Hi Bruno,
a very cool series of posts.
I would also like to express my interest in your MGA argument (my French
is very rusty). I have read the Maudlin Olympia paper, but would like to
hear your "version".
Cheers,
Günther
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received thi
Hi Kory,
nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position
quite accurately :-)
Cheers,
Günther
> Imagine again the mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to
> the binary digits of PI. Somewhere within that description there may
> be descriptions of beings wh
Hello Brent,
> That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that
> happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But
> these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical
> objects. Those "objects" are not in some pure state anyway
Hmm,
> However, I do start getting uncomfortable when I realize that this
> lucky teleportation can happen over and over again, and if it happens
> fast enough, it just reduces to sheer randomness that just happens to
> be generating an ordered pattern that looks like Kory. I have a hard
Kory Heath wrote:
>
> If Lucky Alice is conscious and Empty-Headed Alice is not conscious,
> then there are partial zombies halfway between them. Like you, I can't
> make any sense of these partial zombies. But
also can't make any
I think a materialist would either have to argue that Lu
Brent,
thanks for the paper recommendations! I will have a look at them.
Cheers,
Günther
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Günther Greindl wrote:
>> Hello Brent,
>>
>>
>>> That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that
>>> happens or d
Bruno,
> From this we can extract a logic of the observable proposition and
> compare with the empirical quantum logic, making comp testable, and
> already tested on its most weird consequences, retrospectively.
you could refute COMP (MEC) if it would contradict empirical QM, but QM
(and e
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> If infinities are at play... what is a MAT-history ? it can't even be
> "written".
Agreed. And that is why we should be more reluctant to drop COMP than to
drop MAT.
But IF we drop COMP, we could "accept" unwriteable MAT-histories.
Cheers,
Günther
--~--~-~-
Hi Bruno,
> I think you are correct, but allowing the observer to be mechanically
> described as obeying the wave equation (which solutions obeys to comp),
Hmm well if you have a basis, yes; - but "naked" infinite-dimensional
Hilbert Space (the "everything" in QM)? With MAT we do not only
co
Hey,
Kim Jones wrote:
> I think this idea is so momentous that I actually wish to compose a
> piece of music - possibly a symphony - which seeks to represent this
> idea in music.
That would be cool!
> Et pourquoi pas? Most of the great composers attempted to represent
> the TRANSCENDENT
Hi,
> consciousness, bearing burdensome memories of repugnant actions,
What about consciousness only bearing memories of wonderful actions?
> either surrender the possibility of free will (fatalism)
Denying free will does not imply fatalism! The whole of Nietzsche's
philosophy is a monument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> I realise this coming close to regarding consciousness as akin to the
> religious notion of a disembodied soul. But what are the alternatives?
> As I see it, if we don't discard computationalism the only alternative
> is to deny that consciousness exists at all, whi
Hi all,
Bruno, do you still keep a notion of causality and the likes in
platonia? I have collected these snips from some recent posts:
Brent Meeker wrote:
>But is causality an implementation detail? There seems to be an
>implicit
>assumption that digitally represented states form a sequen
Hello Bruno,
I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3.
With MGA 1 and 2, I would say that, with MEC+MAT, also the the
projection of the movie (and Lucky Alice in 1) are conscious - because
it supervenes on the physical activity.
MEC says: it's the computation that counts, not the s
Bruno,
I have reread MGA 2 and would like to add the following:
We have the
optical boolean graph: OBG -> this computes alice's dream.
we make a movie of this computation.
Now we run again, but in OBG some nodes do not make the computation
correctly, BUT the movie _triggers_ the nodes, so in
Dear Bruno,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> To call it deterministic is IMO OK, but not free will at all. Self
>> or not self: it is a consequence.
>
> Then we should make all criminals free, because they all just obeys
> Schroedinger equation. (Free)-will exists because we cannot known all
No of
Hi Bruno,
>> but no! Then we wouldn't have a substrate anymore.
> Oh( That is not true! We still have the projector and the film. We can
> project the movie in the air or directly in your eyes.
Ok I see now where our intuitions differ (always the problem with
thought experiment) - but maybe w
Hello M.A.,
> * Mine dwells on bad actions. (Jewish guilt perhaps.) *
Maybe this post is of interest for you? (it is good)
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/03/tsuyoku_naritai.html
> The whole of Nietzsche's
> philosophy is a monument dedicated to gainsay that error.
