to that probability calculus on all your
 computations. OK?





 We can come back on this.


 Yes please. This is very interesting!


 Thanks. tell me if you (re)saw the step 7 point.

 Bruno





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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Terren,

  Good question! I ask that you take what you wrote and add the following
question: How do Glak and Terren Communicate?


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:57 AM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.comwrote:


 Bruno,

 It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
 only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only
 one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the
 infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
 being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
 unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
 experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
 experience.

 Terren


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:28 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is
 (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion
 factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like
 how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI
 units.

 Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

 So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely
 the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience
 a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to
 drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?


 It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA.
 (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).

 Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light migvht
 have appeared.


 We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any
 TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any universal system
 taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same physics, at least for
 each pints of view. It gives the same theology, more generally, and physics
 is defined through it.


 Remind me, which is step 7?


 In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we are
 unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change the
 probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true for the
 change between physical implementation and physical virtual
 implementation.

 In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing a
 never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six, except that
 the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize then that to predict
 (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any first person experience you can
 have, like when doing a pizza, you need to apply the probability calculus
 on all your reconstitutions in the UD* (the complete running of the UD).
 So physics is reduced to that probability calculus on all your
 computations. OK?





 We can come back on this.


 Yes please. This is very interesting!


 Thanks. tell me if you (re)saw the step 7 point.

 Bruno





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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Hi Stephen,

Well, I'm not sure if what I'm asking is even coherent within the UDA, as
it may betray a misunderstanding on my part. But if that's not the case,
then it seems to me that I could never communicate with Glak because our
consciousnesses are selecting different universes within the infinite
possibilities of experiences traced by the UD. It's analogous to asking how
we could communicate with someone outside of our light cone.

Terren


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:06 PM, Stephen Paul King 
stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Terren,

   Good question! I ask that you take what you wrote and add the following
 question: How do Glak and Terren Communicate?


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:57 AM, Terren Suydam 
 terren.suy...@gmail.comwrote:


 Bruno,

 It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
 only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only
 one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the
 infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
 being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
 unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
 experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
 experience.

 Terren


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:28 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is
 (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion
 factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like
 how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI
 units.

 Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

 So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely
 the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience
 a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to
 drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?


 It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA.
 (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).

 Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light migvht
 have appeared.


 We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any
 TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any universal system
 taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same physics, at least for
 each pints of view. It gives the same theology, more generally, and physics
 is defined through it.


 Remind me, which is step 7?


 In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we are
 unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change the
 probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true for the
 change between physical implementation and physical virtual
 implementation.

 In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing a
 never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six, except that
 the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize then that to predict
 (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any first person experience you can
 have, like when doing a pizza, you need to apply the probability calculus
 on all your reconstitutions in the UD* (the complete running of the UD).
 So physics is reduced to that probability calculus on all your
 computations. OK?





 We can come back on this.


 Yes please. This is very interesting!


  Thanks. tell me if you (re)saw the step 7 point.

 Bruno





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Re: What are wavefunctions?

2014-01-10 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014  Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote:

I never claimed Liouville's theorem was a fundamental law of physics in
 itself,


Good, I agree.

 rather it is derivable as a mathematical consequence of certain features
 of the fundamental laws.


And of the initial conditions!

 Liouville's theorem is derived in deterministic classical mechanics.


Then Liouville's theorem can only be approximately true.


  It [Liouville's theorem] only becomes statistical if you interpret the
 original set of microstates as representing your own uncertainty


But that's the only way you can interpret it because the laws of physics
insist that you will *always* be uncertain about the microstates, all you
know are purely statistical things about the system, like its temperature
and pressure.

 This line of discussion got started because I was disputing your
 statement that we can derive the 2nd law in a *purely* logical way like
 2+2=5, with no need to invoke knowledge about the laws of physics that was
 based on observation. This would imply that *any* logically possible
 mathematical laws of nature would obey the 2nd law.


Yes, *any* logically possible mathematical law of nature must actually do
something, or it shouldn't be called a law. If the initial state of a
system is in a state of lowest possible entropy, and if one of those laws
goes to work on that state then the entropy of the system in that state
will NOT go down. And that is the second law of thermodynamics.

 If you did not mean to suggest that we can know a priori the 2nd law is
 true because it would be true in any logically possible universe whose
 behavior follows mathematical laws, please clarify.


That is exactly what I meant to suggest, provided that the initial
conditions were of very low entropy.

 But I thought you were talking about logically possible universes as
 well, not just our universe


If the initial conditions were of high entropy then applying a law of
physics to that mess would be just as likely to decrease its entropy as
increase it, therefore the second law would not be true and time would have
no arrow; in fact the very concept of time would have no meaning in that
universe.

 the very fact that you were willing to discuss the Game of Life suggested
 this, since even though it's possible our universe could be a cellular
 automaton, I think we can be pretty confident it's not a 2-dimensional
 cellular automaton like the Game of Life!


Well... you can make a Turing Machine from the Game of Life. And according
to the Bekenstein Bound the maximum amount of information that the laws of
physics allow you to store inside a sphere is NOT proportional to its 3D
volume as you might expect but is instead proportional to the sphere's 2D
surface area. So you could know all there is to know about what's going on
inside a sphere just by looking at its surface, this has led some to
propose what they call  The Holographic principle, the idea is that the
entire volume of our 3D universe is a projection from a 2D surface.

 Maybe they're right. As I've said I don't know what reality will turn out
to be but whatever it is it's going to be weird.

 Another alternative would be to imagine you do have an infinite grid,
 but with a starting state where there are only a finite pattern of black
 squares surrounded by an infinite number of white squares,


  So the ratio of white squares to black is a finite number divided by
 infinity.


 No, because I said that in this case the region of the grid being
 *simulated* could still be finite


So the rules of the Game of Life apply to some of the cells in the grid but
do not apply to others. What rules govern which cells must obey the rules
and which cells can ignore the rules, that is to say who is allowed to
ignore the laws of physics in that universe?

  John K Clark

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

2014-01-10 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 5:38 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

As a lot of people have now pointed out, physics can be local and relistic
 if time symmetry is valid.


If time is symmetrical then retro-causality exists, so how can realism
hold? How can the outcome of a coin flip today have a definite value
independent of the observer if next year or next millennium someone can
cause a change in today's coin flip? If realism holds under those
circumstances then the word realism has no meaning.

And by the way, if time is symmetrical then there is no point in ever
actually performing an experiment because you would remember the future as
clearly as you remember the past, so you would already remember the outcome
of the experiment just as clearly as you remember setting up the
experimental apparatus.

  John K Clark

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 13:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:


On 10 Jan 2014, at 10:52, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


2014/1/10, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com:

2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:


On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear LizR,

That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.


It is answered, completely.



Stephen, LizR

From what I can understand, once cleared from
arithmetic-logic-metaphysic misticism,  the determination of the  
laws
from infinite competitive computations follow Solomonoff's  
theorem

of inductive inference.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff
's_theory_of_inductive_inference

Or it should. But the problem is that Bruno did not gives a weight
for
each computation in order to stablish the outcome of what the  
pencil

does in the air. Neither the algorithmic complexity of each
computation (Solomonoff) nor any other. Therefore, it is  a  
complete

chaos cut by some magic 1p collapse of computations, following QM
fashion. And there is where the aritmetic-logic-metaphysic  
mysticism

does his job.



... Job that I do not know how it is possible if a computation that
does everithing OK until it convert the pencil in a fat female  
soprano
(with big algorithmic complexity) is equally compatible with all  
my 1p

observations until that moment,  is equally probable than the
computation with much less algorithmic complexity that does its job
right and moves the pencil gracefully without emitting molesting
noises.

So anything goes


Yes, that is the white rabbit problem. Most of my earlier posts on
this list has consisted in explaining why algorithmic complexity
cannot work. It surely plays some role, but we have to extract it  
from

the redundancy, no imposed it, as this would mock the consciousness
invariance, and the FPI invariance which follows from comp.
Of course, if you think you can eliminate the white rabbit with only
algorithmic complexity, please do, but you will have to explain why
the 'non algorithmically simple programs' do no more interfere with
the FPI global indeterminacy, and by the delay invariance for the 1p
experiences, that does not seem obvious at all.
You do seem close to grasp the problem.


In any case the problem is in your theory.



That is the result. Yes, it is a problem for comp (which is just  
mechanism after Church, Kleene, Turing, Post).
Then, using the most classical theory of knowledge, the problem  
becomes a problem in arithmetic.





QM predict a infinite small
probability for white rabbits, while yours infer a decent amount of
them until some cut criteria emerges. And that is not my work, but
yours.


QM predict all this by using comp, or an unintelligible dualist theory  
of observation.


Yes, with comp we must derive the wave or the matrix from self- 
observation, itself extracted from arithmetical self-references  
(Gödel, Löb, Solovay).







What is FPI?


First Person Indeterminacy. UDA step 3.




Although it often seems so, this is not a group devoted
to obtaining a certification on Bruno Marchall comp theories.



I have a theorem in a theory (or class of theories extended in an  
effective sense).





You
have to be more didactic and can not rely on your writings when asking
concrete questions. If the number of acronyms + theology, logic and
psychologic concepts mixed in single statements grows when the
conversation gets more concrete, then it is no surprise that people
don´t understand you.


Who does not understand? If you have a problem of understanding, just  
ask. The subject matter (the mind-body problem) is everything but  
simple. Yet we can reason, even get startling conclusions from  
admitting very weak form of mechanism.






 There are many didactic tricks that you refuse
to use like metaphors and examples.


I avoid metaphor indeed, but that is the custom in science. Examples?  
You can find them in the textbook. And/or you can ask any one when you  
feel the need.





And this gives to me the
impression that you are hiding  consciously or uncosnciously a great
flaw.


?





And my observation is that no one understand you in what is original
in your theory.


?





Apart from the brilliant and interesting  first steps.
That is why I read you with attention.


Where precisely the flaw appears?





But until now I don´t find a satisfactory explanation and you confess
that there is not, for the abundance of white rabbits in your theory.


I am a scientist. I do not defend any theory. I just reduce the mind- 
body problem into a purely arithmetical belief in body problem.


I illustrate that with computer science, and usual definitions in  
theology and metaphysics, when we assume comp, we can translate  
theological problem into problem of number theory or computer science.







You simply say: the fact that we have no fat soprano singers and white
rabbits aroud, and the fact that comp is true (sorry, it is a

Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 16:23, Jason Resch wrote:


Liz,

I think Edgar's computational reality can be consistent with the  
computational theory of mind if you somehow constrain reality to be  
small and finite.


OK.




The moment you let the universe be very big (eternal inflation) then  
you also get an infinite number of computers built by aliens in  
distant galaxies, any of which might be simulating you, and the same  
consequences Bruno points out apply.


OK. But the universe might need to be robust too, which, in passing, I  
am not sure our local cosmos can be, even if infinite, unless there is  
really infinite room at the bottom, which I doubt. The UD has toe  
become unboundedly large ...





My question to Edgar is why do you believe reality is finite? This  
seems to contradict a number of current scientific theories.


Also, when do you believe reality was created?  And how do you  
explain it's origins?


Good questions.

Bruno





Jason

On Jan 9, 2014, at 10:35 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:


On 10 January 2014 17:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/9/2014 7:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational  
space that enables computations to take place since something has  
to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the  
processor cycle for computations.


You seem to be nit picking...

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
No you spent them telling me what it does. I'd like to know what  
it is.



On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and  
Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself...


I don't know why there is this concern about Edgar's computations.   
It's seems very much like Bruno's, except Bruno's Universal  
computer is running all possible programs (by dovetailing). The  
time that appears on clocks is a computed ordering relation which  
is conjugate to the conserved quantity called energy.


