On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 06:37:16AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
You are playing on two meanings of fact; that something is not
known until time T does not mean it pops into existence at time
T. Truth is not existence.
Existence is a muddy concept. Truth (even relative truth) is certainly
a possible
On Jul 23, 9:50 pm, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
My own position is that whatever is really real, it is probably
completely unknowable (like Kant's noumenon). We can only know about
phenomena. This leads me to the radical proposal that perhaps all of
phenomena can be
On 21 Jul 2011, at 20:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces
computation to be there.
On Jul 22, 1:53 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 7:43 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 21, 11:55 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Assume both matter and number
On Jul 22, 4:08 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch
On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
relations between the bits.
And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems
to me a mismatch between timelessness and computation.
Not at
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:08 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb
On Jul 22, 3:59 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
relations between the bits.
And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 11:31 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 22, 3:59 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well
defined
relations between
On 7/22/2011 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
Why?
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for
On 7/22/2011 9:40 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Before that question, you need the question: does maths exist
independently.
If you want to debate this question I am happy to. It is the
assumption made by most mathematicians and scientists.
Jason
Actually I was friends with two
On 22 Jul 2011, at 14:17, 1Z wrote:
On Jul 22, 10:08 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
Why?
On 22 Jul 2011, at 21:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
Why?
The point
On 22 Jul 2011, at 22:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 9:40 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Before that question, you need the question: does maths exist
independently.
If you want to debate this question I am happy to. It is the
assumption made by most mathematicians and scientists.
Jason
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic definition
and rejecting ostensive ones.
Why?
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for justifying an
ontology.
That seems to be a non-sequitur. How can any kind of
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation
to be there.
The computations are concrete relations.
If the are concrete then we should be able
On Jul 10, 2:20 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to produce
different molecules by
On Jul 11, 4:48 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
This philosophy has already shown great success for anything that stores,
transmits or processes information. Data can be stored as magnetic poles on
hard drives and tape, different levels of reflectivity on CDs and DVDs, as
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that
i don't see a much of a connection between those statements.
Complexity could be necessary but insufficient. It is,
for instance, difficult to see how you could have
simple colour qualia. Colours represent a lot of intormation.
Yes, I agree, complexity could be necessary but insufficient. Just as
On Jul 12, 11:50 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
My view of awareness is now subtractive and holographic (think pinhole
camera), so that I would read fading qualia in a different way. More
like dementia.. attenuating connectivity between different aspects of
the self, not
On Jul 20, 2:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Jul 2011, at 15:21, 1Z wrote:
On Jul 8, 5:53 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Jul 2011, at 02:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/7/2011 4:59 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 10:12:45PM -0700,
On Jul 21, 8:23 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
1) if conventional physics gives an adequate causal account,does and
experience is explained
with New Physics, does that make experience epiphenomenal?
In my view, physics, experience, and the underlying relation between
On Jul 21, 9:54 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:35 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 11, 4:51 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
automatic consequences which
arise unbidden from from relations that are defined by
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the existence
of
number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
matter does not explain the existence of number relations.
Yes it does.
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 5:02 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 21, 9:54 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:35 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 11, 4:51 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
automatic consequences which
On 7/21/2011 3:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com
mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the
existence of
number relations explains the existence of matter, but the
On Jul 21, 11:55 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the existence
of
number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
matter
In my view, physics, experience, and the underlying relation between
them are all co-phenomenal and co-epiphenomenal
I have no idea what that means.
I'm trying to say that from the vantage point of physical externality,
experience is deterministically caused by physical laws, but from the
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 7:43 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 21, 11:55 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the
existence
of
number
Our brains are obviously doing it with
the colorless nerve impulses (information) that comes in from the optic
nerve. I think most people lack appreciation for just how complex the brain
is, and conclude this or that is impossible for any process (no matter how
complex) to do. The brain has
On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb
On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb
On Jul 8, 12:59 am, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 10:12:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
One that happens to be incompatible with
theory that our minds are computer programs.
