Re: A riddle for John Clark
Chris, What is the first person experience of a road? Bruno On 29 Jul 2015, at 00:38, chris peck wrote: @Bruno Ah! OK. But then give the arguments. The one you gave up to now was a C13 confusion. Like I say, Bruno, I can't understand this argument for you. You have to do that bit. But to say that I haven't given it is just plain wrong. If you imagine being a road going north which branches north-west and north-east you can ask what you see infront of you before the junction? You see that you go north-east *and* north-west. fork-in-the-road1.png Ofcourse, once you have branched into two roads you can ask the same question of each branch. What do you see infront of you. The answer is different, north-east *or* north-west. branch.jpgbranch 2.jpg Its a situational difference, its not a different type of perspective. Its not a confusion between 1-p and 3-p. Its the same perspective, different place. 'interviewing' NW and NE about what they see ahead tells us very little about what N sees ahead. Though, because we are defining identity in terms of memory, or a continuation of some property, we are obliged to call both NW and NE valid continuations of N. Are NE and NW both N? Yes, for no other reason than we have defined the identity to ensure that. Does it follow that perspectives experienced by NE and NW can tell us much about N's perspective? No! Interviewing duplicates to determine what can be expected prior to duplication is a mis-step. It will give you the wrong answer vis-a- vis what N expects to see. Or, The question is: what do you expect to live? and what do expect to write in your personal diary, when describing the city behind the door of the reconstitution box? are different questions which give different answers because they involve different situations. You conflate the two. Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 15:44:54 -0500 Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark From: jasonre...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 11:33 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Forget about giving the correct prediction, a prediction can't even be described by any means. Bruno thinks we can repeat the experiment and compile statistics from it and then compare the number obtained from experiment with the theoretical prediction, but who exactly was the prediction about? If the prediction was about Jason Resch one number is obtained, If the prediction is about the man currently experiencing Helsinki a different number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Moscow Man a third number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Washington Man yet another number is obtained, and if the prediction was about you no number at all is obtained because Bruno doesn't know how to give a consistent meaning to the personal pronoun you. If I understand what you say above, your position is that the question has no answer? My position is that there can't be an answer if there is no question. What EXACTLY is the question? An uploaded mind is running within a computer process. If the mind presses a button inside its virtual environment, the process will fork and if within the simulation of the child process a light within the virtual environment will flash blue, while in the parent process it will flash red. The uploaded mind has pushed the button many times, and each time witnessed either a blue flash or red flash, seemingly at random and with a seemingly equal probability of witnessing either color. Within the simulation there is also a casino which allows betting on which color will flash after the button is pressed. The question is, If the game cost $1 to play, and if it was your mind that was uploaded into this computer process what would the minimum pay out have to be for you to play, and what would your betting strategy be? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 4:44 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: An uploaded mind is running within a computer process. If the mind presses a button inside its virtual environment, the process will fork and if within the simulation of the child process a light within the virtual environment will flash blue, while in the parent process it will flash red. The uploaded mind has pushed the button many times, and each time witnessed either a blue flash or red flash, seemingly at random and with a seemingly equal probability of witnessing either color. Within the simulation there is also a casino which allows betting on which color will flash after the button is pressed. The question is,* If the game cost $1 to play, and if it was your mind that was uploaded into this computer process what would the minimum pay out have to be for you to play, and what would your betting strategy be?* Assuming that just I am duplicated (and not my wallet) and assuming the winning prize is $2 I'd bet on red and I'd make a dollar every time I press the button. Yes the child won't win $2 but he didn't pay $1 for the privilege of pushing the button either so he lost nothing. However the casino owner is heading for bankruptcy. OK I hear you say, what if your wallet was duplicated too? Then the wallet the copy inherits will be $1 lighter but unlike the original will not win $2 so he's out $1. All that is true but it has nothing to do with me because my exact copy is no longer exact, we've had different experiences and thus have diverged; I saw a red light and won the bet but that other fellow saw a blue light and lost the bet. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 28 Jul 2015, at 03:46, chris peck wrote:
@ Bruno
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here.
personal identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
You need to focus on what these factors govern:
1) international tariffs.
2) the state of the chinese economy.
3) international demand for tea grown in china.
?
btw. I wasn't talking about Leibnizinan notions of identity. If you
were committed to that you wouldn't be you, let alone H, W or M, one
moment to the next. Even I don't think your metaphysics is that silly.
I can give you arguments but I can't understand them for you. You
have to do that bit.
Ah! OK. But then give the arguments. The one you gave up to now was a
C13 confusion.
That error has some interest, as its translation in arithmetic gives
the []p versus []p p confusion, which is the main mistake made by
people who are unaware that Gödel's theorem imposes a different logic
for the 3-self (G) and the 1-self (S4Grz). I call it the Lucas-Penrose
error. It has been done by Emil Post and Benacerraf, who saw that by
themselves and correct it, unlike Lucas and Penrose. Well, Penrose saw
it, but did not take it into account for his philosophical conclusion.
UDA is for the babies, so, if, like some scientist, you have a problem
in thought experiment and philosophy of mind, you can look at its
translation in computer science and arithmetic. You can study the
logic of sef-reference in good books (Smullyan, Smorynski, Boolos
1979, Boolos 1993). The 3-view is given by []p (Gödel's beweisbar
predicate) and the 1-view is given by []p p (the Theaetetus'
definition of the knower). Incompleteness, as I have explained,
differentiate them. The self-correctness implies that they prove the
same ([]p - []p p, at the truth (G*) level), but the machine
cannot justify this, and indeed G and G* shows them to be very
different logics: a logic of representable belief, and a logic of non-
representable knowledge).
Still, you might try to give your argument. I will not answer it if it
is just the C13 error, as this is becoming boring given that everyone
on the list have understood this since a long time. So find a genuine
error, if you think there is one, or move to step 4, as your present
post here seems to be only literature without arguments at all.
Bruno
I don't think you'll ever fix step 3 unless you try a bit harder.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:45:40 +0200
On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:
@ Bruno
[John]Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous,
that is a flat out logical contradiction.
[Bruno] Where?
The problem arises because if You = person who remembers
Helsinki then you ought to be able replace one for the other
without truth values altering. Thats just logic 101.
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here.
personal identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which is not
Leibnizian. Let Arthur believe p be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is
irrational,
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is
irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities
equal to a same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the
M guy and the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy
are different guy. Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal
or intensional notion. The math exemplifies this in all details, and
all this ultimately related to pure simple extensional relation
between numbers.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.
{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false
according to Bruno.
No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect
myself to have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The
problem is not in the pronom, but in the undersanding that the
question bears on first person experiences, and not on third person
localization of the experience.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have
to accept that those phrases mean something different, otherwise
where does the difference in truth value come from?
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole
context. I never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here,
but even if I said, it we are in a modal, intensional context, where
John and me agree that we cannot use the Leibniz identity rule.
you can not equal person who remembers Helsinki, otherwise you
are contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that
you will see only one city.
You will see two cities
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 11:24 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 1:47 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: You agreed already that a conscious uploaded mind in a process that forks and diverges is from the uploaded mind's point of view, an experience indistinguishable from fundamental randomness. If it is indistinguishable from randomness, then would you also agree that the experience of going through a process fork, as with an experience involving fundamental randomness, cannot be predicted by any means? Forget about giving the correct prediction, a prediction can't even be described by any means. Bruno thinks we can repeat the experiment and compile statistics from it and then compare the number obtained from experiment with the theoretical prediction, but who exactly was the prediction about? If the prediction was about Jason Resch one number is obtained, If the prediction is about the man currently experiencing Helsinki a different number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Moscow Man a third number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Washington Man yet another number is obtained, and if the prediction was about you no number at all is obtained because Bruno doesn't know how to give a consistent meaning to the personal pronoun you. If I understand what you say above, your position is that the question has no answer? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Forget about giving the correct prediction, a prediction can't even be described by any means. Bruno thinks we can repeat the experiment and compile statistics from it and then compare the number obtained from experiment with the theoretical prediction, but who exactly was the prediction about? If the prediction was about Jason Resch one number is obtained, If the prediction is about the man currently experiencing Helsinki a different number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Moscow Man a third number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Washington Man yet another number is obtained, and if the prediction was about you no number at all is obtained because Bruno doesn't know how to give a consistent meaning to the personal pronoun you. If I understand what you say above, your position is that the question has no answer? My position is that there can't be an answer if there is no question. What *EXACTLY* is the question? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 1:47 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: You agreed already that a conscious uploaded mind in a process that forks and diverges is from the uploaded mind's point of view, an experience indistinguishable from fundamental randomness. If it is indistinguishable from randomness, then would you also agree that the experience of going through a process fork, as with an experience involving fundamental randomness, cannot be predicted by any means? Forget about giving the correct prediction, a prediction can't even be described by any means. Bruno thinks we can repeat the experiment and compile statistics from it and then compare the number obtained from experiment with the theoretical prediction, but who exactly was the prediction about? If the prediction was about Jason Resch one number is obtained, If the prediction is about the man currently experiencing Helsinki a different number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Moscow Man a third number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Washington Man yet another number is obtained, and if the prediction was about you no number at all is obtained because Bruno doesn't know how to give a consistent meaning to the personal pronoun you. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: UDA is for the babies And so are pompous homemade acronyms. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
Since we're talking about electrons or photons, everything should be free, since one is liberated from the heavy realm of neutrons and protons. Maybe computing cycles is the common currency. The Jeff Bezos upload has more computing cycles than I because he is far richer. Maybe this is how heaven works as well? -Original Message- From: Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tue, Jul 28, 2015 4:44 pm Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 11:33 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Forget about giving the correct prediction, a prediction can't even be described by any means. Bruno thinks we can repeat the experiment and compile statistics from it and then compare the number obtained from experiment with the theoretical prediction, but who exactly was the prediction about? If the prediction was about Jason Resch one number is obtained, If the prediction is about the man currently experiencing Helsinki a different number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Moscow Man a third number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Washington Man yet another number is obtained, and if the prediction was about you no number at all is obtained because Bruno doesn't know how to give a consistent meaning to the personal pronoun you. If I understand what you say above, your position is that the question has no answer? My position is that there can't be an answer if there is no question. What EXACTLY is the question? An uploaded mind is running within a computer process. If the mind presses a button inside its virtual environment, the process will fork and if within the simulation of the child process a light within the virtual environment will flash blue, while in the parent process it will flash red. The uploaded mind has pushed the button many times, and each time witnessed either a blue flash or red flash, seemingly at random and with a seemingly equal probability of witnessing either color. Within the simulation there is also a casino which allows betting on which color will flash after the button is pressed. The question is, If the game cost $1 to play, and if it was your mind that was uploaded into this computer process what would the minimum pay out have to be for you to play, and what would your betting strategy be? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 11:33 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Forget about giving the correct prediction, a prediction can't even be described by any means. Bruno thinks we can repeat the experiment and compile statistics from it and then compare the number obtained from experiment with the theoretical prediction, but who exactly was the prediction about? If the prediction was about Jason Resch one number is obtained, If the prediction is about the man currently experiencing Helsinki a different number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Moscow Man a third number is obtained, If the prediction was about the Washington Man yet another number is obtained, and if the prediction was about you no number at all is obtained because Bruno doesn't know how to give a consistent meaning to the personal pronoun you. If I understand what you say above, your position is that the question has no answer? My position is that there can't be an answer if there is no question. What *EXACTLY* is the question? An uploaded mind is running within a computer process. If the mind presses a button inside its virtual environment, the process will fork and if within the simulation of the child process a light within the virtual environment will flash blue, while in the parent process it will flash red. The uploaded mind has pushed the button many times, and each time witnessed either a blue flash or red flash, seemingly at random and with a seemingly equal probability of witnessing either color. Within the simulation there is also a casino which allows betting on which color will flash after the button is pressed. The question is,* If the game cost $1 to play, and if it was your mind that was uploaded into this computer process what would the minimum pay out have to be for you to play, and what would your betting strategy be?* Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
John,
You agreed already that a conscious uploaded mind in a process that forks
and diverges is from the uploaded mind's point of view, an experience
indistinguishable from fundamental randomness.
If it is indistinguishable from randomness, then would you also agree that
the experience of going through a process fork, as with an experience
involving fundamental randomness, cannot be predicted by any means? If not,
pleas explain.
Jason
On Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 8:46 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com
wrote:
@ Bruno
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal
identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
You need to focus on what these factors govern:
1) international tariffs.
2) the state of the chinese economy.
3) international demand for tea grown in china.
btw. I wasn't talking about Leibnizinan notions of identity. If you were
committed to that you wouldn't be you, let alone H, W or M, one moment to
the next. Even I don't think your metaphysics is that silly.
I can give you arguments but I can't understand them for you. You have to
do that bit. I don't think you'll ever fix step 3 unless you try a bit
harder.
--
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:45:40 +0200
On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:
@ Bruno
*[John]Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is
a flat out logical contradiction.**[Bruno] Where? *
The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then
you ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values
altering. Thats just logic 101.
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal
identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which is not Leibnizian. Let
Arthur believe p be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is
irrational,
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is
irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities equal to
a same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the M guy
and the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy are different
guy. Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal or intensional
notion. The math exemplifies this in all details, and all this ultimately
related to pure simple extensional relation between numbers.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.
{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false
according to Bruno.
No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect myself
to have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The problem is not
in the pronom, but in the undersanding that the question bears on first
person experiences, and not on third person localization of the experience.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to
accept that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does
the difference in truth value come from?
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole context.
I never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here, but even if I
said, it we are in a modal, intensional context, where John and me agree
that we cannot use the Leibniz identity rule.
you can not equal person who remembers Helsinki, otherwise you are
contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that you will
see only one city.
You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the
subjective, first person, experience.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions
It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated above.
That's obvious as the question is about what you expect to live from the
first person point of view, and you don't expect to have the experience of
being in W and in M, but, as we assume comp, you expect to live with
certainty in either W or in M (as both copies confirms after).
but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's misunderstanding
comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the
experience to live Washington and not in Moscow.
The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is the one having the experience
to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and that
they each got one bit of information.
Bruno
--
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:
@ Bruno
[John]Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous,
that is a flat out logical contradiction.
[Bruno] Where?
The problem arises because if You = person who remembers
Helsinki then you ought to be able replace one for the other
without truth values altering. Thats just logic 101.
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal
identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which is not Leibnizian.
Let Arthur believe p be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is
irrational,
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is
irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities
equal to a same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the M
guy and the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy are
different guy. Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal or
intensional notion. The math exemplifies this in all details, and all
this ultimately related to pure simple extensional relation between
numbers.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.
{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false
according to Bruno.
No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect
myself to have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The
problem is not in the pronom, but in the undersanding that the
question bears on first person experiences, and not on third person
localization of the experience.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have
to accept that those phrases mean something different, otherwise
where does the difference in truth value come from?
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole
context. I never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here,
but even if I said, it we are in a modal, intensional context, where
John and me agree that we cannot use the Leibniz identity rule.
you can not equal person who remembers Helsinki, otherwise you
are contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that
you will see only one city.
You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of
view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the
subjective, first person, experience.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions
It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated
above. That's obvious as the question is about what you expect to live
from the first person point of view, and you don't expect to have the
experience of being in W and in M, but, as we assume comp, you expect
to live with certainty in either W or in M (as both copies confirms
after).
but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's
misunderstanding comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the
experience to live Washington and not in Moscow.
The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is the one having the
experience to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and that
they each got one bit of information.
Bruno
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the
duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he
(at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because
although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still
just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and
make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will
not; it can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon
as the door was opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they
had different memories, so that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous.
That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both
copies are the Helsinki guy.
After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened
there are 2 bodies but still only one Helsinki guy because they
are identical, when the door is opened they see different things
and thus diverge. They both remain the Helsinki guy because they
have equally vivid memories of being a guy in Helsinki, but they are
no longer each other because they diverged as soon as the door was
opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange, but
please explain how
RE: A riddle for John Clark
@ Bruno
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal
identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
You need to focus on what these factors govern:
1) international tariffs.
2) the state of the Chinese economy.
3) international demand for tea grown in china.
btw. I wasn't talking about Leibnizinan notions of identity. If you were
committed to that you wouldn't be you, let alone H, W or M, one moment to the
next. Even I don't think your metaphysics is that silly.
look, I can supply you with arguments but I can't understand them for you. You
have to do that bit. Personally, I don't think you'll ever fix step 3 unless
you try a bit harder.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:45:40 +0200
On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:@ Bruno
[John]Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat
out logical contradiction.
[Bruno] Where?
The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then you
ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values altering. Thats
just logic 101.
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal identity
is not a Leibnizian notion.That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which
is not Leibnizian. Let Arthur believe p be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is irrational,
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities equal to a
same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the M guy and
the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy are different guy.
Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal or intensional notion. The
math exemplifies this in all details, and all this ultimately related to pure
simple extensional relation between numbers.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.
{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false according
to Bruno.
No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect myself to
have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The problem is not in the
pronom, but in the undersanding that the question bears on first person
experiences, and not on third person localization of the experience.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to accept
that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does the
difference in truth value come from?
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole context. I
never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here, but even if I said, it
we are in a modal, intensional context, where John and me agree that we cannot
use the Leibniz identity rule.
you can not equal person who remembers Helsinki, otherwise you are
contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that you will see
only one city.
You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the subjective,
first person, experience.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions
It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated above. That's
obvious as the question is about what you expect to live from the first person
point of view, and you don't expect to have the experience of being in W and in
M, but, as we assume comp, you expect to live with certainty in either W or in
M (as both copies confirms after).
but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's misunderstanding
comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the experience to
live Washington and not in Moscow.The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is
the one having the experience to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and that they
each got one bit of information.
Bruno
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM,
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber
is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal
pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical
so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened
and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it
can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door
RE: A riddle for John Clark
@ Bruno
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal
identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
You need to focus on what these factors govern:
1) international tariffs.
2) the state of the chinese economy.
3) international demand for tea grown in china.
btw. I wasn't talking about Leibnizinan notions of identity. If you were
committed to that you wouldn't be you, let alone H, W or M, one moment to the
next. Even I don't think your metaphysics is that silly.
I can give you arguments but I can't understand them for you. You have to do
that bit. I don't think you'll ever fix step 3 unless you try a bit harder.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:45:40 +0200
On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:@ Bruno
[John]Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat
out logical contradiction.
[Bruno] Where?
The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then you
ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values altering. Thats
just logic 101.
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal identity
is not a Leibnizian notion.That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which
is not Leibnizian. Let Arthur believe p be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is irrational,
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities equal to a
same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the M guy and
the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy are different guy.
Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal or intensional notion. The
math exemplifies this in all details, and all this ultimately related to pure
simple extensional relation between numbers.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.
{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false according
to Bruno.
No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect myself to
have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The problem is not in the
pronom, but in the undersanding that the question bears on first person
experiences, and not on third person localization of the experience.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to accept
that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does the
difference in truth value come from?
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole context. I
never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here, but even if I said, it
we are in a modal, intensional context, where John and me agree that we cannot
use the Leibniz identity rule.
you can not equal person who remembers Helsinki, otherwise you are
contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that you will see
only one city.
You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the subjective,
first person, experience.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions
It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated above. That's
obvious as the question is about what you expect to live from the first person
point of view, and you don't expect to have the experience of being in W and in
M, but, as we assume comp, you expect to live with certainty in either W or in
M (as both copies confirms after).
but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's misunderstanding
comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the experience to
live Washington and not in Moscow.The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is
the one having the experience to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and that they
each got one bit of information.
Bruno
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM,
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber
is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal
pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical
so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened
and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it
can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was
opened the 2 bodies were
RE: A riddle for John Clark
@ John
In MWI You is the only thing that the laws of physics allow Quentin
Anciaux to observe that is organized in a Johnkclarkian way ... With
duplicating chamber stuff if the bet was you will see Moscow I don't know
how to resolve the bet because I don't know who you is.
MWI is decoherent where Bruno is incoherent?
From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 03:04:56 +
@ Bruno
[John]Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a
flat out logical contradiction.
[Bruno] Where?
The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then you
ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values altering. Thats
just logic 101.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.
{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false according
to Bruno.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to accept
that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does the
difference in truth value come from? you can not equal person who remembers
Helsinki, otherwise you are contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true
and false that you will see only one city.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions but is a direct
consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM,
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber
is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal
pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical
so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened
and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it
can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was
opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they had different memories, so
that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous.
That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both copies are the
Helsinki guy.
After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened there are 2
bodies but still only one Helsinki guy because they are identical, when the
door is opened they see different things and thus diverge. They both remain the
Helsinki guy because they have equally vivid memories of being a guy in
Helsinki, but they are no longer each other because they diverged as soon as
the door was opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange,
but please explain how it is contradictory.
There is nothing contradictory.
On the contrary, that is a good explanation why P(W v M) = 1, when W and M
refer to the self-localization experience. As you said, the experience diverge.
For one Helsinki guy the measurement is W, and so write W in the diary, and for
the other the measurement gives M, and he write M in his diary. Both agree that
they could not have predicted that result, except by betting W v M, which is
undermined but true at both place, and obviously the experience W and M is,
well, not even an experience at all. It is half an experience, and half an
intellectual belief.
There is no ambiguity, you are both guys.
You is both guys.