>
> *Yet most of his pe
Kim, Bruno,
> Not at all. You have already done the first and last leap of faith of
> the reasoning when accepting the digital brain at the first step. I am
> aware that you are not aware of that, because in the reply you seem to
> believe that the MEC hypothesis can be taken for granted. But
Bruno,
>> This conception can, I think, be indeed taken for granted by every
>> scientifically minded person.
>
> Why ? It is an assumption too. What could we taken it for granted?
Yes, it is an assumption - that is why is wrote "scientifically minded"
- if you are in any way naturalist (and a
Bruno,
> But no weakening of comp based on nature is
> known to escape the replicability. Even the non cloning theorem in QM
> cannot be used to escape the UDA conclusion.
I already wanted to ask you on this one: you have said before on the
list that quantum-no cloning does not make a problem
Hello Bruno,
this is an answer for a mail a few weeks back, did not have the time up
to now.
>With comp, we have an (non
> denombrable) infinity of computations, going through a (denombrable)
> infinity of states, and only few of them, I would say will have 1-OM
> role or 3-OM role. Even a few
Stathis,
>
> From the SEP article:
> that a human being unaided by machinery is capable of carrying out --
> carries no implication concerning the extent of the procedures that
> machines are capable of carrying out, even machines acting in
> accordance with 'explicitly stated rules'. For among
beyond the superficial arrow of time caused by entropy differences.
> The whole point of time symmetry, the very definition, is that there
> should be no such implicit arrow of time. This suggestion would seem
> to give consciousness a power that it should not have, allow it to do
>
Bruno,
I have also wanted to ask how you come to 2^aleph_zero
> Well, in part this results from the unbounded dumbness of the
> universal doevtailing procedure which dovetails on all programs but
> also on all non interacting collection of programs (as all interacting
> one).
How do you
-uploading and teleportation and other such things in _this
universe_ (materialist intuition again); while UNIVERSE-COMP would only
allow this in Platonia, in the Universal deployment, which is
inaccessible for manipulation for us inhabitants of the rather small
(considered against Platonia)
Hi Stephen,
Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Nice post! Coments soon.
Thanks :-) Looking forward to the comments.
> Speaking of Svozil's work, please see: Cristian S. Calude, Peter H.
> Hertling and Karl Svozil, ``Embedding Quantum Universes in Classical Ones'',
> Foundations of Physics 29(
Abram,
an intuition I have come to concerning time is the following (it is only
qualitative and may or may not be helpful in thinking about time):
From relativity theory we know that there is no universal now, and that
the invariant between two "points" in the physical universe is spacetime
Hi Bruno,
thanks for your comments, I interleave my response.
>> showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in the limit_
>> there will be an infinite number of histories. So, as we have to also
>> take into account infinite delay, we must take this limit into account
>> and have
Thomas,
>> (Apropos Günther Greindl's remark: "space as the self moving in
>> relation to everything else, time as everything outside the self moving in
>> relation to oneself."
> it's funny that already in 1895, in his novel The Time Machine, H.G.
> Wells wrote, "There is no difference between
Hi Bruno,
> and Cantor get a contradiction from that. You assume the diagram is
> indeed a piece of an existing bijection in Platonia, or known by God.
No, you misunderstand me there - I just meant that we need to take the
step to infinity - see below.
> that you get by flipping the 0 and 1
Hello,
> My domain is theology. scientific and thus agnostic theology. I
> specialized my self in Machine's theology. Or Human's theology once
> assuming comp. The UDA shows (or should show) that physics is a branch
> of theology, so that the AUDA makes Machine's theology experimentally
> re
John, Brent,
John said:
> EPR is a thought-experiment, constructed (designed) to make a point.
>How can one use such artifact as 'evidence' that "shows..."?
Aspect Et Al tested it ages ago, see for instance here:
http://www-ece.rice.edu/~kono/ELEC565/Aspect_Nature.pdf
Brent said:
> But the
Hi Bruno,
> I don't understand what you mean by computations being infinitely far
> away. In the UD deployment, which I will wrote UD*, all computations
> begins soon or later (like all dominoes falls soon or later in the
> infinite discrete dominoe-sequences). All computations reach any of
t; On 09 Jan 2009, at 21:26, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
>> Hello,
>>
>>> My domain is theology. scientific and thus agnostic theology. I
>>> specialized my self in Machine's theology. Or Human's theology once
>>> assuming comp. The UDA shows (or shou
ngle machine m1 will give a different conscious
> experience to running s1 to s10 on m1 and separately s11 to s20 on m2?
