subject:"Re\: Bruno's blasphemy."



On 22 Jul 2011, at 22:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/22/2011 9:40 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Before that question, you need the question: does maths exist
independently.


If you want to debate this question I am happy to.  It is the  
assumption made by most mathematicians and scientists.


Jason


Actually I was friends with two professors of mathematics (one now  
deceased).  One helds that numbers exist - but in some way different  
from tables and chairs.


OK. Like me and the LUMs.




The other denies that they exist.


During the math course or the week-end? I don't believe that he does  
not believe in the existence of numbers. He meant something else, I  
think. People sometimes put to much metaphysics in the term  
"existence". I think they are just doing non genuine Sunday  
philosophy. I try to avoid the term "existence" and use instead the  
notion of "being true independently of me, or of the hulans, etc.".


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On 22 Jul 2011, at 21:08, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/22/2011 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic  
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.


Why?
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for  
justifying an ontology.


That seems to be a non-sequitur.  How can any kind of definition  
justify an ontology?


Because a definition or an axiomatization refer to an intended  
model, of a theory which handle existential quantifier. The theory  
of group requires the existence of a neutral elements, for example.  
The theory of number requires zero, etc.


Satisfying an existentially quantified proposition implies existence  
within that model.  It doesn't justify the model or its ontology.



That is true in general, but not, by definition, for a theory which  
aspires as being a TOE.
Obviously your argument here is correct for any theory. Also for a  
theory of matter. If it assumes matter, matter will exist in its model.










Definitions are about the meaning of words.  If I point to a table  
and say "Table." I'm defining "table", not justifying an ontology.


OK. And then what? You are just pointing on some pattern.





That's what the dream argument shows. Being axiomatic does not  
beg the question. You can be materialist and develop an axiomatic  
of primitive matter. The whole point of an axiomatic approach  
consists in being as neutral as possible on ontological commitment.



But what you demanded was a *physical* axiomatic definition.   
Which seems to be a demand that the definition be physical, yet  
not ostensive.  I think that's contradictory.


I did not asked for a physical axiomatic definition, but for an  
axiomatic definition of physical (and this without using something  
equivalent to the numbers, to stay on topic).


An axiomatic definition isn't possible except within an axiomatic  
system.


?



The whole argument is over the question of whether the physical  
world is an axiomatic system.


It is not, provably so in comp. Nor is consciousness. Both matter and  
consciousness can be entirely axiomatized (nor can be arithmetic!).





I think it very doubtful.


Good.



 The model of physics takes "x exists" to mean we can interact with  
x through our senses (including indirectly through instruments which  
exist), but this is not an axiom.


You are right. But I want a starting axiomatic for the TOE, just to  
avoid philosophy.

















Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces  
computation to be there.


The computations are concrete relations.


If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.


Either by concrete you mean "physical", and that beg the question.


It was your word.


OK. I shoud avoid that; but I am used to consider the arithmetical  
relations as the most concrete things I can imagine. Concrete physical  
object are abstract token, but we are so programmed that we feel them  
as concrete.







If not, I can point on many computations is arithmetic.


No, you can only point to physically realized representations.


You beg the question. I can point on computation in arithmetic. It is  
a bit tedious, because I need the arithmetization of Gödel. But a  
physician needs a primitive universe, and that is treachery and hides  
the mind-body problem, and furthermore misses the quale.





This needs Gödel's ariothmetization, and so is a bit tedious, but  
it is non-controversial that such things exist. Indeed RA and PA  
proves their existence.






They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be  
described by some axiomatic.


And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So  
the "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description  
of relations. The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of  
tables and chairs.


Indeed.





This means only that we *can* agree on simple (but very fertile)  
basic number relations. For primitive matter, that does not  
exist, and that is why people recourse to ostensive "definition".  
They knock the table, and say "you will not tell me that this  
table does not exist". The problem, for them, is that I can dream  
of people knocking tables. So for the basic fundamental ontology,  
you just cannot use the ostensive move (or you have to abandon  
the dream argument, classical theory of knowledge, or comp). But  
this moves seems an ad hoc non-comp move, if not a rather naive  
attitude.


What "dream argument"?  That all we think of as real could be a  
dream?  I think that is as worthless as solipism.


This is the recurring confusion between subjective idealism and  
objective idealism. Objective idealism is not a choice, but a  
consequence of the comp assumption and the weak Occam razor.


And the assumption that the UD exists (?)


It is not an assumption but a theorem in arithmeti

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On 22 Jul 2011, at 14:17, 1Z wrote:

On Jul 22, 10:08 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.

Why?
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for justifying
an ontology.

That seems to be a non-sequitur. How can any kind of definition
justify an ontology?

Because a definition or an axiomatization refer to an intended model,
of a theory which handle existential quantifier. The theory of group
requires the existence of a neutral elements, for example. The theory
of number requires zero, etc.

But the "ontology" of a model need not be real, or be intended to be.
The intended model could be a fictional world. for instance.

The question is: do you believe really that Fermat theorem is fiction?

Definitions are about the meaning of words. If I point to a table
and say "Table." I'm defining "table", not justifying an ontology.

OK. And then what? You are just pointing on some pattern.

That's what the dream argument shows. Being axiomatic does not beg
the question. You can be materialist and develop an axiomatic of
primitive matter. The whole point of an axiomatic approach consists
in being as neutral as possible on ontological commitment.

But what you demanded was a *physical* axiomatic definition. Which
seems to be a demand that the definition be physical, yet not
ostensive. I think that's contradictory.

I did not asked for a physical axiomatic definition, but for an
axiomatic definition of physical (and this without using something
equivalent to the numbers, to stay on topic).

Numbers aren't intended to be real (or unreal) in physics
That protons are really made of three quarks is asserted, but that
is asserting the real exsistence of quarks, not of "3".

What do you mean by "real existence"? If you mean "primitive
existence" then you just contradict comp.

Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces
computation to be there.

The computations are concrete relations.

If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.

Either by concrete you mean "physical", and that beg the question.
If not, I can point on many computations is arithmetic

What would make them concrete, if not being physical?

If physical means concrete, then comp is false, or you have to point
on a flaw in the UD Argument.

. This needs
Gödel's ariothmetization, and so is a bit tedious, but it is non-
controversial that such things exist. Indeed RA and PA proves their
existence.

They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
described by some axiomatic.

And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations. So
the "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of
relations. The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of
tables and chairs.

Indeed.

This means only that we *can* agree on simple (but very fertile)
basic number relations. For primitive matter, that does not exist,
and that is why people recourse to ostensive "definition". They
knock the table, and say "you will not tell me that this table does
not exist". The problem, for them, is that I can dream of people
knocking tables. So for the basic fundamental ontology, you just
cannot use the ostensive move (or you have to abandon the dream
argument, classical theory of knowledge, or comp). But this moves
seems an ad hoc non-comp move, if not a rather naive attitude.

What "dream argument"? That all we think of as real could be a
dream? I think that is as worthless as solipism.

This is the recurring confusion between subjective idealism and
objective idealism. Objective idealism is not a choice, but a
consequence of the comp assumption and the weak Occam razor.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-22 Thread meekerdb


On 7/22/2011 9:40 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Before that question, you need the question: does maths exist
independently.


If you want to debate this question I am happy to.  It is the 
assumption made by most mathematicians and scientists.


Jason


Actually I was friends with two professors of mathematics (one now 
deceased).  One helds that numbers exist - but in some way different 
from tables and chairs.  The other denies that they exist.


Brent

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-22 Thread meekerdb


On 7/22/2011 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic 
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.


Why?
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for justifying 
an ontology.


That seems to be a non-sequitur.  How can any kind of definition 
justify an ontology?


Because a definition or an axiomatization refer to an intended model, 
of a theory which handle existential quantifier. The theory of group 
requires the existence of a neutral elements, for example. The theory 
of number requires zero, etc.


Satisfying an existentially quantified proposition implies existence 
within that model.  It doesn't justify the model or its ontology.






 Definitions are about the meaning of words.  If I point to a table 
and say "Table." I'm defining "table", not justifying an ontology.


OK. And then what? You are just pointing on some pattern.





That's what the dream argument shows. Being axiomatic does not beg 
the question. You can be materialist and develop an axiomatic of 
primitive matter. The whole point of an axiomatic approach consists 
in being as neutral as possible on ontological commitment.



But what you demanded was a *physical* axiomatic definition.  Which 
seems to be a demand that the definition be physical, yet not 
ostensive.  I think that's contradictory.


I did not asked for a physical axiomatic definition, but for an 
axiomatic definition of physical (and this without using something 
equivalent to the numbers, to stay on topic).


An axiomatic definition isn't possible except within an axiomatic 
system.  The whole argument is over the question of whether the physical 
world is an axiomatic system.  I think it very doubtful.  The model of 
physics takes "x exists" to mean we can interact with x through our 
senses (including indirectly through instruments which exist), but this 
is not an axiom.













Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces 
computation to be there.


The computations are concrete relations.


If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.


Either by concrete you mean "physical", and that beg the question.


It was your word.

If not, I can point on many computations is arithmetic. 


No, you can only point to physically realized representations.

This needs Gödel's ariothmetization, and so is a bit tedious, but it 
is non-controversial that such things exist. Indeed RA and PA proves 
their existence.






They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be 
described by some axiomatic.


And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So the 
"fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of 
relations. The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of 
tables and chairs.


Indeed.





This means only that we *can* agree on simple (but very fertile) 
basic number relations. For primitive matter, that does not exist, 
and that is why people recourse to ostensive "definition". They 
knock the table, and say "you will not tell me that this table does 
not exist". The problem, for them, is that I can dream of people 
knocking tables. So for the basic fundamental ontology, you just 
cannot use the ostensive move (or you have to abandon the dream 
argument, classical theory of knowledge, or comp). But this moves 
seems an ad hoc non-comp move, if not a rather naive attitude.


What "dream argument"?  That all we think of as real could be a 
dream?  I think that is as worthless as solipism.


This is the recurring confusion between subjective idealism and 
objective idealism. Objective idealism is not a choice, but a 
consequence of the comp assumption and the weak Occam razor.


And the assumption that the UD exists (?)

Brent



Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 11:31 AM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Jul 22, 3:59 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z  wrote:
> >
> > > > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well
> defined
> > > > relations between the bits.
> >
> > > And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems
> > > to me a mismatch between timelessness and computation.
> >
> > Not at all.  Consider the analogy with a universe:  It either is
> infinitely
> > long in the time dimension or finite.  This doesn't preclude block time.
>
> What are computations *for*, if their results timeless exist
> somewhere?
>
>
A result out of context is meaningless information, what is needed is a
relation.


>
> >
> >
> > > > >  some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even
> > > evolve
> > > > > into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce
> > > > > themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve
> consciousness,
> > > as
> > > > > they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future
> > > observations
> > > > > of bit patterns within the number.  Let's call this function
> Universe.
> > > > > There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve
> > > their
> > > > > survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
> > > > > Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such
> sequences
> > > of
> > > > > numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the
> Fibonacci
> > > > > sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of
> > > recursive
> > > > > relations).
> >
> > > > > I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still
> > > accept
> > > > > that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept
> that
> > > John
> > > > > Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.
> >
> > > > Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the
> universe,
> >
> > > Meaning they end with the universe? Why assume that? What difference
> > > does it make.
> >
> > The universe doesn't end (time as something we move through) only appears
> to
> > observers.  This is true with both the block universe view, and the "I
> exist
> > in some number relation" view.  It is easy to see how this view arises if
> > you consider the example I gave earlier with a life form developing
> through
> > the successive states of a recursive function.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > > if
> > > > not the cause of the universe.
> >
> > > Causation requires events. Maths is timeless.
> >
> > > > In that sense, they are just as concrete if
> > > > not more concrete than any physical object.  Your view is like that
> of a
> > > > being who has spent its whole life in a simulated virtual
> environment: It
> > > > believes the virtual reality and items in it are "more real" than the
> > > actual
> > > > computer which implements the virtual environment.  The beings only
> > > > justification for this belief is that he can't access that computer
> using
> > > > his senses, nor point is he able to point to it.
> >
> > > > Jason
> >
> > > I think we all have  a pretty strong justification for the Real
> > > Reality
> > > theory in the shape of Occam's razor.
> >
> > As I already said, both theories consequences "math exists primarily" or
> > "physics exists primarily" are equally verified by observation.
>
> Nope. The things we see seem to be things, not numbers.
>

That they seem to be things is explained by the theory.  Again, consider the
example of a life form in a progression of numbers.  They are a pattern
which may receive information about other patterns, which exist within that
number.


>
> >They are
> > equally scientific and make the same number of assumptions.  The question
> > then becomes: "Is it redundant to assume a primary existence in the
> physical
> > universe, if one accepts math exists independently of the physical
> world?"
> >
> > Jason
>
> Before that question, you need the question: does maths exist
> independently.
>
>
If you want to debate this question I am happy to.  It is the assumption
made by most mathematicians and scientists.

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 22, 4:04 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:08 AM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> > > > **
> > > > On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb 
> > wrote:
>
> > > >>  On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > > >> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb 
> > wrote:
>
> > > >>>  On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > > >>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb 
> > wrote:
>
> > >  On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > > > Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces
> > computation
> > > >> to be there.
>
> > > > The computations are concrete relations.
>
> > >   If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
>
> > > >>> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them,
> > > >>> everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence
> > of the
> > > >>> computation implementing your mind.
>
> > > >>> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
> > > >>> concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other
> > branches of
> > > >>> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an
> > AI or
> > > >>> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
> > > >>> rendering its environment?
>
> > >  They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
> > > > described by some axiomatic.
>
> > >   And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So
> > the
> > >  "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of
> > relations.
>
> > > >>> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of
> > a
> > > >>> chair?
>
> > >  The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and
> > chairs.
>
> > > >>> Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the
> > existence
> > > >>> of number relations explains the existence of matter,
>
> > > >>>  That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than the
> > > >>> existence of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or
> > > >>> equivalent.
>
> > > >> The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89,
> > 144...
> > > >> It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) +
> > Fib(n-2).
> > > >> This is a simple recursive definition.  You might even say the number
> > line
> > > >> has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1.
> > > >> Different recursive definitions result in different sequences of
> > numbers
> > > >> (different ways of progressing through the integers).  In some of
> > these
> > > >> definitions, bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well
> > > >> defined ways,
>
> > > >>  There's the rub.  Nothing changes in Platonia.  Nothing "moves
> > around" or
> > > >> "computes".  Bit patterns are physical things, like 101101.  Numbers
> > are
> > > >> not.
>
> > > > Nothing changes in physics either.  Block time is the only consistent
> > view
> > > > given relativity.
>
> > > > Different t ==> different g_ab.
>
> > > Different N ==> different Fib(N)
>
> > > > That's change in physics.  Anyway, GR must be incomplete since it's not
> > > > compatible with QM.
>
> > > All the relevant parts of relativity which imply block time have been
> > > confirmed.  The above is like arguing against gravity because Newton's
> > > theory wasn't compatible with the observations of Mercury's orbit.
>
> > > > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well
> > defined
> > > > relations between the bits.
>
> > > >>  some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even
> > evolve
> > > >> into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce
> > > >> themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness,
> > as
> > > >> they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future
> > observations
> > > >> of bit patterns within the number.  Let's call this function Universe.
> > > >> There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve
> > their
> > > >> survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
> > > >> Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such sequences
> > of
> > > >> numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci
> > > >> sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of
> > recursive
> > > >> relations).
>
> > > >>  I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still
> > accept
> > > >> that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that
> > John
> > > >> Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.
>
> > > > Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe,
> > if
> > > > not the cause of the universe.
>
> > > > That assumes numbers exist.
>
> > > It i

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 22, 3:59 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
> > > relations between the bits.
>
> > And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems
> > to me a mismatch between timelessness and computation.
>
> Not at all.  Consider the analogy with a universe:  It either is infinitely
> long in the time dimension or finite.  This doesn't preclude block time.