Bruno's dovetailer is supposedly running (if that's the word) in an  
abstract space, while Edgar's processor units are, as far as one  
can tell, intended to be in some sense physical. It's clear what  
Bruno's ontology is based on, he makes it explicit in his axioms.  
It isn't clear what Edgar's ontology is based on - he seems to be  
assuming that time and some form of computation are fundamental  
properties of the universe, but not what those computers are  
running on (by Turing equivalence, I assume they COULD be running  
on a desktop PC in some other universe) or what his universal  
present moment consists of - is it a linear dimensio, say? But  
then it appears to be quantised, since it only supports discrete  
computational steps. Can time be quantised? What are the  
implications? Do things like the Landauer limit come into his theory?


The concern is, I suspect, due to...

a) a lack of rigour, either logical or mathematical, in describing  
the theory
b) a lack of testable results, or indications of how one gets from  
the theory to the observed reality

c) a bad attitude



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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Terren,


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:15 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.comwrote:

 Hi Stephen,

 Well, I'm not sure if what I'm asking is even coherent within the UDA, as
 it may betray a misunderstanding on my part.


I agree, interaction and the question of different physical laws for
different observers is not well defined in the UDA.




 But if that's not the case, then it seems to me that I could never
 communicate with Glak because our consciousnesses are selecting different
 universes within the infinite possibilities of experiences traced by the
 UD. It's analogous to asking how we could communicate with someone outside
 of our light cone.


I am trying to not assume that a space-time is defined a priori.




 Terren


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:06 PM, Stephen Paul King 
 stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Terren,

   Good question! I ask that you take what you wrote and add the following
 question: How do Glak and Terren Communicate?


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:57 AM, Terren Suydam 
 terren.suy...@gmail.comwrote:


 Bruno,

 It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
 only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only
 one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the
 infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
 being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
 unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
 experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
 experience.

 Terren


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:28 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is
 (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion
 factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, 
 like
 how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI
 units.

 Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

 So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely
 the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we 
 experience
 a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to
 drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?


 It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA.
 (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).

 Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light migvht
 have appeared.


 We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any
 TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any universal system
 taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same physics, at least for
 each pints of view. It gives the same theology, more generally, and 
 physics
 is defined through it.


 Remind me, which is step 7?


 In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we are
 unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change the
 probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true for the
 change between physical implementation and physical virtual
 implementation.

 In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing a
 never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six, except that
 the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize then that to predict
 (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any first person experience you can
 have, like when doing a pizza, you need to apply the probability calculus
 on all your reconstitutions in the UD* (the complete running of the UD).
 So physics is reduced to that probability calculus on all your
 computations. OK?





 We can come back on this.


 Yes please. This is very interesting!


  Thanks. tell me if you (re)saw the step 7 point.

 Bruno





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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Stephen,


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Stephen Paul King 
stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Terren,


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:15 PM, Terren Suydam 
 terren.suy...@gmail.comwrote:

 Hi Stephen,

 Well, I'm not sure if what I'm asking is even coherent within the UDA, as
 it may betray a misunderstanding on my part.


 I agree, interaction and the question of different physical laws for
 different observers is not well defined in the UDA.


I disagree, as interactions are just yet more programs instantiated in UD*.
Programs (universal numbers) can be embedded within other programs. I think
it helps to remember that the infinity of computations going through our
respective states are happening below the substitution level... so that our
interactions, such as they are, exist at emergent levels much higher than
the level being simulated.




 But if that's not the case, then it seems to me that I could never
 communicate with Glak because our consciousnesses are selecting different
 universes within the infinite possibilities of experiences traced by the
 UD. It's analogous to asking how we could communicate with someone outside
 of our light cone.


 I am trying to not assume that a space-time is defined a priori.


I don't understand your comment, we're talking about emergent physics.

Terren

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 17:57, Terren Suydam wrote:



Bruno,

It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined -  
but only for a particular point of view.


Yes, but it is a very general one. It is the particular view of any  
(universal) machine. It has to be the same for any person capable of  
being incarnated/implemented through a finitely describable body  
relatively to some universal numbers.


All what you will add, by consciousness differentiation is local,  
historical, and geographical.




So I, Terren, experience one and only one physics, because my  
consciousness is the selection criteria among the infinity of  
computations going through my state.


Consciousness select you in the consistent extension, OK. But the  
extensions themselves are provided by the infinitely many competing  
universal numbers/computations below you substitution level, and the  
constraints of the observation seen from the self (captured by the  
intensional variant of G and G*, in the math).






But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics?


If Glak mind obeys to the laws of Boole, and if Glak as a finite body,  
and if he is self-referentially correct, then we share with Glak the  
same sigma_1 true sentences, and he figures it out (by Bp  Dt) in the  
same way, so we have the same physics. If Glak shows us an electron  
heaver than ours, we can conclude that the mass of an electron is not  
a necessity, but a contingency, a geographical fact, and there might  
be a law given the mass electron relatively to that type of accessible  
physics (given that we succeed in talking with Glak).








Glak's consciousness selects a unique/invariant physics for Glak,


OK, but it does it with some stability, and then Everett suggest that  
we are multiplied collectively, and so do share most of our histories  
locally.


Better to bet that we do have a collective comp first person plural  
reality.




but that emergent physical universe Glak experiences is  
characterized by laws that are different from what I experience.


It is a different place, but comp suggest it will have the same law,  
probably the same constant. But we get three physics, and they can be  
quite alternated type of reality. It is like the electron might be  
heavier in Heaven apparently :)
I suspect the three physics to be related to possible altered state of  
consciousness here. The soul ( p) resides in three hypostases  
(S4Grz1, X1, X1*).


Without incompleteness, such comp physics would have collapsed into  
classical logic, and physics would have been without law, the  
multiverse would be smooth and and still more multiple, in the high  
continua, inconsistent. That does not exist, thanks to inompleteness.  
The laws of prediction of events are the same for all creature, but  
perhaps with some variants.


Bruno



Terren


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:28 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is  
(locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit  
conversion factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value  
is arbitrary, like how many feet in a mile, which is why it is  
now an exact number in SI units.
Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?)  
to 1.


So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution -  
namely the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP  
- we experience a universe compatible with our existence because  
such a universe has to drop out of the interations of conscious  
beings in Platonia?


It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only  
RSSA. (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).


Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light  
migvht have appeared.


We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it.  
Any TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any  
universal system taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same  
physics, at least for each pints of view. It gives the same  
theology, more generally, and physics is defined through it.


Remind me, which is step 7?


In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we  
are unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change  
the probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true  
for the change between physical implementation and physical  
virtual implementation.


In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing  
a never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six,  
except that the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize  
then that to predict (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any first  
person experience you can have,

Re: A Theory of Consciousness

2014-01-10 Thread Gabriel Bodeen

On Tuesday, December 31, 2013 4:25:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

 As you've explained it above your theory makes a rock just as conscious as 
 a brain.  I'm 
 sure you must have a more subtle theory than that, so I'll ask you the 
 same thing I asked 
 Bruno, if I make a robot what do I have to do make it conscious or not 
 conscious? 

 Brent 


Did you receive any interesting answers? 

I have adequate background in neuroscience but I'm mostly ignorant of AI 
math, robotics work, and philosophy of mind, so excuse my rampant 
speculation.  This is what I'd try in design of a robotic brain to switch 
on and off consciousness and test for its presence:  First, I'd give the 
robot brain modules to interpret its sensory inputs in an associative 
manner analogous to human sensory associative regions.  All these sensory 
inputs would feed into the decision-making module (DMM).  One of the first 
steps taken by the DMM is determining how important each sensory signal is 
for its current objectives.  It decides to pay attention to a subset of 
those signals.  Second, I'd put a switch on another input to make it part 
of the attention subset or not:  the attention's choice of signals would 
also an input to the DMM, and I could turn on or off whether that 
attentional choice was itself let pass through to the next processing 
stages.  I would predict that, with the switch turned off, the robot would 
be not conscious (i.e. it would have no experience of qualia), but that 
with the switch turned on, the robot would be conscious (i.e. it would 
experience qualia corresponding to the signals it is paying attention to).  
I predict this because it seems to me that the experience of qualia can be 
described as being simultaneously aware of a sensory datum and 
(recursively) aware of being aware of it.  If the robot AI was sufficiently 
advanced that we could program it to talk about its experiences, the test 
of my prediction would be that, with the switch off, the robot would talk 
about what it sees and hears, and that with the switch on, the robot would 
also talk about fact that it knew it was seeing and hearing things.

-Gabe

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

2014-01-10 Thread Jesse Mazer

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:20 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Thu, Jan 9, 2014  Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote:

 I never claimed Liouville's theorem was a fundamental law of physics in
 itself,


 Good, I agree.

  rather it is derivable as a mathematical consequence of certain features
 of the fundamental laws.


 And of the initial conditions!


No, it doesn't depend on initial conditions. No matter what set of initial
microstates you choose at time T0, if you evolve each one forward to get a
new set of microstates at time T1, then the volume of phase space occupied
by the microstates at T0 will be precisely equal to the volume of phase
space occupied by the microstates at T1. Do you disagree?




  Liouville's theorem is derived in deterministic classical mechanics.


 Then Liouville's theorem can only be approximately true.


It'd be precisely true in a possible universe where the laws of classical
physics hold exactly. Of course in our universe they don't, but there is
apparently a quantum analogue of Liouville's theorem, though I don't
understand it as well--see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liouville's_theorem_(Hamiltonian)#Quantum_Liouville_equation




  It [Liouville's theorem] only becomes statistical if you interpret the
 original set of microstates as representing your own uncertainty


 But that's the only way you can interpret it because the laws of physics
 insist that you will *always* be uncertain about the microstates, all you
 know are purely statistical things about the system, like its temperature
 and pressure.


In classical physics there is no limit in principle to your knowledge of
the microstate. And in quantum physics, there is nothing in principle
preventing you from determining an exact quantum state for a system; only
if you believe in some hidden-variables theory (like a theory that says
that particles have precise position and momentum at all times, even though
you can't measure them both simultaneously) would this be
less-than-complete information about the microstate.



  This line of discussion got started because I was disputing your
 statement that we can derive the 2nd law in a *purely* logical way like
 2+2=5, with no need to invoke knowledge about the laws of physics that was
 based on observation. This would imply that *any* logically possible
 mathematical laws of nature would obey the 2nd law.


 Yes, *any* logically possible mathematical law of nature must actually do
 something, or it shouldn't be called a law. If the initial state of a
 system is in a state of lowest possible entropy, and if one of those laws
 goes to work on that state then the entropy of the system in that state
 will NOT go down. And that is the second law of thermodynamics.


Do you think my Toroidal Game of Life (a finite grid of cells with the
edges identified, giving it the topology of a torus) is a mathematically
well-defined possible universe? Do you disagree that starting from a
randomly-chosen initial state which is likely to have something close to a
50:50 ratio of black to white squares, the board is likely to evolve to a
state dominated by white squares, which would have lower entropy if we
define macrostates in terms of the black:white ratio?




  If you did not mean to suggest that we can know a priori the 2nd law is
 true because it would be true in any logically possible universe whose
 behavior follows mathematical laws, please clarify.


 That is exactly what I meant to suggest, provided that the initial
 conditions were of very low entropy.


The 2nd law is not restricted to initial conditions of very low entropy,
it says that if the entropy is anything lower than the maximum it will
statistically tend to increase, and if the entropy is at the maximum it is
statistically more likely to stay at that value than to drop to any
specific lower value.



