Re: The consciousness singularity

On 11 Dec 2011, at 19:24, meekerdb wrote: On 12/11/2011 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Dec 2011, at 07:13, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Some say that the interference of particles "with themselves" in the two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these,

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/11/2011 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Dec 2011, at 07:13, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Some say that the interference of particles "with themselves" in the two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does nothing to explain why we obser

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 11 Dec 2011, at 07:13, meekerdb wrote: On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Some say that the interference of particles "with themselves" in the two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does nothing to explain why we observe the particular universe that we do.

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Some say that the interference of particles "with themselves" in the two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does nothing to explain why we observe the particular universe that we do. Comp explains this completely, by explaining why

Re: The consciousness singularity

> >>> Brent > >>> You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict > >>> the world.  Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both > >>> representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain > >>> functions? > >> Mathematics is a subset of language in whic

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 09 Dec 2011, at 19:57, Stephen P. King wrote: Dear Bruno, On 12/9/2011 11:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more than the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets). Ar

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 09 Dec 2011, at 17:55, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] I take Occam to say "in any explanation do not multiply entities beyond necessity." See Brent's answer. Postulating that everything exists without a means to even demostrate necessity is to postulate an infinite (of unkn

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 09 Dec 2011, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2011 11:48 AM, Pzomby wrote: On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote: On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbwrote: On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 09 Dec 2011, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2011 4:34 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P.

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 09 Dec 2011, at 23:50, benjayk wrote: Sorry, I am done with this discussion, I am just tired of it. I actually agree your argument is useful for refuting materialism, OK. but I still don't think your conlusion follows from just COMP, since you didn't eliminate COMP+non-platonic-imm

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/9/2011 2:04 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 2:17 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote

Re: The consciousness singularity

Sorry, I am done with this discussion, I am just tired of it. I actually agree your argument is useful for refuting materialism, but I still don't think your conlusion follows from just COMP, since you didn't eliminate COMP+non-platonic-immaterialism. benjayk -- View this message in context:

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/9/2011 2:17 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote: You m

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/9/2011 11:48 AM, Pzomby wrote: On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote: On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbwrote: On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without any particular reason or mean

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdb wrote: > On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote: > > > > On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdb  wrote: > >> On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: > > >>> Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without > >>> any particular reason or meaning behind them,

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/9/2011 4:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/9/2011 4:34 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb w

Re: The consciousness singularity

Dear Bruno, On 12/9/2011 11:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more than the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets). Are two Boolean algebras that have different proposition

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2011, at 13:34, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephe

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 09 Dec 2011, at 13:34, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meek

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/9/2011 2:47 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote:

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wr

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King"

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 09 Dec 2011, at 00:04, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: To suppose computation requires a material process would be materialism, wouldn't it? Hi Craig, Not quite, a dualist model would require that so

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: To suppose computation requires a mate

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: To suppose computation requires a material process would be materialism, woul

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: To suppose computation requires a material process would be materialism, wouldn't it? Hi Craig, Not quite, a dualis

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: To suppose computation requires a material process would be materialism, wouldn't it? Hi Craig, Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 1:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxwrote: The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: > On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > To suppose computation requires a material process would be > > materialism, wouldn't it? > Hi Craig, > >      Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material > process occur for co

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciauxwrote: The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011/12/8 meekerdb > On 12/8/2011 8:58 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2011/12/8 meekerdb > >> On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >>> The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an >>> argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdb wrote: > On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote: > > >> The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an > >> argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer) > >> is no

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 8:58 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2011/12/8 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote: On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdb wrote: On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for granted. But this is almost as unconvi

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdb wrote: > On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: > > > Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without > > any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for > > granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying "A creator

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011/12/8 meekerdb > On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an >> argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer) >> is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict >> yo

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer) is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to p

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 6:33 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer) is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict your next moment (if computationlism

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 08 Dec 2011, at 14:25, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote: The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying. Explain this in detail. Please. It just doesn't deal

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/8/2011 5:46 AM, benjayk wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if we assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our "artificial" experiments. But it seems natural systems have a be

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 7, 1:09 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I said to Stephen that, concerning the epiphenomena, consciousness and > matter do not play a symmetrical role, but this does not mean that one > of them is primitive. > > With comp, the basic ontology needed is just anything given by the > logical spec

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an > argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer) > is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict > your next moment (if computation

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011/12/8 benjayk > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > > On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote: > >> > >> You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my > >> favorite > >> mystery is acceptable). > > > > This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your > > enthus

Re: The consciousness singularity

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote: >> >> You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my >> favorite >> mystery is acceptable). > > This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your > enthusiast tone of your earlier posts. > I