What are computations *for*, if their results timeless exist
somewhere?


>
>
> > > >  some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even
> > evolve
> > > > into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce
> > > > themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness,
> > as
> > > > they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future
> > observations
> > > > of bit patterns within the number.  Let's call this function Universe.
> > > > There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve
> > their
> > > > survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
> > > > Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such sequences
> > of
> > > > numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci
> > > > sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of
> > recursive
> > > > relations).
>
> > > > I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still
> > accept
> > > > that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that
> > John
> > > > Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.
>
> > > Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe,
>
> > Meaning they end with the universe? Why assume that? What difference
> > does it make.
>
> The universe doesn't end (time as something we move through) only appears to
> observers.  This is true with both the block universe view, and the "I exist
> in some number relation" view.  It is easy to see how this view arises if
> you consider the example I gave earlier with a life form developing through
> the successive states of a recursive function.
>
>
>
>
>
> > > if
> > > not the cause of the universe.
>
> > Causation requires events. Maths is timeless.
>
> > > In that sense, they are just as concrete if
> > > not more concrete than any physical object.  Your view is like that of a
> > > being who has spent its whole life in a simulated virtual environment: It
> > > believes the virtual reality and items in it are "more real" than the
> > actual
> > > computer which implements the virtual environment.  The beings only
> > > justification for this belief is that he can't access that computer using
> > > his senses, nor point is he able to point to it.
>
> > > Jason
>
> > I think we all have  a pretty strong justification for the Real
> > Reality
> > theory in the shape of Occam's razor.
>
> As I already said, both theories consequences "math exists primarily" or
> "physics exists primarily" are equally verified by observation.  

Nope. The things we see seem to be things, not numbers.

>They are
> equally scientific and make the same number of assumptions.  The question
> then becomes: "Is it redundant to assume a primary existence in the physical
> universe, if one accepts math exists independently of the physical world?"
>
> Jason

Before that question, you need the question: does maths exist
independently.

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:08 AM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> > > **
> > > On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> >
> > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb 
> wrote:
> >
> > >>  On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> >
> > >> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb 
> wrote:
> >
> > >>>  On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> >
> > >>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb 
> wrote:
> >
> >  On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > > Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces
> computation
> > >> to be there.
> >
> > > The computations are concrete relations.
> >
> >   If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
> >
> > >>> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them,
> > >>> everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence
> of the
> > >>> computation implementing your mind.
> >
> > >>> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
> > >>> concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other
> branches of
> > >>> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an
> AI or
> > >>> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
> > >>> rendering its environment?
> >
> >  They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
> > > described by some axiomatic.
> >
> >   And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So
> the
> >  "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of
> relations.
> >
> > >>> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of
> a
> > >>> chair?
> >
> >  The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and
> chairs.
> >
> > >>> Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the
> existence
> > >>> of number relations explains the existence of matter,
> >
> > >>>  That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than the
> > >>> existence of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or
> > >>> equivalent.
> >
> > >> The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89,
> 144...
> > >> It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) +
> Fib(n-2).
> > >> This is a simple recursive definition.  You might even say the number
> line
> > >> has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1.
> > >> Different recursive definitions result in different sequences of
> numbers
> > >> (different ways of progressing through the integers).  In some of
> these
> > >> definitions, bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well
> > >> defined ways,
> >
> > >>  There's the rub.  Nothing changes in Platonia.  Nothing "moves
> around" or
> > >> "computes".  Bit patterns are physical things, like 101101.  Numbers
> are
> > >> not.
> >
> > > Nothing changes in physics either.  Block time is the only consistent
> view
> > > given relativity.
> >
> > > Different t ==> different g_ab.
> >
> > Different N ==> different Fib(N)
> >
> > > That's change in physics.  Anyway, GR must be incomplete since it's not
> > > compatible with QM.
> >
> > All the relevant parts of relativity which imply block time have been
> > confirmed.  The above is like arguing against gravity because Newton's
> > theory wasn't compatible with the observations of Mercury's orbit.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well
> defined
> > > relations between the bits.
> >
> > >>  some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even
> evolve
> > >> into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce
> > >> themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness,
> as
> > >> they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future
> observations
> > >> of bit patterns within the number.  Let's call this function Universe.
> > >> There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve
> their
> > >> survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
> > >> Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such sequences
> of
> > >> numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci
> > >> sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of
> recursive
> > >> relations).
> >
> > >>  I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still
> accept
> > >> that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that
> John
> > >> Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.
> >
> > > Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe,
> if
> > > not the cause of the universe.
> >
> > > That assumes numbers exist.
> >
> > It is no worse than assuming the physical universe exists.  Both theories
> > are consistent with observation.
> >
> >
> >
> > >In that sense, they are just as concrete if n

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
> > relations between the bits.
>
> And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems
> to me a mismatch between timelessness and computation.
>

Not at all.  Consider the analogy with a universe:  It either is infinitely
long in the time dimension or finite.  This doesn't preclude block time.


>
> > >  some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even
> evolve
> > > into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce
> > > themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness,
> as
> > > they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future
> observations
> > > of bit patterns within the number.  Let's call this function Universe.
> > > There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve
> their
> > > survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
> > > Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such sequences
> of
> > > numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci
> > > sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of
> recursive
> > > relations).
> >
> > > I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still
> accept
> > > that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that
> John
> > > Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.
> >
> > Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe,
>
>
> Meaning they end with the universe? Why assume that? What difference
> does it make.
>

The universe doesn't end (time as something we move through) only appears to
observers.  This is true with both the block universe view, and the "I exist
in some number relation" view.  It is easy to see how this view arises if
you consider the example I gave earlier with a life form developing through
the successive states of a recursive function.


>
> > if
> > not the cause of the universe.
>
> Causation requires events. Maths is timeless.
>
> > In that sense, they are just as concrete if
> > not more concrete than any physical object.  Your view is like that of a
> > being who has spent its whole life in a simulated virtual environment: It
> > believes the virtual reality and items in it are "more real" than the
> actual
> > computer which implements the virtual environment.  The beings only
> > justification for this belief is that he can't access that computer using
> > his senses, nor point is he able to point to it.
> >
> > Jason
>
> I think we all have  a pretty strong justification for the Real
> Reality
> theory in the shape of Occam's razor.
>
>
As I already said, both theories consequences "math exists primarily" or
"physics exists primarily" are equally verified by observation.  They are
equally scientific and make the same number of assumptions.  The question
then becomes: "Is it redundant to assume a primary existence in the physical
universe, if one accepts math exists independently of the physical world?"

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 6:55 AM, 1Z  wrote:

>
> >
> > If they are not contingent then you accept they exist even without the
> > existence of the physical universe?
>
> No. They are epistemically necessary. That says nothing about
> their existence. The argument is that since they can make no
> difference,
> they should be assumed to have no  mind independent existence.
>
>
>
Do the factors of X not have a mind-independent existence?

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 22, 10:08 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
>
> > On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic  
> >>> definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
>
> >> Why?
> >> The point is that ostensive definition does not work for justifying  
> >> an ontology.
>
> > That seems to be a non-sequitur.  How can any kind of definition  
> > justify an ontology?
>
> Because a definition or an axiomatization refer to an intended model,  
> of a theory which handle existential quantifier. The theory of group  
> requires the existence of a neutral elements, for example. The theory  
> of number requires zero, etc.


But the "ontology" of a model need not be real, or be intended to be.
The intended model could be a fictional world. for instance.

> >  Definitions are about the meaning of words.  If I point to a table  
> > and say "Table." I'm defining "table", not justifying an ontology.
>
> OK. And then what? You are just pointing on some pattern.
>
>
>
> >> That's what the dream argument shows. Being axiomatic does not beg  
> >> the question. You can be materialist and develop an axiomatic of  
> >> primitive matter. The whole point of an axiomatic approach consists  
> >> in being as neutral as possible on ontological commitment.
>
> > But what you demanded was a *physical* axiomatic definition.  Which  
> > seems to be a demand that the definition be physical, yet not  
> > ostensive.  I think that's contradictory.
>
> I did not asked for a physical axiomatic definition, but for an  
> axiomatic definition of physical (and this without using something  
> equivalent to the numbers, to stay on topic).

Numbers aren't intended to be real (or unreal) in physics
That protons are really made of three quarks is asserted, but that
is asserting the real exsistence of quarks, not of "3".

> >>> Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces  
> >>> computation to be there.
>
> >> The computations are concrete relations.
>
> > If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
>
> Either by concrete you mean "physical", and that beg the question.
> If not, I can point on many computations is arithmetic

What would make them concrete, if not being physical?

>. This needs  
> Gödel's ariothmetization, and so is a bit tedious, but it is non-
> controversial that such things exist. Indeed RA and PA proves their  
> existence.
>
>
>
> >> They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be  
> >> described by some axiomatic.
>
> > And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So  
> > the "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of  
> > relations. The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of  
> > tables and chairs.
>
> Indeed.
>
>
>
> >> This means only that we *can* agree on simple (but very fertile)  
> >> basic number relations. For primitive matter, that does not exist,  
> >> and that is why people recourse to ostensive "definition". They  
> >> knock the table, and say "you will not tell me that this table does  
> >> not exist". The problem, for them, is that I can dream of people  
> >> knocking tables. So for the basic fundamental ontology, you just  
> >> cannot use the ostensive move (or you have to abandon the dream  
> >> argument, classical theory of knowledge, or comp). But this moves  
> >> seems an ad hoc non-comp move, if not a rather naive attitude.
>
> > What "dream argument"?  That all we think of as real could be a  
> > dream?  I think that is as worthless as solipism.
>
> This is the recurring confusion between subjective idealism and  
> objective idealism. Objective idealism is not a choice, but a  
> consequence of the comp assumption and the weak Occam razor.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> > **
> > On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> >>  On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> >> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> >>>  On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> >>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>  On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation
> >> to be there.
>
> > The computations are concrete relations.
>
>   If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
>
> >>> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them,
> >>> everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of 
> >>> the
> >>> computation implementing your mind.
>
> >>> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
> >>> concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other branches 
> >>> of
> >>> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an AI or
> >>> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
> >>> rendering its environment?
>
>  They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
> > described by some axiomatic.
>
>   And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So the
>  "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of 
>  relations.
>
> >>> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a
> >>> chair?
>
>  The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs.
>
> >>> Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence
> >>> of number relations explains the existence of matter,
>
> >>>  That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than the
> >>> existence of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or
> >>> equivalent.
>
> >> The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144...
> >> It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) + Fib(n-2).
> >> This is a simple recursive definition.  You might even say the number line
> >> has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1.
> >> Different recursive definitions result in different sequences of numbers
> >> (different ways of progressing through the integers).  In some of these
> >> definitions, bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well
> >> defined ways,
>
> >>  There's the rub.  Nothing changes in Platonia.  Nothing "moves around" or
> >> "computes".  Bit patterns are physical things, like 101101.  Numbers are
> >> not.
>
> > Nothing changes in physics either.  Block time is the only consistent view
> > given relativity.
>
> > Different t ==> different g_ab.
>
> Different N ==> different Fib(N)
>
> > That's change in physics.  Anyway, GR must be incomplete since it's not
> > compatible with QM.
>
> All the relevant parts of relativity which imply block time have been
> confirmed.  The above is like arguing against gravity because Newton's
> theory wasn't compatible with the observations of Mercury's orbit.
>
>
>
>
>
> > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
> > relations between the bits.
>
> >>  some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even evolve
> >> into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce
> >> themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness, as
> >> they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future observations
> >> of bit patterns within the number.  Let's call this function Universe.
> >> There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve their
> >> survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
> >> Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such sequences of
> >> numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci
> >> sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of recursive
> >> relations).
>
> >>  I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still accept
> >> that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that John
> >> Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.
>
> > Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe, if
> > not the cause of the universe.
>
> > That assumes numbers exist.
>
> It is no worse than assuming the physical universe exists.  Both theories
> are consistent with observation.
>
>
>
> >    In that sense, they are just as concrete if not more concrete than any
> > physical object.  Your view is like that of a being who has spent its whole
> > life in a simulated virtual environment: It believes the virtual reality and
> > items in it are "more real" than the actual computer which implements the
> > virtual environment.  The beings only just

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 22, 4:08 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> > **
> > On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> >>  On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> >> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> >>> On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>  Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation
> > to be there.
>
>  The computations are concrete relations.
>
> >>>  If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
>
> >> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them,
> >> everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of 
> >> the
> >> computation implementing your mind.
>
> >> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
> >> concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other branches 
> >> of
> >> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an AI or
> >> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
> >> rendering its environment?
>
> >>> They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
>  described by some axiomatic.
>
> >>>  And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So the
> >>> "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of 
> >>> relations.
>
> >> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a
> >> chair?
>
> >>> The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs.
>
> >> Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence
> >> of number relations explains the existence of matter,
>
> >>  That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than the existence
> >> of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or equivalent.
>
> > The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144...
> > It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) + Fib(n-2).
> > This is a simple recursive definition.  You might even say the number line
> > has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1.
> > Different recursive definitions result in different sequences of numbers
> > (different ways of progressing through the integers).  In some of these
> > definitions, bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well
> > defined ways,
>
> > There's the rub.  Nothing changes in Platonia.  Nothing "moves around" or
> > "computes".  Bit patterns are physical things, like 101101.  Numbers are
> > not.
>
> Nothing changes in physics either.  Block time is the only consistent view
> given relativity.
>
> Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
> relations between the bits.

And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems
to me a mismatch between timelessness and computation.

> >  some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even evolve
> > into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce
> > themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness, as
> > they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future observations
> > of bit patterns within the number.  Let's call this function Universe.
> > There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve their
> > survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
> > Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such sequences of
> > numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci
> > sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of recursive
> > relations).
>
> > I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still accept
> > that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that John
> > Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.
>
> Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe,


Meaning they end with the universe? Why assume that? What difference
does it make.

> if
> not the cause of the universe.

Causation requires events. Maths is timeless.

> In that sense, they are just as concrete if
> not more concrete than any physical object.  Your view is like that of a
> being who has spent its whole life in a simulated virtual environment: It
> believes the virtual reality and items in it are "more real" than the actual
> computer which implements the virtual environment.  The beings only
> justification for this belief is that he can't access that computer using
> his senses, nor point is he able to point to it.
>
> Jason

I think we all have  a pretty strong justification for the Real
Reality
theory in the shape of Occam's razor.

