mate entities and their relations, then non-fundamental
entities (composites) must be aspects of what we know, not what things
ultimately are.
David
>
>
> On Mar 9, 3:25 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 9 March 2011 14:39, 1Z wrote:
>>
>> >> So on this basis you would
On 9 March 2011 16:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
> To me that is an open question. Are philosophical zombies possible? It
> seems unlikely, but when I consider specific ideas about consciousness, such
> as Julian Jaynes, then it seems more plausible that conscious-like behavior
> could be evinced wit
appeal to any and all non-fundamental ontological
entities in precisely this way, and hence show ontology as resting on
a single fundamental base, thereby situating composite entities at the
epistemological level.
David
>
>
> On Mar 9, 2:23 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 9 March 2011 14:
On 9 March 2011 14:17, 1Z wrote:
> Phlogiston was eliminated, heat was reduced. There's a difference
So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e.
not merely epistemologically) distinguishable from molecular motion?
>
>
> On Mar 9, 1:46 pm, David Nyma
On 9 March 2011 13:30, 1Z wrote:
Peter, this is too confusing, you seem to be debating a straw man.
Let's try to keep it simple: am I to assume that you don't agree that
ontological reduction entails ontological elimination?
David
>
>
> On Mar 9, 12:50 pm, David Nyman wr
is the
eliminativist position, however bizarre it may seem. However, unless
we lapse into that sort of inconsistency, it manifestly IS a problem -
i.e. the Hard one.
David
On 9 March 2011 01:24, 1Z wrote:
>
>
> On Mar 9, 1:03 am, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 8 March 2011 23:42, 1Z
n-micro-physical-facts - the so-called "secondary qualities". To
dramatise this, Chalmers uses the metaphor of the zombie, for which no
secondary qualitative composites exist, nor any apparent need of them.
That's what I'm on about, but in a more general way.
David
>
&g
no
zombies in this etiolated picture. There isn't anything composite at
all; nothing above the level of the micro-physical goings-on
themselves. Everything else manifests after the fact of observation.
And that really is the Hard Problem.
David
>
>
> On Mar 8, 1:02 am, David Nyman wr
t is wrong with my argument,
merely that others disagree with it. It would be more helpful if you
would say simply what you find to be wrong or unclear in what I have
said.
David
>
>
> On Mar 7, 8:48 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>&g
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Reduction is not elimination
>>
>
> Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
> *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter. Why
"ontological
On 15 February 2011 13:27, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I am not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
>> and you think you are a number
>
> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
> locally "I am a number", in that sense. But this concerns only my
ntegration must play a role in an adequate
account of reality.
Remember I'm just doing accounting, not peddling solutions. My point,
on this accounting, is that the elusive HP and its zombie spawn seem
to be the consequence of an incomplete tally of what is "real", and
that this i
gt; sense as "transitionally becoming" and transition substitutes for stagnancy.
> Panta Rhei also boggles my mind, especially when I cut out conventional
> time.
>
> I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
> reply.
> Sometimes I
is mere absent-mindedness: you just have
to forget to remember that you can't eat your cake and still have it.
David
>
>
> On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z wrote:
>>
>> > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just to
On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z wrote:
> Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> you 7 doesn't exist.
Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
analogous sense? And that consequently any computational
characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fictio
On 4 February 2011 19:59, Andrew Soltau wrote:
> Your revelation that ' Maudlin uses this result to reject CTM, and Bruno
> follows the opposite tack of rejecting materialism. ' makes things very much
> clearer for me, I had got seriously bogged down in all this.
>
> My problem at present with ei
On 4 February 2011 18:44, Andrew Soltau wrote:
> From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language
> problems.
>
> Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all*
> experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you
> account for our
ically", I still couldn't predict which
copy I would be, or what had occurred in the interim, and for similar
reasons.
David
>
> On 03 Feb 2011, at 22:34, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 3 February 2011 13:40, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>>> Colin h
reement with
observation, isn't it? That's all I was asking.
David
>
> On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 4 February 2011 12:34, 1Z wrote:
>>
>>>> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to"
&g
nce of
> a real world to emerge from
Yes, obviously. But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world "has
to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can
only be true absent such difference. It seems self-contradictory to
me.
David
>
>
> On Feb 3,
tively
rule out ANY alternative, natural-world, non-CTM theory of mind-body?
