Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 May 2019, at 20:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 12:31:12 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Concerning mathematical logic and theology, an incredible book is:
> 
> Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian 
> Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
> 
> That book shows that the whole field of mathematical logic is born from 
> Victorian Faith. I suspected this from my reading of Lewis Carroll, but I did 
> not suspect it to be so historically true. Then, it explains the way this has 
> been hidden, for the professional benefits of the whole of Mathematics, but 
> that did not help for the field of theology, alas.
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Now that book I have never heard of before!
> 
> https://books.google.com/books/about/Equations_from_God.html?id=eYtfAQAACAAJ 
> 
> 
> Incredible. (No pun intended.) 
> 
> Throughout history, application rather than abstraction has been the 
> prominent driving force in mathematics. From the compass and sextant to 
> partial differential equations, mathematical advances were spurred by the 
> desire for better navigation tools, weaponry, and construction methods. But 
> the religious upheaval in Victorian England and the fledgling United States 
> opened the way for the rediscovery of pure mathematics, a tradition rooted in 
> Ancient Greece.
> 
> In "Equations from God," Daniel J. Cohen captures the origins of the rebirth 
> of abstract mathematics in the intellectual quest to rise above common 
> existence and touch the mind of the deity. Using an array of published and 
> private sources, Cohen shows how philosophers and mathematicians seized upon 
> the beautiful simplicity inherent in mathematical laws to reconnect with the 
> divine and traces the route by which the divinely inspired mathematics of the 
> Victorian era begot later secular philosophies.
> 
> Thank you. This made my day.
> 
> @philipthrift  (Ph.D., Applied Mathematics)


You are welcome. 

Bruno




> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 12:31:12 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Concerning mathematical logic and theology, an incredible book is:
>
> Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian 
> Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
>
> That book shows that the whole field of mathematical logic is born from 
> Victorian Faith. I suspected this from my reading of Lewis Carroll, but I 
> did not suspect it to be so historically true. Then, it explains the way 
> this has been hidden, for the professional benefits of the whole of 
> Mathematics, but that did not help for the field of theology, alas.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>

Now that book I have never heard of before!

https://books.google.com/books/about/Equations_from_God.html?id=eYtfAQAACAAJ

Incredible. (No pun intended.) 

Throughout history, a*pplication rather than abstraction* has been the 
prominent driving force in mathematics. From the compass and sextant to 
partial differential equations, mathematical advances were spurred by the 
desire for better navigation tools, weaponry, and construction methods. But 
the religious upheaval in Victorian England and the fledgling United States 
opened the way for* the rediscovery of pure mathematics*, a tradition 
rooted in Ancient Greece.

In "Equations from God," Daniel J. Cohen captures the origins of the 
rebirth of abstract mathematics in the intellectual quest to rise above 
common existence and touch the mind of the deity. Using an array of 
published and private sources, Cohen shows how philosophers and 
mathematicians seized upon the beautiful simplicity inherent in 
mathematical laws *to reconnect with the divine* and traces the route by 
which the divinely inspired mathematics of the Victorian era begot later 
secular philosophies.

Thank you. This made my day.

@philipthrift  (Ph.D., Applied Mathematics)


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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 May 2019, at 15:38, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 7:53 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
>> On 8 May 2019, at 17:44, Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> 
>> 


SNIP



>> 
>> OK.
>> 
>> It is just that this is verified by “mind”, but “mind” and informational 
>> pattern, or number are immaterial, but still admit third person description. 
>> The soul, or consciousness , or first person, is not only immaterial, but is 
>> not identifiable to anything having a third person description. The soul 
>> like god has no “name” (that is no third person description at all). Yet, 
>> with mechanism, it admits meta-description, quasi-axiomatic definition, and 
>> then it can be proved it has no third person description, a bit like the 
>> notion of truth in Tarski theory of truth (which I am using all the time, 
>> explicitly or implicitly).
>> 
>> Would a single observer-moment/experience admit a third-person description? 
>> Is it only the time-evolution of experience that is not definable?
> 
> The expression “observer-moment” is ambiguous. It is often used in a first 
> person sense, then confused with third person sense. 
> 
> In the third person sense, it is equivalent with the notion of instantaneous 
> state description. It is the state of a computer, at some moment of its 
> computation/running.
> 
> A first person observer moment is just a conscious state, lived as 
> here-and-now, like when you open the box in Washington, and get the 
> experience “I am in Washington”. That cannot be formalised or predict in any 
> way, but is still amenable to a metamathematical treatments when we assume 
> mechanism.
> 
> The []p & p definition, makes the first person notion non formalisable. We 
> can come back on this (it is not easy to understand, nor to explain).
> 
> To be sure, to get the immediacy of the observer-moment, []p & <>t & p is 
> better (this suppress the transitivity). []p & p is the logic of 
> knowledgeable. []p & <>t & p is closer to the logic of known-here-and-now.
> 
> 
> Interesting. Might one say "[]p & p" is analagous to the world-soul / Atman 
> from Hinduism


Yes.





> as "[]p & <>t & p" is to the observer/thought moment as in Buddhist's concept 
> of Anatta (no-self)?


May be. (It is not entirely “no-self”, For Anatta, as far as I understand, you 
might need to useat least  the dual diamond, which here will be <>p v []f v p). 
In my long text, that is the “actual/curren/immediate” dream state.

I am glad you got the bible!  I mean Davis’ “The undecidable”. It is the best 
beginning for the machine mathematical theology.

Concerning mathematical logic and theology, an incredible book is:

Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian 
Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.

That books shows that the whole field of mathematical logic is born from 
Victorian Faith. I suspected this from my reading of Lewis Carroll, but I did 
not suspect it to be so historically true. Then, it explains the way this has 
been hidden, for the professional benefits of the whole of Mathematics, but 
that did not help for the field of theology, alas.


Bruno




> 
> Jason
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 7:53 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 8 May 2019, at 17:44, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Apr 29, 2019 at 7:57 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 26 Apr 2019, at 02:50, Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:57 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Apr 2019, at 03:32, Jason Resch  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>


 On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson 
> wrote:
>
> Consciousness is a program.
>
>
> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program,
> that would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like
> a glass of bear and its price.
>
>
>
> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that
> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or
> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be
> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.
>
>
>
> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach
> its soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of 
> (relative)
> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:

 Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with
 matter but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it
 possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from
 our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that
 this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely
 that such universes may exist.
 Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body
 I consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´
 and hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are
 firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but
 when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is
 gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.


 It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to
 grasp immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and
 distinguishes a brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes
 which incorporate memory, purpose, perception, and action.

>>>
>>>
>>> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book”,
>>>
>>>
>>> ?
>>>
>>> You might be too quick here. A book can instantiate a description of a
>>> story, but a story is a sequence of events (be them relative computation in
>>> arithmetic, or in some “universe”).
>>>
>>>
>> You might be misinterpreting my point. I was attempting to show that
>> there is an important distinction between "mind" and "brain", (as there is
>> between "story" and "book", and "program" and "computer”).
>>
>>
>>
>> I was a bit splitting the air, with respect to what you were trying to
>> convey. Sorry.
>>
>
> No worries, greater clarification is always appreciated.
>
>
> I appreciate.
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> BTW, I forget to mention that Post Anticipation has really anticipated
>> the whole things, from Gödel up to immaterialism. In fact Post is the real
>> first person to discover both the Church-Turing thesis, the incompleteness
>> implied by it (something almost forgot since Gödel!, but clearly
>> re-explained by Kleene and Webb later).
>>
>> Emil Post was very sick all its life, and has been a math teacher in High
>> school almost all his life, but eventually, thanks to his paper of 1944
>> (which led to Recursion theory) he will be recognised, and get a position
>> in a university, for a short time before death.
>>
>> I think that Emil Post was the deepest thinker here.
>>
>>
> Interesting I didn't know anything about Post's life or contributions
> before. I will look more into this.
>
>
>
> He found everything, just a bit too much early for his time. He found
> Gödel’s theorem, even the “simple” proof from “Church’s thesis”. He found
> the argument of Lucas-Penrose using “Gödel” against Mechanism. He found the
> deep error that such argument illustrates, he get the understanding that
> materialism is at stake, and the difficulties, etc.
>
> He is at the origin of "Recursion Theory” (theoretical computer science, a
> branch of mathematical logic). That is not in his anticipation, but in his
> paper, which is also in Davis Anthology:
>
> POST E., 1944 , Recursively Enumerable Sets of Positive Integers and their
> Decision Problems, Bull. Am. Math. Soc. 50, pp. 284-31

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 May 2019, at 17:44, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, Apr 29, 2019 at 7:57 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
>> On 26 Apr 2019, at 02:50, Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:57 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>>> On 23 Apr 2019, at 03:32, Jason Resch >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal >>> > wrote:
 
> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson  > wrote:
> 
> Consciousness is a program.
 
 Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that 
 would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a 
 glass of bear and its price.
 
 
 
> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that 
> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or 
> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be 
> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.  
 
 
 How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its 
 soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) 
 computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
 
 Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter 
 but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it 
 possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from 
 our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that 
 this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but 
 unlikely that such universes may exist.
 Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
 consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ 
 and hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two 
 are firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens 
 but when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit 
 is gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps 
 immediately.
>>> 
>>> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to grasp 
>>> immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and distinguishes a 
>>> brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes which incorporate 
>>> memory, purpose, perception, and action.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book”,
>> 
>> ?
>> 
>> You might be too quick here. A book can instantiate a description of a 
>> story, but a story is a sequence of events (be them relative computation in 
>> arithmetic, or in some “universe”).
>> 
>> 
>> You might be misinterpreting my point. I was attempting to show that there 
>> is an important distinction between "mind" and "brain", (as there is between 
>> "story" and "book", and "program" and "computer”).
> 
> 
> I was a bit splitting the air, with respect to what you were trying to 
> convey. Sorry.
> 
> No worries, greater clarification is always appreciated.

I appreciate.


> 
>  
> 
> BTW, I forget to mention that Post Anticipation has really anticipated the 
> whole things, from Gödel up to immaterialism. In fact Post is the real first 
> person to discover both the Church-Turing thesis, the incompleteness implied 
> by it (something almost forgot since Gödel!, but clearly re-explained by 
> Kleene and Webb later).
> 
> Emil Post was very sick all its life, and has been a math teacher in High 
> school almost all his life, but eventually, thanks to his paper of 1944 
> (which led to Recursion theory) he will be recognised, and get a position in 
> a university, for a short time before death.
> 
> I think that Emil Post was the deepest thinker here.
> 
> 
> Interesting I didn't know anything about Post's life or contributions before. 
> I will look more into this.


He found everything, just a bit too much early for his time. He found Gödel’s 
theorem, even the “simple” proof from “Church’s thesis”. He found the argument 
of Lucas-Penrose using “Gödel” against Mechanism. He found the deep error that 
such argument illustrates, he get the understanding that materialism is at 
stake, and the difficulties, etc.

He is at the origin of "Recursion Theory” (theoretical computer science, a 
branch of mathematical logic). That is not in his anticipation, but in his 
paper, which is also in Davis Anthology:

POST E., 1944 , Recursively Enumerable Set

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Apr 29, 2019 at 7:57 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 26 Apr 2019, at 02:50, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:57 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 23 Apr 2019, at 03:32, Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>

 On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson 
 wrote:

 Consciousness is a program.


 Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that
 would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a
 glass of bear and its price.



 It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that
 creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or
 soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be
 uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.



 How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its
 soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative)
 computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.

 Bruno



>>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>>>
>>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter
>>> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it
>>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from
>>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that
>>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely
>>> that such universes may exist.
>>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I
>>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and
>>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are
>>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but
>>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is
>>> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>>>
>>>
>>> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to
>>> grasp immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and
>>> distinguishes a brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes
>>> which incorporate memory, purpose, perception, and action.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book”,
>>
>>
>> ?
>>
>> You might be too quick here. A book can instantiate a description of a
>> story, but a story is a sequence of events (be them relative computation in
>> arithmetic, or in some “universe”).
>>
>>
> You might be misinterpreting my point. I was attempting to show that there
> is an important distinction between "mind" and "brain", (as there is
> between "story" and "book", and "program" and "computer”).
>
>
>
> I was a bit splitting the air, with respect to what you were trying to
> convey. Sorry.
>

No worries, greater clarification is always appreciated.



>
> BTW, I forget to mention that Post Anticipation has really anticipated the
> whole things, from Gödel up to immaterialism. In fact Post is the real
> first person to discover both the Church-Turing thesis, the incompleteness
> implied by it (something almost forgot since Gödel!, but clearly
> re-explained by Kleene and Webb later).
>
> Emil Post was very sick all its life, and has been a math teacher in High
> school almost all his life, but eventually, thanks to his paper of 1944
> (which led to Recursion theory) he will be recognised, and get a position
> in a university, for a short time before death.
>
> I think that Emil Post was the deepest thinker here.
>
>
Interesting I didn't know anything about Post's life or contributions
before. I will look more into this.


>
>
> In all cases, the brain, book, computer, are physical, and can have
> specific physical incarnations.  However, despite differing physically,
> they can be used to implement the same (potentially identical) abstract
> patterns (minds, stories, programs).
>
> Because the latter category refers to abstract, informational, duplicable,
> patterns, they are in a sense immaterial. Many attributes you might
> attribute to a "soul" you could apply to these abstract informational
> patterns, such as:
>
>
>- No physical location
>- No mass or energy
>- Indestructible (at least always recoverable, in theory - ability to
>resurrect)
>- Ability to cross between different physical embodiments (ability to
>reincarnate)
>- Ability to exist in different physical universes/realms/planes
>(ability to transmigrate)
>
>
> OK.
>
> It is just that this is verified by “mind”, but “mind” and informational
> pattern, or number ar

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Apr 29, 2019 at 7:47 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 26 Apr 2019, at 02:38, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:45 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 23 Apr 2019, at 01:24, Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Consciousness is a program.
>>>
>>>
>>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that
>>> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a
>>> glass of bear and its price.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that
>>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or
>>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be
>>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its
>>> soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative)
>>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>>
>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter
>> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it
>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from
>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that
>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely
>> that such universes may exist.
>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I
>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and
>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are
>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but
>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is
>> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>>
>>
>>
>> This shows also how much Turing was blinded by its belief in some primary
>> matter. If, he would have understood at once that our consciousness follows
>> the differentiating computations in arithmetic.
>>
>
> True, he did not appear to reach the conclusion regarding the primacy of
> computation, however, is what he says above all that dissimilar from what
> you have said regarding "souls falling" and becoming entangled with matter
> (the material/physical) world?
>
> It appears Turing was a "mechanist" if not a "primitive arithmetical
> mechanistic”.
>
>
> Turing was a “indexical digital mechanist", I agree.
>
> But he was also a naturalist, and as such he was inconsistent on this. You
> can’t have both mechanism and naturalism/materialism/physicalism.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> Emil Post eventually got the immateriality”, but change its mind after
>> reading … Turing.
>>
>>
> I am interested in learning more about what Emil Post said on
> immateriality. Do you recall the reference?
>
>
>
> Yes, it is his famous “anticipation”, that you can find in Martin Davis’s
> book “The undecidable” (now at Dover, with all key original papers (except
> for the important contribution of Tarski-Mostowki and Robinson, which is
> another thin Dover book). Precisely:
>
> “Absolutely Unsolvable Problems and Relatively Undecidable propositions,
> Account of an Anticipation”.
>
> Published by Martin Davis in the book “The Undecidable”. Dover 1993,
> (First edition: Raven Press, 1965).
>
> Martin Davis wrote : < Journal in 1941 and was rejected. Certainly the speculative (not to say
> metaphysical) “Appendix” is not what one ordinarily expects to find in a
> mathematics paper. So it appears in print for the first time in this
> anthology>>.
>
>
>
Thank you! I have ordered a copy of Davis's book.

Jason



>
>
>
>
>
>> With mechanism, it is simpler to not assume bodies and primitively
>> material bodies unless we get some evidences for them. Yet, until now, the
>> evidences gathered from the observation of nature confirms mechanism, and
>> refute physicalism. For anyone remembering dreams, seeing is not a valid
>> way to attribute any ontological existence, others than a subject, which we
>> already have in arithmetic.
>>
>
> This seems to be the normal pattern in human science.  It was 40-50 years
> between QM and the serious consideration of relative state.  Likewise the
> computational theory of mind began in the 1950s and 1960s, and it wasn't
> until your work that the consequences of this idea, when taken seriously,
> were fully appreciated.
>
>
> Thanks for telling this.
>
>
> Perhaps there are times it takes a new generation growing up with the
> problems uncovered by the previous generation, to make significant leaps.
>
>
> Yes, we perish if we don’t publish, but publishing does not make you
> immune to perishing, especially if the finding does not fit the mentality
> of yo

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 26 Apr 2019, at 02:38, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:45 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Apr 2019, at 01:24, Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> Consciousness is a program.
>> 
>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that 
>> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a 
>> glass of bear and its price.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that 
>>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or 
>>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be 
>>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.  
>> 
>> 
>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its soul 
>> to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) 
>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>> 
>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter but 
>> certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it possible for 
>> a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from our own, but 
>> now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that this would be a 
>> contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely that such 
>> universes may exist.
>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and 
>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are 
>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is gone 
>> and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
> 
> 
> This shows also how much Turing was blinded by its belief in some primary 
> matter. If, he would have understood at once that our consciousness follows 
> the differentiating computations in arithmetic.
> 
> True, he did not appear to reach the conclusion regarding the primacy of 
> computation, however, is what he says above all that dissimilar from what you 
> have said regarding "souls falling" and becoming entangled with matter (the 
> material/physical) world?
> 
> It appears Turing was a "mechanist" if not a "primitive arithmetical 
> mechanistic”.

Turing was a “indexical digital mechanist", I agree.

But he was also a naturalist, and as such he was inconsistent on this. You 
can’t have both mechanism and naturalism/materialism/physicalism.





>  
> 
> Emil Post eventually got the immateriality”, but change its mind after 
> reading … Turing.
> 
> 
> I am interested in learning more about what Emil Post said on immateriality. 
> Do you recall the reference?


Yes, it is his famous “anticipation”, that you can find in Martin Davis’s book 
“The undecidable” (now at Dover, with all key original papers (except for the 
important contribution of Tarski-Mostowki and Robinson, which is another thin 
Dover book). Precisely:

“Absolutely Unsolvable Problems and Relatively Undecidable propositions, 
Account of an Anticipation”.

Published by Martin Davis in the book “The Undecidable”. Dover 1993, (First 
edition: Raven Press, 1965).

Martin Davis wrote : <>.





>  
> With mechanism, it is simpler to not assume bodies and primitively material 
> bodies unless we get some evidences for them. Yet, until now, the evidences 
> gathered from the observation of nature confirms mechanism, and refute 
> physicalism. For anyone remembering dreams, seeing is not a valid way to 
> attribute any ontological existence, others than a subject, which we already 
> have in arithmetic.
>  
> This seems to be the normal pattern in human science.  It was 40-50 years 
> between QM and the serious consideration of relative state.  Likewise the 
> computational theory of mind began in the 1950s and 1960s, and it wasn't 
> until your work that the consequences of this idea, when taken seriously, 
> were fully appreciated.

Thanks for telling this.


> Perhaps there are times it takes a new generation growing up with the 
> problems uncovered by the previous generation, to make significant leaps.