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 22, 1:53 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 7:43 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > On Jul 21, 11:55 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > > > > Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the
> > existence
> > > > of
> > > > > number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence
> > of
> > > > > matter does not explain the existence of number relations.
>
> > > > Yes it does. Any number relation  that has ever been grasped by
> > > > anybody exists in their mind, and therefore in their brain. And as
> > > > for the ungrasped ones...so what? It can make no difference
> > > > if they are there or not.
>
> > > Perhaps if those "ungrasped ones" did not exist then we might not exist.
> >  It
> > > is premature to say their existence does not make a difference to us.
>
> > The existence of matter can explain the existence of numbers.
> > The reverse might also be the case, but that is not a disproof.
>
> > > I think may also be incorrect to say we need to grasp numbers or their
> > > relations for them to matter.  Consider this example: I generate a large
> > > random number X, with no obvious factors (I think it is prime), but when
> > I
> > > compute (y^(X - 1)) and divide by X (where y is not a multiple of X), I
> > find
> > > the remainder is not 1.  This means X is not prime: it has factors other
> > > than 1 and X, but I haven't grasped what those factors are.  Nor is there
> > > any efficient method for finding out what they are.
>
> > > Now the existence of these ungrasped numbers does make a difference.  If
> > I
> > > attempted to build an RSA key using X and another legitimately prime
> > number
> > > (instead of two prime numbers), then the encryption won't work properly.
> >  I
> > > won't be able to determine a private key because I don't know all the
> > > factors.
>
> > The contingent fact that is your failure to grasp a mathematical
> > truth is makes a difference.
>
> Just above you said mathematical objects only exist if they exist physically
> in some brain.  This is a case where the factors are not only unknown by me,
> but likely unknown by anyone in the observable universe.
>
> > Mathematical truths are not contingent,
> > so
> > what difference can they make?
>
> If they are not contingent then you accept they exist even without the
> existence of the physical universe?

No. They are epistemically necessary. That says nothing about
their existence. The argument is that since they can make no
difference,
they should be assumed to have no  mind independent existence.

> If so, then see my post in the other
> thread where I explain how mathematical truth can explain the existence of
> life and consciousness.
>
> Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On 21 Jul 2011, at 20:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces  
computation to be there.


The computations are concrete relations.

If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.


If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them,  
everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the  
existence of the computation implementing your mind.


Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has  
a concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other  
branches of the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?   
How would an AI or human in a virtual environment point to the  
concrete computer that is rendering its environment?



They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be  
described by some axiomatic.


And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So  
the "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description  
of relations.


Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea  
of a chair?


The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and  
chairs.


Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the  
existence of number relations explains the existence of matter,


That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than the  
existence of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or  
equivalent.


Not at all. The UD is a collection of number relation, and its  
existence is a theorem in elementary arithmetic.






It requires the existence of all computation.


That is Sigma_1 truth. That is contained in a tiny fragment of  
provable truth in elementary arithmetic.





I see no reason to suppose these exist, at least not in any  
conventional meaning of 'exist'.



It exists in the sense of "even numbers exist".




It certainly doesn't follow from my saying "Yes" to the doctor that  
I believe they exist.



It does follow.




It also has the problem that it explains too much - the white rabbit  
problem.


But that is *the* interesting things. Matter become a mathematical  
problem. You can refute comp by showing that there is too much white  
rabbits. But the logic of self-reference shows that it is not trivial.  
The logic S4Grz1, X1* and Z1*  explains already why the white rabbits  
might be very rare, perhaps even more rare than with QM.






but the existence of matter does not explain the existence of  
number relations.


It may not explain them, but it exemplifies them.  And in fact  
that's how we learn what numbers are and how to count - long before  
we learn Peano's axioms and Cantor's diagonalization.


That is normal. We are embedded in the reality of numbers, and cannot  
see the numbers before seeing matter. This is explain in the theory.






It is therefore a simpler theory to suppose the existence of number  
relations is fundamental and the appearance of matter is a  
consequence, than to suppose both exist independently of each other.


Simpler, yes.  But then, "God did it" and "Everything exists." are  
simple too.  An explanation with no predictive power isn't much of  
an explanation.


It predicts physics and consciousness. Quantitively and qualitatively.  
OK, it has not YET find a new particle, and that might take time. But  
the theory explains much more than physics has ever explain, and this  
with much fewer assumptions.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On 21 Jul 2011, at 22:54, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:35 PM, 1Z wrote:

On Jul 11, 4:51 pm, Jason Resch wrote:

> > automatic consequences which
> > arise unbidden from "from relations that are defined by
> > computations".
>
> Yes, as you say below, it is a result of processing

Although no one knows how

It is easy to imagine a simple process which is aware of a single
bit of information. Let's say it is some program which is connected
to a photo sensor, thus it can tell if the room is dark or light,
and when the process is queried for this status it can report
whether the room is light or dark. Though it concerns only a single
bit, is this not an example of awareness? Perhaps human
consciousness is fundamentally no different, it is just awareness of
a vastly greater amount of information (more bits).

We don't need a lot of information, but just specific (self-
referential relations). Then the machine first person indeterminacies
on the whole arithmetical domain introduce a lot of information,
indeed, it includes some infinities.

Bruno

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic  
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.


Why?
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for justifying  
an ontology.


That seems to be a non-sequitur.  How can any kind of definition  
justify an ontology?


Because a definition or an axiomatization refer to an intended model,  
of a theory which handle existential quantifier. The theory of group  
requires the existence of a neutral elements, for example. The theory  
of number requires zero, etc.




 Definitions are about the meaning of words.  If I point to a table  
and say "Table." I'm defining "table", not justifying an ontology.


OK. And then what? You are just pointing on some pattern.





That's what the dream argument shows. Being axiomatic does not beg  
the question. You can be materialist and develop an axiomatic of  
primitive matter. The whole point of an axiomatic approach consists  
in being as neutral as possible on ontological commitment.



But what you demanded was a *physical* axiomatic definition.  Which  
seems to be a demand that the definition be physical, yet not  
ostensive.  I think that's contradictory.


I did not asked for a physical axiomatic definition, but for an  
axiomatic definition of physical (and this without using something  
equivalent to the numbers, to stay on topic).











Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces  
computation to be there.


The computations are concrete relations.


If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.


Either by concrete you mean "physical", and that beg the question.
If not, I can point on many computations is arithmetic. This needs  
Gödel's ariothmetization, and so is a bit tedious, but it is non- 
controversial that such things exist. Indeed RA and PA proves their  
existence.






They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be  
described by some axiomatic.


And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So  
the "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of  
relations. The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of  
tables and chairs.


Indeed.





This means only that we *can* agree on simple (but very fertile)  
basic number relations. For primitive matter, that does not exist,  
and that is why people recourse to ostensive "definition". They  
knock the table, and say "you will not tell me that this table does  
not exist". The problem, for them, is that I can dream of people  
knocking tables. So for the basic fundamental ontology, you just  
cannot use the ostensive move (or you have to abandon the dream  
argument, classical theory of knowledge, or comp). But this moves  
seems an ad hoc non-comp move, if not a rather naive attitude.


What "dream argument"?  That all we think of as real could be a  
dream?  I think that is as worthless as solipism.


This is the recurring confusion between subjective idealism and  
objective idealism. Objective idealism is not a choice, but a  
consequence of the comp assumption and the weak Occam razor.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> **
> On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
 On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
>
>
> Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation
>> to be there.
>>
>
> The computations are concrete relations.
>

  If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.


>>> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them,
>>> everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of the
>>> computation implementing your mind.
>>>
>>> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
>>> concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other branches of
>>> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an AI or
>>> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
>>> rendering its environment?
>>>
>>>

 They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
> described by some axiomatic.
>

  And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So the
 "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of relations.
>>>
>>>
>>> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a
>>> chair?
>>>
>>>
 The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs.
>>>
>>>
>>> Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence
>>> of number relations explains the existence of matter,
>>>
>>>
>>>  That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than the
>>> existence of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or
>>> equivalent.
>>>
>>
>> The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144...
>> It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) + Fib(n-2).
>> This is a simple recursive definition.  You might even say the number line
>> has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1.
>> Different recursive definitions result in different sequences of numbers
>> (different ways of progressing through the integers).  In some of these
>> definitions, bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well
>> defined ways,
>>
>>
>>  There's the rub.  Nothing changes in Platonia.  Nothing "moves around" or
>> "computes".  Bit patterns are physical things, like 101101.  Numbers are
>> not.
>>
>
> Nothing changes in physics either.  Block time is the only consistent view
> given relativity.
>
>
> Different t ==> different g_ab.
>

Different N ==> different Fib(N)


> That's change in physics.  Anyway, GR must be incomplete since it's not
> compatible with QM.
>
>
All the relevant parts of relativity which imply block time have been
confirmed.  The above is like arguing against gravity because Newton's
theory wasn't compatible with the observations of Mercury's orbit.


>
>
> Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
> relations between the bits.
>
>
>>
>>  some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even evolve
>> into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce
>> themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness, as
>> they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future observations
>> of bit patterns within the number.  Let's call this function Universe.
>> There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve their
>> survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
>> Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such sequences of
>> numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci
>> sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of recursive
>> relations).
>>
>>
>>  I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still accept
>> that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that John
>> Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.
>>
>
> Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe, if
> not the cause of the universe.
>
>
> That assumes numbers exist.
>

It is no worse than assuming the physical universe exists.  Both theories
are consistent with observation.


>
>
>In that sense, they are just as concrete if not more concrete than any
> physical object.  Your view is like that of a being who has spent its whole
> life in a simulated virtual environment: It believes the virtual reality and
> items in it are "more real" than the actual computer which implements the
> virtual environment.  The beings only justification for this belief is that
> he can't access that computer using hi

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.


On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:




Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course
that forces computation to be there.


The computations are concrete relations.


If the are concrete then we should be able to point to
them.


If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to
them, everything you see and experience is direct evidence
of the existence of the computation implementing your mind.

Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything
that has a concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder
point to the other branches of the wave function, or an
eternalist point to the past?  How would an AI or human in a
virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
rendering its environment?


They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers
relation can be described by some axiomatic.


And one can regard the numbers as defined by their
relations.  So the "fundamental ontology" of numbers is
reduced to a description of relations. 



Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an
idea of a chair?

The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of
tables and chairs.


Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp,
the existence of number relations explains the existence of
matter,


That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than
the existence of number relations, it requires the existence
of a UD or equivalent.


The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55,
89, 144...
It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) +
Fib(n-2).  This is a simple recursive definition.  You might even
say the number line has a simple recursive definition, where
Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1.  Different recursive definitions
result in different sequences of numbers (different ways of
progressing through the integers).  In some of these definitions,
bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well defined
ways,


There's the rub.  Nothing changes in Platonia.  Nothing "moves
around" or "computes".  Bit patterns are physical things, like
101101.  Numbers are not.


Nothing changes in physics either.  Block time is the only consistent 
view given relativity.


Different t ==> different g_ab.  That's change in physics.  Anyway, GR 
must be incomplete since it's not compatible with QM.




Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well 
defined relations between the bits.




some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even
evolve into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to
reproduce themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve
consciousness, as they build brains which attempt to discern and
predict future observations of bit patterns within the number. 
Let's call this function Universe.  There may be bit patterns

(life forms) in Universe(n) which improve their survival or
reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such
sequences of numbers; you cannot deny their existence without
denying the Fibonacci sequence or the number line (these are just
simpler instances of recursive relations).


I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still
accept that certain relations are true of them; just like I can
accept that John Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.


Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the 
universe, if not the cause of the universe.


That assumes numbers exist.

  In that sense, they are just as concrete if not more concrete than 
any physical object.  Your view is like that of a being who has spent 
its whole life in a simulated virtual environment: It believes the 
virtual reality and items in it are "more real" than the actual 
computer which implements the virtual environment.  The beings only 
justification for this belief is that he can't access that computer 
using his senses, nor point is he able to point to it.


That's logically possible and maybe nomologically possible - but there's 
also not an iota of evidence for it.  So my view is *also* like that of 
a being who has spent his whole life in this materi

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> **
> On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>> On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>



 Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation
> to be there.
>

 The computations are concrete relations.

>>>
>>>  If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
>>>
>>>
>> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them,
>> everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of the
>> computation implementing your mind.
>>
>> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
>> concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other branches of
>> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an AI or
>> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
>> rendering its environment?
>>
>>
>>>
>>> They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
 described by some axiomatic.

>>>
>>>  And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So the
>>> "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of relations.
>>
>>
>> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a
>> chair?
>>
>>
>>> The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs.
>>
>>
>> Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence
>> of number relations explains the existence of matter,
>>
>>
>>  That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than the existence
>> of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or equivalent.
>>
>
> The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144...
> It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) + Fib(n-2).
> This is a simple recursive definition.  You might even say the number line
> has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1.
> Different recursive definitions result in different sequences of numbers
> (different ways of progressing through the integers).  In some of these
> definitions, bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well
> defined ways,
>
>
> There's the rub.  Nothing changes in Platonia.  Nothing "moves around" or
> "computes".  Bit patterns are physical things, like 101101.  Numbers are
> not.
>

Nothing changes in physics either.  Block time is the only consistent view
given relativity.

Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
relations between the bits.


>
>  some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even evolve
> into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce
> themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness, as
> they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future observations
> of bit patterns within the number.  Let's call this function Universe.
> There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve their
> survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
> Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such sequences of
> numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci
> sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of recursive
> relations).
>
>
> I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still accept
> that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that John
> Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.
>

Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe, if
not the cause of the universe.  In that sense, they are just as concrete if
not more concrete than any physical object.  Your view is like that of a
being who has spent its whole life in a simulated virtual environment: It
believes the virtual reality and items in it are "more real" than the actual
computer which implements the virtual environment.  The beings only
justification for this belief is that he can't access that computer using
his senses, nor point is he able to point to it.

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.


On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:




Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that
forces computation to be there.


The computations are concrete relations.


If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.


If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them,
everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the
existence of the computation implementing your mind.

Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that
has a concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the
other branches of the wave function, or an eternalist point to
the past?  How would an AI or human in a virtual environment
point to the concrete computer that is rendering its environment?


They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers
relation can be described by some axiomatic.


And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.
 So the "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a
description of relations. 



Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea
of a chair?

The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables
and chairs.


Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the
existence of number relations explains the existence of matter,


That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than the
existence of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD
or equivalent.


The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144...
It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) + 
Fib(n-2).  This is a simple recursive definition.  You might even say 
the number line has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = 
Number(n-1) + 1.  Different recursive definitions result in different 
sequences of numbers (different ways of progressing through the 
integers).  In some of these definitions, bits patterns (within the 
number) may move around in well defined ways,


There's the rub.  Nothing changes in Platonia.  Nothing "moves around" 
or "computes".  Bit patterns are physical things, like 101101.  Numbers 
are not.


some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even 
evolve into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to 
reproduce themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve 
consciousness, as they build brains which attempt to discern and 
predict future observations of bit patterns within the number.  Let's 
call this function Universe.  There may be bit patterns (life forms) 
in Universe(n) which improve their survival or reproductive success by 
correctly predicting parts of Universe(n+x).  There are number 
relations which define such sequences of numbers; you cannot deny 
their existence without denying the Fibonacci sequence or the number 
line (these are just simpler instances of recursive relations).


I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still accept 
that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that 
John Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.


Brent




Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

>Our brains are obviously doing it with
>the colorless nerve impulses (information) that comes in from the optic
>nerve.  I think most people lack appreciation for just how complex the brain
>is, and conclude this or that is impossible for any process (no matter how
>complex) to do.  The brain has 10^15 connections, each of which can change
>its state up to 10^3 times per second.  Most people have trouble imagining
>10^6, never mind 10^15.