Can you explain that? It seems to be Bruno's central claim, but so
far as I
On Jul 8, 5:53 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Jul 2011, at 02:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/7/2011 4:59 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 10:12:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
One that happens to be incompatible with
theory that our minds are computer
On Jul 6, 12:44 pm, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Constantine, this is a rather trollish comment coming from an ignorant
position.
Let me put the following gedanken experiment - consider the
possibility that T. Rex might be either green or blue creatures, and
that either
On 20 Jul 2011, at 15:21, 1Z wrote:
On Jul 8, 5:53 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Jul 2011, at 02:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/7/2011 4:59 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 10:12:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
One that happens to be incompatible with
Bruno:
You may be correct that it is only an intellectual exercise. How many
lines of LISP code comprises the UD?
I may have been infomally exposed to LISP in college, but that was
decades ago.
Ronald
On Jul 20, 5:01 am, Bruno Marchal
On 18 Jul 2011, at 21:26, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 18.07.2011 14:21 ronaldheld said the following:
Bruno:
I do not know LISP. Any UD code written in Fortran?
Ronald
Very good book to learn LISP is
http://mitpress.mit.edu/sicp/full-text/book/book.html
A great
On 7/19/2011 11:32 AM, ronaldheld wrote:
Given limited resources and for only 1 program, it does not seem
logical to learn LISP. Are there Windows or DOS executables of the UD?
FWIW. I use MAPLE and not Mathematica.
Ronald
Maple is based on LISP. An executable UD wouldn't
On 17 Jul 2011, at 19:52, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
The interior of the
singularity is the interior of the cosmos with all of the spacetime
vacuumed out of it. Spacetime is what exteriorizes the big bang
(meaning it's
On 17 Jul 2011, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/17/2011 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jul 2011, at 18:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken
too much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree
Bruno:
I do not know LISP. Any UD code written in Fortran?
Ronald
On Jul 18, 5:26 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Jul 2011, at 19:52, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
The interior
On 7/18/2011 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Jul 2011, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/17/2011 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jul 2011, at 18:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken
too much
On 18 Jul 2011, at 19:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/18/2011 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Jul 2011, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/17/2011 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jul 2011, at 18:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be
On 18.07.2011 14:21 ronaldheld said the following:
Bruno:
I do not know LISP. Any UD code written in Fortran?
Ronald
Very good book to learn LISP is
http://mitpress.mit.edu/sicp/full-text/book/book.html
Just click Next page, read and so on. By the way, List is much
On 15 Jul 2011, at 14:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Interesting stuff. I had a marathon info download with Stephen and
he's helping me access your theory more. Still scratching the surface
but at least getting a better idea of how to approach it.
What you call UDA I think of as 'Runtime' in
On 15 Jul 2011, at 18:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too
much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that
math is about immaterial relation between non material beings.
On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The interior of the
singularity is the interior of the cosmos with all of the spacetime
vacuumed out of it. Spacetime is what exteriorizes the big bang
(meaning it's more of a Big Break, where the void of space rushes
On 7/17/2011 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jul 2011, at 18:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too
much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that
math is about immaterial
I don't know what you mean by singularity, runtime, etc. In the UDA I
use some consensual reality to support an argument, but in fine I
isolated an axiomatic theory.
By singularity I mean the sum total of all phenomena minus timespace.
The idea of a monad from which all temporal phenomena emerges
On 15 Jul 2011, at 00:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will
needs the global structure of all computations.
If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown
physics.
I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a
On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too
much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that
math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could
you give me an explanation that 34 is less
nice
On Jul 15, 12:41 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too
much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that
math is about immaterial relation between non
Evgenii,
Why don't you make a course for dummies about this? (For example in
Second Life)
Because in the second life, the students already know that they are in
a virtual reality :)
It looks more difficult to explain this with first life inquirers.
But is it, really? Got the feeling
On 13 Jul 2011, at 01:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves
differently than a biological plant.
Sure. But they have not the same function.