Yes, we perish if we don’t publish, but publishing does not make you immune to 
perishing, especially if the finding does not fit the mentality of your epoch, 
and changing the mentality can take time, even millennia.
It is normal. Sad, but normal.

Bruno 



> 
> Jason
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 26 Apr 2019, at 02:50, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:57 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Apr 2019, at 03:32, Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson >>> > wrote:
 
 Consciousness is a program.
>>> 
>>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that 
>>> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a 
>>> glass of bear and its price.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that 
 creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or 
 soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be 
 uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its 
>>> soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) 
>>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>>> 
>>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter 
>>> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it 
>>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from 
>>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that 
>>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely 
>>> that such universes may exist.
>>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
>>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and 
>>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are 
>>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
>>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is 
>>> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>> 
>> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to grasp 
>> immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and distinguishes a 
>> brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes which incorporate 
>> memory, purpose, perception, and action.
>> 
>> 
>> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book”,
> 
> ?
> 
> You might be too quick here. A book can instantiate a description of a story, 
> but a story is a sequence of events (be them relative computation in 
> arithmetic, or in some “universe”).
> 
> 
> You might be misinterpreting my point. I was attempting to show that there is 
> an important distinction between "mind" and "brain", (as there is between 
> "story" and "book", and "program" and "computer”).


I was a bit splitting the air, with respect to what you were trying to convey. 
Sorry.

BTW, I forget to mention that Post Anticipation has really anticipated the 
whole things, from Gödel up to immaterialism. In fact Post is the real first 
person to discover both the Church-Turing thesis, the incompleteness implied by 
it (something almost forgot since Gödel!, but clearly re-explained by Kleene 
and Webb later).

Emil Post was very sick all its life, and has been a math teacher in High 
school almost all his life, but eventually, thanks to his paper of 1944 (which 
led to Recursion theory) he will be recognised, and get a position in a 
university, for a short time before death.

I think that Emil Post was the deepest thinker here.


> 
> In all cases, the brain, book, computer, are physical, and can have specific 
> physical incarnations.  However, despite differing physically, they can be 
> used to implement the same (potentially identical) abstract patterns (minds, 
> stories, programs).
> 
> Because the latter category refers to abstract, informational, duplicable, 
> patterns, they are in a sense immaterial. Many attributes you might attribute 
> to a "soul" you could apply to these abstract informational patterns, such as:
> 
> No physical location
> No mass or energy
> Indestructible (at least always recoverable, in theory - ability to resurrect)
> Ability to cross between different physical embodiments (ability to 
> reincarnate)
> Ability to exist in different physical universes/realms/planes (ability to 
> transmigrate)

OK.

It is just that this is verified by “mind”, but “mind” and informational 
pattern, or number are immaterial, but still admit third person description. 
The soul, or consciousness , or first person, is not only immaterial, but is 
not identifiable to anything having

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[cloudversed]

On Friday, April 26, 2019 at 9:04:46 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 26, 2019, > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, April 25, 2019 at 7:29:08 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 2:48 AM Philip Thrift  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, April 22, 2019 at 6:24:37 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>
> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with 
> matter but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe 
> it 
> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from 
> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that 
> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but 
> unlikely 
> that such universes may exist.
>
> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body 
> I consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ 
> and hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two 
> are 
> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is 
> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>
> Jason
>  
>
>>
>>
 I don't think I've seen this quote of Turing before, but it immediately 
 reminds me of *Epicurus *(an ancient panpsychist):

 [SEP: Epicurus]

 Having established the physical basis of the world, Epicurus proceeds 
 to explain the nature of the soul (this, at least, is the order in which 
 Lucretius sets things out). This too, of course, consists of atoms: first, 
 there is nothing that is not made up of atoms and void (secondary 
 qualities 
 are simply accidents of the arrangement of atoms), and second, an 
 incorporeal entity could neither act on nor be moved by bodies, as the 
 soul 
 is seen to do (e.g., it is conscious of what happens to the body, and it 
 initiates physical movement). Epicurus maintains that soul atoms are 
 particularly fine and are distributed throughout the body, and it is by 
 means of them that we have sensations (aisthêseis) and the experience of 
 pain and pleasure, which Epicurus calls pathê (a term used by Aristotle 
 and 
 others to signify emotions instead).

>>>
>>> Nice quote. A bit reminiscent of Descartes and Leibniz's thinking in 
>>> relation to dualism and how souls were to interact with physical bodies.
>>>
>>> Descartes understood a basic form of conservation of energy, and thought 
>>> it was possible for a soul to change the direction (if not the speed) of 
>>> particles.  After Newton formalized conservation of momentum, Leibniz 
>>> understood that changing the direction of particles in motion was also 
>>> impossible, which led to his postulation of a "pre-established harmony".
>>>  
>>>

 *Body without soul atoms is unconscious and inert, and when the atoms 
 of the body are disarranged so that it can no longer support conscious 
 life, the soul atoms are scattered and no longer retain the capacity for 
 sensation. *

 ~~~

 (Since atoms - either physical (body) or psychical (soul) atoms are not 
 destroyed in Epicurus's materialism, the psychical atoms which were 
 "scattered" end up in someone's new body at some point.)


>>> In panpsychism isn't everything consider to be conscious?  I think this 
>>> is a bit different from what Turing suggested, in that Turing believed the 
>>> body had to be in a functioning state to "attract" or "hold" a soul.
>>>
>>> Jason 
>>>
>>
>>
>> Pansychism (a better term would be experiential materialism) is the view 
>> that all is matter, but matter has psychical or experiential properties (in 
>> addition to physical ones - the ones conventional physicists talk about). 
>> The degrees of experientialities in levels of complexity of matter (and a 
>> brain would be considered to be a piece of complex matter), how such things 
>> are combined (from molecules to cells to multicellular configurations), are 
>> the issues.
>>
>
> What would a panpsychist predict for a universe where matter lacked such 
> properties?
>
> A world devoid of intelligent life.
>
> A world full of intelligent (but not consciousness) philosophical zombies.
>
> Something else.
>  
>
>>
>> Physicalism is normally assumed to be incompatible with panpsychism. 
>> Materialism (distinct from physicalism) is compatible with panpsychism 
>> insofar as experiential (or psychical) properties are attributed to matter, 
>> which is the only basic substance.
>>
>> via https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Physicalism_and_materialism
>>
>> So there are brains and all the other other stuff, its just that there is 
>> more to matter than what meets 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Jason Resch]

On Friday, April 26, 2019,  wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, April 25, 2019 at 7:29:08 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 2:48 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, April 22, 2019 at 6:24:37 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:


> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:

 Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with
 matter but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it
 possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from
 our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that
 this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely
 that such universes may exist.

 Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body
 I consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´
 and hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are
 firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but
 when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is
 gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.

 Jason


>
>
>>> I don't think I've seen this quote of Turing before, but it immediately
>>> reminds me of *Epicurus *(an ancient panpsychist):
>>>
>>> [SEP: Epicurus]
>>>
>>> Having established the physical basis of the world, Epicurus proceeds to
>>> explain the nature of the soul (this, at least, is the order in which
>>> Lucretius sets things out). This too, of course, consists of atoms: first,
>>> there is nothing that is not made up of atoms and void (secondary qualities
>>> are simply accidents of the arrangement of atoms), and second, an
>>> incorporeal entity could neither act on nor be moved by bodies, as the soul
>>> is seen to do (e.g., it is conscious of what happens to the body, and it
>>> initiates physical movement). Epicurus maintains that soul atoms are
>>> particularly fine and are distributed throughout the body, and it is by
>>> means of them that we have sensations (aisthêseis) and the experience of
>>> pain and pleasure, which Epicurus calls pathê (a term used by Aristotle and
>>> others to signify emotions instead).
>>>
>>
>> Nice quote. A bit reminiscent of Descartes and Leibniz's thinking in
>> relation to dualism and how souls were to interact with physical bodies.
>>
>> Descartes understood a basic form of conservation of energy, and thought
>> it was possible for a soul to change the direction (if not the speed) of
>> particles.  After Newton formalized conservation of momentum, Leibniz
>> understood that changing the direction of particles in motion was also
>> impossible, which led to his postulation of a "pre-established harmony".
>>
>>
>>>
>>> *Body without soul atoms is unconscious and inert, and when the atoms of
>>> the body are disarranged so that it can no longer support conscious life,
>>> the soul atoms are scattered and no longer retain the capacity for
>>> sensation. *
>>>
>>> ~~~
>>>
>>> (Since atoms - either physical (body) or psychical (soul) atoms are not
>>> destroyed in Epicurus's materialism, the psychical atoms which were
>>> "scattered" end up in someone's new body at some point.)
>>>
>>>
>> In panpsychism isn't everything consider to be conscious?  I think this
>> is a bit different from what Turing suggested, in that Turing believed the
>> body had to be in a functioning state to "attract" or "hold" a soul.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
> Pansychism (a better term would be experiential materialism) is the view
> that all is matter, but matter has psychical or experiential properties (in
> addition to physical ones - the ones conventional physicists talk about).
> The degrees of experientialities in levels of complexity of matter (and a
> brain would be considered to be a piece of complex matter), how such things
> are combined (from molecules to cells to multicellular configurations), are
> the issues.
>

What would a panpsychist predict for a universe where matter lacked such
properties?

A world devoid of intelligent life.

A world full of intelligent (but not consciousness) philosophical zombies.

Something else.


>
> Physicalism is normally assumed to be incompatible with panpsychism.
> Materialism (distinct from physicalism) is compatible with panpsychism
> insofar as experiential (or psychical) properties are attributed to matter,
> which is the only basic substance.
>
> via https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Physicalism_and_materialism
>
> So there are brains and all the other other stuff, its just that there is
> more to matter than what meets the (conventional physicist's) eye.
>
> -
> @philipthrift 
>
>
>
Thanks for the reference. It was an interesting read.

Jason



>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscr

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[cloudversed]

On Thursday, April 25, 2019 at 7:29:08 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 2:48 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, April 22, 2019 at 6:24:37 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
 The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>>>
>>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter 
>>> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it 
>>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from 
>>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that 
>>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely 
>>> that such universes may exist.
>>>
>>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
>>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and 
>>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are 
>>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
>>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is 
>>> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>  
>>>


>> I don't think I've seen this quote of Turing before, but it immediately 
>> reminds me of *Epicurus *(an ancient panpsychist):
>>
>> [SEP: Epicurus]
>>
>> Having established the physical basis of the world, Epicurus proceeds to 
>> explain the nature of the soul (this, at least, is the order in which 
>> Lucretius sets things out). This too, of course, consists of atoms: first, 
>> there is nothing that is not made up of atoms and void (secondary qualities 
>> are simply accidents of the arrangement of atoms), and second, an 
>> incorporeal entity could neither act on nor be moved by bodies, as the soul 
>> is seen to do (e.g., it is conscious of what happens to the body, and it 
>> initiates physical movement). Epicurus maintains that soul atoms are 
>> particularly fine and are distributed throughout the body, and it is by 
>> means of them that we have sensations (aisthêseis) and the experience of 
>> pain and pleasure, which Epicurus calls pathê (a term used by Aristotle and 
>> others to signify emotions instead).
>>
>
> Nice quote. A bit reminiscent of Descartes and Leibniz's thinking in 
> relation to dualism and how souls were to interact with physical bodies.
>
> Descartes understood a basic form of conservation of energy, and thought 
> it was possible for a soul to change the direction (if not the speed) of 
> particles.  After Newton formalized conservation of momentum, Leibniz 
> understood that changing the direction of particles in motion was also 
> impossible, which led to his postulation of a "pre-established harmony".
>  
>
>>
>> *Body without soul atoms is unconscious and inert, and when the atoms of 
>> the body are disarranged so that it can no longer support conscious life, 
>> the soul atoms are scattered and no longer retain the capacity for 
>> sensation. *
>>
>> ~~~
>>
>> (Since atoms - either physical (body) or psychical (soul) atoms are not 
>> destroyed in Epicurus's materialism, the psychical atoms which were 
>> "scattered" end up in someone's new body at some point.)
>>
>>
> In panpsychism isn't everything consider to be conscious?  I think this is 
> a bit different from what Turing suggested, in that Turing believed the 
> body had to be in a functioning state to "attract" or "hold" a soul.
>
> Jason 
>


Pansychism (a better term would be experiential materialism) is the view 
that all is matter, but matter has psychical or experiential properties (in 
addition to physical ones - the ones conventional physicists talk about). 
The degrees of experientialities in levels of complexity of matter (and a 
brain would be considered to be a piece of complex matter), how such things 
are combined (from molecules to cells to multicellular configurations), are 
the issues.

Physicalism is normally assumed to be incompatible with panpsychism. 
Materialism (distinct from physicalism) is compatible with panpsychism 
insofar as experiential (or psychical) properties are attributed to matter, 
which is the only basic substance.

via https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Physicalism_and_materialism

So there are brains and all the other other stuff, its just that there is 
more to matter than what meets the (conventional physicist's) eye.

- 
@philipthrift 



-- 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:57 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 23 Apr 2019, at 03:32, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Consciousness is a program.
>>>
>>>
>>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that
>>> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a
>>> glass of bear and its price.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that
>>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or
>>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be
>>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its
>>> soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative)
>>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>>
>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter
>> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it
>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from
>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that
>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely
>> that such universes may exist.
>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I
>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and
>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are
>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but
>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is
>> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>>
>>
>> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to
>> grasp immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and
>> distinguishes a brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes
>> which incorporate memory, purpose, perception, and action.
>>
>
>
> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book”,
>
>
> ?
>
> You might be too quick here. A book can instantiate a description of a
> story, but a story is a sequence of events (be them relative computation in
> arithmetic, or in some “universe”).
>
>
You might be misinterpreting my point. I was attempting to show that there
is an important distinction between "mind" and "brain", (as there is
between "story" and "book", and "program" and "computer").

In all cases, the brain, book, computer, are physical, and can have
specific physical incarnations.  However, despite differing physically,
they can be used to implement the same (potentially identical) abstract
patterns (minds, stories, programs).

Because the latter category refers to abstract, informational, duplicable,
patterns, they are in a sense immaterial. Many attributes you might
attribute to a "soul" you could apply to these abstract informational
patterns, such as:


   - No physical location
   - No mass or energy
   - Indestructible (at least always recoverable, in theory - ability to
   resurrect)
   - Ability to cross between different physical embodiments (ability to
   reincarnate)
   - Ability to exist in different physical universes/realms/planes
   (ability to transmigrate)



>
>
>
> or a "program" and a "computer", or might there be value in that nuance?
>
>
> I guess you mean a universal program and a computer. But then you use
> “computer” in the sense of “universal digital machine/number”. In this
> list, I use more often “computer” for the physical implementation of a
> computer,
>

(Here I meant a physical computer, I was trying to contrast the
software/hardware distinction)


> which is typically not a computer, nor even anything emubable on a
> computer, given that to emulate even a piece of the physical vacuum, we
> already needs the complete universal dovetailing (the full sigma_1
> arithmetical truth). A physical computer is only an appearance in the
> number’s mind, and it is not emulable, if only because we cannot
> algorithmically decide which computations, in arithmetic, run through our
> state of mind, and which does not.
>
> The difference between software and hardware is only locally dispensable.
> Eventually, the apparent primitive matter is a sum on infinitely many
> computations, belonging to a non recursively enumerable domain.
> A part of the mystery is why physics, or the observable realm, looks so
> much computational, but it is not, and QM confirms this.
>
>
>
>
> Clearly a program stops executing locally when a

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 9:45 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 23 Apr 2019, at 01:24, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Consciousness is a program.
>>
>>
>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that
>> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a
>> glass of bear and its price.
>>
>>
>>
>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that
>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or
>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be
>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.
>>
>>
>>
>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its
>> soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative)
>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>
> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter
> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it
> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from
> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that
> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely
> that such universes may exist.
> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I
> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and
> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are
> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but
> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is
> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>
>
>
> This shows also how much Turing was blinded by its belief in some primary
> matter. If, he would have understood at once that our consciousness follows
> the differentiating computations in arithmetic.
>

True, he did not appear to reach the conclusion regarding the primacy of
computation, however, is what he says above all that dissimilar from what
you have said regarding "souls falling" and becoming entangled with matter
(the material/physical) world?

It appears Turing was a "mechanist" if not a "primitive arithmetical
mechanistic".


>
> Emil Post eventually got the immateriality”, but change its mind after
> reading … Turing.
>
>
I am interested in learning more about what Emil Post said on
immateriality. Do you recall the reference?


> With mechanism, it is simpler to not assume bodies and primitively
> material bodies unless we get some evidences for them. Yet, until now, the
> evidences gathered from the observation of nature confirms mechanism, and
> refute physicalism. For anyone remembering dreams, seeing is not a valid
> way to attribute any ontological existence, others than a subject, which we
> already have in arithmetic.
>

This seems to be the normal pattern in human science.  It was 40-50 years
between QM and the serious consideration of relative state.  Likewise the
computational theory of mind began in the 1950s and 1960s, and it wasn't
until your work that the consequences of this idea, when taken seriously,
were fully appreciated. Perhaps there are times it takes a new generation
growing up with the problems uncovered by the previous generation, to make
significant leaps.

Jason

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 2:48 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, April 22, 2019 at 6:24:37 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>>
>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter
>> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it
>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from
>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that
>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely
>> that such universes may exist.
>>
>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I
>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and
>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are
>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but
>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is
>> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
> I don't think I've seen this quote of Turing before, but it immediately
> reminds me of *Epicurus *(an ancient panpsychist):
>
> [SEP: Epicurus]
>
> Having established the physical basis of the world, Epicurus proceeds to
> explain the nature of the soul (this, at least, is the order in which
> Lucretius sets things out). This too, of course, consists of atoms: first,
> there is nothing that is not made up of atoms and void (secondary qualities
> are simply accidents of the arrangement of atoms), and second, an
> incorporeal entity could neither act on nor be moved by bodies, as the soul
> is seen to do (e.g., it is conscious of what happens to the body, and it
> initiates physical movement). Epicurus maintains that soul atoms are
> particularly fine and are distributed throughout the body, and it is by
> means of them that we have sensations (aisthêseis) and the experience of
> pain and pleasure, which Epicurus calls pathê (a term used by Aristotle and
> others to signify emotions instead).
>

Nice quote. A bit reminiscent of Descartes and Leibniz's thinking in
relation to dualism and how souls were to interact with physical bodies.

Descartes understood a basic form of conservation of energy, and thought it
was possible for a soul to change the direction (if not the speed) of
particles.  After Newton formalized conservation of momentum, Leibniz
understood that changing the direction of particles in motion was also
impossible, which led to his postulation of a "pre-established harmony".


>
> *Body without soul atoms is unconscious and inert, and when the atoms of
> the body are disarranged so that it can no longer support conscious life,
> the soul atoms are scattered and no longer retain the capacity for
> sensation. *
>
> ~~~
>
> (Since atoms - either physical (body) or psychical (soul) atoms are not
> destroyed in Epicurus's materialism, the psychical atoms which were
> "scattered" end up in someone's new body at some point.)
>
>
In panpsychism isn't everything consider to be conscious?  I think this is
a bit different from what Turing suggested, in that Turing believed the
body had to be in a functioning state to "attract" or "hold" a soul.

Jason

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Apr 2019, at 07:13, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 4/22/2019 6:32 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson >>> > wrote:
 
 Consciousness is a program.
>>> 
>>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that 
>>> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a 
>>> glass of bear and its price.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that 
 creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or 
 soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be 
 uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its 
>>> soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) 
>>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>>> 
>>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter 
>>> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it 
>>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from 
>>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that 
>>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely 
>>> that such universes may exist.
>>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
>>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and 
>>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are 
>>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
>>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is 
>>> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>> 
>> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to grasp 
>> immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and distinguishes a 
>> brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes which incorporate 
>> memory, purpose, perception, and action.
>> 
>> 
>> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book", or a 
>> "program" and a "computer", or might there be value in that nuance? 
>> 
>> Clearly a program stops executing locally when a computer executing that 
>> program is destroyed, but of course this says nothing about the destruction, 
>> existence, non-existence, continuation, quantity, or locations of other 
>> instances of that program.
> 
> It does if that program was unique, as any program capable of learning is 
> likely to be.

Programs can be rare relatively to the environment, but no programs is unique.

In the phi_i, for each x, there is an infinity of y such that phi_x = phi_y.



> 
>> I think here Turing was making a similar point, in the nuanced distinction 
>> between a mind and a brain.
> 
> I quite agree with the distinction between mind and brain. 

Me too. Brain is a product of the mind, where mind is a product of the 
computational relations, which are special (sigma_1) number relations.




> But why should we imagine it is different from the distinction between a 
> locomotive and transportation, between a ship and a voyage, between a factory 
> and manufacturing?

We can associate a first person mind (consciousness) to a machine/body/number, 
but a first person mind is indeterminate necessarily on all computations going 
through their actual state, and there is an infinity of them, on which 
consciousness differentiate in the first person way, like in 
self-multiplication though experience/experiment. 

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Apr 2019, at 03:32, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
> 
> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> Consciousness is a program.
>> 
>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that 
>> would identify a first person   notion with a third person 
>> notion, like a glass of bear and its price.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that 
>>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or 
>>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be 
>>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.  
>> 
>> 
>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its soul 
>> to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) 
>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>> 
>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter but 
>> certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it possible for 
>> a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from our own, but 
>> now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that this would be a 
>> contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely that such 
>> universes may exist.
>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and 
>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are 
>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is gone 
>> and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
> 
> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to grasp 
> immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and distinguishes a 
> brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes which incorporate 
> memory, purpose, perception, and action.
> 
> 
> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book”,

?

You might be too quick here. A book can instantiate a description of a story, 
but a story is a sequence of events (be them relative computation in 
arithmetic, or in some “universe”).




> or a "program" and a "computer", or might there be value in that nuance? 

I guess you mean a universal program and a computer. But then you use 
“computer” in the sense of “universal digital machine/number”. In this list, I 
use more often “computer” for the physical implementation of a computer, which 
is typically not a computer, nor even anything emubable on a computer, given 
that to emulate even a piece of the physical vacuum, we already needs the 
complete universal dovetailing (the full sigma_1 arithmetical truth). A 
physical computer is only an appearance in the number’s mind, and it is not 
emulable, if only because we cannot algorithmically decide which computations, 
in arithmetic, run through our state of mind, and which does not. 

The difference between software and hardware is only locally dispensable. 
Eventually, the apparent primitive matter is a sum on infinitely many 
computations, belonging to a non recursively enumerable domain. 
A part of the mystery is why physics, or the observable realm, looks so much 
computational, but it is not, and QM confirms this.



> 
> Clearly a program stops executing locally when a computer executing that 
> program is destroyed, but of course this says nothing about the destruction, 
> existence, non-existence, continuation, quantity, or locations of other 
> instances of that program. I think here Turing was making a similar point, in 
> the nuanced distinction between a mind and a brain.

I see it that way, except that Turing refers to bodies, which in his mind, 
meant material bodies, if not, he would have invoked the universal dovetailing 
(whose existence in arithmetic is obvious). But many texts by Turing seem to 
confirm that Turing was a naturalist (metaphysically).

Bruno


> 
> Jason
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Apr 2019, at 01:24, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson > > wrote:
>> 
>> Consciousness is a program.
> 
> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that would 
> identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a glass of 
> bear and its price.
> 
> 
> 
>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that 
>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or 
>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be 
>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.  
> 
> 
> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its soul 
> to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) 
> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
> 
> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter but 
> certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it possible for 
> a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from our own, but now 
> I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that this would be a 
> contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely that such 
> universes may exist.
> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and 
> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are 
> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is gone 
> and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.


This shows also how much Turing was blinded by its belief in some primary 
matter. If, he would have understood at once that our consciousness follows the 
differentiating computations in arithmetic.

Emil Post eventually got the immateriality”, but change its mind after reading 
… Turing.

With mechanism, it is simpler to not assume bodies and primitively material 
bodies unless we get some evidences for them. Yet, until now, the evidences 
gathered from the observation of nature confirms mechanism, and refute 
physicalism. For anyone remembering dreams, seeing is not a valid way to 
attribute any ontological existence, others than a subject, which we already 
have in arithmetic.

Bruno



> 
> Jason
>  
> 
> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 7:49 PM John Clark > > wrote:
>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 7:22 PM Philip Thrift > > wrote:
>> 
>> > By "experience", philosophers (like Galen Strawson, Philip Goff) mean that 
>> > which you have within yourself right now: the awareness that [...]
>> 
>> Awareness? But awareness is just another word for consciousness, so when you 
>> say  "It's that experience (not just information) that needs processing to 
>> produce consciousness" you're saying that to produce consciousness you must 
>> process consciousness. I don't find that very helpful.
>> > I assume I can be outsmarted by Watson on Jeopardy!
>> 
>> Then Watson't intelligence isn't very pseudo.
>> 
>> John K Clark   
>> 
>>  
>> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, April 22, 2019 at 6:24:37 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>
> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter 
> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it 
> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from 
> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that 
> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely 
> that such universes may exist.
>
> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and 
> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are 
> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is 
> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>
> Jason
>  
>
>>
>>
I don't think I've seen this quote of Turing before, but it immediately 
reminds me of *Epicurus *(an ancient panpsychist):

[SEP: Epicurus]

Having established the physical basis of the world, Epicurus proceeds to 
explain the nature of the soul (this, at least, is the order in which 
Lucretius sets things out). This too, of course, consists of atoms: first, 
there is nothing that is not made up of atoms and void (secondary qualities 
are simply accidents of the arrangement of atoms), and second, an 
incorporeal entity could neither act on nor be moved by bodies, as the soul 
is seen to do (e.g., it is conscious of what happens to the body, and it 
initiates physical movement). Epicurus maintains that soul atoms are 
particularly fine and are distributed throughout the body, and it is by 
means of them that we have sensations (aisthêseis) and the experience of 
pain and pleasure, which Epicurus calls pathê (a term used by Aristotle and 
others to signify emotions instead).

*Body without soul atoms is unconscious and inert, and when the atoms of 
the body are disarranged so that it can no longer support conscious life, 
the soul atoms are scattered and no longer retain the capacity for 
sensation. *