>
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
guenther.grei...@univie.ac.at
Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/
Thesis: http://www
Hi all,
the question goes primarily to Bruno but all other input is welcome :-))
Bruno, you said you have already arrived at a quantum logic in your
technical work?
May I refer to the following two paragraphs?:
We can read here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/
The Reconstructi
Hi,
> Naive question: do physicists reconcile a "really flat" universe and
> the big bang theory? I don't see how.
you mean this problem?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_bang#Flatness.2Foldness_problem
Inflationary theories give a solution, but it is a bit ad hoc.
I am not a big fan of Big B
Brent,
I wonder, what do you mean with materialism (I ask this having been a
materialist myself)?
Physics only describes relations. (see for instance here
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/)
I gather you accept MWI, so quite a lot of relations hold.
The question is, why th
, Mathematics of Modality
http://www.amazon.com/Mathematics-Modality-Center-Language-Information/dp/1881526240/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1232402154&sr=8-1
(the book contains the full paper)
Cheers,
Günther
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 16 Jan 2009, at 22:04, Günther Greindl w
Kim,
> the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited to the
> computable? Clearly it is not.
So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor?
>Could an AI conceive of Platonia?
Why not?
Cheers,
Günther
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You recei
Ronald,
the "ad hoc" is because of the introduction of the inflatons which do
nothing but, um, inflate...
Stephen said:
b) some sound explanation where given as
> to how an in principle unknowable phenomenon - the BB singularity itself -
> is any different from a Creative Deity, sans only the
Hi Brent,
> I didn't use the term - it is one being attributed to me simply because I
> question the adequacy of logic and mathematics to instantiate physics.
That is ok - there are different versions of materialism/physicalism etc.
> I don't accept any such esoteric theories - I merely entert
hing Wiki, but
> it
> seems to have vanished into an alternative universe. Are you still
> around Jason?
>
> Cheer
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
guenther.grei...@univie.ac.at
Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/
Thesis: http://www.c
Hi Bruno,
>> Goldblatt, Mathematics of Modality
> Note that it is advanced stuff for people familiarized with
> mathematical logic (it presupposes Mendelson's book, or Boolos &
> Jeffrey).
>
> Two papers in that book are "part" of AUDA: the UDA explain to the
> universal machine, and her o
gt; but it omits the study of the Arithmetical Hierarchy (SIGMA_0,
> PI_0, SIGMA_1, PI_1, SIGMA_2, PI_2, ...).
>
>
> AUDA without math = Plotinus (or Ibn Arabi or any serious and rational
> mystic). Roughly speaking.
>
> I will think about a layman explanation of AUDA without math,
Bruno,
> theoretical computer science and mathematical logic. Rereading
> "Conscience et Mécanisme" I realize Russell Standish was right, and that
> book should be translated in english because it contains an almost
> complete (self-contained) explanation of logic (for the physicists),
> incl
Again a question for Bruno ;-)
There are certain arguments (Deutsch, Wallace, Greaves) that propose
that they can derive probabilites (and the Born rule) from decision
theory - although I am not convinced (see for instance Price 2008 -
http://arxiv.org/abs/0802.1390).
Criticism notwithstandin
Quentin,
you are, it seems to me, simply reproducing the MGA. You are assuming a
(material) computer on which the AI+environment run - relatively to us,
this will never be conscious - but it _could_ be conscious relatively to
other computations in Platonia.
To make an AI conscious relatively
Hi Quentin,
> So when do the AI becomes a zombie when I run it relatively to me ?
> after how much stub subpart (I'm talking about function in a program,
> not about a physical computer on which the said program is run) have
> been replaced ?
>
> Will answer more later.
Ok, have you looked a
'Tis poetry!
Kim, Bruno, thanks for this wonderful dialog. Most beautiful stuff I've
read in a long time - and so spontaneous.
Cheers,
Günther
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Kim,
>
> I have not the time to think deeply on zero, so I will answer your last
> post instead :)
>
>
> On 05 Feb 2009,
se to being reflective of human
> consciousness? In other words a mathematical model of human consciousness?
>
> Thank you.
>
> >
>
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
guenther.grei...@univie.ac.at
B
;
>
> Who is self-referencing, or even acknowledging self-reference? Or 'Self'
> for that matter? 'Recursively' I agree with, it is 'within'. Machine
> (limited capability) is 'us', so the 'enumerable theories' are OK.
