subject:"RE\: \[PEIRCE\-L\] Metaphysics and Nothing \(was Peirce's Cosmology\)"

Jerry, List:

Answer which question?  The one that you posed initially?

CSP:  A chaos of reactions utterly without any approach to law is
absolutely nothing;

JLRC:  In view of the scope of your literality, what is the meaning of this
sentence to you, pragmatically?  philosophically?  theologically?


I already addressed this, and Clark and I have been discussing that
response.

JAS:  As a first attempt ...


   - Pragmatically, all real reactions have a tendency toward regularity
   (i.e., habit-taking).
   - Philosophically, 1ns and 2ns are both governed by 3ns (cf. CP 6.202).
   - Theologically, God created everything else out of absolutely nothing.

However, I still do not understand what you were driving at in your
subsequent posts.  Care to explain?

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 6:02 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Jon:
>
> From my perspective, the question posed to you was intelligible to an
> undergraduate.
>
> You describe yourself as
> "Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman”.
>
> If you do not want to answer this question about your beliefs, simply say
> you do not want to answer.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
> On Jan 23, 2017, at 5:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry, List:
>
> I am still not following you.  Are you suggesting that meanings are always
> singular, never general?  What makes dictionaries possible if everyone's
> "literal meanings" of the same terms are (or could be) completely
> different, just because we are different individual people?  For that
> matter, what makes communication of any kind possible if that is the case?
> And why would I be "especially" able to "make reasonable projections" about
> the consequences of my writings when they concern "science" or
> "technology"?  Is it just because I am an engineer?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 4:30 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> On Jan 23, 2017, at 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone
>> else's, or from the "generic meaning"?
>>
>> In more than 20 years of posting to List serves, this is among the most
>> surprising responses I have ever received.
>>
>> My response is simple, Jon.
>>
>> Because you are you and not me.
>> Logically, the antecedent of your writings is you. The consequences of
>> your writings are totally beyond your control, although, from time to time,
>> you may make reasonable projections, especially if it concerns “science” or
>> “technology”.
>>
>> This is, literally, a foundational property of reading anything, and,
>> especially, CSP.
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2017-01-23 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list:

Oh, I now remember who asked to be informed when he was acting a
nominalist.

For nominalists do this:

“The Nominalists flatly denied the existence of anything but the concrete.
For them, a universal name was in itself a mere “flatus voices”, according
to Ockam’s famous expression; it had no meaning except when applied to its
singulars…

It had to stand for a singular object, an individual man or being, “But
then,” said the *Universalists, “if it stands for only one individual, you
must know who he is, when you say, He is a thief, as usual in such
sentences.  If you do not know, and deny that it stands for somebody in
general, the sentences becomes a jumble of words, without any meaning.

To put their attack into somewhat more modern language than the crabbed
form of the text: If you say, “Socrates is an animal and it is an ass,” you
mean that the universal “Animal” is replaced by it.  But suppose you
substitute vertebrate for animal; the sense of it is at once altered.
Substitute mammal; the sense varies again.

Thus we have an endless series of different significations given to it,
each of them more concrete, yet none ever reaching the ultimate limit of
individuality.  This would be the ruin of all science; for we could never
draw any inference from the universal to its singulars; and between each of
these it’s there could be found or imagined room for an infinite multitude
of others.  These constantly changing significations would destroy the
possibility of deduction…

We can never conclude that A is this singular individual man.”

~ Johannis Wyclif, *Tractatus de logica*, Volume 2

Hth,

Jerry R

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 6:02 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Jon:
>
> From my perspective, the question posed to you was intelligible to an
> undergraduate.
>
> You describe yourself as
> "Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman”.
>
> If you do not want to answer this question about your beliefs, simply say
> you do not want to answer.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
> On Jan 23, 2017, at 5:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry, List:
>
> I am still not following you.  Are you suggesting that meanings are always
> singular, never general?  What makes dictionaries possible if everyone's
> "literal meanings" of the same terms are (or could be) completely
> different, just because we are different individual people?  For that
> matter, what makes communication of any kind possible if that is the case?
> And why would I be "especially" able to "make reasonable projections" about
> the consequences of my writings when they concern "science" or
> "technology"?  Is it just because I am an engineer?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 4:30 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> On Jan 23, 2017, at 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone
>> else's, or from the "generic meaning"?
>>
>> In more than 20 years of posting to List serves, this is among the most
>> surprising responses I have ever received.
>>
>> My response is simple, Jon.
>>
>> Because you are you and not me.
>> Logically, the antecedent of your writings is you. The consequences of
>> your writings are totally beyond your control, although, from time to time,
>> you may make reasonable projections, especially if it concerns “science” or
>> “technology”.
>>
>> This is, literally, a foundational property of reading anything, and,
>> especially, CSP.
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon:

>From my perspective, the question posed to you was intelligible to an 
>undergraduate.

You describe yourself as 
"Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman”.

If you do not want to answer this question about your beliefs, simply say you 
do not want to answer.

Cheers

Jerry


> On Jan 23, 2017, at 5:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> I am still not following you.  Are you suggesting that meanings are always 
> singular, never general?  What makes dictionaries possible if everyone's 
> "literal meanings" of the same terms are (or could be) completely different, 
> just because we are different individual people?  For that matter, what makes 
> communication of any kind possible if that is the case?  And why would I be 
> "especially" able to "make reasonable projections" about the consequences of 
> my writings when they concern "science" or "technology"?  Is it just because 
> I am an engineer?
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 4:30 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> > wrote:
> List: 
>> On Jan 23, 2017, at 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > > wrote:
>> 
>> Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone 
>> else's, or from the "generic meaning"? 
> 
> In more than 20 years of posting to List serves, this is among the most 
> surprising responses I have ever received.
> 
> My response is simple, Jon.
> 
> Because you are you and not me.
> Logically, the antecedent of your writings is you. The consequences of your 
> writings are totally beyond your control, although, from time to time, you 
> may make reasonable projections, especially if it concerns “science” or 
> “technology”.
> 
> This is, literally, a foundational property of reading anything, and, 
> especially, CSP.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jerry, List:

I am still not following you.  Are you suggesting that meanings are always
singular, never general?  What makes dictionaries possible if everyone's
"literal meanings" of the same terms are (or could be) completely
different, just because we are different individual people?  For that
matter, what makes communication of any kind possible if that is the case?
And why would I be "especially" able to "make reasonable projections" about
the consequences of my writings when they concern "science" or
"technology"?  Is it just because I am an engineer?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 4:30 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List:
>
> On Jan 23, 2017, at 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone
> else's, or from the "generic meaning"?
>
> In more than 20 years of posting to List serves, this is among the most
> surprising responses I have ever received.
>
> My response is simple, Jon.
>
> Because you are you and not me.
> Logically, the antecedent of your writings is you. The consequences of
> your writings are totally beyond your control, although, from time to time,
> you may make reasonable projections, especially if it concerns “science” or
> “technology”.
>
> This is, literally, a foundational property of reading anything, and,
> especially, CSP.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Clark, List:

In various fragmentary drafts of "A Neglected Argument" that appear in R
841 and R 843, Peirce states each of the following.

"'God,' in what sense?" ask ye?  When so 'capitalized' (as we Americans
say) it is, throughout this paper, the definable proper noun, i.e. *Ens
necessarium*, whether Real or not:  He by Whom the three Universes of
Experience are, supposedly, getting, directly or indirectly, created from
Nothing--soberly, from less than a blank.

In this paper, the word 'God,' will be employed as the definable proper
name.  Accordingly, it signifies '*Ens necessarium*."  Reality is not
determined by signification; but supposing Him Real, then out of Nothing,
out of less than a Blank, He is creating the three Universes of Experience.

The proper name, God, will in this paper be applied to that Being, Real or
fictive, Who, out of Nothing, less than a blank, is creating all three
Universes of experience.

"God" in what sense? you ask. When so "capitalized" (as we Americans say,)
I intend it for the definable proper noun: Ens necessarium; whether Real or
not: He who is creating the three Universes of Experience from Nothing;
soberly, from less than a blank.

As an example of an apparently answerless problem that a pure analysis will
solve, take this.  Suppose first no laws to be, then that nothing exist,
finally that there is no Idea, no time, no consequence, even in
possibility.  Why should not this blank Nothing have been all?  The
analysis is not easy, as far as I see; but it can be performed; and it
leads to the conception of a *Necessary Being*, the foundation of theology,
though not of religion.

So I think we can say pretty definitively that Peirce's conception of God,
at least in 1908, does involve God actually creating out of "nothing,"
which he consistently characterizes as "less than a blank."

Regarding the Categories, I mean "govern" more like your second
characterization; not dependence, but how laws of nature (3ns) "govern"
actual objects (2ns) and their embodied monadic predicates (1ns).  Does
that make more sense?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 3:49 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Jan 23, 2017, at 1:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone
> else's, or from the "generic meaning"?  As a first attempt ...
>
>- Pragmatically, all real reactions have a tendency toward regularity
>(i.e., habit-taking).
>- Philosophically, 1ns and 2ns are both governed by 3ns (cf. CP 6.202).
>- Theologically, God created everything else out of absolutely nothing.
>
> Given Peirce’s conception of God is God actually creating out of nothing?
> Further is the nothing as pure potency the nothing of *creation ex nihilo*
> ?
>
> Secondly when you say firstness and secondness are governed by thirdness
> I’m not sure what you mean. CP 6.202 seems to not be addressing that issue,
> depending upon what you mean by “govern.” That passage is more about Peirce
> objecting to his whole system being called tychism. He does say thirdness
> has a commanding function but he also says “that Firstness or chance and
> Secondness or Brute reaction are other elements without the independence of
> which Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate.” (6.202)
> That is they aren’t governed if by govern we mean dependence. Of course if
> by govern we mean lawlike recognition of their manifestation then I’d
> agree.
>
> My apologies if I’m misreading you.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

List: 
> On Jan 23, 2017, at 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone 
> else's, or from the "generic meaning"? 

In more than 20 years of posting to List serves, this is among the most 
surprising responses I have ever received.

My response is simple, Jon.

Because you are you and not me.
Logically, the antecedent of your writings is you. The consequences of your 
writings are totally beyond your control, although, from time to time, you may 
make reasonable projections, especially if it concerns “science” or 
“technology”.

This is, literally, a foundational property of reading anything, and, 
especially, CSP.

Cheers

Jerry

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2017-01-23 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, Edwina, list,

I see nothing whatsoever Saussurean semiological, nominalistic, or
literal-bound (whatever that might mean) in Jon's recent remarks and,
rather, have seen him to *consistently* make at least the attempt here to
analyze relevant concepts in the spirit of Peircean realism.

So I agree with Jon that if Edwina is unwilling or unable to substantiate
her allegations, offering specific examples with commentary analyzing why
she sees Jon's analysis as Saussurean and nominalistic, that there is no
good reason for Jon or anyone to take those allegations seriously. Indeed,
personally it strikes me as no more than a kind of 'intellectual
name-calling' lacking that substantiation.

Best.

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 4:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> That is fine--if you are unwilling to substantiate your allegation, then I
> see no reason to take it seriously.  It seems telling that you evidently
> have no interest in helping me escape from what you perceive to be a
> fundamental error on my part.  Rather, it sounds like you have come up with
> a convenient rationalization for simply dismissing anything that I might
> have to say on the List going forward.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Jon
>
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 2:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon Schmidt: Yes, that's the interpretation I made of your
>> comments [i.e., Saussurian nominalism]. And no, I won't get into any
>> 'alternative interpretation' or debate with you as you, in my  view, are
>> firmly operative within that mould [Saussurian nominalism] and tend to
>> remould Peirce into a strict one-meaning only structure. So - there's no
>> point in debating with you - as the 'debate' reduces into you asserting
>> your view and claiming that other views are 'non-Peircean'.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> *Cc:* Peirce List <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Monday, January 23, 2017 3:36 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
>> Cosmology)
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Are you suggesting, then, that my "analysis" of the quotes that I cited
>> from "New Elements" is "literal-bound" in that sense?  If so, then what
>> alternative interpretation do you think would result from properly applying
>> Peircean semeiotic realism instead?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 2:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon - I explained a 'literal-bound' analysis in my post, when I gave the
>>> example of Saussurian semiological nominalism, where 'this word' stands for
>>> 'that meaning'.
>>>
>>> As for the triad of semiosis, I've explained mediation many times before
>>> and won't repeat that explanation.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> - Original Message -
>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> *Cc:* Peirce List <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
>>> *Sent:* Monday, January 23, 2017 2:46 PM
>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
>>> Cosmology)
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> Would you mind clarifying, as well?  What exactly do you mean by "a
>>> 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce"?  What exactly is "that evolving and
>>> complex mediating 'law'" that you seem to believe is essential to proper
>>> interpretation?  As far as I can tell, Jerry did not point out any such
>>> thing in his response, so maybe I am just missing something.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I think one has to be careful, as others have pointed out, in moving
>>>> into a 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce. That, in my view, moves into
>>>> Saussurian semiological nominalism where 'this word' has just 'that
>>>> meaning'

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2017-01-23 Thread Clark Goble

> On Jan 23, 2017, at 1:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
> 
> Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone 
> else's, or from the "generic meaning"?  As a first attempt ...
> Pragmatically, all real reactions have a tendency toward regularity (i.e., 
> habit-taking).
> Philosophically, 1ns and 2ns are both governed by 3ns (cf. CP 6.202).
> Theologically, God created everything else out of absolutely nothing.
> 

Given Peirce’s conception of God is God actually creating out of nothing? 
Further is the nothing as pure potency the nothing of creation ex nihilo?

Secondly when you say firstness and secondness are governed by thirdness I’m 
not sure what you mean. CP 6.202 seems to not be addressing that issue, 
depending upon what you mean by “govern.” That passage is more about Peirce 
objecting to his whole system being called tychism. He does say thirdness has a 
commanding function but he also says “that Firstness or chance and Secondness 
or Brute reaction are other elements without the independence of which 
Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate.” (6.202) That is they 
aren’t governed if by govern we mean dependence. Of course if by govern we mean 
lawlike recognition of their manifestation then I’d agree. 

My apologies if I’m misreading you.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2017-01-23 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list:



Someone previously asked how to know when he is being a nominalist.

I forget who.



To determine this, we could simply look to its effectiveness for  “settling
metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable.”



“*Questioner*: What, then, is the *raison d’etre *of the doctrine? What
advantage is expected from it?

*Pragmatist*: It will serve to show that almost every proposition of
ontological metaphysics is either meaningless gibberish- one word being
defined by other words, and they by still others, without any real
conception ever being reached- or else is downright absurd;

so that all such rubbish being swept away, what will remain of philosophy
will be a series of problems capable of investigation by the observational
methods of the true sciences- the truth about which can be reached without
the interminable misunderstandings and disputes which have made the highest
of the positive sciences a mere amusement for idle intellects, a sort of
chess- idle pleasure its purpose, and reading out of a book its method.” ~*What
Pragmatism Is*



On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 2:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon Schmidt: Yes, that's the interpretation I made of your comments [i.e.,
> Saussurian nominalism]. And no, I won't get into any 'alternative
> interpretation' or debate with you as you, in my  view, are firmly
> operative within that mould [Saussurian nominalism] and tend to  remould
> Peirce into a strict one-meaning only structure. So - there's no point in
> debating with you - as the 'debate' reduces into you asserting your view
> and claiming that other views are 'non-Peircean'.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce List <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Monday, January 23, 2017 3:36 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Are you suggesting, then, that my "analysis" of the quotes that I cited
> from "New Elements" is "literal-bound" in that sense?  If so, then what
> alternative interpretation do you think would result from properly applying
> Peircean semeiotic realism instead?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon
>
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 2:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - I explained a 'literal-bound' analysis in my post, when I gave the
>> example of Saussurian semiological nominalism, where 'this word' stands for
>> 'that meaning'.
>>
>> As for the triad of semiosis, I've explained mediation many times before
>> and won't repeat that explanation.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -----
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> *Cc:* Peirce List <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Monday, January 23, 2017 2:46 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
>> Cosmology)
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Would you mind clarifying, as well?  What exactly do you mean by "a
>> 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce"?  What exactly is "that evolving and
>> complex mediating 'law'" that you seem to believe is essential to proper
>> interpretation?  As far as I can tell, Jerry did not point out any such
>> thing in his response, so maybe I am just missing something.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I think one has to be careful, as others have pointed out, in moving
>>> into a 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce. That, in my view, moves into
>>> Saussurian semiological nominalism where 'this word' has just 'that
>>> meaning'. Such a dyadic one-to-one referential framework i.e.,
>>> where interpretation absents itself from that evolving and
>>> complex mediating 'law' [as Jerry points out]  is the antithesis of
>>> Peircean semiosis.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>> --
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2017-01-23 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Jon Schmidt: Yes, that's the interpretation I made of your comments [i.e., 
Saussurian nominalism]. And no, I won't get into any 'alternative 
interpretation' or debate with you as you, in my  view, are firmly operative 
within that mould [Saussurian nominalism] and tend to  remould Peirce into a 
strict one-meaning only structure. So - there's no point in debating with you - 
as the 'debate' reduces into you asserting your view and claiming that other 
views are 'non-Peircean'. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce List 
  Sent: Monday, January 23, 2017 3:36 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


  Are you suggesting, then, that my "analysis" of the quotes that I cited from 
"New Elements" is "literal-bound" in that sense?  If so, then what alternative 
interpretation do you think would result from properly applying Peircean 
semeiotic realism instead?


  Thanks,


  Jon


  On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 2:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Jon - I explained a 'literal-bound' analysis in my post, when I gave the 
example of Saussurian semiological nominalism, where 'this word' stands for 
'that meaning'.

As for the triad of semiosis, I've explained mediation many times before 
and won't repeat that explanation.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce List 
  Sent: Monday, January 23, 2017 2:46 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List: 


  Would you mind clarifying, as well?  What exactly do you mean by "a 
'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce"?  What exactly is "that evolving and 
complex mediating 'law'" that you seem to believe is essential to proper 
interpretation?  As far as I can tell, Jerry did not point out any such thing 
in his response, so maybe I am just missing something.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> 
wrote:

I think one has to be careful, as others have pointed out, in moving 
into a 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce. That, in my view, moves into 
Saussurian semiological nominalism where 'this word' has just 'that meaning'. 
Such a dyadic one-to-one referential framework i.e., where interpretation 
absents itself from that evolving and complex mediating 'law' [as Jerry points 
out]  is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.

Edwina


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

Are you suggesting, then, that my "analysis" of the quotes that I cited
from "New Elements" is "literal-bound" in that sense?  If so, then what
alternative interpretation do you think would result from properly applying
Peircean semeiotic realism instead?

Thanks,

Jon

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 2:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon - I explained a 'literal-bound' analysis in my post, when I gave the
> example of Saussurian semiological nominalism, where 'this word' stands for
> 'that meaning'.
>
> As for the triad of semiosis, I've explained mediation many times before
> and won't repeat that explanation.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce List <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Monday, January 23, 2017 2:46 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Would you mind clarifying, as well?  What exactly do you mean by "a
> 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce"?  What exactly is "that evolving and
> complex mediating 'law'" that you seem to believe is essential to proper
> interpretation?  As far as I can tell, Jerry did not point out any such
> thing in his response, so maybe I am just missing something.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> I think one has to be careful, as others have pointed out, in moving into
>> a 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce. That, in my view, moves into
>> Saussurian semiological nominalism where 'this word' has just 'that
>> meaning'. Such a dyadic one-to-one referential framework i.e.,
>> where interpretation absents itself from that evolving and
>> complex mediating 'law' [as Jerry points out]  is the antithesis of
>> Peircean semiosis.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jerry, List:

Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone
else's, or from the "generic meaning"?  As a first attempt ...

   - Pragmatically, all real reactions have a tendency toward regularity
   (i.e., habit-taking).
   - Philosophically, 1ns and 2ns are both governed by 3ns (cf. CP 6.202).
   - Theologically, God created everything else out of absolutely nothing.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:58 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
> On Jan 23, 2017, at 1:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry, List:
>
> I am not sure what you mean by "the scope of [my] literality," or the
> precise distinction that you are drawing between "pragmatically" vs.
> "philosophically" vs. "theologically."  Would you mind clarifying?
>
> The generic meaning of these terms is fine with me.  It is also fine with
> me if you choose your literal meanings.  see below.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
> literal |ˈlidərəlˈlitrəl| adjective1 taking words in their usual or most
> basic sense without metaphor or allegory: dreadful in its literal sense,
> full of dread.• free from exaggeration or distortion: you shouldn't take
> this as a literal record of events.• informal absolute (used to emphasize
> that a strong expression is deliberately chosen to convey one's feelings): 
> fifteen
> years of literal hell.2 (of a translation) representing the exact words
> of the original text.• (of a visual representation) exactly copied;
> realistic as opposed to abstract or impressionistic.3 (also literal-minded
> ) (of a person or performance) lacking imagination; prosaic.4 of, in, or
> expressed by a letter or the letters of the alphabet: literal mnemonics.
>
> In any case, since it occurs only a few paragraphs later within the same
> document, I assume that Peirce meant the same thing by "nothing" in this
> sentence that he did in the first passage that I quoted.  "Not
> determinately nothing ... Utter indetermination.  But a symbol alone is
> indeterminate.  Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute
> beginning, is a symbol."  After all, he went on to say, "... and
> therefore pure nothing was such a chaos.  Then pure indeterminacy having
> developed determinate possibilities, creation consisted in mediating
> between the lawless reactions and the general possibilities by the influx
> of a symbol."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon:
>>
>> On Jan 23, 2017, at 12:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> CSP:  A chaos of reactions utterly without any approach to law is
>> absolutely nothing;
>>
>> In view of the scope of your literality, what is the meaning of this
>> sentence to you,
>>
>> pragmatically?
>> philosophically?
>> theologically?
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> jerry
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2017-01-23 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Jon - I explained a 'literal-bound' analysis in my post, when I gave the 
example of Saussurian semiological nominalism, where 'this word' stands for 
'that meaning'.

As for the triad of semiosis, I've explained mediation many times before and 
won't repeat that explanation.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce List 
  Sent: Monday, January 23, 2017 2:46 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


  Would you mind clarifying, as well?  What exactly do you mean by "a 
'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce"?  What exactly is "that evolving and 
complex mediating 'law'" that you seem to believe is essential to proper 
interpretation?  As far as I can tell, Jerry did not point out any such thing 
in his response, so maybe I am just missing something.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

I think one has to be careful, as others have pointed out, in moving into a 
'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce. That, in my view, moves into Saussurian 
semiological nominalism where 'this word' has just 'that meaning'. Such a 
dyadic one-to-one referential framework i.e., where interpretation absents 
itself from that evolving and complex mediating 'law' [as Jerry points out]  is 
the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.

Edwina


--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Jan 23, 2017, at 1:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> I am not sure what you mean by "the scope of [my] literality," or the precise 
> distinction that you are drawing between "pragmatically" vs. 
> "philosophically" vs. "theologically."  Would you mind clarifying?

The generic meaning of these terms is fine with me.  It is also fine with me if 
you choose your literal meanings.  see below.

Cheers

Jerry 

literal |ˈlidərəlˈlitrəl| 
adjective
1 taking words in their usual or most basic sense without metaphor or allegory: 
dreadful in its literal sense, full of dread.
• free from exaggeration or distortion: you shouldn't take this as a literal 
record of events.
• informal absolute (used to emphasize that a strong expression is deliberately 
chosen to convey one's feelings): fifteen years of literal hell.
2 (of a translation) representing the exact words of the original text.
• (of a visual representation) exactly copied; realistic as opposed to abstract 
or impressionistic.
3 (also literal-minded) (of a person or performance) lacking imagination; 
prosaic.
4 of, in, or expressed by a letter or the letters of the alphabet: literal 
mnemonics.

> 
> In any case, since it occurs only a few paragraphs later within the same 
> document, I assume that Peirce meant the same thing by "nothing" in this 
> sentence that he did in the first passage that I quoted.  "Not determinately 
> nothing ... Utter indetermination.  But a symbol alone is indeterminate.  
> Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, is a 
> symbol."  After all, he went on to say, "... and therefore pure nothing was 
> such a chaos.  Then pure indeterminacy having developed determinate 
> possibilities, creation consisted in mediating between the lawless reactions 
> and the general possibilities by the influx of a symbol."
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> > wrote:
> Jon:
>> On Jan 23, 2017, at 12:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > > wrote:
>> 
>> CSP:  A chaos of reactions utterly without any approach to law is absolutely 
>> nothing; 
> 
> In view of the scope of your literality, what is the meaning of this sentence 
> to you,
>  
> pragmatically?
> philosophically?
> theologically?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> jerry
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
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> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> 
> 
> 
> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

Would you mind clarifying, as well?  What exactly do you mean by "a
'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce"?  What exactly is "that evolving and
complex mediating 'law'" that you seem to believe is essential to proper
interpretation?  As far as I can tell, Jerry did not point out any such
thing in his response, so maybe I am just missing something.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> I think one has to be careful, as others have pointed out, in moving into
> a 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce. That, in my view, moves into
> Saussurian semiological nominalism where 'this word' has just 'that
> meaning'. Such a dyadic one-to-one referential framework i.e.,
> where interpretation absents itself from that evolving and
> complex mediating 'law' [as Jerry points out]  is the antithesis of
> Peircean semiosis.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jerry, List:

I am not sure what you mean by "the scope of [my] literality," or the
precise distinction that you are drawing between "pragmatically" vs.
"philosophically" vs. "theologically."  Would you mind clarifying?

In any case, since it occurs only a few paragraphs later within the same
document, I assume that Peirce meant the same thing by "nothing" in this
sentence that he did in the first passage that I quoted.  "Not
determinately nothing ... Utter indetermination.  But a symbol alone is
indeterminate.  Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute
beginning, is a symbol."  After all, he went on to say, "... and therefore
pure nothing was such a chaos.  Then pure indeterminacy having developed
determinate possibilities, creation consisted in mediating between the
lawless reactions and the general possibilities by the influx of a symbol."

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Jon:
>
> On Jan 23, 2017, at 12:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> CSP:  A chaos of reactions utterly without any approach to law is
> absolutely nothing;
>
> In view of the scope of your literality, what is the meaning of this
> sentence to you,
>
> pragmatically?
> philosophically?
> theologically?
>
> Cheers
>
> jerry
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2017-01-23 Thread Edwina Taborsky

I think one has to be careful, as others have pointed out, in moving into a 
'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce. That, in my view, moves into Saussurian 
semiological nominalism where 'this word' has just 'that meaning'. Such a 
dyadic one-to-one referential framework i.e., where interpretation absents 
itself from that evolving and complex mediating 'law' [as Jerry points out]  is 
the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jerry LR Chandler 
  To: Peirce List 
  Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  Sent: Monday, January 23, 2017 2:24 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Jon:


On Jan 23, 2017, at 12:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
wrote:


CSP:  A chaos of reactions utterly without any approach to law is 
absolutely nothing; 


  In view of the scope of your literality, what is the meaning of this sentence 
to you,

  pragmatically?
  philosophically?
  theologically?


  Cheers


  jerry




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon:

> On Jan 23, 2017, at 12:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> CSP:  A chaos of reactions utterly without any approach to law is absolutely 
> nothing; 

In view of the scope of your literality, what is the meaning of this sentence 
to you,

pragmatically?
philosophically?
theologically?

Cheers

jerry

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-25 Thread John F Sowa


Kirsti,

We are in violent agreement.


I looked at the slides you provided. With as good as all of them,
was mark 'wrong', wrong, and again wrong.


I have been doing R & D in AI for years, and the point I'm trying
to make is that current AI research is *on the wrong track* .
I presented an earlier version of that talk at a conference on
"data mining" -- for which statistics is the major technology.

What I was trying to say:  Statistical methods are useful for
certain kinds of applications, but they are limited to Secondness
-- they cannot answer the question "Why?"

I didn't say much about Peirce in those slides because most of
the people in the audience had been brainwashed by Frege, Russell,
Carnap, and Quine.  Before you can explain the solution (Peirce),
you have to show the areas where current technology (mostly based
on nominalism) has failed.

For examples of failures, see slides 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 23, 25 of http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/nlu.pdf


flexible word order and inflections go together...

Google translations between English and Finnish are worse
than terrible.


That's what I expected.  For modern languages with inflections,
statistical methods are far worse than for languages based on word
order.  For classical Latin, Google produces "word hash" (slide 27).

Interesting point:  Translations from medieval Latin are not quite
as bad -- partly because most speakers of Latin in the universities
were native speakers of languages that had lost or were beginning
to lose the inflections.  Therefore, they spoke Latin in the same
word order as they would in their native languages.


The digital world does not know its history very well.  It should!


I certainly agree.  But the major reason is that most AI researchers
have not studied anything other than 20th century analytic philosophy.
The blind have been leading the blind.


I have developed a method for a dialogue between a six-to-eight
weeks old infant and an adult.


That's important.  Some people had thought that it would be possible
for American infants to learn a language by watching TV.  After months
of watching Chinese TV, they learned nothing.  But after a much shorter
time with a Chinese nanny, they learned Chinese.