~~~

(Since atoms - either physical (body) or psychical (soul) atoms are not 
destroyed in Epicurus's materialism, the psychical atoms which were 
"scattered" end up in someone's new body at some point.)

- pt


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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 12:13 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 4/22/2019 6:32 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Consciousness is a program.
>>>
>>>
>>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that
>>> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a
>>> glass of bear and its price.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that
>>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or
>>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be
>>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its
>>> soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative)
>>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>>
>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter
>> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it
>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from
>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that
>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely
>> that such universes may exist.
>>
>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I
>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and
>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are
>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but
>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is
>> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>>
>>
>> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to
>> grasp immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and
>> distinguishes a brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes
>> which incorporate memory, purpose, perception, and action.
>>
>
>
> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book", or a
> "program" and a "computer", or might there be value in that nuance?
>
> Clearly a program stops executing locally when a computer executing that
> program is destroyed, but of course this says nothing about the
> destruction, existence, non-existence, continuation, quantity, or locations
> of other instances of that program.
>
>
> It does if that program was unique, as any program capable of learning is
> likely to be.
>

This assumes a finite universe and reality (which we have much reason to
doubt).


>
> I think here Turing was making a similar point, in the nuanced distinction
> between a mind and a brain.
>
>
> I quite agree with the distinction between mind and brain.  But why should
> we imagine it is different from the distinction between a locomotive and
> transportation, between a ship and a voyage, between a factory and
> manufacturing?
>

I don't follow.

Jason

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 4/22/2019 6:32 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:



On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson
mailto:martinabrams...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Consciousness is a program.


Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a
program, that would identify a first person notion with a
third person notion, like a glass of bear and its price.




It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and
becomes that creature's awareness of the world. For humans
it becomes the identity or soul which responds to anything
that affects the organism. It can be uploaded into a data
bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.



How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot
attach its soul to any particular computations, only to the
infinity of (relative) computations, and there is at least
aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.

Bruno



The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:

Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with
matter but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did
believe it possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe
entirely separate from our own, but now I consider that matter
and spirit are so connected that this would be a contradiction in
terms. It is possible however but unlikely that such universes
may exist.

Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I
consider that the body by reason of being a living body can
``attract´´ and hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive
and awake the two are firmly connected. When the body is asleep I
cannot guess what happens but when the body dies the
``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is gone and the
spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.



It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt
to grasp immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial"
and distinguishes a brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates
processes which incorporate memory, purpose, perception, and action.



Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book", or 
a "program" and a "computer", or might there be value in that nuance?


Clearly a program stops executing locally when a computer executing 
that program is destroyed, but of course this says nothing about the 
destruction, existence, non-existence, continuation, quantity, or 
locations of other instances of that program.


It does if that program was unique, as any program capable of learning 
is likely to be.


I think here Turing was making a similar point, in the nuanced 
distinction between a mind and a brain.


I quite agree with the distinction between mind and brain.  But why 
should we imagine it is different from the distinction between a 
locomotive and transportation, between a ship and a voyage, between a 
factory and manufacturing?


Brent

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Consciousness is a program.
>>
>>
>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that
>> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a
>> glass of bear and its price.
>>
>>
>>
>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that
>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or
>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be
>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.
>>
>>
>>
>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its
>> soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative)
>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>
> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter
> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it
> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from
> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that
> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely
> that such universes may exist.
>
> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I
> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and
> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are
> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but
> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is
> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>
>
> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to
> grasp immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and
> distinguishes a brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes
> which incorporate memory, purpose, perception, and action.
>


Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book", or a
"program" and a "computer", or might there be value in that nuance?

Clearly a program stops executing locally when a computer executing that
program is destroyed, but of course this says nothing about the
destruction, existence, non-existence, continuation, quantity, or locations
of other instances of that program. I think here Turing was making a
similar point, in the nuanced distinction between a mind and a brain.

Jason

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal > wrote:




On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson
mailto:martinabrams...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Consciousness is a program.


Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program,
that would identify a first person notion with a third person
notion, like a glass of bear and its price.




It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes
that creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the
identity or soul which responds to anything that affects the
organism. It can be uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it
dissipates with death.



How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot
attach its soul to any particular computations, only to the
infinity of (relative) computations, and there is at least
aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.

Bruno



The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:

Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with 
matter but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did 
believe it possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely 
separate from our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are 
so connected that this would be a contradiction in terms. It is 
possible however but unlikely that such universes may exist.


Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
consider that the body by reason of being a living body can 
``attract´´ and hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and 
awake the two are firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot 
guess what happens but when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the 
body, holding the spirit is gone and the spirit finds a new body 
sooner or later perhaps immediately.




It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to 
grasp immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and 
distinguishes a brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes 
which incorporate memory, purpose, perception, and action.


Brent

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson 
> wrote:
>
> Consciousness is a program.
>
>
> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that
> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a
> glass of bear and its price.
>
>
>
> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that
> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or
> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be
> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.
>
>
>
> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its
> soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative)
> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:

Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter
but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it
possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from
our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that
this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely
that such universes may exist.

Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I
consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and
hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are
firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but
when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is
gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.

Jason


>
>
>
> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 7:49 PM John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 7:22 PM Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>
>> *> By "experience", philosophers (like Galen Strawson, Philip Goff) mean
>>> that which you have within yourself right now: the awareness that* [...]
>>>
>>
>> Awareness? But awareness is just another word for consciousness, so when
>> you say  "*It's that experience (not just information) that needs
>> processing to produc**e consciousness" *you're saying that to produce
>> consciousness you must process consciousness. I don't find that very
>> helpful.
>>
>>> > I assume I can be outsmarted by Watson on Jeopardy!
>>>
>>
>> Then Watson't intelligence isn't very pseudo.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>>
>>
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, December 27, 2018 at 6:55:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Dec 2018, at 14:55, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:


 The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) 


 Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
 (non-digital) brain?






 are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
 brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
 with symbols. 


 I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could 
 work. Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to 
 now, I see only a magical use of word.

 For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
 words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
 symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
 there is a theory, or just idea-associations.

 Bruno 





>>>
>>>
>>> Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, 
>>> that's one thing scientists are studying:
>>>
>>> 
>>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>>
>>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
>>> thing (the next chapter):
>>>
>>> 
>>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as 
>>> I've given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
>>> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
>>> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, 
>>> we cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
>>> matter being quite magical.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> But the point is: Matter is not *Mechanistic*.
>> Matter is *Experientialistic*.
>>
>> That's the whole thing!
>>
>>
>> But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first 
>> person, phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, 
>> and so Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic 
>> phenomenological matter. For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would 
>> need to run the entire universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails 
>> a “non-cloning” theorem for matter, confirmed by QM.
>> In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non 
>> computable things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. 
>> Most arithmetical truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy 
>> inherit it by the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> Engineers might be happy with imperfect cloning of matter.
>
>
>
> But engineers and physicist will not claim that matter is primary or 
> fundamental. They are neutral on fictionalism in physics. There is no 
> problem there. The problem is only with “religious dogmatic believer” who 
> forbid to doubt physicalism.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


What if conventional mathematics itself is in error by assuming its primary 
elements are numbers?

(There is arguably something to category/type theory that maybe gets away 
from this.)


What if primary elements include/are non-numbers - (qualitative) 
experiences?

HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies
Vol 9 No 31 (2016) : 
The Enactive Approach to Qualitative Ontology: In Search of New Categories

Introduction :
– the enactive approach opposes the Cartesian bifurcation of reality into 
psychological and physical
– complements quantitative categories, offering a mathematical treatment of 
qualitative aspects of reality

https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/


- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Dec 2018, at 14:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
>>> 
>>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
>>> (non-digital) brain?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
 brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
 with symbols. 
>>> 
>>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
>>> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I 
>>> see only a magical use of word.
>>> 
>>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
>>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
>>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
>>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>>> 
>>> Bruno 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's 
>>> one thing scientists are studying:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
>>> thing (the next chapter):
>>> 
>>> 
>>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
>>> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
>>> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
>>> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>> 
>> 
>> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we 
>> cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
>> matter being quite magical.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> But the point is: Matter is not Mechanistic.
>> Matter is Experientialistic.
>> 
>> That's the whole thing!
> 
> But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first 
> person, phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, and 
> so Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic phenomenological 
> matter. For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would need to run the 
> entire universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails a “non-cloning” 
> theorem for matter, confirmed by QM.
> In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non computable 
> things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. Most 
> arithmetical truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy inherit 
> it by the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Engineers might be happy with imperfect cloning of matter.


But engineers and physicist will not claim that matter is primary or 
fundamental. They are neutral on fictionalism in physics. There is no problem 
there. The problem is only with “religious dogmatic believer” who forbid to 
doubt physicalism.

Bruno



> 
> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) 
>>>
>>>
>>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
>>> (non-digital) brain?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
>>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
>>> with symbols. 
>>>
>>>
>>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could 
>>> work. Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to 
>>> now, I see only a magical use of word.
>>>
>>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
>>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
>>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
>>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>>>
>>> Bruno 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, 
>> that's one thing scientists are studying:
>>
>> 
>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>
>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
>> thing (the next chapter):
>>
>> 
>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>
>>  
>>
>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as 
>> I've given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
>> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
>> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>>
>>
>>
>> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, 
>> we cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
>> matter being quite magical.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> But the point is: Matter is not *Mechanistic*.
> Matter is *Experientialistic*.
>
> That's the whole thing!
>
>
> But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first 
> person, phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, 
> and so Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic 
> phenomenological matter. For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would 
> need to run the entire universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails 
> a “non-cloning” theorem for matter, confirmed by QM.
> In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non 
> computable things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. 
> Most arithmetical truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy 
> inherit it by the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


Engineers might be happy with imperfect cloning of matter.


- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
>> 
>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
>> (non-digital) brain?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
>>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
>>> with symbols. 
>> 
>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
>> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I see 
>> only a magical use of word.
>> 
>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>> 
>> Bruno 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's one 
>> thing scientists are studying:
>> 
>> 
>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
>> thing (the next chapter):
>> 
>> 
>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>  
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
>> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of operating 
>> with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have actual 
>> (material!) realization as experience.
> 
> 
> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we 
> cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
> matter being quite magical.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But the point is: Matter is not Mechanistic.
> Matter is Experientialistic.
> 
> That's the whole thing!

But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first person, 
phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, and so 
Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic phenomenological matter. 
For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would need to run the entire 
universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails a “non-cloning” theorem 
for matter, confirmed by QM.
In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non computable 
things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. Most arithmetical 
truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy inherit it by the First 
Person Indeterminacy on all computations.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) 
>>
>>
>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
>> (non-digital) brain?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
>> with symbols. 
>>
>>
>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
>> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I 
>> see only a magical use of word.
>>
>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>>
>> Bruno 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, 
> that's one thing scientists are studying:
>
> 
> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>
> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
> thing (the next chapter):
>
> 
> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>
>  
>
> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>
>
>
> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we 
> cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary 
> matter being quite magical.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

But the point is: Matter is not *Mechanistic*.
Matter is *Experientialistic*.

That's the whole thing!

- pt

 

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
> 
> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
> (non-digital) brain?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates with 
>> symbols. 
> 
> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I see 
> only a magical use of word.
> 
> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if there 
> is a theory, or just idea-associations.
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's one 
> thing scientists are studying:
> 
> 
> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
> 
> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
> thing (the next chapter):
> 
> 
> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
> 
>  
> 
> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of operating 
> with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have actual 
> (material!) realization as experience.


You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we 
cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary matter 
being quite magical.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) 
>
>
> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the 
> (non-digital) brain?
>
>
>
>
>
>
> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates 
> with symbols. 
>
>
> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I 
> see only a magical use of word.
>
> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any 
> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional 
> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if 
> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
>
>


Whether psychicals (*experiential states*) go down to, say insects, that's 
one thing scientists are studying:


https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/

Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another 
thing (the next chapter):

  
  https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html

 

On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've 
given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of 
operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have 
actual (material!) realization as experience.