   But I thought you were talking about logically possible universes as
 well, not just our universe


 If the initial conditions were of high entropy then applying a law of
 physics to that mess would be just as likely to decrease its entropy as
 increase it, therefore the second law would not be true and time would have
 no arrow; in fact the very concept of time would have no meaning in that
 universe.


If the initial conditions deviated from maximum entropy even slightly, the
second law says that an increase in entropy should be more likely than a
decrease. For example, suppose we have 10,000 gas atoms in a box with no
external forces acting on them, and we divide the box into two equal
halves, and choose an initial macrostate where 5,100 atoms are in one half
of the box and 4,900 atoms are in the other half. If the laws of physics
applied to this initial macrostate were such that the ratio of atoms in
each side was more likely to get *further* from 50:50 than 51:49 rather
than closer to 50:50, that would be a clear violation of the 2nd law. Do
you disagree?

If you agree with that, then it's

Re: What are wavefunctions?

2014-01-10 Thread Jesse Mazer

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:43 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 5:38 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 As a lot of people have now pointed out, physics can be local and
 relistic if time symmetry is valid.


 If time is symmetrical then retro-causality exists, so how can realism
 hold? How can the outcome of a coin flip today have a definite value
 independent of the observer if next year or next millennium someone can
 cause a change in today's coin flip? If realism holds under those
 circumstances then the word realism has no meaning.


There could be no change if the Novikov self-consistency principle holds
(see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novikov_self-consistency_principle ),
which is what physicists usually assume when analyzing theoretical
scenarios where time travel could be possible, like traversable wormholes
in general relativity. In this case the block time assumption holds, you
just have a fixed 4D spacetime where all cause-and-effect sequences are
already part of it, and any retrocausal influences must have been part of
history all along rather than changing history from one sequence of
events to an altered sequence.

Jesse

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Re: Tegmark's New Book




On Jan 10, 2014, at 11:15 AM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com  
wrote:



Hi Stephen,

Well, I'm not sure if what I'm asking is even coherent within the  
UDA, as it may betray a misunderstanding on my part. But if that's  
not the case, then it seems to me that I could never communicate  
with Glak because our consciousnesses are selecting different  
universes within the infinite possibilities of experiences traced by  
the UD. It's analogous to asking how we could communicate with  
someone outside of our light cone.




Stephen,

You and Glak can communicate when a third alien, Thon, in yet a third  
universe creates both you and Glak in a simulation in his labratory,  
and sets up a virtual telescreen in both the simulations that links  
you and Glak.


As you see, defining a universe as the reality supporting the ability  
of more than one observer to communicate becomes quite difficult in  
the computationalist framework.


Jason



Terren


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:06 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com 
 wrote:

Dear Terren,

  Good question! I ask that you take what you wrote and add the  
following question: How do Glak and Terren Communicate?



On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:57 AM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com 
 wrote:


Bruno,

It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined -  
but only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience  
one and only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection  
criteria among the infinity of computations going through my state.  
But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics?  Glak's  
consciousness selects a unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that  
emergent physical universe Glak experiences is characterized by laws  
that are different from what I experience.


Terren


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:28 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is  
(locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit  
conversion factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value  
is arbitrary, like how many feet in a mile, which is why it is  
now an exact number in SI units.
Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?)  
to 1.


So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution -  
namely the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP  
- we experience a universe compatible with our existence because  
such a universe has to drop out of the interations of conscious  
beings in Platonia?


It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only  
RSSA. (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).


Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light  
migvht have appeared.


We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it.  
Any TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any  
universal system taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same  
physics, at least for each pints of view. It gives the same  
theology, more generally, and physics is defined through it.


Remind me, which is step 7?


In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we  
are unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change  
the probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true  
for the change between physical implementation and physical  
virtual implementation.


In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing  
a never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six,  
except that the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize  
then that to predict (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any first  
person experience you can have, like when doing a pizza, you need to  
apply the probability calculus on all your reconstitutions in  
the UD* (the complete running of the UD). So physics is reduced to  
that probability calculus on all your computations. OK?







We can come back on this.

Yes please. This is very interesting!


Thanks. tell me if you (re)saw the step 7 point.

Bruno






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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Jason,

  Could you elaborate on how a simulation of Stephen and Glak is related to
the 1p of Stephen and Glak. There is some ambiguity as to the relation
between the 1p view (via a simulation) that Thon would have and the 3p view
idea. I really think that the 3p concept is deeply problematic!


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 2:43 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Jan 10, 2014, at 11:15 AM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 Hi Stephen,

 Well, I'm not sure if what I'm asking is even coherent within the UDA, as
 it may betray a misunderstanding on my part. But if that's not the case,
 then it seems to me that I could never communicate with Glak because our
 consciousnesses are selecting different universes within the infinite
 possibilities of experiences traced by the UD. It's analogous to asking how
 we could communicate with someone outside of our light cone.


 Stephen,

 You and Glak can communicate when a third alien, Thon, in yet a third
 universe creates both you and Glak in a simulation in his labratory, and
 sets up a virtual telescreen in both the simulations that links you and
 Glak.

 As you see, defining a universe as the reality supporting the ability of
 more than one observer to communicate becomes quite difficult in the
 computationalist framework.

 Jason


 Terren


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:06 PM, Stephen Paul King 
 stephe...@provensecure.com
 stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Terren,

   Good question! I ask that you take what you wrote and add the following
 question: How do Glak and Terren Communicate?


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:57 AM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com
 terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:


 Bruno,

 It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
 only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only
 one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the
 infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
 being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
 unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
 experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
 experience.

 Terren


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:28 AM, Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be
 marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be
 marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb  meeke...@verizon.net
 meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is
 (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion
 factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, 
 like
 how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI
 units.

 Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

 So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely
 the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we 
 experience
 a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to
 drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?


 It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA.
 (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).

 Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light migvht
 have appeared.


 We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any
 TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any universal system
 taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same physics, at least for
 each pints of view. It gives the same theology, more generally, and 
 physics
 is defined through it.


 Remind me, which is step 7?


 In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we are
 unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change the
 probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true for the
 change between physical implementation and physical virtual
 implementation.

 In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing a
 never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six, except that
 the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize then that to predict
 (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any first person experience you can
 have, like when doing a pizza, you need to apply the probability calculus
 on all your reconstitutions in the UD* (the complete running of the UD).
 So physics is reduced to that probability calculus on all your
 computations. OK?





 We can come back on this.


 Yes please. This is very interesting!


  Thanks. tell me if you (re)saw the step 7 point.

 Bruno





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Re: What are wavefunctions?




On Jan 10, 2014, at 11:43 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:


On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 5:38 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

As a lot of people have now pointed out, physics can be local and  
relistic if time symmetry is valid.


If time is symmetrical then retro-causality exists, so how can  
realism hold? How can the outcome of a coin flip today have a  
definite value independent of the observer if next year or next  
millennium someone can cause a change in today's coin flip?


You are the obe who always says free will is meaningless. How can  
anyone change anything from how it would otherwise be if they and  
everything are ruled by the deterministic laws?


The block time view makes this more clear. We can no more change the  
future than change the present or the past.



If realism holds under those circumstances then the word realism  
has no meaning.


Do you think realism is valid in the block time view?




And by the way, if time is symmetrical then there is no point in  
ever actually performing an experiment because you would remember  
the future as clearly as you remember the past,


The second law of thermodynamics prohibits this, as I explained in  
recent posts.


Jason

so you would already remember the outcome of the experiment just as  
clearly as you remember setting up the experimental apparatus.


  John K Clark


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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 04:23, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Liz,

 I think Edgar's computational reality can be consistent with the
 computational theory of mind if you somehow constrain reality to be small
 and finite.


Ah, yes, I think you're right. One of Bruno's steps is to imagine a
physical UD running in a finite universe, so I guess Edgar possibly mirrors
him that far, but no further (it's hard to tell, for me at least, because
Edgar seemes not to wish to formalise his theory).


 The moment you let the universe be very big (eternal inflation) then you
 also get an infinite number of computers built by aliens in distant
 galaxies, any of which might be simulating you, and the same consequences
 Bruno points out apply.


If it's infinite you get the level 1 multiverse of Max Tegmark, which gives
an infinite number of copies of everything (assuming space-time is
quantised at some level), with attendant consequences.


 My question to Edgar is why do you believe reality is finite? This seems
 to contradict a number of current scientific theories.


Yes.


 Also, when do you believe reality was created?  And how do you explain
 it's origins?

 Likewise. One of the reasons I like comp and the MUH is that they actually
answer this question.

Over to you,  Edgar. Jason has pointed out that some of your assumptions
require justification. Please respond constructively to his questions.

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 06:06, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear Terren,

   Good question! I ask that you take what you wrote and add the following
 question: How do Glak and Terren Communicate?

 It's a good question, all right - I suspect the answer is that they can't.
Which puts Glak into the never-never land of most of the multiverse, the
string landscape, the infinite universe beyond our cosmic horizon, etc.

Which isn't to say we can't deduce that he must exist.

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/10/2014 12:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:32, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear LizR,

  There is an interdependency that should not be ignored between the objects that 
express the quantities and relations that are represented by the logic and arithmetic. 
A universe that does not contain any persistent entities would not be capable of 
expressing numbers or statements.


Yes. But arithmetic contains many relatively persistent beings.


But what is the measure of relative persistence?  Are you talking about neutrons that 
may last seconds or millenia, depending on circumstances, or a planet or a person which 
change constantly and are only recognizable as a being in a rough and approximate way?


Brent

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

On 11 January 2014 06:43, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 5:38 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 As a lot of people have now pointed out, physics can be local and
 relistic if time symmetry is valid.


 If time is symmetrical then retro-causality exists, so how can realism
 hold? How can the outcome of a coin flip today have a definite value
 independent of the observer if next year or next millennium someone can
 cause a change in today's coin flip? If realism holds under those
 circumstances then the word realism has no meaning.


Retro-causality (time symmetry is a better term) only exists at the
quantum level. The laws of physics are time-symmetric, but constrained by
boundary conditions. There is a very influential boundary condition in what
we call the past, namely the Big Bang, plus less influential ones in the
future, like the settings of measuring apparatuses. At all scales except
that of individual quantum events, the pastward boundary condition washes
out any noticeable effects of time symmetry. (That's what it means when we
say that entropy increase involves coarse graining.)


 And by the way, if time is symmetrical then there is no point in ever
 actually performing an experiment because you would remember the future as
 clearly as you remember the past, so you would already remember the outcome
 of the experiment just as clearly as you remember setting up the
 experimental apparatus.


I assume you're not so stupid as to think that's what I've been claiming,
so I can only assume this is a deliberate attempt at mockery, directed at a
straw man as such attempts usually are. I had hoped for a better standard
of debate on this list.

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/10/2014 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear LizR,

  That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.


It is answered, completely.





On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 4:45 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com 
mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is 
(locally)
Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion factor 
between
the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like how many 
feet in a
mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI units.

Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely the 
one we
experience?



Only from what we have just experienced before. Comp does not predict the existence of 
the moon, but should predict the physical laws, that is, what is invariant for all 
observers/machines.






So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a universe compatible 
with our
existence because such a universe has to drop out of the interations of 
conscious
beings in Platonia?



As I said, comp uses only a conditional probability, not a bayesian relation, which can 
still be used for geography and history. But the physical laws are defined by the 
general measure on the computation, which must exist with comp, and is given by the 
material points of view (Bp  Dt, mainly).



But can you prove within comp that there must be physical laws, can you prove that 
solipism is false, that it's not ALL geography and we have nothing to thank for our 
existence but WAP?


Brent

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

On 11 January 2014 08:52, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Jan 10, 2014, at 11:43 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 5:38 PM, LizR  lizj...@gmail.com
 lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 As a lot of people have now pointed out, physics can be local and
 relistic if time symmetry is valid.