I'd also like to mention the research by Laura-Ann Petitto, who
studied bilingual infants who were raised by parents with all
pairs of four different languages:  English, French, American
Sign Language (ASL), and Langue des Signes Québécoise (LSQ).

For a summary of her results, see the slide below.  She and her group
have published many articles about bilingualism, child language, and
related topics.  See http://petitto.net/pubs/published/

John


From slide 20 of http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/goal2.pdf :

  SPOKEN AND SIGNED LANGUAGES

The same neural mechanisms are used to produce and interpret
spoken and signed languages. (Petitto 2005)

Studies of bilingual infants of parents with different languages:

● All pairs of four languages: English, French, American Sign
  Language (ASL), and Langue des Signes Québécoise (LSQ).

● Monolingual and bilingual babies go through the same stages and
  at the same ages for both spoken and signed languages.

● Hearing babies born to profoundly deaf parents babble with their
  hands, but not vocally.

● Babies bilingual in a spoken and a signed language babble in both
  modalities – vocally and with their hands.

● And they express themselves with equal fluency in their spoken
  and signed language at every stage of development.

Petitto’s conclusion:  Any hypothesis about a Language Acquisition
Device (LAD) must be independent of modality.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-12 Thread John F Sowa


On 11/12/2016 12:55 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

You wrote:
"Different languages have different options for the grammatical forms
that express such relations.  The number of options could lead to a
combinatorial explosion, but the practical number is limited by human
memory."

I take your first sentence as a most important note. For decades I have
been systematically observing the limitations due to knowing only one
language.


Yes.  That is a very important point.  Following is an excerpt
from a note that I sent to a different email list:

JFS

Grammar is part of the Trivium that had been emphasized in elementary
school (formerly called *grammar* school).  While teaching Knowledge
representation to programmers at IBM, I found that the knowledge of
English grammar by typical native English speakers is abysmal.

But the students from IBM Japan knew English grammar very well.
Their speaking ability was not as good, but they did their homework
assignments better than the natives.


There is a huge difference between knowing how to do something
(e.g., speak English) and knowing how to analyze that process
and map it to another language (natural or artificial).

KM

The second sentence you wrote, my comment is: You take human memory
as something well-known and well-understood. That is not the case.
It is only something commonly spoken about.


No.  From a particular use of a word or phrase, one can assume
a limited number of direct implications.  It's not possible to
assume that the speaker was unaware of other implications.

In fact, what I was thinking about is Terry Deacon's point in the
book, _Symbolic Species_:  The primary constraints on the structures
of natural languages result from the fact that they must be relearned
by infants in every generation.  Anything that a child cannot quickly
learn and use will not be passed down from one generation to the next.

KM

[Finnish is] not at all related to English (the modern Latin)


As an inflected language, Latin is closer (in spirit) to Finnish.
Since English lost almost all inflections, English syntax is more
closely related to Chinese.  The dialect called "Chinese restaurant
English" results from a word for word substitution of English words
into a Chinese pattern.

Even though Japanese uses Chinese characters, its syntax is closer
to Latin:  highly inflected verb-final sentences with "postpositions"
on noun phrases that allow them to be moved freely.  As a result,
there is no dialect called "Japanese restaurant English".

In studies of first-language learning, psycholinguists have found
that infants learn some relations expressed by word inflections
earlier than the same relations expressed by word order.  However,
a complete mastery of the syntax of a highly inflected language does
take longer than the word-order syntax of English or Chinese.

Historical linguists suspect that the loss of inflections in English
began with the Danish invasions:  At that time, Anglo-Saxon and Danish
were sufficiently similar that the words were mutually intelligible,
but the inflections were different.  As a result, the speakers
depended more heavily on word order.  After the French invasion
of 1066, almost all the inflections were gone.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-10 Thread John F Sowa


Edwina, Jon A, Jeff, Jerry, Jon AS, Kirsti,

This topic has so many ramifications that it's impossible to say
anything complete and definitive.  The observation I considered
important was Bateson's remark about stories as a natural way for
minds or quasi-minds to think, talk, and reason about experience.

For example, Einstein's Gedanken experiments about relativity
can be analyzed as stories that enabled him to think about
physics in novel ways that nobody had previously discovered.

Edwina:

You are saying, I think, that different modes of time, eg,
a mathematical analysis and a physical experience...have to be
considered. The mathematical analysis might be in progressive
time; while the physical experience is in both present and
perfect time.


The four kinds I mentioned were not an exhaustive analysis. I just
started with Bateson's remark about stories.  It implies that the
many ways of thinking about time are at least as varied as the many
kinds of stories (formal and informal) and the many ways of relating
the storyteller to the audience and the topic(s).

Re verb tenses:  Those are syntactic options for telling a story
and relating episodes to one another.  Different languages have
different options for the grammatical forms that express such
relations.  The number of options could lead to a combinatorial
explosion, but the practical number is limited by human memory.

ET:

This pointing out for the necessity for dialogic interaction...


That is another interesting path to explore.  It leads to another
combinatorial explosion of ways of interacting among participants,
topics, speech acts, contexts -- many aspects of larger stories.

Jon A

trying to understand inquiry and semiosis in general as temporal
processes is one of the things that forced me to develop differential
logic as an extension of propositional logic, for which I naturally
turned to Peirce's logical graphs as a starting point.


Yes, that's another path to explore.  For any version of logic,
it's important to determine what kinds of problems it can express
and what solutions it can facilitate.  What useful stories or
Gedanken experiments can you explain in terms of it?

Jeff

thinking about the analogy between (1) mathematical models of
the differentiation of spaces starting with a vague continuum of
undifferentiated dimensions and trending towards spaces having
determinate dimensions to (2) models for logic involving similar
sorts of dimensions?  How might we understand processes of
differentiation of dimensions in the case of logic?


Those questions are related to the methods Jon A. is exploring with
his differential logic.  It's important to look at sample problems
(Gedanken experiments) and ask what models can help solve them.

Jon AS

your identification of three different "kinds of time" might align
nicely with the points of view of the three Categories that Nicholas
Guardiano adopted to analyze Peirce's cosmogony...


I was only analyzing one specific problem.  I believe that there is
an open-ended number of kinds of stories -- or perhaps a continuum
of variations in stories, ways of telling them, and ways of relating
the storyteller to the participants, episodes, side plots, audience...

JAS

Guardiano... singles out "the big bang theory" for criticism because
of "its temporal nature and the need for its explanatory cause prior
in time."


Kirsti

Time-sequences between stories do not apply. - The big-bang is
just a story, one on many just as possible stories.


Yes.  Every science is always a work in progress.

Physicists are not happy with the idea that the universe suddenly
popped into existence about 13.8 billion years ago.  They have
proposed many versions that include a Big Bang as just one stage:

 1. A Big Crunch (an earlier universe imploding under the force
of gravity) followed by a Big Bang.

 2. A cyclical universe with multiple big crunches followed
by big bangs.

 3. Multiverses.  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse

The Wikipedia article quotes a summary from the Scientific American:

George Ellis (2011) Does the Multiverse Really Exist?

As skeptical as I am, I think the contemplation of the multiverse is an
excellent opportunity to reflect on the nature of science and on the
ultimate nature of existence: why we are here In looking at this
concept, we need an open mind, though not too open. It is a delicate
path to tread. Parallel universes may or may not exist; the case is
unproved. We are going to have to live with that uncertainty. Nothing
is wrong with scientifically based philosophical speculation, which is
what multiverse proposals are. But we should name it for what it is.


John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-10 Thread kirstima

John, list,

Most important points you take up, John. Time-sequences between
stories do not apply. - The big-bang is just a story,one on many just as
possible stories.

Time-scales are just as crucial with the between - issue as are
storywise arising issues. There are no easy ways out ot the time-scale
issues.

Best, Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 9.11.2016 21:25:

Edwina, Kirsti, list,

I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more detail.

I came across a short passage by Gregory Bateson that clarifies the
issues. See the attached Bateson79.jpg, which is an excerpt from p. 2
of a book on biosemiotics (see below). Following is the critical point:

thinking in terms of stories must be shared by all mind or minds
whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea anemones...
A story is a little knot or complex of that species of
connectedness which we call relevance.

This observation is compatible with Peirce, but CSP used the term
'quasi-mind' to accommodate the species-bias of most humans:

CP 4.551

Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further
be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs
require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-
interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign
they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact
of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical
evolution of thought should be dialogic.

Re time: We have to distinguish (1) time as it is in reality
(whatever that may be); (2) time in our stories (which include the
formalized stories called physics); (3) the mental sequence of
thought; and (4) the logical sequence (dialogic) of connected signs.

The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called
Big Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S [not John S]
read them as BEFORE. In my reading, before the Big Bang, there was
Nothing, not even Platonic worlds.

This question is about time sequences in different kinds of stories:
the Big Bang story about what reality may be; and Platonic stories
about ideal, mathematical forms.

The time sequence of a mathematical story is independent of the time
sequence of a physical story. We may apply the math (for example,
the definitions, axioms, and proofs of a Platonic form) to the
construction of a physical story.

But that application is a mapping between two stories. The term
'prior to' is meaningful only *within* a story, not between stories.

In short, our "commonsense" notion of time is an abstraction from
the stories we tell about our experience. The time sequences in two
different stories may have some similarities, but we must distinguish
three distinct sequences: the time sequences of each story, and the
time sequence of the mapping, which is a kind of meta-story.

JFS

Does anyone know if [Peirce] had written anything about embedding
our universe in a hypothetical space of higher dimension?

I am most interested in knowing more on this.

David Finkelstein, p. 277 of the reference below:

Peirce seems to have included geometry in his evolutionism, at least
in principle... [He] seems not to have responded to the continuously-
evolving physical geometry of Riemann and Clifford... nor to
Einstein's

conceptual unification of space and time.

In any case, I think that the notion of time as an abstraction from
stories -- imaginary, factual, or theoretical -- provides a way of
relating different views. It also allows for metalevel reasoning
that can distinguish and relate different kinds of stories that
have independent time scales and sequences.

John

From Google books:

_A Legacy for Living Systems: Gregory Bateson as Precursor
to Biosemiotics_ edited by Jesper Hoffmeyer, Springer, 2008:
https://books.google.com/books?id=dcHqVpZ97pUC=PA246=PA246=Order+is+simply+thought+embodied+in+arrangement=bl=DQUnZlvOYu=X8bH0YAG597uwjyedB4dSf2BuC0=en=X=0ahUKEwizyZD88JrQAhVENxQKHeEeBwoQ6AEIHTAA#v=onepage=Order%20is%20simply%20thought%20embodied%20in%20arrangement=false

David R. Finkelstein, _Quantum Relativity: A Synthesis of the Ideas
of Heisenberg and Einstein_, Springer, 1996.
https://books.google.com/books?id=OvjsCAAAQBAJ=PA277=PA277=peirce+relativity=bl=0rc7kjxqIJ=Hsgtu9_LwZAoDxH7kbVgvWmAfiI=en=X=0ahUKEwihk4SzpZzQAhWF3YMKHR1kA5wQ6AEIHzAA#v=onepage=peirce%20relativity=false

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-09 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

My initial thought when I read your post was that your identification of
three different "kinds of time" might align nicely with the points of view
of the three Categories that Nicholas Guardiano adopted to analyze Peirce's
cosmogony in the paper that I linked yesterday in the thread on
"Super-Order and the Logic of Continuity."  However, after re-reading that
paper, I am not so sure; such an approach would result in the following
arrangement.

   - Imaginary time = Firstness perspective = continuum (3ns) -> Platonic
   worlds (1ns) -> existing universe (2ns).
   - Factual time = Secondness perspective = spontaneity (1ns) -> reaction
   (2ns) -> habit-taking (3ns).
   - Theoretical time = Thirdness perspective = chaos (1ns) -> process
   (3ns) -> regularity (2ns).

Guardiano specifically discusses temporality near the end of his paper, and
even singles out "the big bang theory" for criticism because of "its
temporal nature and the need for its explanatory cause prior in time."  By
contrast, he claims that Peirce's cosmology "avoids this problem" because
"Its cosmogonic stages … appear to be inherent logical implications of the
given facts of phenomena," which "all suggest a primordial reality that is
more than the same but merely earlier in time."

In fact, it seems to me that Guardiano's Secondness and Thirdness accounts
both have a temporal aspect, but his Firstness account does not.  The
Secondness perspective treats all three stages (1ns>2ns>3ns) as distinct
temporal events in the past, which is a specific reason that Peirce gave in
R 842 for being ultimately unsatisfied with it.  The Thirdness perspective
encompasses the entire scope of time, with the first stage (1ns) in the
infinite past, the second stage (3ns) ongoing, and the third stage (2ns) in
the infinite future.  The Firstness account places all three stages
(3ns>1ns>2ns) in the "past," but time itself does not actually begin until
the third stage (2ns).

With this in mind, it seems possible to integrate the three narratives.
Peirce's diagram makes it very clear that the continuum of highest
generality (clean blackboard) is primordial and underlies everything else
(3ns>1ns>2ns).  Both the Platonic worlds (merged collections of white marks
on the blackboard) and our existing universe (colored marks on one of the
resulting whiteboards) come about and continue to develop by means of
spontaneity, reaction, and habit-taking (1ns>2ns>3ns).  However, this
is a *temporal
*sequence only *within *our existing universe, and it *constitutes *the
ongoing process of its evolution from complete chaos to complete regularity
(1ns>3ns>2ns), which terminates if and when all habits become inveterate
such that there is only dead matter remaining.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Nov 9, 2016 at 1:25 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina, Kirsti, list,
>
> ET
>
>> I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more detail.
>>
>
> I came across a short passage by Gregory Bateson that clarifies the
> issues.  See the attached Bateson79.jpg, which is an excerpt from p. 2
> of a book on biosemiotics (see below). Following is the critical point:
>
> GB
>
>> thinking in terms of stories must be shared by all mind or minds
>> whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea anemones...
>> A story is a little knot or complex of that species of
>> connectedness which we call relevance.
>>
>
> This observation is compatible with Peirce, but CSP used the term
> 'quasi-mind' to accommodate the species-bias of most humans:
>
> CP 4.551
>
>> Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further
>> be declared that there can be no isolated sign.  Moreover, signs
>> require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-
>> interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
>> in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct.  In the Sign
>> they are, so to say, welded.  Accordingly, it is not merely a fact
>> of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical
>> evolution of thought should be dialogic.
>>
>
> Re time:  We have to distinguish (1) time as it is in reality
> (whatever that may be); (2) time in our stories (which include the
> formalized stories called physics); (3) the mental sequence of
> thought; and (4) the logical sequence (dialogic) of connected signs.
>
> ET
>
>> The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called
>> Big Bang?  I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S [not John S]
>> read them as BEFORE. In my reading, before the Big Bang, there was
>> Nothing, not even Platonic worlds.
>>
>
> This question is about time sequences in different kinds of stories:
> the Big Bang story about what reality may be; and Platonic stories
> about ideal, mathematical forms.
>
> The time sequence of a mathematical

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-09 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

John Sowa, Jon Awbrey, Edwina, List,

I wanted to see if anyone have might suggestions for thinking about the analogy 
between (1) mathematical models of the differentiation of spaces starting with 
a vague continuum of undifferentiated dimensions and trending towards spaces 
having determinate dimensions to (2) models for logic involving similar sorts 
of dimensions?  How might we understand processes of differentiation of 
dimensions in the case of logic?

John Sowa says:  We have to distinguish (1) time as it is in reality
(whatever that may be); (2) time in our stories (which include the
formalized stories called physics); (3) the mental sequence of
thought; and (4) the logical sequence (dialogic) of connected signs.

Let's focus on the (3) and (4). Recently, on the List, we've been examining 
what Peirce's says in the last lecture of Reasoning and the Logic of Things 
when he runs through a number of examples in mathematics (i.e., drawn largely 
from projective geometry, number theory and topology), and then attempts to 
clarify a logical conception of continuity.

Shortly thereafter, he indicates that he is trying to understand how the 
logical principles that govern our patterns of inference might be subject to an 
evolutionary process. I take him to making a comparison between how we might 
conceive of the relationship between mathematical systems with a continuum of 
vague dimensions--and how those might give rise to systems with more specific 
numbers of dimensions having a more definite character. One illustration that 
is offered involves the evolution of our experience of spatial dimensions where 
we find ourselves in a cave of odors. One idea I take him to be exploring is 
that the evolution of our subjective systems of logic (e.g. the way we sort out 
different subjects and predicates that are involved in the propositions found 
in the premisses and conclusions of an argument into a referential system 
having different dimensions) can be understood by making a comparison with how 
mathematical systems dimensions are related--ranging from those with a vague 
continuum of dimensions to those with determinate dimension. 

Do you have suggestions about how we might understand an analogy between models 
of the evolution of mathematical dimensions and logical dimensions? In the 
context of the later work on the EG, for instance, might we develop this 
analogy by thinking about a model in which books having many sheets (e.g., of 
interrogation, assertion, etc.) might evolve starting with those in which the 
dimensions are vague and continuous to those that are more determinate?

Turning to point (2) above, John Sowa seems to suggest that relations of 
relevance in context are quite fundamental for understanding how logical 
relations might have evolved (i.e., in either a subjective logic or an 
objective logic) How do such relations of relevance compare to relations of 
similarity and dissimilarity (e.g., what Peirce calls equiparance and 
disquiparance)? That is, do you have suggestions for thinking about the manner 
in which relations of relevance within a context might bear on the connections 
between vague predicates connected to indeterminate subjects arrayed in a book 
consisting of a vague continuum of sheets of interrogation and assertion?

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F Sowa [s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: Wednesday, November 9, 2016 12:25 PM
To: Edwina Taborsky; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, Kirsti, list,

ET
> I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more detail.

I came across a short passage by Gregory Bateson that clarifies the
issues.  See the attached Bateson79.jpg, which is an excerpt from p. 2
of a book on biosemiotics (see below). Following is the critical point:

GB
> thinking in terms of stories must be shared by all mind or minds
> whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea anemones...
> A story is a little knot or complex of that species of
> connectedness which we call relevance.

This observation is compatible with Peirce, but CSP used the term
'quasi-mind' to accommodate the species-bias of most humans:

CP 4.551
> Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further
> be declared that there can be no isolated sign.  Moreover, signs
> require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-
> interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
> in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct.  In the Sign
> they are, so to say, welded.  Accordingly, it is not merely a fact
> of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical
> evolution of thought should be dialogic.

Re time:  We have to distinguish (1) time as it is in reality
(whatever that may be);

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-09 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list:

From Aristotle, *Physics*:

“But we apprehend time only when we have marked motion, marking it by
‘before’ and ‘after’; and it is only when we have perceived ‘before’ and
‘after’ in motion that we say that time has elapsed.

Now we mark them by judging that A and B are different, and that some third
thing is intermediate to them. When we think of the extremes as different
from the middle and the mind pronounces that the ‘nows’ are two, one before
and one after, it is then that we say that there is time, and this that we
say is time. For what is bounded by the ‘now’ is thought to be time — we
may assume this.

On the other hand, when we do perceive a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, then we
say that there is time.

For time is just this — number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and
‘after’.”

one two three… C A B…  surprise matter of course suspect… still CP 5.189

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Wed, Nov 9, 2016 at 2:54 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> George Herbert Spencer? What was I thinking? I meant George Spencer Brown.
> Edwina
>
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-09 Thread Edwina Taborsky

George Herbert Spencer? What was I thinking? I meant George Spencer Brown. 


Edwina


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-09 Thread Edwina Taborsky


John FS; thanks for your comments. See mine below.







1] ET

I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more detail.



JFS: I came across a short passage by Gregory Bateson that clarifies the

issues.  See the attached Bateson79.jpg, which is an excerpt from p. 2
of a book on biosemiotics (see below). Following is the critical point:

GB

thinking in terms of stories must be shared by all mind or minds
whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea anemones...
A story is a little knot or complex of that species of
connectedness which we call relevance.


This observation is compatible with Peirce, but CSP used the term
'quasi-mind' to accommodate the species-bias of most humans:

CP 4.551

Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further
be declared that there can be no isolated sign.  Moreover, signs
require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-
interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct.  In the Sign
they are, so to say, welded.  Accordingly, it is not merely a fact
of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical
evolution of thought should be dialogic.


EDWINA: This pointing out for the necessity for dialogic interaction is 
comparable to George Herbert Spencer's comment in The Laws of Form about the 
'original act of severance' and the vital requirement of  'distinctions' and 
boundaries for interactive dialogue, where 'the world we know is constructed 
in order [and thus in such a way as to be able] to see itself" 105..where 
you have 'one state which sees and at least one other state which is seen" 
[ibid]


2)
JFS: Re time:  We have to distinguish (1) time as it is in reality

(whatever that may be); (2) time in our stories (which include the
formalized stories called physics); (3) the mental sequence of
thought; and (4) the logical sequence (dialogic) of connected signs.


EDWINA: I am impressed by the work of Koichiro Matsuno, who divides time 
into three phenomenological states - which can be compared with the three 
Peircean categories.
There is 'present' time - which can be compared with Firstness; the 
immediate, non-reflective, experience.
There is 'perfect' time - which is the familiar, Newtonian linear mechanical 
progression, which can be compared with Secondness.
And there is 'progressive time - which I see as 'past/future continuity 
[note; this is not experienced in itself in either present or perfect 
timesince it is a process-of-continuity of that matter/mind.] Obviously, 
this can be compared with Thirdness.



3)  ET

The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called
Big Bang?  I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S [not John S]
read them as BEFORE. In my reading, before the Big Bang, there was
Nothing, not even Platonic worlds.



JFS:  This question is about time sequences in different kinds of stories:

the Big Bang story about what reality may be; and Platonic stories
about ideal, mathematical forms.

The time sequence of a mathematical story is independent of the time
sequence of a physical story.  We may apply the math (for example,
the definitions, axioms, and proofs of a Platonic form) to the
construction of a physical story.

But that application is a mapping between two stories.  The term
'prior to' is meaningful only *within* a story, not between stories.


EDWINA: You are saying, I think, that different modes of time, eg, a 
mathematical analysis and a physical experience...have to be considered. The 
mathematical analysis might be in progressive time; while the physical 
experience is in both present and perfect time.


4) JFS:  In short, our "commonsense" notion of time is an abstraction from

the stories we tell about our experience.  The time sequences in two
different stories may have some similarities, but we must distinguish
three distinct sequences:  the time sequences of each story, and the
time sequence of the mapping, which is a kind of meta-story.


EDWINA: Agreed.


JFS

Does anyone know if [Peirce] had written anything about embedding
our universe in a hypothetical space of higher dimension?


KM

I am most interested in knowing more on this.


David Finkelstein, p. 277 of the reference below:

Peirce seems to have included geometry in his evolutionism, at least
in principle...  [He] seems not to have responded to the continuously-
evolving physical geometry of Riemann and Clifford... nor to Einstein's
conceptual unification of space and time.


In any case, I think that the notion of time as an abstraction from
stories -- imaginary, factual, or theoretical -- provides a way of
relating different views.  It also allows for metalevel reasoning
that can distinguish and relate different kinds of stories that
have independent time scales and sequences.

John


From Google books:

_A Legacy for Living Systems:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-09 Thread John F Sowa

Edwina, Kirsti, list,

I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more detail.

This observation is compatible with Peirce, but CSP used the term
'quasi-mind' to accommodate the species-bias of most humans:

CP 4.551

This question is about time sequences in different kinds of stories:
the Big Bang story about what reality may be; and Platonic stories
about ideal, mathematical forms.

But that application is a mapping between two stories. The term
'prior to' is meaningful only *within* a story, not between stories.

time sequence of the mapping, which is a kind of meta-story.

JFS

Does anyone know if [Peirce] had written anything about embedding
our universe in a hypothetical space of higher dimension?

I am most interested in knowing more on this.

David Finkelstein, p. 277 of the reference below:

John

From Google books:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-05 Thread kirstima


John, list,

Everyone seems to take the Big Bang hypothesis as granted. Still, it is 
just a hypothesis with meagre, if any evidence.


And John, a most interesting question you posed:

Does anyone know if he had written anything about embedding our 
universe in a hypothetical space of higher dimension?



 I am most interested in knowing more on this.

Best regards,

Kirsti Määttänen


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-05 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list:

I came across this portion of *Measure for Measure* by Shakespeare through
Peirce's *Man's Glassy Essence*.

I feel like this relates to the present discussion somehow but the
exactness is lost on me.  Not sure that a historicist reading is even
possible.

Any thoughts will be appreciated.

Takes note of what is done; and, like a prophet,
Looks in a glass, that shows what future evils…



but man, proud man,
Drest in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glassy essence, like an angry ape,
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
As make the angels weep; who, with our spleens,
Would all themselves laugh mortal.




Best,

Jerry R

On Sat, Nov 5, 2016 at 9:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon - you have missed my point. I said exactly the opposite of you when I
> said that people must read Peirce for themselves and come to their own
> conclusions.
>
> Instead, you have constantly, relentlessly,  pointed out to me that I am
> quite wrong in my own conclusions; that I have misread and misinterpreted
> Peirce and that your readings are the accurate ones. That is, you have not
> allowed me that right which you claim you do - to come to my own
> conclusions.
>
> Actually, no, I must say that I haven't sharpened my thinking when
> interacting with you; instead, I have been stunned by how you ignore
> various points I raise,  twist my words, nitpick semantics, inform me of my
> failings-to-understand and of your correct views - such that it becomes an
> exhausting dead-end. My deep failure is that I respond to you. And I'll
> respond to your final comment because it is so really ..bizarre but is
> indicative of the whole tone of our interaction. You wrote:
>
> Jon: I am always happy to give her the last word when I have nothing
> further to add.
>
> Don't you see how patronizing, how sanctimonious and smug that statement
> is? I know you don't - but, it's quite the 'put-down' to tell someone that
> their further arguments, after yours, are essentially irrelevant.
>
> OK - I declare that I won't engage further with you.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com>
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Sent:* Saturday, November 05, 2016 9:57 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Mike, List:
>
> I can definitely understand how some would find these discussions
> "tiresome," but almost simultaneously with your negative response, I
> received a private reply to the very same message from a "lurker" stating,
> "This is great, and offlist - just wanted you to know that I enjoyed this
> post and enjoy your posts in general."  As Peirce said, "Different people
> have such wonderfully different ways of thinking ..." (CP 6.462).
>
> I do not understand why my appeals to the List community's good judgment
> would bother you so much.  They are really no different from when Edwina
> has said (and I have agreed) that everyone must read Peirce for themselves
> and come to their own conclusions.  In any case, with all due respect,
> please do not try to dictate how I participate in the List.
>
> Finally, as I have said before, I sincerely appreciate Edwina for
> repeatedly forcing me to sharpen my thinking and argumentation, and I hope
> that her experience has been similar.  I am always happy to give her the
> last word when I have nothing further to add.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 10:49 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:
>
>> I suppose if everyone comments on these constant arguments as being
>> "tiresome" maybe we are approaching a community consensus of what
>> constitutes the sign for "tiresome" in a Peircean sense. I find it
>> interesting that Peirce held the ethics of all of this as separate from the
>> semiotic process.
>>
>> If you would, and this is directed specifically to Jon, please cease from
>> my perspective this practice:
>> On 11/4/2016 9:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> I frankly find it amusing that you think I am "upset and angry" about any
>> of this.  I am quite comfortable with my assessment here, and once again
>> leave it to the good judgment of the List community to separate the wheat
>> from the chaff.
>>
>> These are arguments that you and Edwina choose to pursue *ad i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-05 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Jon - you have missed my point. I said exactly the opposite of you when I said 
that people must read Peirce for themselves and come to their own conclusions.

Instead, you have constantly, relentlessly,  pointed out to me that I am quite 
wrong in my own conclusions; that I have misread and misinterpreted Peirce and 
that your readings are the accurate ones. That is, you have not allowed me that 
right which you claim you do - to come to my own conclusions.

Actually, no, I must say that I haven't sharpened my thinking when interacting 
with you; instead, I have been stunned by how you ignore various points I 
raise,  twist my words, nitpick semantics, inform me of my 
failings-to-understand and of your correct views - such that it becomes an 
exhausting dead-end. My deep failure is that I respond to you. And I'll respond 
to your final comment because it is so really ..bizarre but is indicative of 
the whole tone of our interaction. You wrote:

Jon: I am always happy to give her the last word when I have nothing further to 
add.

Don't you see how patronizing, how sanctimonious and smug that statement is? I 
know you don't - but, it's quite the 'put-down' to tell someone that their 
further arguments, after yours, are essentially irrelevant.

OK - I declare that I won't engage further with you. 

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Mike Bergman 
  Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 9:57 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Mike, List:


  I can definitely understand how some would find these discussions "tiresome," 
but almost simultaneously with your negative response, I received a private 
reply to the very same message from a "lurker" stating, "This is great, and 
offlist - just wanted you to know that I enjoyed this post and enjoy your posts 
in general."  As Peirce said, "Different people have such wonderfully different 
ways of thinking ..." (CP 6.462).