If so, I haven't quite grasped the point yet.
David
>
> On 03 Feb 2011, at 01:41, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 2 February 2011 23:35, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> To protect a natur
e why the argument should go through in the opposite
direction: i.e. that the assumption of a digital ontology is somehow
FORCED by the very existence of Turing-emulable processes. I have a
feeling I'm missing something. What is it?
David
>
> On 02 Feb 2011, at 01:46, David Nyman wrote:
>
On 1 February 2011 22:53, Colin Hales wrote:
Colin
Do forgive me for butting in on an exchange I sometimes only dimly
follow, but I think I may possibly see a misunderstanding on your part
about what Bruno actually claims about "comp" (forgive me, both of
you, if I'm wrong). As I've understood
John
Good to see you back - I wish you better health in 2011.
David
On 22 January 2011 13:19, John Mikes wrote:
> (Including Stephens initiation of course).
> After some time spent enjoying 2 heart attacks in 2010 I returned to
> the computer and found similar discussions to the earlier ones.
>
Gawd, I've missed you Colin, you fierce old thing! Is it wet where
you are or is the inundation confined to poor old Brisbane?
I suppose you know that Bruno and you agree (at least in my estimation
of your lines of argument) that observation is the key phenomenon to
be explained at the outset, in
t;, even though
it appears that one can make predictions, depending on one's theory,
about the distribution of 1-person "heres and nows" amongst
continuations of any given 3-person mental state. As we've remarked
before, it's as if there were one big consciousness that someh
r human at a particular moment
in my life history on Planet Earth in the 21st century, rather than an
alien from the Planet Zog a billion years ago, or hence. What has
"relative proportion" got to do with it? Or is the question just
meaningless?
David
>
> On 03 Jan 2011, at 06
On 2 January 2011 16:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Chalmers told me that after a WM duplication the first person is in both
> cities, which is correct *from a third person point of view on the first
> persons", but not from the first person points of view themselves, and that
> is the crucial point
>
>
> On 26 Aug, 17:37, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> I should stress, again, I'm not personally committed to this view - it
>> seems indeed highly problematic - but it is what the recipe says.
>> Now, just to emphasise the point, when I say it's a hard thing to do
are expressible
only in terms of knowledge gained through the very integrative
phenomena that they explicitly rule out!
David
>
> On 02 Sep 2010, at 17:02, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 1 September 2010 21:51, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> In
>>> other words, it
get to grips with them in the extended technical detail
they demand, as you do. But you, after all, are a logician and I am a
mere quibbler. Nevertheless, it intrigues me that my quibbling
occasionally seems to lead me somewhere in the vicinity of these
notions, so I won't abandon it entirely!
On 1 September 2010 09:21, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> How does my experience of
>> dreaming of a tree connect to numbers? What is it that generates my
>> experience of a tree from the brutely existing substrate of numbers?
>
> Well, from the true but non communicable part given by the self-referenc
quot; are just *insufficiently rich* to
explain the first person phenomena (including the "metaphysical
distinctness" of the composite entities of perception from the
fragmented events of physics). My eliminativist reductio just makes
this more obvious, at least to me, because it demonstrates tha
007/09/intellectual-timidity.html
>
>
> Kindest regards,
>
> Stephen
>
> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of David Nyman
> Sent: Thursday, August 26, 2010 12:38 PM
> To: Everythin
I've been waking up with a persistent thought again, prompted this
time by the way many mainstream philosophers of mind seem to
unconsciously adopt a particularly insidious form of direct realism,
whilst being quite blind to it. It centres on the idea of extreme
physical reductionism, which I take
On 30 July 2010 17:35, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> ... and if you believe that the universe can be accounted for by a some
> consistent mathematical structure. Which is an open problem. Assuming
> mechanism, physical universes have no real existence at all, except as first
> person sharable experience
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0707/0707.2832v1.pdf
Another paper from the same source, discussing additional aspects.
David
On 15 May, 13:09, David Nyman wrote:
> http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0408/0408125v3.pdf
>
> Having stumbled over this link recently, I wonder
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0408/0408125v3.pdf
Having stumbled over this link recently, I wonder if anyone would care
to comment on its relevance or applicability in terms of MWI, comp,
etc.?