There is no such thing as information in a nerve impulse. It has no
data in it except for what relates to modulations of the homeostasis
routines of cells. Biochemistry. The color yellow is not represented
by nervous tissue, it is presented within nervous tissue aggregates as
a subjective experience. The brain is not creating color, it is
experiencing the shared experience of many nerve cells from the inside
out. It is not the function of any nerve cell to produce color
anywhere physically. What we think of as a neuron is just the exterior
of the phenomenon, it's just doing neuron things, not psychological
things. It's the synergistic trans-terior of the whole thing - brain,
body, illuminated 'light' source, etc. What we think of as light is
the interior of our own optical gear as it passes along it's
experience to the rest of the self.

The staggering staggeryness of the brain, yeah I at least try to get a
sense of it. It's unfathomably absurd. It's like oceans per second or
something. I think that it adds to it all to realize that it would be
all forever mute, blind, and intangible were it not for awareness and
qualia - an interior side which permits participation with the thing
and the universe that it thinks it's in. The potential in the universe
for Sense and sanity are more important than a trillion barrels of
brains.

Craig
http://s33light.org

On Jul 21, 7:08 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 5:02 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > On Jul 21, 9:54 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:35 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > > > On Jul 11, 4:51 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > > > > > automatic consequences which
> > > > > > arise unbidden from "from relations that are defined by
> > > > > > computations".
>
> > > > > Yes, as you say below, it is a result of processing
>
> > > > Although no one knows how
>
> > > It is easy to imagine a simple process which is aware of a single bit of
> > > information.  Let's say it is some program which is connected to a photo
> > > sensor, thus it can tell if the room is dark or light, and when the
> > process
> > > is queried for this status it can report whether the room is light or
> > dark.
> > > Though it concerns only a single bit, is this not an example of
> > awareness?
> > > Perhaps human consciousness is fundamentally no different, it is just
> > > awareness of a vastly greater amount of information (more bits).
>
> > > Jason
>
> > Qualia are something more specific than awareness.
> > You can't get colour by summing lots of monochrome,no matter how
> > complex
>
> There are other ways of combining information besides addition.  Colors are
> multidimensional representations, they cannot be represented as a single
> magnitude.  So I agree, being aware of the sum of the values of a bunch of
> monochrome pixels will not yield trichromatic vision, yet the awareness of
> three different values perhaps can.  Our brains are obviously doing it with
> the colorless nerve impulses (information) that comes in from the optic
> nerve.  I think most people lack appreciation for just how complex the brain
> is, and conclude this or that is impossible for any process (no matter how
> complex) to do.  The brain has 10^15 connections, each of which can change
> its state up to 10^3 times per second.  Most people have trouble imagining
> 10^6, never mind 10^15.
>
> Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 7:43 PM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Jul 21, 11:55 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z  wrote:
> >
> > > > Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the
> existence
> > > of
> > > > number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence
> of
> > > > matter does not explain the existence of number relations.
> >
> > > Yes it does. Any number relation  that has ever been grasped by
> > > anybody exists in their mind, and therefore in their brain. And as
> > > for the ungrasped ones...so what? It can make no difference
> > > if they are there or not.
> >
> > Perhaps if those "ungrasped ones" did not exist then we might not exist.
>  It
> > is premature to say their existence does not make a difference to us.
>
> The existence of matter can explain the existence of numbers.
> The reverse might also be the case, but that is not a disproof.
>
> > I think may also be incorrect to say we need to grasp numbers or their
> > relations for them to matter.  Consider this example: I generate a large
> > random number X, with no obvious factors (I think it is prime), but when
> I
> > compute (y^(X - 1)) and divide by X (where y is not a multiple of X), I
> find
> > the remainder is not 1.  This means X is not prime: it has factors other
> > than 1 and X, but I haven't grasped what those factors are.  Nor is there
> > any efficient method for finding out what they are.
>
> > Now the existence of these ungrasped numbers does make a difference.  If
> I
> > attempted to build an RSA key using X and another legitimately prime
> number
> > (instead of two prime numbers), then the encryption won't work properly.
>  I
> > won't be able to determine a private key because I don't know all the
> > factors.
>
>
> The contingent fact that is your failure to grasp a mathematical
> truth is makes a difference.


Just above you said mathematical objects only exist if they exist physically
in some brain.  This is a case where the factors are not only unknown by me,
but likely unknown by anyone in the observable universe.


> Mathematical truths are not contingent,
> so
> what difference can they make?
>

If they are not contingent then you accept they exist even without the
existence of the physical universe?  If so, then see my post in the other
thread where I explain how mathematical truth can explain the existence of
life and consciousness.

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

>> In my view, physics, experience, and the underlying relation between
>> them are all co-phenomenal and co-epiphenomenal
>
>I have  no idea what that means.

I'm trying to say that from the vantage point of physical externality,
experience is deterministically caused by physical laws, but from the
perspective of subjective experience, it is the self which chooses to
cause physical changes to the world through the instrument of their
mind and body. Both sides are self-knowing and self-ignorant and
reflect additional levels of self-knowing and self-ignorance through
interaction with each other.

>> > 2) What is it about the mathematical structures and functions of your
>> > New
>> > Physics that makes it more apt for describing experience than the
>> > Old Physics?
>
>> Because it recognizes that experience cannot be described in third
>> person terms
>
>How can you have physics that is not describable in 3 terms? How
>do people write papers about it or devise tests for it.

By becoming smarter about it. It freaks me out to hear that the
response to "Here is the simple truth of what the cosmos actually is"
should be "how do people write papers about it?". Lets put paper
writing in the museum and make 10 dimensional virtual reality
demonstrations about it instead.

Craig
http://s33light.org


On Jul 21, 5:59 pm, 1Z  wrote:
> On Jul 21, 8:23 pm, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
> > > 1) if conventional physics gives an adequate causal account,does and
> > > experience is explained
> > > with New Physics, does that make experience epiphenomenal?
>
> > In my view, physics, experience, and the underlying relation between
> > them are all co-phenomenal and co-epiphenomenal
>
> I have  no idea what that means.
>
> > > 2) What is it about the mathematical structures and functions of your
> > > New
> > > Physics that makes it more apt for describing experience than the
> > > Old Physics?
>
> > Because it recognizes that experience cannot be described in third
> > person terms
>
> How can you have physics that is not describable in 3 terms? How
> do people write papers about it or devise tests for it.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >, and that this fact is not a problem. Rather, the
> > compulsion to turn it into a problem is explained by the understanding
> > that we ourselves are inherently biased because we cannot get outside
> > of the sense of our own collective experience. Instead, we see the
> > function of privatized phenomenology as a natural feature of, as well
> > as a function of matter.

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 21, 11:55 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > > Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence
> > of
> > > number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
> > > matter does not explain the existence of number relations.
>
> > Yes it does. Any number relation  that has ever been grasped by
> > anybody exists in their mind, and therefore in their brain. And as
> > for the ungrasped ones...so what? It can make no difference
> > if they are there or not.
>
> Perhaps if those "ungrasped ones" did not exist then we might not exist.  It
> is premature to say their existence does not make a difference to us.

The existence of matter can explain the existence of numbers.
The reverse might also be the case, but that is not a disproof.

> I think may also be incorrect to say we need to grasp numbers or their
> relations for them to matter.  Consider this example: I generate a large
> random number X, with no obvious factors (I think it is prime), but when I
> compute (y^(X - 1)) and divide by X (where y is not a multiple of X), I find
> the remainder is not 1.  This means X is not prime: it has factors other
> than 1 and X, but I haven't grasped what those factors are.  Nor is there
> any efficient method for finding out what they are.

> Now the existence of these ungrasped numbers does make a difference.  If I
> attempted to build an RSA key using X and another legitimately prime number
> (instead of two prime numbers), then the encryption won't work properly.  I
> won't be able to determine a private key because I don't know all the
> factors.


The contingent fact that is your failure to grasp a mathematical
truth is makes a difference. Mathematical truths are not contingent,
so
what difference can they make?
> What would you say about the existence of the factors of X?  Do they
> actually exist, despite that no one has any clue what they are?  And does
> their existence (despite being unknown) matter?
>
> Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On 7/21/2011 3:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z > wrote:

> Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the
existence of
> number relations explains the existence of matter, but the
existence of
> matter does not explain the existence of number relations.

Yes it does. Any number relation  that has ever been grasped by
anybody exists in their mind, and therefore in their brain. And as
for the ungrasped ones...so what? It can make no difference
if they are there or not.

Perhaps if those "ungrasped ones" did not exist then we might not 
exist.  It is premature to say their existence does not make a 
difference to us.

I think may also be incorrect to say we need to grasp numbers or their 
relations for them to matter.  Consider this example: I generate a 
large random number X, with no obvious factors (I think it is prime), 
but when I compute (y^(X - 1)) and divide by X (where y is not a 
multiple of X), I find the remainder is not 1.  This means X is not 
prime: it has factors other than 1 and X, but I haven't grasped what 
those factors are.  Nor is there any efficient method for finding out 
what they are.

Now the existence of these ungrasped numbers does make a difference.  
If I attempted to build an RSA key using X and another legitimately 
prime number (instead of two prime numbers), then the encryption won't 
work properly.  I won't be able to determine a private key because I 
don't know all the factors.

What would you say about the existence of the factors of X?  Do they 
actually exist, despite that no one has any clue what they are?  And 
does their existence (despite being unknown) matter?

Jason

I'd say they 'exist' in Platonia; just like the factors of 10 'exist'.  
It just means that if I have ten things I can imagine them in two rows 
of five.  It's quite different from the existence of material objects.

Brent

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 5:02 PM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Jul 21, 9:54 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:35 PM, 1Z  wrote:
> >
> > > On Jul 11, 4:51 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> >
> > > > > automatic consequences which
> > > > > arise unbidden from "from relations that are defined by
> > > > > computations".
> >
> > > > Yes, as you say below, it is a result of processing
> >
> > > Although no one knows how
> >
> > It is easy to imagine a simple process which is aware of a single bit of
> > information.  Let's say it is some program which is connected to a photo
> > sensor, thus it can tell if the room is dark or light, and when the
> process
> > is queried for this status it can report whether the room is light or
> dark.
> > Though it concerns only a single bit, is this not an example of
> awareness?
> > Perhaps human consciousness is fundamentally no different, it is just
> > awareness of a vastly greater amount of information (more bits).
> >
> > Jason
>
> Qualia are something more specific than awareness.
> You can't get colour by summing lots of monochrome,no matter how
> complex
>
>
>
There are other ways of combining information besides addition.  Colors are
multidimensional representations, they cannot be represented as a single
magnitude.  So I agree, being aware of the sum of the values of a bunch of
monochrome pixels will not yield trichromatic vision, yet the awareness of
three different values perhaps can.  Our brains are obviously doing it with
the colorless nerve impulses (information) that comes in from the optic
nerve.  I think most people lack appreciation for just how complex the brain
is, and conclude this or that is impossible for any process (no matter how
complex) to do.  The brain has 10^15 connections, each of which can change
its state up to 10^3 times per second.  Most people have trouble imagining
10^6, never mind 10^15.

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z  wrote:

>
> > Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence
> of
> > number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
> > matter does not explain the existence of number relations.
>
> Yes it does. Any number relation  that has ever been grasped by
> anybody exists in their mind, and therefore in their brain. And as
> for the ungrasped ones...so what? It can make no difference
> if they are there or not.
>
>
Perhaps if those "ungrasped ones" did not exist then we might not exist.  It
is premature to say their existence does not make a difference to us.

I think may also be incorrect to say we need to grasp numbers or their
relations for them to matter.  Consider this example: I generate a large
random number X, with no obvious factors (I think it is prime), but when I
compute (y^(X - 1)) and divide by X (where y is not a multiple of X), I find
the remainder is not 1.  This means X is not prime: it has factors other
than 1 and X, but I haven't grasped what those factors are.  Nor is there
any efficient method for finding out what they are.

Now the existence of these ungrasped numbers does make a difference.  If I
attempted to build an RSA key using X and another legitimately prime number
(instead of two prime numbers), then the encryption won't work properly.  I
won't be able to determine a private key because I don't know all the
factors.

What would you say about the existence of the factors of X?  Do they
actually exist, despite that no one has any clue what they are?  And does
their existence (despite being unknown) matter?

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 21, 9:54 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:35 PM, 1Z  wrote:
>
> > On Jul 11, 4:51 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > > > automatic consequences which
> > > > arise unbidden from "from relations that are defined by
> > > > computations".
>
> > > Yes, as you say below, it is a result of processing
>
> > Although no one knows how
>
> It is easy to imagine a simple process which is aware of a single bit of
> information.  Let's say it is some program which is connected to a photo
> sensor, thus it can tell if the room is dark or light, and when the process
> is queried for this status it can report whether the room is light or dark.
> Though it concerns only a single bit, is this not an example of awareness?
> Perhaps human consciousness is fundamentally no different, it is just
> awareness of a vastly greater amount of information (more bits).
>
> Jason

Qualia are something more specific than awareness.
You can't get colour by summing lots of monochrome,no matter how
complex

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 21, 8:23 pm, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> > 1) if conventional physics gives an adequate causal account,does and
> > experience is explained
> > with New Physics, does that make experience epiphenomenal?
>
> In my view, physics, experience, and the underlying relation between
> them are all co-phenomenal and co-epiphenomenal

I have  no idea what that means.

> > 2) What is it about the mathematical structures and functions of your
> > New
> > Physics that makes it more apt for describing experience than the
> > Old Physics?
>
> Because it recognizes that experience cannot be described in third
> person terms

How can you have physics that is not describable in 3 terms? How
do people write papers about it or devise tests for it.

>, and that this fact is not a problem. Rather, the
> compulsion to turn it into a problem is explained by the understanding
> that we ourselves are inherently biased because we cannot get outside
> of the sense of our own collective experience. Instead, we see the
> function of privatized phenomenology as a natural feature of, as well
> as a function of matter.

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 21, 7:03 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
> > On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >>  Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation
> >>> to be there.
>
> >> The computations are concrete relations.
>
> > If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
>
> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them, everything
> you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of the
> computation implementing your mind.

Ostensive definition is definitional, not an existence proof. The
Everything is Abstract
argument has nothing to work on if no abstract definitions are fed
into it.

> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
> concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other branches of
> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an AI or
> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
> rendering its environment?
>
Again, ostensive definition is definitional, not an existence proof.

>
> >  They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
> >> described by some axiomatic.
>
> > And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So the
> > "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of relations.
>
> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a
> chair?
>
> > The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs.
>
> Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence of
> number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
> matter does not explain the existence of number relations.  

Yes it does. Any number relation  that has ever been grasped by
anybody exists in their mind, and therefore in their brain. And as
for the ungrasped ones...so what? It can make no difference
if they are there or not.