  I do not understand why my appeals to the List community's good judgment 
would bother you so much.  They are really no different from when Edwina has 
said (and I have agreed) that everyone must read Peirce for themselves and come 
to their own conclusions.  In any case, with all due respect, please do not try 
to dictate how I participate in the List.


  Finally, as I have said before, I sincerely appreciate Edwina for repeatedly 
forcing me to sharpen my thinking and argumentation, and I hope that her 
experience has been similar.  I am always happy to give her the last word when 
I have nothing further to add.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 10:49 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:

I suppose if everyone comments on these constant arguments as being 
"tiresome" maybe we are approaching a community consensus of what constitutes 
the sign for "tiresome" in a Peircean sense. I find it interesting that Peirce 
held the ethics of all of this as separate from the semiotic process.

If you would, and this is directed specifically to Jon, please cease from 
my perspective this practice:


On 11/4/2016 9:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

  Edwina, List: 


  I frankly find it amusing that you think I am "upset and angry" about any 
of this.  I am quite comfortable with my assessment here, and once again leave 
it to the good judgment of the List community to separate the wheat from the 
chaff.
These are arguments that you and Edwina choose to pursue ad infinitum. 
Please cease in asking readers of this list to either be on your side or not. 
My "good judgment" is to wish not to hear fruitless arguments pursued to 
exhaustion, looking for the last word, and certainly not be asked to weigh in 
(even in my own mind) on which tiresome argument holds sway.

Mike


--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-05 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Mike, List:

I can definitely understand how some would find these discussions
"tiresome," but almost simultaneously with your negative response, I
received a private reply to the very same message from a "lurker" stating,
"This is great, and offlist - just wanted you to know that I enjoyed this
post and enjoy your posts in general."  As Peirce said, "Different people
have such wonderfully different ways of thinking ..." (CP 6.462).

I do not understand why my appeals to the List community's good judgment
would bother you so much.  They are really no different from when Edwina
has said (and I have agreed) that everyone must read Peirce for themselves
and come to their own conclusions.  In any case, with all due respect,
please do not try to dictate how I participate in the List.

Finally, as I have said before, I sincerely appreciate Edwina for
repeatedly forcing me to sharpen my thinking and argumentation, and I hope
that her experience has been similar.  I am always happy to give her the
last word when I have nothing further to add.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 10:49 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> I suppose if everyone comments on these constant arguments as being
> "tiresome" maybe we are approaching a community consensus of what
> constitutes the sign for "tiresome" in a Peircean sense. I find it
> interesting that Peirce held the ethics of all of this as separate from the
> semiotic process.
>
> If you would, and this is directed specifically to Jon, please cease from
> my perspective this practice:
> On 11/4/2016 9:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> I frankly find it amusing that you think I am "upset and angry" about any
> of this.  I am quite comfortable with my assessment here, and once again
> leave it to the good judgment of the List community to separate the wheat
> from the chaff.
>
> These are arguments that you and Edwina choose to pursue *ad infinitum*.
> Please cease in asking readers of this list to either be on your side or
> not. My "good judgment" is to wish not to hear fruitless arguments pursued
> to exhaustion, looking for the last word, and certainly not be asked to
> weigh in (even in my own mind) on which tiresome argument holds sway.
>
> Mike
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Mike Bergman

Edwina

-
  Original Message - 
From:
  Jon Alan Schmidt 
To:
  Edwina
Taborsky 

  Cc:
Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L ; Helmut
  Raulien 
  Sent:
Friday, November 04, 2016 8:44 PM
          Subject:
    Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was
Peirce's Cosmology)

  Edwina, List:

  ET:  Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or
AFTER the so-called Big Bang?

I guess that depends how one understands
  the Big Bang.  You take it to be the beginning
  of everything; before the Big Bang,
  there was nothing.  The real question
  is, what would Peirce have taken it
  to be?  I think that the much more likely
  answer is when "this Universe of Actual
  Existence" emerged from "the whole universe of
  true and real possibilities" as "a
  discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn
  on the area of the blackboard" (NEM 4:345, RLT
  162).  So the Platonic worlds must have been before
  the Big Bang, because they come before
  the existence of our particular universe,
  and all of them but one have no connection
  with the latter whatsoever.

  ET:  But after, there were multiple
'chalk marks' - but only ONE set began to
take habits and became dominant, while the
others dissipated.

Where do you find this in CP 6.203-208? 
  Where in that passage does it say that only one
  set of chalk marks began to take habits? 
  On the contrary, it states quite plainly,
  "Many such reacting systems may spring up,"
  and that we are "to conceive that there are
  many" Platonic worlds.  Where does it say that
  one of these "became dominant" over the
  others?  Where does it suggest that any merged
  aggregation of chalk marks, having developed
  the habit of persistence, would have--or even
  could have--"dissipated"?  This is not a
  legitimate reading of the text, it is
  the imposition of a predetermined conceptual
  framework on it.

  ET:  I don't think that this dispute can
be 'settled' because we do read the texts
differently ...

We should not block the
  way of inquiry by assuming that, just because
  we read the texts differently, there is no
  correct (or incorrect) way to read the texts.

  ET:  ... but I do
think that we on the list should be aware
that there are different views on this issue

Do you really think
  that anyone on the List is not aware
  of this by now?

Regards,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

Your analysis completely ignores CP 6.206-208.  You claim that none of the
marks *ever *interact, and only *one *mark has staying power.  But Peirce
very clearly stated that *multiple *lines appear, persist, and together
form "a *new *line, the envelope of those others," such that they
"gradually tend to lose their individuality ...  Many such reacting systems
may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these may itself act
as a first line from which a larger system may be built, in which it in
turn will merge its individuality."  These larger systems are the many
"Platonic worlds," and it is not until *this *point in the story that out
of one of them "is differentiated the particular actual universe of
existence in which we happen to be."  *This *is where I place the Big
Bang--not "the development of 'staying power'" much earlier in the
narrative.

Peirce never confines the habit of persistence to one mark, or even one set
of marks.  He never says or implies that the many reacting systems or the
many Platonic worlds "dissipate" after they have developed the habit of
persistence--not even once our particular existing universe appears on the
scene.  Hence your "reading" is quite simply *not consistent with the text
itself*, which means that it is not a *reading *at all--it is your
imposition of a predetermined conceptual framework.  Do I have my own
biases?  Sure, but I readily acknowledge them, and I am making a good-faith
effort to understand *what Peirce meant* based on *what he actually wrote*.

I frankly find it amusing that you think I am "upset and angry" about any
of this.  I am quite comfortable with my assessment here, and once again
leave it to the good judgment of the List community to separate the wheat
from the chaff.

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 9:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, Gary R- I wrote this before -
>
> Peirce was quite explicit about the 'Zero, the Nothing'..see 1.412,
> 6.217.  I do not read this as a set of Platonic worlds, which, after all,
> have some identity. I read this state as 'absolutely undefined and
> unlimited possibility" 6.217.
>
> As I've said, i see the blackboard as POST Big Bang, with sudden flashes
> of chalkmarks on it...unrelated to each other"the mark is a mere
> accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another
> mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency between the
> two. But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a mark will
> *stay* for a little while; that is, until some beginning of a*  habit*
> has been established by virtue of which the accident acquires some
> incipient staying quality, some tendency toward consistency" 6.204.
>
> I read the above as Peirce outlining a POST BigBang number of 'possibles',
> which could be viewed as those Platonic ideas...but...'no progress beyond
> this can be made...until ONE mark will *stay* for a while; i.e., takes on
> Thirdness..and this establishes our particular physico-chemical universe.
>
> So- my reading of this is that many 'marks' [possible world modes] can
> emerge but have no *staying* power...until one such mark DOES develop
> this power..and as such..its consistency makes it dominant as our
> universe's typology of matter/mind.
>
> I am not referring to any 'merged' set of chalkmarks - I am simply reading
> the texts as they are.
> And again - I don't see that the development of 'staying power', which
> develops within Thirdness can be defined as 'the Big Bang'. The 'Big Bang'
> is not Thirdness! Therefore, I don't see that these chalkmarks are Pre-Big
> Bang, but I read them as POST Big Bang.
>
> And Jon - don't you have YOUR set of biases within which you read the
> texts? Of course, others are aware that we interpret the texts differently.
> I suppose I'm trying to say that I really wonder why you are so upset and
> angry about the fact that others don't always accept your view and your
> analysis.
>
> I repeat - others may read these texts in a different interpretation, but,
> there is no need for anger at such differences. And - I don't think that we
> can come to a definitive answer among the few on this list who actually
> comment...
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L
> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 8:44 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Jerry Rhee

Edwina, list:

"I do not understand you," is the phrase of an angry man.

*http://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.html
<http://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.html>*

Hth,
Jerry R

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 9:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, Gary R- I wrote this before -
>
> Peirce was quite explicit about the 'Zero, the Nothing'..see 1.412,
> 6.217.  I do not read this as a set of Platonic worlds, which, after all,
> have some identity. I read this state as 'absolutely undefined and
> unlimited possibility" 6.217.
>
> As I've said, i see the blackboard as POST Big Bang, with sudden flashes
> of chalkmarks on it...unrelated to each other"the mark is a mere
> accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another
> mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency between the
> two. But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a mark will
> *stay* for a little while; that is, until some beginning of a*  habit*
> has been established by virtue of which the accident acquires some
> incipient staying quality, some tendency toward consistency" 6.204.
>
> I read the above as Peirce outlining a POST BigBang number of 'possibles',
> which could be viewed as those Platonic ideas...but...'no progress beyond
> this can be made...until ONE mark will *stay* for a while; i.e., takes on
> Thirdness..and this establishes our particular physico-chemical universe.
>
> So- my reading of this is that many 'marks' [possible world modes] can
> emerge but have no *staying* power...until one such mark DOES develop
> this power..and as such..its consistency makes it dominant as our
> universe's typology of matter/mind.
>
> I am not referring to any 'merged' set of chalkmarks - I am simply reading
> the texts as they are.
> And again - I don't see that the development of 'staying power', which
> develops within Thirdness can be defined as 'the Big Bang'. The 'Big Bang'
> is not Thirdness! Therefore, I don't see that these chalkmarks are Pre-Big
> Bang, but I read them as POST Big Bang.
>
> And Jon - don't you have YOUR set of biases within which you read the
> texts? Of course, others are aware that we interpret the texts differently.
> I suppose I'm trying to say that I really wonder why you are so upset and
> angry about the fact that others don't always accept your view and your
> analysis.
>
> I repeat - others may read these texts in a different interpretation, but,
> there is no need for anger at such differences. And - I don't think that we
> can come to a definitive answer among the few on this list who actually
> comment...
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L
> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 8:44 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big Bang?
>
>
> I guess that depends how one understands the Big Bang.  You take it to be
> the beginning of *everything*; before the Big Bang, there was *nothing*.
> The real question is, what would *Peirce *have taken it to be?  I think
> that the much more likely answer is when "this Universe of Actual
> Existence" emerged from "the whole universe of true and real possibilities"
> as "a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of the
> blackboard" (NEM 4:345, RLT 162).  So the Platonic worlds must have been 
> *before
> *the Big Bang, because they come *before *the existence of our *particular
> *universe, and all of them but one have *no connection* with the latter
> whatsoever.
>
> ET:  But after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set began
> to take habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.
>
>
> Where do you find this in CP 6.203-208?  Where in that passage does it say
> that only *one *set of chalk marks began to take habits?  On the
> contrary, it states quite plainly, "Many such reacting systems may spring
> up," and that we are "to conceive that there are many" Platonic worlds.
> Where does it say that one of these "became dominant" over the others?
> Where does it suggest that *any *merged aggregation of chalk marks,
> having developed the habit of persistence, would have--or even could
> have--"dissipated"?  This is not a legitimate *reading *of the text, it
> is the imposition of a predetermined conceptual framework on it.
>
> ET

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon, Gary R- I wrote this before - 

Peirce was quite explicit about the 'Zero, the Nothing'..see 1.412, 6.217.  I 
do not read this as a set of Platonic worlds, which, after all, have some 
identity. I read this state as 'absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility" 
6.217.

As I've said, i see the blackboard as POST Big Bang, with sudden flashes of 
chalkmarks on it...unrelated to each other"the mark is a mere accident, and 
as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another mark drawn in quite 
another way. There need be no consistency between the two. But no further 
progress beyond this can be made, until a mark will stay for a little while; 
that is, until some beginning of a  habit has been established by virtue of 
which the accident acquires some incipient staying quality, some tendency 
toward consistency" 6.204.

I read the above as Peirce outlining a POST BigBang number of 'possibles', 
which could be viewed as those Platonic ideas...but...'no progress beyond this 
can be made...until ONE mark will stay for a while; i.e., takes on 
Thirdness..and this establishes our particular physico-chemical universe.

So- my reading of this is that many 'marks' [possible world modes] can emerge 
but have no staying power...until one such mark DOES develop this power..and as 
such..its consistency makes it dominant as our universe's typology of 
matter/mind.

I am not referring to any 'merged' set of chalkmarks - I am simply reading the 
texts as they are. 
And again - I don't see that the development of 'staying power', which develops 
within Thirdness can be defined as 'the Big Bang'. The 'Big Bang' is not 
Thirdness! Therefore, I don't see that these chalkmarks are Pre-Big Bang, but I 
read them as POST Big Bang. 

And Jon - don't you have YOUR set of biases within which you read the texts? Of 
course, others are aware that we interpret the texts differently. I suppose I'm 
trying to say that I really wonder why you are so upset and angry about the 
fact that others don't always accept your view and your analysis. 

I repeat - others may read these texts in a different interpretation, but, 
there is no need for anger at such differences. And - I don't think that we can 
come to a definitive answer among the few on this list who actually comment...

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L ; Helmut Raulien 
  Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 8:44 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


ET:  Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big Bang?


  I guess that depends how one understands the Big Bang.  You take it to be the 
beginning of everything; before the Big Bang, there was nothing.  The real 
question is, what would Peirce have taken it to be?  I think that the much more 
likely answer is when "this Universe of Actual Existence" emerged from "the 
whole universe of true and real possibilities" as "a discontinuous mark--like a 
line figure drawn on the area of the blackboard" (NEM 4:345, RLT 162).  So the 
Platonic worlds must have been before the Big Bang, because they come before 
the existence of our particular universe, and all of them but one have no 
connection with the latter whatsoever.


ET:  But after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set began 
to take habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.


  Where do you find this in CP 6.203-208?  Where in that passage does it say 
that only one set of chalk marks began to take habits?  On the contrary, it 
states quite plainly, "Many such reacting systems may spring up," and that we 
are "to conceive that there are many" Platonic worlds.  Where does it say that 
one of these "became dominant" over the others?  Where does it suggest that any 
merged aggregation of chalk marks, having developed the habit of persistence, 
would have--or even could have--"dissipated"?  This is not a legitimate reading 
of the text, it is the imposition of a predetermined conceptual framework on it.


ET:  I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read 
the texts differently ...


  We should not block the way of inquiry by assuming that, just because we read 
the texts differently, there is no correct (or incorrect) way to read the texts.


ET:  ... but I do think that we on the list should be aware that there are 
different views on this issue


  Do you really think that anyone on the List is not aware of this by now?


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Gary R, Helmut:

The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEF

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

ET:  Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big Bang?

I guess that depends how one understands the Big Bang.  You take it to be
the beginning of *everything*; before the Big Bang, there was *nothing*.
The real question is, what would *Peirce *have taken it to be?  I think
that the much more likely answer is when "this Universe of Actual
Existence" emerged from "the whole universe of true and real possibilities"
as "a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of the
blackboard" (NEM 4:345, RLT 162).  So the Platonic worlds must have
been *before
*the Big Bang, because they come *before *the existence of our
*particular *universe,
and all of them but one have *no connection* with the latter whatsoever.

ET:  But after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set began
to take habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.

Where do you find this in CP 6.203-208?  Where in that passage does it say
that only *one *set of chalk marks began to take habits?  On the contrary,
it states quite plainly, "Many such reacting systems may spring up," and
that we are "to conceive that there are many" Platonic worlds.  Where does
it say that one of these "became dominant" over the others?  Where does it
suggest that *any *merged aggregation of chalk marks, having developed the
habit of persistence, would have--or even could have--"dissipated"?  This
is not a legitimate *reading *of the text, it is the imposition of a
predetermined conceptual framework on it.

ET:  I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read
the texts differently ...

We should not block the way of inquiry by assuming that, just because we
read the texts differently, there is no correct (or incorrect) way to read
the texts.

ET:  ... but I do think that we on the list should be aware that there are
different views on this issue

Do you really think that anyone on the List is *not *aware of this by now?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, Helmut:
>
> The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big
> Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S read them as BEFORE. In
> my reading, before the BigBang, there was Nothing, not even Platonic
> worlds. But after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set
> began to take habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.
>
> I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read the
> texts differently, but I do think that we on the list should be aware that
> there are different views on this issue.
>
> Edwina
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, Helmut, Jon S, Jeff, John, Clark, List,

In a passage preceding the one I recently quoted twice, Peirce writes:

[A]s a rule the continuum has been derived from a more general continuum, a
continnum of higher generality.

>From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe with all
its arbitrary secondness is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary
determination, of a world of ideas, a Platonic world [. . .] [Note: *not* an
existential world but "a world of ideas, a Platonic world."]

If that is correct, we cannot suppose the process of derivation, a process
which extends from before time and from before logic, we cannot suppose
that it began elsewhere than in the utter vagueness of completely
undetermined and dimensionless potentiality. [Note: "before time" in "utter
vagueness" not of nothing but of "completely undetermined and
dimensionsless potentiality."]

The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the *existing
universe*, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves
have become or are becoming developed. [Note: the topic here is of an
evolutionary process *not *merely "of the *existing universe,*" emphasis in
the original.]

We shall naturally suppose, of course, that existence is a stage of
evolution. *This existence* is presumably but a special *existence*. We
need not suppose that every form needs for its evolution to emerge into
this world, but only that it needs to enter into *some* theater of
reactions of which it is one. [Note:
*This existence* is presumably but a special *existence;"* further*, *consider
the language he uses of the possibility of emerging *not* into this
world--our Universe--but merely "*some* theater of reactions"--I have
commented elsewhere that this suggests a possibly multi-universe theory. GR]

The evolution of forms begins, or at any rate, has for an early stage of
it, a vague potentiaility, and that either is or is followed by a continuum
of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the individual
dimensions to be distinct. It must be a contraction of the vagueness of
that potentiality of *everything in general and of nothing in particular* that
the world of forms comes forth. [emphasis added, RLT, 259]

So, as I read this, it is not here a matter of 'nothing at all' as Edwina
claims, but the "potentiality of everything in general and nothing in
paritcular" that is still but merely the ground from which, *not* this
*existential
world*, but "the world of forms" can emerge. I'd call that *way *pre-Big
Bang.

One can, I suppose, try to position these comments within the procrustean
bed of *our* special, existential, post-Big Bang  world in which Edwina
would try to fit it, but to me such a reading flies in the face of this
passage, the one I was earlier quoting, the whole of this lecture, and much
else that Peirce wrote (including, the N.A.)

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Gary R, Helmut:
>
> The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big
> Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S read them as BEFORE. In
> my reading, before the BigBang, there was Nothing, not even Platonic
> worlds. But after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set
> began to take habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.
>
> I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read the
> texts differently, but I do think that we on the list should be aware that
> there are different views on this issue.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 4:04 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Helmut, List,
>
> Whatever you or Edwina may think, whatever the 'truth' of the matter may
> prove to be (if any such proof were possible, which I greatly doubt),
> Peirce wrote *this* (embedded in an argument which makes his position--
> that there is a Platonic cosmos from which this, shall we say, Aristotelian
> one issues--quite clear).
>
> Peirce: "[A]ll this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the
> existing universe,* but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are,
> therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and
> subordinated to one another until *finally one of these Platonic worlds
> is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we
> happen to be*." (RLT, 263, emphasis added).
>

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Gary R, Helmut:

The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big 
Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S read them as BEFORE. In my 
reading, before the BigBang, there was Nothing, not even Platonic worlds. But 
after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set began to take 
habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.

I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read the texts 
differently, but I do think that we on the list should be aware that there are 
different views on this issue.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 4:04 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Helmut, List,


  Whatever you or Edwina may think, whatever the 'truth' of the matter may 
prove to be (if any such proof were possible, which I greatly doubt), Peirce 
wrote this (embedded in an argument which makes his position-- that there is a 
Platonic cosmos from which this, shall we say, Aristotelian one issues--quite 
clear).


Peirce: "[A]ll this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing 
universe, but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are, therefore, to 
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another 
until finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular 
actual universe of existence in which we happen to be." (RLT, 263, emphasis 
added).


  The immediate question as I see it is: How did Peirce conceive of this 
matter? I would highly recommend that anyone looking into that question read 
carefully RLT, esp. 261-264.



  Best,


  Gary R








  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

Edwina, list,
I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with 
Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I guess, 
that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of everything, such as 
philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of metaphors, whatever. So 
there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big bang is said to be not only 
the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you suggest a meta-time, in a 
meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning is merely postponed to that: 
Did the meta-universe come from a meta-big-bang? I only have two possible 
explanations for this problem of origin/beginning: Either there was no 
beginning/creation, and no big bang (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe 
some weeks ago) , or there is a circle of creation, like: A creates B, B 
creates C, C creates A. But this would mean, that creation is atemporal, 
otherwise it would not work. But I like it, and maybe it is good for some quite 
funny science-fiction story. But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is 
everywhere, is "God", and it forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop! 
This is getting weird, I have to think some more about it first.
Best,
Helmut
  
 04. November 2016 um 19:44 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
 
Gary R - again, it is my strong sense that I am accurately representing 
Peirce's views on this issue. I don't see that I disagree with him at all - but 
I do disagree with you and Jon on this issue [and, obviously, on theistic 
issues as well]. 

That is - I don't see a Nothing, which is to say, the pre BigBang world, as 
a set of Platonic worlds. If this were the case, then, it would not be nothing 
but would be sets of ideal potentialities. Instead,  it is nothing, 'pure 
zero', pure freedom, no variety of Platonic worlds which after all, establish 
different perspectives, it is "absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility' 
...not a SET of Platonic worlds. [1.412, 6.217]. 

Then, with the BigBang, this set up the Blackboard 'the original vague 
potentiality' and moved into that set of multiple possible Platonic worlds 
within the phase of Firstness and Secondness. At this time, these 'bits' were 
without habits [Thirdness] - that's what provides them with their potentiality; 
it is possible that many chalkmarks appeared. "Many such reacting systems 
may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these may itself acts as a 
first line from which a larger system may be built, in which it in turn will 
merge its individuality" 6.207.  This is POST BigBang.

With these multiple sets - the universe could have gone anywhere; some of 
those 'bits' could have dissipated; others could have emerged; some could have 
stayed. But THEN - came the development of habits, Thirdness - and these habits 
established our particular world rather than one of the oth

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, list,

Yes, that is what I suspect too: It is not about chronologic: Creation, God, necessity, causality. Due to our limited human experience we cannot see these things other than in time flow, chronologically, so likely with a beginning. But maybe causation and time flow are not so strictly connected with each other as we think! Maybe they are two different things, that merely happen to occur parallelly just for us, but not necessarily for, like, God, or whoever.

Best,

Helmut

Freitag, 04. November 2016 um 21:42 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, List:

The Big Bang is called a "singularity" because it is the point in the past when the mathematical equations that scientists currently take as governing our existing universe break down; i.e., the event when those laws of nature came into being, assuming that they have remained essentially unchanged since then. (Peirce, of course, held that they have evolved, and are still subject to minute spontaneous variations.) Consequently, as Gary R. has been highlighting by quoting CP 6.208, if the Big Bang has a place in Peirce's cosmology at all, it can only correspond to the beginning of our existing universe. Everything that comes before that in Peirce's blackboard narrative--the blackboard itself, the initial chalk mark, the aggregation of multiple marks into reacting systems, and the merging of those systems into larger Platonic worlds--must precede the Big Bang. Now, granted, since the Big Bang corresponds to the beginning of time, "precede" has to be taken in some way other than strictly chronologically; but as Clark Goble has affirmed, this problem of language arises no matter what words we use when trying to discuss things "before" time began. The only way to avoid the kind of circularity that you describe below is to recognize the necessity of necessary Being--Ens necessarium--which Peirce explicitly identified as God in "A Neglected Argument."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 2:52 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Edwina, list,

I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I guess, that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of everything, such as philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of metaphors, whatever. So there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big bang is said to be not only the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you suggest a meta-time, in a meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning is merely postponed to that: Did the meta-universe come from a meta-big-bang? I only have two possible explanations for this problem of origin/beginning: Either there was no beginning/creation, and no big bang (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe some weeks ago) , or there is a circle of creation, like: A creates B, B creates C, C creates A. But this would mean, that creation is atemporal, otherwise it would not work. But I like it, and maybe it is good for some quite funny science-fiction story. But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is everywhere, is "God", and it forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop! This is getting weird, I have to think some more about it first.

Best,

Helmut

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Gary R, Jon S, List,

The pages you and Jon are examining (RLT 261-4) are quite challenging. The 
guiding aims of the lecture, he tells us on the first page, are (1) to work out 
the logical difficulties involved in the conception of continuity, and then (2) 
to address the metaphysical difficulties associated with the conception. What 
is needed, he says, is a better method of reasoning about continuity in 
philosophy generally.

It looks to me like the mathematical survey of the relationships he notes 
between topology, projective geometry and metrical geometries are being used to 
set up the arguments. Likewise, the phenomenological thought experiment 
involving the cave of odors is also doing some work.

The mathematical examples he offers are meant, I am supposing, to offer us with 
some nice case studies that we can use to study the methods that have been 
taking shape in the 19th century in order to handle mathematical questions 
about continuity in topology and projective geometry. One goal of this 
discussion, I assume, is to analyze these examples in order to see how those 
mathematical methods might be applied to the logical difficulties involved in 
working with the conception.

Then, the phenomenological experiment is designed as an exercise that helps to 
limber us up for the challenges we face. The goal is to provide us with some 
exercises of the imagination in which we are being asked to explore 
arrangements of odors in spaces that are markedly different from our typical 
experience of how things that are spatially arranged. One of the key ideas, I 
believe, is that this imaginative exploration does not involve any kind of 
optical ray of light or any physical straight bar that might be used to apply 
projective or metrical standards to the spatial arrangements.

The big conclusion he draws from both the mathematical and phenomenological 
investigations is logical in character: "A continuum may have any discrete 
multitude of dimensions whatsoever. If the multiude of dimensions surpasses all 
discrete multitudes there cease to be any distinct dimensions. I have not as 
yet obtained any logically distinct conception of such a continuum. 
Provisionally, I identify it with the uralt vague generality of the most 
abstract potentiality." (253-4) On page 257, he makes the transition from the 
attempt to draw on mathematics and phenomenology for the sake of addressing the 
logical difficulties associated with the concept of continuity, and the then 
takes up the metaphysical difficulties.

Before turning to the questions of theological metaphysics that he takes up on 
258-9 or the example of the diagrams on the blackboard shortly thereafter, let 
me ask a question. In the Additament to the Neglected Argument, he makes use of 
the conception of Super-order. I am wondering if there is anything in his 
discussion of mathematics and phenomenology in the first part of this last 
lecture in RLT that might help us to clarify this conception of Super-order? 
What I'd like to do is to work towards a more adequate understanding of that 
conception and then see if it could be used to shed some light on the points he 
is making on pages 258-64--or vice versa.

--Jeff









Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 4, 2016 1:04 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Helmut, List,

Whatever you or Edwina may think, whatever the 'truth' of the matter may prove 
to be (if any such proof were possible, which I greatly doubt), Peirce wrote 
this (embedded in an argument which makes his position-- that there is a 
Platonic cosmos from which this, shall we say, Aristotelian one issues--quite 
clear).

Peirce: "[A]ll this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing 
universe, but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are, therefore, to 
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another 
until finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular 
actual universe of existence in which we happen to be." (RLT, 263, emphasis 
added).

The immediate question as I see it is: How did Peirce conceive of this matter? 
I would highly recommend that anyone looking into that question read carefully 
RLT, esp. 261-264.

Best,

Gary R


[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Helmut Raulien 
<h.raul...@gmx.de<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:
Edwina, list,
I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with 
Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I guess, 
that "singularity" is not only a matter of physi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread John F Sowa


On 11/4/2016 12:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

JFS:  But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time thereafter,
there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and interpret
that existence.  But there was a physical kind of monadic and dyadic
pre-semiosis.


ET: I don't know that analytic perception/interpretation is necessary
for Thirdness. As Mike Bergman just pointed out, 'Mind' operates in
physico-chemical matter. Therefore, I'd claim that Thirdness, which I'll
define as the process of generating and using habits, i.e., habits of
morphology - emerges at the same time as Firstness and Secondness.


The potential for Thirdness would emerge at the instant of the
Big Bang.  But nothing could interpret that potential Thirdness
as Thirdness until some mind or quasi-mind came into existence.