David
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everyth
t I suspect
there are very specific aspects of the logics you have mentioned
heretofore which must be absorbed in close detail to drive this point
home intuitively (as I say, there seems to be little appreciation of
this in the literature). I feel this is the final step I need in
order to achieve a
he dreams of the machines, finally, seem to have converged on shared
"physical" universes of staggering complexity and consistency.
Is this anything like what you were trying to convey (interpreted
favourably, of course)?
David
>
> On 20 Mar 2010, at 16:56, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
mplies that a
conscious decision-maker would be likely to find itself in
characteristically different extensions to its "environment" as
compared with a non-conscious decision-maker, but some clarification
on this would be very helpful.
David
>
> On 23 Feb 2010, at 22:05, David
On 18 March 2010 17:06, L.W. Sterritt wrote:
> Perhaps more progress can be made by avoiding self referential problems and
> viewing this issue mechanistically.
Undoubtedly.
> I guess I'm in the QM camp
> that believes that what you can measure is what you can know.
But if all that you could
2010/3/2 Jack Mallah :
> I guess by 'physical supervenience' you mean supervenience on physical
> activity only. That is not what computationalism assumes. Computationalism
> assumes supervenience on both physical activity and physical laws (aka
> counterfactuals). There is no secret about th
onsequently you feel justified in attributing it to him. Or is there
something aspect of EQM, or the SWE, that inescapably entails comp as
a theory of mind, irrespective of the originators' assumptions?
That's my question. Sorry about the confusion.
David
>
> On 01 Mar 2010
a prerequisite for "being capable of having a mind",
and I could see why your arguments would apply.
If I could clear up this confusion it would help my understanding of a
lot of threads in the list.
David
>
> On 28 Feb 2010, at 18:43, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 28 Februar
eakening)"?
Do you mean that he was explicitly assuming the comp hypothesis, or
that his approach implicitly presupposes it? I'm confused.
David
>
> On 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> The main probl
On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity
> thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the
> computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
> Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such app
On 24 Feb, 16:09, David Nyman wrote:
> We would seek unambiguous evidence
> that, in the absence of specific subjective 1-p qualitative states,
> certain subsequent 3-p events would be unaccountable without the
> hypothesis of 1-p --> 3-p causal influence.
In the unlikely event t
...
>
> Reason to read Rorty is he will try to convince you that all this discussion
> is just historic accident and that it relies in forgetting Kant on the one
> hand, and the mith of the given, by sellars, on the other.
>
> Bye Bye
>
>
> Diego Caleiro
>
> Phil of
ot;identity" assumptions, which IMO
only wave away the issues. But this then inevitably takes us into a
wider territory, which for example Bruno has been addressing from the
comp perspective.
David
> On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 7:18 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 23 February 2010 05:45,
en about in the sciences, within the framework of those
> portions we already (think) we know. The German proverb says:
> "des Menschen's Wille ist ein Himmelreich" (a man's will is a 'heavenly'
> extension) and so is his mentality. IMO we know only a fractio
ng. Indeed, in this post, I
> will try to explain how comp does solve completely the conceptual hard
> problem of consciousness. (With the usual price that physics becomes a
> branch of machine's theology).
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2010, at 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 22 Febru
icable. You may be right, but in effect this would
simply exclude you from the community of those who'd like to know
more, even if they're destined never to be enlightened. In my view,
such an attitude is premature.
David
> On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:50 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
ust have a
role distinct from their mere description. If they do not, we're
faced with a situation in which the same histories are describable in
terms of "qualia" whether actual qualitative states are present or
not. AFAICS this is the unavoidable crux of the HP, and I don'
le relations. Despite
the difficulty of the subject, I do cherish the hope that progress can
be made if we give up explaining-away from entrenched positions,
accept the seriousness of the challenge to our preconceptions, and
re-examine the real issues with an open mind.
David
> On Tue, Feb 16
misleading. I am not a computation, I am a person.
If this is the correct intuition, then the computations already
contain every possibility from the 3-p perspective, and the additional
existence, nature and possible consequences of 1-p notions are as
inaccessible as they are from a primitive-mate
quot; (1-p) and
"visually detecting" (3-p) may act on the world by partially different
paths (i.e. that there is an additional possibility - beyond mechanism
- in the deep structure of things that, moreover, has not been missed
by evolution).