>It is therefore
> a simpler theory to suppose the existence of number relations is fundamental
> and the appearance of matter is a consequence, than to suppose both exist
> independently of each other.
>
> Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 20, 5:42 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 7/20/2011 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> >>> I'm afraid this is not true. Some people even argue that computation
> >>> does not exist, the physical world only approximate them, according to
> >>> them.
> >>> I have not yet seen a physical definition of computation
>
> >> How about "a series of causally connected states which process
> >> information"
>
> > Can you give me a physical definition of the terms "series", "causal",
> > "connected, "states", "process", and "information"?
> > And I am very demanding: I would like an axiomatic definition.
> > In absence of such a definition, you are just describing an
> > implementation of a computation in what you assume, implicitly, to be
> > a natural universal system.
>
> >>> , except by
> >>> natural phenomenon emulating a mathematical computation. Computer and
> >>> computations have been discovered by mathematicians, and there many
> >>> equivalent definition of the concept, but only if we accept Church
> >>> thesis.
>
> >>> Now if you accept the idea that the propositions like "if x divides 4
> >>> then x divides 8", or "there is an infinity of twin primes" are true
> >>> or false independently of you, then arithmetical truth makes *all* the
> >>> propositions about all computations true or false independently of
> >>> you. The root of why it is so is Gï¿½del arithmetization of the syntax
> >>> of arithmetic (or Principia). To be a piece of a computation is
> >>> arithmetical, even if intensional (can depend on the *existence* of
> >>> coding, but the coding is entirely arithmetical itself.
>
> >>> In short, I can prove to you that there is computations in elementary
> >>> arithmetical truth, but you have to speculate on many things to claim
> >>> that there are physical computations. Locally, typing on this
> >>> computer, makes me OK with the idea that the physical reality emulates
> >>> computations, and that makes the white rabbit problems even more
> >>> complex, but then we have not the choice, given the assumption.
>
>  So I assumed I didn't understand Bruno's argument correctly.
>
> >>> You seem to have a difficulty to see that elementary arithmetic "run"
> >>> the UD, not in time and space, but in the arithmetical truth.
>
> >> He should. Truth is not existence.
>
> > What is "existence"? If you refer to physics, then you are begging the
> > question, or you are just assuming that we are not machine.
>
> > Bruno
>
> But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic definition
> and rejecting ostensive ones.  Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of
> course that forces computation to be there.
>
> Brent

How do you prove there is not concrete existence from your armchair?
Demand exact definitions.
Note that the definitions you have been given are abstract as well as
exact.
Conclude that whatever was being defined was abstract all along.

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 20, 2:43 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 20 Jul 2011, at 15:21, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jul 8, 5:53 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 08 Jul 2011, at 02:35, meekerdb wrote:
>
> >>> On 7/7/2011 4:59 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>  On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 10:12:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
>
> >> One that happens to be incompatible with
> >> theory that our minds are computer programs.
>
> > Can you explain that?  It seems to be Bruno's central claim, but  
> > so
> > far as I can see he only tries to prove that a physical reality is
> > otiose.
>
> > Brent
>
>  Here's my take on it. I guess you read the version I wrote 6 years
>  ago
>  in ToN.
>
>  Once you allow the existence of a universal dovetailer, we are far
>  more likely to be running on the dovetailer (which is a simple
>  program) than on a much more complicated program (such as  
>  simulating
>  the universe as we currently see it). Under COMP, the dovetailer is
>  capable of generating all possible experiences (which is why it is
>  universal). Therefore, everything we call physics (electrons,  
>  quarks,
>  electromagnetic fields, etc) is phenomena caused by the running of
>  the
>  dovetailer. By Church-Turing thesis, the dovetailer could be  
>  running
>  on anything capable of supporting universal computation. To use
>  Kantian terminology, what the dovetailer runs on is the noumenon,
>  unknowable reality, which need have no connection which the
>  phenomenon
>  we observe. In fact with the CT-thesis, we cannot even know which
>  noumenon we're running on, in the case there may be more than  
>  one. We
>  might just as well be running on some demigod's child's  
>  playstation,
>  as running on Platonic arithmetic. It is in principle unknowable,
>  even
>  by any putative omniscient God - there is simply no matter of fact
>  there to know.
>
>  So ultimately, this is why Bruno eliminates the concrete  
>  dovetailer,
>  in the manner of Laplace eliminating God "Sire, je n'ai besoin de  
>  cet
>  hypothese".
>
>  Anyway, Bruno will no doubt correct any mistaken conceptions  
>  here :).
>
>  Cheers
>
> >>> That's what I thought he said.  But I see no reason to suppose a UD
> >>> is running, much less running without physics.  We don't know of any
> >>> computation that occurs immaterially.
>
> >> I'm afraid this is not true. Some people even argue that computation
> >> does not exist, the physical world only approximate them, according  
> >> to
> >> them.
> >> I have not yet seen a physical definition of computation
>
> > How about "a series of causally connected states which process
> > information"
>
> Can you give me a physical definition of the terms "series", "causal",  
> "connected, "states", "process", and "information"?
> And I am very demanding: I would like an axiomatic definition.

There is no reason you should be entitled  to  one. Physicsts
happily define time as what clocks measure.

> In absence of such a definition, you are just describing an  
> implementation of a computation in what you assume, implicitly, to be  
> a natural universal system.
>
>
>
>
>
> >> , except by
> >> natural phenomenon emulating a mathematical computation. Computer and
> >> computations have been discovered by mathematicians, and there many
> >> equivalent definition of the concept, but only if we accept Church
> >> thesis.
>
> >> Now if you accept the idea that the propositions like "if x divides 4
> >> then x divides 8", or "there is an infinity of twin primes" are true
> >> or false independently of you, then arithmetical truth makes *all*  
> >> the
> >> propositions about all computations true or false independently of
> >> you. The root of why it is so is Gödel arithmetization of the syntax
> >> of arithmetic (or Principia). To be a piece of a computation is
> >> arithmetical, even if intensional (can depend on the *existence* of
> >> coding, but the coding is entirely arithmetical itself.
>
> >> In short, I can prove to you that there is computations in elementary
> >> arithmetical truth, but you have to speculate on many things to claim
> >> that there are physical computations. Locally, typing on this
> >> computer, makes me OK with the idea that the physical reality  
> >> emulates
> >> computations, and that makes the white rabbit problems even more
> >> complex, but then we have not the choice, given the assumption.
>
> >>> So I assumed I didn't understand Bruno's argument correctly.
>
> >> You seem to have a difficulty to see that elementary arithmetic "run"
> >> the UD, not in time and space, but in the arithmetical truth.
>
> > He should. Truth is not existence.
>
> What is "existence"?

This. [[points in all directions]].

>If you refer to physics, then you are begging the  
> question, or you are just assuming that we are not machine.
>
> Bru

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 12, 11:50 pm, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> My view of awareness is now subtractive and holographic (think pinhole
> camera), so that I would read fading qualia in a different way. More
> like dementia.. attenuating connectivity between different aspects of
> the self, not changing qualia necessarily. The brain might respond to
> the implanted chips, even ruling out organic rejection, the native
> neurology may strengthen it's remaining connections and attempt to
> compensate for the implants with neuroplasticity, routing around the
> 'damage'

By hypothesis the replacements preserve functioning.
Dementia is  a change in functioning, so it won't occur.

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

>i don't see a much of a connection between those statements.
>Complexity could be necessary but insufficient. It is,
>for instance, difficult to see how you could have
>simple colour qualia. Colours represent a lot of intormation.

Yes, I agree, complexity could be necessary but insufficient. Just as
complex arrangements of inorganic molecules do not lead to organisms,
but in particular cases of organic molecules, they lead to cells, some
cells can lead to animals, some animals are vertebrates, some
vertebrates are like us, etc. Complex arrangements of daisy cells
don't lead to a gorilla, etc.

I'm not sure that color represents any information per se, it could be
that the visual subject, informed by color, informs the cognitive
subjects, which projects it's own semantic associative content on top
of the visual qualia. The 'information' may be separable qualia.

>They could report one thing whilst experiencing or
>having experienced another. Let's they have bits
>of their brain replaced by functionally equivalent
>silicon; let's also say that silicon can't have qualia.
>Then, as the replacement procedes, their qualia
>will fade...but they will continue to report them,
>because of the functional equivalence.

Right, yes. That's why I was saying it would come close to convincing
me (rather than making me sure). In my view, silicon could have
qualia, I would just guess that it doesn't scale up to rich subjective
depth. The way we build with silicon, it never reaches the state of
becoming a living organism, so I think it's likely limited to pre-
biotic qualia. Permittivity and permeability perhaps, wattage.

On Jul 21, 3:26 pm, 1Z  wrote:
> On Jul 11, 2:52 am, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
> >  I'm saying that
> > the potential for awareness must be built in to matter at the lowest
> > level or not at all. Complexity alone cannot cause awareness in
> > inanimate objects, let alone the kind of rich, ididopathic phenomena
> > we think of as qualia.
>
> i don't see a much of a connection between those statements.
> Complexity could be necessary but insufficient. It is,
> for instance, difficult to see how you could have
> simple colour qualia. Colours represent a lot of intormation.
>
> > The only thing that would come close to convincing me that a
> > virtualized brain was successful in producing human consciousness
> > would be if a person could live with half of their brain emulated for
> > a while, then switch to the other half emulated for a while and report
> > as to whether their memories and experiences of being emulated were
> > faithful.
>
> They could report one thing whilst experiencing or
> having experienced another. Let's they have bits
> of their brain replaced by functionally equivalent
> silicon; let's also say that silicon can't have qualia.
> Then, as the replacement procedes, their qualia
> will fade...but they will continue to report them,
> because of the functional equivalence.

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:35 PM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Jul 11, 4:51 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > > automatic consequences which
> > > arise unbidden from "from relations that are defined by
> > > computations".
> >
> > Yes, as you say below, it is a result of processing
>
> Although no one knows how
>
>
It is easy to imagine a simple process which is aware of a single bit of
information.  Let's say it is some program which is connected to a photo
sensor, thus it can tell if the room is dark or light, and when the process
is queried for this status it can report whether the room is light or dark.
Though it concerns only a single bit, is this not an example of awareness?
Perhaps human consciousness is fundamentally no different, it is just
awareness of a vastly greater amount of information (more bits).

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 2:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> >Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence
> of
> >number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
> >matter does not explain the existence of number relations.  It is
> therefore
> >a simpler theory to suppose the existence of number relations is
> fundamental
> >and the appearance of matter is a consequence, than to suppose both exist
> >independently of each other.
>
> How does the existence of number relations really explain the material
> qualities of matter though?


The material qualities of matter are all the results of rules (which are
ultimately determined by the properties of the mathematical object an
observer happens to find themselves in).  With computationalism, the exact
mathematical object an observer happens to exist in cannot be definitively
determined or predicted.  Rather it might be said the observer
simultaneously exists in all of them (all mathematical structures which
contain that observer's mind).  This is confirmed by quantum mechanics.
When you measure the state of a particle, the result is unpredictable
because one cannot know in which universe they will be at the time the the
result is observed.


> Would that mean that in all possible
> universes a proton is a proton and 79 protons is gold? Is water a
> mathematical inevitability independent of our macroscopic experience
> of water?
>

It is believed that there are many free parameters in the standard model
(around 20 or so).  Varying these parameters results in universes with
entirely different physics and chemistry.  For example, physicists have
discovered no good reason why the fine structure constant has the value it
does.


>
> On Jul 21, 2:03 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
> > > On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > >>  Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces
> computation
> > >>> to be there.
> >
> > >> The computations are concrete relations.
> >
> > > If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
> >
> > If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them,
> everything
> > you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of the
> > computation implementing your mind.
> >
> > Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
> > concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other branches
> of
> > the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an AI
> or
> > human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
> > rendering its environment?
> >
> >
> >
> > >  They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
> > >> described by some axiomatic.
> >
> > > And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So the
> > > "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of
> relations.
> >
> > Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a
> > chair?
> >
> > > The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs.
> >
> > Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence
> of
> > number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
> > matter does not explain the existence of number relations.  It is
> therefore
> > a simpler theory to suppose the existence of number relations is
> fundamental
> > and the appearance of matter is a consequence, than to suppose both exist
> > independently of each other.
> >
> > Jason
>
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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 11, 4:51 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:

> > automatic consequences which
> > arise unbidden from "from relations that are defined by
> > computations".
>
> Yes, as you say below, it is a result of processing

Although no one knows how

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> **
> On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>> On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation
 to be there.

>>>
>>> The computations are concrete relations.
>>>
>>
>>  If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
>>
>>
> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them,
> everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of the
> computation implementing your mind.
>
> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
> concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other branches of
> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an AI or
> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
> rendering its environment?
>
>
>>
>>  They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
>>> described by some axiomatic.
>>>
>>
>>  And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So the
>> "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of relations.
>
>
> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a
> chair?
>
>
>> The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs.
>
>
> Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence of
> number relations explains the existence of matter,
>
>
> That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than the existence
> of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or equivalent.
>

The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144...
It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) + Fib(n-2).
This is a simple recursive definition.  You might even say the number line
has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1.
Different recursive definitions result in different sequences of numbers
(different ways of progressing through the integers).  In some of these
definitions, bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well
defined ways, some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may
even evolve into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to
reproduce themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve
consciousness, as they build brains which attempt to discern and predict
future observations of bit patterns within the number.  Let's call this
function Universe.  There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n)
which improve their survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting
parts of Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such
sequences of numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the
Fibonacci sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of
recursive relations).

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 11, 4:48 am, Jason Resch  wrote:

> This philosophy has already shown great success for anything that stores,
> transmits or processes information.  Data can be stored as magnetic poles on
> hard drives and tape, different levels of reflectivity on CDs and DVDs, as
> charges of electrons in flash memory, etc.  Data can be sent as vibrations
> in the air, electric fields in wires, photons in glass fibers, or ions
> between nerve cells.  Data can be processed by electromechanical machines,
> vacuum tubes, transistors, or biological neural networks.  These different
> technologies can be meshed together without causing any problem.  You can
> have packets sent over a copper wire in an Ethernet cable, and then be
> bridged to a fiber optic connection and represented as groups of photons,
> and then translated again to vibrations in the air, and then after being
> received by a cochlea, transmitted as releases of ions between nerve cells.
> Data can be copied from the flash memory in a digital camera, to a hard
> drive in a computer, and then encoded into a persons brain by way of a
> monitor.  To believe in the impossibility of an artificial brain is to
> believe there is some form of information which can only be transmitted by
> neurons, or some computation performed by neurons which cannot be reproduced
> by any other substrate.

Not necessarily. It could just be a disbelief in artificial qualia.

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Jul 11, 2:52 am, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>  I'm saying that
> the potential for awareness must be built in to matter at the lowest
> level or not at all. Complexity alone cannot cause awareness in
> inanimate objects, let alone the kind of rich, ididopathic phenomena
> we think of as qualia.

i don't see a much of a connection between those statements.
Complexity could be necessary but insufficient. It is,
for instance, difficult to see how you could have
simple colour qualia. Colours represent a lot of intormation.

> The only thing that would come close to convincing me that a
> virtualized brain was successful in producing human consciousness
> would be if a person could live with half of their brain emulated for
> a while, then switch to the other half emulated for a while and report
> as to whether their memories and experiences of being emulated were
> faithful.

They could report one thing whilst experiencing or
having experienced another. Let's they have bits
of their brain replaced by functionally equivalent
silicon; let's also say that silicon can't have qualia.
Then, as the replacement procedes, their qualia
will fade...but they will continue to report them,
because of the functional equivalence.

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



> 1) if conventional physics gives an adequate causal account,does and
> experience is explained
> with New Physics, does that make experience epiphenomenal?

In my view, physics, experience, and the underlying relation between
them are all co-phenomenal and co-epiphenomenal

> 2) What is it about the mathematical structures and functions of your
> New
> Physics that makes it more apt for describing experience than the
> Old Physics?