They both decorate a vase. How do we know when we build a chip that
it's performing the same
The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will
needs the global structure of all computations.
If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown
physics.
I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't
disqualify 1p phenomena. I don't get
What is a person? What can a person be but the continuos response of a wet
chemical neural network to exogenous and endogenous inputs. The response will
be modified by changes in the networks chemical environment, and now we learn
by strong external pulsed magnetic fields. In a series of
But a person also makes changes to their chemical network by
exercising their will out of purely semantic conscious intent, having
no biochemical rationale or specific neurogeographical constraint. You
don't have to get from one part of your brain to another part to think
about something else,
Bruno,
Why don't you make a course for dummies about this? (For example in
Second Life)
Evgenii
On 11.07.2011 16:01 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 11 Jul 2011, at 14:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.07.2011 17:32 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 10 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Craig
Hi Stephen,
I have to do a Part I now and get into Part II later on.
How does this causality flows in both directions work? I have a
model of something that has that kind of feature, but I am curious about
yours.
Subjectively we feel, (and see, hear, remember, understand) that we
can
On 09 Jul 2011, at 04:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You assumptions are not enough clear so I never know if you talk of
what is or of what seems to be.
I'm trying for 'what seems to be what is',
OK. But what is your assumption?
since what is isn't
knowable
In which theory. I think that a
Part II
What is your source of that information?
About human tetrachromats?
http://www.klab.caltech.edu/cns186/papers/Jameson01.pdf
Everything else is just my hypothesis.
To suspect that ... is
to bet that ... is true. How different is that from what Bruno is
talking about with the Yes,
Craig, I wonder what you'd think of Chalmers' Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia,
Dancing Qualia argument at http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html which to me
makes a strong argument for organizational invariance, which says physical
systems organized the same way should produce the same qualia, so
On 11 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm having trouble understanding what you're saying.
Computer chips don't behave in the same way though.
That is just a question of choice of level of description. Unless you
believe in substantial infinite souls.
Not sure what you mean in
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the
necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition,
doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's
ridiculous to think that
Thanks, I always seem to like Chalmers perspectives. In this case I
think that the hypothesis of physics I'm working from changes how I
see this argument compared to how I would have a couple years ago. My
thought now is that although organizational invariance is valid,
molecular structure is part
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2011 15:50:12 -0700
Subject: Re: Bruno's blasphemy.
From: whatsons...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Thanks, I always seem to like Chalmers perspectives. In this case I
think that the hypothesis of physics I'm working from changes how I
see
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 6:10 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
**
On 7/12/2011 2:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the
necessity of color. Omnipotence
Oh, yeah I would agree with you if you are talking real world live
healthy human bodies then they are going to have a human experience.
In a hypothetical, you could not know whether a person was a zombie or
not for sure, just because subjectivity is airtight, but mechanically
there is no way to
On 10 Jul 2011, at 17:59, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/9/2011 9:58 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Sure, it would be great to have improved synthetic bodies, but I have
no reason to believe that depth and quality of consciousness is
independent from substance. If I have an artificial heart, that
On 11 Jul 2011, at 04:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
All right, but then honesty should force you to do the same with
computer ships. Unless you presuppose the molecules not being Turing
emulable.
Computer chips don't behave in the same way though.
That is just a question of choice of level of
That's not true. It's dead precisely because it doesn't have the same
organization.
No, it's dead because the organization means something specific to the
molecular participants below and the biological community above. If it
were just a matter of organization, then there should be no
On 10.07.2011 17:32 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 10 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
...
Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out
of ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of
On 11 Jul 2011, at 14:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.07.2011 17:32 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 10 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
...
Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out
of ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
Maybe I should try to condense this a bit. The primary disagreement we
have is rooted in how we view the relation between feeling, awareness,
qualia, and meaning, calculation, and complexity. I know from having
gone through dozens of these conversations that you are likely to
adhere to your
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 9:54 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
Maybe I should try to condense this a bit. The primary disagreement we
have is rooted in how we view the relation between feeling, awareness,
qualia, and meaning, calculation, and complexity. I know from having
gone
On 7/10/2011 6:20 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
What in the brain would be not Turing emulable
Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out of
ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of electromagnetism
They are not trivial. If they were, our brains would not require billions
of neurons and quadrillions of connections.