 If time is symmetrical then retro-causality exists, so how can realism
 hold? How can the outcome of a coin flip today have a definite value
 independent of the observer if next year or next millennium someone can
 cause a change in today's coin flip?


 You are the obe who always says free will is meaningless. How can anyone
 change anything from how it would otherwise be if they and everything are
 ruled by the deterministic laws?

 The block time view makes this more clear. We can no more change the
 future than change the present or the past.

 The simplest way to understand this is to consider the past. If you look
at the past, you see a perfect example of a block universe, with all the
causal links (in either time direction) embedded in it. Now you just have
to make the mental effort to extend that to the future, and to imagine that
we are embedded, just as King Harold is embedded in 1066. Harold thinks
that he is in a moving present but we can see his entire history. It's
all there.  Was he wrong? Yes, he was, we can see that now. Are we wrong?
Ask someone in the next year/day/minute...

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/10/2014 1:34 AM, LizR wrote:
On 10 January 2014 22:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be 
wrote:



I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor computing 
the state
of the universe. In fact there is no such universe. The universe is an 
appearance
emerging, from below the substitution level, on all computations going 
through our
current state. A single computation can hardly do that a priori, although 
this is
not excluded, but this would lead to a newtonian-like type of reality. 
Everett
confirms that such a computation cannot be unique, which is the default 
stance in
the comp theory, although we cannot avoid at this stage some possible 
conspiracy by
numbers leading to a unique computable reality.

Surely a single computer could run the UD, at least until it wore out?


As I understand it the multiverse, the world, is the complete output of the UD.  In effect 
the UD must finish in order to have computed the world, which of course is an 
uncomputable output.


Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:


It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but only for a 
particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only one physics, because my 
consciousness is the selection criteria among the infinity of computations going through 
my state. But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness 
selects a unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak 
experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I experience.


But then if you ask, Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-versa? you see that the 
answer must be that it would be an improbable continuation of my brain states to suddenly 
instantiate a different physics and experience being Glak.  This is like the white rabbit 
problem, except in the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps 
saying must have a solution (if comp is true).


Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/10/2014 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

QM predict a infinite small
probability for white rabbits, while yours infer a decent amount of
them until some cut criteria emerges. And that is not my work, but
yours.


QM predict all this by using comp, or an unintelligible dualist theory of observation. 


 I don't understand that.  QM predicts a low probability for white rabbits - but not by 
using comp, in fact it assumes a continuum.  And comp doesn't entail QM.


Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear LizR,

  I am trying to get a somewhat complicate question out and understood. Let
me state it crudely: Given the infinite number of possible 1p content that
the UD can run, how do we obtain from the UDA or UD or UD* the situation
that we believe to be true: that there exists a space-time that *contains*
some huge number of observer -each with its own 1p- *and* the appearance of
interactions among them *and* a set of physical laws, GR and QM that have a
mathematical structure that prohibits the assumption of an absolute 1p that
could see everything all at once?

BTW, there are empirical reasons to strongly doubt that space-time has some
form of granularity, as such would violate SR by making signal propagation
velocities dependent on the energy of the photons. Ultra high energy and
medium energy gamma rays have been observed to arrive simultaneously
(modulo small error bars) from sources that are millions of light-years
away. This makes the notion of quantized space-time dubious.


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 4:14 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 11 January 2014 06:06, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear Terren,

   Good question! I ask that you take what you wrote and add the following
 question: How do Glak and Terren Communicate?

 It's a good question, all right - I suspect the answer is that they
 can't. Which puts Glak into the never-never land of most of the multiverse,
 the string landscape, the infinite universe beyond our cosmic horizon, etc.

 Which isn't to say we can't deduce that he must exist.

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Brent,

  Vaughn Pratt's dualist theory is consistent with QM and does show a
mechanism that prohibits White Rabbits. It is intelligible to anyone that
puts forth the effort to comprehend it.


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 QM predict a infinite small
 probability for white rabbits, while yours infer a decent amount of
 them until some cut criteria emerges. And that is not my work, but
 yours.


 QM predict all this by using comp, or an unintelligible dualist theory of
 observation.


  I don't understand that.  QM predicts a low probability for white rabbits
 - but not by using comp, in fact it assumes a continuum.  And comp doesn't
 entail QM.

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Brent,

  ISTM that your characterization of Terren's question could be analyzed in
terms of Boltzmann brains and continuations between BBs. No?


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:


  It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
 only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only
 one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the
 infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
 being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
 unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
 experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
 experience.


 But then if you ask, Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-versa?
 you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable continuation
 of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics and
 experience being Glak.  This is like the white rabbit problem, except in
 the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps saying
 must have a solution (if comp is true).

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/10/2014 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics?


If Glak mind obeys to the laws of Boole, and if Glak as a finite body, and if he is 
self-referentially correct, then we share with Glak the same sigma_1 true sentences, and 
he figures it out (by Bp  Dt) in the same way, so we have the same physics. If Glak 
shows us an electron heaver than ours, we can conclude that the mass of an electron is 
not a necessity, but a contingency, a geographical fact, and there might be a law given 
the mass electron relatively to that type of accessible physics (given that we succeed 
in talking with Glak).



But there's the rub. Could Glak's universe not have electrons?  Could it not have 
electrical charge?  A theory that cannot tell us what is contingent and only that 
arithmetical (or logical truths) are necessary doesn't really tell us anything.  It just 
says Tautologies are true.


Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Brent!

Indeed! A theory that explains everything must be more than a list of
tautologies!


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:25 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics?


  If Glak mind obeys to the laws of Boole, and if Glak as a finite body,
 and if he is self-referentially correct, then we share with Glak the same
 sigma_1 true sentences, and he figures it out (by Bp  Dt) in the same way,
 so we have the same physics. If Glak shows us an electron heaver than ours,
 we can conclude that the mass of an electron is not a necessity, but a
 contingency, a geographical fact, and there might be a law given the mass
 electron relatively to that type of accessible physics (given that we
 succeed in talking with Glak).



 But there's the rub.  Could Glak's universe not have electrons?  Could it
 not have electrical charge?  A theory that cannot tell us what is
 contingent and only that arithmetical (or logical truths) are necessary
 doesn't really tell us anything.  It just says Tautologies are true.

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 07:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 17:57, Terren Suydam wrote:


 Bruno,

 It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
 only for a particular point of view.


 Yes, but it is a very general one. It is the particular view of any
 (universal) machine. It has to be the same for any person capable of being
 incarnated/implemented through a finitely describable body relatively to
 some universal numbers.

 All what you will add, by consciousness differentiation is local,
 historical, and geographical.


What does local mean in this context?

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 10:57, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 1:34 AM, LizR wrote:

  On 10 January 2014 22:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor
 computing the state of the universe. In fact there is no such universe.
 The universe is an appearance emerging, from below the substitution level,
 on all computations going through our current state. A single computation
 can hardly do that a priori, although this is not excluded, but this would
 lead to a newtonian-like type of reality. Everett confirms that such a
 computation cannot be unique, which is the default stance in the comp
 theory, although we cannot avoid at this stage some possible conspiracy by
 numbers leading to a unique computable reality.

   Surely a single computer could run the UD, at least until it wore out?


 As I understand it the multiverse, the world, is the complete output of
 the UD.  In effect the UD must finish in order to have computed the
 world, which of course is an uncomputable output.


Eek! Of coruse it must, to have an infinity of computations...! Still, I
suppose the UD has always finished, within Platonia. But a computer,
running for a large amount of time, running the UD, might still generate
*some* experiences --- eventually --- surely?

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 11:20, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear LizR,

   I am trying to get a somewhat complicate question out and understood.
 Let me state it crudely: Given the infinite number of possible 1p content
 that the UD can run, how do we obtain from the UDA or UD or UD* the
 situation that we believe to be true: that there exists a space-time that
 *contains* some huge number of observer -each with its own 1p- *and* the
 appearance of interactions among them *and* a set of physical laws, GR and
 QM that have a mathematical structure that prohibits the assumption of an
 absolute 1p that could see everything all at once?

 BTW, there are empirical reasons to strongly doubt that space-time has
 some form of granularity, as such would violate SR by making signal
 propagation velocities dependent on the energy of the photons. Ultra high
 energy and medium energy gamma rays have been observed to arrive
 simultaneously (modulo small error bars) from sources that are millions of
 light-years away. This makes the notion of quantized space-time dubious.

 Apparently the jury is still out on this - see the 4/1/14 edition of New
Scientist with the (typically non-sensationalist :) headline BREAKING
RELATIVITY - The celestial signals that defy Einstein, which claims the
opposite - that BRB130427A (from a distance of some billions of light
years, redshift 0.34) had a delay of 100s of second between low and high
energy gamma rays. This is the most energetic event observed to date (on
27/4/13). Also, on 30/6/05, the MAGIC telescope in the Canary Islands
detected a gamma ray burst from half a billion light years away with a 4
minute delay between the low and high energy radiation. There is also some
data from the Ice Cube neutrino observatory that indicates hints of an
energy dependent time lag in neutrino bursts...

But there are other observations that don't show these features, plus there
are some assumptions involved that may change how we interpret them, and so
on. What is needed of course is more light! - as observations continue it
should become clearer whether there is some dispersion (maybe only at gamma
ray energies that even GRBs struggle to reach very often, which would
indicate that the granularity of space-time is quite small) - or not, in
which case any granularity that exists would have to be very small, even
compared to the Planck length,

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Sorry typo that should be GRB not BRB!


On 11 January 2014 12:36, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 11 January 2014 11:20, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear LizR,

   I am trying to get a somewhat complicate question out and understood.
 Let me state it crudely: Given the infinite number of possible 1p content
 that the UD can run, how do we obtain from the UDA or UD or UD* the
 situation that we believe to be true: that there exists a space-time that
 *contains* some huge number of observer -each with its own 1p- *and* the
 appearance of interactions among them *and* a set of physical laws, GR and
 QM that have a mathematical structure that prohibits the assumption of an
 absolute 1p that could see everything all at once?

 BTW, there are empirical reasons to strongly doubt that space-time has
 some form of granularity, as such would violate SR by making signal
 propagation velocities dependent on the energy of the photons. Ultra high
 energy and medium energy gamma rays have been observed to arrive
 simultaneously (modulo small error bars) from sources that are millions of
 light-years away. This makes the notion of quantized space-time dubious.

 Apparently the jury is still out on this - see the 4/1/14 edition of New
 Scientist with the (typically non-sensationalist :) headline BREAKING
 RELATIVITY - The celestial signals that defy Einstein, which claims the
 opposite - that BRB130427A (from a distance of some billions of light
 years, redshift 0.34) had a delay of 100s of second between low and high
 energy gamma rays. This is the most energetic event observed to date (on
 27/4/13). Also, on 30/6/05, the MAGIC telescope in the Canary Islands
 detected a gamma ray burst from half a billion light years away with a 4
 minute delay between the low and high energy radiation. There is also some
 data from the Ice Cube neutrino observatory that indicates hints of an
 energy dependent time lag in neutrino bursts...

 But there are other observations that don't show these features, plus
 there are some assumptions involved that may change how we interpret them,
 and so on. What is needed of course is more light! - as observations
 continue it should become clearer whether there is some dispersion (maybe
 only at gamma ray energies that even GRBs struggle to reach very often,
 which would indicate that the granularity of space-time is quite small) -
 or not, in which case any granularity that exists would have to be very
 small, even compared to the Planck length,


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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear LizR,

   The paper (that I can't seem to find at the moment) that I am using as a
reference takes into account other sources of variation in arrival times,
for example that the gamma rays where not simultaneously emitted, and looks
also at the dispersal of the individual polarizations of the photons. If
there is a granularity to space-time, there will be an energy dependence in
both the arrival times and the polarization dispersal patterns. Both where
not found on that occasion within the sensitivity of the device discussed.
  The basic point here is that such an energy dependence is a violation of
the invariance of the speed of light for observers and makes space-time's
structure observer dependent. This concept can be taken in many
directions... but nevertheless, the idea that space-time is not smooth has
been looked at by many researchers and has severe consequences that need to
be carefully considered.