Intellectually. The experience have diverged, The outcome of the
self-localization are different. From now on, you are either a guy living in
Moscow having a doppelganger in Washington, OR a guy living in Washington
having a doppelganger in Moscow. You don't become a mysterious entity
experiencing both place simultaneously. Both got one bit of information from
the push+self-localization measurement.
One guy will be in Moscow. One guy will be in Washington. But you will see
only one city.
yes, in Helsinki, you can be sure of that/ You push on a button, open a door,
and see only one city, and get a cup of coffee.
You have guessed right the other day. P(coffee) = 1 because coffee is
satisfied in both place. But W or M is also satisfied in both place, and W
and M is false in both place, as W and M refers to the incompatible experience
of seeing Moscow and seeing Washington from the direct first person experience.
Indeed, only the mysterious entity experiencing both places could wriite W and
M, by the definition of the FIRST person experience denoted by W and M.
Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat out
logical contradiction.
Where? it is W M which is a flat out contradiction, when W and M refers to
the first person experience. One diary contains M, the other contain W. None
contain W and M. I hope you are OK with this.
I said
RE: A riddle for John Clark
@ Bruno
[John]Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a
flat out logical contradiction.
[Bruno] Where?
The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then you
ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values altering. Thats
just logic 101.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.
{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false according
to Bruno.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to accept
that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does the
difference in truth value come from? you can not equal person who remembers
Helsinki, otherwise you are contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true
and false that you will see only one city.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions but is a direct
consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM,
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber
is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal
pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical
so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened
and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it
can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was
opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they had different memories, so
that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous.
That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both copies are the
Helsinki guy.
After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened there are 2
bodies but still only one Helsinki guy because they are identical, when the
door is opened they see different things and thus diverge. They both remain the
Helsinki guy because they have equally vivid memories of being a guy in
Helsinki, but they are no longer each other because they diverged as soon as
the door was opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange,
but please explain how it is contradictory.
There is nothing contradictory.
On the contrary, that is a good explanation why P(W v M) = 1, when W and M
refer to the self-localization experience. As you said, the experience diverge.
For one Helsinki guy the measurement is W, and so write W in the diary, and for
the other the measurement gives M, and he write M in his diary. Both agree that
they could not have predicted that result, except by betting W v M, which is
undermined but true at both place, and obviously the experience W and M is,
well, not even an experience at all. It is half an experience, and half an
intellectual belief.
There is no ambiguity, you are both guys.
You is both guys.
Intellectually. The experience have diverged, The outcome of the
self-localization are different. From now on, you are either a guy living in
Moscow having a doppelganger in Washington, OR a guy living in Washington
having a doppelganger in Moscow. You don't become a mysterious entity
experiencing both place simultaneously. Both got one bit of information from
the push+self-localization measurement.
One guy will be in Moscow. One guy will be in Washington. But you will see
only one city.
yes, in Helsinki, you can be sure of that/ You push on a button, open a door,
and see only one city, and get a cup of coffee.
You have guessed right the other day. P(coffee) = 1 because coffee is
satisfied in both place. But W or M is also satisfied in both place, and W
and M is false in both place, as W and M refers to the incompatible experience
of seeing Moscow and seeing Washington from the direct first person experience.
Indeed, only the mysterious entity experiencing both places could wriite W and
M, by the definition of the FIRST person experience denoted by W and M.
Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat out
logical contradiction.
Where? it is W M which is a flat out contradiction, when W and M refers to
the first person experience. One diary contains M, the other contain W. None
contain W and M. I hope you are OK with this.
I said it before I'll say it again, if Bruno Marchal wants the words you will
only see one city to be true Bruno Marchal is going to have to change the
meaning of the personal pronoun you ;
I don't have to change the meaning. Right at the start, the question is about
the expected outcome of a first person experience. You agree that there is a
divergence, so I guess you understood that one write in the diary W, and the
other write M. Those are what makes the divergence to exist. I
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: John Clark knows that's not exactly what was asked but if a better definition of you is given a better answer will be provided. It has been given, and we have agreed on it. We agreed (or I thought we had) that you means anyone who remembers being a man in Helsinki. But of course I CT1PAT3P We don't need a better definition of you, we need only to take into account that the question is about the first person experience [blah blah] And by referring to *THE * first person experience rather than *A* first person experience Bruno Marchal completely contradicts what was agreed on. But of course I CT1PAT3P the first person experience from the first person experience pov itself. Please define again what the word you means without circularity (without using the very word to be defined) and with the proper usage of the words a and the in a world with people duplicating machines. I have no clue how you can maintain W and M, except by confusing 1-you and 3-1-you. In the math part, it is the confusion between [etc and etc] Save time, save electrons, use Y CT1PAT3P. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 24 Jul 2015, at 18:33, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: John Clark knows that's not exactly what was asked but if a better definition of you is given a better answer will be provided. It has been given, and we have agreed on it. We agreed (or I thought we had) that you means anyone who remembers being a man in Helsinki. But of course ICT1PAT3P We don't need a better definition of you, we need only to take into account that the question is about the first person experience [blah blah] And by referring to THE first person experience rather than A first person experience Bruno Marchal completely contradicts what was agreed on. But of course ICT1PAT3P the first person experience from the first person experience pov itself. Please define again what the word you means without circularity (without using the very word to be defined) and with the proper usage of the words a and the in a world with people duplicating machines. I have no clue how you can maintain W and M, except by confusing 1-you and 3-1-you. In the math part, it is the confusion between [etc and etc] Save time, save electrons, use YCT1PAT3P. Wonderful. I see that you see the point. But the YCT1PAT3P (that is the confusion between the 1p pov and the 3p pov) is explained in the [etc and etc] that you juste hide. Your method are transparent. If you have an argument that we can understand, give it to us, and explain. Find a new one avoiding the YCT1PAT3P (your stupid acronym for the 1-3 confusion, that is, your mysterious amnesy of the interview of the copies). Hmm... Let me still make a try to help you, or me (who knows?). Let me ask you a new question, with a different protocol/history. You are in Helsinki, and you want to go to Moscow. But there is a bad whether and no planes, and you decide to teleport you in Moscow, where, incidentally we met. Up to now I hope you are OK that you feel to be in Moscow, in some clear and definite sense. But I have a bad news. There has been some Eve who has eavesdropped your Helsinki-code during the transmission to Moscow. I don't know if there has been a reconstitution made of that copy, still less where if it is the case. All I know is that there has been that copy by Eve. And, I don't dare to tell you. I promise you that the teleportation was safe, and secure. I was wrong, but as I am not sure it is serious, I tell you nothing about it for now. The question is do you think that such information would influence the personal feeling of where you feel to be (in Moscow)? Put in other way, would the presence of a (diverged, post duplication) doppelanger influence your belief that you are, right now, in front of only Russian people in Moscow? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they had different memories, so that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous. That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both copies are the Helsinki guy. After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened there are 2 bodies but still only one Helsinki guy because they are identical, when the door is opened they see different things and thus diverge. They both remain the Helsinki guy because they have equally vivid memories of being a guy in Helsinki, but they are no longer each other because they diverged as soon as the door was opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange, but please explain how it is contradictory. There is no ambiguity, you are both guys. You is both guys. One guy will be in Moscow. One guy will be in Washington. But you will see only one city. Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat out logical contradiction. I said it before I'll say it again, if Bruno Marchal wants the words you will only see one city to be true Bruno Marchal is going to have to change the meaning of the personal pronoun you ; somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki just won't work. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they had different memories, so that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous. That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both copies are the Helsinki guy. After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened there are 2 bodies but still only one Helsinki guy because they are identical, when the door is opened they see different things and thus diverge. They both remain the Helsinki guy because they have equally vivid memories of being a guy in Helsinki, but they are no longer each other because they diverged as soon as the door was opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange, but please explain how it is contradictory. There is nothing contradictory. On the contrary, that is a good explanation why P(W v M) = 1, when W and M refer to the self-localization experience. As you said, the experience diverge. For one Helsinki guy the measurement is W, and so write W in the diary, and for the other the measurement gives M, and he write M in his diary. Both agree that they could not have predicted that result, except by betting W v M, which is undermined but true at both place, and obviously the experience W and M is, well, not even an experience at all. It is half an experience, and half an intellectual belief. There is no ambiguity, you are both guys. You is both guys. Intellectually. The experience have diverged, The outcome of the self- localization are different. From now on, you are either a guy living in Moscow having a doppelganger in Washington, OR a guy living in Washington having a doppelganger in Moscow. You don't become a mysterious entity experiencing both place simultaneously. Both got one bit of information from the push+self-localization measurement. One guy will be in Moscow. One guy will be in Washington. But you will see only one city. yes, in Helsinki, you can be sure of that/ You push on a button, open a door, and see only one city, and get a cup of coffee. You have guessed right the other day. P(coffee) = 1 because coffee is satisfied in both place. But W or M is also satisfied in both place, and W and M is false in both place, as W and M refers to the incompatible experience of seeing Moscow and seeing Washington from the direct first person experience. Indeed, only the mysterious entity experiencing both places could wriite W and M, by the definition of the FIRST person experience denoted by W and M. Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat out logical contradiction. Where? it is W M which is a flat out contradiction, when W and M refers to the first person experience. One diary contains M, the other contain W. None contain W and M. I hope you are OK with this. I said it before I'll say it again, if Bruno Marchal wants the words you will only see one city to be true Bruno Marchal is going to have to change the meaning of the personal pronoun you ; I don't have to change the meaning. Right at the start, the question is about the expected outcome of a first person experience. You agree that there is a divergence, so I guess you understood that one write in the diary W, and the other write M. Those are what makes the divergence to exist. I keep the meaning of you, and you are in both city, but the point is that in both city you see only once city, so the bet P(one city) = 1 was correct, and P(I see two cities at once when opening the box) = 0. The prediction is on the personal experience of what is seen when opening the door. It is NOT on the third person localization of those experiences. somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki just won't work. It works perfectly well. After the duplication, I interviewed all the guys who remember having been the guy pushing on the button in Helsinki, and they all told me that indeed, as predicted, the self- localizaton measurement gave as a result only once city. P(one city) was equal as P(coffe), for the exact same reason: that is what is lived by all the continuations. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: A riddle for John Clark
Le 23 juil. 2015 21:44, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com a écrit : On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 2:41 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; Same thing with MWI, No not the same, both involve duplication but after that the similarities end. I remind you however you are that you are duplicated along the measurement apparatus. Yes. So who's you who make the bet? In MWI You is the only thing that the laws of physics allow Quentin Anciaux to observe that is organized in a Johnkclarkian way; Quentin Anciaux is in no way involved in that, only the matter who's unfortunately organized in a johnclarkian way is involved in both experiments and questions, and unfortunately again in both experiments this matter is duplicated... that is the thing that will give Quentin Anciaux money if the bet is lost and that is the thing Quentin Anciaux will have to give money to if the bet is won. With duplicating chamber stuff if the bet was you will see Moscow I don't know how to resolve the bet because I don't know who you is; maybe Quentin would have to give the Moscow Man $5 and the Washington Man would have to give Quentin $5, but that seems rather silly. What would be the point of Quentin Anciaux making such a bet? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 23 Jul 2015, at 05:09, chris peck wrote: Quentin Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so probability should also be one Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of probability coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed determinism and chance were difficult to marry... Computationalism, once the 1p/3p distinction is made clear, put transparent, 3p describable, light on this. (Determinism + ontology rich enough to duplicate oneself) === chance. Even Tegmark rediscovered this in his recent book, as Jason Resch quoted once. Then elementary arithmetic confirms the quantum probabilities logic(s) with the []p t (and some others) views. That is, at the exact place(s) forced by the UD Argument. This is pure math and has been thoroughly verified. It is not well known because few physicists dare to think on Gödel's theorem (especially after Penrose), and few logicians knows about Everett. Well, there are other factors which are more contingent. The point is that computationalism explains that 3p-determinism entails 1p-indeterminism. Bruno Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark To: everything-list@googlegroups.com From: meeke...@verizon.net Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700 On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. It follows from physics. We don't know that. Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at different locations do not experience both locations - their minds are separate because their brains are. If that is more than just an assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of mind. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might expect the duplicates to share one mind. Brent But does it follow from UD computations? It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in computer science. Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 23 Jul 2015, at 13:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le 23 juil. 2015 09:24, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com a écrit : Quentin Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? we've done this sketch before...and John Clarke just did the same sketch with you hours ago...Why do you need things repeated to you so much? No he did not. He pretends probabilities do have meaning in MWI. When he says 0.5 with his bet he ignores he is entangled with the measurement apparatus and duplicated with it, with one john winning and one losinf his bet. Exactly. The deny of the FPI has been shown now equivalent with the deny of the use of probability in QM (beyond having be shown inconsistent per se, or based on the 1-3 confusion). Case close. (Normally). Bruno David Wallace, a proponent of MWI at Oxford University, puts it this way with regards to Schrodinger's Cat: We're not really sure how probability makes any sense in Many Worlds Theory. So the theory seems to be a theory which involves deterministic branching: if I ask what should I expect in the future the answer is I should with 100% certainty expect to be a version of David who sees the cat alive and in addition I should expect with 100% certainty to be a version of David who sees the cat dead. What Wallace does is tackle incoherence head on. Does he over come it? Im not brainy enough to say. But I am brainy enough to see that he doesn't take the Bruno-Quentin approach of praying the problem will go away by pretending it doesn't exist. Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 08:48:51 +0200 Subject: RE: A riddle for John Clark From: allco...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Le 23 juil. 2015 05:09, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com a écrit : Quentin Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so probability should also be one Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of probability coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed determinism and chance were difficult to marry... Then you're refuting MWI as not being able to correctly renders the probabilities, right? Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? Quentin Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark To: everything-list@googlegroups.com From: meeke...@verizon.net Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700 On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. It follows from physics. We don't know that. Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/ mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at different locations do not experience both locations - their minds are separate because their brains are. If that is more than just an assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of mind. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might expect the duplicates to share one mind. Brent But does it follow from UD computations? It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in computer science. Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 23 Jul 2015, at 00:19, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: So you're claiming that the probability of seeing spin up while doing a measurement of the spin is one (likewise seeing spin down) right? That is neither right nor wrong because it is not clear what the probability refers to; the probability of *who* seeing spin up? Oh, You said us that in the MWI there were no problem as the copies cannot met, and so the use of probability makes sense in QM. OK you did change your mind, and I guess this is to hide the fact that your argument against the FPI and Chris Peck's argument would contradict each other. It looks a bit opportunistic to me, and it annihilates your previews post on the subject. What I am claiming is that if the MWI is correct and if Quentin Anciaux performs a spin measurement on a electron then Quentin Anciaux will see spin up with 100% probability and Quentin Anciaux will see spin down with 100% probability. In the description of the wave, yes, a typical 3-1 view. But n QM we use that to evaluate outcomes of future measurement, and we get probabilities. I am also claiming that if Quentin Anciaux measures the spin of a electron and I say I bet Quentin Anciaux got spin up I will win the bet 50% of the time. Again assuming that the MWI is correct. You get only probability 100% if you include yourself in the wave, by what you say above, or you get solipsisme, as you allow probabilities, but only for you, which is indeed a way to confuse the 3p and the 1p. Bruno Then, for one if you agree, you're just saying MWI is false, so you lied to us for years saying the contrary, And likewise the probability of Quentin Anciaux fucking a horse is 100% and the probability of Quentin Anciaux fucking a mule is 100%; but if I say I bet it was a mule not a horse that Quentin Anciaux fucked I will win my bet 50% of the time. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 22 Jul 2015, at 22:15, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 2:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results Yes, provided that you means somebody who remembers being Quentin Anciaux at this instant. MWI says everything that doesn't violate the laws of physics will happen, so in one of those many worlds you have been elected Pope, and in another you have graduated from Ringling Brothers and Barnum Bailey Clown College, and in yet another you have won the Nobel Prize. And all of them are you because all of them remember reading this post at this instant. Oh! You change your mind. Now computationalism is like MWI, you agree with Quentin that if there is no computationalist FPI, there is no probability in QM either. At least this makes you coherent, but then you have a problem with how Everett justify the use of probability in QM (and indeed it is a particular case) on the FPI. Bruno you and Clark are in total disagreement contrary to your encouragement in trolling would let us believe. Trolling? Unlikely as it is do you think it is conceivable that in one of those many worlds there is somebody who sincerely disagrees with you and Bruno, or would such a thing violate the laws of physics? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 23 Jul 2015, at 09:24, chris peck wrote: Quentin Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? we've done this sketch before...and John Clarke just did the same sketch with you hours ago...Why do you need things repeated to you so much? Well Quentin points to the fact that your critics on the FPI is inconsistent with Clarks' critics. That so true that you succeed in making Clark changing his mind on the difference between the FPI used in comp and in QM. Nice, now he is a bit more coherent, and ... contradicted by anyone using QM, as it is a probabilistic theory. Bruno David Wallace, a proponent of MWI at Oxford University, puts it this way with regards to Schrodinger's Cat: We're not really sure how probability makes any sense in Many Worlds Theory. So the theory seems to be a theory which involves deterministic branching: if I ask what should I expect in the future the answer is I should with 100% certainty expect to be a version of David who sees the cat alive and in addition I should expect with 100% certainty to be a version of David who sees the cat dead. What Wallace does is tackle incoherence head on. Does he over come it? Im not brainy enough to say. But I am brainy enough to see that he doesn't take the Bruno-Quentin approach of praying the problem will go away by pretending it doesn't exist. Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 08:48:51 +0200 Subject: RE: A riddle for John Clark From: allco...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Le 23 juil. 2015 05:09, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com a écrit : Quentin Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so probability should also be one Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of probability coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed determinism and chance were difficult to marry... Then you're refuting MWI as not being able to correctly renders the probabilities, right? Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? Quentin Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark To: everything-list@googlegroups.com From: meeke...@verizon.net Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700 On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. It follows from physics. We don't know that. Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/ mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at different locations do not experience both locations - their minds are separate because their brains are. If that is more than just an assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of mind. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might expect the duplicates to share one mind. Brent But does it follow from UD computations? It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in computer science. Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything- list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 23 Jul 2015, at 01:25, meekerdb wrote: On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. It follows from physics. We don't know that. Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. Because we are at the step 3 protocol. The point is logical. Comp assumes a physical reality stable enough to have computer working deterministically, without anything non Turing emulable in them. Only later we will understood, from the reasoning, that such a physics needs to be extracted from arithmetic. We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at different locations do not experience both locations - their minds are separate because their brains are. Yes, as we assume computationalism (and thus some amount of physics needed to be able to say yes to a doctor). What is not assumed is that such a physical reality is primitive. Later, we get the proof that it cannot be primitive, and that such physics has to be derived from RA, or, if it contradicts it, we will refute computationalism. If that is more than just an assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of mind. I don't think so. At this stage it relies on some physics, to implement computer. It does not rely on the fact that such physics is primitive, and so it does not rely on the existence of a physical basis of mind. By definition of comp, it relies only on the fact that we are in a physical universe in which we can implement locally universal machine. No possibility to say yes to a doctor without it. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might expect the duplicates to share one mind. Not at all, because we know, or have good reason to believe, that our brain are physical, and that our human consciousness needs it to manifest itself relatively to others and relatively to the physical universe. The conclusion of the UDA never put any doubt on this. It rejects only the idea that physicalism is true. No problem at all with physics, as long as the empirical world confirms the physics extracted from Robinson Arithmetic (and computationalism) as it does up to now. At some point we use only that (p - ~p) - ~p. (with p being for example the physical supervenience thesis. Bruno Brent But does it follow from UD computations? It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in computer science. Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 23 Jul 2015, at 19:33, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 12:55 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Actually John Clark pretends that half the John Clark's who say I bet Quentin Anciaux will see spin up when the electron is measured will win the bet. Actually John Clark can say the same thing betting that after duplication he will find moscow behind the door, Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they had different memories, so that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous. That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both copies are the Helsinki guy. There is no ambiguity, you are both guys. But both guys have incompatible first person experiences, and that explains the prediction W v M, as explained with all detail before (reread the last posts). It looks you change your mind on this, but then it looks you say whatever needed to deny the obvious. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 23 Jul 2015, at 18:58, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That is neither right nor wrong because it is not clear what the probability refers to; the probability of *who* seeing spin up? Oh, You said us that in the MWI there were no problem as the copies cannot met, and so the use of probability makes sense in QM. Quentin asked if the probability of you seeing spin up and seeing spin down is both 1. John Clark doesn't know how to answer that except to say if MWI is correct then the probability of John Clark seeing spin up is 1 and the probability of John Clark seeing spin down is 1. But Chris Peck, if I understood him correctly, seems to agree that in QM-Everett, we keep the usual probability. Indeed Everett justifies those probabilities, notably with MWI+Gleason theorem. And this uses the comp FPI. John Clark knows that's not exactly what was asked but if a better definition of you is given a better answer will be provided. It has been given, and we have agreed on it. We don't need a better definition of you, we need only to take into account that the question is about the first person experience content, that is, the first person experience from the first person experience pov itself. As the experience W and M are incompatible, as you have agreed also, W M is directly ruled out. Nobody will experience from that 1-1 view being in the two cities at once. That follows easily from the fact that the two brain copies are disconnected and cannot be aware of each other in any 1p direct view (unless magical telepathy of course, but we can't have it with the computationalist hypothesis and this protocol. OK you did change your mind I change my mind all the time, but not in this case. and I guess this is to hide the fact that your argument against the FPI and Chris Peck's argument would contradict each other. There may come a time when I disagree with Chris Peck, if and when that day comes I will not hesitate to say so. You may have noticed that I'm not particularly shy in that regard. I don't think Chris Peck is saying that P(up) = P(down) = 1 in QM (Everett or not). Of course this is as much ridiculous than to predict W and M in step 3, as the subjective experience of seeing simultaneously UP and DOWN, like W and M, are incompatible. To be oneself in superposition does not lead to a blurred experience of the two outcomes. Sorry, but I have no clue how you can maintain W and M, except by confusing 1-you and 3-1-you. In the math part, it is the confusion between []p and []p p, which has a long history in science and philosophy. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 2:41 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; Same thing with MWI, No not the same, both involve duplication but after that the similarities end. I remind you however you are that you are duplicated along the measurement apparatus. Yes. So who's you who make the bet? In MWI You is the only thing that the laws of physics allow Quentin Anciaux to observe that is organized in a Johnkclarkian way; that is the thing that will give Quentin Anciaux money if the bet is lost and that is the thing Quentin Anciaux will have to give money to if the bet is won. With duplicating chamber stuff if the bet was you will see Moscow I don't know how to resolve the bet because I don't know who you is; maybe Quentin would have to give the Moscow Man $5 and the Washington Man would have to give Quentin $5, but that seems rather silly. What would be the point of Quentin Anciaux making such a bet? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: No he did not. He [Quentin means John Clark. I think] pretends probabilities do have meaning in MWI. When he says 0.5 with his bet Actually John Clark pretends that half the John Clark's who say I bet Quentin Anciaux will see spin up when the electron is measured will win the bet. Granted there will be mathematical problems if there are an infinite number of John Clarks and not just 10^500^500 of them, but that is a difficulty that the many worlds theory has never entirely cleared up in my opinion. Yes it needs work but I still think the theory is on the right track. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 7:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results Yes, provided that you means somebody who remembers being Quentin Anciaux at this instant. MWI says everything that doesn't violate the laws of physics will happen, so in one of those many worlds you have been elected Pope , and in another you have graduated from Ringling Brothers and Barnum Bailey Clown College , and in yet another you have won the Nobel Prize. And all of them are you because all of them remember reading this post at this instant. Oh! You change your mind. Now computationalism is like MWI, I have always thought that computationalism was compatible with MWI, if not I would have never come to believe that MWI was the least ridiculous of all known quantum interpretations. you agree with Quentin I was unaware that Quentin and I agreed on anything. that if there is no computationalist FPI, I have no idea what absurd logical contortions you underwent to form that conclusion, and please don't tell me, I just ate. you have a problem with how Everett justify the use of probability in QM A transactional approach is interesting but very few of even the most enthusiastic supporters of Everett (including me) think that all the mathematical difficulties of dealing with probability if infinity is involved have been ironed out. But if spacetime is quantized then Everett might not need to deal with infinities at all. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
Le 23 juil. 2015 17:58, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com a écrit : On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: No he did not. He [Quentin means John Clark. I think] pretends probabilities do have meaning in MWI. When he says 0.5 with his bet Actually John Clark pretends that half the John Clark's who say I bet Quentin Anciaux will see spin up when the electron is measured will win the bet. Actually John Clark can say the same thing betting that after duplication he will find moscow behind the door, and about half the time he will be right. And round and round we go. Granted there will be mathematical problems if there are an infinite number of John Clarks and not just 10^500^500 of them, but that is a difficulty that the many worlds theory has never entirely cleared up in my opinion. Yes it needs work but I still think the theory is on the right track. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That is neither right nor wrong because it is not clear what the probability refers to; the probability of *who* seeing spin up? Oh, You said us that in the MWI there were no problem as the copies cannot met, and so the use of probability makes sense in QM. Quentin asked if the probability of you seeing spin up and seeing spin down is both 1. John Clark doesn't know how to answer that except to say if MWI is correct then the probability of John Clark seeing spin up is 1 and the probability of John Clark seeing spin down is 1. John Clark knows that's not exactly what was asked but if a better definition of you is given a better answer will be provided. OK you did change your mind I change my mind all the time, but not in this case. and I guess this is to hide the fact that your argument against the FPI and Chris Peck's argument would contradict each other. There may come a time when I disagree with Chris Peck, if and when that day comes I will not hesitate to say so. You may have noticed that I'm not particularly shy in that regard. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
Le 23 juil. 2015 19:33, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com a écrit : On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 12:55 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Actually John Clark pretends that half the John Clark's who say I bet Quentin Anciaux will see spin up when the electron is measured will win the bet. Actually John Clark can say the same thing betting that after duplication he will find moscow behind the door, Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; Same thing with MWI, I remind you however you are that you are duplicated along the measurement apparatus. So who's you who make the bet? it can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they had different memories, so that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: A riddle for John Clark
Le 23 juil. 2015 05:09, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com a écrit : Quentin Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so probability should also be one Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of probability coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed determinism and chance were difficult to marry... Then you're refuting MWI as not being able to correctly renders the probabilities, right? Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? Quentin Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark To: everything-list@googlegroups.com From: meeke...@verizon.net Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700 On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. It follows from physics. We don't know that. Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at different locations do not experience both locations - their minds are separate because their brains are. If that is more than just an assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of mind. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might expect the duplicates to share one mind. Brent But does it follow from UD computations? It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in computer science. Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group
RE: A riddle for John Clark
Quentin Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? we've done this sketch before...and John Clarke just did the same sketch with you hours ago...Why do you need things repeated to you so much? David Wallace, a proponent of MWI at Oxford University, puts it this way with regards to Schrodinger's Cat: We're not really sure how probability makes any sense in Many Worlds Theory. So the theory seems to be a theory which involves deterministic branching: if I ask what should I expect in the future the answer is I should with 100% certainty expect to be a version of David who sees the cat alive and in addition I should expect with 100% certainty to be a version of David who sees the cat dead. What Wallace does is tackle incoherence head on. Does he over come it? Im not brainy enough to say. But I am brainy enough to see that he doesn't take the Bruno-Quentin approach of praying the problem will go away by pretending it doesn't exist. Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 08:48:51 +0200 Subject: RE: A riddle for John Clark From: allco...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Le 23 juil. 2015 05:09, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com a écrit : Quentin Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so probability should also be one Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of probability coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed determinism and chance were difficult to marry... Then you're refuting MWI as not being able to correctly renders the probabilities, right? Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? Quentin Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark To: everything-list@googlegroups.com From: meeke...@verizon.net Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700 On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. It follows from physics. We don't know that. Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at different locations do not experience both locations - their minds are separate because their brains are. If that is more than just an assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of mind. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might expect the duplicates to share one mind. Brent But does it follow from UD computations? It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in computer science. Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more
RE: A riddle for John Clark
Le 23 juil. 2015 09:24, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com a écrit : Quentin Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? we've done this sketch before...and John Clarke just did the same sketch with you hours ago...Why do you need things repeated to you so much? No he did not. He pretends probabilities do have meaning in MWI. When he says 0.5 with his bet he ignores he is entangled with the measurement apparatus and duplicated with it, with one john winning and one losinf his bet. David Wallace, a proponent of MWI at Oxford University, puts it this way with regards to Schrodinger's Cat: We're not really sure how probability makes any sense in Many Worlds Theory. So the theory seems to be a theory which involves deterministic branching: if I ask what should I expect in the future the answer is I should with 100% certainty expect to be a version of David who sees the cat alive and in addition I should expect with 100% certainty to be a version of David who sees the cat dead. What Wallace does is tackle incoherence head on. Does he over come it? Im not brainy enough to say. But I am brainy enough to see that he doesn't take the Bruno-Quentin approach of praying the problem will go away by pretending it doesn't exist. Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 08:48:51 +0200 Subject: RE: A riddle for John Clark From: allco...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Le 23 juil. 2015 05:09, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com a écrit : Quentin Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so probability should also be one Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of probability coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed determinism and chance were difficult to marry... Then you're refuting MWI as not being able to correctly renders the probabilities, right? Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? Quentin Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark To: everything-list@googlegroups.com From: meeke...@verizon.net Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700 On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. It follows from physics. We don't know that. Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at different locations do not experience both locations - their minds are separate because their brains are. If that is more than just an assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of mind. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might expect the duplicates to share one mind. Brent But does it follow from UD computations? It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in computer science. Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe
RE: A riddle for John Clark
Le 22 juil. 2015 01:11, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com a écrit : Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person experience. Obviously. if I could experience M and W simultaneously they would not be exclusive by definition . If anyone besides you thinks I would argue any different they should look again. I argued that in worlds with duplication machines I can expect my future to involve numerous mutually exclusive perspectives. That isn't the same. The probability of me seeing Moscow from a first person perspective after duplication is governed by two things which have nothing to do with 1p or 3p perspectives: whether or not, prior to duplication, I am justified in thinking the person post duplication will be me ... and your set up insists upon this and whether at least one duplicate will be in Moscow and your set up also guarantees this. Neither of these statements are dependent on perspective. Tegmark's bird and frog would agree on both. But nevertheless, it follows directly from these two statements that the probability of me seeing Moscow would be 1. Its just guaranteed by your set up and the way you define your terms. Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so probability should also be one, so you've refuted MWI... Don't you? If you say that in the MWI case contrary to the duplication experiment, probability is not one then you're inconsistent like Clark, if not then you and Clark are in total disagreement contrary to your encouragement in trolling would let us believe. Quentin The specter of chance in step 3 stems from the idea of there being 1 person and two cities. But that is an incomplete description of the set up. There is 1 person and then that person in each city. You are not betting on a flicked coin you are placing bets on red and black and then spinning a roulette wheel. Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 18:02:58 -0400 Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark From: johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person experience. They can if the first person experience has been duplicated because that's what the word duplicated means. But of course ICT1PWT3P, So I guess this is just the traditional John Clark's confusion between the 1-1 and 3-1 views. Yep, as you've pointed out many many MANY times, all the problems with your theory and all the mysteries of the universe can be solved by ICT3PWT1P. To explain the error here, sometimes I imagine a guy who win a price: going to Mars, but the law of his country forbid self-annihilation, and so he can only be copied and pasted on Mars. Why is it that in all such thought experiments it's always the original's viewpoint that is followed and never the copies? --No problem he said, I expect to live both experiences No problem , I expect to live both experiences provided that I means whoever remembers being in Helsinki right now. And what else could I mean? he go in the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. But the copy on Mars is disappointed, because when he opened the door and sees only Mars. in front on me on Earth, S o he go es in to the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. And the copy on Mars is not disappointed when he (somebody who remembers being in Helsinki) opened the door and he sees only Mars and no sign of Earth because that is exactly what heexpected to happen. If Bruno Marchal does not like that fact then Bruno Marchal is going to need to change the meaning of he. He asked: did the copy occur? We told him that yes his copy is on Mars. He asked: did the original survive ? We told him that yes his original is on Earth. he realized that the one staying on Erath, will just not experience the adventure on Mars. Not being a complete imbecile the copy realized that the original on Earth w ill just not experience the adventure on Mars. He can intellectually conceive that he survived on Mars through that doppelganger, but that is a meagre consolation Although that is what he expected to happen when he diverged because that's what diverged means. If he repeat that experience, the probability that he [...] A example of personal pronoun addiction . S ee above. Why? Let us read the diary. Why? In Helsinki he wrote I expect to have both experiences in the first person sense. And Mr.I did indeed have both experiences in the first person sense, for proof of that just ask the two people who call themselves Mr. I. In Moscow, well, he sees only Moscow Another example of personal pronoun addiction
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 2:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results Yes, provided that you means somebody who remembers being Quentin Anciaux at this instant. MWI says everything that doesn't violate the laws of physics will happen, so in one of those many worlds you have been elected Pope , and in another you have graduated from Ringling Brothers and Barnum Bailey Clown College , and in yet another you have won the Nobel Prize. And all of them are you because all of them remember reading this post at this instant. you and Clark are in total disagreement contrary to your encouragement in trolling would let us believe. Trolling? Unlikely as it is do you think it is conceivable that in one of those many worlds there is somebody who sincerely disagrees with you and Bruno, or would such a thing violate the laws of physics? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 22 Jul 2015, at 03:18, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Obviously. if I could experience M and W simultaneously they would not be exclusive by definition . I agree that it all depends on definitions, in this case the definition of I. If the definition of I is somebody who remembers being John Clark in Helsinki before the duplication then it's obvious how many cities I will see. Bruno wants I to see only one city but the only way to do that is to change the meaning of I. Not at all. I is and remains the guy who remember Helsinki. Both copies verifies that definition, and both can see only once city after the duplication. So P(W v M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0; once you distinguish the 1-I and the 3-I related to that same I. You agree that the guy is in both city, but you forget to interview them about their experience. If you do, both I, after the duplication, confirms that (W M) was pure nonsense. I argued that in worlds with duplication machines I can expect my future to involve numerous mutually exclusive perspectives. Exactly. Nonsense. Nobody will ever experience exclusive experiences in the setting described. They can believe intellectually in those exclusive experience, but not experience them (unless telepathy or other non computationalist magic). There is 1 person and then that person in each city. Correct again. So no person can experience the exclusive alternative. Sometimes the language in dealing with this sort of thing can sound a bit awkward, but English was not made to be used in a world with people duplicating machines; once these devices become common personal pronouns are going to need major revisions. The 1p/ 3p distinction is the major revision. When we are duplicated, it is rather obvious that this distinction transforms an and into an exclusive or. The guy could say: I will be in W and M, but I will feel to be in W, or in M, as I will never *experience*, no matter what, to be in W and M. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. It follows from physics. We don't know that. We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/ mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. But does it follow from UD computations? It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in computer science. Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 22 Jul 2015, at 00:02, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person experience. They can if the first person experience has been duplicated because that's what the word duplicated means.But of course ICT1PWT3P, The first person is duplicated in the third person perspective, but the person does not feel the split, and from the first person perspective it remain one person, getting a doppelganger in the other city. So I guess this is just the traditional John Clark's confusion between the 1-1 and 3-1 views. Yep, as you've pointed out many many MANY times, all the problems with your theory and all the mysteries of the universe can be solved by ICT3PWT1P. It just shows that your critics of the FPI does not work. To explain the error here, sometimes I imagine a guy who win a price: going to Mars, but the law of his country forbid self- annihilation, and so he can only be copied and pasted on Mars. Why is it that in all such thought experiments it's always the original's viewpoint that is followed and never the copies? On the contrary, I insist that the confirmation of the probability evaluate in Helsinki must be confirmed by interviewing *all* copies, which is what *you* never do. You say the contrary of what I say. I guess it is just your usual rhetorical tricks. Of course, the evaluation of the proba are asked before the duplication. The confirmation, yet, is in the interview of the copies. --No problem he said, I expect to live both experiences No problem, I expect to live both experiences provided that I means whoever remembers being in Helsinki right now. And what else could I mean? We are in a loop. We agree on the 3p description of that I this since the start. But this does not entail that I can expect to live in both city, given than in both cities, I live only the seeing of one city, so it is a certainty that the guy who remember Helsinki can access only two states in which, FROM THE 1P view itself (to answer the question asked), he can expect to live, from that 1p view, in only once city: W or M. (in this case Earth or Mars). he go in the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. But the copy on Mars is disappointed, because when he opened the door and sees only Mars. in front on me on Earth, So he goes into the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. And the copy on Mars is not disappointed Yes. The copy is happy, although the copy was expecting living in both place (in Chris Peck's mind), and that is also refuted by the copy. when he (somebody who remembers being in Helsinki) opened the door and he sees only Mars and no sign of Earth because that is exactly what heexpected to happen. Which confirms the FPI. If Bruno Marchal does not like that fact then Bruno Marchal is going to need to change the meaning of he. I love it. You just confirmed that both will live a unique experience Mars ~Earth, and Earth ~Mars. They are incompatible in the first person perspective, so he knows in advance (assuming computationalism ...) that he must predict ((Mars ~Earth) OR (Earth ~Mars)). He asked: did the copy occur? We told him that yes his copy is on Mars. He asked: did the original survive? We told him that yes his original is on Earth. Which confirms the FPI. he realized that the one staying on Erath, will just not experience the adventure on Mars. Not being a complete imbecile the copy realized that the original on Earth will just not experience the adventure on Mars. Again. Good. He can intellectually conceive that he survived on Mars through that doppelganger, but that is a meagre consolation Although that is what he expected to happen when he diverged because that's what diverged means. Again, good. If he repeat that experience, the probability that he [...] A example of personal pronoun addiction. Irrelevant. See above. Why? See above. Let us read the diary. Why? Because, as we seem to agree on this now, we need to interview all the copies' diary to verify the prediction. And we have: ((Mars ~Earth) AND (Earth ~Mars)) is refuted by all copies. ((Mars ~Earth) OR (Earth ~Mars)) is confirmed by all copies. If he repeat the experience, with he being any of the guy who remember Helsinki, or Earth, this will be confirmed again. In Helsinki he wrote I expect to have both experiences in the first person sense. And Mr.I did indeed have both experiences in the first person sense, In the 3-1 view, yes, but none of the copies have both experience from the 1p view. So the answer you gave is only the correct intellectual third person description of the