Re: The consciousness singularity

meekerdb wrote: > > On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: >> Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if >> we >> assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our >> "artificial" >> experiments. But it seems natural systems have a better ability to >> r

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011/12/8 benjayk > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > > On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> I am just not arguing at all for what > >> y

Re: The consciousness singularity

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> I am just not arguing at all for what >> your argument(s) seeks to refute. > > I know

Re: The consciousness singularity

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > I can relate with many things you say. > Indeed I can argue that the universal (Löbian) machine already relate > on this, too. > > But science get rid only on subjective judgement in publication > (ideally), making them universally communicable. > > But consider

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote: You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my favorite mystery is acceptable). This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your enthusiast tone of your earlier posts. Quentin and Brent(*), and myself, have patien

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying "A creator God is just there, we have to take him for granted

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: I am just not arguing at all for what your argument(s) seeks to refute. I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to *believe* in t

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if we assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our "artificial" experiments. But it seems natural systems have a better ability to remain coherent, when it would be imposs

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 07 Dec 2011, at 16:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 7, 6:02 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote: but so does ideal monism. Why? The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the problem of epiphenomena. I don't follow you on this. We

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 07 Dec 2011, at 17:14, benjayk wrote: meekerdb wrote: And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations are done and how they are being interfaced with the environment. One could define computer more

Re: The consciousness singularity

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote: >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> I am just not arguing at all for what your argument(s) seeks to refute. >>> >>> I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to >>> *believe* in the conclusion of c

Re: The consciousness singularity

meekerdb wrote: > >> And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the >> computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations are >> done >> and how they are being interfaced with the environment. >> One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and ou

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 7, 6:02 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > but so does ideal monism. > > Why? > > > The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the problem > > of epiphenomena. > > I don't follow you on this. We have discussed that before. Matter >

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 06 Dec 2011, at 20:44, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/6/2011 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Dec 2011, at 18:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2011/12/6 meekerdb On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The only thing that matter is digitalness... the > fact that you run it on your

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 06 Dec 2011, at 21:04, meekerdb wrote: On 12/6/2011 11:27 AM, benjayk wrote: Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be > run/simulated > on a digital computer. Even if it does (it is not exactly COMP as defined by Bruno, because it doesn't state that we ourselves can

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/6/2011 11:27 AM, benjayk wrote: Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be > run/simulated > on a digital computer. Even if it does (it is not exactly COMP as defined by Bruno, because it doesn't state that we ourselves can be run on a computer, just that our body can

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/6/2011 2:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: I am just not arguing at all for what your argument(s) seeks to refute. I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to *believe* in the conclusion of comp. You j

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/6/2011 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Dec 2011, at 18:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2011/12/6 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The only thing that matter is digitalness... the > fact that you run it on your pi

Re: The consciousness singularity

Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: > > 2011/12/6 benjayk > >> >> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: >> > >> > 2011/12/5 benjayk >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >>> >> >> >

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: I am just not arguing at all for what your argument(s) seeks to refute. I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to *believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable that those conclu

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 06 Dec 2011, at 18:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2011/12/6 meekerdb On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The only thing that matter is digitalness... the > fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter. > It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong bal

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011/12/6 meekerdb > On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > The only thing that matter is digitalness... the >> > fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter. >> > >> It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that >> interact with the e

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The only thing that matter is digitalness... the > fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter. > It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that interact with the environment This i

Re: The consciousness singularity

Sorry for the spelling mistakes, please read: That's not the point... if we are turing emulable *then* it exists a *perfect* level of substitution *or* we are not turing emulable. The fact that an imperfect chosen level would work does not change the fact that *if* we are turing emulable *then*

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011/12/6 benjayk > > > Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: > > > > 2011/12/5 benjayk > > > >> > >> > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > > >> > > >> > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote: > >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >>> > >> The steps rely on the substitution being "perfec

Re: The consciousness singularity

Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: > > 2011/12/5 benjayk > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> > >> > >> > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >> The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they will >> never >> be. >> >>>

Re: The consciousness singularity

2011/12/5 benjayk > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> > The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they will > never > be. > >>> > >>> That would contradict the digital and corr

Re: The consciousness singularity

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they will never be. >>> >>> That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption. >>> >> No. Correctly func

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they will never be. That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption. No. Correctly functioning means "good enough to be working", not perfect. Once

Re: The consciousness singularity

Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they will >> never >> be. > > That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption. > No. Correctly functioning means "good enough to be working", not perfect. Digital means based on discrete values

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 02 Dec 2011, at 19:08, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer. If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of life, then you can unders