David
> David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
the mirror of nature. Richard Rorty
>
> In particular "The Concepts of Counsciousness" By Ned Block and "Mental
> Causation" by stephen Yablo will get you nearer to where you are trying to
> get.
>
> Best wish for all
>
> Diego Caleiro
>
> Philosopher of
ce and nature of such phenomena
can't be computed from the basis of 3-p, and even in the case that the
phenomena didn't exist at all! This doesn't strike me as a
satisfactory resolution.
David
> David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 17 February 2010 00:06, Brent Meeker wr
ms of any purely 3-p level of description. Prima facie, this might
seem to lead to an even more problematic interactive dualism, but my
suspicion is that there is scope for some genuinely revelatory
reconciliation at a more fundamental level - i.e. a truly explanatory
identity theory. But we won&#x
tirely gratuitous to the
3-p "thought-process" and its consequences. More problematic still,
neither the existence nor the experiential characteristics of 1-p
experience is computable from the confines of the 3-p narrative. So
how can it be possible for any such narrative to *refer* to the
ssert* - given the undeniable "seeming" of conscious experience -
that this *must* be the case, whilst offering no glimmer of what the
nature of such a transcendent level of reconciliation could possibly
be.
David
> On 17 February 2010 05:07, David Nyman wrote:
>> T
t; Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
> combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
> trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list
This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every
morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
person perspective? The only rationale for adducing the additional
existence of any 1-p experi
2009/10/7 Bruno Marchal
> Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our
> discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of
> "ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your
> private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that yo
2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>>if it can't, we need another strategy to
>> disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter
>> conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in
>> comp.
>
> There is no ambiguity in the reduction of computation
> to physics.
H
2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>> But this is the very hinge of disagreement. CTM's Trojan Horse is the
>> incoherence of its posit of materialism.
>
> Accordign to whom?
>
>>It's demonstrably as
>> dependant on AR as comp is;
>
> What is dependent on AR? Materialism?
CTM. But you still won't accept t
2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>> > You seem to be assuming a workign MGA
>>
>> Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
>> intelligibility of CTM,
>
> I haven't seen you give an argument that CTM is incompatible
> with phsycalism, only that CTM wouldn't give the seame
> sort of ans
On Sep 24, 9:39 am, Flammarion wrote:
>> Could you either
>> state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit
>> of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop
>> your insistence on it?
>>
> I have explained that several times. It clarifies the issue
>
On Sep 24, 2:44 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Of course Johnson's refutation didn't change any idealist
> minds, but he pointed to the use of operational definitions
> as the basis of science which ultimately had a lot more
> influence than Berkeley.
That is very true. The idealist road is a hard
2009/9/24 Flammarion :
> The idealist defence agaisnt these refutations always involves things
> being arranged "just so" so as to givew he imitation
> of a material world with minds supervening on brains. And it
> doesn't give a good reason why things should be just so. It's a much
> worse expl
2009/9/24 Flammarion :
> Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists
> tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM
> has no trouble explaining how people play chess.
It hasn't got lost - e.g. two sentences later I said "I have no
quarrel with th
g else solving the
HP, that has never been relevant to the discussion.
David
>
>
>
> On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/23 Flammarion :
>>
>>
>>
>> >> >>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
>>
On Sep 22, 1:10 pm, Flammarion wrote:
> > No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a x86
> > computer than on an ARM based one ?
>
> There's a difference between being independent of any
> specific instantiation and being independent of all instantiations.
Computat
d
mathematical primacy is a necessary posit for computational
supervenience - i.e. AR. And he claims that the predictions of the
theory are empirically refutable, which means that its ultimate
justification is to be sought abductively.
>Other
> peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark.
Do
t rehashed idealism with all the standard problems.
The point is that Brent's comment - like Johnson's 'refutation' of
Berkeley - is ineffectual as a dismissal of Bruno's theoretical
position. Hoffman gives a neat account of how this might go. As to
the problems, you pays
e than once). This is not to say
that I'm in any way convinced that first-person experience can be
explained satisfactorily in this manner, but it's what a physical
account should look like if consciousness is deemed to supervene on
physical states in any standardly justified sense.
David
&
. But this entails entertaining a different
>> intuition about the relative primacy of physical and mathematical
>> accounts of states of affairs. But since appeals to the 'substantive'
>> nature - as opposed to the theoretical and methodological constraint
On Sep 22, 7:47 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
> > matter, or to argue with those who b
ument
RITSIAR = Real In The Sense I Am Real
ITEODYNAM? = Is That Enough Or Do You Need Any More?