Because it recognizes that experience cannot be described in third
person terms, and that this fact is not a problem. Rather, the
compulsion to turn it into a problem is explained by the understanding
that we ourselves are inherently biased because we cannot get outside
of the sense of our own collective experience. Instead, we see the
function of privatized phenomenology as a natural feature of, as well
as a function of matter.

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

>Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence of
>number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
>matter does not explain the existence of number relations.  It is therefore
>a simpler theory to suppose the existence of number relations is fundamental
>and the appearance of matter is a consequence, than to suppose both exist
>independently of each other.

How does the existence of number relations really explain the material
qualities of matter though? Would that mean that in all possible
universes a proton is a proton and 79 protons is gold? Is water a
mathematical inevitability independent of our macroscopic experience
of water?

On Jul 21, 2:03 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
> > On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >>  Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation
> >>> to be there.
>
> >> The computations are concrete relations.
>
> > If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
>
> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them, everything
> you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of the
> computation implementing your mind.
>
> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
> concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other branches of
> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an AI or
> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
> rendering its environment?
>
>
>
> >  They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
> >> described by some axiomatic.
>
> > And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So the
> > "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of relations.
>
> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a
> chair?
>
> > The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs.
>
> Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence of
> number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
> matter does not explain the existence of number relations.  It is therefore
> a simpler theory to suppose the existence of number relations is fundamental
> and the appearance of matter is a consequence, than to suppose both exist
> independently of each other.
>
> Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.


On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:




Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that
forces computation to be there.


The computations are concrete relations.


If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.


If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them, 
everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence 
of the computation implementing your mind.


Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a 
concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other 
branches of the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  
How would an AI or human in a virtual environment point to the 
concrete computer that is rendering its environment?



They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can
be described by some axiomatic.


And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So
the "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description
of relations. 



Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a 
chair?


The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and
chairs.


Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the 
existence of number relations explains the existence of matter,


That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than the 
existence of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or 
equivalent.  It requires the existence of all computation.  I see no 
reason to suppose these exist, at least not in any conventional meaning 
of 'exist'.  It certainly doesn't follow from my saying "Yes" to the 
doctor that I believe they exist.  It also has the problem that it 
explains too much - the white rabbit problem.


but the existence of matter does not explain the existence of number 
relations.


It may not explain them, but it exemplifies them.  And in fact that's 
how we learn what numbers are and how to count - long before we learn 
Peano's axioms and Cantor's diagonalization.


It is therefore a simpler theory to suppose the existence of number 
relations is fundamental and the appearance of matter is a 
consequence, than to suppose both exist independently of each other.


Simpler, yes.  But then, "God did it" and "Everything exists." are 
simple too.  An explanation with no predictive power isn't much of an 
explanation.


Brent



Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.



On Jul 10, 2:20 pm, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
>
> The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
> molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to produce
> different molecules by changing the content of our consciousness
> subjectively suggests to me that it makes sense to give molecules the
> benefit of the doubt.
>
> >What in the brain would be not Turing emulable
>
> Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out of
> ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
> perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of electromagnetism
> automatically, or does it see yellow when it's own emulated units are
> vibrating on the functionally proportionate scale to itself? Does the
> ping pong ball brain see it's own patterns of collisions as yellow or
> does yellow = electromagnetic ~580nm and nothing else. At what point
> does the yellow come in? Where did it come from? Were there other
> options? Can there ever be new colors? From where? What is the minimum
> mechanical arrangement required to experience yellow?
>
> >You need to speculate
> > on a new physics,
>
> Yes, I do speculate on a new physics. I think that what we can
> possibly see outside of ourselves is half of what exists. What we
> experience is only a small part of the other half. Physics wouldn't
> change, but it would be seen as the exterior half of a universal
> topology. I did a post this morning that might 
> help:http://s33light.org/post/7453105138

1) if conventional physics gives an adequate causal account,does and
experience is explained
with New Physics, does that make experience epiphenomenal?

2) What is it about the mathematical structures and functions of your
New
Physics that makes it more apt for describing experience than the
Old Physics?

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

> On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation
>>> to be there.
>>>
>>
>> The computations are concrete relations.
>>
>
> If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
>
>
If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them, everything
you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of the
computation implementing your mind.

Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other branches of
the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an AI or
human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
rendering its environment?

>
>  They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
>> described by some axiomatic.
>>
>
> And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So the
> "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of relations.

Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a
chair?

> The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs.

Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the existence of
number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
matter does not explain the existence of number relations.  It is therefore
a simpler theory to suppose the existence of number relations is fundamental
and the appearance of matter is a consequence, than to suppose both exist
independently of each other.

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.


On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic definition 
and rejecting ostensive ones.


Why?
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for justifying an 
ontology.


That seems to be a non-sequitur.  How can any kind of definition justify 
an ontology?  Definitions are about the meaning of words.  If I point to 
a table and say "Table." I'm defining "table", not justifying an ontology.


That's what the dream argument shows. Being axiomatic does not beg the 
question. You can be materialist and develop an axiomatic of primitive 
matter. The whole point of an axiomatic approach consists in being as 
neutral as possible on ontological commitment.



But what you demanded was a *physical* axiomatic definition.  Which 
seems to be a demand that the definition be physical, yet not 
ostensive.  I think that's contradictory.






Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces 
computation to be there.


The computations are concrete relations.


If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.

They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be 
described by some axiomatic.


And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So the 
"fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of 
relations. The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables 
and chairs.


This means only that we *can* agree on simple (but very fertile) basic 
number relations. For primitive matter, that does not exist, and that 
is why people recourse to ostensive "definition". They knock the 
table, and say "you will not tell me that this table does not exist". 
The problem, for them, is that I can dream of people knocking tables. 
So for the basic fundamental ontology, you just cannot use the 
ostensive move (or you have to abandon the dream argument, classical 
theory of knowledge, or comp). But this moves seems an ad hoc non-comp 
move, if not a rather naive attitude.


What "dream argument"?  That all we think of as real could be a dream?  
I think that is as worthless as solipism.


Brent



Bruno


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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-21 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Jul 2011, at 18:42, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/20/2011 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I'm afraid this is not true. Some people even argue that  
computation
does not exist, the physical world only approximate them,  
according to

them.
I have not yet seen a physical definition of computation


How about "a series of causally connected states which process
information"



Can you give me a physical definition of the terms "series",  
"causal", "connected, "states", "process", and "information"?

And I am very demanding: I would like an axiomatic definition.
In absence of such a definition, you are just describing an  
implementation of a computation in what you assume, implicitly, to  
be a natural universal system.






, except by
natural phenomenon emulating a mathematical computation. Computer  
and

computations have been discovered by mathematicians, and there many
equivalent definition of the concept, but only if we accept Church
thesis.

Now if you accept the idea that the propositions like "if x  
divides 4
then x divides 8", or "there is an infinity of twin primes" are  
true
or false independently of you, then arithmetical truth makes  
*all* the

propositions about all computations true or false independently of
you. The root of why it is so is Gödel arithmetization of the  
syntax

of arithmetic (or Principia). To be a piece of a computation is
arithmetical, even if intensional (can depend on the *existence* of
coding, but the coding is entirely arithmetical itself.

In short, I can prove to you that there is computations in  
elementary
arithmetical truth, but you have to speculate on many things to  
claim

that there are physical computations. Locally, typing on this
computer, makes me OK with the idea that the physical reality  
emulates

computations, and that makes the white rabbit problems even more
complex, but then we have not the choice, given the assumption.


So I assumed I didn't understand Bruno's argument correctly.


You seem to have a difficulty to see that elementary arithmetic  
"run"

the UD, not in time and space, but in the arithmetical truth.


He should. Truth is not existence.


What is "existence"? If you refer to physics, then you are begging  
the question, or you are just assuming that we are not machine.


Bruno


But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic  
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.


Why?
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for justifying an  
ontology. That's what the dream argument shows. Being axiomatic does  
not beg the question. You can be materialist and develop an axiomatic  
of primitive matter. The whole point of an axiomatic approach consists  
in being as neutral as possible on ontological commitment.




Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces  
computation to be there.


The computations are concrete relations. They don't need axioms to  
exist. Then the numbers relation can be described by some axiomatic.  
This means only that we *can* agree on simple (but very fertile) basic  
number relations. For primitive matter, that does not exist, and that  
is why people recourse to ostensive "definition". They knock the  
table, and say "you will not tell me that this table does not exist".  
The problem, for them, is that I can dream of people knocking tables.  
So for the basic fundamental ontology, you just cannot use the  
ostensive move (or you have to abandon the dream argument, classical  
theory of knowledge, or comp). But this moves seems an ad hoc non-comp  
move, if not a rather naive attitude.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-20 Thread ronaldheld

Bruno:
 You may be correct that it is only an intellectual exercise. How many
lines of LISP code comprises the UD?
 I may have been infomally exposed to LISP in college, but that was
decades ago.
Ronald

On Jul 20, 5:01 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 19 Jul 2011, at 21:16, meekerdb wrote:
>
> > On 7/19/2011 11:32 AM, ronaldheld wrote:
> >> Given limited resources and for only 1 program, it does not seem
> >> logical to learn LISP. Are there Windows or DOS executables of the  
> >> UD?
> >> FWIW. I use MAPLE and not Mathematica.
> >>                Ronald
>
> > Maple is based on LISP.  An executable UD wouldn't be very  
> > interesting.  Since it doesn't halt what would you do with it?  It's  
> > the program itself that is more interesting.
>
> Absolutely. Even more important is the understanding that the UD, and  
> its mathematical execution is embedded in the first order arithmetical  
> true relation. This is not obvious, nor easy to prove. But it is  
> proved in any accurate proof of Gödel's theorem for arithmetic.
>
> Also, I would say to Ronald that it is easy to write a code for the UD  
> in any language. I guess it will be a tedious work in a language like  
> Fortran, but that might be a good exercise in programming. But again,  
> you are right: it makes no sense to program a UD. The running is  
> infinite. The only reasons to program it are pedagogical and  
> illustrative.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-20 Thread meekerdb


On 7/20/2011 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I'm afraid this is not true. Some people even argue that computation
does not exist, the physical world only approximate them, according to
them.
I have not yet seen a physical definition of computation


How about "a series of causally connected states which process
information"



Can you give me a physical definition of the terms "series", "causal", 
"connected, "states", "process", and "information"?

And I am very demanding: I would like an axiomatic definition.
In absence of such a definition, you are just describing an 
implementation of a computation in what you assume, implicitly, to be 
a natural universal system.






, except by
natural phenomenon emulating a mathematical computation. Computer and
computations have been discovered by mathematicians, and there many
equivalent definition of the concept, but only if we accept Church
thesis.

Now if you accept the idea that the propositions like "if x divides 4
then x divides 8", or "there is an infinity of twin primes" are true
or false independently of you, then arithmetical truth makes *all* the
propositions about all computations true or false independently of
you. The root of why it is so is Gödel arithmetization of the syntax
of arithmetic (or Principia). To be a piece of a computation is
arithmetical, even if intensional (can depend on the *existence* of
coding, but the coding is entirely arithmetical itself.

In short, I can prove to you that there is computations in elementary
arithmetical truth, but you have to speculate on many things to claim
that there are physical computations. Locally, typing on this
computer, makes me OK with the idea that the physical reality emulates
computations, and that makes the white rabbit problems even more
complex, but then we have not the choice, given the assumption.


So I assumed I didn't understand Bruno's argument correctly.


You seem to have a difficulty to see that elementary arithmetic "run"
the UD, not in time and space, but in the arithmetical truth.


He should. Truth is not existence.


What is "existence"? If you refer to physics, then you are begging the 
question, or you are just assuming that we are not machine.


Bruno 


But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic definition 
and rejecting ostensive ones.  Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of 
course that forces computation to be there.


Brent

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Jul 2011, at 15:21, 1Z wrote:




On Jul 8, 5:53 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 08 Jul 2011, at 02:35, meekerdb wrote:




On 7/7/2011 4:59 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 10:12:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:



One that happens to be incompatible with
theory that our minds are computer programs.


Can you explain that?  It seems to be Bruno's central claim, but  
so

far as I can see he only tries to prove that a physical reality is
otiose.



Brent



Here's my take on it. I guess you read the version I wrote 6 years
ago
in ToN.



Once you allow the existence of a universal dovetailer, we are far
more likely to be running on the dovetailer (which is a simple
program) than on a much more complicated program (such as  
simulating

the universe as we currently see it). Under COMP, the dovetailer is
capable of generating all possible experiences (which is why it is
universal). Therefore, everything we call physics (electrons,  
quarks,

electromagnetic fields, etc) is phenomena caused by the running of
the
dovetailer. By Church-Turing thesis, the dovetailer could be  
running

on anything capable of supporting universal computation. To use
Kantian terminology, what the dovetailer runs on is the noumenon,
unknowable reality, which need have no connection which the
phenomenon
we observe. In fact with the CT-thesis, we cannot even know which
noumenon we're running on, in the case there may be more than  
one. We
might just as well be running on some demigod's child's  
playstation,

as running on Platonic arithmetic. It is in principle unknowable,
even
by any putative omniscient God - there is simply no matter of fact
there to know.


So ultimately, this is why Bruno eliminates the concrete  
dovetailer,
in the manner of Laplace eliminating God "Sire, je n'ai besoin de  
cet

hypothese".


Anyway, Bruno will no doubt correct any mistaken conceptions  
here :).



Cheers



That's what I thought he said.  But I see no reason to suppose a UD
is running, much less running without physics.  We don't know of any
computation that occurs immaterially.


I'm afraid this is not true. Some people even argue that computation
does not exist, the physical world only approximate them, according  
to

them.
I have not yet seen a physical definition of computation


How about "a series of causally connected states which process
information"



Can you give me a physical definition of the terms "series", "causal",  
"connected, "states", "process", and "information"?

And I am very demanding: I would like an axiomatic definition.
In absence of such a definition, you are just describing an  
implementation of a computation in what you assume, implicitly, to be  
a natural universal system.






, except by
natural phenomenon emulating a mathematical computation. Computer and
computations have been discovered by mathematicians, and there many
equivalent definition of the concept, but only if we accept Church
thesis.

Now if you accept the idea that the propositions like "if x divides 4
then x divides 8", or "there is an infinity of twin primes" are true
or false independently of you, then arithmetical truth makes *all*  
the

propositions about all computations true or false independently of
you. The root of why it is so is Gödel arithmetization of the syntax
of arithmetic (or Principia). To be a piece of a computation is
arithmetical, even if intensional (can depend on the *existence* of
coding, but the coding is entirely arithmetical itself.

In short, I can prove to you that there is computations in elementary
arithmetical truth, but you have to speculate on many things to claim
that there are physical computations. Locally, typing on this
computer, makes me OK with the idea that the physical reality  
emulates

computations, and that makes the white rabbit problems even more
complex, but then we have not the choice, given the assumption.


So I assumed I didn't understand Bruno's argument correctly.


You seem to have a difficulty to see that elementary arithmetic "run"
the UD, not in time and space, but in the arithmetical truth.


He should. Truth is not existence.


What is "existence"? If you refer to physics, then you are begging the  
question, or you are just assuming that we are not machine.


Bruno






Even the
tiny Robinson arithmetic proves all the propositions of the form it
exist i, j, s such that phi_i(j)^s is the s first step of the
computation of phi_i(j). And RA gives already all the proves, and so
already define a UD, which works is entirely made true by the
arithmetical reality, which I hope you can imagine as being not
dependent of us, the human, nor the alien, nor the Löbian machines
themselves (RA+ the inductions).