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 5:41:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 19:36, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> snip
> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I should add: Why is fictionalism compelling?
>>> 
>>> When you get down to the bottom of it, numbers are spiritual entities.
>> 
>> I have no problem with that. I have some evidence for spiritual entities, 
>> indeed all the mathematical notions are spiritual or immaterial, then 
>> consciousness mind, etc. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Many are compelled to want to eliminate spiritual entities.
>> 
>> 
>> Like you apparently. If you put the spiritual entities, like numbers and 
>> math in fictionalism, it will look you consider them as fiction, it seems to 
>> me.
>> 
>> I am problem driven. And my favorite problem is the mind-body problem. I 
>> reduce the mind-body problem into the justification why universal spiritual 
>> entities get the (admittedly persistent) impression of a primitively 
>> material world. I found it. All universal “spiritual” entities go through 
>> this.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> A: There is arithmetical reality where there are "simulated" entities that 
>> surmise a material reality (but matter itself does not actually exist).
>> 
>> M. There is material reality where arithmetic is a language (or language 
>> group) created by material entities.
> 
> But the arithmetical reality is not a language.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> But to have A producing matter in reality, or matter "emerging from" A   
>> (A→M),  is a kind of dualism. And what would be the need for A→M if A is 
>> enough? 
> 
> Because []p & <>t (prediction) is not the same as []p, from the point of view 
> of the machine. It feels different. It obeys different laws. That difference 
> of perception is explained in virtue of the arithmetical reality..
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> In M, "mind" comes from the psychical states of matter (Strawson, et al., 
>> who say of course that the "mechanistic", "physicalistic", whatever 
>> materialists are misguided).
> 
> 
> Which psychical states of matter? 
> 
> Should we give the right to vote to Milk and coffee?
> 
> To have thinking, usually we bet on some form of dialog, and that is why a 
> brain or a computer has so many connexions/relations. Why would we need a 
> brain if there is some primary matter with the ability to think? Do you think 
> a brain is not Turing emulable, or do you think a brain can be Turing 
> emulated but that this would only make a p-zombie (someone acting like it was 
> conscious, but isn’t?).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That arithmetic is a language (or technically, a language group) leads to it 
> (from a language theory perspective) includes both syntax & semantics.
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory
> Formal semantics
> 
> Main article: Formal semantics of programming languages 
> 
> Formal semantics is the formal specification of the behavior of computer 
> programs and programming languages. Three common approaches to describe the 
> semantics or "meaning" of a computer program are denotational semantics 
> , operational semantics 
>  and axiomatic semantics 
> .
> 
> 

Wiki is not quite accurate on those matters. Better to separate the language, 
the semantics, and the theories.  I use the notion of theory, to avoid the 
“semantics” used in programming language (to avoid possible confusion). 





> (From a fictionalist view, the objects of arithmetic are fictional objects: a 
> fictional semantics.)


The point is that with Mechanism, primary physics is inconsistent. So we are 
out of my working hypothesis.


> 
> 
> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)

Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the (non-digital) 
brain?






> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The 
> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates with 
> symbols. 

I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work. 
Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I see 
only a magical use of word.

For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any words. 
Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional symbols, and 
R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if there is a theory, 
or just idea-associations.

Bruno 




> 
> 
> - pt 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 5:41:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Dec 2018, at 19:36, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> snip
>>
>>
>
>>
>> I should add: Why is fictionalism compelling?
>>
>> When you get down to the bottom of it, *numbers are spiritual entities*.
>>
>>
>> I have no problem with that. I have some evidence for spiritual entities, 
>> indeed all the mathematical notions are spiritual or immaterial, then 
>> consciousness mind, etc. 
>>
>>
>>
>> Many are compelled to want to eliminate spiritual entities.
>>
>>
>>
>> Like you apparently. If you put the spiritual entities, like numbers and 
>> math in fictionalism, it will look you consider them as fiction, it seems 
>> to me.
>>
>> I am problem driven. And my favorite problem is the mind-body problem. I 
>> reduce the mind-body problem into the justification why universal spiritual 
>> entities get the (admittedly persistent) impression of a primitively 
>> material world. I found it. All universal “spiritual” entities go through 
>> this.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
> A: There is arithmetical reality where there are "simulated" entities that 
> surmise a material reality (but matter itself does not actually exist).
>
> M. There is material reality where arithmetic is a language (or language 
> group) created by material entities.
>
>
> But the arithmetical reality is not a language.
>
>
>
>
> But to have A producing matter in reality, or matter "emerging from" A  
>  (A→M),  is a kind of dualism. And what would be the need for A→M if A is 
> enough? 
>
>
> Because []p & <>t (prediction) is not the same as []p, from the point of 
> view of the machine. It feels different. It obeys different laws. That 
> difference of perception is explained in virtue of the arithmetical 
> reality..
>
>
>
>
> In M, "mind" comes from the psychical states of matter (Strawson, et al., 
> who say of course that the "mechanistic", "physicalistic", whatever 
> materialists are misguided).
>
>
>
> Which psychical states of matter? 
>
> Should we give the right to vote to Milk and coffee?
>
> To have thinking, usually we bet on some form of dialog, and that is why a 
> brain or a computer has so many connexions/relations. Why would we need a 
> brain if there is some primary matter with the ability to think? Do you 
> think a brain is not Turing emulable, or do you think a brain can be Turing 
> emulated but that this would only make a p-zombie (someone acting like it 
> was conscious, but isn’t?).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
That arithmetic is a language (or technically, a language group) leads to 
it (from a language theory perspective) includes both syntax & semantics.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory
Formal semantics
Main article: Formal semantics of programming languages 


Formal semantics is the formal specification of the behavior of computer 
programs and programming languages. Three common approaches to describe the 
semantics or "meaning" of a computer program are denotational semantics 
, operational 
semantics  and axiomatic 
semantics .

(From a fictionalist view, the objects of arithmetic are fictional objects: 
a fictional semantics.)


The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain) are the real 
constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The brain-as-computer operates 
with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates with symbols. 


- pt 

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Dec 2018, at 19:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> snip

>> 
>> 
>> I should add: Why is fictionalism compelling?
>> 
>> When you get down to the bottom of it, numbers are spiritual entities.
> 
> I have no problem with that. I have some evidence for spiritual entities, 
> indeed all the mathematical notions are spiritual or immaterial, then 
> consciousness mind, etc. 
> 
> 
> 
>> Many are compelled to want to eliminate spiritual entities.
> 
> 
> Like you apparently. If you put the spiritual entities, like numbers and math 
> in fictionalism, it will look you consider them as fiction, it seems to me.
> 
> I am problem driven. And my favorite problem is the mind-body problem. I 
> reduce the mind-body problem into the justification why universal spiritual 
> entities get the (admittedly persistent) impression of a primitively material 
> world. I found it. All universal “spiritual” entities go through this.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A: There is arithmetical reality where there are "simulated" entities that 
> surmise a material reality (but matter itself does not actually exist).
> 
> M. There is material reality where arithmetic is a language (or language 
> group) created by material entities.

But the arithmetical reality is not a language.



> 
> But to have A producing matter in reality, or matter "emerging from" A   
> (A→M),  is a kind of dualism. And what would be the need for A→M if A is 
> enough? 

Because []p & <>t (prediction) is not the same as []p, from the point of view 
of the machine. It feels different. It obeys different laws. That difference of 
perception is explained in virtue of the arithmetical reality..



> 
> In M, "mind" comes from the psychical states of matter (Strawson, et al., who 
> say of course that the "mechanistic", "physicalistic", whatever materialists 
> are misguided).


Which psychical states of matter? 

Should we give the right to vote to Milk and coffee?

To have thinking, usually we bet on some form of dialog, and that is why a 
brain or a computer has so many connexions/relations. Why would we need a brain 
if there is some primary matter with the ability to think? Do you think a brain 
is not Turing emulable, or do you think a brain can be Turing emulated but that 
this would only make a p-zombie (someone acting like it was conscious, but 
isn’t?).

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 9:24:12 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:04:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  
> wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p 
> is proved. 
> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is 
> true)  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p 
> -> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = 
> Gödel’s 
> beweisbar. 
> >> 
> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> 
>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will 
> belong to G* \ G. 
>  
>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being 
> true. In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of 
> inconsistency. 
> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting 
> them for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though 
> "true" 
> is undefinable)? 
> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any 
> obvious truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition 
> for which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent 
> (“1=1”), and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too 
> which 
> this provability and consistency referred to. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
>  
> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
> > 
> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building 
> doesn't mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>
> ? 
>
>
>
> > 
> >> 
> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories 
> are false. 
> > 
> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>
> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not 
> mean anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* 
> arithmetic. 
>
> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, 
> then it is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than 
> arithmetic, but the observable must obey some laws, so we can test 
> Mechanism. 
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > 
> >> 
> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of 
> arithmetic, as no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s 
> consistency 
> in arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic 
> is 
> consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
> > 
> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>
> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need 
> to assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure 
> more 
> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
> get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
> even in the infinity axioms. 
>
> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the 
> use of the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their 
> descriptions and names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot 
> even 
> secure the finite and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one 
> the system is rich enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson 
> Arithmetic is, you get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. 
> We 
> know now 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 9:24:12 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:04:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:32, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>>>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
>>>  proved. 
>>> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true) 
>>> >>>  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
>>> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> 
>>> >> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
>>> >> beweisbar. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >>> 
>>>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
>>>  G* \ G. 
>>>  
>>>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
>>>  In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>>>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency. 
>>> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
>>> >>> for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" 
>>> >>> is undefinable)? 
>>> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
>>> >> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
>>> >>> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
>>> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), 
>>> >> and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
>>> >> provability and consistency referred to. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>>  
>>> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>>>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
>>> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
>>> >>> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
>>> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
>>> > 
>>> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
>>> > mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>>> 
>>> ? 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> > 
>>> >> 
>>> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
>>> >> false. 
>>> > 
>>> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>>> 
>>> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
>>> anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
>>> 
>>> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then it 
>>> is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, but 
>>> the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> > 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as 
>>> >> no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in 
>>> >> arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is 
>>> >> consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
>>> > 
>>> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>>> 
>>> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
>>> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
>>> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
>>> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
>>> get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
>>> even in the infinity axioms. 
>>> 
>>> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use of 
>>> the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions and 
>>> names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the finite 
>>> and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system is rich 
>>> enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic is, you 
>>> get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now that we 
>>> understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> > 
>>> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
>>> >> quite the contrary. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
>>> >> (easily) its consistency. 
>>> > 
>>

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 9:24:12 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:04:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
 > 
 > 
 > 
 > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  
 wrote: 
 >>> 
 >>> 
 >>> 
 >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p 
 is proved. 
 >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is 
 true)  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
 >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p 
 -> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
 beweisbar. 
 >> 
 >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >>> 
  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong 
 to G* \ G. 
  
  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being 
 true. In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of 
 inconsistency. 
 >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting 
 them for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" 
 is undefinable)? 
 >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
 truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition 
 for which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
 >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent 
 (“1=1”), and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too 
 which 
 this provability and consistency referred to. 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
  
 > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
 >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
 arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
 >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
 > 
 > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building 
 doesn't mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 

 ? 



 > 
 >> 
 >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories 
 are false. 
 > 
 > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 

 In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not 
 mean anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* 
 arithmetic. 

 If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then 
 it is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, 
 but the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 






 > 
 >> 
 >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, 
 as no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in 
 arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is 
 consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
 > 
 > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 

 Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
 assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
 system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
 on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
 get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
 even in the infinity axioms. 

 Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use 
 of the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions 
 and names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the 
 finite and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system 
 is rich enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic 
 is, you get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now 
 that we understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 



 > 
 >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s 
 consistency, quite the contrary. 
 >> 
 >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
 (easily) its consistency. 
 > 
 > On

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:04:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:32, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>>>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p 
>>> is proved. 
>>> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is 
>>> true)  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
>>> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p 
>>> -> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
>>> beweisbar. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >>> 
>>>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong 
>>> to G* \ G. 
>>>  
>>>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being 
>>> true. In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>>>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of 
>>> inconsistency. 
>>> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting 
>>> them for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" 
>>> is undefinable)? 
>>> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
>>> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
>>> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
>>> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent 
>>> (“1=1”), and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which 
>>> this provability and consistency referred to. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>>  
>>> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>>>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
>>> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
>>> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
>>> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
>>> > 
>>> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building 
>>> doesn't mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>>>
>>> ? 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > 
>>> >> 
>>> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
>>> false. 
>>> > 
>>> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>>>
>>> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not 
>>> mean anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
>>>
>>> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then 
>>> it is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, 
>>> but the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, 
>>> as no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in 
>>> arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is 
>>> consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
>>> > 
>>> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>>>
>>> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
>>> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
>>> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
>>> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
>>> get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
>>> even in the infinity axioms. 
>>>
>>> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use 
>>> of the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions 
>>> and names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the 
>>> finite and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system 
>>> is rich enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic 
>>> is, you get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now 
>>> that we understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > 
>>> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s 
>>> consistency, quite the contrary. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
>>> (easily) its consistency. 
>>> > 
>>> > Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a 
>>> contradiction. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. 
>>> The proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers. 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
>>  proved. 
>> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  
>> >>> So in this case proof entails truth?? 
>> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) 
>> >> -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
>> >> beweisbar. 
>> >> 
>> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>> 
>>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
>>  G* \ G. 
>>  
>>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
>>  In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency. 
>> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
>> >>> for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
>> >>> undefinable)? 
>> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
>> >> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
>> >>> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
>> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), 
>> >> and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
>> >> provability and consistency referred to. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>>  
>> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
>> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic. 
>> >>>  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
>> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
>> > 
>> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
>> > mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>> 
>> ? 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
>> >> false. 
>> > 
>> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>> 
>> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
>> anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
>> 
>> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then it 
>> is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, but 
>> the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as 
>> >> no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in 
>> >> arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is 
>> >> consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
>> > 
>> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>> 
>> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
>> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
>> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
>> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, get 
>> soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and even in 
>> the infinity axioms. 
>> 
>> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use of 
>> the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions and 
>> names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the finite 
>> and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system is rich 
>> enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic is, you 
>> get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now that we 
>> understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> > 
>> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
>> >> quite the contrary. 
>> >> 
>> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
>> >> (easily) its consistency. 
>> > 
>> > Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction. 
>> 
>> 
>> That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. The 
>> proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers. 
>> 
>> So, at the meta-level, to say that PA is inconsistent means that there is 
>> standard number describing a 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 6:51:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
>> proved. 
>> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is 
>> true)  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
>> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> 
>> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
>> beweisbar. 
>> >> 
>> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>> 
>>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong 
>> to G* \ G. 
>>  
>>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being 
>> true. In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of 
>> inconsistency. 
>> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
>> for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
>> undefinable)? 
>> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
>> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
>> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
>> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent 
>> (“1=1”), and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which 
>> this provability and consistency referred to. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>>  
>> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
>> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
>> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
>> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
>> > 
>> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
>> mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>>
>> ? 
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
>> false. 
>> > 
>> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>>
>> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
>> anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
>>
>> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then 
>> it is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, 
>> but the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, 
>> as no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in 
>> arithmetic, which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is 
>> consistent, it cannot prove its consistency. 
>> > 
>> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>>
>> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
>> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
>> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
>> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
>> get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
>> even in the infinity axioms. 
>>
>> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use 
>> of the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions 
>> and names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the 
>> finite and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system 
>> is rich enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic 
>> is, you get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now 
>> that we understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s 
>> consistency, quite the contrary. 
>> >> 
>> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
>> (easily) its consistency. 
>> > 
>> > Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction. 
>>
>>
>> That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. 
>> The proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers. 
>>
>> So, at the meta-level, to say that PA is inconsistent means that there is 
>> standard number describing a finite proof of f. And in that case, PA would 
>> prove any proposition. In classical logic, proving A and proving ~A is 
>> equivalent with proving (A & 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Dec 2018, at 19:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker > 
> > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  >>> > wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
>  proved. 
> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  
> >>> So in this case proof entails truth?? 
> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) 
> >> -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
> >> beweisbar. 
> >> 
> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> 
>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* 
>  \ G. 
>  
>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
>  In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency. 
> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for 
> >>> every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> >>> undefinable)? 
> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth 
> >> you want, like “1 = 1”. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
> >>> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), 
> >> and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
> >> provability and consistency referred to. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
>  
> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  
> >>> But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
> > 
> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
> > mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
> 
> ? 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> >> 
> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
> >> false. 
> > 
> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
> 
> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
> anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
> 
> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then it is 
> absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, but the 
> observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no 
> >> one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, 
> >> which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it 
> >> cannot prove its consistency. 
> > 
> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
> 
> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich system 
> of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more on 
> themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, get 
> soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and even in 
> the infinity axioms. 
> 
> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use of 
> the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions and 
> names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the finite 
> and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system is rich 
> enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic is, you get 
> an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now that we 
> understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
> >> quite the contrary. 
> >> 
> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
> >> (easily) its consistency. 
> > 
> > Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction. 
> 
> 
> That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. The 
> proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers. 
> 
> So, at the meta-level, to say that PA is inconsistent means that there is 
> standard number describing a finite proof of f. And in that case, PA would 
> prove any proposition. In classical logic, proving A and proving ~A is 
> equivalent with proving (A & ~A), which []f, interpreted at the meta-level. 
> Now, for the machine, []f is consistent, as the machine 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 5:00:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker > 
> >> wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>  But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
> >>> I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
> >>> proved. 
> >> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  
> >> So in this case proof entails truth?? 
> > But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) 
> > -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
> > beweisbar. 
> > 
> > The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >>> For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* 
> >>> \ G. 
> >>> 
> >>> Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In 
> >>> fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
> >>> Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency. 
> >> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for 
> >> every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> >> undefinable)? 
> > No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth 
> > you want, like “1 = 1”. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for which 
> >> []<>t -> <>t is false? 
> > You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), and 
> > indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
> > provability and consistency referred to. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >>> 
>  Nothing which is proven can be false, 
> >>> Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
> >> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  
> >> But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
> > Explain this to your tax inspector! 
> 
> I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
> mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
> 
> > 
> > If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
> > false. 
> 
> Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
> 
> > 
> > Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no 
> > one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, 
> > which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it 
> > cannot prove its consistency. 
> 
> But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
> 
> > Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
> > quite the contrary. 
> > 
> > Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
> > (easily) its consistency. 
> 
> Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction.  
> And even then there might be a question of the rules of inference. 
> 
> Brent 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I have read in various texts that at some point matter (all there is in the 
> universe) may reach a point of inconsistency: All matter itself would just 
> disintegrate.  That's all, folks!

That is what Black-Holes are in Newton physics, and they appear if any two 
masses are at distance 0 of each other. The *quantum* black hole are attempts 
by nature to survive God’s dividing number by zero!

With Mechanism we have partial control. It is up to us to try not dividing by 
zero and multiplying by the infinite. But we can’t control all bugs (security) 
without losing Turing universality (liberty).

Matter will remain apparent, but its semantic will differ, as it is a mix of 
contingent with what is observable for all universal 
number/machine/combinator/… 

With (indexical, digital) Mechanism, that is mainly the classical 
Church-Turing-Post-Kleene thesis, the physical reality is phi_i independent. It 
should imply the structure on which a measure one exist, may be like Turing 
universal groups (like the unitary groups). With mechanism, the origin of the 
physical laws is ia problem in mathematics, and partial solution already 
obtained compare well with the general data of contemporary physics. Major 
advantage: the Gödel-Löb-Solovay split of G and G* (the truth on “me” and what 
I can justify on “me”) allows to distinguish, in the observable, the 
justifiable and the non justifiable, but also the knowable and non knowable, 
the observable and the non observable, and this is used to distinguish the 
quanta and the qualia in the sensible realm. 