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 6:36 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 11 January 2014 11:20, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear LizR,

   I am trying to get a somewhat complicate question out and understood.
 Let me state it crudely: Given the infinite number of possible 1p content
 that the UD can run, how do we obtain from the UDA or UD or UD* the
 situation that we believe to be true: that there exists a space-time that
 *contains* some huge number of observer -each with its own 1p- *and* the
 appearance of interactions among them *and* a set of physical laws, GR and
 QM that have a mathematical structure that prohibits the assumption of an
 absolute 1p that could see everything all at once?

 BTW, there are empirical reasons to strongly doubt that space-time has
 some form of granularity, as such would violate SR by making signal
 propagation velocities dependent on the energy of the photons. Ultra high
 energy and medium energy gamma rays have been observed to arrive
 simultaneously (modulo small error bars) from sources that are millions of
 light-years away. This makes the notion of quantized space-time dubious.

 Apparently the jury is still out on this - see the 4/1/14 edition of New
 Scientist with the (typically non-sensationalist :) headline BREAKING
 RELATIVITY - The celestial signals that defy Einstein, which claims the
 opposite - that BRB130427A (from a distance of some billions of light
 years, redshift 0.34) had a delay of 100s of second between low and high
 energy gamma rays. This is the most energetic event observed to date (on
 27/4/13). Also, on 30/6/05, the MAGIC telescope in the Canary Islands
 detected a gamma ray burst from half a billion light years away with a 4
 minute delay between the low and high energy radiation. There is also some
 data from the Ice Cube neutrino observatory that indicates hints of an
 energy dependent time lag in neutrino bursts...

 But there are other observations that don't show these features, plus
 there are some assumptions involved that may change how we interpret them,
 and so on. What is needed of course is more light! - as observations
 continue it should become clearer whether there is some dispersion (maybe
 only at gamma ray energies that even GRBs struggle to reach very often,
 which would indicate that the granularity of space-time is quite small) -
 or not, in which case any granularity that exists would have to be very
 small, even compared to the Planck length,

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter


On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple example is 
arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is computable (this is provable if you accept 
the Church Turing thesis).


But it's questionable whether it exists.

Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 12:46, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear LizR,

The paper (that I can't seem to find at the moment) that I am using as
 a reference takes into account other sources of variation in arrival times,
 for example that the gamma rays where not simultaneously emitted, and looks
 also at the dispersal of the individual polarizations of the photons. If
 there is a granularity to space-time, there will be an energy dependence in
 both the arrival times and the polarization dispersal patterns. Both where
 not found on that occasion within the sensitivity of the device discussed.
   The basic point here is that such an energy dependence is a violation of
 the invariance of the speed of light for observers and makes space-time's
 structure observer dependent. This concept can be taken in many
 directions... but nevertheless, the idea that space-time is not smooth has
 been looked at by many researchers and has severe consequences that need to
 be carefully considered.

 I agree. The main significance of this new events is that it was at a
higher energy than anything previously seen, and hence in theory probes a
lower size of granularity - especially since it was also at a high
redshift, and hence was even more energetic when it happened than it
appears to us now. The main thing is, we need enough results at various
energies to build up a coherent picture. It's all highly speculative at
present, with only a relatively few data points.

If space-time's smooth or not, of course, either would be an exciting
discovery. Especially if it's quantised, but at a smaller scale than most
theories predict - hence ruling out some or all of the current ideas.

More light!

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter

On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple
 example is arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is computable (this is
 provable if you accept the Church Turing thesis).

 But it's questionable whether it exists.


Does it kick back? Could two beings in different universes, with different
laws of physics (if such exist) discover it independently?

If so, it exists by any reasonable definition (including Stephen's)

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea
(notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would be
separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of those
worlds... or were you making a different point?

Terren
On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:


  It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
 only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only
 one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the
 infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
 being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
 unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
 experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
 experience.


 But then if you ask, Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-versa?
 you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable continuation
 of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics and
 experience being Glak.  This is like the white rabbit problem, except in
 the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps saying
 must have a solution (if comp is true).

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Terren,

  Yes, it is about the continuations and measures thereof. I am not having
much luck discovering how the measures are defined.


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 8:02 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.comwrote:

 Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea
 (notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would be
 separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of those
 worlds... or were you making a different point?

 Terren
 On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:


  It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
 only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only
 one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the
 infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
 being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
 unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
 experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
 experience.


 But then if you ask, Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-versa?
 you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable continuation
 of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics and
 experience being Glak.  This is like the white rabbit problem, except in
 the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps
 saying must have a solution (if comp is true).

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me,
that's it - how an infinity of emulations condense into a single
conscious experience.

Terren
On Jan 10, 2014 8:04 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
wrote:

 Dear Terren,

   Yes, it is about the continuations and measures thereof. I am not having
 much luck discovering how the measures are defined.


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 8:02 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.comwrote:

 Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea
 (notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would be
 separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of those
 worlds... or were you making a different point?

 Terren
 On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:


  It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined -
 but only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and
 only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among
 the infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
 being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
 unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
 experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
 experience.


 But then if you ask, Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-versa?
 you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable continuation
 of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics and
 experience being Glak.  This is like the white rabbit problem, except in
 the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps
 saying must have a solution (if comp is true).

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 14:02, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:

 Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea
 (notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would be
 separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of those
 worlds... or were you making a different point?

Brent seems to have a habit of sounding as though he's disagreeing when
what he says is really an addition to what you said, or even just a
rephrasing of it. But he looks like a nice bloke, so I'm sure it's all just
part of his eccentric charm :D

Hi, Brent, how are you today?

I'm fine. But suppose I was to ask -- *how are you!?*

Terren
 On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:


  It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
 only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only
 one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the
 infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
 being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
 unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
 experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
 experience.


 But then if you ask, Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-versa?
 you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable continuation
 of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics and
 experience being Glak.  This is like the white rabbit problem, except in
 the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps
 saying must have a solution (if comp is true).

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me,
 that's it - how an infinity of emulations condense into a single
 conscious experience.

If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the experiences
apart. They would be fungible, like the infinite identical copies that
exist in the MWI prior to branching / differentiation. So they would just
be one experience, even if it was generated an infinite number of times. I
guess this is the capsule theory of identity, like Fred Hoyle and his
pigeon holes and flashlight view of consciousness in October the first is
too late. From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't matter if
millions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes in them, and
others only appeared once.

I think.

(I'm assuming it's the infinity part that's the problem...)

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/10/2014 2:23 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

  Vaughn Pratt's dualist theory is consistent with QM and does show a mechanism that 
prohibits White Rabbits. It is intelligible to anyone that puts forth the effort to 
comprehend it.


Can you summarize it?

Brent

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Re: What are wavefunctions?


On 1/10/2014 9:43 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 5:38 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com 
mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

As a lot of people have now pointed out, physics can be local and relistic 
if time
symmetry is valid.


If time is symmetrical


I'm not sure what time is symmetrical means to you.  It's the equations of dynamical 
evolution that are t-symmetric in physics (both classical and quantum-sans-collapse).


then retro-causality exists, so how can realism hold? How can the outcome of a coin flip 
today have a definite value independent of the observer if next year or next millennium 
someone can cause a change in today's coin flip?


If the coin flip today had a definite outcome why do suppose some one the future could 
simply choose it to be a different outcome?...free will?



If realism holds under those circumstances then the word realism has no 
meaning.


So you think realism would have no meaning in Laplace's deterministic universe?



And by the way, if time is symmetrical then there is no point in ever actually 
performing an experiment because you would remember the future as clearly as you 
remember the past, so you would already remember the outcome of the experiment just as 
clearly as you remember setting up the experimental apparatus.


Not if time is symmetrical == dynamical equations are t-symmetric and memory depends 
on the state of a lot of particles in your brain so that the 2nd law applies.


Brent

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Re: A Theory of Consciousness


On 1/10/2014 10:49 AM, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:

On Tuesday, December 31, 2013 4:25:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

As you've explained it above your theory makes a rock just as conscious as 
a brain.
 I'm
sure you must have a more subtle theory than that, so I'll ask you the same 
thing I
asked
Bruno, if I make a robot what do I have to do make it conscious or not 
conscious?

Brent


Did you receive any interesting answers?

I have adequate background in neuroscience but I'm mostly ignorant of AI math, robotics 
work, and philosophy of mind, so excuse my rampant speculation.  This is what I'd try in 
design of a robotic brain to switch on and off consciousness and test for its presence:  
First, I'd give the robot brain modules to interpret its sensory inputs in an 
associative manner analogous to human sensory associative regions.  All these sensory 
inputs would feed into the decision-making module (DMM).  One of the first steps taken 
by the DMM is determining how important each sensory signal is for its current 
objectives.  It decides to pay attention to a subset of those signals.


So is it conscious of those signals?  How does it decide?


Second, I'd put a switch on another input to make it part of the attention 
subset or not:


What other input would you put a switch on?  What inputs are there besides sensory?  I 
think you've assumed conscious = self aware.  Is one conscious when one is lost in 
thought?



the attention's choice of signals would also an input to the DMM, and I could turn on or 
off whether that attentional choice was itself let pass through to the next processing 
stages.  I would predict that, with the switch turned off, the robot would be not 
conscious (i.e. it would have no experience of qualia), but that with the switch turned 
on, the robot would be conscious (i.e. it would experience qualia corresponding to the 
signals it is paying attention to).  I predict this because it seems to me that the 
experience of qualia can be described as being simultaneously aware of a sensory datum 
and (recursively) aware of being aware of it. If the robot AI was sufficiently advanced 
that we could program it to talk about its experiences, the test of my prediction would 
be that, with the switch off, the robot would talk about what it sees and hears, and 
that with the switch on, the robot would also talk about fact that it knew it was seeing 
and hearing things.


So is a Mars Rover conscious because it processes video from it's camera to send to JPL, 
AND it senses that its camera is powered and working and that its transmitter is working 
AND it reports those internal status variables to JPL too.


Is it conscious all the time or only when it talks to JPL?

Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book




On Jan 10, 2014, at 1:54 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com 
 wrote:



Dear Jason,

  Could you elaborate on how a simulation of Stephen and Glak is  
related to the 1p of Stephen and Glak.


The simulation provides a consistent continuation path for your first  
person view. In fact you could be in Thon's labratory right now.   
Therefore you cannot be sure whether or not you and Glak are forever  
unable to communicate as Glak's universe might also be within a  
simulation run by Thon.



There is some ambiguity as to the relation between the 1p view (via  
a simulation) that Thon would have and the 3p view idea. I really  
think that the 3p concept is deeply problematic!




In the third person view you might see an infinite number of  
explanations for your first person view, but it feels like there is  
only one from the first person perspective.


Jason



On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 2:43 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:



On Jan 10, 2014, at 11:15 AM, Terren Suydam  
terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:



Hi Stephen,

Well, I'm not sure if what I'm asking is even coherent within the  
UDA, as it may betray a misunderstanding on my part. But if that's  
not the case, then it seems to me that I could never communicate  
with Glak because our consciousnesses are selecting different  
universes within the infinite possibilities of experiences traced  
by the UD. It's analogous to asking how we could communicate with  
someone outside of our light cone.