For a collection of articles on "protosemiosis" and related issues,
http://www.uni-kassel.de/upress/online/frei/978-3-933146-63-2.volltext.frei.pdf

General consensus:  It's debatable -- and they debated it.


JFS: [The line called supertime] exists only in our 100-D hypothesis.



ET: Interesting - and I wish we could get into the analysis of
time in more detail.


Peirce understood the notion of spaces of arbitrarily many dimensions,
since he had edited his father's book on linear algebra -- and he had
discovered and added new theorems about them in the new edition.

He also understood the issues of relating different coordinate systems,
and he considered it likely that our universe is not Euclidean.

Does anyone know if he had written anything about embedding our
universe in a hypothetical space of higher dimension?

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Clark Goble

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:46 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos pre-the Big Bang 
> (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't really 
> bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I used the 
> modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language do we have 
> to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last lecture of the 
> 1898 Reasoning and the Logic of Things from this, our, existential one?) 
> contra a more Aristotelian cosmos once there exists a, shall we say, 
> particular three category semiosic universe might be helpful in  moving this 
> discussion forward. So, my question: Are these two different? If so, how so? 
> If not, why not?

For Peirce the platonic forms clearly are potentialities. Much as in the 
Platonists you have forms becoming more differentiated or limited. To the 
Platonists this is emanation. While I’ll confess I don’t quite grasp the 
absolute transitions between the three worlds of Plotinus and related 
neoPlatonists it seems likely Peirce is following something similar. So for the 
Platonist the world of soul or spirit involves time and mediation and is 
roughly Peirce’s thirdness. Souls as moving essences generate the material and 
phenomenal world. 

It’s worth noting that there isn’t a single platonic view here. Rather there’s 
lots of related views of how to deal with the emanations. I’m quite sure Peirce 
had read Proclus, Plotinus and possibly Iamblicus and Pseudo-Dionysius. Yet as 
Soren mentioned Schelling also can’t be neglected here. Again his commentary on 
the Timaeus probably is relevant particularly for RLT.

The simple view is that Peirce just recognizes the difference between 
possibility (treated as real in his mature thought) and actuality. Aristotle’s 
own universe is a tad more complex than you suggest since prime matter plays 
such an important role. And it’s this reconciling Aristotle and Plato with 
prime matter as pure differentiation that I confess I find interesting in 
Peirce. This is a matter (forgive the pun) Peirce doesn’t address much in his 
mature thought. It’s mainly in his earlier more Kantian period that it pops up. 
While I recognize people here don’t like him too much, I think that Derrida’s 
notion of différance is something he picks up out of Peirce’s conception of the 
symbol and ends up being this neoPlatonic/Aristotilean prime matter. In turn 
this becomes quite important for understanding type-token repetition which was 
such a concern in Continental Philosophy in the 50’s and 60’s. (Not just 
Derrida but also Deleuze and others)

I bring this up because if we’re going to talk about the logical pre-material 
order we’re getting into places Peirce isn’t necessarily explicit (or at least 
clear). It’s also places where I think people have extended Peirce following 
his logic. In particular in thirdness within his mature phase we have to ask 
what differentiates the triadic parts enabling a triad? That sounds obvious and 
not important until one stops to think about it long. When the sign indicates 
its object by a hint that implies a space of some sort. Within temporal 
situated signs that’s partially due to time but there must a logical gap too or 
a spacing. So Peirce’s weather vane example functions because there’s a logical 
gap between the material vane and the wind. That difference always must precede 
the sign.

This difference isn’t the nothing that Jon and Edwina are disputing. That’s a 
kind of positively acting potential of potentiality. (Roughly akin to the 
Platonic One) This difference is a logically previous ‘substance’ that must be 
there for signs to be signs. It’s prime matter or if we return again to the 
Timaeus it is pure logical space or receptical. (Khora)

So before the big bang in its physical sense there must be possibility with the 
big bang in one interpretation merely being the event of actualization. 
(Especially if we consider it in a General Relativity conception as the 
emergence of a four dimensions block universe — of course things are trickier 
in quantum mechanics but then so too is the existence of a big bang) But this 
possibility must come from something so too must the place for the possibility 
to become actual. Again if we think of the big bang as the emergence of a four 
dimensional space ‘all at once’ then what is the place where this is able to 
appear? The possibility of possibility and the possibility of place must 
pre-‘exist’ the big bang. 

Which again is just the traditional Platonic story of the Timaeus by way of 
Aristotle. And again I’m not saying I agree with any of this. Although it is 
nice to know all that platonism I read back in the 90’s that had seemed 
pointless for so long is finally being worth something.

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Helmut, List:

The Big Bang is called a "singularity" because it is the point in the past
when the mathematical equations that scientists currently take as governing
our existing universe break down; i.e., the event when those laws of nature
came into being, *assuming *that they have remained essentially unchanged
since then.  (Peirce, of course, held that they have *evolved*, and are
still subject to minute spontaneous variations.)  Consequently, as Gary R.
has been highlighting by quoting CP 6.208, if the Big Bang has a place in
Peirce's cosmology *at all*, it can *only *correspond to the beginning of
our *existing *universe.  Everything that comes *before *that in Peirce's
blackboard narrative--the blackboard itself, the initial chalk mark, the
aggregation of multiple marks into reacting systems, and the merging of
those systems into larger Platonic worlds--must *precede *the Big Bang.
Now, granted, since the Big Bang corresponds to the *beginning *of time,
"precede" has to be taken in some way other than strictly chronologically;
but as Clark Goble has affirmed, this problem of language arises no matter
what words we use when trying to discuss things "before" time began.  The
only way to avoid the kind of circularity that you describe below is to
recognize the necessity of necessary Being--*Ens necessarium*--which Peirce
explicitly identified as God in "A Neglected Argument."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 2:52 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Edwina, list,
> I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with
> Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I
> guess, that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of
> everything, such as philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of
> metaphors, whatever. So there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big
> bang is said to be not only the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you
> suggest a meta-time, in a meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning
> is merely postponed to that: Did the meta-universe come from a
> meta-big-bang? I only have two possible explanations for this problem of
> origin/beginning: Either there was no beginning/creation, and no big bang
> (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe some weeks ago) , or there is a
> circle of creation, like: A creates B, B creates C, C creates A. But this
> would mean, that creation is atemporal, otherwise it would not work. But I
> like it, and maybe it is good for some quite funny science-fiction story.
> But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is everywhere, is "God", and it
> forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop! This is getting weird, I
> have to think some more about it first.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

t; emergence of matter/mind...and are not separate from it.
>
> Therefore - you and Jon, and others, may certainly reject my reading of
> Peirce, just as I reject yours and Jon's - but, I don't think we are at the
> stage where we can definitely say that only ONE reading is The Accurate
> One. I offer my reading; some on the list may agree; some may not. That is
> as far as a scholarly list can go, I think.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 1:55 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, Jon S, List,
>
> I certainly do not intend to get into a long (or even a short) discussion
> with you, Edwina, on this as both your position and Jon's (and mine) have
> been rather thoroughly and repeatedly articulated. I must say, however,
> that I do not see your "reading" of the blackboard passages as 'fair
> minded' at all, but rather it seems to me to impose your own conceptual
> framework on Peirce's very different one.
>
> For example, at RLT, 263, in the midst of the long and complex blackboard
> discussion, RLT, 261-4, which blackboard Peirce himself refers to as "a
> sort of Diagram of the original vague potentiality," RLT, 261), he comments
> (and I've pointed to this passage before):
>
>
> "[A]ll this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the existing
> universe,* but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are, therefore, to
> conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one
> another until *finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the
> particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be*." (RLT,
> 263, emphasis added).
>
>
> Now you may disagree with Peirce in this matter, but this is what he
> wrote--the blackboard diagram would seem to represent what he no doubt
> believed to be the character of the cosmos *before* "one of these
> Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of
> existence in which we happen to be," that is, before what corresponds to
> the Big Bang.
>
> It is my strong sense that Jon has consistently accurately presented
> Peirce's views as they appear in the 1898 lecture, and that your remarks
> *contra* his do not represent Peirce's clearly articulated views (as, for
> example, given in the quotation above), but rather your own. They seem to
> me less an interpretation than a misreading of Peirce, one which your
> conceptual framework apparently requires.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690*
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>>
>> Gary R, list:
>>
>> Well, I consider myself a 'fair-minded reader of Peirce' and I certainly
>> don't agree with Jon S's view that the blackboard is pre-Big Bang and that
>> the three Categories are pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial.
>>
>> Of course the blackboard is a metaphor - set out as a diagram...but that
>> diagram is a metaphor of what we assume is that 'original vague
>> potentiality or at any rate of some early stage of its determination'.
>> 6.203. As I said in my earlier post today, my reading is that this
>> blackboard is POST Big Bang, which is why it is a 'continuum of some
>> indefinite multitude of dimensions'. 6.203. This is NOT the same as the
>> pre  Big Bang Zeroness - which is NOTHING.
>>
>> And by 'continuum', I certainly don't see this as Thirdness, for
>> Thirdness is a continuum of *some particular habits*, not just a
>> 'continuum and certainly not of 'indefinite multitude of dimensions. The
>> very nature of Thirdness is its function to constrain novelty and insert
>> morphological habits.
>>
>> As for quibbling about whether the chalk mark is a point or a line -
>> that's irrelevant. It is a unique 'bit' of matter/mind - that is
>> differentiated from what-it-is-not ["the limit between the black surface
>> and the white surface} 6.203].  It's the differentiation from
>> 'what-it-is-not' that is important, for this is obviously Secondness.
>>
>> The first chalkmark exhibits only Firstness [its novel appearance] and
>> Secondness [its differentiation from the blackness] but would only exhibit
>> Thirdness if it stayed 'as it is' and if other chalkmarks appear and they
>> deve

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Helmut Raulien


Edwina, list,

I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I guess, that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of everything, such as philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of metaphors, whatever. So there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big bang is said to be not only the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you suggest a meta-time, in a meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning is merely postponed to that: Did the meta-universe come from a meta-big-bang? I only have two possible explanations for this problem of origin/beginning: Either there was no beginning/creation, and no big bang (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe some weeks ago) , or there is a circle of creation, like: A creates B, B creates C, C creates A. But this would mean, that creation is atemporal, otherwise it would not work. But I like it, and maybe it is good for some quite funny science-fiction story. But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is everywhere, is "God", and it forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop! This is getting weird, I have to think some more about it first.

Best,

Helmut

 

 04. November 2016 um 19:44 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
 



Gary R - again, it is my strong sense that I am accurately representing Peirce's views on this issue. I don't see that I disagree with him at all - but I do disagree with you and Jon on this issue [and, obviously, on theistic issues as well]. 

 

That is - I don't see a Nothing, which is to say, the pre BigBang world, as a set of Platonic worlds. If this were the case, then, it would not be nothing but would be sets of ideal potentialities. Instead,  it is nothing, 'pure zero', pure freedom, no variety of Platonic worlds which after all, establish different perspectives, it is "absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility' ...not a SET of Platonic worlds. [1.412, 6.217]. 

 

Then, with the BigBang, this set up the Blackboard 'the original vague potentiality' and moved into that set of multiple possible Platonic worlds within the phase of Firstness and Secondness. At this time, these 'bits' were without habits [Thirdness] - that's what provides them with their potentiality; it is possible that many chalkmarks appeared. "Many such reacting systems may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these may itself acts as a first line from which a larger system may be built, in which it in turn will merge its individuality" 6.207.  This is POST BigBang.

 

With these multiple sets - the universe could have gone anywhere; some of those 'bits' could have dissipated; others could have emerged; some could have stayed. But THEN - came the development of habits, Thirdness - and these habits established our particular world rather than one of the other 'Platonic worlds'. By chance [tychasm],  habits developed within ONE TYPE of 'Platonic world'...and the others, I presume, dissolved, as our particular universe took over. 

 

The multiple Platonic worlds are not pre BigBang, in my reading, but post. And Thirdness quickly isolated and privileged one 'Set' - which then became our particular universe. 

 

Therefore, I equally don't read Peirce as having the three categories 'existential' in the pre BigBang phase; my reading is that these three categories, which are fundamental laws of matter/mind...emerged WITH the emergence of matter/mind...and are not separate from it.

 

Therefore - you and Jon, and others, may certainly reject my reading of Peirce, just as I reject yours and Jon's - but, I don't think we are at the stage where we can definitely say that only ONE reading is The Accurate One. I offer my reading; some on the list may agree; some may not. That is as far as a scholarly list can go, I think.

 

Edwina

 

 

 

 

 

 


- Original Message -

From: Gary Richmond

To: Peirce-L

Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 1:55 PM

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

 


Edwina, Jon S, List,

 

I certainly do not intend to get into a long (or even a short) discussion with you, Edwina, on this as both your position and Jon's (and mine) have been rather thoroughly and repeatedly articulated. I must say, however, that I do not see your "reading" of the blackboard passages as 'fair minded' at all, but rather it seems to me to impose your own conceptual framework on Peirce's very different one. 

 

For example, at RLT, 263, in the midst of the long and complex blackboard discussion, RLT, 261-4, which blackboard Peirce himself refers to as "a sort of Diagram of the original vague potentiality," RLT, 261), he comments (and I've pointed to this passage before):

 


"[A]ll this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Gary R - again, it is my strong sense that I am accurately representing 
Peirce's views on this issue. I don't see that I disagree with him at all - but 
I do disagree with you and Jon on this issue [and, obviously, on theistic 
issues as well]. 

That is - I don't see a Nothing, which is to say, the pre BigBang world, as a 
set of Platonic worlds. If this were the case, then, it would not be nothing 
but would be sets of ideal potentialities. Instead,  it is nothing, 'pure 
zero', pure freedom, no variety of Platonic worlds which after all, establish 
different perspectives, it is "absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility' 
...not a SET of Platonic worlds. [1.412, 6.217]. 

Then, with the BigBang, this set up the Blackboard 'the original vague 
potentiality' and moved into that set of multiple possible Platonic worlds 
within the phase of Firstness and Secondness. At this time, these 'bits' were 
without habits [Thirdness] - that's what provides them with their potentiality; 
it is possible that many chalkmarks appeared. "Many such reacting systems 
may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these may itself acts as a 
first line from which a larger system may be built, in which it in turn will 
merge its individuality" 6.207.  This is POST BigBang.

With these multiple sets - the universe could have gone anywhere; some of those 
'bits' could have dissipated; others could have emerged; some could have 
stayed. But THEN - came the development of habits, Thirdness - and these habits 
established our particular world rather than one of the other 'Platonic 
worlds'. By chance [tychasm],  habits developed within ONE TYPE of 'Platonic 
world'...and the others, I presume, dissolved, as our particular universe took 
over. 

The multiple Platonic worlds are not pre BigBang, in my reading, but post. And 
Thirdness quickly isolated and privileged one 'Set' - which then became our 
particular universe. 

Therefore, I equally don't read Peirce as having the three categories 
'existential' in the pre BigBang phase; my reading is that these three 
categories, which are fundamental laws of matter/mind...emerged WITH the 
emergence of matter/mind...and are not separate from it.

Therefore - you and Jon, and others, may certainly reject my reading of Peirce, 
just as I reject yours and Jon's - but, I don't think we are at the stage where 
we can definitely say that only ONE reading is The Accurate One. I offer my 
reading; some on the list may agree; some may not. That is as far as a 
scholarly list can go, I think.

Edwina






  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 1:55 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, Jon S, List,


  I certainly do not intend to get into a long (or even a short) discussion 
with you, Edwina, on this as both your position and Jon's (and mine) have been 
rather thoroughly and repeatedly articulated. I must say, however, that I do 
not see your "reading" of the blackboard passages as 'fair minded' at all, but 
rather it seems to me to impose your own conceptual framework on Peirce's very 
different one. 


  For example, at RLT, 263, in the midst of the long and complex blackboard 
discussion, RLT, 261-4, which blackboard Peirce himself refers to as "a sort of 
Diagram of the original vague potentiality," RLT, 261), he comments (and I've 
pointed to this passage before):


"[A]ll this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing 
universe, but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are, therefore, to 
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another 
until finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular 
actual universe of existence in which we happen to be." (RLT, 263, emphasis 
added).


  Now you may disagree with Peirce in this matter, but this is what he 
wrote--the blackboard diagram would seem to represent what he no doubt believed 
to be the character of the cosmos before "one of these Platonic worlds is 
differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen 
to be," that is, before what corresponds to the Big Bang.


  It is my strong sense that Jon has consistently accurately presented Peirce's 
views as they appear in the 1898 lecture, and that your remarks contra his do 
not represent Peirce's clearly articulated views (as, for example, given in the 
quotation above), but rather your own. They seem to me less an interpretation 
than a misreading of Peirce, one which your conceptual framework apparently 
requires.


  Best,


  Gary R








  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Gary R, list:

W

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, Jon S, List,

I certainly do not intend to get into a long (or even a short) discussion
with you, Edwina, on this as both your position and Jon's (and mine) have
been rather thoroughly and repeatedly articulated. I must say, however,
that I do not see your "reading" of the blackboard passages as 'fair
minded' at all, but rather it seems to me to impose your own conceptual
framework on Peirce's very different one.

For example, at RLT, 263, in the midst of the long and complex blackboard
discussion, RLT, 261-4, which blackboard Peirce himself refers to as "a
sort of Diagram of the original vague potentiality," RLT, 261), he comments
(and I've pointed to this passage before):

"[A]ll this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the existing
universe,* but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are, therefore, to
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one
another until *finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the
particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be*." (RLT,
263, emphasis added).

Now you may disagree with Peirce in this matter, but this is what he
wrote--the blackboard diagram would seem to represent what he no doubt
believed to be the character of the cosmos *before* "one of these Platonic
worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in
which we happen to be," that is, before what corresponds to the Big Bang.

It is my strong sense that Jon has consistently accurately presented
Peirce's views as they appear in the 1898 lecture, and that your remarks
*contra* his do not represent Peirce's clearly articulated views (as, for
example, given in the quotation above), but rather your own. They seem to
me less an interpretation than a misreading of Peirce, one which your
conceptual framework apparently requires.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Gary R, list:
>
> Well, I consider myself a 'fair-minded reader of Peirce' and I certainly
> don't agree with Jon S's view that the blackboard is pre-Big Bang and that
> the three Categories are pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial.
>
> Of course the blackboard is a metaphor - set out as a diagram...but that
> diagram is a metaphor of what we assume is that 'original vague
> potentiality or at any rate of some early stage of its determination'.
> 6.203. As I said in my earlier post today, my reading is that this
> blackboard is POST Big Bang, which is why it is a 'continuum of some
> indefinite multitude of dimensions'. 6.203. This is NOT the same as the
> pre  Big Bang Zeroness - which is NOTHING.
>
> And by 'continuum', I certainly don't see this as Thirdness, for Thirdness
> is a continuum of *some particular habits*, not just a 'continuum and
> certainly not of 'indefinite multitude of dimensions. The very nature of
> Thirdness is its function to constrain novelty and insert morphological
> habits.
>
> As for quibbling about whether the chalk mark is a point or a line -
> that's irrelevant. It is a unique 'bit' of matter/mind - that is
> differentiated from what-it-is-not ["the limit between the black surface
> and the white surface} 6.203].  It's the differentiation from
> 'what-it-is-not' that is important, for this is obviously Secondness.
>
> The first chalkmark exhibits only Firstness [its novel appearance] and
> Secondness [its differentiation from the blackness] but would only exhibit
> Thirdness if it stayed 'as it is' and if other chalkmarks appear and they
> develop common habits of formation. As Peirce notes 'However, the mark is a
> mere accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with
> another mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency
> between the two. But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a
> mark with *stay* for a little while; that is, until some beginning of a
> *habit* has been established by virtue of which the accident acquires
> some incipient staying quality, some tendency toward consistency. This
> habit is a generalizing tendency" 6.204.
>
> The three categories are fundamental laws of nature; their origin is with
> nature - which includes the physico-chemical as well as biological realms.
> Therefore - I disagree that they are pre-BigBang. I read Peirce that they
> originate, as natural laws, with the BigBang's potentiality.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 12:27

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Gary R, list:

Well, I consider myself a 'fair-minded reader of Peirce' and I certainly don't 
agree with Jon S's view that the blackboard is pre-Big Bang and that the three 
Categories are pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial.

Of course the blackboard is a metaphor - set out as a diagram...but that 
diagram is a metaphor of what we assume is that 'original vague potentiality or 
at any rate of some early stage of its determination'. 6.203. As I said in my 
earlier post today, my reading is that this blackboard is POST Big Bang, which 
is why it is a 'continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions'. 6.203. 
This is NOT the same as the pre  Big Bang Zeroness - which is NOTHING. 

And by 'continuum', I certainly don't see this as Thirdness, for Thirdness is a 
continuum of some particular habits, not just a 'continuum and certainly not of 
'indefinite multitude of dimensions. The very nature of Thirdness is its 
function to constrain novelty and insert morphological habits. 

As for quibbling about whether the chalk mark is a point or a line - that's 
irrelevant. It is a unique 'bit' of matter/mind - that is differentiated from 
what-it-is-not ["the limit between the black surface and the white surface} 
6.203].  It's the differentiation from 'what-it-is-not' that is important, for 
this is obviously Secondness.

The first chalkmark exhibits only Firstness [its novel appearance] and 
Secondness [its differentiation from the blackness] but would only exhibit 
Thirdness if it stayed 'as it is' and if other chalkmarks appear and they 
develop common habits of formation. As Peirce notes 'However, the mark is a 
mere accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another 
mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency between the two. 
But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a mark with stay for a 
little while; that is, until some beginning of a habit has been established by 
virtue of which the accident acquires some incipient staying quality, some 
tendency toward consistency. This habit is a generalizing tendency" 6.204. 

The three categories are fundamental laws of nature; their origin is with 
nature - which includes the physico-chemical as well as biological realms. 
Therefore - I disagree that they are pre-BigBang. I read Peirce that they 
originate, as natural laws, with the BigBang's potentiality. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 12:27 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Jon S, Edwina, List, 


  Jon wrote:


  a.. The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being 
differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a 
discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.
Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the 
source of its continuity--cannot be post-Big Bang; and the three Categories 
must be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.


  Minus your addition of the notion of a whiteboard--which additon I think is 
quite helpful in representing the "Aggregations of merged chalk marks 
represent[ing] "reacting systems" that aggregate further into "Platonic worlds" 
(CP 6.206-208"--this is certainly the way I have always seen Peirce's 
blackboard discussion and, I believe, a fair minded reader must see it (whether 
or not they agree with Peirce here). As I wrote just yesterday, in the 
blackboard diagram--not a metaphor (I stand corrected)--"Peirce seems not at 
all to be considering the semiosic universe we inhabit, but the conditions for 
any, perhaps many, possible universe(s) to arise."


  Thanks especially for succinctly putting the argumentation into bullet points 
(including pointers to the exact passages in CP 6.203-208), this constituting 
an excellent summary of Peirce's 1898 argument.


  Best,


  Gary R








  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
wrote:

Edwina, List:


I could post a lengthy rebuttal, but it would basically just repeat what I 
have already laid out in considerable detail in this thread and the others 
associated with Peirce's Cosmology, so I will spare everyone (including myself) 
the dissertation.  I will simply reiterate a few quick points about the 
blackboard illustration.
  a.. The blackboard is "a sort of diagram" (CP 6.203), not a metaphor; 
this means that it embodies the significant relations among the parts of 
whatever it represents.

  b.. The blackboard "is a continuum of two dimensions" that represents "a 
continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (CP 6.203); and a 
conti

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


John, List: Excellent comments. See mine below:




On 11/4/2016 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

1) >> my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a three category semiosic

universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only emerge
within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe.



JFS:  Yes.  But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time thereafter,

there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and interpret
that existence.  But there was a physical kind of monadic and dyadic
pre-semiosis.


ET: I don't know that analytic perception/interpretation is necessary for 
Thirdness. As Mike Bergman just pointed out, 'Mind' operates in 
physico-chemical matter. Therefore, I'd claim that Thirdness, which I'll 
define as the process of generating and using habits, i.e., habits of 
morphology - emerges at the same time as Firstness and Secondness.  So, what 
first emerged as let's say, a hydrogen atom could continue on its typology 
within the habits of Thirdness.

---



2) JFS:> As soon as life of any kind (even some kind of pre-life) began

to form, there was the beginning of a non-degenerate Thirdness.

As soon as there were animals with sight (any alien animals on
any early planets), they could look up at more ancient stars and
interpret (full Thirdness) patterns that had never previously
been the objects of semiosis.


ET: Again, I don't see Thirdness as operative only within life/pre-life; it 
exists in the physico-chemical realms as well. As for objective 
interpretation -  I'm not sure that all that is required is sight. I  think 
that the development and use of symbols is necessary for objective analysis. 
And I don't see symbolic use outside of our species.

--



3) >> my reading of this pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce

notes "unbounded potentiality'. This "Nothingness of boundless
freedom 6.219..." is not, in my view, the same as the logic of
freedom or possibility [which is Firstness].



JFS: I agree.  But we have to distinguish the universe (whatever it is)

from any mathematical coordinate system we impose upon it, around it,
or outside of it.

For the moment, let's ignore string theory, multiverses, and other
such hypotheses.  Just consider an Einsteinian 4-D universe.

Mathematically, we can postulate a 100-dimensional coordinate system
in which that 4-D universe is "embedded".  But that system is just
pure mathematics.  Nothing exists that has that shape.

We could name one of those dimensions "supertime" and imagine
that coordinate line running through the middle of the 4D universe.
Then we could call the line segment running to minus infinity
"pre-time" and the segment running to plus infinity "post-time".

But whatever we call it is irrelevant.  It exists only in our
100-D hypothesis.  For the actual universe, that line called
supertime is meaningless.

As Peirce would say, supertime has no implications whatsoever
for anything that any intelligent being in the universe could
ever perceive or act upon.  It's just pure mathematics with
no observable effects or meaningful applications.



ET: Interesting - and I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more 
detail.>

John









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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

, as Peirce
>> notes "unbounded potentiality'. This "Nothingness of boundless freedom
>> 6.219..."is not, in my view,  the same as the logic of freedom or
>> possibility [which is Firstness].
>>
>> "What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became
>> potentiality of this or that sort - that is ,of some *quality*' 6.220.
>> Now - my reading is that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is NOT
>> Firstness or Thirdness]...suddenly moved into Firstness.
>>
>> Again, 'the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into
>> the *unit* of some quality" 6.220.  So again, the zero of nothing moved
>> into Firstness, where 'something is possible/Red is something; therefore
>> Red is possible'. 6.220.  Again - the zero of bare possibility is NOT
>> Firstness or Thirdness. It is Nothing. Then..it moved into being 'embedded'
>> within matter - as Firstnesswhere *something* is possible. Not
>> unbounded possibility but *something* is possible. This is already
>> constrained possibility, very different from the 'zero of boundless
>> possibility'.
>>
>> 2) His next phase seems to be, following the basic 'vague to the
>> definite' 6.191, from a 'vague potentiality; and that either is or is
>> followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great
>> for the individuals dimensions to be distinct" 6.196.  These would be
>> differentiated units in Secondness [and Firstness]. Then, habits of
>> relations or Thirdness begin...and this vast multitude is 'contracted'.
>> "The general indefinite potentiality became limited and heterogeneous"
>> 6.199.
>>
>> 3) With regard to the blackboard metaphor, my reading of it is that the
>> blackboard refers to 'the original vague potentiality, or at any rate of
>> some stage of its determination' 6.203. My reading is that this
>> blackboard is POST Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare
>> possibility'. Instead, it is POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular point
>> appears - that chalk line. [I'll leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it].
>> As a point, it has *identity*,  that continuity-of-being that Peirce
>> refers to ['There is a certain element of continuity in this line"
>> 6.203]..This is a unit in Secondness.
>>
>> The white chalk line appears within the act of Firstness, but is, in
>> itself, operating ALSO within the mode of Secondness - because it is
>> discrete and distinct.
>>
>> And then, habits or Thirdness, that generalizing tendency, develops. NOTE
>> - Thirdness did not pre-exist on its own; it develops as the discrete units
>> appear within Firstness and Secondness. That is, Thirdness is embedded
>> within the existentialities of matter operating within Firstness and
>> Secondness. It 'feeds and works' within these individual 'bits'...and
>> develops generalizing laws.
>>
>> That's how I see this metaphor.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:46 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
>> Cosmology)
>>
>> Jon, Edwina, Clark, List,
>>
>> Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards
>> repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most
>> active participants.
>>
>> I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos *pre*-the
>> Big Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't
>> really bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I
>> used the modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language
>> *do* we have to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the
>> last lecture of the 1898 *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* from *this,
>> our,* existential one?) *contra* a more Aristotelian cosmos once there
>> *exists* a, shall we say, *particular* three category semiosic universe
>> might be helpful in  moving this discussion forward. So, my question: Are
>> these two different? If so, how so? If not, why not?
>>
>> One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and others
>> make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, as I
>> interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic
>> universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many,
>> possible universe(s) to arise*. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay,
&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Mike, list - I totally, fully agree.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Mike Bergman 
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 11:11 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

  On 11/4/2016 9:19 AM, John F Sowa wrote:

On 11/4/2016 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 

  my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a three category semiosic 
  universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only emerge 
  within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe. 