For the universal machine there is a rich corona in between the rational 
(justifiable) and the surrational (true but non provable) and the Lobian 
machine (those knowing that they are universal) are aware of that corona in the 
first person (non justifiable nor even describable) way. 


Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are sub

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 11:27:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
>  I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
> proved. 
> >>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is 
> true)  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
> >> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> 
> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
> beweisbar. 
> >> 
> >> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> 
>  For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
> G* \ G. 
>  
>  Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being 
> true. In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
>  Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of 
> inconsistency. 
> >>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
> for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> undefinable)? 
> >> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
> >> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), 
> and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
> provability and consistency referred to. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
>  
> > Nothing which is proven can be false, 
>  Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
> >>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
> >> Explain this to your tax inspector! 
> > 
> > I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
> mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>
> ? 
>
>
>
> > 
> >> 
> >> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
> false. 
> > 
> > Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>
> In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
> anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 
>
> If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then it 
> is absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, but 
> the observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism. 
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > 
> >> 
> >> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as 
> no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, 
> which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it 
> cannot prove its consistency. 
> > 
> > But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>
> Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to 
> assume more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich 
> system of belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more 
> on themselves. Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, 
> get soon or later the tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and 
> even in the infinity axioms. 
>
> Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use of 
> the infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions and 
> names, but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the finite 
> and the numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system is rich 
> enough to implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic is, you 
> get an explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now that we 
> understand about nothing on numbers and machine. 
>
>
>
> > 
> >> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
> quite the contrary. 
> >> 
> >> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
> (easily) its consistency. 
> > 
> > Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction. 
>
>
> That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. 
> The proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers. 
>
> So, at the meta-level, to say that PA is inconsistent means that there is 
> standard number describing a finite proof of f. And in that case, PA would 
> prove any proposition. In classical logic, proving A and proving ~A is 
> equivalent with proving (A & ~A), which []f, interpreted at the meta-level. 
> Now, for the machine, []f is consistent, as the machine cannot prove that 
> []f -> f, which would be her consistency. G* proves <>[]f. 
>
> It is because the domain here is full of ambiguities, that the logic 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Dec 2018, at 00:00, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.
 I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
 proved.
>>> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  So 
>>> in this case proof entails truth??
>> But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) -> 
>> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s beweisbar.
>> 
>> The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
 For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* \ 
 G.
 
 Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In 
 fact <>t -> ~[]<>t.
 Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.
>>> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for 
>>> every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
>>> undefinable)?
>> No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth 
>> you want, like “1 = 1”.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for which 
>>> []<>t -> <>t is false?
>> You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), and 
>> indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
>> provability and consistency referred to.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
 
> Nothing which is proven can be false,
 Assuming consistency, which is not provable.
>>> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  
>>> But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.
>> Explain this to your tax inspector!
> 
> I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't mean 
> it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater.

?



> 
>> 
>> If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are false.
> 
> Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises.

In classical logic false entails inconsistent. Inapplicable does not mean 
anything, as the theory’s application are *in* and *about* arithmetic. 

If we are universal machine emulable at some level of description, then it is 
absolutely undecidable if there is something more than arithmetic, but the 
observable must obey some laws, so we can test Mechanism.






> 
>> 
>> Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no 
>> one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, 
>> which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it 
>> cannot prove its consistency.
> 
> But it can be proven in bigger systems.

Yes, and Ronsion arithmetic emulates all the bigger systems. No need to assume 
more than Robinson arithmetic to get the emulation of more rich system of 
belief, which actually can help the finite things to figure more on themselves. 
Numbers which introspect themselves, and self-transforms, get soon or later the 
tentation to believe in the induction axioms, and even in the infinity axioms.

Before Gödel 1931, the mathematicians thought they could secure the use of the 
infinities by proving consistent the talk about their descriptions and names, 
but after Gödel, we understood that we cannot even secure the finite and the 
numbers with them. The real culprit is that one the system is rich enough to 
implement a universal machine, like Robinson Arithmetic is, you get an 
explosion in complexity and uncontrollability. We know now that we understand 
about nothing on numbers and machine.



> 
>> Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
>> quite the contrary.
>> 
>> Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
>> (easily) its consistency.
> 
> Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction. 


That is []f, that does not necessarily means arithmetic is inconsistent. The 
proof could be given by a non standard natural numbers.

So, at the meta-level, to say that PA is inconsistent means that there is 
standard number describing a finite proof of f. And in that case, PA would 
prove any proposition. In classical logic, proving A and proving ~A is 
equivalent with proving (A & ~A), which []f, interpreted at the meta-level. 
Now, for the machine, []f is consistent, as the machine cannot prove that []f 
-> f, which would be her consistency. G* proves <>[]f.

It is because the domain here is full of ambiguities, that the logic of G and 
G*, which capture the consequence of incompleteness are so useful.

Bruno




> And even then there might be a question of the rules of inference.
> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsu

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Dec 2018, at 12:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 4:49:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:05, Brent Meeker > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 12/13/2018 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with 
 Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers
 http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf 
 
>>> 
>>> Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic NOT 
>>> available for the machines.
>> 
>> What about S5 makes it not available for machines?
> 
> 
> There are no intensional variant of G leading to S5.
> 
> The axiom “5” is the guilty one (as []p & p obeys S4, and S5 can be defined 
> by S4 + “5”)
> 
> “5” is <>p -> []<>p (the opposite of incompleteness: <>p -> ~[]<>p, but also 
> incompatible in the logic X, Z, etc.).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> How does this relate to the "higher-order theorem provers" that deals with 
> modal systems like S5?
> 
> 
> https://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/16/Papers/137.pdf 


Rather interesting. The machine makes the right critics! Not quite serious 
about theology though. The definition of God by St-Anselme is a bit too much 
post-529 for the universal machine’s view. But some paragraph, notably the 
requirement of symmetry, gives me the feeling that the machine’s sensibility 
mode ([]p & <>t & p) defined in G1* (with 1 being what they called the collapse 
formula: p -> []p, which does not entail any collapse in arithmetic) might make 
the first person sensibility “believing” in the God of St-Anselme. It would be 
interesting to see what aspect of the ONE would correspond to this.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 5:00:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>  But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
> >>> I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
> proved. 
> >> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true) 
>  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
> > But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> 
> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
> beweisbar. 
> > 
> > The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >>> For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
> G* \ G. 
> >>> 
> >>> Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
> In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
> >>> Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency. 
> >> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
> for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> undefinable)? 
> > No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
> > You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), 
> and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
> provability and consistency referred to. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >>> 
>  Nothing which is proven can be false, 
> >>> Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
> >> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
> > Explain this to your tax inspector! 
>
> I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
> mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>
> > 
> > If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
> false. 
>
> Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>
> > 
> > Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as 
> no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, 
> which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it 
> cannot prove its consistency. 
>
> But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>
> > Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
> quite the contrary. 
> > 
> > Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
> (easily) its consistency. 
>
> Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction.  
> And even then there might be a question of the rules of inference. 
>
> Brent 
>




I have read in various texts that at some point matter (all there is in the 
universe) may reach a point of inconsistency: All matter itself would just 
disintegrate.  That's all, folks!

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.

I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is proved.

So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  So in 
this case proof entails truth??

But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) -> p” 
is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s beweisbar.

The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p.






For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* \ G.

Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In fact <>t -> 
~[]<>t.
Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.

I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for every 
substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is undefinable)?

No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth you 
want, like “1 = 1”.





Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for which []<>t -> 
<>t is false?

You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), and 
indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this provability 
and consistency referred to.







Nothing which is proven can be false,

Assuming consistency, which is not provable.

So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  But 
finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.

Explain this to your tax inspector!


I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater.




If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are false.


Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises.



Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no one 
has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, which 
confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it cannot 
prove its consistency.


But it can be proven in bigger systems.


Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, quite 
the contrary.

Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove (easily) 
its consistency.


Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction.  
And even then there might be a question of the rules of inference.


Brent

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 4:49:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:05, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/13/2018 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> *Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with 
> Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers*
> http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf
>
>
> Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic NOT 
> available for the machines.
>
>
> What about S5 makes it not available for machines?
>
>
>
> There are no intensional variant of G leading to S5.
>
> The axiom “5” is the guilty one (as []p & p obeys S4, and S5 can be 
> defined by S4 + “5”)
>
> “5” is <>p -> []<>p (the opposite of incompleteness: <>p -> ~[]<>p, but 
> also incompatible in the logic X, Z, etc.).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

How does this relate to the "higher-order theorem provers" that deals with 
modal systems like S5?


https://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/16/Papers/137.pdf 

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.
>> 
>> I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is proved.
> 
> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  So 
> in this case proof entails truth??

But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) -> p” 
is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s beweisbar.

The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p.



> 
> 
>> For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* \ G.
>> 
>> Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In 
>> fact <>t -> ~[]<>t.
>> Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.
> 
> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for 
> every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> undefinable)? 

No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth you 
want, like “1 = 1”.




> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for which 
> []<>t -> <>t is false?

You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), and 
indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this provability 
and consistency referred to.




> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Nothing which is proven can be false,
>> 
>> Assuming consistency, which is not provable.
> 
> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  But 
> finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.

Explain this to your tax inspector!

If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are false.

Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no one 
has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, which 
confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it cannot 
prove its consistency. Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about 
arithmetic’s consistency, quite the contrary.

Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove (easily) 
its consistency.



> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false.
>> 
>> Which is of course easily refuted.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very different 
>>> from the common one.
>> 
>> “BBB” is true just in case it is the case that BBB.
> 
> But you can't know whether it is the case that 10^1 + 1 is the successor 
> of 10^1000 independent of the axioms, i.e. you assume it.

That is the best we can do in science.

Bruno






> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> I am not sure, but the point is that no machine can prove []p -> p in 
>> general. And the machine can know that, making her “modest” (Löbian).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:05, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/13/2018 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with 
>>> Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers
>>> http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf 
>>> 
>> 
>> Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic NOT 
>> available for the machines.
> 
> What about S5 makes it not available for machines?


There are no intensional variant of G leading to S5.

The axiom “5” is the guilty one (as []p & p obeys S4, and S5 can be defined by 
S4 + “5”)

“5” is <>p -> []<>p (the opposite of incompleteness: <>p -> ~[]<>p, but also 
incompatible in the logic X, Z, etc.).

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.


I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
proved.


So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  
So in this case proof entails truth??



For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
G* \ G.


Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t.

Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.


I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
undefinable)?  Or are you asserting that there is at least one true 
proposition for which []<>t -> <>t is false?






Nothing which is proven can be false,


Assuming consistency, which is not provable.


So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.







which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false.


Which is of course easily refuted.



Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very 
different from the common one.


“BBB” is true just in case it is the case that BBB.


But you can't know whether it is the case that 10^1 + 1 is the 
successor of 10^1000 independent of the axioms, i.e. you assume it.


Brent



I am not sure, but the point is that no machine can prove []p -> p in 
general. And the machine can know that, making her “modest” (Löbian).


Bruno



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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/13/2018 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
*Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with 
Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers*

http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf


Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic 
NOT available for the machines.


What about S5 makes it not available for machines?

Brent

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 9:30:10 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>  the mathematical idea of "true" is very different from the common one.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
This reminds me of the "truth" the guys on *The Big Bang Theory* refer to a 
lot: They have arguments of what would be the case (be "true") of 
characters in their favorite comic, SF, fantasy universes (Game of Thrones, 
Star Trek, Marvel, DC, ...).

Math truth is pretty much like that.

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 04:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/12/2018 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > 
 wrote:
 
 
 
 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
> 
> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
 
 That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
 make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
 reality.
 
 Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
 “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
 philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
 to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
 idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
 lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
 
 I've been following him like forever.
 
 * e.g.
 Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have 
 the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
 professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that 
 in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" 
 that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
 infinity.
>>> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
>>> induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
>>> physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is 
>>> not less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction 
>>> is needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.
>> 
>> That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) 
>> correctly. It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. The 
>> machine’s soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything 
>> describable in any 3p terms.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
>>> intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
>>> consciousness primary.
>> 
>> Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital 
>> body.
>> 
>> But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital body 
>> in his childhood, to survive some disease?
>> 
>> You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will 
>> be that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown 
>> that no universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without 
>> observable clue, a physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation of 
>> approximations of that physical reality at some level of substitution (fine 
>> grained, with 10^100 decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely many 
>> such approximation exists in arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial 
>> equation, and the invariance of the first person for “delays of 
>> reconstitution” (definable by the number of steps done by the universal 
>> dovetailer to get the relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted 
>> with a continuum. The math shows that it has to be a special (models of []p 
>> & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of 
>> provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: 
>> Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. It 
>> represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that PA is close for the Löb 
>> rule: if you convince PA that the provability of the existence of Santa 
>> Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, then PA will soon or later 
>> prove the existence of Santa Klauss.
> 
> But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 

I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is proved. 
For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* \ G.

Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In fact 
<>t -> ~[]<>t. 
Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.


> Nothing which is proven can be false,

Assuming consistency, which is not provable.



> which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false. 

Which is of course easily refuted.



> Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very different 
> from the common one.

“BBB” is true just in case it 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:37, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:18:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
 
 (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>>> 
>>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
>>> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
>>> reality.
>>> 
>>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some “religions” 
>>> do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some philosophies 
>>> vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads to 
>>> relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea, 
>>> but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
>>> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>>> 
>>> I've been following him like forever.
>>> 
>>> * e.g.
>>> Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have the 
>>> good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of professional 
>>> mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases 
>>> is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" that are 
>>> completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called infinity.
>> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
>> induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
>> physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is not 
>> less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction is 
>> needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.
> 
> That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) correctly. 
> It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. The machine’s 
> soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything describable in 
> any 3p terms.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
>> intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
>> consciousness primary.
> 
> Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital body.
> 
> But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital body 
> in his childhood, to survive some disease?
> 
> You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will be 
> that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown that no 
> universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without observable clue, a 
> physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation of approximations of 
> that physical reality at some level of substitution (fine grained, with 
> 10^100 decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely many such 
> approximation exists in arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial equation, 
> and the invariance of the first person for “delays of reconstitution” 
> (definable by the number of steps done by the universal dovetailer to get the 
> relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted with a continuum. The math 
> shows that it has to be a special (models of []p & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] 
> is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of provability of Gödel 1931. It is 
> my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: Löbian. They obeys to the formula 
> of modesty of Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. It represents a scheme of theorems of 
> PA saying that PA is close for the Löb rule: if you convince PA that the 
> provability of the existence of Santa Klauss entails the existence of Santa 
> Klauss, then PA will soon or later prove the existence of Santa Klauss. Put 
> in another way, unless PA proves something, she will never prove that the 
> provability of something entails that something. PA is maximally modest on 
> her own provability ability. 
> 
> In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the ~[]f, 
> equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in general not 
> provable and is not a theorem of PA.
> 
> Incompleteness enforces the nuances between
> 
> Truth p
> Provable  []p
> Knowable  []p & p
> Observable[]p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ 
> = consistent)
> Sensible  []p & <>t
> 
> And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the observable and 
> the sensible along the provable/true parts, G and G

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/12/2018 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift > wrote:




On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
wrote:




On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:



On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift
 wrote:


Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise".

(Derrida, Rorty, …)


That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism.
Confirmation does not make an idea true, but it is better
than nothing, once we postulate some reality.

Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like
some “religions” do, although only when they are used for
that purpose.  Some philosophies vindicate  their lack of
rigour into a principle. That leads to relativisme, and
obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea,
but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.

Bruno



Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the
(youtube) lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?

I've been following him like forever.

* e.g.

  * *Mathematics is /so/ useful because physical scientists and
engineers have the good sense to largely ignore the
"religious" fanaticism of professional mathematicians, and
their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases is
misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms"
that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the
so-called infinity.*


Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even
without the induction axiom, is the “ontological things”.
Induction axioms, infinity, physics, humans, etc. belongs to the
phenomenology. The phenomenology is not less real, but its is not
primary, it is second order, and that fiction is needed to
survive, even if fictionally.

Bruno



To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.


That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) 
correctly. It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non 
provable. The machine’s soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor 
even anything describable in any 3p terms.








To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
consciousness primary.


Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a 
digital body.


But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital 
body in his childhood, to survive some disease?


You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point 
will be that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can 
be shown that no universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, 
without observable clue, a physical reality from any of infinitely 
many emulation of approximations of that physical reality at some 
level of substitution (fine grained, with 10^100 decimals correct, for 
example). Then, infinitely many such approximation exists in 
arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial equation, and the 
invariance of the first person for “delays of reconstitution” 
(definable by the number of steps done by the universal dovetailer to 
get the relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted with a 
continuum. The math shows that it has to be a special (models of []p & 
p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of 
provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, 
shortly: Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of Löb: []([]p 
-> p) -> []p. It represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that PA 
is close for the Löb rule: if you convince PA that the provability of 
the existence of Santa Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, 
then PA will soon or later prove the existence of Santa Klauss.


But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.  Nothing which is proven 
can be false, which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false.  
Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very 
different from the common one.


Brent

Put in another way, unless PA proves something, she will never prove 
that the provability of something entails that something. PA is 
maximally modest on her own provability ability.


In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the 
~[]f, equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in 
general not provable and is not a theorem of PA.


Incompleteness enforces the nuances between

Truthp
Provable[]p
Knowable[]p & p
Observable[]p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ = 
consistent)

Sensible[]p & <>t

And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the 
observable and the sensible along the provable/true parts, G 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:18:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>>>
>>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>>>
>>>
>>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does 
>>> not make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate 
>>> some reality.
>>>
>>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
>>> “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
>>> philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
>>> to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
>>> idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
>> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>>
>> I've been following him like forever.
>>
>> * e.g.
>>
>>- *Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers 
>>have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
>>professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, 
>> that 
>>in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on 
>> "axioms" 
>>that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
>>infinity.*
>>
>> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without 
>> the induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, 
>> infinity, physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The 
>> phenomenology is not less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, 
>> and that fiction is needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.
>
>
> That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) 
> correctly. It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. 
> The machine’s soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything 
> describable in any 3p terms.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
> intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
> consciousness primary.
>
>
> Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital 
> body.
>
> But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital 
> body in his childhood, to survive some disease?
>
> You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will 
> be that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown 
> that no universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without 
> observable clue, a physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation 
> of approximations of that physical reality at some level of substitution 
> (fine grained, with 10^100 decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely 
> many such approximation exists in arithmetic, even in diophantine 
> polynomial equation, and the invariance of the first person for “delays of 
> reconstitution” (definable by the number of steps done by the universal 
> dovetailer to get the relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted 
> with a continuum. The math shows that it has to be a special (models of []p 
> & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of 
> provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: 
> Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. 
> It represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that PA is close for the 
> Löb rule: if you convince PA that the provability of the existence of Santa 
> Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, then PA will soon or later 
> prove the existence of Santa Klauss. Put in another way, unless PA proves 
> something, she will never prove that the provability of something entails 
> that something. PA is maximally modest on her own provability ability. 
>
> In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the 
> ~[]f, equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in general 
> not provable and is not a theorem of PA.
>
> Incompleteness enforces the nuances between
>
> Truth p
> Provable []p
> Knowable []p & p
> Observable []p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ = 
> consistent)
> Sensible []p & <>t
>
> And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the observable 
> and the sensible along the provable/true parts, G and G*.
> That gives 8 personal points of view on the (sigma_1) Arithmetic. 5 
> “terrestrial” (provable) and 5 “divine” (true but non provable) modes on 
> the

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>>> 
>>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>> 
>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
>> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
>> reality.
>> 
>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some “religions” 
>> do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some philosophies 
>> vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads to relativisme, 
>> and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea, but 
>> eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
>> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>> 
>> I've been following him like forever.
>> 
>> * e.g.
>> Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have the 
>> good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of professional 
>> mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases 
>> is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" that are 
>> completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called infinity.
> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
> induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
> physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is not 
> less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction is 
> needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.