Stephen,

You and Glak can communicate when a third alien, Thon, in yet a  
third universe creates both you and Glak in a simulation in his  
labratory, and sets up a virtual telescreen in both the simulations  
that links you and Glak.


As you see, defining a universe as the reality supporting the  
ability of more than one observer to communicate becomes quite  
difficult in the computationalist framework.


Jason



Terren


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:06 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com 
 wrote:

Dear Terren,

  Good question! I ask that you take what you wrote and add the  
following question: How do Glak and Terren Communicate?



On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 11:57 AM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com 
 wrote:


Bruno,

It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined -  
but only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience  
one and only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection  
criteria among the infinity of computations going through my state.  
But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics?  Glak's  
consciousness selects a unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that  
emergent physical universe Glak experiences is characterized by  
laws that are different from what I experience.


Terren


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:28 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:


On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is  
(locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit  
conversion factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's  
value is arbitrary, like how many feet in a mile, which is why  
it is now an exact number in SI units.
Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?)  
to 1.


So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution -  
namely the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the  
WAP - we experience a universe compatible with our existence  
because such a universe has to drop out of the interations of  
conscious beings in Platonia?


It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only  
RSSA. (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).


Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light  
migvht have appeared.


We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it.  
Any TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any  
universal system taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same  
physics, at least for each pints of view. It gives the same  
theology, more generally, and physics is defined through it.


Remind me, which is step 7?


In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we  
are unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change  
the probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true  
for the change between physical implementation and physical  
virtual implementation.


In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing  
a never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six,  
except that the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize  
then that to predict (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any  
first person experience you can have, like when doing a pizza, you  
need to apply the probability calculus on

Re: Tegmark's New Book

Lol! So that explains it.
On Jan 10, 2014 8:56 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 11 January 2014 14:02, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:

 Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea
 (notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would be
 separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of those
 worlds... or were you making a different point?

 Brent seems to have a habit of sounding as though he's disagreeing when
 what he says is really an addition to what you said, or even just a
 rephrasing of it. But he looks like a nice bloke, so I'm sure it's all just
 part of his eccentric charm :D

 Hi, Brent, how are you today?

 I'm fine. But suppose I was to ask -- *how are you!?*

  Terren
 On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:


  It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined -
 but only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and
 only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among
 the infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
 being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
 unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
 experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
 experience.


 But then if you ask, Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-versa?
 you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable continuation
 of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics and
 experience being Glak.  This is like the white rabbit problem, except in
 the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps
 saying must have a solution (if comp is true).

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

If they're all truly identical then yes, it's much easier to see how it
could be experienced as a single consciousness.

But what precisely does it mean for an infinity of computations to go
through my state? How precisely is my state specified?  Imagine you have
two computations that essentially simulate my brain and they are identical
in every way except that there is a difference in orientation of a single
water molecule. Would one of those emulations be excluded from the infinity
of computations going through my state? If so, it seems to be an overly
stringent requirement for specifying my state, but that could just be a
question of what substitution level you bet on. If the two nearly identical
simulations do both contribute, then we can ask the same question of bigger
and bigger differences between two hypothetical simulations until we can
say unambiguously that they cannot both be part of the snapshot of my
current conscious state. The question is then, where exactly did we cross
the line, and how do you define it?

You can also go through the same exercise, but modifying instead the
environment, where the environment could include other people and their
states of mind. This one seems easier, as you could group together all
computations whose differences don't impact the environment that I am
consciously aware of.

The point being that if we do allow that non-identical emulations can
contribute, that's where the magic happens... the fact that my experience
is a measure of the most stable continuations, in the sense that white
rabbits don't appear. Are there other worlds (akin to Glak's) where I am
typing this email only to be interrupted by a ufo tractoring my house off
the ground?

Terren
On Jan 10, 2014 9:02 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me,
 that's it - how an infinity of emulations condense into a single
 conscious experience.

 If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the experiences
 apart. They would be fungible, like the infinite identical copies that
 exist in the MWI prior to branching / differentiation. So they would just
 be one experience, even if it was generated an infinite number of times. I
 guess this is the capsule theory of identity, like Fred Hoyle and his
 pigeon holes and flashlight view of consciousness in October the first is
 too late. From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't matter if
 millions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes in them, and
 others only appeared once.

 I think.

 (I'm assuming it's the infinity part that's the problem...)

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter


On 1/10/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net 
wrote:


On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple 
example is
arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is computable (this is provable if 
you
accept the Church Turing thesis).

But it's questionable whether it exists.


Does it kick back? Could two beings in different universes, with different laws of 
physics (if such exist) discover it independently?


Of course discover begs the question.



If so, it exists by any reasonable definition (including Stephen's)



Two beings with different laws of physics in different universes could invent the game of 
rock, paper, scissors.  Does that mean the game exists?  Did it exist before they invented 
it?  Does the continuum exist?


Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/10/2014 6:01 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com 
mailto:terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:


Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me, 
that's it -
how an infinity of emulations condense into a single conscious experience.

If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the experiences apart. They 
would be fungible, like the infinite identical copies that exist in the MWI prior to 
branching / differentiation. So they would just be one experience, even if it was 
generated an infinite number of times. I guess this is the capsule theory of identity, 
like Fred Hoyle and his pigeon holes and flashlight view of consciousness in October 
the first is too late. From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't matter if 
millions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes in them, and others only 
appeared once.


But might their number provide a kind of probability measure for the continuation of your 
consciousness?


Brent




I think.

(I'm assuming it's the infinity part that's the problem...)

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 15:57, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:

 If they're all truly identical then yes, it's much easier to see how it
 could be experienced as a single consciousness.

 But what precisely does it mean for an infinity of computations to go
 through my state? How precisely is my state specified?  Imagine you have
 two computations that essentially simulate my brain and they are identical
 in every way except that there is a difference in orientation of a single
 water molecule. Would one of those emulations be excluded from the infinity
 of computations going through my state? If so, it

I don't think they emulate your brain, only your mental state. So I don't
think a water molecule would normally matter, since it isn't perceived.

 seems to be an overly stringent requirement for specifying my state, but
 that could just be a question of what substitution level you bet on. If the
 two nearly identical simulations do both contribute, then we can ask the
 same question of bigger and bigger differences between two hypothetical
 simulations until we can say unambiguously that they cannot both be part of
 the snapshot of my current conscious state. The question is then, where
 exactly did we cross the line, and how do you define it?

Yes, that sounds reasonable. Although I beleive the subst level isn't
knowable, even in principle, according to Bruno.

  You can also go through the same exercise, but modifying instead the
 environment, where the environment could include other people and their
 states of mind. This one seems easier, as you could group together all
 computations whose differences don't impact the environment that I am
 consciously aware of.

 The point being that if we do allow that non-identical emulations can
 contribute, that's where the magic happens... the fact that my experience
 is a measure of the most stable continuations, in the sense that white
 rabbits don't appear. Are there other worlds (akin to Glak's) where I am
 typing this email only to be interrupted by a ufo tractoring my house off
 the ground?

I think we have to assume so, along with ones where you spontaneously
combust, turn into a white rabbit, etc. But those have very small measure
(and I expect one day Bruno will explain why... but I think this is an open
problem!)

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter

On 11 January 2014 16:02, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple
 example is arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is computable (this is
 provable if you accept the Church Turing thesis).

  But it's questionable whether it exists.


  Does it kick back? Could two beings in different universes, with
 different laws of physics (if such exist) discover it independently?

 Of course discover begs the question.


No it doesn't. It *is* the question. I used discover in the sense of
making a discovery, as opposed to inventing something. If alien
mathematicians start from whatever axioms the humans mathematicians start
from, and find themselves led inexorably to the same logical conclusion as
the humans, then I would say they are discovering something about the
nature of reality. If they start from the same premises and arrive at a
different conclusion (and neither sets of mathematicians have made any
mistakes), then I would say they are inventing something. That's the
sense in which I asked if they would discover the (alleged) facts of
maths. It seems to me a perfectly reasonable way to ask the question. Would
they independently discover the same results, or wouldn't they? What's
wrong with that?

I suppose I could have assumed my audience were drongoes and added
something like ...or would they invent completely different results? But
I didn't bother to insult my audience like that, because it seems to me
that was implicit in the way I'd asked the question. In fact I'd very
neatly *summarised* the entire question through the use of that one word -
discover.

 If so, it exists by any reasonable definition (including Stephen's)

 Two beings with different laws of physics in different universes could
 invent the game of rock, paper, scissors.  Does that mean the game exists?
 Did it exist before they invented it?


That isn't the same as being led to one specific conclusion by applying
logic to a given set of axioms, though, which is what discover implies.


 Does the continuum exist?


I don't know. I assume it exists as a mathematically discoverable entity
(or is there a problem with that?) I don't know if it exists in the
physical sense of space-time being one. As I mentioned elsewhere recently,
the jury is out on this one due to the GRB data still being relatively
scarce. Watch this space.

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 16:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 6:01 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me,
 that's it - how an infinity of emulations condense into a single
 conscious experience.

 If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the experiences
 apart. They would be fungible, like the infinite identical copies that
 exist in the MWI prior to branching / differentiation. So they would just
 be one experience, even if it was generated an infinite number of times. I
 guess this is the capsule theory of identity, like Fred Hoyle and his
 pigeon holes and flashlight view of consciousness in October the first is
 too late. From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't matter if
 millions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes in them, and
 others only appeared once.


 But might their number provide a kind of probability measure for the
 continuation of your consciousness?


I don't know. I assume that it continues in all possible continuations, if
that isn't a tautology, but there's definitely a measure problem here - why
are white rabbits far, far less common? So what do you think? Does the
measure mean that I'm more likely to remain me rather than spontaneously
morphing into the ruler of the World? (dammit!) I think my mind is starting
to boggle just thinking about this...

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 6:06 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple
 example is arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is computable (this is
 provable if you accept the Church Turing thesis).

 But it's questionable whether it exists.


 Does it kick back? Could two beings in different universes, with different
 laws of physics (if such exist) discover it independently?

 If so, it exists by any reasonable definition (including Stephen's)


I would say it definitely kicks back: it's not physically possible to write
a correct proof that 17 is a composite using a pen and paper.

Jason

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter

On 1/10/2014 7:33 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 January 2014 16:02, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 1/10/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:

On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple
example is arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is computable (this
is
provable if you accept the Church Turing thesis).

But it's questionable whether it exists.

Does it kick back? Could two beings in different universes, with different
laws of
physics (if such exist) discover it independently?

Of course discover begs the question.

No it doesn't. It /is/ the question. I used discover in the sense of making a
discovery, as opposed to inventing something.

That's what begs the question means, the form of your question implicitly assumes the
answer you presuppose. Discover implies existence independent of invention. But that's
the point I'm questioning. When we count are we discovering 1,2,3,... or are we inventing
the concept of several things consitituting a numberable set.

If alien mathematicians start from whatever axioms the humans mathematicians start from,
and find themselves led inexorably to the same logical conclusion as the humans, then I
would say they are discovering something about the nature of reality. If they start
from the same premises and arrive at a different conclusion (and neither sets of
mathematicians have made any mistakes), then I would say they are inventing something.
That's the sense in which I asked if they would discover the (alleged) facts of maths.
It seems to me a perfectly reasonable way to ask the question. Would they independently
discover the same results, or wouldn't they? What's wrong with that?

Why couldn't they invent the same concepts?

I suppose I could have assumed my audience were drongoes and added something like ...or
would they invent completely different results? But I didn't bother to insult my
audience like that, because it seems to me that was implicit in the way I'd asked the
question. In fact I'd very neatly /summarised/ the entire question through the use of
that one word - discover.