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 2, 3:22 pm, meekerdb wrote: > On 12/2/2011 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > > On Dec 2, 12:28 pm, meekerdb  wrote: > >> On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > >>> I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known > >>> source of experience. We can cha

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/2/2011 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 2, 12:28 pm, meekerdb wrote: On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our brain and vice versa. The same ca

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 2, 12:28 pm, meekerdb wrote: > On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known > > source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our > > brain and vice versa. The same cannot be said for anything else in

Re: The consciousness singularity

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer. >>> >>> If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of >>> life, then you can understand that you ar

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/2/2011 6:22 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our brain and vice versa. The same cannot be said for anything else in the universe, can it? I can change my experience

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 2, 6:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> OK. And comp assumes that we are not more than a computer, concerning > >> our abilities to think, etc. This is what is captured in a quasi > >> operational way by the "yes doctor" thought experiment. Most people > >> understand that they can survive

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 01 Dec 2011, at 20:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 1, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer. If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 12/1/2011 4:22 AM, benjayk wrote: John Mikes wrote: Don't let yourself drag into a narrower vision just to be able to agree, please. I say openly: I dunno (not Nobel-stuff I admit). I agree wholheartedly! That's why I don't like the reasoning. It is very narrow, and pretends to be a proof

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Dec 1, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote: > > > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >>> I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer. > > >> If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of > >> life, then you can understand t

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 01 Dec 2011, at 13:22, benjayk wrote: John Mikes wrote: Don't let yourself drag into a narrower vision just to be able to agree, please. I say openly: I dunno (not Nobel-stuff I admit). I agree wholheartedly! That's why I don't like the reasoning. It is very narrow, and pretends t

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer. If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer. So, then I am computer or some

Re: The consciousness singularity

John Mikes wrote: > > Don't let yourself drag into a narrower vision just to be able to agree, > please. I say openly: I dunno (not Nobel-stuff I admit). > I agree wholheartedly! That's why I don't like the reasoning. It is very narrow, and pretends to be a proof (or at least a valid reasoning)

Re: The consciousness singularity

Hello John, I agree with you (almost) completely that "we" (bio-beings) are computers, except for the diminishing factor we HAVE to include into a "computer" as a machine of knowable components and capabilities, observed WITHIN our perspectives as of yesterday. We don't need to know the

Re: The consciousness singularity

Dear Bruno, I agree with you (almost) completely that "we" (bio-beings) are computers, except for the *diminishing factor* we HAVE to include into a "computer" as a machine of knowable components and capabilities, observed WITHIN our perspectives as of yesterday. Your term "universal computer" may

Re: The consciousness singularity

Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer. > > If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of > life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer. So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer?

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 27 Nov 2011, at 16:12, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: since an uploaded digital mind could also be part of a lot of dreamy realities It is a part of a lot of "dreamy realities", without any uploading. By definition of the body and of the digital level of substitution, if we

Re: The consciousness singularity

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> since an uploaded digital mind could also >> be part of a lot of dreamy realities > > It is a part of a lot of "dreamy realities", without any uploading. By > definition of the body and of the digital level of substitution, if we > upload ourself in a computer,

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 25 Nov 2011, at 15:14, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: So uploading is not necessarily superfluous. It is vein if the abstract goal is "immortality", but full of sense if the goal consists in seeing the next soccer cup and your brain is too much ill to do it 'naturally'. But as so

Re: The consciousness singularity

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > So uploading is not necessarily superfluous. It is vein if the > abstract goal is "immortality", but full of sense if the goal consists > in seeing the next soccer cup and your brain is too much ill to do it > 'naturally'. But as soon as we upload ourselves, we can

Re: The consciousness singularity

Jason Resch-2 wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 2:44 PM, benjayk > wrote: > >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> > On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 1:17 PM, meekerdb wrote: >> > >> >> On 11/23/2011 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >>> The simulation argument: >> >>> >> >>> http://www.simulation-*

Re: The consciousness singularity

On 24 Nov 2011, at 23:00, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 2:44 PM, benjayk > wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: > > On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 1:17 PM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 11/23/2011 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >>> The simulation argument: >>> >>> http://www.simulation-**argume

Re: The consciousness singularity

On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 2:44 PM, benjayk wrote: > > > Jason Resch-2 wrote: > > > > On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 1:17 PM, meekerdb wrote: > > > >> On 11/23/2011 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > >> > >>> The simulation argument: > >>> > >>> http://www.simulation-**argument.com/simulation.html< > http://www

Re: The consciousness singularity

Jason Resch-2 wrote: > > On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 1:17 PM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 11/23/2011 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >>> The simulation argument: >>> >>> http://www.simulation-**argument.com/simulation.html >>> >>> If any civilization

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