Yes.  But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time thereafter, 
there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and interpret 
that existence.  But there was a physical kind of monadic and dyadic 
pre-semiosis. 

  I do not see where life or minds are a prerequisite for Thirdness. My 
interpretation of Peirce is that the natural physical laws governing matter 
that emerged after the Big Bang provide the generalities or "habits" sufficient 
to qualify as Thirdness. Did he not also point to crystals and the purely 
physical world?

Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and 
one can
no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, 
etc., of objects
are really there. CP 4.551

  Mike 

--

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

ard is POST Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare
> possibility'. Instead, it is POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular point
> appears - that chalk line. [I'll leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it].
> As a point, it has *identity*,  that continuity-of-being that Peirce
> refers to ['There is a certain element of continuity in this line"
> 6.203]..This is a unit in Secondness.
>
> The white chalk line appears within the act of Firstness, but is, in
> itself, operating ALSO within the mode of Secondness - because it is
> discrete and distinct.
>
> And then, habits or Thirdness, that generalizing tendency, develops. NOTE
> - Thirdness did not pre-exist on its own; it develops as the discrete units
> appear within Firstness and Secondness. That is, Thirdness is embedded
> within the existentialities of matter operating within Firstness and
> Secondness. It 'feeds and works' within these individual 'bits'...and
> develops generalizing laws.
>
> That's how I see this metaphor.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:46 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Jon, Edwina, Clark, List,
>
> Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards
> repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most
> active participants.
>
> I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos *pre*-the Big
> Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't
> really bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I
> used the modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language
> *do* we have to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last
> lecture of the 1898 *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* from *this, our,* 
> existential
> one?) *contra* a more Aristotelian cosmos once there *exists* a, shall we
> say, *particular* three category semiosic universe might be helpful in
>  moving this discussion forward. So, my question: Are these two different?
> If so, how so? If not, why not?
>
> One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and others
> make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, as I
> interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic
> universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many,
> possible universe(s) to arise*. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay,
> there is no explicit mention of God here, and Peirce seems to be making a
> purely scientific hypothesis. So, perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a
> moment, what is Peirce attempting in RLT?
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> > wrote:
>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome exegetical
>> battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last post to
>> be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought.  I once again
>> leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of us--has
>> demonstrated the more accurate interpretation.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in
>>> terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical
>>> with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.
>>>
>>> My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function
>>> within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the  sense of it being a
>>> generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does
>>> *exist* as a *state* of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling,
>>> an openness, BUT, this state *is itself an experience, entire in itself*,
>>> and as such, it *exists* within that experience of its fullness. There
>>> is no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! Since it is a *state of
>>> experience*, then, it must be embodied. It is simply 'complete', so to
>>> speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or reaction.
>>>
>>> You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Mike Bergman


  
  
On 11/4/2016 9:19 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
On 11/4/2016 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
  
  my own view that our 'existential cosmos'
IS a three category semiosic

universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only
emerge

within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe.

  
  
  Yes.  But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time
  thereafter,
  
  there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and
  interpret
  
  that existence.  But there was a physical kind of monadic and
  dyadic
  
  pre-semiosis.
  


I do not see where life or minds are a prerequisite for Thirdness.
My interpretation of Peirce is that the natural physical laws
governing matter that emerged after the Big Bang provide the
generalities or "habits" sufficient to qualify as Thirdness. Did he
not also point to crystals and the purely physical world?

Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
  appears in the
  work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
  world; and one can
  no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the
  shapes, etc., of objects
  are really there. CP 4.551


Mike 


  


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread John F Sowa


On 11/4/2016 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a three category semiosic
universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only emerge
within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe.


Yes.  But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time thereafter,
there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and interpret
that existence.  But there was a physical kind of monadic and dyadic
pre-semiosis.

As soon as life of any kind (even some kind of pre-life) began
to form, there was the beginning of a non-degenerate Thirdness.

As soon as there were animals with sight (any alien animals on
any early planets), they could look up at more ancient stars and
interpret (full Thirdness) patterns that had never previously
been the objects of semiosis.


my reading of this pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce
notes "unbounded potentiality'. This "Nothingness of boundless
freedom 6.219..." is not, in my view, the same as the logic of
freedom or possibility [which is Firstness].


I agree.  But we have to distinguish the universe (whatever it is)
from any mathematical coordinate system we impose upon it, around it,
or outside of it.

For the moment, let's ignore string theory, multiverses, and other
such hypotheses.  Just consider an Einsteinian 4-D universe.

Mathematically, we can postulate a 100-dimensional coordinate system
in which that 4-D universe is "embedded".  But that system is just
pure mathematics.  Nothing exists that has that shape.

We could name one of those dimensions "supertime" and imagine
that coordinate line running through the middle of the 4D universe.
Then we could call the line segment running to minus infinity
"pre-time" and the segment running to plus infinity "post-time".

But whatever we call it is irrelevant.  It exists only in our
100-D hypothesis.  For the actual universe, that line called
supertime is meaningless.

As Peirce would say, supertime has no implications whatsoever
for anything that any intelligent being in the universe could
ever perceive or act upon.  It's just pure mathematics with
no observable effects or meaningful applications.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Gary, list - yes, I think that both tone and repetition are getting tiresome, 
to say the least.

I'm not sure what you mean by your suggestion of differentiating the 'early 
cosmos' from 'this our existential one' contra an Aristotelian one 'once there 
exists a particular three category semiosic universe'. 

1) My confusion comes from my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a three 
category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only 
emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe. There are no 
categories before this 'Big Bang' or whatever began our universe. 

That is, in the pre-universe, "We start, then, with nothing, pure zero'This 
pure zero is the nothing of not having been born..boundless freedom".  
6.217.  My reading of this is that this pure zero is NOT the same as Firstness, 
because, my reading of Firstness is that it is an embedded state of feeling, 
which means, that its nature is to express a quality of some form of 
matter/mind.  Redness; heat; coldness Therefore, my reading of this 
pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce notes "unbounded potentiality'. 
This "Nothingness of boundless freedom 6.219..."is not, in my view,  the same 
as the logic of freedom or possibility [which is Firstness]. 

"What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became potentiality 
of this or that sort - that is ,of some quality' 6.220.   Now - my reading is 
that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is NOT Firstness or 
Thirdness]...suddenly moved into Firstness.

Again, 'the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into the 
unit of some quality" 6.220.  So again, the zero of nothing moved into 
Firstness, where 'something is possible/Red is something; therefore Red is 
possible'. 6.220.  Again - the zero of bare possibility is NOT Firstness or 
Thirdness. It is Nothing. Then..it moved into being 'embedded' within matter - 
as Firstnesswhere something is possible. Not unbounded possibility but 
something is possible. This is already constrained possibility, very different 
from the 'zero of boundless possibility'.

2) His next phase seems to be, following the basic 'vague to the definite' 
6.191, from a 'vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a 
continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the 
individuals dimensions to be distinct" 6.196.  These would be differentiated 
units in Secondness [and Firstness]. Then, habits of relations or Thirdness 
begin...and this vast multitude is 'contracted'. "The general indefinite 
potentiality became limited and heterogeneous" 6.199. 

3) With regard to the blackboard metaphor, my reading of it is that the 
blackboard refers to 'the original vague potentiality, or at any rate of some 
stage of its determination' 6.203. My reading is that this blackboard is POST 
Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare possibility'. Instead, it is 
POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular point appears - that chalk line. [I'll 
leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it]. As a point, it has identity,  that 
continuity-of-being that Peirce refers to ['There is a certain element of 
continuity in this line" 6.203]..This is a unit in Secondness.

The white chalk line appears within the act of Firstness, but is, in itself, 
operating ALSO within the mode of Secondness - because it is discrete and 
distinct. 

And then, habits or Thirdness, that generalizing tendency, develops. NOTE - 
Thirdness did not pre-exist on its own; it develops as the discrete units 
appear within Firstness and Secondness. That is, Thirdness is embedded within 
the existentialities of matter operating within Firstness and Secondness. It 
'feeds and works' within these individual 'bits'...and develops generalizing 
laws.

That's how I see this metaphor.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:46 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Jon, Edwina, Clark, List,


  Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards 
repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most active 
participants.


  I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos pre-the Big Bang 
(note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't really bring 
such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I used the modifier 
"loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language do we have to 
distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last lecture of the 1898 
Reasoning and the Logic of Things from this, our, existential one?) contra a 
more Aristotelian cosmos once there exists a, shall we say, particular three 
category semiosic universe might be helpful in  moving this discussion forward. 
So, my question: Are these two differen

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-03 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, Edwina, Clark, List,

Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards
repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most
active participants.

I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos *pre*-the Big
Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't
really bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I
used the modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language
*do* we have to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last
lecture of the 1898 *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* from *this,
our,* existential
one?) *contra* a more Aristotelian cosmos once there *exists* a, shall we
say, *particular* three category semiosic universe might be helpful in
 moving this discussion forward. So, my question: Are these two different?
If so, how so? If not, why not?

One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and others
make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, as I
interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic
universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many, possible
universe(s) to arise*. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay, there is no
explicit mention of God here, and Peirce seems to be making a purely
scientific hypothesis. So, perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a moment,
what is Peirce attempting in RLT?

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome exegetical
> battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last post to
> be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought.  I once again
> leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of us--has
> demonstrated the more accurate interpretation.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in
>> terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical
>> with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.
>>
>> My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function
>> within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the  sense of it being a
>> generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does
>> *exist* as a *state* of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling,
>> an openness, BUT, this state *is itself an experience, entire in itself*,
>> and as such, it *exists* within that experience of its fullness. There
>> is no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! Since it is a *state of
>> experience*, then, it must be embodied. It is simply 'complete', so to
>> speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or reaction.
>>
>> You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow an
>> understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'.
>>
>> I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the absence
>> of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, but i
>> don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, therefore,
>> where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy,
>> in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411.  My reading of that,
>> is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or Secondness in this
>> 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. Nothing.
>>
>> Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -----
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
>> Cosmology)
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's.
>> Firstness is real, but does not exist.  It has no Relations, because any
>> Relation requires Secondness.  "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and
>> Secondness in the absence of Thirdness.  Accepting any matter of fact--such
>> as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable,
>> because it blocks the way of inquiry.  Nothing new here, so I will leave it
>> at that.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome exegetical
battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last post to
be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought.  I once again
leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of us--has
demonstrated the more accurate interpretation.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in
> terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical
> with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.
>
> My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function
> within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the  sense of it being a
> generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does *exist*
> as a *state* of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling, an
> openness, BUT, this state *is itself an experience, entire in itself*,
> and as such, it *exists* within that experience of its fullness. There is
> no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! Since it is a *state of
> experience*, then, it must be embodied. It is simply 'complete', so to
> speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or reaction.
>
> You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow an
> understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'.
>
> I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the absence
> of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, but i
> don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, therefore,
> where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy,
> in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411.  My reading of that,
> is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or Secondness in this
> 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. Nothing.
>
> Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's.
> Firstness is real, but does not exist.  It has no Relations, because any
> Relation requires Secondness.  "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and
> Secondness in the absence of Thirdness.  Accepting any matter of fact--such
> as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable,
> because it blocks the way of inquiry.  Nothing new here, so I will leave it
> at that.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different
>> actions.
>>
>> With regard to Firstness, I see it,  as a spontaneous *state* *of
>> existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness
>> of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they operate within
>> Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that 
>> *spontaneous
>> state of existence* [which might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't
>> *bond/relate* to another entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.
>>
>>  For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell *might* be accepted by
>> other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, *might
>> not*  be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate.
>>
>> Or, a novel mode of transportation [*Uber*] might suddenly develop and
>> might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might
>> disappear in a month.
>>
>> The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir
>> provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect
>> changes in the larger system.
>>
>> Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer
>> to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as
>> a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the
>> pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness,
>> Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].
>>
>> Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and
>> 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is
>> no explanation, does not mean that I can

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in 
terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical with 
that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.

My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function within 
Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the  sense of it being a generality [ie., 
the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does exist as a state of 
'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling, an openness, BUT, this state is 
itself an experience, entire in itself, and as such, it exists within that 
experience of its fullness. There is no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! 
Since it is a state of experience, then, it must be embodied. It is simply 
'complete', so to speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or reaction.

You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow an 
understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'. 

I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the absence of 
Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, but i don't see 
this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, therefore, where there 
was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which 
nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411.  My reading of that, is that there 
was no matter in a mode of Firstness or Secondness in this 'original chaos' - 
no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. Nothing.

Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


  Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's.  
Firstness is real, but does not exist.  It has no Relations, because any 
Relation requires Secondness.  "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and 
Secondness in the absence of Thirdness.  Accepting any matter of fact--such as 
the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable, because 
it blocks the way of inquiry.  Nothing new here, so I will leave it at that.


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different actions.

With regard to Firstness, I see it,  as a spontaneous state of existence 
which might then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness of this state'. The 
point of all the categories is that they operate within Relations; they are not 
isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that spontaneous state of existence [which 
might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't bond/relate to another 
entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.

 For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell might be accepted by other 
cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, might not  be 
accepted and its energy-content would dissipate.

Or, a novel mode of transportation [Uber] might suddenly develop and might 
spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might disappear in 
a month.

The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir provides 
has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect changes in the 
larger system. 

Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer to 
1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as a 
transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the 
pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].

Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and 
'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is no 
explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one - 
certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, then, 
I'm not going to offer a  self-organized belief in god as having been First 
Cause. I simply don't know. 

Edwina 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Clark, List: 


  Your points, as usual, are well-taken.  Is it helpful at all to refer to 
"actualization," rather than "cause"?  Edwina's position, as I understand it, 
is that our existing universe is not only self-organizing but also 
self-generating or self-originating; as Houser put it in his introduction to EP 
1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is self-actualizing." 
 This is the crucial transition from Firstness (possibility) to Secondness 
(actuality), and the wor

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's.
Firstness is real, but does not exist.  It has no Relations, because any
Relation requires Secondness.  "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and
Secondness in the absence of Thirdness.  Accepting any matter of fact--such
as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable,
because it blocks the way of inquiry.  Nothing new here, so I will leave it
at that.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different
> actions.
>
> With regard to Firstness, I see it,  as a spontaneous *state* *of
> existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness
> of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they operate within
> Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that *spontaneous
> state of existence* [which might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't
> *bond/relate* to another entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.
>
>  For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell *might* be accepted by
> other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, *might
> not*  be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate.
>
> Or, a novel mode of transportation [*Uber*] might suddenly develop and
> might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might
> disappear in a month.
>
> The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir
> provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect
> changes in the larger system.
>
> Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer
> to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as
> a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the
> pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness,
> Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].
>
> Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and
> 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is
> no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one -
> certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist,
> then, I'm not going to offer a  self-organized belief in god as having been
> First Cause. I simply don't know.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Clark, List:
>
> Your points, as usual, are well-taken.  Is it helpful at all to refer to
> "actualization," rather than "cause"?  Edwina's position, as I understand
> it, is that our existing universe is not only self-*organizing *but also
> self-*generating *or self-*originating*; as Houser put it in his
> introduction to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the
> chaos is self-actualizing."  This is the crucial transition from Firstness
> (possibility) to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects
> the fact that Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively
> leaves this step unexplained.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
>
>> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> ET:  Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the
>> term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of
>> habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him
>> to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a
>> causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
>>
>> No, I understood exactly what you meant.  My disagreement is that I take
>> "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than
>> randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could
>> ever be "a causal force."  I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but
>> you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad
>> thing!
>>
>> Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating over
>> the t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 5:01 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:
> 
> I agree that Pierce claims that to do science you must have faith in the 
> possibility of finding truth and that knowing is connected to thirdness. I 
> wonder if it has anything to do with agapism?

I think in the places he uses faith he means something closer to hope. (Which 
is one of the strong senses of faith) Of course course 1 Cor 13:10-13 is 
relevant here:

But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be 
done away. When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I 
thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things. For 
now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; 
but then shall I know even as also I am known. And now abideth faith, hope, 
charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.

> We know that Peirce’s view is influenced by “a Schelling-fashioned idealism 
> which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind.

And Schelling was himself influenced by the Platonists who held those views. 
I’ve not read it (and I don’t even know if it’s in a translation since I don’t 
read German) but apparently he had a well regarded commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus which is relevant to all these. Some see Schelling’s philosophy as a 
mixture or even conflation of Plato and Kant. Which is interesting since in 
many ways that describes Peirce as well.

I know John Sallis’ commentary on the Timaeus (very Continental styled 
philosophy so I suspect many here wouldn’t like it) grapples with Schelling 
there quite a bit. I really liked that little book of Sallis’ and think it 
quite relevant. While Kelly Parker never brings it up, the earlier Peirce’s use 
of substance fits quite closely to Schelling as represented by Sallis. (Again 
I’ve not read Schelling here so I can’t speak to the actual text itself)

> CP 6.102, so Emerson and his over-soul may also have some influence, but I 
> have only found him twice in SP. I agree that Peirce avoids the concept of 
> demiurge and thereby all the discussions of the good and evil of that concept.
> 

That wasn’t what I said. Quite the opposite. I was saying that Peirce’s process 
God in many ways is Plato’s demiurge. It’s not God as this origin but God as 
these creative principle that brings form to receptacle. That’s also why it has 
to be real but not actual given the logic of the Timaeus.

In Christianity likely due to gnosticism the demiurge had a rather bad 
reputation. With Spinoza due to his Jewish background you don’t see that. 
Admittedly ‘Nature’ as Spinoza’s demiurge lacks the agent/choice aspects that 
the demiurge has. There’s also arguably in most readings the elimination of 
teleology. Both those elements are brought back by Peirce although the swerve 
as chance but also choice is perhaps a bit more ambiguous.

> Hartshorne has analyzed the concept of Good in many religious philosophies. I 
> wonder why his interpretations do not come up in these discussion. He is a 
> highly recognized theologian and Peirce scholar.
>  

Hartshorne did have some odd views on Peirce though. He thought Peirce’s 
secondness was wrong for instance as I recall. I have some of Hartshorne’s 
works in my library but I confess I was not enamored of him. I have some 
friends who absolutely love him though. I just find the places he breaks from 
Peirce as problematic as Peirce found James’ breaks.

> One other way to understand Peirce’s concept of God is that the ‘farther’ or 
> ‘Godhead’ is the type and the ‘son’ is the token and the sign process is the 
> ‘holy spirit’, but I have never seen that in any of his writings.

Yes and that would line up with how he uses the Trinity. But I don’t recall it 
explicit in anyplace. As I said there was this weird ambiguity between son as 
mediator and spirit as mediator. Although to be fair this difference between 
son and holy ghost in its more platonic conception was a key break between the 
eastern Church and western Church notions of the Trinity. At least as I recall. 
Again this isn’t my area of specialty.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 3:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Is it helpful at all to refer to "actualization," rather than "cause"?  
> Edwina's position, as I understand it, is that our existing universe is not 
> only self-organizing but also self-generating or self-originating; as Houser 
> put it in his introduction to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality 
> of the chaos is self-actualizing."  This is the crucial transition from 
> Firstness (possibility) to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" 
> reflects the fact that Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology 
> effectively leaves this step unexplained.

Well I tend to agree with Edwina there with regards to Peirce’s position. 
Although I’m not sure actualization works. Usually I see that term being used 
to distinguish from a plan or a possibility versus the realization of that plan 
in actual matter. The problem is that our language really isn’t up to the task 
of these things. Which is why the Platonists tend to use explicit metaphor more 
regularly. It really does avoid a lot of problems for all the ridicule it might 
generate at times. This is also partially why in classic education Plato was 
left until last because it was considered so difficult to deal with. It’s 
interesting that these days we start with Plato in introductory classes and 
typically never return to him unless one is specializing in ancient philosophy 
or classics.

Regarding firstness as possibility to secondness as actuality I think it 
illustrates the problem if we quote the relevant Peirce. While he’ll frequently 
talk of it as possibility and uncaused he’ll also talk of it as spontaneous 
occurrence. The problem is that occurrence again is nearly as problematic a 
term as cause is. After all to occur requires a brute appearance that is more 
secondness. So the language in these divisions can mislead somewhat if we don’t 
keep the categories numerical aspect front and center.

I do not mean that potentiality immediately results in actuality. Mediately 
perhaps it does; but what immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality 
became potentiality of this or that sort -- that is, of some quality.
Thus the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into the unit 
of some quality. (CP 6.220)

Again here we see running up against the same problem of language. This 
‘zeroth’ category is a kind of possibility too. But he has to distinguish it 
from firstness as possibility. We might call it the possibility of possibility 
or simply this difference between possibility as such versus a particular 
possibility. Again the Platonists had these exact same problems with language 
and Peirce is almost certainly familiar with the language they used. You can 
see these a few pages earlier when he adopts explicitly platonic language.

The evolution of forms begins or, at any rate, has for an early stage of it, a 
vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a continuum of forms 
having a multitude of dimensions too great for the individual dimensions to be 
distinct. It must be by a contraction of the vagueness of that potentiality of 
everything in general, but of nothing in particular, that the world of forms 
comes about. (CP 6.196)

Really the process Peirce is after is the continuum between the completely 
unlimited to the completely limited. This is the three universes but within 
each universe there is its own continuum. This really is traditional 
neplatonism of late antiquity minus some of the more annoying metaphors like 
breaking of vessels. Although Peirce does use the womb metaphor albeit in a 
somewhat reversal of how the Timaeus does.

Again I’m not sure I buy Peirce here in the least. Particularly I find the 
emanation theory he gives in CP 1.412 to be problematic for a few reasons. But 
that is his cosmology.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different actions.

With regard to Firstness, I see it,  as a spontaneous state of existence which 
might then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness of this state'. The point 
of all the categories is that they operate within Relations; they are not 
isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that spontaneous state of existence [which 
might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't bond/relate to another 
entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.

 For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell might be accepted by other cells 
and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, might not  be accepted and 
its energy-content would dissipate.

Or, a novel mode of transportation [Uber] might suddenly develop and might 
spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might disappear in 
a month.

The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir provides has on 
other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect changes in the larger 
system. 

Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer to 
1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as a 
transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the 
pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].

Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and 'something' is 
not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is no explanation, 
does not mean that I can or even should come up with one - certainly, science 
hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, then, I'm not going to 
offer a  self-organized belief in god as having been First Cause. I simply 
don't know. 

Edwina

 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Clark, List:


  Your points, as usual, are well-taken.  Is it helpful at all to refer to 
"actualization," rather than "cause"?  Edwina's position, as I understand it, 
is that our existing universe is not only self-organizing but also 
self-generating or self-originating; as Houser put it in his introduction to EP 
1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is self-actualizing." 
 This is the crucial transition from Firstness (possibility) to Secondness 
(actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects the fact that Houser's attempt to 
summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively leaves this step unexplained.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:

  On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
wrote:

  ET:  Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the 
term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of 
habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to 
such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a causal force 
- and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.

  No, I understood exactly what you meant.  My disagreement is that I take 
"chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than 
randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could 
ever be "a causal force."  I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but you 
refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad thing!

Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating over the 
term ‘cause.’  In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity isn’t causal and 
in an other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness is its own unmoved 
mover. The problem is that making sense of causality at all when little is 
necessary and most things are underdetermined is problematic. 

I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons too. For 
instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic Newtonian formulation 
of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the Hamiltonian or Lagrangian 
forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet metaphysically quite conceptually 
different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the wave function (what in 
quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger equation) and it’s hard to 
make sense of causality in terms of it.

Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments against 
causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same extended argument I 
linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any sign can be divided 
it’s worth asking if we h

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> ET:  Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the term 
> of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of habit. 
> Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to such 
> conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a causal force - 
> and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
> 
> No, I understood exactly what you meant.  My disagreement is that I take 
> "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than 
> randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could 
> ever be "a causal force."  I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but you 
> refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad thing!
> 

Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating over the term 
‘cause.’  In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity isn’t causal and in an 
other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness is its own unmoved mover. 
The problem is that making sense of causality at all when little is necessary 
and most things are underdetermined is problematic. 

I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons too. For 
instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic Newtonian formulation 
of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the Hamiltonian or Lagrangian 
forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet metaphysically quite conceptually 
different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the wave function (what in 
quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger equation) and it’s hard to 
make sense of causality in terms of it.

Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments against 
causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same extended argument I 
linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any sign can be divided 
it’s worth asking if we have causality at all.

Despite these problems of causality we all use the term causality.

> He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his very first 
> draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other comments about 
> it that are relevant to this discussion.
> 
> CSP:  I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all 
> experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my 
> original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless determinations of 
> single events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming ... 
> But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first 
> suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features of 
> the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others and 
> have struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my 
> theory was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and Professor 
> Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some original tendency to 
> take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis; while I myself 
> was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in 
> time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from single events; since an 
> event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added)

I think this might be better read as there being no cause for firstness not 
that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect we’re talking past 
one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an element in a triadic 
sign more or less entails a certain sense of causation. (Although I prefer 
Peirce’s term determination although that too has the genealogy in problematic 
metaphysical understanding)

I should add that this problem of language for this foundational event isn’t 
new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over whether the platonic One is 
one or ought to be considered two emanation steps. While I’ll confess to 
finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical reason for the 
analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many angels could dance on a 
pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over kinds in medieval 
scholasticism)

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-03 Thread Jerry Rhee

s, but also due to his "own meditations" in
> the interim.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> 1) Clark - yes, thank you for your comment on my comment:
>>
>> ET: The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence
>> and evolution of matter/mind ...
>>
>> Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the term of
>> 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of habit.
>> Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to such
>> conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a *causal
>> force* - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
>>
>> 2) But I don't agree with Jon's comment that Firstness is 'pure nothing'
>> in the absence of continuity or Thirdness. Nothing-is-nothing, and none of
>> the categories can be applicable to it.
>>
>> Firstness is a mode of organization of matter/mind that is novel,
>> spontaneous - and thus, has no habits. BUT, it is not 'nothing', for
>> otherwise matter would never evolve its new habits. Matter only evolves
>> these new habits when Firstness introduces a novel form [which is not
>> 'nothing' but a novel form] ..and this novel form can then persist within
>> its taking on of habits/Thirdness.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
>> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU>
>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 2:28 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
>> Cosmology)
>>
>>
>> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually
>> agree with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a
>> process theology perspective.  Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or
>> necessitarianism, as he usually called it--but I think that he did view God
>> as First Cause in the specific sense of *Ens necessarium*, since he said
>> so explicitly in "A Neglected Argument," its additaments, and the
>> associated manuscript drafts.
>>
>>
>> It’s worth noting that Peirce’s notions of vagueness in ontology (as
>> opposed to epistemology/logic) combined with his ontology of chance tend to
>> significantly change the meaning of both causation and *ens necessarium*.
>> Especially relative to how most thought even in the 19th century.
>>
>>
>> ET:  The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence
>> and evolution of matter/mind ...
>>
>>
>> I do not see how we can attribute "agential force" to chance or
>> Firstness, when in Peirce's thought--even in conjunction with Brute
>> reaction or Secondness--it is *pure nothing* in the absence of
>> continuity or Thirdness.
>>
>>
>> I suspect there’s some talking past one an other here. Given Peirce’s
>> semiotic realism rather than a more traditional substance ontology (or even
>> monads of process such as in Leibniz and perhaps Spinoza) it’s worth asking
>> what ‘agent’ means.
>>
>> Without speaking for Edwina I suspect she means by agent something
>> different from how you may be taking her.
>>
>> I think due to the nature of Peirce’s idea of continuity in his semiotics
>> and ontology any ‘agent’ can always be further analyzed as made up of
>> ‘smaller’ bits of firstness, secondness, and thirdness.
>>
>>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

 to such
> conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a *causal
> force* - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
>
> 2) But I don't agree with Jon's comment that Firstness is 'pure nothing'
> in the absence of continuity or Thirdness. Nothing-is-nothing, and none of
> the categories can be applicable to it.
>
> Firstness is a mode of organization of matter/mind that is novel,
> spontaneous - and thus, has no habits. BUT, it is not 'nothing', for
> otherwise matter would never evolve its new habits. Matter only evolves
> these new habits when Firstness introduces a novel form [which is not
> 'nothing' but a novel form] ..and this novel form can then persist within
> its taking on of habits/Thirdness.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -----
> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU>
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 2:28 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually agree
> with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a
> process theology perspective.  Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or
> necessitarianism, as he usually called it--but I think that he did view God
> as First Cause in the specific sense of *Ens necessarium*, since he said
> so explicitly in "A Neglected Argument," its additaments, and the
> associated manuscript drafts.
>
>
> It’s worth noting that Peirce’s notions of vagueness in ontology (as
> opposed to epistemology/logic) combined with his ontology of chance tend to
> significantly change the meaning of both causation and *ens necessarium*.
> Especially relative to how most thought even in the 19th century.
>
>
> ET:  The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence
> and evolution of matter/mind ...
>
>
> I do not see how we can attribute "agential force" to chance or Firstness,
> when in Peirce's thought--even in conjunction with Brute reaction or
> Secondness--it is *pure nothing* in the absence of continuity or
> Thirdness.
>
>
> I suspect there’s some talking past one an other here. Given Peirce’s
> semiotic realism rather than a more traditional substance ontology (or even
> monads of process such as in Leibniz and perhaps Spinoza) it’s worth asking
> what ‘agent’ means.
>
> Without speaking for Edwina I suspect she means by agent something
> different from how you may be taking her.
>
> I think due to the nature of Peirce’s idea of continuity in his semiotics
> and ontology any ‘agent’ can always be further analyzed as made up of
> ‘smaller’ bits of firstness, secondness, and thirdness.
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

1) Clark - yes, thank you for your comment on my comment:

ET: The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and 
evolution of matter/mind ...

Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the term of 
'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of habit. 
Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him to such 
conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a causal force - 
and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.

2) But I don't agree with Jon's comment that Firstness is 'pure nothing' in the 
absence of continuity or Thirdness. Nothing-is-nothing, and none of the 
categories can be applicable to it. 

Firstness is a mode of organization of matter/mind that is novel, spontaneous - 
and thus, has no habits. BUT, it is not 'nothing', for otherwise matter would 
never evolve its new habits. Matter only evolves these new habits when 
Firstness introduces a novel form [which is not 'nothing' but a novel form] 
..and this novel form can then persist within its taking on of habits/Thirdness.

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 2:28 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)




On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
wrote:


While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually agree 
with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a process 
theology perspective.  Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or 
necessitarianism, as he usually called it--but I think that he did view God as 
First Cause in the specific sense of Ens necessarium, since he said so 
explicitly in "A Neglected Argument," its additaments, and the associated 
manuscript drafts.


  It’s worth noting that Peirce’s notions of vagueness in ontology (as opposed 
to epistemology/logic) combined with his ontology of chance tend to 
significantly change the meaning of both causation and ens necessarium. 
Especially relative to how most thought even in the 19th century.




  ET:  The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence 
and evolution of matter/mind ...


I do not see how we can attribute "agential force" to chance or Firstness, 
when in Peirce's thought--even in conjunction with Brute reaction or 
Secondness--it is pure nothing in the absence of continuity or Thirdness.


  I suspect there’s some talking past one an other here. Given Peirce’s 
semiotic realism rather than a more traditional substance ontology (or even 
monads of process such as in Leibniz and perhaps Spinoza) it’s worth asking 
what ‘agent’ means. 


  Without speaking for Edwina I suspect she means by agent something different 
from how you may be taking her.


  I think due to the nature of Peirce’s idea of continuity in his semiotics and 
ontology any ‘agent’ can always be further analyzed as made up of ‘smaller’ 
bits of firstness, secondness, and thirdness.






--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

cal reality of neutrality - which
> would foul up a LOT of scientific evaluations! In X-case, a population
> makes a decision about Y. ...based on a scale of 1 to 5. The value of '3'
> is NEUTRAL *and is a valid statistic, suggestion NO JUDGMENT*. Your
> one-dimenstional binarism rejects neutrality.  For you - everything MUST be
> a judgment; you either accept or reject. I don't agree with this.
>
> 6) As for your conclusion that I'm in the  minority - well, that's another
> statistical flaw since of course, you don't know - and the 'well-chosen
> average' is not always right.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:42 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> 1) What?  I never said anything about "what [I interpret as his meaning]";
> those are *your *words, which you inserted into my *conditional *comment--IF
> Peirce wrote what he meant and meant what he wrote, THEN it is
> incontrovertible that in 1908 he believed that God as *Ens necessarium *was
> the Creator of all three Universes of Experience and all of their contents,
> without exception.  His words to this effect are quite plain and
> unambiguous in all four of the quotes that I provided.  By claiming that
> they are somehow "metaphorical," you have effectively conceded that your
> view is that Peirce DID NOT write what he meant or mean what he wrote.
>
> 2) With all due respect, this is very poor argumentation on your part.
> You cannot correlate the four 1908 statements with Peirce's earlier
> cosmological writings, so they simply *must *be "metaphorical"; i.e.,
> pertaining to "the experience of life" (whatever that means) rather than
> the origin and order of our existing universe, despite explicitly calling
> God the Creator of everything in all three Universes.  And you simply
> assert this, without offering any justification from the texts whatsoever.
>
> To set the record straight, I never used the word "rejection" or
> "rejected" with respect to the three Categories; I *speculated *that
> Peirce had *substituted *"Universes" for "Categories" in his late
> writings, asked the List community for help in evaluating this hypothesis,
> and ultimately withdrew it when confronted with the fact that Peirce
> continued to write at length about the Categories in the 1907 drafts of
> "Pragmatism."  My revised view--which just goes to show that some of us are
> willing and able to change our minds based on the discussions here--is that
> the Universes are phenomenological and/or metaphysical manifestations of
> the Categories.  That makes sense not only in "A Neglected Argument," but
> also in the 23 December 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby, where Peirce
> similarly defined three Universes and then assigned his ten semeiotic
> trichotomies to them as Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants.  You cannot
> have it both ways--if the Universes have nothing to do with the Categories,
> then neither do these divisions of signs and their relations.
>
> 3) Okay, we disagree on the principle that later writings should generally
> be given priority over earlier writings; I suspected that (and said so) a
> long time ago.  Do we at least agree on the principle of charity now?
>
> 4) The decision not to judge is itself a judgment.  You choose not to take
> "A Neglected Argument" into account, which implies that you do not consider
> it to be relevant--i.e., you *reject *it when seeking to identify and
> understand Peirce's cosmological views.  There is no *practical *difference
> between "rejection" and "no comment," so there is no *conceptual *
> difference.
>
> 5) Then I suspect that you are in a very small minority of Peirce
> scholars.  For one thing, what else could plausibly be the subject matter
> of CP 6.490?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 10:44 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - again, you are lifting words/phrases and inserting your own
>> meanings.
>>
>> 1) To now claim that your statement that either a writer 'means what he
>> says or doesn't' is a *'common-sense assumption* is not the same as
>> 'either he meant what [I interpret as his meaning] or he did not' - is not
>> logical evidence - but almost a threat'. You are leaving out *''what I
>> interpret as his meaning'*.
>>
>> 2) Again, the definitions given in the NA do not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-03 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list:

The pragmatic maxim:

If good because useful, then not useful because we do not even look to it.
Therefore, not useful.

Best,
Jerry R



On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 1:44 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:23 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:
>
> Quantum filed theory seems to have arrived at such a foundational
> ur-continuity.
>
>
> I’m not sure that’s right. There’s certainly a type of continuity in
> quantum field theory but it’s unlike Peirce’s ur-continutiy because QFT
> pretty well assumes space/time are in some sense well defined. As soon as
> you start trying to deal with space/time more critically you end up having
> problems which is of course why string theory and other models like loop
> quantum gravity arose.
>
> Peirce’s ur-continuity largely is following a platonic emanation model and
> thus is logically *before* space and time. (Even space in the Timaeus is
> a much more abstract notion of receptacle even if it clearly is
> metaphorically tied to our experience of space) I think it’s therefore
> misleading to apply QFT to Peirce here.
>
> What fascinates me with this interpretation is that it changes the
> conception of God from the  person creator  we are used in standard
> Christianity and many other religions to a general process ontology…
>
>
> I’m not sure the creator in standard Christianity is a person-creator. At
> least as I understand most of the theology. I think the typical lay belief
> about creation is much more a bearded man making everything but that’s
> simply not what you encounter in Augustine, Aquinas, Duns Scotus or others.
> This gets into my comment last week between God as Being or source of Being
> versus God as intervening being.
>
> The process view that I think comes closest to Peirce is a kind of halfway
> point between the two views in traditional Christianity. It’s not really
> being or ground but neither is it really an intervening being. (That’s
> especially true in Peirce’s real but not existing view)
>
> An other way of putting this is to look at the various forms of
> Christian/Platonism that were less traditional. So gnosticism had the
> Platonic One as God and also had Jesus but had Plato’s demiurge as a kind
> of evil in between being. (Often associated by them with the God of the Old
> Testament for various reasons) You get similar ideas in a more positive way
> in Kabbalism with the En Sof as the platonic One and Adam Kadmon being
> similar to the demiurge. The logic of God that Peirce seems focused on is
> the demiurge even though he breaks it into three components. Although again
> that’s not without precedence. The various gnostic groups often got
> complicated in their emanation theories. The 12th century Kabbalisms tied
> Adam Kadmon to the Sefiroth or a set of 10 complicated emanations.
>
> building on phenomenology in its metaphysics and thus allows for the
> qualitative sciences in a sort of non-reductive view of all the sciences
> that is not fundamentally opposing as spiritual world view and it makes a
> lot of theory of meditation plausible, which we have not between able to
> handle physiologically or psychologically  so far.
>
>
> Not quite sure what you mean here.
>
> Thus it allows a dialog between science and spirituality and leaves the
> theist religions to faith, as I think they should. The subjective relation
> with the divine should in  my view be a personal  thing. The possibility of
> it not.
>
>
> I’m not sure I agree here. I think faith has a complicated role in Peirce.
> I think Peirce’s view of the theistic religions, especially Christianity,
> was that it shouldn’t be left to faith typically. That is there’s a
> functional faith tied to inquiry and evolution Peirce saw as valuable.
> There’s an other type of faith that cuts off inquiry that Peirce would see
> as closer to accepting dogmatism and far from praiseworthy.
>
>
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:23 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:
> 
> Quantum filed theory seems to have arrived at such a foundational 
> ur-continuity. 

I’m not sure that’s right. There’s certainly a type of continuity in quantum 
field theory but it’s unlike Peirce’s ur-continutiy because QFT pretty well 
assumes space/time are in some sense well defined. As soon as you start trying 
to deal with space/time more critically you end up having problems which is of 
course why string theory and other models like loop quantum gravity arose.

Peirce’s ur-continuity largely is following a platonic emanation model and thus 
is logically before space and time. (Even space in the Timaeus is a much more 
abstract notion of receptacle even if it clearly is metaphorically tied to our 
experience of space) I think it’s therefore misleading to apply QFT to Peirce 
here.

> What fascinates me with this interpretation is that it changes the conception 
> of God from the  person creator  we are used in standard Christianity and 
> many other religions to a general process ontology…

I’m not sure the creator in standard Christianity is a person-creator. At least 
as I understand most of the theology. I think the typical lay belief about 
creation is much more a bearded man making everything but that’s simply not 
what you encounter in Augustine, Aquinas, Duns Scotus or others. This gets into 
my comment last week between God as Being or source of Being versus God as 
intervening being.

The process view that I think comes closest to Peirce is a kind of halfway 
point between the two views in traditional Christianity. It’s not really being 
or ground but neither is it really an intervening being. (That’s especially 
true in Peirce’s real but not existing view)

An other way of putting this is to look at the various forms of 
Christian/Platonism that were less traditional. So gnosticism had the Platonic 
One as God and also had Jesus but had Plato’s demiurge as a kind of evil in 
between being. (Often associated by them with the God of the Old Testament for 
various reasons) You get similar ideas in a more positive way in Kabbalism with 
the En Sof as the platonic One and Adam Kadmon being similar to the demiurge. 
The logic of God that Peirce seems focused on is the demiurge even though he 
breaks it into three components. Although again that’s not without precedence. 
The various gnostic groups often got complicated in their emanation theories. 
The 12th century Kabbalisms tied Adam Kadmon to the Sefiroth or a set of 10 
complicated emanations.

> building on phenomenology in its metaphysics and thus allows for the 
> qualitative sciences in a sort of non-reductive view of all the sciences that 
> is not fundamentally opposing as spiritual world view and it makes a lot of 
> theory of meditation plausible, which we have not between able to handle 
> physiologically or psychologically  so far. 

Not quite sure what you mean here.

> Thus it allows a dialog between science and spirituality and leaves the 
> theist religions to faith, as I think they should. The subjective relation 
> with the divine should in  my view be a personal  thing. The possibility of 
> it not.

I’m not sure I agree here. I think faith has a complicated role in Peirce. I 
think Peirce’s view of the theistic religions, especially Christianity, was 
that it shouldn’t be left to faith typically. That is there’s a functional 
faith tied to inquiry and evolution Peirce saw as valuable. There’s an other 
type of faith that cuts off inquiry that Peirce would see as closer to 
accepting dogmatism and far from praiseworthy.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon, List

1) An IF-THEN argument, as you have set it up, removes the conditional and 
interpretive factor inherent in an IF-THEN argument. That's because you have 
inserted a moral condition, that suggests that IF one doesn't accept the  THEN 
assertions in the list you provided, THEN, it suggests that Peirce's comments 
were lies. But the NA paper still has to be interpreted, - something you reject 
- and I do not interpret the term 'God' as you do - with your quite literal and 
theist reading.

2) I repeat: the definitions, if taken literally,  in the 1908 NA paper do not 
correlate with Peirce's earlier writings on the emergence of Mind and Matter; 
the role of chance; the role of habit-formation. That is why I introduce the 
suggestion of metaphor - 

3) Your 'substitution' of 'universes' for 'categories' made no sense, as I 
originally tried to explain to you - and failed, since you rarely accept any of 
my comments as having any validity. And I don't agree with your new view - that 
the universes are 'phenomenological and/or metaphysical manifestations of the 
Categories'.  The Categories stand quite well on their own in a 
phenomenological and metaphysical manner.

4) No- we don't agree on the 'principle of charity' since it seems, to me at 
least, empty because it can serve, incorrectly, to justify any interpretation.

5) I totally and absolutely reject your view that 'not judging is itself a 
judgment'. That's pure semantic sophistry. 

You are essentially saying that, for example, there is no difference between: 
'murdering a man, and that same man dying naturally in his bed'. After all, to 
you, there is no practical difference [since that man is dead in both 
instances] and therefore, for you, there is no conceptual difference. I don't 
agree.

In addition, you reject the statistical reality of neutrality - which would 
foul up a LOT of scientific evaluations! In X-case, a population makes a 
decision about Y. ...based on a scale of 1 to 5. The value of '3' is NEUTRAL 
and is a valid statistic, suggestion NO JUDGMENT. Your one-dimenstional 
binarism rejects neutrality.  For you - everything MUST be a judgment; you 
either accept or reject. I don't agree with this.

6) As for your conclusion that I'm in the  minority - well, that's another 
statistical flaw since of course, you don't know - and the 'well-chosen 
average' is not always right.

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:42 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


  1) What?  I never said anything about "what [I interpret as his meaning]"; 
those are your words, which you inserted into my conditional comment--IF Peirce 
wrote what he meant and meant what he wrote, THEN it is incontrovertible that 
in 1908 he believed that God as Ens necessarium was the Creator of all three 
Universes of Experience and all of their contents, without exception.  His 
words to this effect are quite plain and unambiguous in all four of the quotes 
that I provided.  By claiming that they are somehow "metaphorical," you have 
effectively conceded that your view is that Peirce DID NOT write what he meant 
or mean what he wrote.


  2) With all due respect, this is very poor argumentation on your part.  You 
cannot correlate the four 1908 statements with Peirce's earlier cosmological 
writings, so they simply must be "metaphorical"; i.e., pertaining to "the 
experience of life" (whatever that means) rather than the origin and order of 
our existing universe, despite explicitly calling God the Creator of everything 
in all three Universes.  And you simply assert this, without offering any 
justification from the texts whatsoever.


  To set the record straight, I never used the word "rejection" or "rejected" 
with respect to the three Categories; I speculated that Peirce had substituted 
"Universes" for "Categories" in his late writings, asked the List community for 
help in evaluating this hypothesis, and ultimately withdrew it when confronted 
with the fact that Peirce continued to write at length about the Categories in 
the 1907 drafts of "Pragmatism."  My revised view--which just goes to show that 
some of us are willing and able to change our minds based on the discussions 
here--is that the Universes are phenomenological and/or metaphysical 
manifestations of the Categories.  That makes sense not only in "A Neglected 
Argument," but also in the 23 December 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby, where 
Peirce similarly defined three Universes and then assigned his ten semeiotic 
trichotomies to them as Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants.  You cannot 
have it both ways--if the Universes have nothing to do with the Categories, 
then neither do these divisions of signs and their relations.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually agree 
> with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a process 
> theology perspective.  Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or 
> necessitarianism, as he usually called it--but I think that he did view God 
> as First Cause in the specific sense of Ens necessarium, since he said so 
> explicitly in "A Neglected Argument," its additaments, and the associated 
> manuscript drafts.

It’s worth noting that Peirce’s notions of vagueness in ontology (as opposed to 
epistemology/logic) combined with his ontology of chance tend to significantly 
change the meaning of both causation and ens necessarium. Especially relative 
to how most thought even in the 19th century.

> 
> ET:  The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and 
> evolution of matter/mind ...
> 
> I do not see how we can attribute "agential force" to chance or Firstness, 
> when in Peirce's thought--even in conjunction with Brute reaction or 
> Secondness--it is pure nothing in the absence of continuity or Thirdness.

I suspect there’s some talking past one an other here. Given Peirce’s semiotic 
realism rather than a more traditional substance ontology (or even monads of 
process such as in Leibniz and perhaps Spinoza) it’s worth asking what ‘agent’ 
means. 

Without speaking for Edwina I suspect she means by agent something different 
from how you may be taking her.

I think due to the nature of Peirce’s idea of continuity in his semiotics and 
ontology any ‘agent’ can always be further analyzed as made up of ‘smaller’ 
bits of firstness, secondness, and thirdness.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-03 Thread Søren Brier

Gary, list

Quantum filed theory seems to have arrived at such a foundational 
ur-continuity. What fascinates me with this interpretation is that it changes 
the conception of God from the  person creator  we are used in standard 
Christianity and many other religions to a general process ontology that is 
compatible with  a semiotically informed science og which biosemiotics is one, 
and at the same time it integrates the “normative” sciences  building on 
phenomenology in its metaphysics and thus allows for the qualitative sciences 
in a sort of non-reductive view of all the sciences that is not fundamentally 
opposing as spiritual world view and it makes a lot of theory of meditation 
plausible, which we have not between able to handle physiologically or 
psychologically  so far. Thus it allows a dialog between science and 
spirituality and leaves the theist religions to faith, as I think they should. 
The subjective relation with the divine should in  my view be a personal  
thing. The possibility of it not.

   Best
  Søren

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 3. november 2016 05:05
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Soren, Jon, List.

Soren wrote:

But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the 
tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so 
Well in Natural propositions and feeling is present in all matter (Hylozoism) 
and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero. . .

Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following the 
creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely speak) is 
*not* the same as the 3ns which is the ur-continuity represented by the black 
board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It seems to me that much hinges 
on whether or not one sees our Universe as presupposing this ur-continuity 
(nothing in particular but everything in general, with yet a tendency toward 
habit-taking because of this ur-continuity, otherwise termed the zero of pure 
potential, which is, for Peirce, certainly not "nothing at all").

It has further been noted that Peirce suggests that the Creator is, or in some 
way participates, in this ur-continuity. Once *this* Universe is "in effect," 
then, yes, all that you and Stjernfelt argue may follow (although, I remain, as 
was Peirce, I firmly believe, a theist and not a panentheist, so I tend to 
reject that part of your argumentation, at least in consideration of the early 
cosmos).

Best,

Gary R

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690>

On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 7:41 PM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
Jon, List


But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the 
tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so 
Well in Natural propositions and feeling is present in all matter (Hylozoism) 
and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero, why should its 
self-organization not match Eckhart’s idea of Jesus consciousness born in every 
man, if  “the father” is pure Zero and the holy spirit or ghost  is thirdness 
as self-organization, meaning that human consciousness as the aware man  is the 
living conscious realization in the flesh of the origin of our  being? Peirce’s 
naturalization encompassed pure Zero as the transcendental a part of nature and 
us. It fits a form of Gnostic panentheism, is my abduction. It fits with his 
mystical experience. It is esoterical  pure mysticism encompassing rationality 
and science without a  conscious personal creator. The basic postulate is that 
we can have access to the Godhead through a developed consciousness. This is 
basically what Bhakti Vedanta and much of Buddhism – and in my view Meister 
Eckhart in Christianity – say, and why he was excommunicated from the Catholic 
church, because he was – as many scholars has pointed out – too close to Adi 
Shankara’s thinking. It is pretty much Suzuki’s point of view too 
http://terebess.hu/zen/mesterek/d-t-suzuki-mysticism-christian-and-buddhist.pdf 
and he was hired by Paul Carus the editor of the Monist. Of cause we here have 
Emerson and the trandscendentalist’s view too.

  Best
  Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 2. november 2016 22:43
To: John F Sowa
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

John, List:

The question still arises of what to make of the statement in John's Gospel 
that "the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us."  Neither nature nor its laws 
can be substitute

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Clark, List:

All good points, thanks.

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 1:15 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 10:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> CG:  As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the
> historic ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical
> ones (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending
> arguments beyond where Peirce took them).
>
>
> I agree, and I have tried to stick to the first issue in these discussions.
>
> CG:  As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s razor a charitable reading
> doesn’t guarantee a correct reading. Often charitable readings transform a
> philosopher’s arguments into something other than they intended in order to
> make it function better. I tend to think that while we must read with a
> hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a hermeneutic of suspicion.
> Typically multiple readings are possible and we should be careful
> eliminating them without justification.
>
>
> I agree with this, as well, although it is probably quite evident by now
> that when in doubt I am inclined to err on the side of charity.  I would
> not be surprised if there is an argument to be made that Peirce's
> cosmological views significantly *changed* sometime between 1888 and
> 1908; the problem is that no one has even tried to make that case yet.  I
> might still disagree--again, like Parker, I see the later writings as
> *continuous *with the earlier ones, reflecting further development and
> clarification of Peirce's ideas--but I could then at least recognize it as a
>  *defensible *position, unlike "no comment."
>
> I confess I tend to favor keeping open a plurality of readings. Likewise
> when it seems the strength of argument is weaker (as is especially the case
> with metaphysical arguments) I think we have to acknowledge that. We might
> say something is the best reading yet still a weak one. This is important
> in some places such as say Higher Criticism where frankly the data out of
> which arguments are made is quite weak. (I bring that up given your quote
> about Peirce and Higher Criticism this morning)
>
> So to me erring on the side of charity is problematic if it reduces the
> number of defensible readings too much. (Keeping defensible somewhat vague
> since that’s usually a matter of debate in any particular set of readings)
>
> I think there is an argument that Peirce’s cosmology changed between 1888
> and 1908. His adoption of modal realism during the later 1890’s is the
> clearest part of that. I think that a pretty significant change to his
> cosmology. But despite thinking that even if he didn’t adopt a full
> throated modal realism I think elements of it are in the logic of his
> arguments well before 1895-6. That is if we take many of his arguments as
> carefully vague in key parts then the adoption modal realism can help
> determine them.
>
> An other way of putting my concern here really is in taking Peirce’s logic
> of vagueness seriously when considering charity. My experience especially
> with people in the analytic tradition such as Davidson is that they don’t
> pay sufficient attention to these elements of vagueness in terms of meaning
> and intentionality. This becomes important when part of a reading/argument
> is tied to reference to real things where we can peel back the vagueness.
> So any author in their intents because they can refer can have the meaning
> of their arguments be fuller than their understanding of their arguments.
> Again this is due to the nature of reference and vagueness.
>
> I think this is pretty important relative to Peirce’s fundamental ontology
> and cosmology. I was actually critical for a long time of some elements of
> Kelly Parker’s argument that I’ve since rethought due to this logic of
> vagueness. A good example might be his appeal in the early Peirce (the
> pre-1880 writings) to Kant’s categories and Being and Substance being the
> unthinkable limits of the categories. I initially thought it was
> inappropriate to take those early writings and tie them to later writings.
> Now I’m not so sure and think Kant informs Peirce quite a bit more than I
> was willing to concede.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

ET:  I would expect Jon S to disagree.

While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually agree
with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a
process theology perspective.  Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or
necessitarianism, as he usually called it--but I think that he did view God
as First Cause in the specific sense of *Ens necessarium*, since he said so
explicitly in "A Neglected Argument," its additaments, and the associated
manuscript drafts.

ET:  The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence
and evolution of matter/mind ...

I do not see how we can attribute "agential force" to chance or Firstness,
when in Peirce's thought--even in conjunction with Brute reaction or
Secondness--it is *pure nothing* in the absence of continuity or Thirdness.

CSP:  Thus, when I speak of chance, I only employ a mathematical term to
express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity. Permit
me further to say that I object to having my metaphysical system as a whole
called Tychism. For although tychism does enter into it, it only enters as
subsidiary to that which is really, as I regard it, the characteristic of
my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness,
and, in order to secure to thirdness its really commanding function, I find
it indispensable fully [to] recognize that it is a third, and that
Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other
elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have
anything upon which to operate. Accordingly, I like to call my theory
Synechism, because it rests on the study of continuity. (CP 6.201-202; 1898)

CSP:  We start, then, with nothing, pure zero … It is the germinal nothing,
in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is
absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility—boundless possibility. There
is no compulsion and no law … Now the question arises, what necessarily
resulted from that state of things? But the only sane answer is that where
freedom was boundless nothing in particular necessarily resulted. (CP
6.217-218; 1898)

Chance as Firstness is "freedom or spontaneity," rather than randomness or
inexplicability; and it is something upon which, along with Brute reaction
as Secondness, continuity as Thirdness operates in exercising "its really
commanding function."  I thus equate it with *divine* freedom or
spontaneity--but I do not insist that this is the *only *viable
interpretation.

CSP:  Those who express the idea to themselves by saying that the Divine
Creator determined so and so may be incautiously clothing the idea in a
garb that is open to criticism, but it is, after all, substantially the
only philosophical answer to the problem. (CP 6.199; 1898)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Clark, list:
>
> Agreed, that the term of 'god' in Peirce, at least in my interpretation,
> is more akin to the god-in-process 'theology' [or I prefer
> Nature-in-process'] rather than a priori determinism or First Cause. I
> would expect Jon S to disagree.
>
> The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and
> evolution of matter/mind - and of Thirdness as a process of habit formation
> - and of complexity of interactions within the triadic semiosic network
> can't be overlooked.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 10:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> CG:  As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the 
> historic ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical 
> ones (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments 
> beyond where Peirce took them).
> 
> I agree, and I have tried to stick to the first issue in these discussions.
> 
> CG:  As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s razor a charitable reading doesn’t 
> guarantee a correct reading. Often charitable readings transform a 
> philosopher’s arguments into something other than they intended in order to 
> make it function better. I tend to think that while we must read with a 
> hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a hermeneutic of suspicion. 
> Typically multiple readings are possible and we should be careful eliminating 
> them without justification.
> 
> I agree with this, as well, although it is probably quite evident by now that 
> when in doubt I am inclined to err on the side of charity.  I would not be 
> surprised if there is an argument to be made that Peirce's cosmological views 
> significantly changed sometime between 1888 and 1908; the problem is that no 
> one has even tried to make that case yet.  I might still disagree--again, 
> like Parker, I see the later writings as continuous with the earlier ones, 
> reflecting further development and clarification of Peirce's ideas--but I 
> could then at least recognize it as a defensible position, unlike "no 
> comment."

I confess I tend to favor keeping open a plurality of readings. Likewise when 
it seems the strength of argument is weaker (as is especially the case with 
metaphysical arguments) I think we have to acknowledge that. We might say 
something is the best reading yet still a weak one. This is important in some 
places such as say Higher Criticism where frankly the data out of which 
arguments are made is quite weak. (I bring that up given your quote about 
Peirce and Higher Criticism this morning)

So to me erring on the side of charity is problematic if it reduces the number 
of defensible readings too much. (Keeping defensible somewhat vague since 
that’s usually a matter of debate in any particular set of readings)

I think there is an argument that Peirce’s cosmology changed between 1888 and 
1908. His adoption of modal realism during the later 1890’s is the clearest 
part of that. I think that a pretty significant change to his cosmology. But 
despite thinking that even if he didn’t adopt a full throated modal realism I 
think elements of it are in the logic of his arguments well before 1895-6. That 
is if we take many of his arguments as carefully vague in key parts then the 
adoption modal realism can help determine them.

An other way of putting my concern here really is in taking Peirce’s logic of 
vagueness seriously when considering charity. My experience especially with 
people in the analytic tradition such as Davidson is that they don’t pay 
sufficient attention to these elements of vagueness in terms of meaning and 
intentionality. This becomes important when part of a reading/argument is tied 
to reference to real things where we can peel back the vagueness. So any author 
in their intents because they can refer can have the meaning of their arguments 
be fuller than their understanding of their arguments. Again this is due to the 
nature of reference and vagueness.