The arithmetization is not entirely obvious. It uses the Chinese
theorem on remainders, you need Bezout theorem, and all in all it is
like implementing a very high level programming languages in a very
low level "machine language", with very few instructions.
Mati

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-20 Thread 1Z



On Jul 6, 12:44 pm, Russell Standish  wrote:
> Constantine, this is a rather trollish comment coming from an ignorant
> position.
>
> Let me put the following gedanken experiment - consider the
> possibility that T. Rex might be either green or blue creatures, and
> that either possibility is physically consistent with everything we
> know about them. In a Multiverse (such as we consider here), we are in
> a superposition of histories, which include both green and blue
> T. Rexes.
>
> Then one day, someone discovers an exquisitely fossilised T. Rex
> feather, from which it is possible to determine the T. Rex's colour by
> means of photonics. Let us say, that the colour was determined to be
> green to everybody's satisfaction. But there is an alternate universe,
> where the colour was determined to be blue. This universe has now
> differentiated from our own, on the single fact of T. Rex colour.
>
> The question is, when was the colour of the dinosaur established as a
> fact? Many of us many worlders would argue it wasn't established
> until the photonics measurement was made - there was no 'matter of
> fact' about the dinosaur colour prior to that.
>
> Generalising from this, it is quite plausible that suns and stars did
> not exist

You are playing on two meanings of "fact"; that something is not
known until time T does not mean it pops into existence at time
T. Truth is not existence.

>prior to there being minds to perceive them. It is somewhat
> disorienting to realise this possibility, ingrained as we are from
> birth to believing in a directly perecived external reality. Yet the
> reality we perceive is very definitely a construction of our minds - a
> confabulation as it were, and there is not one scrap of evidence that
> that reality exists independently of our minds.

The evidence that reality exists independent of out minds
is just the evidence that other people's brains exist and
work in such-and-such a way. No scientific evidence can disprove
reality, including evidence about brains.

It may well be the case that our perceptions of reality
include feed-forward, reconstruction, interpretation, etc, etc.
But that does not mean there is no objective world. Indirect
perception of the world is still perception of the world,
Indirect perception does not move reality inside
the head anymore than photography steals souls.

> BTW Bruno is not assuming that consciousness preceded matter, he is
> instead assuming that consciousness is the result of the running of
> some computer program, as I'm sure he would tell you. The consequence
> of that latter assumption is that perceived reality is just that - a
> perception.



>
> On Tue, Jul 05, 2011 at 08:14:23PM -0700, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
> > Bruno assumes that consciousness preceded matter
>
> > then why do we only find consciousness as a terrestrial phenomena
> > (suns and stars aren't conscious).. and as a later stage terrestrial
> > phenomena for that matter i.e. water, plants, minerals etc. are
> > not conscious. and intellect and understanding in any real sense
> > are found in even later stage terrestrial forms, and we have physical
> > explanations for this...
>
> > Bruno sins against naturalism and all that we know and intuit.
>
> > He will do anything to resurrect from the dead some rudimentary and
> > vague Mysticism.
>
> > --
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> 
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> Principal, High Performance Coders
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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-20 Thread 1Z



On Jul 8, 5:53 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 08 Jul 2011, at 02:35, meekerdb wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 7/7/2011 4:59 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >> On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 10:12:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  One that happens to be incompatible with
>  theory that our minds are computer programs.
>
> >>> Can you explain that?  It seems to be Bruno's central claim, but so
> >>> far as I can see he only tries to prove that a physical reality is
> >>> otiose.
>
> >>> Brent
>
> >> Here's my take on it. I guess you read the version I wrote 6 years  
> >> ago
> >> in ToN.
>
> >> Once you allow the existence of a universal dovetailer, we are far
> >> more likely to be running on the dovetailer (which is a simple
> >> program) than on a much more complicated program (such as simulating
> >> the universe as we currently see it). Under COMP, the dovetailer is
> >> capable of generating all possible experiences (which is why it is
> >> universal). Therefore, everything we call physics (electrons, quarks,
> >> electromagnetic fields, etc) is phenomena caused by the running of  
> >> the
> >> dovetailer. By Church-Turing thesis, the dovetailer could be running
> >> on anything capable of supporting universal computation. To use
> >> Kantian terminology, what the dovetailer runs on is the noumenon,
> >> unknowable reality, which need have no connection which the  
> >> phenomenon
> >> we observe. In fact with the CT-thesis, we cannot even know which
> >> noumenon we're running on, in the case there may be more than one. We
> >> might just as well be running on some demigod's child's playstation,
> >> as running on Platonic arithmetic. It is in principle unknowable,  
> >> even
> >> by any putative omniscient God - there is simply no matter of fact
> >> there to know.
>
> >> So ultimately, this is why Bruno eliminates the concrete dovetailer,
> >> in the manner of Laplace eliminating God "Sire, je n'ai besoin de cet
> >> hypothese".
>
> >> Anyway, Bruno will no doubt correct any mistaken conceptions here :).
>
> >> Cheers
>
> > That's what I thought he said.  But I see no reason to suppose a UD  
> > is running, much less running without physics.  We don't know of any  
> > computation that occurs immaterially.
>
> I'm afraid this is not true. Some people even argue that computation  
> does not exist, the physical world only approximate them, according to  
> them.
> I have not yet seen a physical definition of computation

How about "a series of causally connected states which process
information"

>, except by  
> natural phenomenon emulating a mathematical computation. Computer and  
> computations have been discovered by mathematicians, and there many  
> equivalent definition of the concept, but only if we accept Church  
> thesis.
>
> Now if you accept the idea that the propositions like "if x divides 4  
> then x divides 8", or "there is an infinity of twin primes" are true  
> or false independently of you, then arithmetical truth makes *all* the  
> propositions about all computations true or false independently of  
> you. The root of why it is so is Gödel arithmetization of the syntax  
> of arithmetic (or Principia). To be a piece of a computation is  
> arithmetical, even if intensional (can depend on the *existence* of  
> coding, but the coding is entirely arithmetical itself.
>
> In short, I can prove to you that there is computations in elementary  
> arithmetical truth, but you have to speculate on many things to claim  
> that there are physical computations. Locally, typing on this  
> computer, makes me OK with the idea that the physical reality emulates  
> computations, and that makes the white rabbit problems even more  
> complex, but then we have not the choice, given the assumption.
>
> > So I assumed I didn't understand Bruno's argument correctly.
>
> You seem to have a difficulty to see that elementary arithmetic "run"  
> the UD, not in time and space, but in the arithmetical truth.

He should. Truth is not existence.

>Even the  
> tiny Robinson arithmetic proves all the propositions of the form it  
> exist i, j, s such that phi_i(j)^s is the s first step of the  
> computation of phi_i(j). And RA gives already all the proves, and so  
> already define a UD, which works is entirely made true by the  
> arithmetical reality, which I hope you can imagine as being not  
> dependent of us, the human, nor the alien, nor the Löbian machines  
> themselves (RA+ the inductions).
>
> The arithmetization is not entirely obvious. It uses the Chinese  
> theorem on remainders, you need Bezout theorem, and all in all it is  
> like implementing a very high level programming languages in a very  
> low level "machine language", with very few instructions.  
> Matiyasevitch has deeply extended that result, by making it possible  
> to construct a creative set (a universal machine) as the set of non  
> negative integers of a degree four diophantine equation. This has the  
> consequence that yo

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-20 Thread 1Z



On Jul 8, 12:59 am, Russell Standish  wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 10:12:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> > >One that happens to be incompatible with
> > >theory that our minds are computer programs.
>
> > Can you explain that?  It seems to be Bruno's central claim, but so
> > far as I can see he only tries to prove that a physical reality is
> > otiose.
>
> > Brent
>
> Here's my take on it. I guess you read the version I wrote 6 years ago
> in ToN.
>
> Once you allow the existence of a universal dovetailer, we are far
> more likely to be running on the dovetailer (which is a simple
> program) than on a much more complicated program (such as simulating
> the universe as we currently see it). Under COMP, the dovetailer is
> capable of generating all possible experiences (which is why it is
> universal). Therefore, everything we call physics (electrons, quarks,
> electromagnetic fields, etc) is phenomena caused by the running of the
> dovetailer. By Church-Turing thesis, the dovetailer could be running
> on anything capable of supporting universal computation. To use
> Kantian terminology, what the dovetailer runs on is the noumenon,
> unknowable reality,

If it is unknowable, we don't know the UD is running on it. So I don't
accept the existence of  a UD.

> which need have no connection which the phenomenon
> we observe. In fact with the CT-thesis, we cannot even know which
> noumenon we're running on, in the case there may be more than one. We
> might just as well be running on some demigod's child's playstation,
> as running on Platonic arithmetic. It is in principle unknowable, even
> by any putative omniscient God - there is simply no matter of fact
> there to know.

Hurrah for Occam!

> So ultimately, this is why Bruno eliminates the concrete dovetailer,
> in the manner of Laplace eliminating God "Sire, je n'ai besoin de cet
> hypothese".

And why i reject the abstract dovetailer.

> Anyway, Bruno will no doubt correct any mistaken conceptions here :).
>
> Cheers
>
> --
>
> 
> Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-20 Thread Russell Standish

On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 12:16:01PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> On 7/19/2011 11:32 AM, ronaldheld wrote:
> >Given limited resources and for only 1 program, it does not seem
> >logical to learn LISP. Are there Windows or DOS executables of the UD?
> >FWIW. I use MAPLE and not Mathematica.
> >Ronald
> 
> Maple is based on LISP.  An executable UD wouldn't be very
> interesting.  Since it doesn't halt what would you do with it?  It's
> the program itself that is more interesting.
> 
> Brent
> 

No, unless it changed recently. Unlike most symbolic systems at the
time (eg Reduce, muMath or indeed Mathematica), it wasn't based on
Lisp, or implemented a Lisp-like language, but implemented a very
procedural language. This was both its strength and weakness -
weakness in the sense that you couldn't implement logical reasoning
(give it an equation and ask the system to solve it), but strength in
that competing systems (eg Mathematica) usually couldn't solve such
problems either without extensive procedure-like hints.

Maple was actually implemented in C (in the dim, distant, past, I
worked on the Maple source code).

Going back to the FORTRAN issue (or C++ or Java), these languages do
not make it easy to describe programs written in their own
language. It is probably an exercise in futility to implement a UD in
them, given what we know about universal computing.

It would probably be far easier to do it in some kind of assembler
language (if Lisp, or Lisp-like languages are not your cup of tea). If
you try this - pick an old/simpler assembly language - eg the 8080
instruction set perhaps - rather than modern ones that deal with
multitasking operating systems and virtual memory.

Cheers
-- 

Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 19 Jul 2011, at 21:16, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/19/2011 11:32 AM, ronaldheld wrote:

Given limited resources and for only 1 program, it does not seem
logical to learn LISP. Are there Windows or DOS executables of the  
UD?

FWIW. I use MAPLE and not Mathematica.
   Ronald



Maple is based on LISP.  An executable UD wouldn't be very  
interesting.  Since it doesn't halt what would you do with it?  It's  
the program itself that is more interesting.


Absolutely. Even more important is the understanding that the UD, and  
its mathematical execution is embedded in the first order arithmetical  
true relation. This is not obvious, nor easy to prove. But it is  
proved in any accurate proof of Gödel's theorem for arithmetic.


Also, I would say to Ronald that it is easy to write a code for the UD  
in any language. I guess it will be a tedious work in a language like  
Fortran, but that might be a good exercise in programming. But again,  
you are right: it makes no sense to program a UD. The running is  
infinite. The only reasons to program it are pedagogical and  
illustrative.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-19 Thread meekerdb


On 7/19/2011 11:32 AM, ronaldheld wrote:

Given limited resources and for only 1 program, it does not seem
logical to learn LISP. Are there Windows or DOS executables of the UD?
FWIW. I use MAPLE and not Mathematica.
Ronald
   


Maple is based on LISP.  An executable UD wouldn't be very interesting.  
Since it doesn't halt what would you do with it?  It's the program 
itself that is more interesting.


Brent

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-19 Thread ronaldheld


Given limited resources and for only 1 program, it does not seem
logical to learn LISP. Are there Windows or DOS executables of the UD?
FWIW. I use MAPLE and not Mathematica.
   Ronald

On Jul 19, 10:14 am, Bruno Marchal  ote:
> On 18 Jul 2011, at 21:26, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
> > On 18.07.2011 14:21 ronaldheld said the following:
> >> Bruno:
> >>    I do not know LISP. Any UD code written in Fortran?
> >>                     Ronald
>
> > Very good book to learn LISP is
>
> >http://mitpress.mit.edu/sicp/full-text/book/book.html
>
> A great classic book indeed. Very good indeed.
>
> For the beginners, "The Little Lisper" by Daniel P. Friedman is a chef-
> d'oeuvre of pedagogy.
> I don't find any version online, alas.
> Here are reference for its third edition (but it looks out of print!):
>
> http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=4879
>
>
>
> > Just click Next page, read and so on. By the way, List is much nicer  
> > than Fortran. I have learned Lisp after Fortran - C - C++ and I  
> > should say that I love Lisp (well, I prefer Mathematica - it is a  
> > Lisp with a human face).
>
> I guess we have a different conception of what is a human face :)
> I do have problems with the syntax of Mathematica, but it might be  
> that I have never succeeded in compiling it in the right way. It might  
> be due also to the fact that I use cheap versions, I dunno.
>
> > Yet, the real programmer must start with Lisp. If she will be scared  
> > by too many brackets, for example
>
> > (define (fast-expt b n)
> >  (cond ((= n 0) 1)
> >        ((even? n) (square (fast-expt b (/ n 2
> >        (else (* b (fast-expt b (- n 1))
>
> > then she should forget about programming.
>
> Of course, the brackets are what makes the syntax of Lisp so  
> transparent. Indeed the programs have the structure of the data-
> structures handled naturally by Lisp (the lists). This makes meta-
> programming very easy. The "Gödel number" of (define ...) is just  
> (quote (define ...)). Together with its functional nature, it makes  
> Lisp particularly easy for (third person) self-reference. Lisp is very  
> close, in spirit, with the combinators or the lambda calculus, on  
> which I have talked about regularly.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-19 Thread Bruno Marchal




Hi,

I really want to apology for my spelling. I will not correct my post  
(I could add errors!), but I want to correct a statement I made:



On 18 Jul 2011, at 20:44, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Accepting what you can feel and see and test is the antithesis of  
taking it for granted and the epitome of the scientific attitude.


That is Aristotle definition of reality (in modern vocabulary). But  
the platonist defend the idea that what we feel, see and test, is  
only number relation, and that the true reality, be it a universe or  
a god, is what we try to extrapolate.


Of course this is a mistaken statement. Not all platonists are  
pythagoreans. I thought writing this:


"But the platonists defend the idea that what we feel, see, and test  
might be the shadow, or the border of something else, which might be  
non physical.".


Plato knew the Pythagorean, and a part of the academia defended the  
idea that the fundamental reality was mathematical. But other  
Platonists, like Plato himself, were just more agnostic on this than  
the so-called Mathematicians (notably Xeusippes). Plotinus show the  
same agnosticism, despite its amazing enneads on the Numbers.