That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) correctly. 
It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. The machine’s 
soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything describable in any 
3p terms.





> 
> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is intrinsic 
> to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make consciousness 
> primary.

Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital body.

But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital body in 
his childhood, to survive some disease?

You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will be 
that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown that no 
universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without observable clue, a 
physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation of approximations of 
that physical reality at some level of substitution (fine grained, with 10^100 
decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely many such approximation exists 
in arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial equation, and the invariance of 
the first person for “delays of reconstitution” (definable by the number of 
steps done by the universal dovetailer to get the relevant states) entails that 
the 1p is confronted with a continuum. The math shows that it has to be a 
special (models of []p & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] is the arithmetical 
“beweisbar” predicate of provability of Gödel 1931. It is my generic 
Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: Löbian. They obeys to the formula of modesty of 
Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. It represents a scheme of theorems of PA saying that 
PA is close for the Löb rule: if you convince PA that the provability of the 
existence of Santa Klauss entails the existence of Santa Klauss, then PA will 
soon or later prove the existence of Santa Klauss. Put in another way, unless 
PA proves something, she will never prove that the provability of something 
entails that something. PA is maximally modest on her own provability ability. 

In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the ~[]f, 
equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in general not 
provable and is not a theorem of PA.

Incompleteness enforces the nuances between

Truth   p
Provable[]p
Knowable[]p & p
Observable  []p & <>t.  (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ 
= consistent)
Sensible[]p & <>t

And incompleteness also doubles, or split,  the provable, the observable and 
the sensible along the provable/true parts, G and G*.
That gives 8 personal points of view on the (sigma_1) Arithmetic. 5 
“terrestrial” (provable) and 5 “divine” (true but non provable) modes on the 
Self, with two of them (Truth and Knowable) at the intersection of Earth 
(effective, provable) and Heaven (truth).

The beauty is that G* prove

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>>
>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>>
>>
>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does 
>> not make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate 
>> some reality.
>>
>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
>> “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
>> philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
>> to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
>> idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
>
> I've been following him like forever.
>
> * e.g.
>
>- *Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers 
>have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
>professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that 
>in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" 
>that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
>infinity.*
>
> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without 
> the induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, 
> infinity, physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The 
> phenomenology is not less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, 
> and that fiction is needed to survive, even if fictionally. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing.

To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is 
intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make 
consciousness primary.


https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>> 
>> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
> 
> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
> reality.
> 
> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some “religions” 
> do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some philosophies 
> vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads to relativisme, 
> and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea, but eventually 
> it hurts in front of the truth.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) lectures 
> of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?
> 
> I've been following him like forever.
> 
> * e.g.
> Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have the 
> good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of professional 
> mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases 
> is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" that are 
> completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called infinity.
Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the 
induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, 
physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is not 
less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction is 
needed to survive, even if fictionally. 

Bruno




> 
> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
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> .
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> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout 
> .

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/11/2018 3:58 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:


Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise".

(Derrida, Rorty, …)


That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation
does not make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we
postulate some reality.

Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some
“religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.
 Some philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a
principle. That leads to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks
nice as anyone can defend any idea, but eventually it hurts in
front of the truth.

Bruno



Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?


I've been following him like forever.

* e.g.

  * *Mathematics is /so/ useful because physical scientists and
engineers have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious"
fanaticism of professional mathematicians, and their insistence on
so-called rigor, that in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical,
since it is based on "axioms" that are completely fictional, i.e.
those that involve the so-called infinity.*



Physics is to mathematics as sex is to masturbation.
   --- Richard Feynman

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>
> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>
>
> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
> reality.
>
> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
> “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
> philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
> to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
> idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?

I've been following him like forever.

* e.g.

   - *Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers 
   have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
   professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that 
   in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" 
   that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
   infinity.*
   - 
   

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 4:21:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:45, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
 computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
 call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
 Galen Strawson):
>>> 
>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
 
 [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
  ]
 
  -pt
 
 
>>> 
>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>>  
>>> 
>>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>>> ] — where 
>>> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
>>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>>> fiction.)
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>> math-fictionanlist.
>> 
>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>> arithmetic.
>> 
>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
>> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. 
>> I can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
>> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not 
>> have solutions.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
>> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
>> (like us).
>> 
>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
> 
> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
> than in the moon.
> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
> the computationalist theory of mind.
> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
> objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
> aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Example: The Turing 
>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>  
>> 
>>  ].
> 
> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, 
> and their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid 
> get a 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since 
>> a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>> "boring”.)
> 
> 
> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
> machine) in Turing sense.
> 
> 
>> 
>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
> 
> 
> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
> some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
> 
> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/ 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 4:21:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:45, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically 
>>> that *computationalism is indeed false*, and it should be replaced 
>>> by what I call *real computationalism* (where I am adopting the 
>>> "real" label from Galen Strawson):
>>>
>>>
>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>> ]
>>>
>>>  -pt
>>>
>>>
>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>  
>>
>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>> ] — 
>> where *there are no such things as mathematical objects* — if 
>> computation is considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then 
>> computationalism is fiction.)
>>
>>
>>
>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>> math-fictionanlist.
>>
>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>> arithmetic.
>>
>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z 
>> such x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon 
>> exists”. I can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t 
>> conceive waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have 
>> and 
>> not have solutions.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist 
> are ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of 
> nature (like us).
>
> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 
>
>
> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
> than in the moon.
> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot 
> use the computationalist theory of mind.
> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
> objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
> aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>
>
>
>
> Example: The Turing 
> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>  
> ].
>
>
> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, 
> and 
> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>
>
>
>
> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" 
> since a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that 
> idea "boring”.)
>
>
>
> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
> machine) in Turing sense.
>
>
>
> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>
>
>
> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
> some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in

 http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional 
 Computing
 http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and 
 Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
 etc.


 Does it

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:45, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>>> computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
>>> call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
>>> Galen Strawson):
>> 
>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>> opinion private, if I have one.
>> 
>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>>  ]
>>> 
>>>  -pt
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>  
>> 
>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>> ] — where 
>> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>> fiction.)
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
> math-fictionanlist.
> 
> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
> arithmetic.
> 
> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
> solutions.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
> (like us).
> 
> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
 
 That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
 than in the moon.
 Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
 the computationalist theory of mind.
 I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
 are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of 
 the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
 
 
 
 
> Example: The Turing 
> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>  
> 
>  ].
 
 Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
 immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
 But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
 their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
 
 
 
> 
> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
> "boring”.)
 
 
 I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
 machine) in Turing sense.
 
 
> 
> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
 
 
 Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
 non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
 
 http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/   - International 
 Center of Unconventional Computing
 http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/  - 
 Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 
 2019
 https://en.wikipedia.org/w

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>> *computationalism 
>> is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
>> computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
>> Strawson):
>>
>>
>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>> ]
>>
>>  -pt
>>
>>
>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>  
>
> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
> ] — 
> where *there are no such things as mathematical objects* — if 
> computation is considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then 
> computationalism is fiction.)
>
>
>
> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
> math-fictionanlist.
>
> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
> arithmetic.
>
> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z 
> such x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon 
> exists”. I can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t 
> conceive waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and 
> not have solutions.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
 Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
 ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
 (like us).

 "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 


 That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
 than in the moon.
 Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot 
 use the computationalist theory of mind.
 I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
 objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
 aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.




 Example: The Turing 
 machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
 https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
  
 ].


 Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
 immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
 But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
 their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...




 (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since 
 a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
 "boring”.)



 I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
 machine) in Turing sense.



 So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 



 Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
 some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.

 Bruno



>>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>>>
>>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional 
>>> Computing
>>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
>>> Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
>>> etc.
>>>
>>>
>>> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> One just uses the term  *unconventional computation* or *unconventional 
>>> computing* - a widely used term - and people will understand the 
>>> non-standard non-assumptions.
>>>
>>>
>>> Widely used does not mean that the notion is cle

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>> computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
>> call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
>> Galen Strawson):
> 
> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
> opinion private, if I have one.
> 
> Bruno
>> 
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>  ]
>> 
>>  -pt
>> 
>> 
> 
> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>  
> 
> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
> ] — where 
> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
> fiction.)
> 
> 
 
 
 You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
 physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
 math-fictionanlist.
 
 But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
 arithmetic.
 
 I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
 x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
 can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
 waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
 solutions.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 
 Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
 ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
 (like us).
 
 "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
>>> 
>>> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) than 
>>> in the moon.
>>> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
>>> the computationalist theory of mind.
>>> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
>>> are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of 
>>> the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 Example: The Turing 
 machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
 https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
  
 
  ].
>>> 
>>> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
>>> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
>>> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
>>> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
>>> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
 computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
 "boring”.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
>>> machine) in Turing sense.
>>> 
>>> 
 
 So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
>>> non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>>> 
>>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/   - International Center 
>>> of Unconventional Computing
>>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/  - 
>>> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 
>>> 2019
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing 
>>> 
>>> etc.
>> 
>> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> One just uses the term  unconventional computation or unconventional 
>>> computing - a widely u

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
> *computationalism 
> is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
> computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
> Strawson):
>
>
> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
> opinion private, if I have one.
>
> Bruno
>

> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ]
>
>  -pt
>
>
> The background idea of real computationalism is:
  

 (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
 ] — 
 where *there are no such things as mathematical objects* — if 
 computation is considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then 
 computationalism is fiction.)



 You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
 physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
 math-fictionanlist.

 But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
 arithmetic.

 I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
 x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
 can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
 waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
 solutions.

 Bruno




>>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
>>> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
>>> (like us).
>>>
>>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
>>> than in the moon.
>>> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
>>> the computationalist theory of mind.
>>> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
>>> objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
>>> aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Example: The Turing 
>>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>>  
>>> ].
>>>
>>>
>>> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
>>> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
>>> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
>>> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
>>> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since 
>>> a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>>> "boring”.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
>>> machine) in Turing sense.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
>>> some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>>
>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional 
>> Computing
>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
>> Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
>> etc.
>>
>>
>> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> One just uses the term  *unconventional computation* or *unconventional 
>> computing* - a widely used term - and people will understand the 
>> non-standard non-assumptions.
>>
>>
>> Widely used does not mean that the notion is clear. I have been asked to 
>> participate to a book in unconventional computing (which has been published 
>> since, but I don’t find the reference now).
>> Natural computing seems to me based on a misunderstanding of Turing’s 
>> notion of computation.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Of course UC say

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
> computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
> call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
> Galen Strawson):
 
 I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
 computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
 computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
 opinion private, if I have one.
 
 Bruno
> 
> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>  ]
> 
>  -pt
> 
> 
 
 The background idea of real computationalism is:
  
 
 (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
 ] — where 
 there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
 considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
 fiction.)
 
 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>>> math-fictionanlist.
>>> 
>>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>>> arithmetic.
>>> 
>>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such x^3 
>>> + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I can 
>>> conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive waking 
>>> up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
>>> solutions.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
>>> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
>>> (like us).
>>> 
>>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
>> 
>> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) than 
>> in the moon.
>> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use the 
>> computationalist theory of mind.
>> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
>> are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of the 
>> pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Example: The Turing 
>>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  ].
>> 
>> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
>> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. But 
>> the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and their 
>> existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 0/10, it 
>> will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
>>> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>>> "boring”.)
>> 
>> 
>> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
>> machine) in Turing sense.
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>> 
>> 
>> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
>> non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>> 
>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/   - International Center 
>> of Unconventional Computing
>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/  - 
>> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing 
>> 
>> etc.
> 
> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> One just uses the term  unconventional computation or unconventional 
>> computing - a widely used term - and people will understand the non-standard 
>> non-assumptions.
> 
> Widely used does not mean that the notion is clear. I have been asked to 
> participate to a book in unconventional computing (which has been published 
> since, but I don’t find the reference now).

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>


 On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
 *computationalism 
 is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
 computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
 Strawson):


 I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
 computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
 computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
 opinion private, if I have one.

 Bruno

>>>
 [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ]

  -pt


 The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>>  
>>>
>>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>>> ] — where 
>>> *there 
>>> are no such things as mathematical objects* — if computation is 
>>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>>> fiction.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>>> math-fictionanlist.
>>>
>>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>>> arithmetic.
>>>
>>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
>>> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
>>> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
>>> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
>>> solutions.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
>> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
>> (like us).
>>
>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 
>>
>>
>> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
>> than in the moon.
>> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
>> the computationalist theory of mind.
>> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
>> objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
>> aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Example: The Turing 
>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>  
>> ].
>>
>>
>> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
>> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
>> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
>> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
>> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
>> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>> "boring”.)
>>
>>
>>
>> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
>> machine) in Turing sense.
>>
>>
>>
>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>>
>>
>>
>> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
>> some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>
> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional 
> Computing
> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
> Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
> etc.
>
>
> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>
>
>
>
> One just uses the term  *unconventional computation* or *unconventional 
> computing* - a widely used term - and people will understand the 
> non-standard non-assumptions.
>
>
> Widely used does not mean that the notion is clear. I have been asked to 
> participate to a book in unconventional computing (which has been published 
> since, but I don’t find the reference now).
> Natural computing seems to me based on a misunderstanding of Turing’s 
> notion of computation.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Of course UC says CTT is false. 

(Pragmatists don't get "hung up" with truth, as you know.) 

It's the UCNC conferences, which is a bit odd, but they put UC and NC 
together. I don't really like NC. Just UC, since I think that's clearer. 

The International Conference on Unconventional Computation

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
 computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I call 
 real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
 Strawson):
>>> 
>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
 
 [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
  ]
 
  -pt
 
 
>>> 
>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>>  
>>> 
>>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>>> ] — where 
>>> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
>>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>>> fiction.)
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, physics 
>> is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by math-fictionanlist.
>> 
>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>> arithmetic.
>> 
>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such x^3 
>> + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I can 
>> conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive waking up 
>> in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have solutions.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are ones 
>> that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature (like 
>> us).
>> 
>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
> 
> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) than 
> in the moon.
> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use the 
> computationalist theory of mind.
> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
> are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of the 
> pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Example: The Turing 
>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>  
>> 
>>  ].
> 
> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. But 
> the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and their 
> existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 0/10, it 
> will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
>> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>> "boring”.)
> 
> 
> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
> machine) in Turing sense.
> 
> 
>> 
>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
> 
> 
> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
> non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
> 
> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional Computing
> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
> Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
> etc.

Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?



> 
> One just uses the term  unconventional computation or unconventional 
> computing - a widely used term - and people will understand the non-standard 
> non-assumptions.

Widely used does not mean that the notion is clear. I have been asked to 
participate to a book in unconventional computing (which has been published 
since, but I don’t find the reference now).
Natural computing seems to me based on a misunderstanding of Turing’s notion of 
computation.

Bruno


> 
> - pt
>  
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>>> *computationalism 
>>> is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
>>> computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
>>> Strawson):
>>>
>>>
>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ]
>>>
>>>  -pt
>>>
>>>
>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>  
>>
>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>> ] — where 
>> *there 
>> are no such things as mathematical objects* — if computation is 
>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>> fiction.)
>>
>>
>>
>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>> math-fictionanlist.
>>
>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>> arithmetic.
>>
>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
>> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
>> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
>> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
>> solutions.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
> (like us).
>
> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 
>
>
> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
> than in the moon.
> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
> the computationalist theory of mind.
> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
> are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of 
> the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>
>
>
>
> Example: The Turing 
> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>  
> ].
>
>
> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>
>
>
>
> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
> "boring”.)
>
>
>
> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
> machine) in Turing sense.
>
>
>
> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>
>
>
> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
> non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in

http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional Computing
http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
etc.

One just uses the term  *unconventional computation* or *unconventional 
computing* - a widely used term - and people will understand the 
non-standard non-assumptions.

- pt
 

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>>> computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I call 
>>> real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
>>> Strawson):
>> 
>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>> opinion private, if I have one.
>> 
>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>>  ]
>>> 
>>>  -pt
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>  
>> 
>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>> ] — where 
>> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>> fiction.)
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, physics 
> is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by math-fictionanlist.
> 
> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
> arithmetic.
> 
> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such x^3 + 
> y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I can 
> conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive waking up 
> in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have solutions.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are ones 
> that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature (like us).
> 
> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.

That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) than in 
the moon.
Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use the 
computationalist theory of mind.
I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects are 
much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of the 
pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.




> Example: The Turing 
> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>  ].

Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. But 
the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and their 
existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 0/10, it 
will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...



> 
> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
> "boring”.)


I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal machine) 
in Turing sense.


> 
> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 


Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some non 
standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>> *computationalism 
>> is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
>> computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
>> Strawson):
>>
>>
>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ]
>>
>>  -pt
>>
>>
>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>  
>
> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
> ] — where 
> *there 
> are no such things as mathematical objects* — if computation is 
> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
> fiction.)
>
>
>
> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
> math-fictionanlist.
>
> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
> arithmetic.
>
> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
> solutions.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
(like us).

"Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. Example: The 
Turing 
machine as defined in the standard textbook manner 
[ 
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html 
].

(Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
"boring".)

So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 6:37:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 11:39, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:25:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
>> 
>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
>> behave intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, 
>> and it behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of 
>> matter is “magical”.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
>> then humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter 
>> behaves intelligently.  
> 
> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
> complete. 
> 
> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
> this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
> 
> 
> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a 
> random oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which 
> computations run us, if I may say.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
> 
> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
> 
> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
> sense (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely 
> about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant 
> to computation. [ 
> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>  
> 
>  ]).
> 
> 
> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
> non-Turing.
> 
> This new article may be of interest:
> 
> 
> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
> them, too"
> ] 
> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>  
> 
>  ]
 
 I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
 provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
 “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
 mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
 true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the 
 subject of
 
 Galileo's Error
 Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
 
 by Philip Goff
 (coming from Penguin Random House)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but 
>>> present the idea and use it.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 
 What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
 no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
 matter (the subject of science).
>>> 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 at 6:05 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>* It is very simple. Never claim to have the truth, and always present a
> theory having verifiable consequences.*
>

Your theory is a working Turing Machine can be made without using matter or
physics, so don't show me more squiggles, show me a verifiable consequence
of that theory, show me  your mystical machine actually making a
calculation so I can verify  it is correct. Of course we both know you will
never EVER be able to do that, but that won't stop you from continuing to
sell your snake oil.