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 22 Jul 2015, at 01:11, chris peck wrote: Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person experience. Obviously. if I could experience M and W simultaneously they would not be exclusive by definition . If anyone besides you thinks I would argue any different they should look again. Nice. But then you can't avoid the FPI. I argued that in worlds with duplication machines I can expect my future to involve numerous mutually exclusive perspectives. That isn't the same. Sure, that is the correct 3p answer, but if you agree that the experience W is exclusive with the experience M, then the FPI (the objective indeterminacy on the subjective experiences) follows. The probability of me seeing Moscow from a first person perspective after duplication is governed by two things which have nothing to do with 1p or 3p perspectives: That is self-contradictory. whether or not, prior to duplication, I am justified in thinking the person post duplication will be me ... and your set up insists upon this and whether at least one duplicate will be in Moscow and your set up also guarantees this. Neither of these statements are dependent on perspective. Tegmark's bird and frog would agree on both. But nevertheless, it follows directly from these two statements that the probability of me seeing Moscow would be 1. Its just guaranteed by your set up and the way you define your terms. You have not answer Quentin question. Do you think that if we send a beam of polarized photon on an analyser in the oblic direction, the probability that eleven photon go through the analyser is equal to 1? Interviewing the W-guy is enough to see that P(M) = 1 was wrong. In W the guy is forced to agree with this, or to confuse 1p and 3p, or to ignore that the question was about his next 1p, seen in the 1p view (not on the 1p seen in the 3p view). The specter of chance in step 3 stems from the idea of there being 1 person and two cities. But that is an incomplete description of the set up. There is 1 person and then that person in each city. And as nobody can be in two cities at once from an 1p view, this confirms the FPI. You are not betting on a flicked coin you are placing bets on red and black and then spinning a roulette wheel. Nobody will bet on red and black, as P(red and black) = 0. Bruno Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 18:02:58 -0400 Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark From: johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person experience. They can if the first person experience has been duplicated because that's what the word duplicated means.But of course ICT1PWT3P, So I guess this is just the traditional John Clark's confusion between the 1-1 and 3-1 views. Yep, as you've pointed out many many MANY times, all the problems with your theory and all the mysteries of the universe can be solved by ICT3PWT1P. To explain the error here, sometimes I imagine a guy who win a price: going to Mars, but the law of his country forbid self- annihilation, and so he can only be copied and pasted on Mars. Why is it that in all such thought experiments it's always the original's viewpoint that is followed and never the copies? --No problem he said, I expect to live both experiences No problem, I expect to live both experiences provided that I means whoever remembers being in Helsinki right now. And what else could I mean? he go in the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. But the copy on Mars is disappointed, because when he opened the door and sees only Mars. in front on me on Earth, So he goes into the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. And the copy on Mars is not disappointed when he (somebody who remembers being in Helsinki) opened the door and he sees only Mars and no sign of Earth because that is exactly what heexpected to happen. If Bruno Marchal does not like that fact then Bruno Marchal is going to need to change the meaning of he. He asked: did the copy occur? We told him that yes his copy is on Mars. He asked: did the original survive? We told him that yes his original is on Earth. he realized that the one staying on Erath, will just not experience the adventure on Mars. Not being a complete imbecile the copy realized that the original on Earth will just not experience the adventure on Mars. He can intellectually conceive that he survived on Mars through that doppelganger, but that is a meagre consolation Although that is what he expected to happen when he diverged because that's what diverged means. If he repeat that experience, the probability that he [...] A example of personal pronoun
Re: A riddle for John Clark
Le 22 juil. 2015 22:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com a écrit : On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 2:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results Yes, provided that you means somebody who remembers being So you're claiming that the probability of seeing spin up while doing a measurement of the spin is one (likewise seeing spin down) right? Then, for one if you agree, you're just saying MWI is false, so you lied to us for years saying the contrary, if you're not claiming that, then if chris says the probability is one, you're in total disagreement with him, last if you both agree that under MWI, the probability is 1/2, then you're inconsistent, as there are two mutually exclusive 1st person POV, but you inconsistently treat them differently than the duplication experiment with no reason, the splitting / differentiation is a duplication, under MWI it is garanteed that every possibilities are realised likewise in a duplication experiment. I expect as usual a dodging answer. You can leave whenever you want. Quentin Quentin Anciaux at this instant. MWI says everything that doesn't violate the laws of physics will happen, so in one of those many worlds you have been elected Pope , and in another you have graduated from Ringling Brothers and Barnum Bailey Clown College , and in yet another you have won the Nobel Prize. And all of them are you because all of them remember reading this post at this instant. you and Clark are in total disagreement contrary to your encouragement in trolling would let us believe. Trolling? Unlikely as it is do you think it is conceivable that in one of those many worlds there is somebody who sincerely disagrees with you and Bruno, or would such a thing violate the laws of physics? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: A riddle for John Clark
Quentin Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so probability should also be one Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of probability coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed determinism and chance were difficult to marry... Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark To: everything-list@googlegroups.com From: meeke...@verizon.net Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700 On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. It follows from physics. We don't know that. Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at different locations do not experience both locations - their minds are separate because their brains are. If that is more than just an assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of mind. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might expect the duplicates to share one mind. Brent But does it follow from UD computations? It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in computer science. Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: So you're claiming that the probability of seeing spin up while doing a measurement of the spin is one (likewise seeing spin down) right? That is neither right nor wrong because it is not clear what the probability refers to; the probability of *who* seeing spin up? What I am claiming is that if the MWI is correct and if Quentin Anciaux performs a spin measurement on a electron then Quentin Anciaux will see spin up with 100% probability and Quentin Anciaux will see spin down with 100% probability. I am also claiming that if Quentin Anciaux measures the spin of a electron and I say I bet Quentin Anciaux got spin up I will win the bet 50% of the time. Again assuming that the MWI is correct. Then, for one if you agree, you're just saying MWI is false, so you lied to us for years saying the contrary, And likewise the probability of Quentin Anciaux fucking a horse is 100% and the probability of Quentin Anciaux fucking a mule is 100%; but if I say I bet it was a mule not a horse that Quentin Anciaux fucked I will win my bet 50% of the time. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. It follows from physics. We don't know that. Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at different locations do not experience both locations - their minds are separate because their brains are. If that is more than just an assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of mind. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might expect the duplicates to share one mind. Brent But does it follow from UD computations? It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in computer science. Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can hear those days. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Obviously. if I could experience M and W simultaneously they would not be exclusive by definition . I agree that it all depends on definitions, in this case the definition of I. If the definition of I is somebody who remembers being John Clark in Helsinki before the duplication then it's obvious how many cities I will see. Bruno wants I to see only one city but the only way to do that is to change the meaning of I. I argued that in worlds with duplication machines I can expect my future to involve numerous mutually exclusive perspectives. Exactly. There is 1 person and then that person in each city. Correct again. Sometimes the language in dealing with this sort of thing can sound a bit awkward, but English was not made to be used in a world with people duplicating machines; once these devices become common personal pronouns are going to need major revisions. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 7/21/2015 7:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jul 2015, at 00:05, chris peck wrote: the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be seeing one city among W and M, i.e. W or M. nah. he can expect to have two mutually exclusive experiences. Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person experience. I guess you mean, he can expect to have, seen from outside, two mutually exclusive experiences. Of course that is tautologically true, by definition of mutually exclusive. But are the experiences mutually exclusive? You've argued that consciousness has no location in spacetime. So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 21 Jul 2015, at 18:57, meekerdb wrote: On 7/21/2015 7:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jul 2015, at 00:05, chris peck wrote: the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be seeing one city among W and M, i.e. W or M. nah. he can expect to have two mutually exclusive experiences. Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person experience. I guess you mean, he can expect to have, seen from outside, two mutually exclusive experiences. Of course that is tautologically true, by definition of mutually exclusive. But are the experiences mutually exclusive? It is the experiences which are exclusive. You've argued that consciousness has no location in spacetime. The pure 1-consciousness, or 1-1-consciousness, or 1-1-1 consciousness, ... But when people say that their consciousness will be implemented in both cities, they attribute consciousness to person which are locally incarnated/implemented relatively to them (in what will be called normal environment). And comp reduces the mind-body problem to a justification of the existence of such normal environment (and that is solved by the quantum logics). Consciousness is not localizable, but relative consciousness of other people can, a priori, by sharing the normal computations with others. It is the same with multi-user video game. You will locate you enemi in this or that virtual city, and use virtual planes or rockets to get there, without knowing that your enemy is played by your neighbor, and both are played by infinities of computations in arithmetic. Mathematically, it is enough to understand why incompeleteness entails the difference of logoc and mathematics in all the points of view (the 3-I logics are G and G*, the 1_I logic is given by S4Grz, the observable is given by S4Grz1, or X1*, or Z1*etc.) So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. You can modify the protocol to make this or other statements false, but not in a way relevant for the pursuit of the reasoning. It is supposed that the W and M guy does not got a new corpus callosum! It is part of the default hypotheses. In step 4, the delay prevents such critics at once, showing the non relevance of adding machinery to help disputing the exclusion of the first person experience. Replace the cities by hell and heaven, if that helps. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other. You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as no one can open door in Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person experience. It follows from physics. But does it follow from UD computations? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person experience. They can if the first person experience has been duplicated because that's what the word duplicated means. But of course ICT1PWT3P, So I guess this is just the traditional John Clark's confusion between the 1-1 and 3-1 views. Yep, as you've pointed out many many MANY times, all the problems with your theory and all the mysteries of the universe can be solved by ICT3PWT1P. To explain the error here, sometimes I imagine a guy who win a price: going to Mars, but the law of his country forbid self-annihilation, and so he can only be copied and pasted on Mars. Why is it that in all such thought experiments it's always the original's viewpoint that is followed and never the copies? --No problem he said, I expect to live both experiences No problem , I expect to live both experiences provided that I means whoever remembers being in Helsinki right now. And what else could I mean? he go in the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. But the copy on Mars is disappointed, because when he opened the door and sees only Mars. in front on me on Earth, S o he go es in to the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. And the copy on Mars is not disappointed when he (somebody who remembers being in Helsinki) opened the door and he sees only Mars and no sign of Earth because that is exactly what heexpected to happen. If Bruno Marchal does not like that fact then Bruno Marchal is going to need to change the meaning of he. He asked: did the copy occur? We told him that yes his copy is on Mars. He asked: did the original survive ? We told him that yes his original is on Earth. he realized that the one staying on Erath, will just not experience the adventure on Mars. Not being a complete imbecile the copy realized that the original on Earth w ill just not experience the adventure on Mars. He can intellectually conceive that he survived on Mars through that doppelganger, but that is a meagre consolation Although that is what he expected to happen when he diverged because that's what diverged means. If he repeat that experience, the probability that he [...] A example of personal pronoun addiction . S ee above. Why? Let us read the diary. Why? In Helsinki he wrote I expect to have both experiences in the first person sense. And Mr.I did indeed have both experiences in the first person sense, for proof of that just ask the two people who call themselves Mr. I. In Moscow, well, he sees only Moscow Another example of personal pronoun addiction . and so conclude that he was wrong . And John Clark concludes that he doesn't know what he means. (even if he sees a video showing that he has successfully been reconstituted in Washington; but he cannot feel the W experience Not true, for proof just ask a Mr. He. A Mr. He who says I feel the W experience can always be found. even Clark admits, there are two streams of consciousness, Well of course there are two streams of consciousness after the duplication b ecause *HE* **has been duplicated and that's what duplicated* means. * But of course ICT1PWT3P, John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: A riddle for John Clark
Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person experience. Obviously. if I could experience M and W simultaneously they would not be exclusive by definition . If anyone besides you thinks I would argue any different they should look again. I argued that in worlds with duplication machines I can expect my future to involve numerous mutually exclusive perspectives. That isn't the same. The probability of me seeing Moscow from a first person perspective after duplication is governed by two things which have nothing to do with 1p or 3p perspectives: whether or not, prior to duplication, I am justified in thinking the person post duplication will be me ... and your set up insists upon this and whether at least one duplicate will be in Moscow and your set up also guarantees this. Neither of these statements are dependent on perspective. Tegmark's bird and frog would agree on both. But nevertheless, it follows directly from these two statements that the probability of me seeing Moscow would be 1. Its just guaranteed by your set up and the way you define your terms. The specter of chance in step 3 stems from the idea of there being 1 person and two cities. But that is an incomplete description of the set up. There is 1 person and then that person in each city. You are not betting on a flicked coin you are placing bets on red and black and then spinning a roulette wheel. Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 18:02:58 -0400 Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark From: johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person experience. They can if the first person experience has been duplicated because that's what the word duplicated means.But of course ICT1PWT3P, So I guess this is just the traditional John Clark's confusion between the 1-1 and 3-1 views. Yep, as you've pointed out many many MANY times, all the problems with your theory and all the mysteries of the universe can be solved by ICT3PWT1P. To explain the error here, sometimes I imagine a guy who win a price: going to Mars, but the law of his country forbid self-annihilation, and so he can only be copied and pasted on Mars. Why is it that in all such thought experiments it's always the original's viewpoint that is followed and never the copies? --No problem he said, I expect to live both experiences No problem, I expect to live both experiences provided that I means whoever remembers being in Helsinki right now. And what else could I mean? he go in the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. But the copy on Mars is disappointed, because when he opened the door and sees only Mars. in front on me on Earth, So he goes into the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. And the copy on Mars is not disappointed when he (somebody who remembers being in Helsinki) opened the door and he sees only Mars and no sign of Earth because that is exactly what heexpected to happen. If Bruno Marchal does not like that fact then Bruno Marchal is going to need to change the meaning of he. He asked: did the copy occur? We told him that yes his copy is on Mars. He asked: did the original survive? We told him that yes his original is on Earth. he realized that the one staying on Erath, will just not experience the adventure on Mars. Not being a complete imbecile the copy realized that the original on Earth will just not experience the adventure on Mars. He can intellectually conceive that he survived on Mars through that doppelganger, but that is a meagre consolation Although that is what he expected to happen when he diverged because that's what diverged means. If he repeat that experience, the probability that he [...] A example of personal pronoun addiction. See above. Why? Let us read the diary. Why? In Helsinki he wrote I expect to have both experiences in the first person sense. And Mr.I did indeed have both experiences in the first person sense, for proof of that just ask the two people who call themselves Mr. I. In Moscow, well, he sees only Moscow Another example of personal pronoun addiction. and so conclude that he was wrong. And John Clark concludes that he doesn't know what he means. (even if he sees a video showing that he has successfully been reconstituted in Washington; but he cannot feel the W experience Not true, for proof just ask a Mr. He. A Mr. He who says I feel the W experience can always be found. even Clark admits, there are two streams of consciousness, Well of course there are two streams of consciousness after the duplication because HE has been duplicated and that's what duplicated means. But of course ICT1PWT3P, John K Clark -- You received this message
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 21 Jul 2015, at 00:05, chris peck wrote: the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be seeing one city among W and M, i.e. W or M. nah. he can expect to have two mutually exclusive experiences. Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person experience. I guess you mean, he can expect to have, seen from outside, two mutually exclusive experiences. So I guess this is just the traditional John Clark's confusion between the 1-1 and 3-1 views. He will dream of being in Red Square and of having a coffee by the feet of the Lincoln memorial, all in vivid 1p. He will expect both experiences and look forward to them. If he only expected one then he would demand to go half price. Who would book a duplication to Moscow and Washington only expecting to see one? To explain the error here, sometimes I imagine a guy who win a price: going to Mars, but the law of his country forbid self-annihilation, and so he can only be copied and pasted on Mars. --No problem he said, I expect to live both experiences (like you say). OK, so he go in the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. But the original on Earth is disappointed, because when he opened the door, in front on me on Earth, he is still on Earth (obviously). He asked: did the copy occur? We told him that yes his copy is on Mars. That did not make him happy, as he realized that the one staying on Erath, will just not experience the adventure on Mars. He can intellectually conceive that he survived on Mars through that doppelganger, but that is a meagre consolation as he feel to be only on Earth, and will never got that mars direct first person experience he was wishing for. He understand now that the duplication does not guaranty the direct experience of the copies, but of only one of them. If he repeat that experience, the probability that he stays on Earth will be made small, but never null. Repeating it a lot, the probability tends to 1 - epsilon. But on Erath, we can dialog directly only with the original, and he can only get more and more frustrated, as he is the one staying on Earth, despite the proba was epsilon. This double expectancy has nothing to do with confusing 1p 3-he 2-I or p p it just follows from the fact he will be multiplied. His body and his first person experience are multiplied in the 3-1 view. His body is multiplied in the 1-views. But his first person experience is not multiplied in the 1-1 views. That would lead to the exoerience of two mutually exclusive experience, and ... see above. He can't avoid taking that into account. It will seem odd that these experiences will be separate from one another, particularly while he is in Helsinki where he is just one man, but relative to this situation in Helsinki he WILL expect to have both experiences. And he will be right. Let us read the diary. In Helsinki he wrote I expect to have both experiences in the first person sense. In Moscow, well, he sees only Moscow, and so conclude that he was wrong (even if he sees a video showing that he has successfully been reconstituted in Washington; but he cannot feel the W experience, and that is thus not part of his first experience of seeing a city (the other one is seen only through a video). Consequently, P(W || M) = 1. P(W or M) ? Yes, that is correct. P(W M) = 1. That is correct in the 3-1 view, but the question was on the 1-views themselves, and nobody can have the *experience* of two mutually exclusive experiences. As even Clark admits, there are two streams of consciousness, and as I explain, the question concerns the content of the experiences, not the content that we can attribute to them intellectually. Bruno From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 09:05:48 +0200 On 20 Jul 2015, at 01:17, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The probability of he (or anyone, actually) *experiencing* one and only one city is one. If you want that statement to be true then he can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have to change what he means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Not at all. he means the guy who remember being the man in Helsinki. But the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be seeing one city among W and M, i.e. W or M. Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door. OK, he will say one city, Moscow. And he will say one city
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 20 Jul 2015, at 01:17, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The probability of he (or anyone, actually) *experiencing* one and only one city is one. If you want that statement to be true then he can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have to change what he means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Not at all. he means the guy who remember being the man in Helsinki. But the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be seeing one city among W and M, i.e. W or M. Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door. OK, he will say one city, Moscow. And he will say one city, Washington. In the third person description of the first person experience, not in the content of each of those experience. So if 1+1 =2, and I really think it is, then he saw 2 cities. Nobody see two cities from their first person points on view, which is what has to be taken into account to answer the question asked. Unless you believe that after a duplication you become a two head monster capable of seeing two cities at once (but you have already agreed that the two first person experience are independent, so ...). If you want that statement to be false then he can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, On the contrary, he can only mean that. Now there are two of them, so we must interview two of those man who have the Helsinki memory, and both confirms P(W v M) = 1, and both confirms P(W M) = 0. I can't interview the two headed monster, as it is not even a man, but an imaginary being which makes no sense with computationalism. you're going to have to change what he means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Not at all. The definition of which we agree is fine. From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate, If that first person wants to discuss what will happen to him after the people duplicator has been turned on that discussion will be gibberish unless it is realized that the first person view has been duplicated. But of course ICT1PWT3P, The first person has been duplicated in the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. The question was about the 1-view to be expected. As none ever get the seeing of W and M, and as both get the seeing of W or M, the answer is rather easy. The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing the copies, about their experience I agree but one interview is not sufficient to confirm or refute the expectation, two are required. Nobody has ever disagree on this. Yet, both interview confirms the W v M expectation, and both confirms W M is never felt. The W M does not even make sense for a first person content of self- localization. W M is evacuated immediately once we understand that the question was about those first person experience. Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. Perhaps. Yet the question *is* about the unique city possible felt after the duplication. Both confirms the feeling of the uniqueness of the city seen when opening the door, and thus the W or M is confirmed, and the W M is refuted. For both of them. Bruno But of course ICT1PWT3P, John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: A riddle for John Clark
the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be seeing one city among W and M, i.e. W or M. nah. he can expect to have two mutually exclusive experiences. He will dream of being in Red Square and of having a coffee by the feet of the Lincoln memorial, all in vivid 1p. He will expect both experiences and look forward to them. If he only expected one then he would demand to go half price. Who would book a duplication to Moscow and Washington only expecting to see one? This double expectancy has nothing to do with confusing 1p 3-he 2-I or p p it just follows from the fact he will be multiplied. He can't avoid taking that into account. It will seem odd that these experiences will be separate from one another, particularly while he is in Helsinki where he is just one man, but relative to this situation in Helsinki he WILL expect to have both experiences. And he will be right. Consequently, P(W || M) = 1. P(W M) = 1. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 09:05:48 +0200 On 20 Jul 2015, at 01:17, John Clark wrote:On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The probability of he (or anyone, actually) *experiencing* one and only one city is one. If you want that statement to be true then he can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have to change what he means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Not at all. he means the guy who remember being the man in Helsinki. But the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be seeing one city among W and M, i.e. W or M. Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door. OK, he will say one city, Moscow. And he will say one city, Washington. In the third person description of the first person experience, not in the content of each of those experience. So if 1+1 =2, and I really think it is, then he saw 2 cities. Nobody see two cities from their first person points on view, which is what has to be taken into account to answer the question asked. Unless you believe that after a duplication you become a two head monster capable of seeing two cities at once (but you have already agreed that the two first person experience are independent, so ...). If you want that statement to be false then he can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, On the contrary, he can only mean that. Now there are two of them, so we must interview two of those man who have the Helsinki memory, and both confirms P(W v M) = 1, and both confirms P(W M) = 0. I can't interview the two headed monster, as it is not even a man, but an imaginary being which makes no sense with computationalism. you're going to have to change what he means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Not at all. The definition of which we agree is fine. From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate, If that first person wants to discuss what will happen to him after the people duplicator has been turned on that discussion will be gibberish unless it is realized that the first person view has been duplicated. But of course ICT1PWT3P, The first person has been duplicated in the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. The question was about the 1-view to be expected. As none ever get the seeing of W and M, and as both get the seeing of W or M, the answer is rather easy. The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing the copies, about their experience I agree but one interview is not sufficient to confirm or refute the expectation, two are required. Nobody has ever disagree on this. Yet, both interview confirms the W v M expectation, and both confirms W M is never felt. The W M does not even make sense for a first person content of self-localization. W M is evacuated immediately once we understand that the question was about those first person experience. Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. Perhaps. Yet the question *is* about the unique city possible felt after the duplication. Both confirms the feeling of the uniqueness of the city seen when opening the door, and thus the W or M is confirmed, and the W M is refuted. For both of them. Bruno But of course ICT1PWT3P, John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post