I think this is pretty important relative to Peirce’s fundamental ontology and 
cosmology. I was actually critical for a long time of some elements of Kelly 
Parker’s argument that I’ve since rethought due to this logic of vagueness. A 
good example might be his appeal in the early Peirce (the pre-1880 writings) to 
Kant’s categories and Being and Substance being the unthinkable limits of the 
categories. I initially thought it was inappropriate to take those early 
writings and tie them to later writings. Now I’m not so sure and think Kant 
informs Peirce quite a bit more than I was willing to concede.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-03 Thread Jerry Rhee

Jon, Edwina, list:

I would like to recommend a method to help you clarify your meaning.  To
ascertain the meaning of your current intellectual conception, one should
consider what practical consequences might result from the truth of that
conception—and the sum of these consequences constitute the entire meaning
of that conception.

That is, I recommend a method of reflexion which is guided by constantly
holding in view its purpose and the purpose of the ideas it analyzes,
whether these ends be of the nature and uses of action or of thought.

Here it is:

Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings
*you* conceive
the object of *your* conception to have: then the general mental habit that
consists in the production of these effects is the whole meaning of *your*
concept.

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings,
*we* conceive
the object of *our* conception to have. Then, *our* conception of these
effects is the whole of *our *conception of the object.

Note that in these three lines one finds, “conceivably,” “conceive,”
“conception,” “conception,” “*conception*.” Now I find there are many
people who detect the authorship of my unsigned screeds; and I doubt not
that one of the marks of my style by which they do so is my inordinate
reluctance to repeat a word. This employment five times over of derivates
of concipere must then have had a purpose.

So now…that settles it, eh?

Let us do well and fare well.

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Clark, list:
>
> Agreed, that the term of 'god' in Peirce, at least in my interpretation,
> is more akin to the god-in-process 'theology' [or I prefer
> Nature-in-process'] rather than a priori determinism or First Cause. I
> would expect Jon S to disagree.
>
> The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and
> evolution of matter/mind - and of Thirdness as a process of habit formation
> - and of complexity of interactions within the triadic semiosic network
> can't be overlooked.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU>
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:26 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
>
> I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of
> 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this
> 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang
> Thirdness.
>
> But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we
> are moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal
> beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching
> for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs.
>
>
> I tend to think we’re getting to the limits of Peirce here although I
> think there is considerable textual evidence in Peirce for an
> ur-continuity. Again Kelly Parker has pretty compelling arguments here for
> Peirce’s beliefs. Peirce speaks of a creator in numerous places but clearly
> he means something different from the first cause of Duns Scotus or
> Aristotle due to the place of chance in his ontology. As we’ve discussed
> over the past weeks his creator is more akin to the God in process theology
> or perhaps a process reading of Spinoza.
>
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
>
> My response to his NA is not to ignore it but to acknowledge that I cannot
> interpret it within his full body of work - which includes his earlier
> writings. Note - I am not ignoring it; I cannot correlate it except as
> * metaphoric*, with his earlier writings.
>
>
> I think accepting a break between the early works and later works is fine
> when we can’t reconcile them. However I think the NA is quite reconcilable
> with most of his work from what era of say 1896 forward. At least I don’t
> see the contradictions. We may not like what he says, but I confess I don’t
> quite understand the treating it as metaphoric. That seems a bit of a dodge.
>
> As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the historic
> ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical ones
> (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments
> beyond where Peirce took them). I’ll confess I find the more platonic
> aspects of Peirce a little harder to accept and the arguments certainly
> weaker than his main doctrines. But I have to concede the arguments for
> Peirce having held them are quite strong and hard for me to di

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Clark, list:

Agreed, that the term of 'god' in Peirce, at least in my interpretation, is 
more akin to the god-in-process 'theology' [or I prefer Nature-in-process'] 
rather than a priori determinism or First Cause. I would expect Jon S to 
disagree.

The vital importance of chance as an agential force in the emergence and 
evolution of matter/mind - and of Thirdness as a process of habit formation - 
and of complexity of interactions within the triadic semiosic network can't be 
overlooked.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:26 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)




On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of 
'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this 'ur-continuity'. 
Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang Thirdness.

But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we 
are moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal beliefs 
about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching for and 
'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs.


  I tend to think we’re getting to the limits of Peirce here although I think 
there is considerable textual evidence in Peirce for an ur-continuity. Again 
Kelly Parker has pretty compelling arguments here for Peirce’s beliefs. Peirce 
speaks of a creator in numerous places but clearly he means something different 
from the first cause of Duns Scotus or Aristotle due to the place of chance in 
his ontology. As we’ve discussed over the past weeks his creator is more akin 
to the God in process theology or perhaps a process reading of Spinoza.




On Nov 3, 2016, at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


My response to his NA is not to ignore it but to acknowledge that I cannot 
interpret it within his full body of work - which includes his earlier 
writings. Note - I am not ignoring it; I cannot correlate it except as 
metaphoric, with his earlier writings.


  I think accepting a break between the early works and later works is fine 
when we can’t reconcile them. However I think the NA is quite reconcilable with 
most of his work from what era of say 1896 forward. At least I don’t see the 
contradictions. We may not like what he says, but I confess I don’t quite 
understand the treating it as metaphoric. That seems a bit of a dodge.



  As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the historic 
ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical ones (whether 
particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments beyond where 
Peirce took them). I’ll confess I find the more platonic aspects of Peirce a 
little harder to accept and the arguments certainly weaker than his main 
doctrines. But I have to concede the arguments for Peirce having held them are 
quite strong and hard for me to disbelieve.


On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
wrote:


Are you not familiar with "the principle of charity"?  It is not a 
"sanctimonious claim" that I invented; it is a legitimate, well-established, 
and widely endorsed method of interpretation.  Per Wikipedia, "In philosophy 
and rhetoric, the principle of charity requires interpreting a speaker's 
statements to be rational and, in the case of any argument, considering its 
best, strongest possible interpretation."  As Donald Davidson put it, "We make 
maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way 
that optimises agreement."  So we assume that "A Neglected Argument," for 
example, is fully consistent with everything else that Peirce wrote--unless and 
until the evidence compels us to conclude otherwise.


  I think we have to be careful here. As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s 
razor a charitable reading doesn’t guarantee a correct reading. Often 
charitable readings transform a philosopher’s arguments into something other 
than they intended in order to make it function better. I tend to think that 
while we must read with a hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a 
hermeneutic of suspicion. Typically multiple readings are possible and we 
should be careful eliminating them without justification.




--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Clark, List:

CG:  As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the
historic ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical
ones (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending
arguments beyond where Peirce took them).


I agree, and I have tried to stick to the first issue in these discussions.

CG:  As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s razor a charitable reading
doesn’t guarantee a correct reading. Often charitable readings transform a
philosopher’s arguments into something other than they intended in order to
make it function better. I tend to think that while we must read with a
hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a hermeneutic of suspicion.
Typically multiple readings are possible and we should be careful
eliminating them without justification.


I agree with this, as well, although it is probably quite evident by now
that when in doubt I am inclined to err on the side of charity.  I would
not be surprised if there is an argument to be made that Peirce's
cosmological views significantly *changed* sometime between 1888 and 1908;
the problem is that no one has even tried to make that case yet.  I might
still disagree--again, like Parker, I see the later writings as *continuous
*with the earlier ones, reflecting further development and clarification of
Peirce's ideas--but I could then at least recognize it as a
*defensible *position,
unlike "no comment."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 11:26 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of
> 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this
> 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang
> Thirdness.
>
> But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we
> are moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal
> beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching
> for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs.
>
> I tend to think we’re getting to the limits of Peirce here although I
> think there is considerable textual evidence in Peirce for an
> ur-continuity. Again Kelly Parker has pretty compelling arguments here for
> Peirce’s beliefs. Peirce speaks of a creator in numerous places but clearly
> he means something different from the first cause of Duns Scotus or
> Aristotle due to the place of chance in his ontology. As we’ve discussed
> over the past weeks his creator is more akin to the God in process theology
> or perhaps a process reading of Spinoza.
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> My response to his NA is not to ignore it but to acknowledge that I cannot
> interpret it within his full body of work - which includes his earlier
> writings. Note - I am not ignoring it; I cannot correlate it except as
> * metaphoric*, with his earlier writings.
>
> I think accepting a break between the early works and later works is fine
> when we can’t reconcile them. However I think the NA is quite reconcilable
> with most of his work from what era of say 1896 forward. At least I don’t
> see the contradictions. We may not like what he says, but I confess I don’t
> quite understand the treating it as metaphoric. That seems a bit of a dodge.
>
> As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the historic
> ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical ones
> (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments
> beyond where Peirce took them). I’ll confess I find the more platonic
> aspects of Peirce a little harder to accept and the arguments certainly
> weaker than his main doctrines. But I have to concede the arguments for
> Peirce having held them are quite strong and hard for me to disbelieve.
>
> On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Are you not familiar with "the principle of charity"?  It is not a
> "sanctimonious claim" that I invented; it is a legitimate,
> well-established, and widely endorsed method of interpretation.  Per
> Wikipedia, "In philosophy and rhetoric, the principle of charity requires
> interpreting a speaker's statements to be rational and, in the case of any
> argument, considering its best, strongest possible interpretation."  As
> Donald Davidson put it, "We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of
> others when we interpret in a way that optimises agreement."  So we assume
> that "A Neglected Argument," for example, is *fully consistent* with 
> *everything
> else* that Peirce wrote--unless and until the evidence *compels* us to
> conclude otherwise.
>
> I think we have to be careful here. As

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

accurately
> reflects my considered views'. All it does it reflect what i wrote
> yesterday.  To insert 'more accurately' suggests a mechanical process of
> Mind where the words are supposed to 'accurately match' the Mind's
> content!!!. I don't see Mind operating that  way. As I said, I am quite
> able to fritter nonsense today - while my work of 20 years ago - might have
> been functional. There is NO EVIDENCE of a linear progression of anyone's
> Mind or work.
>
> I don't subscribe to your theory that the content of my mind is 'set'; I
> can change my mind. I can evolve a theory; I can reject a perspective.  And
> this doesn't involve 'harmonization'.
>
> 4) The difference between 'rejection' and 'no comment' is obvious. The
> former is an action of deliberate rejection of content, it is a JUDGMENT.
> The latter is - no action and no judgment.
>
> 5) I don't consider that the NA has anything to do with Peirce's long
> analyses of the emergence and evolution of matter/mind.
>
> And as I said - in my statement that this type of argument goes nowhere
> and has little to do with Peirce - that's exactly what is happening now.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:18 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> 1) How does expressing a common-sense assumption about any author's
> writings constitute "almost a threat"?
>
> 2) How do you "metaphorically" interpret these rather straightforward
> statements by Peirce, all written in 1908 (emphases in original)?
>
>1. The word 'God,' so 'capitalized' (as we Americans say), is the
>definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief
>Really creator of all three Universes of Experience.
>2. I do *not *mean, then, a "soul of the World" or an intelligence is
>"immanent" in Nature, but is the Creator of the three Universes of minds,
>of matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of everything in them.
>3. Indeed, meaning by "God," as throughout this paper will be meant,
>the Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him,
>omniscience, omnipotence, infinite benignity, a Being *not *"immanent
>in" the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every
>content of them without exception ...
>4. But I had better add that I do *not *mean by God a being merely
>"immanent in Nature," but I mean that Being who has created every content
>of the world of ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and
>the world of all minds, without any exception whatever.
>
> 3) Okay, but you also have not shown that "A Neglected Argument" is 
> *irreconcilable
> *with Peirce's earlier cosmological writings.
>
> 4) Acknowledging that something you wrote yesterday more accurately
> presents your considered views does not *nullify *what you wrote twenty
> years ago--unless you *changed your mind* during the intervening two
> decades.  As I have said before, that is one viable explanation that would
> be consistent with your view on this matter--Peirce *changed his mind*
> sometime between 1887-1888 and 1908.  All I have tried to show is that such
> an explanation is not *necessary*; i.e., it is *possible *to harmonize 
> *everything
> *that Peirce wrote about the origin and order of our existing
> universe--and therefore *preferable* to do so, rather than positing a
> *discontinuity* in the development of his thought (more below).
>
> 5) Previously you stated, "I admit that I can't explain the NA - and I
> don't even attempt to do so."  You also stated, "I said, and repeat, that I
> have *no comment* on the NA, since I don't find that it fits in with the
> emergence-evolution arguments found elsewhere in Peirce."  I then
> asked what *practical *effects are different between "rejection" and "no
> comment," besides the words that we use for them; but I never got an
> answer.  Now you are claiming that you interpret "A Neglected Argument"
> *metaphorically*, whatever that means (see above).
>
> Are you not familiar with "the principle of charity"?  It is not a
> "sanctimonious claim" that I invented; it is a legitimate,
> well-established, and widely endorsed method of interpretation.  Per
> Wikipedia, "In philosophy and rhetoric, the principle of charity requires
> interpreting a speaker's statements to be rational a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of 
> 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this 
> 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang 
> Thirdness.
>  
> But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we are 
> moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal beliefs 
> about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching for and 
> 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs.

I tend to think we’re getting to the limits of Peirce here although I think 
there is considerable textual evidence in Peirce for an ur-continuity. Again 
Kelly Parker has pretty compelling arguments here for Peirce’s beliefs. Peirce 
speaks of a creator in numerous places but clearly he means something different 
from the first cause of Duns Scotus or Aristotle due to the place of chance in 
his ontology. As we’ve discussed over the past weeks his creator is more akin 
to the God in process theology or perhaps a process reading of Spinoza.

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 8:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> My response to his NA is not to ignore it but to acknowledge that I cannot 
> interpret it within his full body of work - which includes his earlier 
> writings. Note - I am not ignoring it; I cannot correlate it except as 
> metaphoric, with his earlier writings.

I think accepting a break between the early works and later works is fine when 
we can’t reconcile them. However I think the NA is quite reconcilable with most 
of his work from what era of say 1896 forward. At least I don’t see the 
contradictions. We may not like what he says, but I confess I don’t quite 
understand the treating it as metaphoric. That seems a bit of a dodge.

As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the historic ones 
(what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical ones (whether 
particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments beyond where 
Peirce took them). I’ll confess I find the more platonic aspects of Peirce a 
little harder to accept and the arguments certainly weaker than his main 
doctrines. But I have to concede the arguments for Peirce having held them are 
quite strong and hard for me to disbelieve.

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Are you not familiar with "the principle of charity"?  It is not a 
> "sanctimonious claim" that I invented; it is a legitimate, well-established, 
> and widely endorsed method of interpretation.  Per Wikipedia, "In philosophy 
> and rhetoric, the principle of charity requires interpreting a speaker's 
> statements to be rational and, in the case of any argument, considering its 
> best, strongest possible interpretation."  As Donald Davidson put it, "We 
> make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a 
> way that optimises agreement."  So we assume that "A Neglected Argument," for 
> example, is fully consistent with everything else that Peirce wrote--unless 
> and until the evidence compels us to conclude otherwise.

I think we have to be careful here. As sympathetic as I am to Davidson’s razor 
a charitable reading doesn’t guarantee a correct reading. Often charitable 
readings transform a philosopher’s arguments into something other than they 
intended in order to make it function better. I tend to think that while we 
must read with a hermeneutics of charity we must also read with a hermeneutic 
of suspicion. Typically multiple readings are possible and we should be careful 
eliminating them without justification.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Clark, List

yes, I'd agree; even now we can't be sure that 'the Big Bang' is an 'absolute 
beginning' and as you note - we still haven't figured out the notion of time.

I'd also agree with your "the universe in its role as a sign is developing 
simultaneously historically and logically.". And a requirement of  that 
semiosic development is the role of the Three Categories - which includes 
totally novel chance events as well as habits of organization.

Yes - I'd add that we can't say that our 'Mind' and its analyses over time is 
'an essentially ordered series' or includes 'accidental' influences which may 
or may not move into habits of thought. That means that one cannot declare that 
a 'later work' 'more accurately reflects my analytic research' than an earlier 
work. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:51 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)




On Nov 2, 2016, at 10:05 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:


Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following 
the creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely 
speak) is *not* the same as the 3ns which is the ur-continuity represented by 
the black board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It seems to me that 
much hinges on whether or not one sees our Universe as presupposing this 
ur-continuity (nothing in particular but everything in general, with yet a 
tendency toward habit-taking because of this ur-continuity, otherwise termed 
the zero of pure potential, which is, for Peirce, certainly not "nothing at 
all").



  I’m not sure I’d agree about injecting the big bang into this. It seems to me 
Peirce’s at best ambiguous about a beginning to the universe. Admittedly he’s 
living before most of the interesting physical discoveries of the 20th century. 
But even among physicists these days the common view is that the big bang isn’t 
an absolute beginning.


  That said I do think we should distinguish, as the ancient platonists did, 
between logical relations in emanations and historic development. Of course 
this distinction blurs a bit given his semiotics is his logic yet the universe 
in its role as a sign is developing simultaneously historically and logically.


  I find Peirce’s fundamental ontology and cosmology the most problematic of 
his views (and perhaps the most separable). However if we take it as a logical 
analysis rather than a cosmological/temporal one then it is far more fruitful. 
As soon as you inject chance as an inherent ontological component of ones logic 
then that has a lot of implications I think Peirce traced out quite well. Most 
of the controversial aspects of his thought are natural consequences of holding 
to tychism and synechism.


  Fundamentally it leads to the problem of time which is a traditionally thorny 
issue. I’m not sure physics has figured it out despite the mathematics of 
general relativity. We really don’t understand the arrow of time and a lot 
else. The understanding of time Peirce had available to him was limited. There 
are a lot of thorny difficult problems here and it’s probably a place Peirce is 
less trustworthy in his analysis. 


  Interestingly there’s a famous argument by Duns Scotus against causes going 
backwards infinitely in time. I don’t know if Peirce mentions this although I’d 
assume he’d read it.


  
http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_I/D2/Q2B


  I should I don’t buy the argument although it is quite a good argument. 
However it hinges on the distinction between an essentially ordered series and 
accidental series.


--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 2, 2016, at 10:05 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following the 
> creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely speak) 
> is *not* the same as the 3ns which is the ur-continuity represented by the 
> black board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It seems to me that 
> much hinges on whether or not one sees our Universe as presupposing this 
> ur-continuity (nothing in particular but everything in general, with yet a 
> tendency toward habit-taking because of this ur-continuity, otherwise termed 
> the zero of pure potential, which is, for Peirce, certainly not "nothing at 
> all").

I’m not sure I’d agree about injecting the big bang into this. It seems to me 
Peirce’s at best ambiguous about a beginning to the universe. Admittedly he’s 
living before most of the interesting physical discoveries of the 20th century. 
But even among physicists these days the common view is that the big bang isn’t 
an absolute beginning.

That said I do think we should distinguish, as the ancient platonists did, 
between logical relations in emanations and historic development. Of course 
this distinction blurs a bit given his semiotics is his logic yet the universe 
in its role as a sign is developing simultaneously historically and logically.

I find Peirce’s fundamental ontology and cosmology the most problematic of his 
views (and perhaps the most separable). However if we take it as a logical 
analysis rather than a cosmological/temporal one then it is far more fruitful. 
As soon as you inject chance as an inherent ontological component of ones logic 
then that has a lot of implications I think Peirce traced out quite well. Most 
of the controversial aspects of his thought are natural consequences of holding 
to tychism and synechism.

Fundamentally it leads to the problem of time which is a traditionally thorny 
issue. I’m not sure physics has figured it out despite the mathematics of 
general relativity. We really don’t understand the arrow of time and a lot 
else. The understanding of time Peirce had available to him was limited. There 
are a lot of thorny difficult problems here and it’s probably a place Peirce is 
less trustworthy in his analysis. 

Interestingly there’s a famous argument by Duns Scotus against causes going 
backwards infinitely in time. I don’t know if Peirce mentions this although I’d 
assume he’d read it.

http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_I/D2/Q2B

I should I don’t buy the argument although it is quite a good argument. However 
it hinges on the distinction between an essentially ordered series and 
accidental series.
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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon - again, you are lifting words/phrases and inserting your own meanings.

1) To now claim that your statement that either a writer 'means what he says or 
doesn't' is a 'common-sense assumption is not the same as  'either he meant 
what [I interpret as his meaning] or he did not' - is not logical evidence - 
but almost a threat'. You are leaving out ''what I interpret as his meaning'.

2) Again, the definitions given in the NA do not, in my view, correlate with 
the emergence-evolution outlines of the universe given elsewhere in Peirce's 
works [not only 1.412, but the outlines of tychasm and agapasm and synechism]. 
Therefore, I can only conclude that they are metaphors for the experience of 
life. Not for the analysis of the triadic semiosic evolution of life. I 
therefore do not comment on them.

 I am aware that you tried, very hard, to suggest that the 'three universes of 
experience' were advanced analyses by Peirce [because written at a later date] 
and thus included the rejection of the Three Categories. My suggestion that the 
Three Universes of  Experience had nothing to do with the Three Categories, 
which were not rejected by Peirce [as you were trying to claim] was denied by 
you - but- eventually, you were persuaded by others [not by me] to  abandon 
this claim.

Beyond my suggestion that the NA is about the 'experience of life' - I have no 
comment as, yet again, I see no correlation with Peirce's arguments about the 
emergence and evolution of matter/mind in the universe. You attempt to 
correlate them; I don't see this interpretation as valid.

3) i do NOT acknowledge that what I wrote yesterday 'more accurately reflects 
my considered views'. All it does it reflect what i wrote yesterday.  To insert 
'more accurately' suggests a mechanical process of Mind where the words are 
supposed to 'accurately match' the Mind's content!!!. I don't see Mind 
operating that  way. As I said, I am quite able to fritter nonsense today - 
while my work of 20 years ago - might have been functional. There is NO 
EVIDENCE of a linear progression of anyone's Mind or work. 

I don't subscribe to your theory that the content of my mind is 'set'; I can 
change my mind. I can evolve a theory; I can reject a perspective.  And this 
doesn't involve 'harmonization'.

4) The difference between 'rejection' and 'no comment' is obvious. The former 
is an action of deliberate rejection of content, it is a JUDGMENT. The latter 
is - no action and no judgment.

5) I don't consider that the NA has anything to do with Peirce's long analyses 
of the emergence and evolution of matter/mind. 

And as I said - in my statement that this type of argument goes nowhere and has 
little to do with Peirce - that's exactly what is happening now.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:18 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


  1) How does expressing a common-sense assumption about any author's writings 
constitute "almost a threat"?


  2) How do you "metaphorically" interpret these rather straightforward 
statements by Peirce, all written in 1908 (emphases in original)?
1.. The word 'God,' so 'capitalized' (as we Americans say), is the 
definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really creator 
of all three Universes of Experience.

2.. I do not mean, then, a "soul of the World" or an intelligence is 
"immanent" in Nature, but is the Creator of the three Universes of minds, of 
matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of everything in them.

3.. Indeed, meaning by "God," as throughout this paper will be meant, the 
Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, 
omniscience, omnipotence, infinite benignity, a Being not "immanent in" the 
Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of 
them without exception ...

4.. But I had better add that I do not mean by God a being merely "immanent 
in Nature," but I mean that Being who has created every content of the world of 
ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and the world of all 
minds, without any exception whatever.
  3) Okay, but you also have not shown that "A Neglected Argument" is 
irreconcilable with Peirce's earlier cosmological writings.



  4) Acknowledging that something you wrote yesterday more accurately presents 
your considered views does not nullify what you wrote twenty years ago--unless 
you changed your mind during the intervening two decades.  As I have said 
before, that is one viable explanation that would be consistent with your view 
on this matter--Peirce changed his mind sometime between 1887-1888 and 1908.  
All I have tried to show is that such an explanation is not necessary; i.e., it 
is possible to ha

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

If Peirce wrote what he meant and meant what he wrote, then it is
incontrovertible that in 1908 he believed that God as *Ens necessarium *was
the Creator of all three Universes of Experience and all of their contents,
without exception.  By what valid method of interpretation can anyone
plausibly deny this?

You have admitted that your response to "A Neglected Argument" is to *ignore
*it, because you cannot explain it; it does not and cannot align with your
favored interpretation of Peirce's earlier cosmological writings.  I, on
the other hand, do not *reject* the latter, as you keep (wrongly) alleging;
on the contrary, as I have said before, I seek to *harmonize *them with his
later writings, under the principle of charity--we should assume *consistency
*between two passages, unless there is no viable way to reconcile them.  At
the same time, I do believe that later writings should generally be given
priority over earlier ones, in accordance with the presupposition that they
reflect additional contemplation and refinement of the ideas discussed.
Again, which more accurately presents your considered views--something that
you wrote twenty years ago, or something that you wrote yesterday?

I hope you realize that the sword you are now wielding cuts both ways.  The
FACT that you, yourself, are a firm non-believer in such a 'pre-existent
Creator' seems to me, to encourage you to declare that Peirce, without
proof, rejected his later writings.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:46 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, list - and that's my point. You insist that 'there is really no
> debating whether he (at least eventually) believed that there is a
> non-immanent Creator involved; he said so explicitly, in "A Neglected
> Argument" and its manuscript drafts. "
>
> But there IS a debate. You choose to ignore his other arguments against
> such a pre-existent Creator  as 'irrelevant' because you declare, without
> proof,  that since he wrote such views earlier in his life that he thus,
> according to you, 'evolved' out of them. The FACT that you, yourself, are a
> firm believer in such a 'pre-existent Creator' seems to me, to encourage
> you to declare that Peirce, without proof, rejected his earlier writings.
> You insert the same focus in other areas, such as the notion of a pre-world
> 'ur-Thirdness' - since you, yourself, firmly  believe in a prior Force.
>
> And since you tend to immediately reject any attempts to suggest that your
> interpretations of Peirce's beliefs and yours are not identical - then,
> this thread moves away from discussion to circularity with you insisting
> that you have 'proved your case' and 'there is no debate'. But - I don't
> see such finality.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L
> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 9:33 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang
> universe' of 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this
> 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang
> Thirdness.
>
>
> Gary R. and I have laid out our reasons for seeing all of that in Peirce.
> In particular, there is really no debating whether he (at least eventually)
> believed that there is a non-immanent Creator involved; he said so
> explicitly, in "A Neglected Argument" and its manuscript drafts.  One can
> argue that he was *wrong *about that, but not that he *himself *was an
> atheist, even though atheists can certainly gain many valuable insights
> from him; ditto for pantheists and panentheists.
>
> ET:  It seems to me that we are moving into a discussion based around our
> own firmly-held personal beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and
> are using Peirce, searching for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support
> our own personal beliefs.
>
>
> There is *always *a danger--a likelihood, even--that our own personal
> biases will influence our "readings" of someone else's writings; but that
> extends to *all *aspects of Peirce's thought, not just these particular
> metaphysical matters.  By discussing them in a forum like this, we are
> giving others the opportunity to help us recognize when we fall into such
> patterns and adjust our thinking accordingly.  Some of us have even changed
> our minds as a result of these conversations.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

d by a current inaccurate 'fad'
> attachment on my part; there is no evidence that I am less susceptible to
> such emotions as I age.
>
> 5) Nor do I declare, anywhere,  that Peirce rejected his later writings.
> Would you please provide me with *evidence* for where I declare or even
> suggest that he did so?
>
> I have said that I, myself, am not able to correlate his NA with the rest
> of his body of work - and again, your insistence that YOU have done so, has
> not convinced me of such a result. Since I don't insert assumptions of 'the
> principle of charity' which is a rather sanctimonious claim - then, I am
> not going to claim that the NA IS or IS NOT consistent with Peirce's other
> work.
>
>  I am only talking about MYSELF - which is that I don't see that it, read
> 'in itself' rather than metaphorocally, correlates with the rest of his
> work. Your insistence that it does; that your interpretation is 'beyond
> debate' ; that 'it is incontrovertible' ..etc...are indeed powerful
> statements but these phrases are not arguments.
>
> So- I don't see the point of such counterclaims. They have less to do with
> Peirce than with ourselves.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 10:15 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> If Peirce wrote what he meant and meant what he wrote, then it is
> incontrovertible that in 1908 he believed that God as *Ens necessarium *was
> the Creator of all three Universes of Experience and all of their contents,
> without exception.  By what valid method of interpretation can anyone
> plausibly deny this?
>
> You have admitted that your response to "A Neglected Argument" is to *ignore
> *it, because you cannot explain it; it does not and cannot align with
> your favored interpretation of Peirce's earlier cosmological writings.  I,
> on the other hand, do not *reject* the latter, as you keep (wrongly)
> alleging; on the contrary, as I have said before, I seek to *harmonize *them
> with his later writings, under the principle of charity--we should assume 
> *consistency
> *between two passages, unless there is no viable way to reconcile them.
> At the same time, I do believe that later writings should generally be
> given priority over earlier ones, in accordance with the presupposition
> that they reflect additional contemplation and refinement of the ideas
> discussed.  Again, which more accurately presents your considered
> views--something that you wrote twenty years ago, or something that you
> wrote yesterday?
>
> I hope you realize that the sword you are now wielding cuts both ways.
> The FACT that you, yourself, are a firm non-believer in such a
> 'pre-existent Creator' seems to me, to encourage you to declare that
> Peirce, without proof, rejected his later writings.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:46 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list - and that's my point. You insist that 'there is really no
>> debating whether he (at least eventually) believed that there is a
>> non-immanent Creator involved; he said so explicitly, in "A Neglected
>> Argument" and its manuscript drafts. "
>>
>> But there IS a debate. You choose to ignore his other arguments against
>> such a pre-existent Creator  as 'irrelevant' because you declare, without
>> proof,  that since he wrote such views earlier in his life that he thus,
>> according to you, 'evolved' out of them. The FACT that you, yourself, are a
>> firm believer in such a 'pre-existent Creator' seems to me, to encourage
>> you to declare that Peirce, without proof, rejected his earlier writings.
>> You insert the same focus in other areas, such as the notion of a pre-world
>> 'ur-Thirdness' - since you, yourself, firmly  believe in a prior Force.
>>
>> And since you tend to immediately reject any attempts to suggest that
>> your interpretations of Peirce's beliefs and yours are not identical -
>> then, this thread moves away from discussion to circularity with you
>> insisting that you have 'proved your case' and 'there is no debate'. But -
>> I don't see such finality.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L
>> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Thur

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon, list - and that's my point. You insist that 'there is really no debating 
whether he (at least eventually) believed that there is a non-immanent Creator 
involved; he said so explicitly, in "A Neglected Argument" and its manuscript 
drafts. "

But there IS a debate. You choose to ignore his other arguments against such a 
pre-existent Creator  as 'irrelevant' because you declare, without proof,  that 
since he wrote such views earlier in his life that he thus, according to you, 
'evolved' out of them. The FACT that you, yourself, are a firm believer in such 
a 'pre-existent Creator' seems to me, to encourage you to declare that Peirce, 
without proof, rejected his earlier writings. You insert the same focus in 
other areas, such as the notion of a pre-world 'ur-Thirdness' - since you, 
yourself, firmly  believe in a prior Force.