Trivial in the technical sense of not being as real as the objective
mechanics which are associated with them. You are saying that it's
only the high quantity of neurons and
But it could do those things without ever experiencing yellow. A
traffic signal could look like the smell of burnt toast and achieve
the exact same functionality.Yellow isn't just some variable used as a
placeholder. It has a specific character than must be seen first hand
to have any
On 7/10/2011 6:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I do think that we can say, with the same certainty that we cannot
create a square circle, that it would not be possible at any level of
complexity. It's not that they can't create novelty or surprise, it's
that they can't feel or care about their own
On 7/10/2011 6:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Yeah I like that demo. It's not a new primary color though, that's
just contradictory mixing of familiar colors.
Primary colors aren't even a mental construct. They're a language
choice. Orange is new primary color (according to you), as is cyan
On 7/10/2011 8:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Qualia aren't directly connected to sensory measurements from the
environment though. If I swapped all the red-preferring cones in your
eyes with the blue-preferring cones, then shone blue-colored light at
your eyes, you would report it as red.
For
On 7/10/2011 8:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Why can't we mentally construct new colors
ourselves?
We have little control over the number of cone cells we are born
with. (But this may change soon, using gene therapy). If we had full
control to rewire our brain in any way we wanted, we
I'm having trouble understanding what you're saying.
Computer chips don't behave in the same way though.
That is just a question of choice of level of description. Unless you
believe in substantial infinite souls.
Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves
differently
On Jul 11, 2011, at 4:47 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/10/2011 8:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Why can't we mentally construct new colors
ourselves?
We have little control over the number of cone cells we are born
with. (But this may change soon, using gene therapy). If we
I'm not talking about acutal ping pong balls, I'm talking about ideal
ping pong balls which are not made of any subordinate units. Just
white spheres which serve as placeholders for atoms, digital vectors,
whatever. Just the principle of basic things having only physical
qualities to demonstrate
On 7/11/2011 3:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm not talking about the idea of a primary color as linguistic
distinction, I'm talking about the inability of a color to be reduced
to combinations of other colors. Red, Green, and Blue are the primary
hues of projected light, Red, Yellow, and Blue
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 5:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
I'm not talking about the idea of a primary color as linguistic
distinction, I'm talking about the inability of a color to be reduced
to combinations of other colors. Red, Green, and Blue are the primary
hues of
There are humans who have four pigments in their color receptors but
they do not perceive a fourth primary color.
http://www.klab.caltech.edu/cns186/papers/Jameson01.pdf
They just have increased distinction between the primary colors we
perceive. I take that to mean that they cannot point to
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 1:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
They are not trivial. If they were, our brains would not require billions
of neurons and quadrillions of connections.
Trivial in the technical sense of not being as real as the objective
mechanics which are
On Jul 11, 7:13 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Craig,
Do you believe there is something physically special about red green and
blue compared to other wavelengths of light? Do you think other animals
that see colors can only see combinations of red, green and blue, regardless
On 7/11/2011 11:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
But it could do those things without ever experiencing yellow.
So you say. But it's just an unsupported assertion on your part. If
the ping-pong intelligence could do those things without experiencing
yellow then maybe you could too. I would I
On Jul 11, 8:08 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 1:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
Not just their quantity, but the relationships of their connections to each
other.
Ok, but you are still privileging the exterior appearances of neurons
On 09 Jul 2011, at 18:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Sure, it would be great to have improved synthetic bodies, but I have
no reason to believe that depth and quality of consciousness is
independent from substance. If I have an artificial heart, that
artificiality may not affect me as much as
You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to produce
different molecules by changing the content of our consciousness
subjectively suggests to me that
On 10 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to produce
different molecules by changing the content of
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