RE: A riddle for John Clark
Le 21 juil. 2015 01:05, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com a écrit : the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be seeing one city among W and M, i.e. W or M. nah. he can expect to have two mutually exclusive experiences. He will dream of being in Red Square and of having a coffee by the feet of the Lincoln memorial, all in vivid 1p. He will expect both experiences and look forward to them. If he only expected one then he would demand to go half price. Who would book a duplication to Moscow and Washington only expecting to see one? This double expectancy has nothing to do with confusing 1p 3-he 2-I or p p it just follows from the fact he will be multiplied. He can't avoid taking that into account. It will seem odd that these experiences will be separate from one another, particularly while he is in Helsinki where he is just one man, but relative to this situation in Helsinki he WILL expect to have both experiences. And he will be right. Consequently, P(W || M) = 1. P(W M) = 1. Then under MWI, P(spin up spin down) = 1, if you agree then fine. Quentin From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 09:05:48 +0200 On 20 Jul 2015, at 01:17, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: T he probability of he (or anyone, actually) *experiencing* one and only one city is one. If you want that statement to be true then he can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have to change what he means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Not at all. he means the guy who remember being the man in Helsinki. But the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be seeing one city among W and M, i.e. W or M. Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door. OK, he will say one city, Moscow. And he will say one city, Washington. In the third person description of the first person experience, not in the content of each of those experience. So if 1+1 =2, and I really think it is, then he saw 2 cities. Nobody see two cities from their first person points on view, which is what has to be taken into account to answer the question asked. Unless you believe that after a duplication you become a two head monster capable of seeing two cities at once (but you have already agreed that the two first person experience are independent, so ...). If you want that statement to be false then he can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, On the contrary, he can only mean that. Now there are two of them, so we must interview two of those man who have the Helsinki memory, and both confirms P(W v M) = 1, and both confirms P(W M) = 0. I can't interview the two headed monster, as it is not even a man, but an imaginary being which makes no sense with computationalism. you're going to have to change what he means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Not at all. The definition of which we agree is fine. From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate, If that first person wants to discuss what will happen to him after the people duplicator has been turned on that discussion will be gibberish unless it is realized that the first person view has been duplicated. But of course ICT1PWT3P, The first person has been duplicated in the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. The question was about the 1-view to be expected. As none ever get the seeing of W and M, and as both get the seeing of W or M, the answer is rather easy. The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing the copies, about their experience I agree but one interview is not sufficient to confirm or refute the expectation, two are required. Nobody has ever disagree on this. Yet, both interview confirms the W v M expectation, and both confirms W M is never felt. The W M does not even make sense for a first person content of self-localization. W M is evacuated immediately once we understand that the question was about those first person experience. Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. Perhaps. Yet the question *is* about the unique city possible felt after the duplication. Both confirms the feeling of the uniqueness of the city seen when opening the door, and thus the W or M is confirmed, and the W M is refuted. For both of them. Bruno But of course ICT1PWT3P, John K Clark -- You received this message
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 18 Jul 2015, at 18:54, John Clark wrote: And if he means a being who remembers being a man in Helsinki, and Bruno Marchal has said more than once that is what is meant, then the probability of he experiencing one and only one city is zero. The probability of he (or anyone, actually) *experiencing* one and only one city is one. Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door. All can only answer I have seen (experience) only one city. So P(W and M) = 0 was correct for both, and P(W v M) = 1 was correct for both, when, of course, W and M each refers to the first person experience content, and not to the third person description of those possible first person experiences. W and M for the first person apprehension by a machine of its self- localisation is simply meaningless, when we assume digital mechanism. In particular, the guy would have been lied and told that it is a simple (without duplication) tele-transportation to W or M with a random coin, he would not have known that he has been duplicated at all. From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate, in any first person sensible way, the first person experience. Then the indeterminacy does not depend if the duplicate is in a far away galaxy, in a parallel universe, or even (as is shown later) in the very elementary (Sigma_1) arithmetical reality. If not you add either new Turing emulable relations, and the level was just wrong; or you add non Turing emulable relations, but then we have to compare them with the non Turing emulable reality with which all machines are already confronted too, by theoretical computer science and the First Person Indeterminacy. You are just not taking the definition given. It is very simple, if you take the definition of the third person definition of first person notions used here. The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing the copies, about their experience (not about what they imagine). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: T he probability of he (or anyone, actually) **experiencing** one and only one city is *one*. If you want that statement to be true then he can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have to change what he means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door. OK, he will say one city, Moscow. And he will say one city, Washington. So if 1+1 =2, and I really think it is, then he saw 2 cities. If you want that statement to be false then he can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have to change what he means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate, If that first person wants to discuss what will happen to him after the people duplicator has been turned on that discussion will be gibberish unless it is realized that the first person view has been duplicated. But of course ICT1PWT3P, The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing the copies, about their experience I agree but one interview is not sufficient to confirm or refute the expectation, two are required. Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. But of course ICT1PWT3P, John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Fri, Jul 17, 2015 at 1:03 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I said it before I'll say it again, when talking about the future in a world with people duplicating machines there is no such thing as *THE* first person experience , there is only *A* first person experience; Wordplay. There is a synonym for wordplay, it's called logic; perhaps you've heard of it. For P(W xor M) you need only to mention the experience of seeing one city And if he means a being who remembers being a man in Helsinki, and Bruno Marchal has said more than once that is what is meant, then the probability of he experiencing one and only one city is *zero*. If Bruno Marchal finds that conclusion distasteful then Bruno Marchal is going to need to change the meaning of he, there is simply no other logical alternative. both experiences (in M and W) deserves to be qualified as the continuing experience, when we handle the 1p experiences content. OK fine, then he (that is to say the man in Helsinki) can expect to experience M *and* W *from the 1p*; not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. know hundreds of people who get the step 3. I know only 4 people who claimed to not get it In general dumb people outnumber smart people, although that statistical fact can be inverted in certain small populations, such as National Academy of Science members or Noble Prize winners. How many members of those groups get step 3? Bruno, have you ever considered the possibility that maybe just maybe you are the one who is confused? Well, give me your prediction, then. I predict that Bruno will continue to chant his mantra you confuse the 1p and the 3p as if that can solve all logical problems, and despite Bruno's obvious love for homemade acronyms will for some reason not use the timesaving YCT1PAT3P. N ot that predictions , correct ones or incorrect, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 16 Jul 2015, at 21:48, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 3:02 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: chris peck wrote: There is no contradiction here as Clark has pointed out with excruciating and what must amount to inhuman patience over many many years. Neither duplicate would conclude that P(W M) was 0 for their mutual ancestor and the fact they only see one city wouldn't be considered by either of them to be evidence that he was wrong. Only by dismissing the question asked, and confusing the third person description of the first person experience and their explicit content. I said it before I'll say it again, when talking about the future in a world with people duplicating machines there is no such thing as THE first person experience, there is only A first person experience; Wordplay. For P(W xor M) you need only to mention the experience of seeing one city (which is implemented in both places), like the experience of drinking coffee. If you don't believe that there is a (unique, well defined) experience after pushing the button, then you believe that you die already in the simple (without duplication) teleportation. Again, you can see this more easily in the iterated cases, where the experience is any one *among* all experiences. All confirms that the was well defined, as they lived it. It is only the experience that you will live (as you agree you surivive). It is undetermined, but not ambiguous. This reduces your present remark to the same 3-1/1-1 confusion. Well tried. and specifying that the one who deserves the grand title THE is the one HE experiences does not make things one bit less ambiguous. It means that both experiences (in M and W) deserves to be qualified as the continuing experience, when we handle the 1p experiences content. As we can 3p verify by looking at the diaries of all copies. Not that the future, or the lack of one, has anything to do with present consciousness or the feeling of a unique self. you seem to painfully imitate John Clark's persistent confusion Bruno, have you ever considered the possibility that maybe just maybe you are the one who is confused? Well, give me your prediction, then. The one you gave up to now has been refuted again and again by all people on this list, except Chris Peck which reproduces exactly the same error. I know hundreds of people who get the step 3. I know only 4 people who claimed to not get it, but also have never been able to convince anyone of what is their problem. So, may be you could ask that question to yourself. Isn't it? Your bizarre deny of the 1-1/3-1 difference either just establishes determinacy in the 3p description (which has never been doubted, but does not answer the question asked) or introduces an ambiguity, which simply is not there. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 16 Jul 2015, at 03:38, chris peck wrote: Simple comp predicts that in W, the H-guy opens the door and sees only W and ~M (as those letters refers to the first person experience, not the intellectual belief), and that in M, the H-guy opens the door and sees only M and ~W. Both concludes that P(W M) was 0, and know better, now (hopefully). Nah. The Helsinki guy predicts that he will see both cities and that encompasses the prediction that both his duplicates will individually see only one. Precisely, the Helsinki guy predicts that 3-he (or 3-I) will see both cities, and that implies that both his 1-he (or 1-I) will see only one. Now the question was about his 1p view (1-I, or 1-he), so this entails P(W v M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0. The fact neither duplicate will see two cities doesn't effect Helsinki guy's expectancies. It does when you remind that the question is about his expectation about his first personal experience, not about where his body (or the 1p associated to it) will be. Once you get that, it is obvious that in Helsinki, W M will be refuted at both place. They can not be in two places at once, That's the key point leading to the 1p indeterminacy, as the prediction is about its experience, and he will never experience being in the two places, making immediately P(W M) = 0. but through the magic of duplication Helsinki guy will be. He expects to be both of his future selves even though they would not expect to be each other. Then we are already all the same person, which is probably true, but useless to make any prediction for any personal experiences. For example, in QM, this strategy predicts I will see both the electron (supposed to be in the 1/sqrt(2)(up+down) in the (up* and* down) state where both Copenhagen and Everett gives a probability one half. But when 3-1 is in both W and M (or seeing up and down), the 1-I can see either up OR down, respectively either W or M. There is no contradiction here as Clark has pointed out with excruciating and what must amount to inhuman patience over many many years. Neither duplicate would conclude that P(W M) was 0 for their mutual ancestor and the fact they only see one city wouldn't be considered by either of them to be evidence that he was wrong. Only by dismissing the question asked, and confusing the third person description of the first person experience and their explicit content. Its painfully obvious you have confused P(W||M)(WM) with P(H)(WM) and this is about P(H)(WM). 1p 3p 1p-3p 3p-1p or even no pee pee. No clue what you say here. But above you seem to painfully imitate John Clark's persistent confusion about the 3p view on the 1p views, and the 1p-views themselves on which the question was all about. You don't refute the 1p indeterminacy, you just change the original question, like if it would have been asked about the third person description of where he will be localized? But he is asked to predict what he will see from his first person view, which by comp, as you say yourself above, cannot feel the split and cannot feel to be at both place at once, making P(W v M) = 1, and P(W and M) = 0. Bruno From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 19:34:18 +0200 On 15 Jul 2015, at 18:08, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: one place plus one place equals two places. But a place is a 3p notion. I is 1p and I have a notion of place. Actually this contradicts your statement that consciousness is not localized from its pov. But that might be not relevant here. I is 1p, well the 1-I is, OK, and that does not prevent it localise itself, sure. But the point is that adding another 1-I elsewhere will not make any 1-one feeling being two. For the M-guy, the presence or absence of the W guy will not change anything in its immediate experience Agreed. OK. (on which the prediction was asked). No, the prediction was about what would happen to the H-guy and the M-guy's fate is only part of the story, the W-guy's tale is just as important. That is why in all illustration I interview always both the M-guy and the W-guy. Did you see one or two city, in your direct sensula experience? Both told me; we have seen only one city behind the door. That confirms P(one-city) = 1. And thus P(W v M) = 1. Even with the exclusive OR. that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism, and so believe that as a person he will survive, OK. OK. and he knows that wherever he will feel to have survived, That guy in Helsinki knows that that guy in Helsinki will feel to have survived in TWO cities. How could anyone FEEL to have survived in both city. Both will FEEL to survive in one city, and as far as they know, the doppelganger might
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 3:02 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: chris peck wrote: There is no contradiction here as Clark has pointed out with excruciating and what must amount to inhuman patience over many many years. Neither duplicate would conclude that P(W M) was 0 for their mutual ancestor and the fact they only see one city wouldn't be considered by either of them to be evidence that he was wrong. Only by dismissing the question asked, and confusing the third person description of the first person experience and their explicit content. I said it before I'll say it again, when talking about the future in a world with people duplicating machines there is no such thing as *THE* first person experience , there is only *A* first person experience; and specifying that the one who deserves the grand title *THE* is the one *HE* experiences does not make things one bit less ambiguous. Not that the future, or the lack of one, has anything to do with present consciousness or the feeling of a unique self. you seem to painfully imitate John Clark's persistent confusion Bruno, have you ever considered the possibility that maybe just maybe you are the one who is confused? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: A riddle for John Clark
Simple comp predicts that in W, the H-guy opens the door and sees only W and ~M (as those letters refers to the first person experience, not the intellectual belief), and that in M, the H-guy opens the door and sees only M and ~W. Both concludes that P(W M) was 0, and know better, now (hopefully). Nah. The Helsinki guy predicts that he will see both cities and that encompasses the prediction that both his duplicates will individually see only one. The fact neither duplicate will see two cities doesn't effect Helsinki guy's expectancies. They can not be in two places at once, but through the magic of duplication Helsinki guy will be. He expects to be both of his future selves even though they would not expect to be each other. There is no contradiction here as Clark has pointed out with excruciating and what must amount to inhuman patience over many many years. Neither duplicate would conclude that P(W M) was 0 for their mutual ancestor and the fact they only see one city wouldn't be considered by either of them to be evidence that he was wrong. Its painfully obvious you have confused P(W||M)(WM) with P(H)(WM) and this is about P(H)(WM). 1p 3p 1p-3p 3p-1p or even no pee pee. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 19:34:18 +0200 On 15 Jul 2015, at 18:08, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: one place plus one place equals two places. But a place is a 3p notion. I is 1p and I have a notion of place. Actually this contradicts your statement that consciousness is not localized from its pov. But that might be not relevant here.I is 1p, well the 1-I is, OK, and that does not prevent it localise itself, sure. But the point is that adding another 1-I elsewhere will not make any 1-one feeling being two. For the M-guy, the presence or absence of the W guy will not change anything in its immediate experience Agreed. OK. (on which the prediction was asked). No, the prediction was about what would happen to the H-guy and the M-guy's fate is only part of the story, the W-guy's tale is just as important. That is why in all illustration I interview always both the M-guy and the W-guy. Did you see one or two city, in your direct sensula experience? Both told me; we have seen only one city behind the door. That confirms P(one-city) = 1. And thus P(W v M) = 1. Even with the exclusive OR. that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism, and so believe that as a person he will survive, OK. OK. and he knows that wherever he will feel to have survived, That guy in Helsinki knows that that guy in Helsinki will feel to have survived in TWO cities. How could anyone FEEL to have survived in both city. Both will FEEL to survive in one city, and as far as they know, the doppelganger might not yet exist, nor ever exist. They both have to wait for a 3p confirmation, and both will wrote in the diary: I survived in M (resp W) and I am waiting the news that the doppelganger has been well reconstituted in W (resp M). he will feel to be in one city, If that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism then that guy in Helsinki knows that the personal pronoun he in the above is ambiguous It is not ambiguous. He refers to both guys, and they are those that we will interview to confirm or refute the prediction. he is the guy in helsinki and is the guy who will remember having been the guy in Helsinki. Once duplicated the 1p diverge, and that is why we ask what he (that guy) expects to FEEL after pushing on the button. You will claim that we change the definition, only when we remind that the prediction bear on the first person experience content. That is all the precision we need, and that changes the 3-1 and into the 1p or, as nobody can feel to be in both city simultaneously. You said yourself, there are two persons after the duplication. each has its own unique first person experience, despite being both a legitimate Helsinki-guy. and that is why Bruno Marchal insists on using so many of them, they paint over flaws in the logical edifice of Bruno Marchal. So if 2 cities is not the correct answer to the question how many cities will the guy in Helsinki see? you're going to need to change the meaning of the guy in Helsinki. I don't have to change the meaning of the guy in Helsinki (or better: the guy who remember being or having be the guy in Helsinki). So the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday will see TWO cities but the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday will see only one city. Mr. Marchal, it's going to take more than ICT3PWT1P to get out of that logical black hole. You repeat yourself, see above. Once again, you dismiss the 1p and 3p difference to introduce an ambiguity which is not there. I have only to interview them in W
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 14 Jul 2015, at 19:33, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: when the Helsinki guy is in the two cities, BOTH feels to be in once place. Yes, and one place plus one place equals two places. But a place is a 3p notion. One first person experience + one first person experience remain one first person experience from all first person experience. To get a doppelganger is like the split in Everett: you will not suddenly be aware of a second first person experience. That is why we cannot feel the split. For the M-guy, the presence or absence of the W guy will not change anything in its immediate experience (on which the prediction was asked). You interpret like if we were asking where the first person experience are from a third person point of view, in which case you would be correct I don't even know what a first person experience from a third person point of view is. It is what you are using all the time. I call that the 3-1 view. It is the first experience that we attriubute to other person, like when you say that you will be in both W and M. It is because you attribute a first person experience to the two reconstitutions. But the question is asked about the first person experience from the first person experience view. As you said both feel unique, and so P(one city) = 1, as both will confirm that from they first person pov content, they both see only one city, and that was the point. Then he will see BOTH cities! End of story. In the eyes of God, but the question is asked about what he, the guy in helsinki, will feel, Today the guy in Helsinki feels like the guy in Helsinki, But that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism, and so believe that as a person he will survive, and he knows that wherever he will feel to have survived, he will feel to be in one city, so he expect one city when he will open the door. tomorrow the guy in Helsinki means whoever remembers being the guy in Helsinki yesterday, and you said there are now 2 people who remember that, and they are in different cities. In the third person view, that is correct, but avoid the question asked, which is about the first person that he expects to live. And, as you agreed, he will never make the experience of being two persons. he might intellectually believe he will be two persons, but the word intellectually betrays that it is a 3p view on itself, not the actual content of the experience possible. Without telepathy, he might still (after the duplication) doubt that his doppelganger has been reconstituted. That intellectual experience is not the actual experience of any of the reconsitutions. So if 2 cities is not the correct answer to the question how many cities will the guy in Helsinki see? you're going to need to change the meaning of the guy in Helsinki. I don't have to change the meaning of the guy in Helsinki (or better: the guy who remember being or having be the guy in Helsinki). I have only to interview them in W and in M to see that the experience possibles have all a content describing only one city. The guy in M told me: I expected to be in both city, but I have to admit I was wrong, as clearly, I experienced only M, when opening the door. The same occurs for the W guy, who told me that after opening the door he saw only W. Both confirms the experience of seeing only one city. and children already get the point Professional logicians are supposed to be more rigorous in their use of logic than children, but you are not. You just want a change of definition of personal identity, when all we have to do is to look at the content of the diaries, or their memories, and both confirms I see only once city. So P(one city) = 1 for the same reason that P(coffee) = 1. The first person experience predicted (drinking coffee, seeing one city) occurs in both branches, and sp their probability = 1. after duplication he (both he) will see only one city. SO WHAT? Each he will see one, both will see 2, Come on. Both is not a person. Why not? If the Helsinki Man has been duplicated then both is a person, That is not even grammatically correct. Both *are* person. Both is not a person, or the entire humanity is a person. may be in colloquial or poetical sense, but you can't use such sense for the prediction of the first person experience. You have agreed that there are two stream of consciousness, and that the person have become different from each other, even if both are the same person as the Helsinki guy. No problem as personal identity is an intensional modal indexical notion, which are known to not obey Leibniz identity rule. There is no paradox, no ambiguity, just an impossibility to predict a particular outcome of an experience. if not then the Helsinki Man has NOT