If so, it exists by any reasonable definition (including Stephen's)

Two beings with different laws of physics in different universes could
invent the
game of rock, paper, scissors. Does that mean the game exists? Did it
exist before
they invented it?

That isn't the same as being led to one specific conclusion by applying logic to a given
set of axioms, though, which is what discover implies.

I think it is the same. RPSR is not so complicated it couldn't be discovered in
almost all worlds.

Does the continuum exist?

I don't know. I assume it exists as a mathematically discoverable entity (or is there a
problem with that?) I don't know if it exists in the physical sense of space-time being
one. As I mentioned elsewhere recently, the jury is out on this one due to the GRB data
still being relatively scarce. Watch this space.

I don't have any problem with exists in mathematics or in Platonia or in the realm of
fiction (e.g. where Sherlock Holmes exists) so long these can be given some reasonable
definition. But it seems like a leap to say that because we can make up rules about
creating sentences (inference from axioms) that makes things exist. Did we invent
insurance or discover it? What about the non-standard models of arithmetic? Are we to
say they don't exist because...why exactly?...we didn't think of them first?

I think of them all as models, some are just models of little pieces of reality (e.g.
numbers-things we can count) others try to be models to much big parts (e.g. quantum
field theory) and exists is relative to the model.

Brent

Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter

On 11 January 2014 17:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 7:33 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 11 January 2014 16:02, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple
 example is arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is computable (this is
 provable if you accept the Church Turing thesis).

  But it's questionable whether it exists.


  Does it kick back? Could two beings in different universes, with
 different laws of physics (if such exist) discover it independently?

  Of course discover begs the question.


  No it doesn't. It *is* the question. I used discover in the sense of
 making a discovery, as opposed to inventing something.


 That's what begs the question means, the form of your question
 implicitly assumes the answer you presuppose.  Discover implies existence
 independent of invention.  But that's the point I'm questioning.  When we
 count are we discovering 1,2,3,... or are we inventing the concept of
 several things consitituting a numberable set.


THAT'S THE SAME QUESTION I WAS ASKING!

Are you being deliberately aggravating? I ASKED if we discover maths, and
you've come out with all this nonsense saying I'm begging the question.
But begging the question means assuming the answer to a question, which
isn't what I did. I asked a question.

You may have said something sensible below, but while you appear to be
trolling over this I'm not in a mood to read it,

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 1/10/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 January 2014 16:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 1/10/2014 6:01 PM, LizR wrote:

On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com
mailto:terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:

Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me,
that's it
- how an infinity of emulations condense into a single conscious
experience.

If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the experiences
apart.
They would be fungible, like the infinite identical copies that exist in
the MWI
prior to branching / differentiation. So they would just be one experience,
even if
it was generated an infinite number of times. I guess this is the capsule
theory
of identity, like Fred Hoyle and his pigeon holes and flashlight view of
consciousness in October the first is too late. From the viewpoint of the
experiencer, it wouldn't matter if millions of pigeon holes were identical,
with
identical notes in them, and others only appeared once.

But might their number provide a kind of probability measure for the
continuation of
your consciousness?

I don't know. I assume that it continues in all possible continuations,

Sure, but it is quite likely that you experience some things and almost impossible that
you experience others. One of the problems with Everett's quantum mechanics is explaining
this. I think Deutsch has argued that the probability has to be proportional to the
number of continuations: So when you observed a quantum event that was only half as likely
as its complement there must be three continuations. But then what is the probability is
1/pi? If you just assume there IS a probability measure then you can show it must be the
Hilbert space norm; but that corresponds to assigning a real numbered weight to each world.

Brent

if that isn't a tautology, but there's definitely a measure problem here - why are
white rabbits far, far less common? So what do you think? Does the measure mean that
I'm more likely to remain me rather than spontaneously morphing into the ruler of the
World? (dammit!) I think my mind is starting to boggle just thinking about this...

Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Brent,

  I will try a crude summary and hope to not be misunderstood... It starts
with the Stone duality, a well known isomorphism between Boolean algebras
and totally disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces. The former are
identified with minds (logical, computational, numerical, etc) and the
latter with physical objects (what is more physical that a space that
looks exactly like Democritus' atoms in a
voidhttp://www.scottaaronson.com/democritus/lec1.html
?.
   This solves the mind-body linkage problem of Descartes' dualism. The
paper http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf then discusses how
interactions between pairs of minds (generalizations of Boolean algebras
identified as states) is mediated via pairs of bodies (generalizations of
Stone spaces to include mass, spin, charge, potentials,... physics
identified as events). A crude diagram of this relation for the evolution
of a single entity is:

... - Body - Body' - ...
   | |
... - Mind - Mind' - ...

where the | symbol is the Stone isomorphism, - is the physical
evolution of one event to the next and - is the logical arrow of
implication.

  Mathematics as considered my most people usually ignores evolution of
logical structures, such as Boolean algebras, and so the difference between
mind and mind' is not considered. Now that computers are commonplace, the
idea that logical structures evolve makes a lot more sense! A computation
is the transformation of information and since logical structures capture
the relations of the information, it is natural to consider this theory.

  In this theory, minds and bodies (including brains!) are not separable
substances but are isomorphs that have dynamics whose arrows point in
opposite directions. Physical process moves forward from event to event' in
sequences of time according to thermodynamics, etc. and logic looks
backward to ensure that any new state is consistent with previous states.
This implies an elegant solution to the measurement problem of QM!
Differences between states and parameters of time can be subdivided as
finely as one wishes; even to the smoothness of continua.
  It is what the logical 'side of the coin does to select physical events
that won me over to Pratt's theory: a physical transition from event x at
time t to event x' at time t' is allowed if and only if the state x'* at t'
does not imply information that would contradict prior states at t^-1,
t^-2, etc. Basically, events will occur iff they do not imply a
contradiction of previously allowed events. This automatically solves the
White Rabbit problem by disallowing events that imply logical
contradictions.
   It also gives a slightly different take on computational universality:
individual logical structures are associated with equivalence classes of
physical functions and physical systems are associated with equivalence
classes of logical structures. The equivalences are, respectively:
equivalent function and semantical equivalence. Thus computations and the
physical processes are not ontologically isolated from each other, but
universality obtains because there is no a priori bijective map between the
set of particular physical systems and the set of particular Turing
universal computations.

  It seems that Pratt abandoned the theory because of a lack of interest in
the community but still hosts the papers on his website. Maybe in hope that
some one might come along, like me, that can make sense of it and develop
it further. It does not consider SR at all, which bothers me a little bit,
but that can be fixed using ideas such as those of Kevin Knuth, IMHO.

Its main prediction is that neither ghosts (logics that cannot be
associated with any physical structure) nor zombies (bodies that cannot be
represented by an internal self-referencing logical structure) exist. This
argues against both material and mental monism. (Thus my conflict with
Bruno's AR!)


On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 9:02 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 2:23 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  Dear Brent,

Vaughn Pratt's dualist theory is consistent with QM and does show a
 mechanism that prohibits White Rabbits. It is intelligible to anyone that
 puts forth the effort to comprehend it.


 Can you summarize it?

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/10/2014 9:05 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

  I will try a crude summary and hope to not be misunderstood... It starts with the 
Stone duality, a well known isomorphism between Boolean algebras and totally 
disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces. The former are identified with minds (logical, 
computational, numerical, etc) and the latter with physical objects (what is more 
physical that a space that looks exactly like Democritus' atoms in a void 
http://www.scottaaronson.com/democritus/lec1.html?.
   This solves the mind-body linkage problem of Descartes' dualism. The paper 
http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf then discusses how interactions between 
pairs of minds (generalizations of Boolean algebras identified as states) is mediated 
via pairs of bodies (generalizations of Stone spaces to include mass, spin, charge, 
potentials,... physics identified as events). A crude diagram of this relation for the 
evolution of a single entity is:


... - Body - Body' - ...
   | |
... - Mind - Mind' - ...

where the | symbol is the Stone isomorphism, - is the physical evolution of one 
event to the next and - is the logical arrow of implication.


  Mathematics as considered my most people usually ignores evolution of logical 
structures, such as Boolean algebras, and so the difference between mind and mind' is 
not considered. Now that computers are commonplace, the idea that logical structures 
evolve makes a lot more sense! A computation is the transformation of information and 
since logical structures capture the relations of the information, it is natural to 
consider this theory.


  In this theory, minds and bodies (including brains!) are not separable substances but 
are isomorphs that have dynamics whose arrows point in opposite directions. Physical 
process moves forward from event to event' in sequences of time according to 
thermodynamics, etc. and logic looks backward to ensure that any new state is 
consistent with previous states. This implies an elegant solution to the measurement 
problem of QM! Differences between states and parameters of time can be subdivided as 
finely as one wishes; even to the smoothness of continua.
  It is what the logical 'side of the coin does to select physical events that won me 
over to Pratt's theory: a physical transition from event x at time t to event x' at time 
t' is allowed if and only if the state x'* at t' does not imply information that would 
contradict prior states at t^-1, t^-2, etc. Basically, events will occur iff they do not 
imply a contradiction of previously allowed events. This automatically solves the White 
Rabbit problem by disallowing events that imply logical contradictions.


Hmm?  Steven turns into a White Rabbit is not a /*logical*/ contradiction, it's a 
/*nomological*/ one.  If there's a transition from (t1,x1) to (t2,x2) it seems the only 
/*logical*/ contradiction would be x2=Not x1 at t1.  Logical is a very weak condition; 
as far as I know it just means being consistent=(not every sentence is a theorem).


Brent

   It also gives a slightly different take on computational universality: individual 
logical structures are associated with equivalence classes of physical functions and 
physical systems are associated with equivalence classes of logical structures. The 
equivalences are, respectively: equivalent function and semantical equivalence. Thus 
computations and the physical processes are not ontologically isolated from each other, 
but universality obtains because there is no a priori bijective map between the set of 
particular physical systems and the set of particular Turing universal computations.


  It seems that Pratt abandoned the theory because of a lack of interest in the 
community but still hosts the papers on his website. Maybe in hope that some one might 
come along, like me, that can make sense of it and develop it further. It does not 
consider SR at all, which bothers me a little bit, but that can be fixed using ideas 
such as those of Kevin Knuth, IMHO.


Its main prediction is that neither ghosts (logics that cannot be associated with any 
physical structure) nor zombies (bodies that cannot be represented by an internal 
self-referencing logical structure) exist. This argues against both material and mental 
monism. (Thus my conflict with Bruno's AR!)



On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 9:02 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 1/10/2014 2:23 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

Vaughn Pratt's dualist theory is consistent with QM and does show a 
mechanism that
prohibits White Rabbits. It is intelligible to anyone that puts forth the 
effort to
comprehend it.


Can you summarize it?

Brent
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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Brent,

  Hmm?  Steven turns into a White Rabbit is not a *logical* contradiction,
it's a *nomological* one.  If there's a transition from (t1,x1) to (t2,x2)
it seems the only *logical* contradiction would be x2=Not x1 at t1.
Logical is a very weak condition; as far as I know it just means being
consistent=(not every sentence is a theorem).

nom·o·log·i·cal
ˌnäməˈläjikəl/
*adjective*

   1. *1*.
   relating to or denoting certain principles, such as laws of nature, that
   are neither logically necessary nor theoretically explicable, but are
   simply taken as true.


  Right! It was a very crude and informal explanation. Things become,
hopefully, more clear when one considers the scenario where there are many
minds that are communicating/interacting while evolving. Interaction
requires some level of  similarity between the participants.
  For example, I I where to experience a White Rabbit, what effects would
it have to have on others that I interact with so that it would not effect
their 1p content. I would say that it was a hallucination, maybe... We
forget that what we experience of the world is not that world itself, it is
our mind/brains version of such. We have to take the capacity
of hallucinations into account in our thoughts of that is a mind...
   Can we not take as true what we experience? How can we know that it is
not some controlled simulation? We need to answer Descartes question: How
do I know that I am not just a brain in a vat (or a computation running in
some UD)?