> With suc
Dear Bruno,
>> Some of these books I have already read (Boolos),
> You mean read with pencil and paper?
Well no *grin* - it was the adopted textbook in one of the courses I
took, and I did the assigned exercises, but now flipping through the
book I realize I must go back to it again - more than
Hello Jack,
> I could tell you what's wrong with his MGA, but I'm here to deal with the QS
> paper first.
I appreciate your prioritizing your paper, but I would be interested in
what you find wrong with the MGA.
By the way, as I mentioned in a previous mail to John, my departure from
materia
I'm with Mike and Brent.
Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
can't go out of the system.
And your remark that we should differentiate infinite identical platonic
computations confuses me - it see
Kim,
>> Günther recommends recently the book "Eveything Must Go" by Ladyman
>> et al. This looks like heavy going but seems like a good and a
>> relevant tome to get into, possibly circling around the mechanist
>> idea. Do you also recommend it?
The book does not concern the mechanist thes
Dear John,
> JM: 'evolutionary' is 'relational' anyway originated in 'human mind
> capabilities' - D.Bohm: "there are no numbers in nature". (Not arguing
> against Bruno, who IMO stands for "nature is IN numbers")
Well yes, that is the interesting question. But if you say that there
are no nu
Jack,
> There are some people who will, but relatively few. That is what counts for
> QS to be invalid.
Hmm, that does not make QS invalid (see Quentin and Jonathan's posts for
my views on the issue, they have expressed everything clearly), and in
fact you have already conceded QI (by assert
a net increase in
> measure. That is equivalent to new people being born even if they have your
> memories. This once happenned to Will Riker on Star Trek: TNG.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >
>
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy
Hi guys,
I finally got around to writing the AUDA references page:
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/auda
Comments welcome.
Cheers,
Günther
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everyt
Hi Bruno,
will incorporate your changes as soon as time permits :-)
Best Wishes,
Günther
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Günther,
>
> Nice work Günther. Now my comment is longer than I wish. I really would
> insist on one change. See (**) below.
>
> On 16 Feb 2009, at 22:54, Gün
Hi Stathis, Bruno, List,
>> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up
>> to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
>> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and unnameable.
>> Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much
>> more precise.
>
Jack, Wei Dai,
> machines are invented, there will be a much greater selection pressure
> towards U=M*Q. But given that U=Q is closer to the reality today, I'm not
> sure what good it would do to "taking a stand against QS/QI".
To "translate":
U=M*Q is 3rd person POV (hypothetical; viewed from
Hi,
> I would say the Universal Soul. To be the ONE? The difficulty is that
> Plotinus is not always clear.
I go now from my reading of mystical texts, not from the arithmetic
interpretation - and here mystics often report feeling at one with the
universe, everything etc.
I would say tha
Hi,
> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here
> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself.
> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that uni
Bruno, List,
> in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting.
Let us say that we have a measure of continuation (of psychological)
identity from 1 to 0, where 1=full continuation and 0=death, and we
apply this measure from one OM to the next.
Then forgetting would be everything be
Stathis, List,
> if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
> will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there
As Bruno said in a previous post, what we should care about in personal
survival is not concrete memories (although memories are essential
> John Mikes wrote:
>> Brent:
>> who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why?
It is only a thought experiment to make clear what we care about
regarding personal identity.
And if computationalism is true, this thought experiment will be
practically quite relevant in the near(?) fu
Stathis, Bruno,
>> It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture
>> their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of
>> course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule
>> with comp is "don't do to the other what the other does not wa
Hello,
have incorporated most of Bruno's change wishes:
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/auda
Best Wishes,
Günther
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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To pos
Hi,
> better: this is just the "usual" comp-suicide self-selection (assuming
> of course we can really kill the copies, which is in itself not an
> obvious proposition).
I have been thinking along these lines lately, in a somewhat different
context: the teleportation with annihilation exper
Stathis,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Imagine the sequence:
>>
>> Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute
> The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some
> means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is
> probably no such means, no matter how advanced t
Bruno,
> Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another
> number. Even a God cannot do that!
The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond
to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and 4.
Cheers,
Günther
--~--~-~--~---
HI Bruno,
>>> Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another
>>> number. Even a God cannot do that!
>> The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond
>> to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and
>> 4.