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 15 Jul 2015, at 18:08, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: one place plus one place equals two places. But a place is a 3p notion. I is 1p and I have a notion of place. Actually this contradicts your statement that consciousness is not localized from its pov. But that might be not relevant here. I is 1p, well the 1-I is, OK, and that does not prevent it localise itself, sure. But the point is that adding another 1-I elsewhere will not make any 1-one feeling being two. For the M-guy, the presence or absence of the W guy will not change anything in its immediate experience Agreed. OK. (on which the prediction was asked). No, the prediction was about what would happen to the H-guy and the M-guy's fate is only part of the story, the W-guy's tale is just as important. That is why in all illustration I interview always both the M-guy and the W-guy. Did you see one or two city, in your direct sensula experience? Both told me; we have seen only one city behind the door. That confirms P(one-city) = 1. And thus P(W v M) = 1. Even with the exclusive OR. that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism, and so believe that as a person he will survive, OK. OK. and he knows that wherever he will feel to have survived, That guy in Helsinki knows that that guy in Helsinki will feel to have survived in TWO cities. How could anyone FEEL to have survived in both city. Both will FEEL to survive in one city, and as far as they know, the doppelganger might not yet exist, nor ever exist. They both have to wait for a 3p confirmation, and both will wrote in the diary: I survived in M (resp W) and I am waiting the news that the doppelganger has been well reconstituted in W (resp M). he will feel to be in one city, If that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism then that guy in Helsinki knows that the personal pronoun he in the above is ambiguous It is not ambiguous. He refers to both guys, and they are those that we will interview to confirm or refute the prediction. he is the guy in helsinki and is the guy who will remember having been the guy in Helsinki. Once duplicated the 1p diverge, and that is why we ask what he (that guy) expects to FEEL after pushing on the button. You will claim that we change the definition, only when we remind that the prediction bear on the first person experience content. That is all the precision we need, and that changes the 3-1 and into the 1p or, as nobody can feel to be in both city simultaneously. You said yourself, there are two persons after the duplication. each has its own unique first person experience, despite being both a legitimate Helsinki-guy. and that is why Bruno Marchal insists on using so many of them, they paint over flaws in the logical edifice of Bruno Marchal. So if 2 cities is not the correct answer to the question how many cities will the guy in Helsinki see? you're going to need to change the meaning of the guy in Helsinki. I don't have to change the meaning of the guy in Helsinki (or better: the guy who remember being or having be the guy in Helsinki). So the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday will see TWO cities but the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday will see only one city. Mr. Marchal, it's going to take more than ICT3PWT1P to get out of that logical black hole. You repeat yourself, see above. Once again, you dismiss the 1p and 3p difference to introduce an ambiguity which is not there. I have only to interview them in W and in M to see that the experience possibles have all a content describing only one city. If both are interviewed then TWO cities will be described In the diary of the interviewer. But in the diary of each survivors, you will see only W, or M, not or I feel to be in two cities at once (that asks for telepathy). and both descriptions come from the Helsinki Man, unless you've changed the definition of The Helsinki Man yet again. Both comes come from the Helsinki man, yes, but as you know, he has been duplicated, and now the H-man has become the HM-man in M, and the HW-man in W, and both told me that they have seen, from their direct first person experience (liked asked) that they saw only once city. If they do the experience again, both told me that they would bet P(one- city) = P(W v M) = 1. You just want a change of definition of personal identity, I'm not picky, you are free to give any definition to personal identity that you like, all I ask is that you use it consistently, but apparently that is too much to ask. You dismiss the 3-1 p and the 1p content of the experience. You just did it even more explicitly than usual above. You confused the interviewer's diary, containing the description of the
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: one place plus one place equals two places. But a place is a 3p notion. I is 1p and I have a notion of place. For the M-guy, the presence or absence of the W guy will not change anything in its immediate experience Agreed. (on which the prediction was asked). No, the prediction was about what would happen to the H-guy and the M-guy's fate is only part of the story, the W-guy's tale is just as important. that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism, and so believe that as a person he will survive, OK. and he knows that wherever he will feel to have survived, T hat guy in Helsinki knows that that guy in Helsinki will feel to have survived in TWO cities. he will feel to be in one city, If that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism then that guy in Helsinki knows that the personal pronoun he in the above is ambiguous and that is why Bruno Marchal insists on using so many of them , they paint over flaws in the logical edifice of Bruno Marchal . So if 2 cities is not the correct answer to the question how many cities will the guy in Helsinki see? you're going to need to change the meaning of the guy in Helsinki. I don't have to change the meaning of the guy in Helsinki (or better: the guy who remember being or having be the guy in Helsinki). So the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday will see TWO cities but the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday will see only one city. Mr. Marchal, it's going to take more than ICT3PWT1P to get out of that logical black hole. I have only to interview them in W and in M to see that the experience possibles have all a content describing only one city. If both are interviewed then TWO cities will be described and both descriptions come from the Helsinki Man, unless you've changed the definition of The Helsinki Man yet again. You just want a change of definition of personal identity, I'm not picky, you are free to give any definition to personal identity that you like, all I ask is that you use it consistently, but apparently that is too much to ask. In step 3 there is no delays (or no explicit delay). Step four is when we introduce an explicit and long delay (say one year). Do you think that such a delay would change anything in the Probability evaluated in Helsinki? No, the probability that the Helsinki Man would see BOTH cities in the future would remain at 100%, provided of course that The Helsinki Man still means somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 14 Jul 2015, at 03:19, John Clark wrote: you just said BOTH the W-guy AND the M-guy are the H-guy. Yes, but after the split, they *FEEL* to be only one of them. That is irrelevant if they both are the H-guy, and you just said they are; It is relevant because the question is asked to the Helsinki guy about the expectation of its experience/feeling. If you missed this, then read again the posts or the paper. That is explaiend in all details. then the things that deserve the label H-guy will *FEEL* to be in W AND M. Total non sense. Assuming mechanism there will never be any person ever feeling to be in W AND M. Unless you change what you mean by The Helsinki Man a logical person could form no other conclusion. Only because you abstract your self from the question asked. One individual can have his body (3-I) in many places, but his first person self can only be in only one place FROM that first person view. The Helsinki man is in the two cities, but [...] Why on earth is a but needed? If the Helsinki man is in the two cities after duplication then before the duplication then the correct answer to the question what will the Helsinki Man see after the duplication? would be Moscow AND Washington and no but is required. Given your statement above I don't see how this is even a debatable question. Because when the Helsinki guy is in the two cities, BOTH feels to be in once place. As they know that in advance, P(W and M) = 0. You interpret like if we were asking where the first person experience are from a third person point of view, in which case you would be correct, but that is not what was asked, which is about the 1p as seen by the 1p themselves. We do agree on the the notion ofpersonal identity, but your problem is that you just avoid the fact that 1) the experiencer will surivive I agree, and if the experiencer is duplicated there will be 2 experiencers. I mean...what else could duplicated mean? Yes, and there are 7 billions of experiences on this planet, all belonging to the initial amoeba, somehow, but once we have differentiated, we don't mix the experience and they are orthogonal. Same for the W and M person, none of them feels W and M. 2- and know in advance that from his first person pov he will be unique in one city I know that tomorrow when my future experiencers (plural) in Moscow and Washington look into the past to today they (plural) will see 2 unique paths leading up to them, but I would also know that if I am to be duplicated then when I look toward the future there is no unique path to be seen because I (aka The Helsinki Man of today) has no unique future. There is two (in the 3p) unique (in the 1p) paths to be seen. Your are just pursuing your 1/3 distinction dismissal. They are both the Helsinki man, that is why in Helsinki the experiencer is unable to predict his next PERSONAL first person experience. Who's next PERSONAL first person experience are you talking about? Oh yes, *his*. The Helsinki guy. Both will feel to be in once city, so P(W or M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as everyone understand except those who me crackpot for some reason of personal notoriety or something. Those personal pronouns really come in handy, they're great at hiding irrationality You still fail to see that using names or 3p description can't work either. The reasoning is based on the definition provided for the 1p and 3p discourses or view. If you don't read the reasoning, it is not astonishing that you fail to understand. There is not an atom of ambiguity. The ambiguity comes only from the fact that after the soplit, you decide to not read the person diary. I have never disputed the validity of memories tn the thought experiment, so could you please explain the value and purpose of those stupid diaries? The diaries are used to better invoke the difference between the 3p views and the 1p views? Memories in the brain works well here too. Now, you DO dispute the validity of memories, as you dismiss them both for the W and M guy. none of them ever memorized having been in two cities from the 1p view, and so conclude that the bet P(W v M) should have been equal to 1, and P(W M) = 0. You can deny this only by dismissing the memories. I recall that the prediction is on the future experience of the experiencer. As opposed to what, the future experience of the non- experiencer? As opposed to a 3p description of the future experiences or body's positions, fro which W M would be correct, but that is not what is asked, as we ask about the 1p (as seen by the 1p). In the 3-1 view, but he will never see two cities” Then “he” doesn’t mean what you just said it does, “he” can’t mean somebody who remembers being the Helsinki Man. false. It always mean
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: when the Helsinki guy is in the two cities, BOTH feels to be in once place. Yes, and one place plus one place equals two places. You interpret like if we were asking where the first person experience are from a third person point of view, in which case you would be correct I don't even know what a first person experience from a third person point of view is. Then he will see BOTH cities! End of story. In the eyes of God, but the question is asked about what he, the guy in helsinki, will feel, Today the guy in Helsinki feels like the guy in Helsinki, tomorrow the guy in Helsinki means whoever remembers being the guy in Helsinki yesterday, and you said there are now 2 people who remember that, and they are in different cities. So if 2 cities is not the correct answer to the question how many cities will the guy in Helsinki see? you're going to need to change the meaning of the guy in Helsinki. and children already get the point Professional logicians are supposed to be more rigorous in their use of logic than children, but you are not. after duplication he (both he) will see only one city. SO WHAT? Each he will see one, both will see 2, Come on. Both is not a person. Why not? If the Helsinki Man has been duplicated then both is a person, if not then the Helsinki Man has NOT been duplicated. I admit that both being a person is odd, but odd is not the same as logically contradictory. and you just agreed that The Helsinki Man is both, But not at once. That's the point you forget to take into account. There was a delay between the appearance of the Moscow Man and the appearance of the Washington Man? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 12 Jul 2015, at 19:43, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 2:06 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You know in Helsinki with certainty (accepting comp But I do not accept “comp”. You do accept comp by definition of comp. You might believe there is a flaw in comp = reversal, but that is another point. You have failed up to now to find a flaw. See the preceding posts. I don't see any problem. Just play with words. Logic is playing with symbols according to certain rules, and words are symbols. Words are usually not symbols, but sequence of symbols, having or not some interpretation. is that it is never specified who is making this all important 1p and 3p distinction. The guy in Helsinki when trying to evaluate what to expect from the experiential view. And how many experiential views will the guy in Helsinki have after duplication? Two. But of course ICT3PAT1P. We have already agreed that both the W-guy and the M-guy are the Helsinki man. Then what the hell are we arguing about?! On the fact, to make it straight, that once your 3-you (3-he, 3-Hoàhn- Clark) are in two cities at once, your 1-you (1-he, 1-John Clark) are and can aonly be in only one city from their points of view, on which bear the step 3 question. The problem is that there is no such thing as *THE* 1p, there is only *A* 1p. There is the 1p of the W-guy, and the 1p of the M-guy Yes, and you just said BOTH the W-guy AND the M-guy are the H-guy. Yes, but after the split, they *FEEL* to be only one of them. and as first person experience they are incoptaible. Incompatible from each other but NOT incompatible from the Helsinki Man, That is not true, unless the Helsinki man believes that he will die in the process, but then he has to think that he dies already at step 0 and 1, and 2. Who will *experience* two-cities? The Helsinki Man. Nobody ever experience two cities” Then “The Helsinki Man” doesn’t mean what you just said it means. So what does it mean now? Not at all. The Helsinki man is in the two cities, but from his first person view, he feels only to be in one city, and he knew that in advance. It is not a Leibnizian identity Well duh! If a Leibnizian identity is a requirement for survival they you will not survive the next 5 seconds. So we agree. as we have also agreed that after the duplication, the Helsinki man has two incompatible continuations Incompatible with each other but not incompatible with the Helsinki Man, Incompatoble with every man and woman and machine ... I recall you that the prediction is on the first person experience as seen by the first person experience. It is not on the first person experience as attributed by other people. and it’s the Helsinki Man you were asking about. But yeah yeah I know, ICT3PAT1P. We do agree on the notion of personal identity. Apparently not. So I repeat my question, if Bruno Marchal doesn't mean someone who remembers being Bruno Marchal yesterday then who the hell are you? We do agree on the the notion ofpersonal identity, but your problem is that you just avoid the fact that 1) the experiencer will surivive 2- and know in advance that from his first person pov he will be unique in one city I am the guy who has BM's private memory. And the Moscow Man has the Helsinki Man’s private memories and the Washington Man has the Helsinki Man’s private memories. We agreed on that since the start. So why aren't they The Helsinki MEN? Oh yes, because ICT3PAT1P. They are both the Helsinki man, that is why in Helsinki the experiencer is unable to predict his next PERSONAL first person experience. being duplicated would not change that. I agree. There is absolutely no law of physics that forbids more than one guy having that private memory, the only reason that sort of thing is not common is due to technological limitations It would just bifurcate my future and introduce an indeterminacy on which future I will live. The use of ambiguous personal pronouns comes so easily that Bruno doesn't even seem to realize that Bruno is using them; it's like breathing, thought is required for neither activity. Boring useless rhetorical trick only. The Helsinki Man means having that memory and we agree that TWO people who have that memory, so The Helsinki Man is two people, That never occurs from the first person pov, and the question was about that. There is not an atom of ambiguity. The ambiguity comes only from the fact that after the soplit, you decide to not read the person diary. Your means to avoid the question are becoming very transparent and repetitive. so the Helsinki Man sees both cities. Nobody see two cities. You might say that two Helsinki man see two cities, but that is not even grammatically correct. Each see one and only one city. I
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: But I do not accept “comp”. You do accept comp by definition of comp. Comp has a definition?? That's news to me, it's certainly not in any dictionary and from your usage I gathered it was just a sequence of ASCII characters that you liked to type from time to time for some reason. Logic is playing with symbols according to certain rules, and words are symbols. Words are usually not symbols, but sequence of symbols, A sentence is a sequence of symbols. Letters are not symbols (except sometimes I and a) because they don't symbolize anything, but words do symbolize something so words are symbols. Then what the hell are we arguing about?! On the fact, to make it straight, that once your 3-you (3-he, 3-Hoàhn-Clark) are in two cities at once, your 1-you (1-he, 1-John Clark) are and can aonly be in only one city from their points of view, on which bear the step 3 question. I recognize most (but not all) of the words in the above, but the way they are sequenced together doesn't seem to form any sort of coherent thought. you just said BOTH the W-guy AND the M-guy are the H-guy. Yes, but after the split, they *FEEL* to be only one of them. That is irrelevant if they both are the H-guy, and you just said they are; then the things that deserve the label H-guy will *FEEL* to be in W AND M. Unless you change what you mean by The Helsinki Man a logical person could form no other conclusion. Mathematicians are supposed to give precise meaning to the symbols they use, but you're being sloppy, very sloppy. The Helsinki man is in the two cities, but [...] Why on earth is a but needed? If the Helsinki man is in the two cities after duplication then before the duplication then the correct answer to the question what will the Helsinki Man see after the duplication? would be Moscow AND Washington and no but is required. Given your statement above I don't see how this is even a debatable question. from his first person view, he feels only to be in one city, and he knew that in advance. He he and he! I am sick to death of he! Get rid of your philosophical training wheels and get rid of he. We do agree on the the notion ofpersonal identity, but your problem is that you just avoid the fact that 1) the experiencer will surivive I agree, and if the experiencer is duplicated there will be 2 experiencers. I mean...what else could duplicated mean? 2- and know in advance that from his first person pov he will be unique in one city I know that tomorrow when my future experiencers (plural) in Moscow and Washington look into the past to today they (plural) will see 2 unique paths leading up to them, but I would also know that if I am to be duplicated then when I look toward the future there is no unique path to be seen because I (aka The Helsinki Man of today) has no unique future. They are both the Helsinki man, that is why in Helsinki the experiencer is unable to predict his next PERSONAL first person experience. Who's next PERSONAL first person experience are you talking about? Oh yes, *his*. Those personal pronouns really come in handy, they're great at hiding irrationality The Helsinki Man means having that memory and we agree that TWO people who have that memory, so The Helsinki Man is two people, That never occurs from the first person pov, and the question was about that. The? Tommy has 2 apples. Which of Tommie's apples is the apple? The question was about that. There is not an atom of ambiguity. The ambiguity comes only from the fact that after the soplit, you decide to not read the person diary. I have never disputed the validity of memories tn the thought experiment, so could you please explain the value and purpose of those stupid diaries? I recall that the prediction is on the future experience of the experiencer . As opposed to what, the future experience of the non- experiencer ? In the 3-1 view, but he will never see two cities” Then “he” doesn’t mean what you just said it does, “he” can’t mean somebody who remembers being the Helsinki Man. false. It always mean the guy who remember seeing Helsinki, Then he will see BOTH cities! End of story. but Again with that but. after duplication he (both he) will see only one city. SO WHAT? Each he will see one, both will see 2, and you just agreed that The Helsinki Man is both,so The Helsinki Man will see both. What more needs to be said? So P(one city) = 1. Explain what the P means in the above, the probability of *who* seeing one city? Oh yes I forgot, the probability that he will see one city. Good old he. The Helsinki man can be sure of this; whoever he will become, he will become a guy seeing only one city, NO! The Helsinki
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 1:46 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 5:12 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: It's about continuity of consciousness above all else, and the labels change nothing about that. Labels are what gives meanings to words and all the arguments you have made on this list are made of words, so now you're saying the meanings of those words are not important and can be changed to mean anything. Well you can do that with your words if you want, but I'm not going to do it with mine. John k Clark I'm not saying the meanings of words are not important. You must be out of arguments. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 2:06 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You know in Helsinki with certainty (accepting comp But I do not accept “comp”. I don't see any problem. Just play with words. Logic is playing with symbols according to certain rules, and words are symbols. is that it is never specified who is making this all important 1p and 3p distinction. The guy in Helsinki when trying to evaluate what to expect from the experiential view. And how many experiential views will the guy in Helsinki have after duplication? Two. But of course ICT3PAT1P. We have already agreed that both the W-guy and the M-guy are the Helsinki man. Then what the hell are we arguing about?! The problem is that there is no such thing as *THE* 1p, there is only *A* 1p. There is the 1p of the W-guy, and the 1p of the M-guy Yes, and you just said BOTH the W-guy AND the M-guy are the H-guy. and as first person experience they are incoptaible. Incompatible from each other but NOT incompatible from the Helsinki Man, Who will *experience* two-cities? The Helsinki Man. Nobody ever experience two cities” Then “The Helsinki Man” doesn’t mean what you just said it means. So what does it mean now? It is not a Leibnizian identity Well duh! If a Leibnizian identity is a requirement for survival they you will not survive the next 5 seconds. as we have also agreed that after the duplication, the Helsinki man has two incompatible continuations Incompatible with each other but not incompatible with the Helsinki Man, and it’s the Helsinki Man you were asking about. But yeah yeah I know, ICT3PAT1P. We do agree on the notion of personal identity. Apparently not. So I repeat my question, if Bruno Marchal doesn't mean someone who remembers being Bruno Marchal yesterday then who the hell are you? I am the guy who has BM's private memory. And the Moscow Man has the Helsinki Man’s private memories and the Washington Man has the Helsinki Man’s private memories. So why aren't they The Helsinki MEN? Oh yes, because ICT3PAT1P . being duplicated would not change that. I agree. There is absolutely no law of physics that forbids more than one guy having that private memory, the only reason that sort of thing is not common is due to technological limitations It would just bifurcate my future and introduce an indeterminacy on which future I will live. The use of ambiguous personal pronouns comes so easily that Bruno doesn't even seem to realize that Bruno is using them; it's like breathing, thought is required for neither activity. You are the one introducing again and again the same ambiguity by confusing the 3p views and the 1p views. Yeah yeah I know, I Confuse The 3P And The 1P, but I keep telling you it will save time if you use the acronym ICT3PAT1P. And we all know you love acronyms He means the guy who has been in Helsinki and has the corresponding memory, And there are TWO people who have that memory, Yes, that is why there is an indeterminacy. The Helsinki Man means having that memory and we agree that TWO people who have that memory, so The Helsinki Man is two people, so the Helsinki Man sees both cities. I see no indeterminacy in that, everything is specified, but yeah yeah I know, ICT3PAT1P. those TWO people live in different cities, and if we accept your definition of he then it doesn't take a Kurt Godel to form the logical conclusion that he will see TWO cities. In the 3-1 view, but he will never see two cities” Then “he” doesn’t mean what you just said it does, “he” can’t mean somebody who remembers being the Helsinki Man. The question asked back in Helsinki was what cities will he see tomorrow, so if asked yesterday back in Helsinki what he meant what would be the correct answer? On second thought never mind, don't bother answering I already know what you will say, you will start babbling about *THE* 1p even though after duplication there is no such thing as *THE* 1p there is only *A* 1p; but of course ICT3PAT1P. There is no atoms of ambiguity, as I specify the type of view on which the expectations are evaluated. Big talk, so I repeat my challenge that you refused to accept last time, run through the entire duplicating procedure from start to finish WITHOUT using ambiguous personal pronouns and WITH the correct usage of the words “the” and “a”. I’m betting you can't do it without tripping over your own logic. how many cities did the Helsinki man see? Two in the third description of the 1-views of the survivors. One, in each first person view of each experiencers. And now the Helsinki Man now has TWO experiencers because the Helsinki Man has been duplicated. Pop Quiz: How much is 1+1? of course they are now different person Yes. and both the W and the M man see only once city. Yes. So you agree that P(W or M) = 1 My agreement depends on if that is a exclusive OR. and