David
> Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes being
> used in this thread? (e.g. CTM, PM, UD etc.)
>
>
>
> - Original Message -----
> From: &q
alternative of abandoning CTM or PM would
probably choose the former option. However, Bruno has a point when he
observes that this could be mere Aristotelian prejudice. The waste
bin of thought is stuffed with intuitively obvious ideas that turned
out to be the opposite of the truth. I
ience - yes? I didn't think that was your
position, but you've made this kind of comment so frequently recently
that I'm starting to wonder.
David
> David Nyman wrote:
> > 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
> >>> So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
&g
y concern is simply
the fit or otherwise between CTM and PM, and in this sense to claim
CTM as a plausible materialist hypothesis merely on the basis of the
otherwise unsupported indispensability and effectiveness of a
material substrate is an entirely circular argument. The analysis
does not,
rule out intrinsic
properties, I assume you're not thinking of Chalmers' proposal.
David
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman wrote:
>> On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> > There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>>
>> Wha
On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion wrote:
> There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
What do you mean by this?
David
> On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> > > UD. Th
open to empirical refutation, so it's research. Is your problem
that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"? If so, it
shouldn't be. Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation
if one can find an error. Further, even if one can't, this doesn't
f
are the ontological consequences for materialism of such a view
of computational-physical identity? Is there a logically or
contingently possible material world that contains structurally
identical computational zombies, in your view?
David
>
>
>
> On 17 Sep, 17:35, David Nyman wrote:
>&g
hat is opaque is its relation to physics.
David
> On 17 Sep, 00:02, David Nyman wrote:
>
> > Has it? I thought we were discussing whether CTM made any meaningful
> > commitments as a physical theory, not whether physics can or can't
> > include consciousness per se.
either
explanatory scheme. The opinions cited in the first posting assume
the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take
the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo. Comp takes
the opposite position. The rest is a research programme, isn't it?
David
nd action in the third
person sphere.
David
>
>
> On 16 Sep 2009, at 18:33, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>> David Nyman wrote:
>>> 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
>>>
>>>
>>>>> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
>
justified in saying that our theory describes what exists. Isn't
that about the size of it?
David
>
>
>
> On 16 Sep, 12:54, David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
>>
>> >> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
>&g
y open to what any theory may tell us at
this stage of our endarkenment.
David
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
>>
>>
>>>> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
>>>> between numbers existing mathematically and n
deep enough explanatory role (a moot
point I admit) isn't that 'ontological' enough?
David
>
>
>
> On 15 Sep, 19:21, David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/14 Flammarion :
>>
>> >> They don't exist physically. They do exist mathematically. It is
2009/9/14 Flammarion :
>> They don't exist physically. They do exist mathematically. It is all
>> what is used.
>
> You mean they exist Platonically. For formlalists,
> such "existence" is a mere metaphor and has
> no metaphyscial consequences.
I find that I can't real say what the difference is
invoking physical
processing as simultaneously both necessary and irrelevant to
experience.
Sorry if this was already obvious, I just wanted to check for
clarification. Does your involvement of the wider environment beyond
the narrowly defined computational realisation change the force of the
the Chinese Room? If so, what is your view of
the mechanism by which physical-experiential association at this level
would be established?
David
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/14 Brent Meeker :
>>
>>>> Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that'
o do their work, because this physical vacuity is what permits
grossly implausible realisations to be considered valid by the posits
of the theory. This is QED AFAICS. How specifically, and at what
point of the argument, would you disagree?
David
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/13
processes going on down there, and none of them
much like our own wetware version. How can we get a consistent
physics of consciousness out of this? What to do? I know - it
doesn't matter!
Great physical theory, eh?
David
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/11 Flammario
e ghost of a
'consciousness' that is - ex hypothesi without need for justification
- allegedly conjured by any ad-hoc collection of physical events that
happens to accord with the purely formal criteria of the theory.
It turns out that if CTM is true on any basis, then it cannot be
becau
homogeneous because
everything functionally relevant is assumed to be exhausted in the
processual account, and hence experience could be nothing but
epiphenomenal to this. So what difference could it make? But that is
another discussion.
David
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/1
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