>
> I am not sure I unders
Hi Stathis,
>> It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me
>> could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the
>> following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to
>> the emergent class of "me, being conscious." Then I would be dead
Hi Colin,
the problem is that while the _ideal_ of science is rationality, it is
not yet fully institutionalized (can it ever be?) and people still
harbor a lot of irrationality personally (scientists often have the
strangest beliefs outside their speciality
(http://www.overcomingbias.com/200
> Which "I"? Aren't you concerned that you would press the button - and vanish?
> Brent
The psychological continuer - the one who remembers having pressed the
button but with +5 dollars on his account.
@Stathis: would you really do this (press the button, also in the
absoute measure scenario
Bruno,
>> My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to
>> numbers in the first place
>
> But that would violate the comp assumption.
No, you still misunderstand me ;-) not correspond in the sense of
non-existing, not in the sense of existing but not number.
>> - that is
Hi Bruno,
>> With COMP it is not so clear.
>
> explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp & Dt; the
> "Dt" suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next
> instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith.
Please bear in mind that I have not
Stathis, Brent,
> There are two copies of me in perfect lockstep, A1 and A2. I'm one of
> these copies and not the other (though I don't know which). Suppose
> I'm A1 and I decide to teleport 100km away. That means A1 disappears
> and a new copy, B, appears 100m away. I'm happy, since I feel I've
Hi Bruno,
>> The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have
>> successors
>> (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
>> numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic
>> is
>> consistent).
>
> Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I
Hi,
this paper (Mikovic) is unfortunately not very good. I quote:
"There are strong arguments that the human mind is not computable, based
on Goedel’s theorems in logic, see [3]."
3 refers to Penrose's "Emperor's new mind".
I don't think that I have to comment this fallacy on this list. (Brun
Hi Bruno,
> 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs,
> themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of
> computations going trough their corresponding states.
> Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is
> already a continuum of storie
Kim,
great post, thanks!
You may enjoy this TED talk:
http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/ken_robinson_says_schools_kill_creativity.html
As to your "laughing" friend, I also know some such people, they have in
truth not understood what science is about: asking questions, being
critical (espec
Hi Bruno,
thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
> course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In case
> you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
> state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality is a
Hello all,
after a rather long hiatus I am back on the list; I have been grappling
with the relationship of mathematical entities to the real world and
feel like entering the fray again :-))
> From: Youness Ayaita
>
> 3 No-justification
>
> In this last paragraph it can be seen that the no
or A than for B. But he sometimes can
also say that C is strictly ruled out (of course, this is often said too
soon in practice, but if one is careful one can nevertheless say this,
of inconsistent theories for instance).
Cheers,
Günther
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy
and
> verification.
Ok, that is of course correct - but you have to at least convince the
people that it is worthwile to _reason_ correctly :-)
(not all people seem to share this opinion, even at university!)
Best Regards,
Günther
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosop
the consequences of reasoning incorrectly,
> if he can still learn after!
> Problem: about fundamental questions, this can take millennia, and more
Agreed.
Best,
Günther
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://
writing this up as a peer reviewed article though.
>
> Cheers
>
>
> A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTEC
e two viewpoints underly much of "measure
problem", doomsday and other arguments of the same sort.
Regards,
Günther
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/
Blog: http://dao.complexitys
nes.
Well put explicitly!! And IMHO that is also why all variants of the
doomsday argument fail. DA also only works if you had a transition into
some civilization from a "civ spirit" - which obviously is not the case.
Regards,
Günther
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy
l properties.
Why not? Do you have a counterexample?
Regards,
Günther
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/
Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
Site: ht
numbers of the interval
[1,100].
Then, if you would draw the ball "517012" you would not know from which
urn it was either.
It is definitely a "labeling" artefact.
Regards,
Günther
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[EMAIL
erything-list@eskimo.com/msg05958.html
> http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05959.html
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> >
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosoph
r)
>
> Finite and infinite concepts are dual concepts you can't leave one without
> leaving the other.
Could you elaborate some more on this?
Regards,
Günther
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissensc
e list at
infinity? This seems very arbitrary to me.
I am becoming more and more an ultra-finitist. Arguments with infinity
seem to be very based on the assumptions you make (about platonia or
whatever)
Regards,
Günther
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vien
t what you are asking?
Regards,
Günther
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/
Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org
--~--~-~--~~~--
they are perfect
> asymmetry) and time evolves towards a whole other kind of order
> (unity, balance, perfect symmetry) which is actually the infinite
I suppose you do not mean the heat death of the universe. But what would
perfect symmetry be but heat death?
Regards,
Gün
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