>>show me a WORKING Turing Machine that doesn't make use of the laws of
>> physics so that I can observe it making a calculation.You insist such a
>> thing exists so put up or shut up.
>
>
> *> The existence is provable in Peano arithmet*ic.
>

If an observable Turing Machine that makes no use of matter or physics has
been proven to exist why is it that nobody has ever seen one and nobody
ever will? Because what Peano actually proved is that some squiggles that
humans (who are made of matter and obey the laws of physics) have assigned
meaning to is the same as other squiggles that humans have assigned
different meanings to. None of those squiggles are Turing Machines and none
of them are powerful enough to calculate 2+2.


> *>Read Gödel 1931.*
>

In 1931 Godel knew nothing about Turing Machines.

>> Prove me wrong by producing a working machine that doesn't use matter or
>> physics.
>
>
> *>This is ambiguous.*
>

*Like hell it is!* My request is about as unambiguous as things get.

> *Either you ask me something contradictory at the start,*
>

Like explaining why your observable Turing Machine, the one that works
without using using matter or physics, is totally unobservable


> > *or you ask me an example of a working machine, relatively to a
> universal machine, in arithmetic. *
>

I'm not picky, it can be relative to anything you want, all I ask is that
it be observable and able to make a calculation without using matter or
physics; and it need not be complicated, 2+2 would be good enough.


> >>And by "working" I mean one that changes in time or space or both.
>
>
> >OK. Then your laptop is an excellent example.
>

Correct, and unless Apple just came out with something new all laptops are
made of matter and they all obey the laws of physics.

*> People who says that theology or metaphysics cannot be done with the
> scientific method are those who want impose their personal conviction to
> others.*
>

Metaphysics with the scientific method is just physics, and theology with
the scientific method causes the entire area of study to evaporate.


> > *Religion has been separated from science for one reason only: to make
> it into an instrument of control of the others.*
>

Yes let's go back to the good old days of the inquisition when authorities
knew how to deal with blasphemers like Galileo.


> You can produce it anyway you like provided its observable.
>
>

> *We have to agree by what mean by observable.*
>

But before we can do that we must first agree on what we mean by "mean",
then we have to agree on what we mean by "mean by "mean"" then we have to
agree on what we mean by "mean by "mean by "mean""", then 

I've noticed this phenomena before in debates when somebody is losing, they
start demanding definitions of words, and then demanding definitions of the
words in the definition, and then definitions of the words in the definitions
of the words in the definition, and then ...


> > *I have no clue what you mean by observable,*
>

Oh I think you do, I think you have a clue, you just can't produce what I
ask.


> > *you invoke your god-primary matter*  [...]  *Repeating a statement
> again and again does not make it valid.*
>

Very good, for once you say something I agree with completely.

  >> I want to observe a working Turing Machine that is not made of matter
> and does not make use of the laws of physics.


> >  *{(q1 B 1 q1)}*
>

I tried that but it doesn't work, I've been shouting at {(q1 B 1 q1)} at
the top of my lungs "*HOW MUCH IS 2+2 ?*" but nothing changes,
the squiggles  just sit there.

>>You just said that pure arithmetic can do exactly that, so stop talking
>> about it and SHOW ME.
>
>
> > See my paper for the proof.
>

To hell with your idiotic "proof", don't tell me SHOW ME a Turing Machine
that is not made of matter that can calculate 2+2!


> >>I already told you that matter, or anything else, is real if you can
>> make a working Turing Machine out of it.
>
>
> > *“Working” is ambiguous.*
>

I guess "ambiguous" is you're new favorite word. I already said "working"
is something that changes in time or space or both, what the hell is
ambiguous about that?


> > *How could a universal machine distinguish a physically working
> environment, and an arithmetically environment?*
>

Easy, if the environment changes in time or space then its physical, if it
doesn't then its arithmetical, and if the environment can't change then a
Turi

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 6:37:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Dec 2018, at 11:39, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:25:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 
>>
>>
>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
>> behave 
>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter 
>> is 
>> “magical”.
>>
>>
>>
> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
> then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
> behaves intelligently*.  
>
>
> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
> complete. 
>
> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
> this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>
>
>
>
>
> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years 
> thought that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in 
> nature.
>
>
>
> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful 
> processing ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature 
> use a random oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which 
> computations run us, if I may say.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

 Going by something Barry Cooper wrote

 *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly 
 entails higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect 
 for embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
 content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*

 "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
 that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
 sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is 
 precisely about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is 
 relevant to computation.* [ 
 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
  
 ]).


 I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
 non-Turing.

 This new article may be of interest:


 "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
 not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
 them, too"
 ] 
 https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
  
 ]


 I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
 provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
 “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
 mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
 true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 

 Bruno



>>> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the 
>>> subject of
>>>
>>> Galileo's Error
>>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>>>
>>> by Philip Goff
>>> (coming from Penguin Random House)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, 
>>> but present the idea and use it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there 
>>> is no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
>>> matter (the subject of science).
>>>
>>>
>>> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, 
>>> and then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you 
>>> assume matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 Dec 2018, at 11:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:25:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
> 
> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
> behave intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and 
> it behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of 
> matter is “magical”.
> 
> 
> 
> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
> then humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter 
> behaves intelligently.  
 
 Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
 (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
 complete. 
 
 It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
 means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
 
 
 
 
> 
> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
 
 
 If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
 ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a 
 random oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which 
 computations run us, if I may say.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 
 
 Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
 
 The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
 higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
 embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
 content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
 
 "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
 that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
 sense (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely 
 about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
 computation. [ 
 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
  
 
  ]).
 
 
 I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
 non-Turing.
 
 This new article may be of interest:
 
 
 "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
 not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
 them, too"
 ] 
 https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
  
 
  ]
>>> 
>>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
>>> provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
>>> “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
>>> mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
>>> true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the subject 
>>> of
>>> 
>>> Galileo's Error
>>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>>> 
>>> by Philip Goff
>>> (coming from Penguin Random House)
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but 
>> present the idea and use it.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
>>> no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
>>> matter (the subject of science).
>> 
>> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, and 
>> then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 
>> 
>> 
>> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you assume 
>> matter, you need indeed a non computational

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:25:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 
>
>
> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
> behave 
> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter 
> is 
> “magical”.
>
>
>
 If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
 then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
 behaves intelligently*.  


 Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
 (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
 complete. 

 It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
 this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).





 It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
 that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.



 If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
 ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a 
 random 
 oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
 run us, if I may say.

 Bruno




>>>
>>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>>>
>>> *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
>>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
>>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
>>> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*
>>>
>>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
>>> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
>>> sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is 
>>> precisely about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is 
>>> relevant to computation.* [ 
>>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>>>  
>>> ]).
>>>
>>>
>>> I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
>>> non-Turing.
>>>
>>> This new article may be of interest:
>>>
>>>
>>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
>>> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
>>> them, too"
>>> ] 
>>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>>>  
>>> ]
>>>
>>>
>>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
>>> provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
>>> “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
>>> mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
>>> true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the 
>> subject of
>>
>> Galileo's Error
>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>>
>> by Philip Goff
>> (coming from Penguin Random House)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, 
>> but present the idea and use it.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
>> no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
>> matter (the subject of science).
>>
>>
>> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, 
>> and then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 
>>
>>
>> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you 
>> assume matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and 
>> of mind, which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it 
>> experimentally, which is not a good sign. 
>>
>> All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid 
>> assuming it when doping physics, so there is no need of assuming it outside 
>>

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
 
 
 
> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
 
 No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that 
 physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
 computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
 behave intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and 
 it behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter 
 is “magical”.
 
 
 
 If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
 then humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves 
 intelligently.  
>>> 
>>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
>>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
>>> complete. 
>>> 
>>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
>>> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
 that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
>>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
>>> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
>>> run us, if I may say.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>>> 
>>> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
>>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
>>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
>>> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
>>> 
>>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
>>> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
>>> sense (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely 
>>> about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
>>> computation. [ 
>>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  ]).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
>>> non-Turing.
>>> 
>>> This new article may be of interest:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not 
>>> just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them, 
>>> too"
>>> ] 
>>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  ]
>> 
>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is provably 
>> inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is “natural” or a 
>> product of matter. That equates two different kind of mysteries, without 
>> adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be true, but I don’t 
>> see any evidence for such a move. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the subject 
>> of
>> 
>> Galileo's Error
>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>> 
>> by Philip Goff
>> (coming from Penguin Random House)
> 
> 
> 
> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but 
> present the idea and use it.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is no 
>> evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of matter 
>> (the subject of science).
> 
> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, and 
> then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 
> 
> 
> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you assume 
> matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and of mind, 
> which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it experimentally, 
> which is not a good sign. 
> 
> All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid assuming 
> it when doping physics, so there is no need of 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:




 Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 


 No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
 that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
 computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
 behave 
 intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
 behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
 “magical”.



>>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
>>> then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
>>> behaves intelligently*.  
>>>
>>>
>>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
>>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
>>> complete. 
>>>
>>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
>>> this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
>>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
>>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
>>> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
>>> run us, if I may say.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>>
>> *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
>> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*
>>
>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
>> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
>> sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is 
>> precisely about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is 
>> relevant to computation.* [ 
>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>>  
>> ]).
>>
>>
>> I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
>> non-Turing.
>>
>> This new article may be of interest:
>>
>>
>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
>> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
>> them, too"
>> ] 
>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>>  
>> ]
>>
>>
>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
>> provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
>> “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
>> mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
>> true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the 
> subject of
>
> Galileo's Error
> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>
> by Philip Goff
> (coming from Penguin Random House)
>
>
>
>
> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, 
> but present the idea and use it.
>
>
>
>
>
> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
> no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
> matter (the subject of science).
>
>
> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, 
> and then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 
>
>
> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you 
> assume matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and 
> of mind, which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it 
> experimentally, which is not a good sign. 
>
> All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid 
> assuming it when doping physics, so there is no need of assuming it outside 
> some primary matter. (I am the skeptical here).
>
> When assuming mechanism, we can’t assume more than arithmetic, without 
> empirical evidence for more, or we just make things harder to avoid solving 
> problems (that can prevent science).
>
> I claim no truth, I just show that we can test ex

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 Dec 2018, at 12:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 5:05:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> You assume a primary physical reality. I do not, and on the contrary show 
> that this idea is contradictory with the Mechanist theory.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Since Matter (a material computer) can compute Mechanism, I don't see how 
> Mechanism contradicts Materialism.


A material computer can emulate a computation supporting a person relatively to 
us, but with mechanism, a person cannot distinguish (without observing details) 
any computations leading to its local state, and so physics, and the appearance 
of matter can only be given by a statistics of all computation leading to that 
state, and structured by the ability of a machine to refer to itself.

Read my papers, I explain all this, or tell me at which step of the 8th step 
you have problem with. 





> 
> One could of course "eliminate" Matter in an Idealist metaphysics, but one 
> can (more plausibly to many) eliminate Numbers.

If you can understand the arithmetical definition of computation (Gödel, 
Church, Kleene), and if you are open to the digital mechanist thesis, then you 
can understand it will be easier to explain the appearances of the physical 
from the numbers, than to explain consciousness in term of material relation, 
and what those could be?

But all what I have done is providing the way to test all this, and what we 
observe till now rather confirm mechanism, and not materialism.

Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:26:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:24, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 
>> 
>> 
>> X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged 
>> enough equivalent).
>> 
>> The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to assume 
>> a bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who dislike 
>> the idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything physical. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> My understanding of "primary matter" is that it is what matter (hyle) is 
>> before it meets form, hence hylomorphism [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism 
>>  ]. 
>> 
>> Thomas Aquinas thought (from what I've read) that matter is that which gives 
>> forms individual instances, or "character", like individual trees, or 
>> people, etc.
>> 
> 
> That is the usual Aristotelian explanation. It is inconsistent with the 
> assumption of digital mechanism.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> molecules?
>> 
>> Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
>> electrons, and quantum mechanics.
>> 
>> 
>> Why are there so many articles today that claim to refute this?
> 
> Read them, and if one convince you, you can explain it here. Note that the 
> background of those paper are Aristotelian, where Mechanism enforces the 
> platonic view (if only to define properly what is a computation or machine).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> The papers in scientific publications (in recent science news, etc.) mainly 
> involve positing downward causation: There are chemical laws that cannot be 
> reduced to physical laws, and these (higher-level chemical) laws are needed 
> to explain currently "unsolved" problems in chemistry and biochemistry.

Above the threshold of universality, all reductionist theory broke. You can 
predict perfectly well the transistors, and still have no clue if a program 
will stop or not.

All my interest in arithmetic/meta-arithmetic is that we can see and understand 
how very simple rule, once Turing universal, leads to transfinite hierarchies 
of non controllability. 

Arithmetic is full of downward causation, and circular or spiral causation, at 
different levels.

That should be easy to understand from their self-referential logics and their 
variants. 

Bruno





> 
> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
>>> 
>>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that 
>>> physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
>>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
>>> “magical”.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), then 
>>> humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves 
>>> intelligently.  
>> 
>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
>> complete. 
>> 
>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
>> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
>>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>> 
>> 
>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
>> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
>> run us, if I may say.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>> 
>> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic content 
>> of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
>> 
>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense that 
>> doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing sense 
>> (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely about the 
>> relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
>> computation. [ 
>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>>  
>> 
>>  ]).
>> 
>> 
>> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
>> non-Turing.
>> 
>> This new article may be of interest:
>> 
>> 
>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not 
>> just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them, too"
>> ] 
>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>>  
>> 
>>  ]
> 
> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is provably 
> inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is “natural” or a 
> product of matter. That equates two different kind of mysteries, without 
> adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be true, but I don’t see 
> any evidence for such a move. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the subject of
> 
> Galileo's Error
> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
> 
> by Philip Goff
> (coming from Penguin Random House)



Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but 
present the idea and use it.



> 
> 
> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is no 
> evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of matter 
> (the subject of science).

There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, and 
then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 


Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you assume 
matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and of mind, 
which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it experimentally, 
which is not a good sign. 

All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid assuming it 
when doping physics, so there is no need of assuming it outside some primary 
matter. (I am the skeptical here).

When assuming mechanism, we can’t assume more than arithmetic, without 
empirical evidence for more, or we just make things harder to avoid solving 
problems (that can prevent science).

I claim no truth, I just show that we can t

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 5:05:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> You assume a primary physical reality. I do not, and on the contrary show 
> that this idea is contradictory with the Mechanist theory.
>
>
>

Since Matter (a material computer) can compute Mechanism, I don't see how 
Mechanism *contradicts *Materialism.

One could of course "eliminate" Matter in an Idealist metaphysics, but one 
can (more plausibly to many) eliminate Numbers.

- pt


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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 30 Nov 2018, at 20:52, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 1:53 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>All I ask you to do is follow the scientific method. 
> 
> > I do, which is not so frequent in theology
> 
> The scientific method in theology? You must be kidding.

It is very simple. Never claim to have the truth, and always present a theory 
having verifiable consequences.




> 
> > You are the one invoking your ontological commitment when defining real by 
> > “physically real”
> 
> I'm not defining anything in fact I'm asking you to stop defining stuff for 
> one second and instead show me a example, show me a WORKING Turing Machine 
> that doesn't make use of the laws of physics so that I can observe it making 
> a calculation.


Well, assuming mechanism, you, and your laptop, are good examples, as there is 
no physical reality which is primary at all in that case.

You assume a primary physical reality. I do not, and on the contrary show that 
this idea is contradictory with the Mechanist theory.





> You insist such a thing exists so put up or shut up.


The existence is provable in Peano arithmetic. Read Gödel 1931.





>  
> > and then asking me the impossible task to transform a computation realised 
> > in arithmetic into a computation realised in the physical reality.
> 
> If it's impossible for arithmetic to do that, and I agree with you it is, 
> then physical reality can do something arithmetic can’t.

Arithmetic makes you believe in a physical reality. The physical becomes 
phenomenological.

You are the one doing an ontological commitment. 






>  
> >> the multiverse as a collection of all real universes and a real universe 
> >> is one capable of producing a working Turing Machine.
> 
> All terms are used in too fuzzy way here.
> 
> So says the man that can't use personal pronouns without tying himself into 
> logical knots and contradictions.

Repeating a statement again and again does not make it valid. Just wait I 
explain this to some other.




>  
> > The arithmetical reality produces all working machines
> 
> I don't believe you. Prove me wrong by producing a working machine that 
> doesn't use matter or physics.

This is ambiguous. Either you ask me something contradictory at the start, like 
creating primary matter from the numbers, or you ask me an example of a working 
machine, relatively to a universal machine, in arithmetic. That is long to 
show. See the proof by Gödel in 25 steps (in his 1931 paper).





> And by "working" I mean one that changes in time or space or both.

OK. Then your laptop is an excellent example.





> You can claim all you want  you've proven there are a thousand angels dancing 
> on the head of a pin by redefining the words "angles" and "dancing" and "pin" 
> but I won't be interested until you show me many very small spiritual beings 
> moving to the rhythm of music on a dance floor of less than one square 
> millimeter in area.
>  
> > You can’t use work like "real” when doing metaphysics with the scientific 
> > method.
> 
> There is no such thing as metaphysics with the scientific method


People who says that theology or metaphysics cannot be done with the scientific 
method are those who want impose their personal conviction to others.
Religion has been separated from science for one reason only: to make it into 
an instrument of control of the others.





> 
>  >> there is no better way to prove that something exists than to produce it.
> 
> > I guess you mean to produce it physically,
> 
> You can produce it anyway you like provided its observable.

We have to agree by what mean by observable. I gave a precise definition for 
“observable with measure one”, and illustrated it in step 3 with the cup of 
coffee offered to both reconstituted person. Eventually observable is defined 
by being sigma_1, provable and consistent. That is enough to extract quantum 
logic, and to begin an explanation of why observation can be persistent and 
locally sharable between different universal machine. 
I have no clue what you mean by observable, as you invoke your god-primary 
matter, which makes no sense.




>   I want to observe a working Turing Machine that is not made of matter and 
> does not make use of the laws of physics.


 {(q1 B 1 q1)}





> You just said that pure arithmetic can do exactly that, so stop talking about 
> it and SHOW ME.  

See my paper for the proof. But what you ask me to so is enough ambiguous, so 
whatever I will show you, I know how you will criticized it, and it will be 
invalid as you will invoke your god.

It is hard to convince believer.






>   
> >  the criteria of meta^hysical reality due to Aristotle [...]
> 
> Don't you ever get tired of dead Greeks?


The big difference between two quite different conceptions of reality start 
there: Aristotle (matter exists ontologically) and Plato (matter is a symptom 
of a deeper non physical reality). Since 1500 years, we have 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:26:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:24, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>
>> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 
>>
>>
>>
>> X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something 
>> judged enough equivalent).
>>
>> The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to 
>> assume a bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who 
>> dislike the idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything 
>> physical. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
> My understanding of "primary matter" is that it is what matter (hyle) is 
> before it meets form, hence *hylomorphism *[ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism ]. 
>
> Thomas Aquinas thought (from what I've read) that matter is that which 
> gives forms individual instances, or "character", like individual trees, or 
> people, etc.
>
>
> That is the usual Aristotelian explanation. It is inconsistent with the 
> assumption of digital mechanism.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> molecules? 
>>
>>
>> Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
>> electrons, and quantum mechanics.
>>
>
>
> Why are there so many articles today that claim to refute this?
>
>
> Read them, and if one convince you, you can explain it here. Note that the 
> background of those paper are Aristotelian, where Mechanism enforces the 
> platonic view (if only to define properly what is a computation or machine).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
The papers in scientific publications (in recent science news, etc.) mainly 
involve positing *downward causation*: There are chemical laws that cannot 
be reduced to physical laws, and these (higher-level chemical) laws are 
needed to explain currently "unsolved" problems in chemistry and 
biochemistry.


- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 
>>>
>>>
>>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
>>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
>>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
>>> “magical”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
>> then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
>> behaves intelligently*.  
>>
>>
>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
>> complete. 
>>
>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
>> this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>>
>>
>>
>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
>> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
>> run us, if I may say.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>
> *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*
>
> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
> sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is precisely 
> about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
> computation.* [ 
> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>  
> ]).
>
>
> I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
> non-Turing.
>
> This new article may be of interest:
>
>
> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
> them, too"
> ] 
> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity 
> ]
>
>
> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
> provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
> “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
> mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
> true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the subject 
of

Galileo's Error
Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness

by Philip Goff
(coming from Penguin Random House)


What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
matter (the subject of science).

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 
> 
> 
> X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged 
> enough equivalent).
> 
> The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to assume a 
> bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who dislike the 
> idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything physical. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> My understanding of "primary matter" is that it is what matter (hyle) is 
> before it meets form, hence hylomorphism [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism ]. 
> 
> Thomas Aquinas thought (from what I've read) that matter is that which gives 
> forms individual instances, or "character", like individual trees, or people, 
> etc.
> 

That is the usual Aristotelian explanation. It is inconsistent with the 
assumption of digital mechanism.



> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> molecules?
> 
> Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
> electrons, and quantum mechanics.
> 
> 
> Why are there so many articles today that claim to refute this?

Read them, and if one convince you, you can explain it here. Note that the 
background of those paper are Aristotelian, where Mechanism enforces the 
platonic view (if only to define properly what is a computation or machine).

Bruno



> 
> [ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3262307/ ]
> [ 
> https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/the-curious-wavefunction/historical-contingency-and-the-futility-of-reductionism-why-chemistry-and-biology-is-not-physics/
>  ]
> 
>  - pt
> 
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
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> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
>> 
>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that 
>> physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
>> “magical”.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), then 
>> humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves 
>> intelligently.  
> 
> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
> complete. 
> 
> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought that 
>> the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
> 
> 
> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations run 
> us, if I may say.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
> 
> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for embodied 
> information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic content of 
> descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
> 
> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense that 
> doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing sense (but 
> could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely about the 
> relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to computation. 
> [ 
> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>  ]).
> 
> 
> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
> non-Turing.
> 
> This new article may be of interest:
> 
> 
> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not 
> just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them, too"
> ] 
> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity 
> ]

I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is provably 
inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is “natural” or a 
product of matter. That equates two different kind of mysteries, without adding 
light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be true, but I don’t see any 
evidence for such a move. 

Bruno



> 
> 
> 
> - pt
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[John Clark]

On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 1:53 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>All I ask you to do is follow the scientific method.
>
>
> *> I do, which is not so frequent in theology*
>

The scientific method in theology? You must be kidding.

> *You are the one invoking your ontological commitment when defining real
> by “physically real”*
>

I'm not defining anything in fact I'm asking you to stop defining stuff for
one second and instead show me a example, show me a WORKING Turing Machine
that doesn't make use of the laws of physics so that I can observe it
making a calculation. You insist such a thing exists so put up or shut up.


> > *and then asking me the impossible task to transform a computation
> realised in arithmetic into a computation realised in the physical reality.*
>

If it's impossible for arithmetic to do that, and I agree with you it is,
then physical reality can do something arithmetic can't.


> >> the multiverse as a collection of all real universes and a real
>> universe is one capable of producing a working Turing Machine.
>
>
> *All terms are used in too fuzzy way here.*
>

So says the man that can't use personal pronouns without tying himself into
logical knots and contradictions.


> > *The arithmetical reality produces all working machines*
>

I don't believe you. Prove me wrong by producing a working machine that
doesn't use matter or physics. And by "working" I mean one that changes in
time or space or both. You can claim all you want  you've proven there are
a thousand angels dancing on the head of a pin by redefining the words
"angles" and "dancing" and "pin" but I won't be interested until you show
me many very small spiritual beings moving to the rhythm of music on a
dance floor of less than one square millimeter in area.


> > *You can’t use work like "real” when doing metaphysics with the
> scientific method.*
>

There is no such thing as metaphysics with the scientific method

 >> there is no better way to prove that something exists than to produce
>> it.
>
>
> > *I guess you mean to produce it physically,*
>

You can produce it anyway you like provided its observable.  I want to
observe a working Turing Machine that is not made of matter and does not
make use of the laws of physics. You just said that pure arithmetic can do
exactly that, so stop talking about it and SHOW ME.


> >  *the criteria of meta^hysical reality due to Aristotle* [...]
>

Don't you ever get tired of dead Greeks?


> > *No problem, but then you need to abandon mechanism, or to explain us
> what in “real matter”  *
>

I already told you that matter, or anything else, is real if you can make a
working Turing Machine out of it.


> > *is both Turing emulable (as it should with mechanism), yet not
> emulated in arithmetic, which would violate Turing completeness of
> arithmetic,*
>

You've got it exactly backwards yet again. Turing proved matter can
calculate anything that can be calculated but he did not prove that
arithmetic can. That's why it's easy for me to show you matter doing
arithmetic but you have to rack your brains dreaming up excuses why you
can't show me arithmetic doing matter, in fact you can't even show me
arithmetic doing arithmetic.

> *It is a standard theorem in all mathematical textbook that Robison
> arithmetic is Turing complete.*
>

And when you tell that mathematical textbook to calculate 2+2 what happens?


> >> Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard
>> that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.
>
>
> >
> *You repeat this again, *
>

And I'd need scientific notation to count how many times you've called me
religious or dug up some Greek who's been dead for 2500 years as your
ultimate authority. You stop your repetition and I'll stop mine.

>>> *The number (2^4)*(3^5) typically encodes the list (4, 5),*
>>
>>
>> >>Do you know of a way that large Godel number can be un-encoded to get
>> back the 4 and 5 without doing any calculations?
>
>
> > *No of course.*
>

Then you can't use Godel numbering to encode information without matter and
the laws of physics.


> > *The point is that infinitely many of those calculations are realised
> in virtue of true relations of the type 2+2=4.*
>
> *You are the one saying that computationalism is true, but that only a
> special universal number counts.*
>

There is no special relationship between that Godel number and 4 and 5,
there are a infinite number of ways 4 and 5 can be manipulated to get
another larger number, Godel just picked one of them


> *>>>The FPI is that you are maximally ignorant of the future experience
>>> that you (the you here and now in Helsinki, say) will *live* after pus-hing
>>> on the button.*
>>
>>

>>If that is how the personal pronoun "you" is defined then "you" will not
>> live in the future regardless of if the button is pushed or not because the
>> here and now will not exist in the there and then,
>
>
> >*If the here and now will not exist in the here and then, *
>

There is n

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 29 Nov 2018, at 16:36, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:08 PM Martin Abramson  > wrote:
> 
> > How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams as 
> > before? Thanks for the response. m.a.
> 
> The exact mechanism depends on the specific example, computers have many 
> different ways to duplicate information. In the case of DNA the double helix 
> unravels and splits down the middle so you have 2 single helix molecules, but 
> each helix still contains as much information as the original double helix 
> because the 4 bases in the helix is what carries the information and Adenine 
> only binds with Thymine and Cytosine only binds with Guanine. So each single 
> helix can grab free bases floating around and start to grow, and pretty soon 
> you have 2 identical double helix molecules where there was only one before.

This is what can be made utterly precise with the second recursion theorem, or 
some of its generalisation. You can look at my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and 
Dreaming Machine” where I explain self-reproduction, self-transformation, 
set-regeneration, and dreams, by using Kleene’s second recursion theorem, or 
John Case’s generalisation of it. A planaria, here, is a program that you can 
cut in many pieces, and each pieces can build the entire program back 
(self-regeneration). Nature used it, somehow, arguably.

Bruno



> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

What does this mean in terms of (the possibility of) making a Star Trek 
transporter?  :)

[ https://www.thoughtco.com/star-trek-instantaneous-matter-transport-3072118 
]

- pt

On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 8:34:23 PM UTC-6, Monterey wrote:
>
> My original question was about copying memories between identical carbon 
> atoms. How does that work with DNA molecules? Are they composed of carbon 
> atoms?
>
> On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 10:37 AM John Clark  > wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:08 PM Martin Abramson > > wrote:
>>
>> > *How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams 
>>> as before? Thanks for the response. m.a.*
>>>
>>
>> The exact mechanism depends on the specific example, computers have many 
>> different ways to duplicate information. In the case of DNA the double 
>> helix unravels and splits down the middle so you have 2 single helix 
>> molecules, but each helix still contains as much information as the 
>> original double helix because the 4 bases in the helix is what carries the 
>> information and Adenine only binds with Thymine and Cytosine only binds 
>> with Guanine. So each single helix can grab free bases floating around and 
>> start to grow, and pretty soon you have 2 identical double helix molecules 
>> where there was only one before.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>>
>>
>>

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Martin Abramson]

My original question was about copying memories between identical carbon
atoms. How does that work with DNA molecules? Are they composed of carbon
atoms?

On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 10:37 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:08 PM Martin Abramson 
> wrote:
>
> > *How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams as
>> before? Thanks for the response. m.a.*
>>
>
> The exact mechanism depends on the specific example, computers have many
> different ways to duplicate information. In the case of DNA the double
> helix unravels and splits down the middle so you have 2 single helix
> molecules, but each helix still contains as much information as the
> original double helix because the 4 bases in the helix is what carries the
> information and Adenine only binds with Thymine and Cytosine only binds
> with Guanine. So each single helix can grab free bases floating around and
> start to grow, and pretty soon you have 2 identical double helix molecules
> where there was only one before.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
> --
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 
>
>
>
> X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged 
> enough equivalent).
>
> The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to 
> assume a bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who 
> dislike the idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything 
> physical. 
>
>
>
>
My understanding of "primary matter" is that it is what matter (hyle) is 
before it meets form, hence *hylomorphism *[ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism 
]. 

Thomas Aquinas thought (from what I've read) that matter is that which 
gives forms individual instances, or "character", like individual trees, or 
people, etc.





>
>
>
> molecules? 
>
>
> Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
> electrons, and quantum mechanics.
>


Why are there so many articles today that claim to refute this?

[ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3262307/ ]
[ 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/the-curious-wavefunction/historical-contingency-and-the-futility-of-reductionism-why-chemistry-and-biology-is-not-physics/
 
]

 - pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 
>>
>>
>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
>> “magical”.
>>
>>
>>
> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
> then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
> behaves intelligently*.  
>
>
> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
> complete. 
>
> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>
>
>
>
>
> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>
>
>
> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
> run us, if I may say.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

Going by something Barry Cooper wrote

*The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*

"natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is precisely 
about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
computation.* [ 
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
 
]).


I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
non-Turing.

This new article may be of interest:


"there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not 
just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them, 
too"
] https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity 
]



- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Nov 2018, at 00:44, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 5:32 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>My commitment is with the scientific method, so when you make outlandish 
> >>claims (matter is not needed to make calculations Robison arithmetic alone 
> >>can do so,  Kleene’s predicate T(x, y, z) can encode information) I ask you 
> >>to actually do so.
>  
> > You ask me to implement those computation in the physical reality.
> 
> All I ask you to do is follow the scientific method. 


I do, which is not so frequent in theology and metaphysics those days.

You are the one invoking your ontological commitment when defining real by 
“physically real”, and then asking me the impossible task to transform a 
computation realised in arithmetic into a computation realised in the physical 
reality. The only way to do that is to implement a universal machine (a 
mathematical being) into the physical reality.

The whole point is that this physical reality is not necessarily primary, and 
that it is an appearance emerging from the first person indeterminacy of any 
universal machine respectively to the set of all computations.

You just mock the argument at the start by invoking your personal metaphysical 
belief. That is not valid.




>  
> > That has nothing to do with the fact that all computations are implemented 
> > in the “block-univers”, or better “block-mindscape” associate to arithmetic.
> 
> All that is just a fancy way of saying you don't need no stinking scientific 
> method. You like definitions so I will give you two, the multiverse as a 
> collection of all real universes and a real universe is one capable of 
> producing a working Turing Machine.

All terms are used in too fuzzy way here. The arithmetical reality produces all 
working machines, and indeed all of their works. You can’t use work like "real” 
when doing metaphysics with the scientific method.





>   And there is no better way to prove that something exists than to produce 
> it.

I guess you mean to produce it physically, which means that you are using the 
criteria of meta^hysical reality due to Aristotle. No problem, but then you 
need to abandon mechanism, or to explain us what in “real matter”  is both 
Turing emulable (as it should with mechanism), yet not emulated in arithmetic, 
which would violate Turing completeness of arithmetic, indeed of its tiny 
initial sigma_1 segment.
That makes no sense.



> Neither you or Mr.Kleene or Mr.Robinson or anybody else has ever shown that a 
> working Turing Machine can be produced without using matter that obeys the 
> laws of physics and they haven't even come close to doing so.


They start from that. They are not doing metaphysics, nor physics. It is a 
standard theorem in all mathematical textbook that Robison arithmetic is Turing 
complete. If a sigma_1 relation is true, RA proves it, and that proofs can be 
translated in arithmetic and is associated to a computation done in arithmetic. 
You just show that you have no clue what computability theory is. 



> 
> > That is the usual interest form of pseudo-regions behaviour.
>  
> Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that 
> one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

You repeat this again, which might show that you are not aware of your 
prejudices. But your older post does not confirm this. 

Do you commit yourself or not in a primary physical universe? That is what I 
called the Aristotelian Theology. The first “God” of Aristotle is the “first 
mover”, the one who gave the initial “impulsion”, and plays no other role. The 
second God of Aristotle is Matter. An irreducible substance which essence 
implies its existence, which is a way to say that it does not come from 
something else, which departs a lot from Plato’s types of conception of reality.


>  
> > my “outlandish” statements are just part of any course in computer science.
> 
> BULLSHIT!  Try peddling your ideas in Silicon Valley, talk to a venture 
> capitalist about funding it, You'd be laughed out if town!  


You have not yet begun to criticise my ideas (actually, the Löbian machine’s 
idea). You criticise (without realising) the mathematical work of Turing and 
others on which the Silicon Valley already relies.




> 
> > I have been asked both in Brussels and Lille to withdraw those explanations 
> > as it was judged to be well known.
> 
> The stuff you're correct about is not original and the stuff that's original 
> is not correct.

You seem to repeat a common slogan. Good. Usually this is not done publicly. 
Do you get money for this?





>  
> > You are not criticising me, you are criticising the whole of computer 
> > science.
> 
> Tell that to the Billionaires in Silicon Valley, they'll cry all the way to 
> the bank.
> 
> >> I don't ask you to tell me about it, anybody can spin a tale in the 
> >> English language or the Mathematical language, I ask you to actually make

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 11/27/2018 2:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 25 Nov 2018, at 15:41, John Clark >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 4:40 AM Philip Thrift >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>>  Dennett's said:
>>> 
>>> “The elusive subjective conscious experience—the redness of red, the 
>>> painfulness of pain—that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.”
>>> 
>>> The trouble with the above statement isn't so much that it's false, the 
>>> trouble is that it's silly. In the first place an illusion is a 
>>> misinterpretation of the senses, but pain is direct experience that needs 
>>> no interpretation. I would love to ask Mr. Dennett how things would be 
>>> different if pain was not an illusion, if he can't answer that, and I don't 
>>> think he could, then the statement "pain is a illusion" contains no 
>>> information.
>>> 
>>> And illusion itself is a conscious phenomena, so saying consciousness is an 
>>> illusion is just saying consciousness is consciousness which, although 
>>> true, is not very illuminating. When discussing any philosophical issue the 
>>> word "illusion" should be used very cautiously. And if the topic involves 
>>> consciousness or quala and silliness is to be avoided the word "illusion" 
>>> should never be used at all because it explains nothing.  
>> 
>> That us why we use synonymous like first person, phenomenological, etc. 
>> 
>> For example, with mechanism, the matter that we see is not an illusion, but 
>> the primary matter that we infer
> 
> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 


X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged 
enough equivalent).

The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to assume a 
bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who dislike the 
idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything physical. 







> molecules?

Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
electrons, and quantum mechanics.




> atoms? quarks? strings? 

Strings might be close to a notion of primary matter, except it is nt clear if 
they are conceived of being made by something, and it is also open, for most 
physicists, if they are primitive of not.

The notion of primary matter is typically not a physical notion, but a 
metaphysical one. To solve the problem which came first, mind or matter, it is 
obvious we cannot decide in advance the solution.




>   Who is it who every claims any one of these is "primary”? 

The (weak) materialist metaphysician. Like those who says that a computation 
needs to be implemented in some primitive physical reality to exist. They adopt 
Aristotle assumption about some ontological physical reality.

Most physicists, as any good scientists, are neutral on this. Some proposes 
their own opinion, after pension, or at some dinner when drunk. But physics and 
metaphysics are not the same branche of inquiry, even if related of course.




> What theory depends on one of them being primary? 


Many people says that there is no after-life. They use the mind-brain identity 
principle, usually in some materialist context, so that when the brain perish, 
they believe that their first person stop to exist in some absolute way. With 
mechanism, like with Everett QM, that conclusion does not follow.




> I think you are beating a straw man to imply that others theories are wrong 
> therefore yours must be right.


I never claim that a theory is right or wrong. I show only that the Mechanist 
theory implies immaterialism, and I explain how to recover physics 
phenomenologically, and how we can test that, and why the current empirical 
evidences favours more mechanism than materialism. 


Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> from that seeing experience is an illusion, or a delusion. It is just a 
>> wrong inference, as most illusion are. 
>> 
>> Consciousness cannot be an illusion, indeed, but all content of 
>> consciousness, minus being conscious, can be wrong.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> John K Clark
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > 
>> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
> 
> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that 
> physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it behaves 
> as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is “magical”.
> 
> 
> 
> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), then 
> humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves 
> intelligently.  

Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a (universal) 
computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing complete. 

It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).




> 
> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought that 
> the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.


If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing ability 
than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random oracle, 
which would come only from our ignorance about which computations run us, if I 
may say.

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[John Clark]

On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:08 PM Martin Abramson 
wrote:

> *How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams as
> before? Thanks for the response. m.a.*
>

The exact mechanism depends on the specific example, computers have many
different ways to duplicate information. In the case of DNA the double
helix unravels and splits down the middle so you have 2 single helix
molecules, but each helix still contains as much information as the
original double helix because the 4 bases in the helix is what carries the
information and Adenine only binds with Thymine and Cytosine only binds
with Guanine. So each single helix can grab free bases floating around and
start to grow, and pretty soon you have 2 identical double helix molecules
where there was only one before.

 John K Clark

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