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 12:45 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 9:05 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  Dear Brent,

I will try a crude summary and hope to not be misunderstood... It
 starts with the Stone duality, a well known isomorphism between Boolean
 algebras and totally disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces. The former are
 identified with minds (logical, computational, numerical, etc) and the
 latter with physical objects (what is more physical that a space that
 looks exactly like Democritus' atoms in a 
 voidhttp://www.scottaaronson.com/democritus/lec1.html
 ?.
This solves the mind-body linkage problem of Descartes' dualism. The
 paper http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf then discusses how
 interactions between pairs of minds (generalizations of Boolean algebras
 identified as states) is mediated via pairs of bodies (generalizations of
 Stone spaces to include mass, spin, charge, potentials,... physics
 identified as events). A crude diagram of this relation for the evolution
 of a single entity is:

  ... - Body - Body' - ...
 | |
  ... - Mind - Mind' - ...

  where the | symbol is the Stone isomorphism, - is the physical
 evolution of one event to the next and - is the logical arrow of
 implication.

Mathematics as considered my most people usually ignores evolution of
 logical structures, such as Boolean algebras, and so the difference between
 mind and mind' is not considered. Now that computers are commonplace, the
 idea that logical structures evolve makes a lot more sense! A computation
 is the transformation of information and since logical structures capture
 the relations of the information, it is natural to consider this theory.

In this theory, minds and bodies (including brains!) are not separable
 substances but are isomorphs that have dynamics whose arrows point in
 opposite directions. Physical process moves forward from event to event' in
 sequences of time according to thermodynamics, etc. and logic looks
 backward to ensure that any new state is consistent with previous states.
 This implies an elegant solution to the measurement problem of QM!
 Differences between states and parameters of time can be subdivided as
 finely as one wishes; even to the smoothness of continua.
   It is what the logical 'side of the coin does to select physical events
 that won me over to Pratt's theory: a physical transition from event x at
 time t to event x' at time t' is allowed if and only if the state x'* at t'
 does not imply information that would contradict prior states at t^-1,
 t^-2, etc. Basically, events will occur iff they do not imply a
 contradiction of previously allowed events. This automatically solves the
 White Rabbit problem by disallowing events that imply logical
 contradictions.


 Hmm?  Steven turns into a White Rabbit is not a *logical* contradiction,
 it's a *nomological* one.  If there's a transition from (t1,x1) to
 (t2,x2) it seems the only *logical* contradiction would be x2=Not x1 at
 t1.  Logical is a very weak condition; as far as I know it just means
 being consistent=(not every sentence is a theorem).

 Brent

 It also gives a slightly different take on computational
 universality: individual logical structures are associated with equivalence
 classes of physical functions and physical systems are associated with
 equivalence classes of logical structures. The equivalences are,
 respectively: equivalent

Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 22:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/10/2014 12:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:32, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear LizR,

  There is an interdependency that should not be ignored between  
the objects that express the quantities and relations that are  
represented by the logic and arithmetic. A universe that does not  
contain any persistent entities would not be capable of expressing  
numbers or statements.


Yes. But arithmetic contains many relatively persistent beings.


But what is the measure of relative persistence?


It is the measure almost defined by the material hypostases (in  
S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*). It defines the comp physical laws. If they don't  
exist, comp has to be false, or we are in a simulation, or the S4  
theory of knowledge should be amended.




Are you talking about neutrons that may last seconds or millenia,  
depending on circumstances, or a planet or a person which change  
constantly and are only recognizable as a being in a rough and  
approximate way?


?  (May be answers have already been given by others. Nor sure I see  
what you mean here).


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 22:51, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/10/2014 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear LizR,

  That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.


It is answered, completely.





On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 4:45 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is  
(locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit  
conversion factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value  
is arbitrary, like how many feet in a mile, which is why it is  
now an exact number in SI units.
Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?)  
to 1.


So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution -  
namely the one we experience?


Only from what we have just experienced before. Comp does not  
predict the existence of the moon, but should predict the physical  
laws, that is, what is invariant for all observers/machines.





So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a universe  
compatible with our existence because such a universe has to drop  
out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?


As I said, comp uses only a conditional probability, not a bayesian  
relation, which can still be used for geography and history. But  
the physical laws are defined by the general measure on the  
computation, which must exist with comp, and is given by the  
material points of view (Bp  Dt, mainly).



But can you prove within comp that there must be physical laws,


Yes. If not (that is if the physical laws were only the calssical  
boolean tuatologies), the material hypostases would have collapse into  
propositional calculus. So we are assured that some physics exists for  
any universal machines, and is the same for all of them.





can you prove that solipism is false,


Not yet, although Z1* suggests it to be false, as it should give the  
first person plural. Everett of course suggests that it exists  
empirically, and so comp should confirms that. The quantum nature of  
the Bp  Dt on the sigma_1 sentences shows that comp might indeed  
refute solipsism (statistically).



that it's not ALL geography and we have nothing to thank for our  
existence but WAP?


Only arithmetic.

Bruno




Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 22:57, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/10/2014 1:34 AM, LizR wrote:

On 10 January 2014 22:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor  
computing the state of the universe. In fact there is no such  
universe. The universe is an appearance emerging, from below the  
substitutionlevel, on all computations  
going through our current state. A single computation can hardly do  
that a priori, although this is not excluded, but this would lead  
to a newtonian-like type of reality. Everett confirms that such a  
computation cannot be unique, which is the default stance in the  
comp theory, although we cannot avoid at this stage some possible  
conspiracy by numbers leading to a unique computable reality.


Surely a single computer could run the UD, at least until it wore  
out?


As I understand it the multiverse, the world, is the complete output  
of the UD.


?

The UD has no output. I guess you think to the trace of the UD, UD*,  
which from the first person perspective is entirely given, by the 1p  
delay invariance.




In effect the UD must finish in order to have computed the world,


UD* is entirely given in the tiny sigma_1 block arithmetical reality.




which of course is an uncomputable output.


It is not an output. The trace is computable. Only the FPI on that set  
of computations is not computable.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Bruno,

   You wrote: Comp does not predict the existence of the moon, but should
predict the physical laws, that is, what is invariant for all
observers/machines. 

  That is the same as my definition of a reality for *all*
observers/machines!


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 22:51, meekerdb wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  Dear LizR,

That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.


  It is answered, completely.




 On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 4:45 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

   On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is
 (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion
 factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like
 how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI
 units.

  Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

  So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely
 the one we experience?


  Only from what we have just experienced before. Comp does not predict
 the existence of the moon, but should predict the physical laws, that is,
 what is invariant for all observers/machines.




So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a universe
 compatible with our existence because such a universe has to drop out of
 the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?


  As I said, comp uses only a conditional probability, not a bayesian
 relation, which can still be used for geography and history. But the
 physical laws are defined by the general measure on the computation, which
 must exist with comp, and is given by the material points of view (Bp  Dt,
 mainly).



 But can you prove within comp that there must be physical laws,


 Yes. If not (that is if the physical laws were only the calssical boolean
 tuatologies), the material hypostases would have collapse into
 propositional calculus. So we are assured that some physics exists for any
 universal machines, and is the same for all of them.



 can you prove that solipism is false,


 Not yet, although Z1* suggests it to be false, as it should give the first
 person plural. Everett of course suggests that it exists empirically, and
 so comp should confirms that. The quantum nature of the Bp  Dt on the
 sigma_1 sentences shows that comp might indeed refute solipsism
 (statistically).


 that it's not ALL geography and we have nothing to thank for our existence
 but WAP?


 Only arithmetic.

 Bruno



 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Wait, Brent may have written that and I missattributed the quote.


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 2:51 AM, Stephen Paul King 
stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Bruno,

You wrote: Comp does not predict the existence of the moon, but
 should predict the physical laws, that is, what is invariant for all
 observers/machines. 

   That is the same as my definition of a reality for *all*
 observers/machines!


 On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 22:51, meekerdb wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  Dear LizR,

That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.


  It is answered, completely.




 On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 4:45 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

   On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is
 (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion
 factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like
 how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI
 units.

  Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

  So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely
 the one we experience?


  Only from what we have just experienced before. Comp does not predict
 the existence of the moon, but should predict the physical laws, that is,
 what is invariant for all observers/machines.




So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a universe
 compatible with our existence because such a universe has to drop out of
 the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?


  As I said, comp uses only a conditional probability, not a bayesian
 relation, which can still be used for geography and history. But the
 physical laws are defined by the general measure on the computation, which
 must exist with comp, and is given by the material points of view (Bp  Dt,
 mainly).



 But can you prove within comp that there must be physical laws,


 Yes. If not (that is if the physical laws were only the calssical boolean
 tuatologies), the material hypostases would have collapse into
 propositional calculus. So we are assured that some physics exists for any
 universal machines, and is the same for all of them.



 can you prove that solipism is false,


 Not yet, although Z1* suggests it to be false, as it should give the
 first person plural. Everett of course suggests that it exists empirically,
 and so comp should confirms that. The quantum nature of the Bp  Dt on the
 sigma_1 sentences shows that comp might indeed refute solipsism
 (statistically).


 that it's not ALL geography and we have nothing to thank for our
 existence but WAP?


 Only arithmetic.

 Bruno



 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 10 Jan 2014, at 23:19, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/10/2014 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

QM predict a infinite small
probability for white rabbits, while yours infer a decent amount of
them until some cut criteria emerges. And that is not my work, but
yours.


QM predict all this by using comp, or an unintelligible dualist  
theory of observation.


 I don't understand that.  QM predicts a low probability for white  
rabbits - but not by using comp, in fact it assumes a continuum.


Comp entails a continuum too. Everett uses comp to handle the quantum  
white rabbits, and is not aware of the arithmetical one (Everett is  
still physicalist).





And comp doesn't entail QM.


Then QM is false, or comp is false, or we are in a normal simulation  
(by our descendants or something). Up to now, comp does seem to imply  
QM, with some technical nuances, as we get a credibility measure  
instead of a probability, but it is quite quantum by the presence of  
the arithmetical quantizations.


Bruno



Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Der Bruno,

The UD has no output. I guess you think to the trace of the UD, UD*, which
from the first person perspective is entirely given, by the 1p delay
invariance.

   The UD never stops. If a process lasts forever, it is eternal, then it
does not ever complete and thus its results never obtain in any way that
can be considered as accessible.


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 2:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 22:57, meekerdb wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 1:34 AM, LizR wrote:

  On 10 January 2014 22:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


  I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor
 computing the state of the universe. In fact there is no such universe.
 The universe is an appearance emerging, from below the substitution level,
 on all computations going through our current state. A single computation
 can hardly do that a priori, although this is not excluded, but this would
 lead to a newtonian-like type of reality. Everett confirms that such a
 computation cannot be unique, which is the default stance in the comp
 theory, although we cannot avoid at this stage some possible conspiracy by
 numbers leading to a unique computable reality.

   Surely a single computer could run the UD, at least until it wore out?


 As I understand it the multiverse, the world, is the complete output of
 the UD.


 ?

 The UD has no output. I guess you think to the trace of the UD, UD*, which
 from the first person perspective is entirely given, by the 1p delay
 invariance.


 In effect the UD must finish in order to have computed the world,


 UD* is entirely given in the tiny sigma_1 block arithmetical reality.



 which of course is an uncomputable output.


 It is not an output. The trace is computable. Only the FPI on that set of
 computations is not computable.

 Bruno




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Re: Tegmark's New Book