And since you tend to immediately reject any attempts to suggest that your 
interpretations of Peirce's beliefs and yours are not identical - then, this 
thread moves away from discussion to circularity with you insisting that you 
have 'proved your case' and 'there is no debate'. But - I don't see such 
finality.

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 9:33 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


ET:  I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang 
universe' of 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this 
'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang Thirdness.


  Gary R. and I have laid out our reasons for seeing all of that in Peirce.  In 
particular, there is really no debating whether he (at least eventually) 
believed that there is a non-immanent Creator involved; he said so explicitly, 
in "A Neglected Argument" and its manuscript drafts.  One can argue that he was 
wrong about that, but not that he himself was an atheist, even though atheists 
can certainly gain many valuable insights from him; ditto for pantheists and 
panentheists.


ET:  It seems to me that we are moving into a discussion based around our 
own firmly-held personal beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and are 
using Peirce, searching for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own 
personal beliefs.


  There is always a danger--a likelihood, even--that our own personal biases 
will influence our "readings" of someone else's writings; but that extends to 
all aspects of Peirce's thought, not just these particular metaphysical 
matters.  By discussing them in a forum like this, we are giving others the 
opportunity to help us recognize when we fall into such patterns and adjust our 
thinking accordingly.  Some of us have even changed our minds as a result of 
these conversations.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of 
'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this 'ur-continuity'. 
Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang Thirdness.

But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we 
are moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal beliefs 
about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching for and 
'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs. 

I don't see the point of such a discussion.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:05 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Soren, Jon, List. 


  Soren wrote:

But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or 
the tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so 
Well in Natural propositions and feeling is present in all matter (Hylozoism) 
and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero. . .


  Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following 
the creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely 
speak) is *not* the same as the 3ns which is the ur-continuity represented by 
the black board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It seems to me that 
much hinges on whether or not one sees our Universe as presupposing this 
ur-continuity (nothing in particular but everything in general, with yet a 
tendency toward habit-taking because of this ur-continuity, otherwise termed 
the zero of pure potential, which is, for Peirce, certainly not "nothing a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

ET:  I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang
universe' of 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this
'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang
Thirdness.

Gary R. and I have laid out our reasons for seeing all of that in Peirce.
In particular, there is really no debating whether he (at least eventually)
believed that there is a non-immanent Creator involved; he said so
explicitly, in "A Neglected Argument" and its manuscript drafts.  One can
argue that he was *wrong *about that, but not that he *himself *was an
atheist, even though atheists can certainly gain many valuable insights
from him; ditto for pantheists and panentheists.

ET:  It seems to me that we are moving into a discussion based around our
own firmly-held personal beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and
are using Peirce, searching for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support
our own personal beliefs.

There is *always *a danger--a likelihood, even--that our own personal
biases will influence our "readings" of someone else's writings; but that
extends to *all *aspects of Peirce's thought, not just these particular
metaphysical matters.  By discussing them in a forum like this, we are
giving others the opportunity to help us recognize when we fall into such
patterns and adjust our thinking accordingly.  Some of us have even changed
our minds as a result of these conversations.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of
> 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this
> 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang
> Thirdness.
>
> But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we
> are moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal
> beliefs about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching
> for and 'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs.
>
> I don't see the point of such a discussion.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:05 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Soren, Jon, List.
>
> Soren wrote:
>
> 
>
> But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the
> tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so
> Well in *Natural propositions* and feeling is present in all matter
> (Hylozoism) and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero. . .
>
>
> Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges"
> *following* the creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang,
> so to loosely speak) is *not* the same as the 3ns which is the *ur*-continuity
> represented by the black board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It
> seems to me that much hinges on whether or not one sees our Universe as
> presupposing this ur-continuity (nothing in particular but everything in
> general, with yet a tendency toward habit-taking *because *of this
> ur-continuity, otherwise termed the zero of pure potential, which is, for
> Peirce, certainly not "nothing at all").
>
> It has further been noted that Peirce suggests that the Creator is, or in
> some way participates, in this ur-continuity. *Once* *this* Universe is
> "in effect," then, yes, all that you and Stjernfelt argue may follow
> (although, I remain, as was Peirce, I firmly believe, a theist and not a
> panentheist, so I tend to reject that part of your argumentation, at least
> in consideration of the early cosmos).
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of 
'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this 'ur-continuity'. 
Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang Thirdness.

But I am concerned about the focus of this thread. It seems to me that we are 
moving into a discussion based around our own firmly-held personal beliefs 
about god, the world, creation etc, and are using Peirce, searching for and 
'interpreting' his writings, to support our own personal beliefs. 

I don't see the point of such a discussion.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 12:05 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Soren, Jon, List. 


  Soren wrote:

But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the 
tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so 
Well in Natural propositions and feeling is present in all matter (Hylozoism) 
and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero. . .


  Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following the 
creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely speak) is 
*not* the same as the 3ns which is the ur-continuity represented by the black 
board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It seems to me that much hinges 
on whether or not one sees our Universe as presupposing this ur-continuity 
(nothing in particular but everything in general, with yet a tendency toward 
habit-taking because of this ur-continuity, otherwise termed the zero of pure 
potential, which is, for Peirce, certainly not "nothing at all").



  It has further been noted that Peirce suggests that the Creator is, or in 
some way participates, in this ur-continuity. Once *this* Universe is "in 
effect," then, yes, all that you and Stjernfelt argue may follow (although, I 
remain, as was Peirce, I firmly believe, a theist and not a panentheist, so I 
tend to reject that part of your argumentation, at least in consideration of 
the early cosmos).


  Best,


  Gary R






  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 7:41 PM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:

Jon, List




But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or 
the tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so 
Well in Natural propositions and feeling is present in all matter (Hylozoism) 
and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero, why should its 
self-organization not match Eckhart’s idea of Jesus consciousness born in every 
man, if  “the father” is pure Zero and the holy spirit or ghost  is thirdness 
as self-organization, meaning that human consciousness as the aware man  is the 
living conscious realization in the flesh of the origin of our  being? Peirce’s 
naturalization encompassed pure Zero as the transcendental a part of nature and 
us. It fits a form of Gnostic panentheism, is my abduction. It fits with his 
mystical experience. It is esoterical  pure mysticism encompassing rationality 
and science without a  conscious personal creator. The basic postulate is that 
we can have access to the Godhead through a developed consciousness. This is 
basically what Bhakti Vedanta and much of Buddhism – and in my view Meister 
Eckhart in Christianity – say, and why he was excommunicated from the Catholic 
church, because he was – as many scholars has pointed out – too close to Adi 
Shankara’s thinking. It is pretty much Suzuki’s point of view too 
http://terebess.hu/zen/mesterek/d-t-suzuki-mysticism-christian-and-buddhist.pdf 
and he was hired by Paul Carus the editor of the Monist. Of cause we here have 
Emerson and the trandscendentalist’s view too.



  Best

  Søren



From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 2. november 2016 22:43
To: John F Sowa
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
    Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)



John, List:



The question still arises of what to make of the statement in John's Gospel 
that "the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us."  Neither nature nor its laws 
can be substituted for Logos in this case.



Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt



On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 4:02 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

On 11/2/2016 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

His favorite Gospel was that of John, but did he ever quote its
first chapter?  "In the beginning was the Word [logos] ...


Since his father ta

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-02 Thread Gary Richmond

Soren, Jon, List.

Soren wrote:

But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the
tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so
Well in *Natural propositions* and feeling is present in all matter
(Hylozoism) and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero. . .

Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" *following*
the creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely
speak) is *not* the same as the 3ns which is the *ur*-continuity
represented by the black board example in the last of the 1898 lectures. It
seems to me that much hinges on whether or not one sees our Universe as
presupposing this ur-continuity (nothing in particular but everything in
general, with yet a tendency toward habit-taking *because *of this
ur-continuity, otherwise termed the zero of pure potential, which is, for
Peirce, certainly not "nothing at all").

It has further been noted that Peirce suggests that the Creator is, or in
some way participates, in this ur-continuity. *Once* *this* Universe is "in
effect," then, yes, all that you and Stjernfelt argue may follow (although,
I remain, as was Peirce, I firmly believe, a theist and not a panentheist,
so I tend to reject that part of your argumentation, at least in
consideration of the early cosmos).

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 7:41 PM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:

> Jon, List
>
>
>
> 
> But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the
> tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so
> Well in *Natural propositions* and feeling is present in all matter
> (Hylozoism) and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero, why
> should its self-organization not match Eckhart’s idea of Jesus
> consciousness born in every man, if  “the father” is pure Zero and the holy
> spirit or ghost  is thirdness as self-organization, meaning that human
> consciousness as the aware man  is the living conscious realization in the
> flesh of the origin of our  being? Peirce’s naturalization encompassed pure
> Zero as the transcendental a part of nature and us. It fits a form of
> Gnostic panentheism, is my abduction. It fits with his mystical experience.
> It is esoterical  pure mysticism encompassing rationality and science
> without a  conscious personal creator. The basic postulate is that we can
> have access to the Godhead through a developed consciousness. This is
> basically what Bhakti Vedanta and much of Buddhism – and in my view Meister
> Eckhart in Christianity – say, and why he was excommunicated from the
> Catholic church, because he was – as many scholars has pointed out – too
> close to Adi Shankara’s thinking. It is pretty much Suzuki’s point of view
> too http://terebess.hu/zen/mesterek/d-t-suzuki-mysticism-christi
> an-and-buddhist.pdf and he was hired by Paul Carus the editor of the
> Monist. Of cause we here have Emerson and the trandscendentalist’s view too.
>
>
>
>   Best
>
>   Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 2. november 2016 22:43
> *To:* John F Sowa
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
>
>
> John, List:
>
>
>
> The question still arises of what to make of the statement in John's
> Gospel that "the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us."  Neither nature
> nor its laws can be substituted for Logos in this case.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 4:02 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:
>
> On 11/2/2016 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> His favorite Gospel was that of John, but did he ever quote its
> first chapter?  "In the beginning was the Word [logos] ...
>
>
> Since his father taught him Greek at a very early age, I'm sure
> that New Testament Greek was one of the first texts he studied.
>
> Given his interest in logic, Peirce may have preferred this gospel
> because of its use of the word 'logos'.
>
> Around 400 BC, Heraclitus (Fragment 1) wrote
>
> all things come to be according to this logos
>
>
> In the first century AD, John wrote
>
> In the beginning was the Logos. The Logos was with God.
> And God was the Logos. It was in the be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Søren, List:

SB:  But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or
the tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness ...


... then the first chapter of John's Gospel is not talking about the same
Logos, since it says that it "became flesh and dwelt among us" in the human
person of Jesus.

As previously discussed, Peirce stated explicitly in three different drafts
of "A Neglected Argument" that God is NOT "immanent in" Nature or the three
Universes of Experience, but rather is the Creator of everything in them
without exception.  Lest he be misunderstood, he even underlined "not" in
all three places.  I do not see how this stance can plausibly be reconciled
with panentheism, unless I am completely misunderstanding the meaning of
that term.

Regards,

Jon

On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 6:41 PM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:

> Jon, List
>
>
>
> But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the
> tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so
> Well in *Natural propositions* and feeling is present in all matter
> (Hylozoism) and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero, why
> should its self-organization not match Eckhart’s idea of Jesus
> consciousness born in every man, if  “the father” is pure Zero and the holy
> spirit or ghost  is thirdness as self-organization, meaning that human
> consciousness as the aware man  is the living conscious realization in the
> flesh of the origin of our  being? Peirce’s naturalization encompassed pure
> Zero as the transcendental a part of nature and us. It fits a form of
> Gnostic panentheism, is my abduction. It fits with his mystical experience.
> It is esoterical  pure mysticism encompassing rationality and science
> without a  conscious personal creator. The basic postulate is that we can
> have access to the Godhead through a developed consciousness. This is
> basically what Bhakti Vedanta and much of Buddhism – and in my view Meister
> Eckhart in Christianity – say, and why he was excommunicated from the
> Catholic church, because he was – as many scholars has pointed out – too
> close to Adi Shankara’s thinking. It is pretty much Suzuki’s point of view
> too http://terebess.hu/zen/mesterek/d-t-suzuki-mysticism-
> christian-and-buddhist.pdf and he was hired by Paul Carus the editor of
> the Monist. Of cause we here have Emerson and the trandscendentalist’s view
> too.
>
>
>
>   Best
>
>   Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 2. november 2016 22:43
> *To:* John F Sowa
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
>
>
> John, List:
>
>
>
> The question still arises of what to make of the statement in John's
> Gospel that "the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us."  Neither nature
> nor its laws can be substituted for Logos in this case.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 4:02 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:
>
> On 11/2/2016 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> His favorite Gospel was that of John, but did he ever quote its
> first chapter?  "In the beginning was the Word [logos] ...
>
>
> Since his father taught him Greek at a very early age, I'm sure
> that New Testament Greek was one of the first texts he studied.
>
> Given his interest in logic, Peirce may have preferred this gospel
> because of its use of the word 'logos'.
>
> Around 400 BC, Heraclitus (Fragment 1) wrote
>
> all things come to be according to this logos
>
>
> In the first century AD, John wrote
>
> In the beginning was the Logos. The Logos was with God.
> And God was the Logos. It was in the beginning with God.
> All things came to be through it, and without it nothing
> came to be that has come to be.
>
>
> They both used 'panta' (all things) and 'gignomai' (come to be).
> Heraclitus did not use the word 'Theos' (God), but John equated
> Theos with Logos.  Some scholars claim that John was influenced
> by Philo of Alexandria, who wrote many volumes (in Greek) to
> reconcile the Torah with Greek philosophy.
>
> Other scholars commented on the similarity between Logos as
> Heraclitus used it, Dao (or Tao) as Lao Zi used it, and Dharma
> as Gautama Buddha used it.  Perhaps that was not a coincidence,
> because they were approximate contemporaries, and they lived
> near the trade routes (Silk Road) from China t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Clark:

To clarify, I did not mean to imply that I was stating *Peirce's* analysis
of John 1:1; again, as far as I know, he never quoted or directly commented
on it.  That was just my own first pass at parsing it in terms of the three
Categories.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 4:58 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On Nov 2, 2016, at 3:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> At first glance, it seems to me that mapping John 1:1 to Peirce's
> Categories gives us something like, "In the beginning was the Word
> [Thirdness], and the Word was with God [Secondness], and the Word was God
> [Firstness]."
>
> I’ll just confess my ignorance here since there are different ways to read
> that and I couldn’t find anything on how Peirce did. His beliefs are
> idiocyncratic enough I’m loath to simply impose on him traditional views of
> the Trinity or the Logos. After all this was also a point where Eckhart and
> Duns Scotus differed as well. (Is the Father Being or Intellect among other
> matters)
>
> Making things more complicated are the various ways “logos” can be used.
> Scotus often uses it as reason.
>
> Unfortunately I don’t have my CP handy so I’ll see if I have time to look
> this up at home. (I still need to find that Ransdell paper on love too —
> although I’m coming to think I conflated it in my memory with a paper of
> Michael Ventimiglia, “Reclaiming the Peircean Cosmology: Existential
> Abduction and the Growth of Self")
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-02 Thread Jerry Rhee

Clark, list:

If you require aid in interpreting John 1:1, I would contrast a lecture by
Benedict XVI with Peirce’s “What is Christian Faith?”.

“At this point, as far as understanding of God and thus the concrete
practice of religion is concerned, we are faced with an unavoidable
dilemma. Is the conviction that acting unreasonably contradicts God's
nature merely a Greek idea, or is it always and intrinsically true? I
believe that here we can see the profound harmony between what is Greek in
the best sense of the word and the biblical understanding of faith in God.
Modifying the first verse of the Book of Genesis, the first verse of the
whole Bible, John began the prologue of his Gospel with the words: "In the
beginning was the λόγος". This is the very word used by the emperor: God
acts, σὺν λόγω, with *logos*. *Logos* means both reason and word - a
reason which is creative and capable of self-communication, precisely as
reason. John thus spoke the final word on the biblical concept of God, and
in this word all the often toilsome and tortuous threads of biblical faith
find their culmination and synthesis. In the beginning was the *logos*, and
the *logos* is God, says the Evangelist. The encounter between the Biblical
message and Greek thought did not happen by chance.” ~Benedict XVI

https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html

“Keep your one purpose steadily and alone in view, and you may promise
yourself the attainment of your sole desire, which is to hasten the chariot
wheels of redeeming love!” ~Peirce

“Of the nature of the soul, though her true form be ever a theme of large
and more than mortal discourse, let me speak briefly, and in a figure. And
let the figure be composite — a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now
the winged horses and the charioteers of the gods are all of them noble and
of noble descent, but those of other races are mixed; the human charioteer
drives his in a pair; and one of them is noble and of noble breed, and the
other is ignoble and of ignoble breed; and the driving of them of necessity
gives a great deal of trouble to him.” ~Plato, Phaedrus

Hth,

Jerry Rhee

On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 4:58 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Nov 2, 2016, at 3:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> At first glance, it seems to me that mapping John 1:1 to Peirce's
> Categories gives us something like, "In the beginning was the Word
> [Thirdness], and the Word was with God [Secondness], and the Word was God
> [Firstness]."
>
>
> I’ll just confess my ignorance here since there are different ways to read
> that and I couldn’t find anything on how Peirce did. His beliefs are
> idiocyncratic enough I’m loath to simply impose on him traditional views of
> the Trinity or the Logos. After all this was also a point where Eckhart and
> Duns Scotus differed as well. (Is the Father Being or Intellect among other
> matters)
>
> Making things more complicated are the various ways “logos” can be used.
> Scotus often uses it as reason.
>
> Unfortunately I don’t have my CP handy so I’ll see if I have time to look
> this up at home. (I still need to find that Ransdell paper on love too —
> although I’m coming to think I conflated it in my memory with a paper of
> Michael Ventimiglia, “Reclaiming the Peircean Cosmology: Existential
> Abduction and the Growth of Self")
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-02 Thread Søren Brier

Jon, List

But if the Logos is logic as semiotics and is emerging as thirdness or the 
tendency to take habits in all nature of Secondness as Stjernfelt argues so 
Well in Natural propositions and feeling is present in all matter (Hylozoism) 
and all three categories arise as universes from pure Zero, why should its 
self-organization not match Eckhart’s idea of Jesus consciousness born in every 
man, if  “the father” is pure Zero and the holy spirit or ghost  is thirdness 
as self-organization, meaning that human consciousness as the aware man  is the 
living conscious realization in the flesh of the origin of our  being? Peirce’s 
naturalization encompassed pure Zero as the transcendental a part of nature and 
us. It fits a form of Gnostic panentheism, is my abduction. It fits with his 
mystical experience. It is esoterical  pure mysticism encompassing rationality 
and science without a  conscious personal creator. The basic postulate is that 
we can have access to the Godhead through a developed consciousness. This is 
basically what Bhakti Vedanta and much of Buddhism – and in my view Meister 
Eckhart in Christianity – say, and why he was excommunicated from the Catholic 
church, because he was – as many scholars has pointed out – too close to Adi 
Shankara’s thinking. It is pretty much Suzuki’s point of view too 
http://terebess.hu/zen/mesterek/d-t-suzuki-mysticism-christian-and-buddhist.pdf 
and he was hired by Paul Carus the editor of the Monist. Of cause we here have 
Emerson and the trandscendentalist’s view too.

  Best
  Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 2. november 2016 22:43
To: John F Sowa
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

John, List:

The question still arises of what to make of the statement in John's Gospel 
that "the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us."  Neither nature nor its laws 
can be substituted for Logos in this case.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 4:02 PM, John F Sowa 
<s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
On 11/2/2016 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
His favorite Gospel was that of John, but did he ever quote its
first chapter?  "In the beginning was the Word [logos] ...

Since his father taught him Greek at a very early age, I'm sure
that New Testament Greek was one of the first texts he studied.

Given his interest in logic, Peirce may have preferred this gospel
because of its use of the word 'logos'.

Around 400 BC, Heraclitus (Fragment 1) wrote
all things come to be according to this logos

In the first century AD, John wrote
In the beginning was the Logos. The Logos was with God.
And God was the Logos. It was in the beginning with God.
All things came to be through it, and without it nothing
came to be that has come to be.

They both used 'panta' (all things) and 'gignomai' (come to be).
Heraclitus did not use the word 'Theos' (God), but John equated
Theos with Logos.  Some scholars claim that John was influenced
by Philo of Alexandria, who wrote many volumes (in Greek) to
reconcile the Torah with Greek philosophy.

Other scholars commented on the similarity between Logos as
Heraclitus used it, Dao (or Tao) as Lao Zi used it, and Dharma
as Gautama Buddha used it.  Perhaps that was not a coincidence,
because they were approximate contemporaries, and they lived
near the trade routes (Silk Road) from China to Asia Minor.

In his _Ethica_, Spinoza used the words 'God' (Deus) and 'nature'
(Natura) almost interchangeably.  When asked whether he believed
in God, Einstein replied, "I believe in the God of Spinoza".

The equation of God with the laws of nature by Spinoza and Einstein
should be compared to Logos, Dao, and Dharma.  The Latin 'natura'
is the Scholastic translation of the Greek 'physis'.  The English
word 'physics' is an 18th century synonym for 'natural philosophy'.

Peirce was also familiar with Aristotle's use of 'logos'.  The
first paragraph of _De Interpretatione_ (in Greek and in various
Scholastic commentaries) was likely to be another influence:
First we must determine what are noun (onoma) and verb (rhêma); and
after that, what are negation (apophasis), assertion (kataphasis),
proposition (apophansis), and sentence (logos). Those in speech (phonê)
are symbols (symbola) of affections (pathêmata) in the psyche, and
those written (graphomena) are symbols of those in speech. As letters
(grammata), so are speech sounds not the same for everyone. But they
are signs (sêmeia) primarily of the affections in the psyche, which
are the same for everyone, and so are the objects (pragmata) of which
they are likenesses (homoiômata). On the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-02 Thread Clark Goble

> On Nov 2, 2016, at 3:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> At first glance, it seems to me that mapping John 1:1 to Peirce's Categories 
> gives us something like, "In the beginning was the Word [Thirdness], and the 
> Word was with God [Secondness], and the Word was God [Firstness]."
> 

I’ll just confess my ignorance here since there are different ways to read that 
and I couldn’t find anything on how Peirce did. His beliefs are idiocyncratic 
enough I’m loath to simply impose on him traditional views of the Trinity or 
the Logos. After all this was also a point where Eckhart and Duns Scotus 
differed as well. (Is the Father Being or Intellect among other matters)

Making things more complicated are the various ways “logos” can be used. Scotus 
often uses it as reason. 

Unfortunately I don’t have my CP handy so I’ll see if I have time to look this 
up at home. (I still need to find that Ransdell paper on love too — although 
I’m coming to think I conflated it in my memory with a paper of Michael 
Ventimiglia, “Reclaiming the Peircean Cosmology: Existential Abduction and the 
Growth of Self")

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Clark, List:

At first glance, it seems to me that mapping John 1:1 to Peirce's
Categories gives us something like, "In the beginning was the Word
[Thirdness], and the Word was with God [Secondness], and the Word was God
[Firstness]."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Nov 2, 2016, at 2:07 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
>
> Potter writes:
>
> I would like to add here on my account that when it coms to understanding
> the conditions of possibility of special disclosure or revelation in holy
> persons or historical events, disclosure of God in the natural order is
> first required as a real possibility since without it there would be no way
> of telling what is allegedly disclosed in these persons and events is truly
> God. Hence I have argued [in "Revelation and 'Natural' Knowledge of God"]
> and would argue that some form of "natural knowledge" of God must be
> possible if there is to be any "super-natural revelation." It seems to me
> self-evident that in this matter dogmatism is unsatisfactory and  an appeal
> to privileged mystical arbitrary" (13).
>
>
> In his response, Smith writes "What Potter is driving at here is not
> wholly clear to me" (90). It is "wholly clear" to me either. Any thoughts?
>
> Just a guess that might be completely wrong. I think he puts quotes around
> “supernatural” because he doesn’t subscribe to Hume’s conception of the
> supernatural. (Neither does Peirce as I think I mentioned in a quote by him
> Monday) That is if there is intervention it’s natural in the Peircean
> sense. But if it is then it is an empirically analyzable phenomena.
> Dogmatism or private mystical ‘senses’ are unsatisfactory because they
> simply don’t engage with this empirical manifestation.
>
> Peirce seems to hint at this in the various places he’s skeptical of
> scriptural accounts of Jesus or miracles. The reasons go back to his
> objections to most belief in “The Fixation of Belief.” To simply trust the
> account without reason is dogmatism and authoritarianism which are simply
> not trustworthy. So his answer is that we don’t know. What he *doesn’t* say
> though is that it is unknowable. That is assuming the events happened in a
> fashion similar to what is described then under the pragmatic maxim we have
> real differences that can give us knowledge.
>
> I’ve not read Potter here (although I will now check it out) but I bet
> that’s the point he’s getting at.
>
> I actually bring this up in epistemological discussions quite often.
> Rather than talking religion with all its baggage though I’ll bring up UFOs
> which few believe in. Now I think most UFO accounts are either mistaken,
> lies or delusion. But if I were walking alone in the woods and came upon a
> space vehicle with clearly non-human intelligent beings at that point I
> think I have experience to justify a belief in them. It may not be public
> in the sense that scientific knowledge in but I’d have a very hard time
> doubting. Especially if I did the usual inquiry to ensure I wasn’t
> hallucinating, dreaming, or being misled in some fashion.
>
> As for the Gospel of John, Peirce refers to John as "the ontological
> gospeler" whom he says made "the One Supreme Being, by whom all things have
> been made out of nothing, to be cherishing love" (6.287). How this might
> relate to the famous first chapter of that Gospel (which John Sowa also
> pointed to) in consideration of our question, I'm uncertain.
>
> I think many of his views of love come out of John’s gospel. (Or at least
> it sure seems that way to me) He also seems to ascribe fairly common
> scholastic views here so I suspect that’s affecting him a great deal too.
> But of course elsewhere he ties the Trinity (Father, Son, Holy Ghost) to
> his categories. Again he’s not far off tradition here. Augustine famously
> formulates the Trinity in terms of platonic conceptions of relation. At
> time he also talks about how the “divine trinity of object, interpretant,
> and ground… In many respects this trinity agrees with the Christian
> trinity; indeed I am not aware that there are any points of disagreement…if
> our former guess that reference to an interpretant is Paternity be right,
> this would also be the *Son of God*. The ground being that, partaking of
> which is requisite to any communication with Symbol, corresponds in its
> function to the Holy Spirit.” (MS 359)
>
> Now while talking about the Son it doesn’t really tell us much about Jesus
> but it does I think get at how God is love and how that manifests itself. I
> think that effectively God as sign in Peirce’s conception of love and man
> as sign differ only in terms of breadth. (Or at least it sure seems that
> way to me) Love is thirdness for Peirce or evolution. Secondness or Son is
> a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)