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 10 Jul 2015, at 20:21, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 10:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: He, he and he! The use of ambiguous personal pronouns comes so easily that Bruno doesn't even seem to realize that Bruno is using them; it's like breathing, thought is required for neither activity. The he is explained in the [...]. This proves that you work only by disingenuous rethorical tricks or that you don't read the post(s). The complete quote is: That is indeed exactly why that guy in Helsinki was able to predict that wherever he will survive he will feel unique, in a unique specific city, and a city that he could not have predicted in advance. With he denoting the guys remembering having been the Helsinki guy. Both of them congratulate themselves for having written in the diary, when in Helsinki: P(coffee) = 1, P(unique- city) = 1, P(W v M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as the diary contains the personal, particular, experience, which mention only *one* city, in both diaries, either M, or W. Do you understand now why both he congratulate themselves when in Helsinki the guy predicted P(one city) = 1, P(W v M) = 1? No I do NOT understand and neither do you. If you did understand you'd have shown I was wrong long ago by simply stop using he in your thought experiment; I did, but it changes nothing, as there is no problem with the pronouns when you understand and apply the 1p and 3p distinction. but that is impossible because he is of vital importance, he is needed to cover up the logical blunders in the proof. All right, which one. You mention it often but never show it. You've made use of the fact that in everyday life most don't give much thought to personal pronouns, they don't need to because the referent is obvious, And reman obvious all along the duplication, if you take into account the distinction made. but people duplicating machines have not been invented yet Of course they have been invented, and with computationalisme we have everything we need to make the prediction asked. and that is not in everyday life, and so bad habits need to be broken and attention must be payed. Do you agree that P(experiencing-coffee) = 1? (you said ago yes, I guess) As I said , if everything in the universe gets coffee then he will get coffee too regardless of what that personal pronoun means. And why if everything is in front of one city, in one experience, would that not apply? And I said I guess because it's hard to get excited over such a vapid thought experiment Nice, so you do agree. Do you agree that P(experiencing-coffee) = 1 implies P(experiencing-a-unique-city) = 1? I don't know if I agree or not because this time everything in the universe will NOT be experiencing-a-unique-city. Who will *experience* two-cities? The prediction is supposed to be about what he will see but this time it does matter what he means. Before I can give a answer I need to understand the question. If he means The Helsinki Man then the probability he will experience one and only one city is zero, the probability he will experience both cities is 1. Nobody will ever experience both cities. Nobody. You ill be in both city, for an outsider point of view (the 3-1 view), and you will se only one city (the 1-view). And the h as defined completely in the quote, and we have agreed on its meaning, so I supect ypur remain stuck in your habit of rhetorical thinking. If he means The Moscow Man then the probability he will experience one and only one city is 1, the probability he will experience both cities is zero. He means the guy who has been in Helsinki and has the corresponding memory, so the M man, and the W man are both the Helsinki man, but of course they are now different person and both the W and the M man see only once city. If he means Bruno Marchal then the probability he will experience one and only one city is zero, the probability he will experience both cities is 1. If he means The Washington Man then the probability he will experience one and only one city is 1, the probability he will experience both cities is zero. See above. So tell me what he means and I'll give you a prediction. Not that predictions, good bad or mediocre, have anything to do with consciousness or the feeling of unique personal identity. Read the quote, or any post I send lately, or the sane04 paper, or the two more recent papers, or the thesis. Sorry, but I have still not an atom of clue of what you don't understand. You ask question in post where the question have been answered and on what we have already agreed. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 10 Jul 2015, at 23:12, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 4:41 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 4:11 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Let's call them Helsinki Man, Helsinki-To-Moscow Man, and Helsinki-To-Washington Man. That's quite a mouthful but OK. So the answer to the question what city will the Helsinki Man With No Hyphen see? is The Helsinki Man With No Hyphen will see no city at all, oblivion awaits. And that's odd because I thought we agreed that The Helsinki Man survives. This is map/territory confusion. Whatever you call them has no bearing on Helsinki Man's consciousness as it survives the duplication and diverges, just as in the Schrodinger's Cat experiment. It's about continuity of consciousness above all else, and the labels change nothing about that. There's a perfectly clear way to analyze this, but you insist on muddying the waters. It is the least we can say. Bruno Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 11 Jul 2015, at 19:34, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: there is no problem with the pronouns when you understand and apply the 1p and 3p distinction. The problem is that there is no such thing as *THE* 1p, there is only *A* 1p. There is the 1p of the W-guy, and the 1p of the M-guy, and as first person experience they are incoptaible. You know in Helsinki with certainty (accepting comp and the default hypotheses) that you will en up, whoever you can be after the duplication seeing a city. Another problem Which problem? I don't see any problem. Just play with words. is that it is never specified who is making this all important 1p and 3p distinction. The guy in Helsinki when trying to evaluate what to expect from the experiential view. Who's 1p are we talking about? The 1p described in the diary of the experiencers. Who will *experience* two-cities? The Helsinki Man. Nobody ever experience two cities in the sense we have provided for first person experience, because, trivially, nobody evcer open a door and see two cities simultaneously from its first person experience pov. Nobody will ever experience both cities. Nobody. Then today The Helsinki Man can't mean someone who remembers being The Helsinki Man yesterday, so what does The Helsinki Man mean? We have already agreed that both the W-guy and the M-guy are the Helsinki man. It is not a Leibnizian identity, as we have also agreed that after the duplication, the Helsinki man has two incompatible continuations, as they both experience a unique city. We loss often the Leibnizian identity in intensional or modal contexts. There is no problem with that, and that is handled in arithmetic easily later. And so by analogy today Bruno Marchal can't mean someone who remembers being Bruno Marchal yesterday. So who are you? We do agree on the notion of personal identity. No need to come back on this. I am the guy who has BM's private memory. being duplicated would not change that. It would just bifurcate my future and introduce an indeterminacy on which future I will live. You ill be in both city, for an outsider point of view (the 3-1 view), and you will se only one city (the 1-view). The use of ambiguous personal pronouns comes so easily that Bruno doesn't even seem to realize that Bruno is using them; it's like breathing, thought is required for neither activity. Only in your head. There is no atoms of ambiguity, as I specify the type of view on which the expectations are evaluated. You are the one introducing again and again the same ambiguity by confusing the 3p views and the 1p views. He means the guy who has been in Helsinki and has the corresponding memory, And there are TWO people who have that memory, Yes, that is why there is an indeterminacy. and those TWO people live in different cities, and if we accept your definition of he then it doesn't take a Kurt Godel to form the logical conclusion that he will see TWO cities. In the 3-1 view, but he will never see two cities, and that explained why he cannot predict what he will *live* as experience. You never describe the experience lived by each survivors, you describe the two survivors experience without taking their content into account which can only be W, or M. That trick has been debunked, many times, but you never quote them, or just isolate sentence to make opportunist irrelevant remarks. the M man, and the W man are both the Helsinki man, Yes. Pop Quiz: If for the sake of argument we assume the controversial idea that 1+1=2 is true then how many cities did the Helsinki man see? Two in the third description of the 1-views of the survivors. One, in each first person view of each experiencers. but of course they are now different person Yes. and both the W and the M man see only once city. Yes. So you agree that P(W or M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as P(W) = P(M) is very reasonable, we get P(M) = P(W) = 1/2. Move to step 4, please. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Sat, Jul 11, 2015 at 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: there is no problem with the pronouns when you understand and apply the 1p and 3p distinction. The problem is that there is no such thing as *THE* 1p, there is only *A* 1p. Another problem is that it is never specified who is making this all important 1p and 3p distinction. Who's 1p are we talking about? Who will *experience* two-cities? The Helsinki Man. Nobody will ever experience both cities. Nobody. Then today The Helsinki Man can't mean someone who remembers being The Helsinki Man yesterday, so what does The Helsinki Man mean? And so by analogy today Bruno Marchal can't mean someone who remembers being Bruno Marchal yesterday. So who are you? You ill be in both city, for an outsider point of view (the 3-1 view), and you will se only one city (the 1-view). The use of ambiguous personal pronouns comes so easily that Bruno doesn't even seem to realize that Bruno is using them; it's like breathing, thought is required for neither activity. He means the guy who has been in Helsinki and has the corresponding memory, And there are TWO people who have that memory, and those TWO people live in different cities, and if we accept your definition of he then it doesn't take a Kurt Godel to form the logical conclusion that he will see TWO cities. the M man, and the W man are both the Helsinki man, Yes. Pop Quiz: If for the sake of argument we assume the controversial idea that 1+1=2 is true then how many cities did the Helsinki man see? but of course they are now different person Yes. and both the W and the M man see only once city. Yes. See above. Why? I have still not an atom of clue of what you don't understand. Then you don't understand that you don't understand, and that is the worst form of ignorance. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 5:12 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: It's about continuity of consciousness above all else, and the labels change nothing about that. Labels are what gives meanings to words and all the arguments you have made on this list are made of words, so now you're saying the meanings of those words are not important and can be changed to mean anything. Well you can do that with your words if you want, but I'm not going to do it with mine. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 09 Jul 2015, at 21:25, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 9, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: that guy in Helsinki was able to predict that wherever he will survive he will feel unique, in [] He, he and he! The use of ambiguous personal pronouns comes so easily that Bruno doesn't even seem to realize that Bruno is using them; it's like breathing, thought is required for neither activity. The he is explained in the [...]. This proves that you work only by disingenuous rethorical tricks or that you don't read the post(s). The complete quote is: That is indeed exactly why that guy in Helsinki was able to predict that wherever he will survive he will feel unique, in a unique specific city, and a city that he could not have predicted in advance. With he denoting the guys remembering having been the Helsinki guy. Both of them congratulate themselves for having written in the diary, when in Helsinki: P(coffee) = 1, P(unique- city) = 1, P(W v M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as the diary contains the personal, particular, experience, which mention only *one* city, in both diaries, either M, or W. Do you understand now why both he congratulate themselves when in Helsinki the guy predicted P(one city) = 1, P(W v M) = 1? Do you agree that P(experiencing-coffee) = 1? (you said ago yes, I guess) Do you agree that P(experiencing-coffee) = 1 implies P(experiencing-a- unique-city) = 1? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 10:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: He, he and he! The use of ambiguous personal pronouns comes so easily that Bruno doesn't even seem to realize that Bruno is using them; it's like breathing, thought is required for neither activity. The he is explained in the [...]. This proves that you work only by disingenuous rethorical tricks or that you don't read the post(s). The complete quote is: That is indeed exactly why that guy in Helsinki was able to predict that wherever he will survive he will feel unique, in a unique specific city, and a city that he could not have predicted in advance. With he denoting the guys remembering having been the Helsinki guy. Both of them congratulate themselves for having written in the diary, when in Helsinki: P(coffee) = 1, P(unique-city) = 1, P(W v M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as the diary contains the personal, particular, experience, which mention only *one* city, in both diaries, either M, or W. Do you understand now why both he congratulate themselves when in Helsinki the guy predicted P(one city) = 1, P(W v M) = 1? No I do NOT understand and neither do you. If you did understand you'd have shown I was wrong long ago by simply stop using he in your thought experiment; but that is impossible because he is of vital importance, he is needed to cover up the logical blunders in the proof. You've made use of the fact that in everyday life most don't give much thought to personal pronouns, they don't need to because the referent is obvious, but people duplicating machines have not been invented yet and that is not in everyday life, and so bad habits need to be broken and attention must be payed. Do you agree that P(experiencing-coffee) = 1? (you said ago yes, I guess) As I said , if everything in the universe gets coffee then he will get coffee too regardless of what that personal pronoun means. And I said I guess because it's hard to get excited over such a vapid thought experiment Do you agree that P(experiencing-coffee) = 1 implies P(experiencing-a-unique-city) = 1? I don't know if I agree or not because this time everything in the universe will NOT be experiencing-a-unique-city . The prediction is supposed to be about what he will see but this time it does matter what he means. Before I can give a answer I need to understand the question. If he means The Helsinki Man then the probability he will experience one and only one city is zero, the probability he will experience both cities is 1. If he means The Moscow Man then the probability he will experience one and only one city is 1, the probability he will experience both cities is zero. If he means Bruno Marchal then the probability he will experience one and only one city is zero, the probability he will experience both cities is 1. If he means The Washington Man then the probability he will experience one and only one city is 1, the probability he will experience both cities is zero. So tell me what he means and I'll give you a prediction. Not that predictions, good bad or mediocre, have anything to do with consciousness or the feeling of unique personal identity. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Thu, Jul 9, 2015 at 3:41 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Jul 9, 2015 at 2:13 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged . Let's assume you're correct, then if the referent of the personal pronoun you in the question what city will you see? is the Helsinki man (and I don't know what else it could be) then the correct answer would be I will see no city whatsoever, oblivion awaits. But we both agreed that you would survive the duplicating procedure, so your initial assumption must be incorrect and the Helsinki man is still around. And because there is no logical reason to favor one city over the other The Helsinki Man must survive in BOTH Moscow AND Washington. QED. You're the one with the problem with personal pronouns. I'm not using them, so I'm baffled as to why you're bringing them back in. All I want is to understand what you meant by they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged , and to do that all I really need is to understand exactly what you mean by The Helsinki Man. I thought it meant somebody who remembers being The Helsinki Man yesterday ,but obviously you think it means something else and I'd just like to know what it is. Did my car analogy not make it clear? Terren To save time I will include the standard reminder that it doesn't matter whether observers of either experiment would have ambiguities with the personal identity of the participants. But if you're describing the outcome of an experiment (thought or otherwise) ambiguities most certainly DO matter! Otherwise it's not science, it's not even philosophy, its more like very bad poetry. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: All I want is to understand what you meant by they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged , and to do that all I really need is to understand exactly what you mean by The Helsinki Man. I thought it meant somebody who remembers being The Helsinki Man yesterday ,but obviously you think it means something else and I'd just like to know what it is. Did my car analogy not make it clear? I duplicate my red car. I then paint one of the 2 cars blue. I now have one red car and one blue car. I t hen destroy *THE* car. What color is *THE* remaining car? Did I not make my question clear? If not that's OK because the question I really want answered is what you meant by they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged . John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 3:43 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: All I want is to understand what you meant by they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged , and to do that all I really need is to understand exactly what you mean by The Helsinki Man. I thought it meant somebody who remembers being The Helsinki Man yesterday ,but obviously you think it means something else and I'd just like to know what it is. Did my car analogy not make it clear? I duplicate my red car. I then paint one of the 2 cars blue. I now have one red car and one blue car. I t hen destroy *THE* car. What color is *THE* remaining car? Did I not make my question clear? If not that's OK because the question I really want answered is what you meant by they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged . John K Clark Let's call them Helsinki Man, Helsinki-To-Moscow Man, and Helsinki-To-Washington Man. I don't really care what the labels are, so long as the labels we choose accomplish the following: - we can clearly refer to the desired person in terms of where they are physically or temporally, pre or post duplication If you need the labels to suggest that the duplicated persons are continuations of the original, I have no problem with that. The labels we choose don't impact that (beyond potential for clarity/confusion) since what's important is not how we refer to them, but what the consequences are of the experience of being duplicated. No different from Superposed Experimenter, Superposed-To-Dead-Cat Experimenter, and Superposed-To-Live-Cat Experimenter. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 4:11 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Let's call them Helsinki Man, Helsinki-To-Moscow Man, and Helsinki-To-Washington Man. That's quite a mouthful but OK. So the answer to the question what city will the Helsinki Man With No Hyphen see? is The Helsinki Man With No Hyphen will see no city at all, oblivion awaits. And that's odd because I thought we agreed that The Helsinki Man survives. If you need the labels [...] All experiments need labels, even thought experiments . John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 4:41 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 4:11 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Let's call them Helsinki Man, Helsinki-To-Moscow Man, and Helsinki-To-Washington Man. That's quite a mouthful but OK. So the answer to the question what city will the Helsinki Man With No Hyphen see? is The Helsinki Man With No Hyphen will see no city at all, oblivion awaits. And that's odd because I thought we agreed that The Helsinki Man survives. This is map/territory confusion. Whatever you call them has no bearing on Helsinki Man's consciousness as it survives the duplication and diverges, just as in the Schrodinger's Cat experiment. It's about continuity of consciousness above all else, and the labels change nothing about that. There's a perfectly clear way to analyze this, but you insist on muddying the waters. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Thu, Jul 9, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I see only your usual rhetorical tricks Those rhetorical tricks have another name, it's an obscure technical term called logic. Perhaps you've heard of it. Just answer this. I recall that W means I feel to be in W, and I feel to be in M, with the I being the first person I, To hell with THE! If a person has been duplicated then there is no more the, it's now a because that's what duplicated means. And a Helsinki Man today is anyone or anything that remembers being the Helsinki Man before the duplication. And yes yes I know, I confuse the 1p and the 3p; so cure my confusion and run through the entire duplicating procedure from start to finish strictly from *the* first person perspective without using ambiguous personal pronouns and using the and a correctly. I'm betting you can't do it. I recall that you have agreed that the first person experiences W and M are incompatible and belongs to separate streams of consciousness/first person experiences. Yes, obviously they are incompatible with each other, but neither is incompatible with the Helsinki Man if The Helsinki Man means something that remembers being a man in Helsinki before the duplication occurred. And if it doesn't mean that then what does it mean? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 11:47 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged. Let's assume you're correct, then if the referent of the personal pronoun you in the question what city will you see? is the Helsinki man (and I don't know what else it could be) then the correct answer would be I will see no city whatsoever, oblivion awaits. But we both agreed that you would survive the duplicating procedure, so your initial assumption must be incorrect and the Helsinki man is still around. And because there is no logical reason to favor one city over the other The Helsinki Man must survive in BOTH Moscow AND Washington. QED. You're the one with the problem with personal pronouns. I'm not using them, so I'm baffled as to why you're bringing them back in. Let's try a different tack. Let's say I have a white Toyota. Then I duplicate it and one of them I paint red and one of them I paint blue. At that point, what is the clearest way to refer to the cars? Personally, I would go with white Toyota, red Toyota and blue Toyota. I would not be arguing strenuously about the need to refer to all three as white Toyota. Something about the duplicated cars has differentiated them from the original, so it is clearer to refer to them in terms of what has changed. And yes, cars are not conscious. I'm just talking about the clearest way to refer to the various 'bodies'. Let's stick with Helsinki Man, Moscow Man, and Washington Man. With the understanding that both Moscow Man and Washingotn man believes himself to be the guy that was just duplicated in Helsinki, but they are clearly different people from one another. If we do it that way we can see how easy it is to compare this to Many Worlds, where we might refer to Schrodinger's Cat experiment participants as superposed experimenter, dead-cat experimenter, and live-cat experimenter. Dead-cat experimenter and live-cat experimenter both believe they are also superposed experimenter, but they are clearly different people from one another as they have diverged. To save time I will include the standard reminder that it doesn't matter whether observers of either experiment would have ambiguities with the personal identity of the participants. It only matters whether the consciousnesses are continuous. Terren To save time I will include the standard canned response used whenever Bruno's ideas are shown to be illogical, I confuse the 1p and the 3p. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 08 Jul 2015, at 18:46, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 , Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Nonsense. I can show you the diaries proving that the Helsinki Man did write I see Moscow AND did write I see Washington. Yes, but (I see Moscow) and (I see Washington) describes two different, and exclusive, first person experience. Those two first person experiences are indeed different from each other but they do have one thing in common, they both have equally vivid memories of being the Helsinki Man yesterday, and if that's not what being the Helsinki Man today means then what does it mean? you are here again confusing the 3-1 view (an outsider description of the first person experiences (plural) of the two copies, and the 1-views [...] You keep confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-views I'm not generally a BIG fan of acronyms but you seem to like them and I fear you will get carpal tunnel from typing you confuse the 1p with the 3p so often, so how about YCT1PWT3P ? I the Helsinki Man predict that I will see Moscow AND Washington is correct if I-the helsinki man refers to two persons It refers to ANYONE who remembers saying I the Helsinki Man predict that I will see Moscow AND Washington. So Bruno you tell me, after the duplication how many people remember saying that? but after the duplication, I-the Helsinki man refers to two exclusive and incompatible FIRST-PERSON EXPERIENCES, There is absolutely nothing incompatible about two different people having equally vivid memories of being the Helsinki Man. Yes its odd because we are not accustomed to people duplicating machines, but odd is not the same as illogical. Not that predictions, good bad or mediocre, have anything to do with the nature of personal identity or consciousness. This is wrong, So when something does not turn out as you expected you black out and lose consciousness or no longer feel that you are Bruno Marchal or both. and irrelevant So your proof has nothing to do with consciousness or the nature of personal identity. Then what is it about? that has nothing to do with UDA Maybe so I don't know, I've forgot again what UDA is. I know you've told me before but it must be pretty forgettable. Wait a minute... I think the D has something to do with a bird... is it dovetail? I see only your usual rhetorical tricks, and you don't answer the question asked. Just answer this. I recall that W means I feel to be in W, and I feel to be in M, with the I being the first person I, that is the owner of personal diary/memory which is taken in the teletransportation box. I recall that you have agreed that the first person experiences W and M are incompatible and belongs to separate streams of consciousness/ first person experiences. I recall that you have agreed that P(coffee) = 1 (in the step 3 protocol) The question is: do you agree that in Helsinki P(W v M) = 1? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Thu, Jul 9, 2015 at 2:13 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged . Let's assume you're correct, then if the referent of the personal pronoun you in the question what city will you see? is the Helsinki man (and I don't know what else it could be) then the correct answer would be I will see no city whatsoever, oblivion awaits. But we both agreed that you would survive the duplicating procedure, so your initial assumption must be incorrect and the Helsinki man is still around. And because there is no logical reason to favor one city over the other The Helsinki Man must survive in BOTH Moscow AND Washington. QED. You're the one with the problem with personal pronouns. I'm not using them, so I'm baffled as to why you're bringing them back in. All I want is to understand what you meant by they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged , and to do that all I really need is to understand exactly what you mean by The Helsinki Man. I thought it meant somebody who remembers being The Helsinki Man yesterday ,but obviously you think it means something else and I'd just like to know what it is. To save time I will include the standard reminder that it doesn't matter whether observers of either experiment would have ambiguities with the personal identity of the participants. But if you're describing the outcome of an experiment (thought or otherwise) ambiguities most certainly DO matter! Otherwise it's not science, it's not even philosophy, its more like very bad poetry. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Thu, Jul 9, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: that guy in Helsinki was able to predict that wherever he will survive he will feel unique, in [] He, he and he! The use of ambiguous personal pronouns comes so easily that Bruno doesn't even seem to realize that Bruno is using them; it's like breathing, thought is required for neither activity. Nobody understands your point It's not my point it's an obvious point, and m aybe nobody around here understands it but this list is not the world, plenty of people understand it. A nd that my dear Bruno is why you haven't won the Nobel Prize. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 09 Jul 2015, at 17:56, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 9, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Just answer this. I recall that W means I feel to be in W, and I feel to be in M, with the I being the first person I, To hell with THE! If a person has been duplicated then there is no more the, In philosophy, this is called an indexical. In computer science, it is defined with the Dx = F(xx) diagonal technic and intensional variants. But here, when I say that I is the first person I, I use it for the notion, not for the person. It means *the* notion that we have defined using the diary etc. it's now a because that's what duplicated means. And a Helsinki Man today is anyone or anything that remembers being the Helsinki Man before the duplication. And yes yes I know, I confuse the 1p and the 3p; so cure my confusion and run through the entire duplicating procedure from start to finish strictly from *the* first person perspective without using ambiguous personal pronouns and using the and a correctly. I'm betting you can't do it. I recall that you have agreed that the first person experiences W and M are incompatible and belongs to separate streams of consciousness/first person experiences. Yes, obviously they are incompatible with each other, but neither is incompatible with the Helsinki Man if The Helsinki Man means something that remembers being a man in Helsinki before the duplication occurred. And if it doesn't mean that then what does it mean? It means that, no problem. We have agreed a million times on this. That is indeed exactly why that guy in Helsinki was able to predict that wherever he will survive he will feel unique, in a unique specific city, and a city that he could not have predicted in advance. With he denoting the guys remembering having been the Helsinki guy. Both of them congratulate themselves for having written in the diary, when in Helsinki: P(coffee) = 1, P(unique-city) = 1, P(W v M) = 1, and P(W M) = 0, as the diary contains the personal, particular, experience, which mention only *one* city, in both diaries, either M, or W. You don't succeed to justify why you don't move on step 4. You only repeat, like a bot, the same rhetorical tricks. You failed to explain anybody why P(coffee) = 1 (on which you agreed, or at least guessed) does not entail P(unique-city) = 1. You go out of your body at the duplication time, and never reintegrate, yes, only one body, indexically, after. You don't put yourself in the shoes of any of the continuers. But you need to do that, for each one, which is not that hard when the case is just one, or a few iteration of, duplication(s). Each one feel unique, verifying everywhere that P(unique-city) = 1 was correct. Nobody understands your point, and the ad hominem tone adds to the idea that your agenda is not really related to the topic of the list. Unless you change your tone and can tell me gently and politely, as clearly as possible, what is it that you do not understand in what I have just explained above, I will no more do much effort. I guess this thread becomes pretty boring for the participants. You always mock the 1p/3p distinction and then by abstracting yourself from it, you either see determinacy or ambiguity, where comp and the notion of identity on which we have agreed a million times entails what I say above, which is enough to proceed. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 08 Jul 2015, at 03:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote On 07 Jul 2015, at 01:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 7/6/2015 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 1:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If there's only one consciousness which is aware of both Washington and Moscow then asking the body looking at the Washington Monument what the Kremlin looks like would elicit an accurate answer. There's no contradiction in information being transferred from Moscow to Washington any more than transferring it from a toe to a brain. Nobody thinks new physics would be needed to explain how a message moves from your toe to your brain, but new physics would be required to explain how the Washington Man could accurately say what's going on in Moscow without using electronics. So I don't think the Washington Man could do that. I didn't say they could, I said there was no *logical* contradiction in them doing so. In fact it's not even a nomological contradiction because humans could have evolved or manufactured RF communication devices in their brains such that, when duplicated, the two copies continued to shared information. But my point was that in Bruno's UD multiverse there will be universes in which this is the case. So to show that duplication necessarily entails two consciouses, he needs to show that our physics and our evolution are necessary, not contingent. Bruno appears to believe that the same physics must obtain in all possible universes, only initial conditions can differ. Please. You oversimpilfy. Not at all -- I simply report what you have said. Wrongly as your quote confirms. Quote: Only the geographico-historical features can be brute facts. The whole point is that with comp, physical laws does exist, and are the same for all universal machine, because they are all under the same FPI on the same domain (UD*). Physics, unlike geography is justified. You see? I say that the physical laws have to be the same for all universal machine. This is neutral on the question of the existence of one, two, three or infinity (enumerable, not eneumarable, ...) of physical universes. The number of universe is irrelevant, and not what I said. Your claim, repeated here, is that the physical laws are the same for all existing universes. No. I say that the physical laws are the same for all universal machines. They are the observers, and I can prove, even in RA, their existence, unlike universe which might just not exist, and even if they exist in some secondary sense, it is only in the mind of universal numbers. I think Bruno is simply wrong here. For the dovetailer in Platonia (AUDA), every computable universe is included, and these can have arbitrarily different physics. Cf. Tegmark's CUH. Exercise: refute the CUH. Hint: UDA. Exercise: prove yo youself that the dovetailer running in Platonia (arithmetic) completely implements Tegmark's CUH. Proof: Trivially true, since the UD runs all possible programs, it must run the programs instatiating every computable universe. But you are simultaneously in all of them. Only the change above your substitution level can make your consciousness differentiating, and so being in a stable, normal universe, is determined by the statistics on all computable universe, and that has to be unique, as that is determined globally by all universal numbers/computations. Here you use an identity mind-brain which is simply false once we accept computationalism. The physical is what make your experience, not just existing, but stable and normal in some gaussian sense. With comp, we can't exclude other universe so different that we have non counterparts in it. See, you say it again. All possible universes are instantiated, even those that do not support intelligent (conscious) life. The physical is what assure the existence of a measure one. It depends on all computation. You cannot attach your mind to one computable universe, you needs them all, and all universal machines is the same for all machines. You have not yet understood or mediate enough on the step seven. The fact is that we are supported by an infinity of computations, and the laws of physics are invariant in the way to manage those infinities. This makes no sense. We need only the computations that constitute each individual universe. You forget the FPI. If you were true, there would be no Boltzmann Brain problem, even in infinite robust physical universes. Repetitions are merely the same universe again -- identity of indiscernibles. But they can differentiate. All the human universe are equal only if your substitution level is infinitely low, or that your only brain is the whole physical reality. My only fear, when young, was that this would lead to classical logic,
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged. Let's assume you're correct, then if the referent of the personal pronoun you in the question what city will you see? is the Helsinki man (and I don't know what else it could be) then the correct answer would be I will see no city whatsoever, oblivion awaits. But we both agreed that you would survive the duplicating procedure, so your initial assumption must be incorrect and the Helsinki man is still around. And because there is no logical reason to favor one city over the other The Helsinki Man must survive in BOTH Moscow AND Washington. QED. To save time I will include the standard canned response used whenever Bruno's ideas are shown to be illogical, I confuse the 1p and the 3p. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 , Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Nonsense. I can show you the diaries proving that the Helsinki Man did write I see Moscow AND did write I see Washington. Yes, but (I see Moscow) and (I see Washington) describes two different, and exclusive, first person experience. T hose two first person experiences are indeed different from each other but they do have one thing in common, they both have equally vivid memories of being the Helsinki Man yesterday, and if that's not what being the Helsinki Man today means then what does it mean? you are here again confusing the 3-1 view (an outsider description of the first person experiences (plural) of the two copies, and the 1-views [...] You keep confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-views I'm not generally a BIG fan of acronyms but you seem to like them and I fear you will get carpal tunnel from typing you confuse the 1p with the 3p so often, so how about YCT1PWT3P ? I the Helsinki Man predict that I will see Moscow AND Washington is correct if I-the helsinki man refers to two persons It refers to ANYONE who remembers saying I the Helsinki Man predict that I will see Moscow AND Washington . So Bruno you tell me, after the duplication how many people remember saying that? but after the duplication, I-the Helsinki man refers to two exclusive and incompatible FIRST-PERSON EXPERIENCES, There is absolutely nothing incompatible about two different people having equally vivid memories of being the Helsinki Man. Yes its odd because we are not accustomed to people duplicating machines, but odd is not the same as illogical. Not that predictions, good bad or mediocre, have anything to do with the nature of personal identity or consciousness. This is wrong, So when something does not turn out as you expected you black out and lose consciousness or no longer feel that you are Bruno Marchal or both. and irrelevant So your proof has nothing to do with consciousness or the nature of personal identity. Then what is it about? that has nothing to do with UDA Maybe so I don't know, I've forgot again what UDA is. I know you've told me before but it must be pretty forgettable. Wait a minute... I think the D has something to do with a bird... is it dovetail? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 08 Jul 2015, at 03:16, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: that's a pretty dull thought experiment. if everything in the universe will get a cup of coffee then it doesn't matter what the referent to you is because whatever it is he she or it will get some coffee. What's your point? If you agree that P(experience of getting a cup of coffee soon) = 1, If everything and everyone will get coffee then obviously I will get coffee too regardless of what I means. And I still don't see your point. then you have to agree that P(experience of opening the door and writing W or opening the door and writing M in a personal diary) = 1, Or? Is that a exclusive or? If it's a OR gate then P=1. If it's a XOR gate then P=0. and that P(experience of writing W and M in a personal diary) = 0. Nonsense. I can show you the diaries proving that the Helsinki Man did write I see Moscow AND did write I see Washington. Yes, but [(I see Moscow) and (I see Washington)] describes two different, and exclusive, first person experience. It is not the same as (I see Washington and Moscow). None write I see Moscow and Washington. Each one see, as you say here, only one city. So, if you agree that P(coffee) = one because both get coffee, you have to agree that both confirms in the same way that P(one city) = 1 and P(W or M) = 1 (with or being any or you want: the usual logical non exclusive or, or the xor). And P(W and M) is zero as the experience (I see Washington and Moscow) never occurs to anybody. So, you are here again confusing the 3-1 view (an outsider description of the first person experiences (plural) of the two copies, and the 1- views, which both (thus all, at that time), like the coffee experience, have the experience of feeling to be in one city. you can predict in advance that after pushing the button, you are in front of *one* door, and that behind that door there is *one* precise city, and that you have no clue which one it could be. Maybe that's what you would predict only you know that, but I know for a fact that's not what I would predict. I would say I the Helsinki Man predict that I will see Moscow AND Washington Sure, but that does not entail that after pushing the button the helsinki man will see both city at once. Whoever the Helsinki man will feel to be, it can only be either the W-man, or the M-man, and never both at once. You keep confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-views accessible to the Helsinki man. ; and events would later prove that the prediction was correct. ...because you put it in an ambiguous way. I the Helsinki Man predict that I will see Moscow AND Washington is correct if I-the helsinki man refers to two persons, but after the duplication, I-the Helsinki man refers to two exclusive and incompatible FIRST-PERSON EXPERIENCES, as you have just said to Terren. And in that sense, which is the sense of the question asked in Helsinki, the events later prove that the and prediction was incorrect. Both refute that they see W and M. Both confirms that they get coffee and that in only one city. Not that predictions, good bad or mediocre, have anything to do with the nature of personal identity or consciousness. This is wrong, and irrelevant, also. to have a persistent personal identity, some amount of prediction must be verified. But that has nothing to do with UDA and its goal. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 07 Jul 2015, at 01:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 7/6/2015 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 1:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If there's only one consciousness which is aware of both Washington and Moscow then asking the body looking at the Washington Monument what the Kremlin looks like would elicit an accurate answer. There's no contradiction in information being transferred from Moscow to Washington any more than transferring it from a toe to a brain. Nobody thinks new physics would be needed to explain how a message moves from your toe to your brain, but new physics would be required to explain how the Washington Man could accurately say what's going on in Moscow without using electronics. So I don't think the Washington Man could do that. I didn't say they could, I said there was no *logical* contradiction in them doing so. In fact it's not even a nomological contradiction because humans could have evolved or manufactured RF communication devices in their brains such that, when duplicated, the two copies continued to shared information. But my point was that in Bruno's UD multiverse there will be universes in which this is the case. So to show that duplication necessarily entails two consciouses, he needs to show that our physics and our evolution are necessary, not contingent. Bruno appears to believe that the same physics must obtain in all possible universes, only initial conditions can differ. Please. You oversimpilfy. Quote: Only the geographico-historical features can be brute facts. The whole point is that with comp, physical laws does exist, and are the same for all universal machine, because they are all under the same FPI on the same domain (UD*). Physics, unlike geography is justified. You see? I say that the physical laws have to be the same for all universal machine. This is neutral on the question of the existence of one, two, three or infinity (enumerable, not eneumarable, ...) of physical universes. I think Bruno is simply wrong here. For the dovetailer in Platonia (AUDA), every computable universe is included, and these can have arbitrarily different physics. Cf. Tegmark's CUH. Exercise: refute the CUH. Hint: UDA. The physical is what make your experience, not just existing, but stable and normal in some gaussian sense. With comp, we can't exclude other universe so different that we have non counterparts in it. The fact is that we are supported by an infinity of computations, and the laws of physics are invariant in the way to manage those infinities. My only fear, when young, was that this would lead to classical logic, from which it would have followed that physics does not exist and is only a form of geography. That would have make comp somehow trivial about physics. But that is not the case, there is a complex physical core shared by all universal beings. Now, it is a complex structure, and depending of its derivation from the intensional nuances, it might have different phase allowing different kind of physical reality. The picture is just very rich, and unlike physicists, we get the qualia theory extending the quanta. All this from an hypothesis that almost all scientists believe in (even when not really knowing the mathematical theory behind). By testing the quanta part, we can refute or confirm indirectly the qualia part. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 12:19 AM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: But they're not Helsinki man anymore. Yes they are provided the Helsinki man is defined as somebody who remembers being T erren Suydam in Helsinki, and that's the definition we'd use if instead of using a copying machine you'd just gotten on a jet and flown from Helsinki to Moscow. So it seems like a reasonable definition to me and I see no need to change it just because the means of transportation has changed. We have to differentiate them because they were duplicated... to refer to that as mere transportation is weaselly. Weaselly my ass! If I put you under anesthesia in Helsinki and then put you on a jet and woke you up in Moscow it would be subjectively identical to using a duplicating chamber. You're the one who objects to ambiguity in the referent so it's rather strange for you to insist on calling the duplicates Helsinki man. Where is the ambiguity? The Helsinki Man has been DUPLICATED so of course there are now 2 Helsinki Men because that's what the word duplicated means. When they open their respective doors on their respective cities they will both retain all the characteristics of the Helsinki Man but they will gain additional characteristics, and because the two cities are different the additional characteristics will be different. They both *were *Helsinki Man and now one is Moscow Man and one is Washington Man. If the Helsinki Man isn't the man who remembers being Terren Suydam in Helsinki yesterday then who is the Helsinki Man? If you're not the man who remembers being Terren Suydam yesterday then who the hell are you? One sees one thing, the other sees the other. Yes, one remembers Moscow and one remembers Washington so they must diverge, but their memories of Helsinki are unaffected and remain identical so they both have a equal right to call themselves The Helsinki Man. You've acknowledged several times on this thread alone that the consciousnesses diverge and are different. Yes, they've diverged from each other but not from the Helsinki Man. NO! They diverged from each other but they did NOT diverge from the Helsinki Man, they both remember being the Helsinki man as strongly as ever, but neither the Moscow nor Washington man remembers being the other. Both are the Helsinki Man but neither is the other You've spent the last few months bashing Bruno for his use of ambiguous pronouns, but now you're doing your damndest to avoid referring to the various persons in the one way that makes things crystal clear. It is crystal clear that The Moscow Man means the Helsinki Man who is now seeing Moscow and the Washington Man means the Helsinki Man who is now seeing Moscow. Is it the fact that there are now 2 Helsinki Men that makes you say it's ambiguous? Well you tell me, if the Helsinki Man has been duplicated do you believe there still only one Helsinki Man? Are you using some new meaning for the word duplicated? Logical self contradiction is even worse than ambiguity. You keep insisting that personal identity is so important to this experiment, but it's not. What *is *important is continuity of consciousness. Consciousness is always continuous, except at birth and death, because nobody can remember not remembering. Anesthesia does not cause a discontinuity in consciousness, subjectively it causes the external universe to make a discontinuous jump, and subjectivity is far more important than objectivity. Or at least I think so. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 06 Jul 2015, at 19:39, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 1:16 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You (or anyone) are in Helsinki, you will be duplicated, and both copies will get a cup of coffee in W and in M. The question is asked to you (or to anyone doing that experiment) in Helsinki, before pushing the button: what is your personal first person expectation of drinking a cup of coffee after having push on the button. If both get the coffee then I would expect to get the coffee regardless of the precise meaning of the personal pronoun I ; So you agree that P(experience of getting a cup of coffee soon) = 1. OK? OK I guess, You guess? but that's a pretty dull thought experiment. if everything in the universe will get a cup of coffee then it doesn't matter what the referent to you is because whatever it is he she or it will get some coffee. What's your point? If you agree that P(experience of getting a cup of coffee soon) = 1, then you have to agree that P(experience of opening the door and writing W or opening the door and writing M in a personal diary) = 1, and that P(experience of writing W and M in a personal diary) = 0. Which would make the point. In modal logic []p is reasonable for a probability one, evaluated in a world alpha in case: 1) all the worlds beta accessible from alpha satisfy p 2) the set of accessible worlds from alpha is non-empty, i.e. alpha is not a cul-de-sac world. That is the case with alpha = helsinki, and the accessibility relation is the set of computational (at the right level, etc.) continuations, here beta1 = M, and beta2 = W. (M abbreviates Moscow, W abbreviates Washington). P(coffee) = 1, because the experience of drinking coffee is done at both places. The experience that city is W or M is done at both places too (as p or q is true if one of them is true). So if you agree that P(coffee) = 1, you should agree with P(W or M) = 1. As you have also agree that the experience are exclusive, and that there are two independent consciousness, and that each experiencers (which remembers being the Helsinki guy) see one and only city, from its own first person experiencer pov, so P(W and M) = 0. None will write I have the personal experience of seeing two cities. If you are sure to get that coffee, you are sure to arrive in *one* city. Because *that* experience happens in all the accessible worlds. Then you can predict in advance that after pushing the button, you are in front of *one* door, and that behind that door there is *one* precise city, and that you have no clue which one it could be. Indeed that was predictable already in Helsinki. And again, that happens with probability one. Once you (both of you, the copies) open the door, both of view look at the (unique) city, and write the result in the diary: it is W, for one of them, and M, for the other. It confirms the old P(W or M) = 1, and P(W and M) = 0. later, I can explain that the Theaetetus definition of the knower Congratulations, you've taught me to really hate the ancient Greeks. What Jason was 'babbling' about, is that the thesis is mainly the UDA I'm just not hungry for more of your homemade alphabet soup. Smullyan's Forever Undecided is a good introduction to the main modal logic of self-reference, the modal logic G. I love that book and first read it decades ago. Anything by Smullyan is good if not great. Then, honestly, you should have no problem with any hypostases, as Smullyan book is a book on G, and they are all represented in G. Note that the Theatetus' idea is so natural that Smullyan use it in some place without noticing. There is a chapter on the Kripke semantics of G, and, well, the relation with computability and logic is treated too much concisely. It is quite extended in his diagonalization and self- reference book, or in other books. I don't think Smullyan is much aware of Church's thesis, (never cite it) and he lacks rigor when making some point in philosophy. So, you should read the AUDA part, which is the part two of my SANE04 paper without too much problems. That's the thesis in computer science. In the original thesis, UDA and MGA are UDP and MGP (Universal Dovetailer Paradox, and Movie Graph Paradox). I explained to the directors that it was an argument, but that is was more diplomatic to call it a paradox, and to use it only for the motivation for the intensional variant of G ([]p p, []p t, ...). Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: that's a pretty dull thought experiment. if everything in the universe will get a cup of coffee then it doesn't matter what the referent to you is because whatever it is he she or it will get some coffee. What's your point? If you agree that P(experience of getting a cup of coffee soon) = 1, If everything and everyone will get coffee then obviously I will get coffee too regardless of what I means. And I still don't see your point. then you have to agree that P(experience of opening the door and writing W or opening the door and writing M in a personal diary) = 1, Or? Is that a exclusive or? If it's a OR gate then P=1. If it's a XOR gate then P=0. and that P(experience of writing W and M in a personal diary) = 0. Nonsense. I can show you the diaries proving that the Helsinki Man did write I see Moscow AND did write I see Washington. you can predict in advance that after pushing the button, you are in front of *one* door, and that behind that door there is *one* precise city, and that you have no clue which one it could be. Maybe that's what you would predict only you know that, but I know for a fact that's not what I would predict. I would say I the Helsinki Man predict that I will see Moscow AND Washington ; and events would later prove that the prediction was correct. Not that predictions, good bad or mediocre, have anything to do with the nature of personal identity or consciousness. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
Bruno Marchal wrote On 07 Jul 2015, at 01:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 7/6/2015 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 1:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If there's only one consciousness which is aware of both Washington and Moscow then asking the body looking at the Washington Monument what the Kremlin looks like would elicit an accurate answer. There's no contradiction in information being transferred from Moscow to Washington any more than transferring it from a toe to a brain. Nobody thinks new physics would be needed to explain how a message moves from your toe to your brain, but new physics would be required to explain how the Washington Man could accurately say what's going on in Moscow without using electronics. So I don't think the Washington Man could do that. I didn't say they could, I said there was no *logical* contradiction in them doing so. In fact it's not even a nomological contradiction because humans could have evolved or manufactured RF communication devices in their brains such that, when duplicated, the two copies continued to shared information. But my point was that in Bruno's UD multiverse there will be universes in which this is the case. So to show that duplication necessarily entails two consciouses, he needs to show that our physics and our evolution are necessary, not contingent. Bruno appears to believe that the same physics must obtain in all possible universes, only initial conditions can differ. Please. You oversimpilfy. Not at all -- I simply report what you have said. Quote: Only the geographico-historical features can be brute facts. The whole point is that with comp, physical laws does exist, and are the same for all universal machine, because they are all under the same FPI on the same domain (UD*). Physics, unlike geography is justified. You see? I say that the physical laws have to be the same for all universal machine. This is neutral on the question of the existence of one, two, three or infinity (enumerable, not eneumarable, ...) of physical universes. The number of universe is irrelevant, and not what I said. Your claim, repeated here, is that the physical laws are the same for all existing universes. I think Bruno is simply wrong here. For the dovetailer in Platonia (AUDA), every computable universe is included, and these can have arbitrarily different physics. Cf. Tegmark's CUH. Exercise: refute the CUH. Hint: UDA. Exercise: prove yo youself that the dovetailer running in Platonia (arithmetic) completely implements Tegmark's CUH. Proof: Trivially true, since the UD runs all possible programs, it must run the programs instatiating every computable universe. The physical is what make your experience, not just existing, but stable and normal in some gaussian sense. With comp, we can't exclude other universe so different that we have non counterparts in it. See, you say it again. All possible universes are instantiated, even those that do not support intelligent (conscious) life. The fact is that we are supported by an infinity of computations, and the laws of physics are invariant in the way to manage those infinities. This makes no sense. We need only the computations that constitute each individual universe. Repetitions are merely the same universe again -- identity of indiscernibles. My only fear, when young, was that this would lead to classical logic, from which it would have followed that physics does not exist and is only a form of geography. That would have make comp somehow trivial about physics. But that is not the case, there is a complex physical core shared by all universal beings. Now, it is a complex structure, and depending of its derivation from the intensional nuances, it might have different phase allowing different kind of physical reality. The picture is just very rich, and unlike physicists, we get the qualia theory extending the quanta. All this from an hypothesis that almost all scientists believe in (even when not really knowing the mathematical theory behind). By testing the quanta part, we can refute or confirm indirectly the qualia part. This reduces to an argument that consciousness is essential for physical existence. That is manifest nonsense. The universe we inhabit existed for billions of years before any intelligent or conscious life evolved. You make consciousness into some ineffable magic that brings physical universes into being. What utter nonsense. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options,