Best,

Bruno





We certainly don't see, feel, or test a *primitive* physical  
universe. The existence of such a primitive physical reality is a  
metaphysical proposition. We cannot test that. This follows directly  
from the dream argument. That is what Plato will try to explain with  
the cave.







The trouble with axiomatic methods is that they prove what you put  
into them.  They make no provision for what may loosely be called  
"boundary conditions".  Physics is successful because it doesn't  
try to explain everything.  Religions fall into dogma because they  
do.


I don't criticize physics, but aristotelian physicalism. which is,  
for many scientists, a sort of dogma.
Religion fall into dogma, because humans have perhaps not yet the  
maturity to be able to doubt on fundamental question. To admit that  
we don't know if there is a (primitive) physical universe.














Physicists use mathematics (in preference to other languages) in  
order to be precise and to avoid self-contradiction.


That is the main error of the physicists. They confuse mathematics  
with a language.


And the main error of mathematicians is they confuse proof with  
truth.



That is unfair because all what I use here is the (big) discovery of  
Gödel that arithmetical truth escapes all possible effective or  
axiomatizable proof systems. So mathematicians are able to  
distinguish mathematically, in many case, the difference between  
proof and truth.
Only intuitionist confuse proof and truth, (like S4Grz!) but  
classical mathematicians note that not only proof does not entail  
truth, but that even in the case where proof entails truth, the  
contrary remains false: truth does not entail proof.


The whole AUDA is based on the fact that arithmetical truth is  
beyond all correct machines (proofs).



Let me comment a little part of your dialog with Jason. I comment  
also Jason.





 "True" is just a value that is preserved in the logical inference  
from axioms to theorem.  It's not the same as "real".


True is more than inference from axioms.



I think Jason said that. I agree. Truth is preserved in the  
application of sound inference rules, but truth is far bigger than  
anything you can access by inference rules and axioms. Arithmetical  
truth is, compared to any machine, *very* big. The predicate truth  
cannot even be made arithmetical.





For example, Godel's theorem is a statement about axiomatic  
systems, it is not derived from axioms.


Well, the beauty is that Gödel's second incompleteness theorem is a  
theorem of arithmetic. BDt -> Bf (or ~Bf -> ~B~Bf) is a theorem of  
PA. It is the whole point of interviewing PA about itself. It can  
prove its own Gödel's theorem. That is missed in Lucas, Penrose, and  
many use of Gödel's theorem by anti-mechanist. Simple, but not so  
simple, machine have tremendous power of introspection. Löbian one,  
have, actually, maximal power of introspection.






Sure it is.  It's a logical inference in a meta-theory.



Not at all. The second (deeper) theorem of Gödel, like the theorem  
of Löb, is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic. The tedious part consists  
in translating the "Bx" in arithmetic, but Gödel's succeeded  
famously in the task (cf beweisbar ('x')).


G axiomatise all such metatheorem that a theory can prove about  
itself, and G* formalize all the truth that the theory can prove +  
that the theory cannot prove about itself. In that way, Solovay  
closed the research in the modal propositional provability/ 
consistency logics, by finding their axiomatization, and this both  
for the provable part of the machine (which contains BDt -> Bf), and  
the non provable part (which contains typically Dt, DDt, DDDt, DBf,  
DDBf, etc.).


Bruno









Brent

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-19 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 18 Jul 2011, at 21:26, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 18.07.2011 14:21 ronaldheld said the following:

Bruno:
   I do not know LISP. Any UD code written in Fortran?
Ronald



Very good book to learn LISP is

http://mitpress.mit.edu/sicp/full-text/book/book.html


A great classic book indeed. Very good indeed.

For the beginners, "The Little Lisper" by Daniel P. Friedman is a chef- 
d'oeuvre of pedagogy.

I don't find any version online, alas.
Here are reference for its third edition (but it looks out of print!):

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=4879




Just click Next page, read and so on. By the way, List is much nicer  
than Fortran. I have learned Lisp after Fortran - C - C++ and I  
should say that I love Lisp (well, I prefer Mathematica - it is a  
Lisp with a human face).


I guess we have a different conception of what is a human face :)
I do have problems with the syntax of Mathematica, but it might be  
that I have never succeeded in compiling it in the right way. It might  
be due also to the fact that I use cheap versions, I dunno.





Yet, the real programmer must start with Lisp. If she will be scared  
by too many brackets, for example


(define (fast-expt b n)
 (cond ((= n 0) 1)
   ((even? n) (square (fast-expt b (/ n 2
   (else (* b (fast-expt b (- n 1))

then she should forget about programming.


Of course, the brackets are what makes the syntax of Lisp so  
transparent. Indeed the programs have the structure of the data- 
structures handled naturally by Lisp (the lists). This makes meta- 
programming very easy. The "Gödel number" of (define ...) is just  
(quote (define ...)). Together with its functional nature, it makes  
Lisp particularly easy for (third person) self-reference. Lisp is very  
close, in spirit, with the combinators or the lambda calculus, on  
which I have talked about regularly.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-18 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


On 18.07.2011 14:21 ronaldheld said the following:

Bruno:
I do not know LISP. Any UD code written in Fortran?
 Ronald



Very good book to learn LISP is

http://mitpress.mit.edu/sicp/full-text/book/book.html

Just click Next page, read and so on. By the way, List is much nicer 
than Fortran. I have learned Lisp after Fortran - C - C++ and I should 
say that I love Lisp (well, I prefer Mathematica - it is a Lisp with a 
human face). Yet, the real programmer must start with Lisp. If she will 
be scared by too many brackets, for example


(define (fast-expt b n)
  (cond ((= n 0) 1)
((even? n) (square (fast-expt b (/ n 2
(else (* b (fast-expt b (- n 1))

then she should forget about programming.

Evgenii
http://blog.rudnyi.ru

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-18 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 18 Jul 2011, at 19:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/18/2011 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Jul 2011, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/17/2011 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Jul 2011, at 18:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken  
too much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the  
fact that math is about immaterial relation between non  
material beings. Could you give me an explanation that 34 is  
less than 36 by using a physics which does not presuppose  
implicitly the numbers.



||


Nice, indeed. We do agree that 34 is less than 36, and what that  
means.
I am not sure your proof is physical thought. Physics has been  
very useful to convey the idea, and I thank God for not having  
made my computer crashed when reading your post, but I see you  
only teleporting information. That fact that you are using the  
physical reality to convey an idea does not make that idea  
physical.

I was expecting a physical definition of the numbers.


Of course there is no physical definition of the numbers because  
the usual definition includes the axiom of infinity.


You don't need the axiom of infinity for axiomatizing the numbers.  
The axiom of infinity is typical for set theories, not natural  
number theories. You need it to have OMEGA and others infinite  
ordinals and cardinals.







As finite beings we can hypothesize infinities.


Yes, but we don't need this for numbers. On the contrary, the  
induction axioms are limitation axioms to prevent the rising of  
infinite numbers.






By thinking that I can understand your proof, you are  
presupposing many things, including the numbers, and the way to  
compare them.


On the contrary I think you (and Peano) conceived of numbers by  
considering such such examples.  The examples presuppose very  
little - probably just the perceptual power the evolution endowed  
us with.


That is provably impossible. No machine can infer numbers from  
examples, without having them preprogrammed at the start. You need  
the truth on number to make sense on any inference of any notion.



Nothing can be proven that is not implicit in the axioms and rules  
of inference.


OK.





 So I doubt the significance of this proven impossibility.



?

It means, contrary of the expectations of the logicist that the  
natural numbers existence is not implicit in many logical system.
We cannot derive them from logic alone, nor from first order theories  
of the real numbers, nor from most algebra, etc. So, if we want  
natural numbers in the intended model of the theory, they have to be  
postulated, implicitly (like in wave theory, set theory) or  
explicitly, like in RA or PA.

















So it is a funny answer, which did surprise me, but which avoids  
the difficulty of defining what (finite) numbers are.
It *is* a theorem in logic, that we can't define them  
"univocally" in first order logical system. We can define them in  
second order logic, but this one use the intuition of number.


If you agree that physics is well described by QM, an explanation  
of 34 < 36 should be a theorem in quantum physics,


I'm sure it is.  If you add 34 electrons to 36 positrons you get  
two positrons left over.


Physics is not an axiomatic system.


That is the main defect of physics. But things evolve. Without  
making physics into an axiomatic, the whole intepretation problem  
of the physical laws will remain sunday philosophy handwaving.  
Physicists are just very naïve on what can be an interpretation.  
The reason is they "religious" view of the universe. They take it  
for granted, which is problematic, because that is not a scientific  
attitude.


Accepting what you can feel and see and test is the antithesis of  
taking it for granted and the epitome of the scientific attitude.


That is Aristotle definition of reality (in modern vocabulary). But  
the platonist defend the idea that what we feel, see and test, is only  
number relation, and that the true reality, be it a universe or a god,  
is what we try to extrapolate.


We certainly don't see, feel, or test a *primitive* physical universe.  
The existence of such a primitive physical reality is a metaphysical  
proposition. We cannot test that. This follows directly from the dream  
argument. That is what Plato will try to explain with the cave.







The trouble with axiomatic methods is that they prove what you put  
into them.  They make no provision for what may loosely be called  
"boundary conditions".  Physics is successful because it doesn't try  
to explain everything.  Religions fall into dogma because they do.


I don't criticize physics, but aristotelian physicalism. which is, for  
many scientists, a sort of dogma.
Religion fall into dogma, because humans have perhaps not yet the  
maturity to be able to doubt

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-18 Thread meekerdb


On 7/18/2011 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Jul 2011, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/17/2011 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Jul 2011, at 18:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken 
too much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact 
that math is about immaterial relation between non material 
beings. Could you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 
by using a physics which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers.



||


Nice, indeed. We do agree that 34 is less than 36, and what that means.
I am not sure your proof is physical thought. Physics has been very 
useful to convey the idea, and I thank God for not having made my 
computer crashed when reading your post, but I see you only 
teleporting information. That fact that you are using the physical 
reality to convey an idea does not make that idea physical.

I was expecting a physical definition of the numbers.


Of course there is no physical definition of the numbers because the 
usual definition includes the axiom of infinity.


You don't need the axiom of infinity for axiomatizing the numbers. The 
axiom of infinity is typical for set theories, not natural number 
theories. You need it to have OMEGA and others infinite ordinals and 
cardinals.







As finite beings we can hypothesize infinities.


Yes, but we don't need this for numbers. On the contrary, the 
induction axioms are limitation axioms to prevent the rising of 
infinite numbers.






By thinking that I can understand your proof, you are presupposing 
many things, including the numbers, and the way to compare them.


On the contrary I think you (and Peano) conceived of numbers by 
considering such such examples.  The examples presuppose very little 
- probably just the perceptual power the evolution endowed us with.


That is provably impossible. No machine can infer numbers from 
examples, without having them preprogrammed at the start. You need the 
truth on number to make sense on any inference of any notion.



Nothing can be proven that is not implicit in the axioms and rules of 
inference.  So I doubt the significance of this proven impossibility.












So it is a funny answer, which did surprise me, but which avoids the 
difficulty of defining what (finite) numbers are.
It *is* a theorem in logic, that we can't define them "univocally" 
in first order logical system. We can define them in second order 
logic, but this one use the intuition of number.


If you agree that physics is well described by QM, an explanation of 
34 < 36 should be a theorem in quantum physics,


I'm sure it is.  If you add 34 electrons to 36 positrons you get two 
positrons left over.


Physics is not an axiomatic system.


That is the main defect of physics. But things evolve. Without making 
physics into an axiomatic, the whole intepretation problem of the 
physical laws will remain sunday philosophy handwaving. Physicists are 
just very naïve on what can be an interpretation. The reason is they 
"religious" view of the universe. They take it for granted, which is 
problematic, because that is not a scientific attitude.


Accepting what you can feel and see and test is the antithesis of taking 
it for granted and the epitome of the scientific attitude.  The trouble 
with axiomatic methods is that they prove what you put into them.  They 
make no provision for what may loosely be called "boundary conditions".  
Physics is successful because it doesn't try to explain everything.  
Religions fall into dogma because they do.








Physicists use mathematics (in preference to other languages) in 
order to be precise and to avoid self-contradiction.


That is the main error of the physicists. They confuse mathematics 
with a language. 


And the main error of mathematicians is they confuse proof with truth.

Brent

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-18 Thread ronaldheld

Bruno:
   I do not know LISP. Any UD code written in Fortran?
Ronald

On Jul 18, 5:26 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 17 Jul 2011, at 19:52, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal   
> > wrote:
>
> > The interior of the
> > singularity is the interior of the cosmos with all of the spacetime
> > vacuumed out of it. Spacetime is what exteriorizes the big bang
> > (meaning it's more of a Big Break, where the void of space rushes
> > inward. There is no exterior to the big bang since it prefigures
> > timespace, therefore it can only be conceived of accurately from the
> > interior perspective. explicates matter as volume and the void of time
> > explicates 'energy' (the experience of matter) as sequence-memory. The
> > Singularity then is always happening and never happening, since it is
> > outside timespace, the hub of the wheel of Runtime/UD.
>
> > The UD is a mathematical being. It is an open question if the  
> > apparent physical universe run a UD, without stopping.
> > One has run, in my office, for one week. Such a program is demanding  
> > in memory, to say the least.
>
> > Bruno,
>
> > Is the source of this program available?  I am curious how many  
> > lines of (Fortran?) code is was.
>
> Jason,
>
> Click on
>
> Φ-LISP & Φ-DOVE
>
> in the volume 4 of "Conscience et Mécanisme" here:
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html
>
> It is not in FORTRAN, but in LISP. The UD is written in a personal  
> LISP, described itself there too (in Allegro Common Lisp).
>
> Sorry for the comments in french, but if you know a few LISP, the code  
> is self-explaining. Examples are given for most subroutines. The whole  
> program makes about 300 lines.
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-18 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 17 Jul 2011, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/17/2011 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Jul 2011, at 18:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken  
too much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the  
fact that math is about immaterial relation between non material  
beings. Could you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36  
by using a physics which does not presuppose implicitly the  
numbers.



||


Nice, indeed. We do agree that 34 is less than 36, and what that  
means.
I am not sure your proof is physical thought. Physics has been very  
useful to convey the idea, and I thank God for not having made my  
computer crashed when reading your post, but I see you only  
teleporting information. That fact that you are using the physical  
reality to convey an idea does not make that idea physical.

I was expecting a physical definition of the numbers.


Of course there is no physical definition of the numbers because the  
usual definition includes the axiom of infinity.


You don't need the axiom of infinity for axiomatizing the numbers. The  
axiom of infinity is typical for set theories, not natural number  
theories. You need it to have OMEGA and others infinite ordinals and  
cardinals.







As finite beings we can hypothesize infinities.


Yes, but we don't need this for numbers. On the contrary, the  
induction axioms are limitation axioms to prevent the rising of  
infinite numbers.






By thinking that I can understand your proof, you are presupposing  
many things, including the numbers, and the way to compare them.


On the contrary I think you (and Peano) conceived of numbers by  
considering such such examples.  The examples presuppose very little  
- probably just the perceptual power the evolution endowed us with.


That is provably impossible. No machine can infer numbers from  
examples, without having them preprogrammed at the start. You need the  
truth on number to make sense on any inference of any notion.










So it is a funny answer, which did surprise me, but which avoids  
the difficulty of defining what (finite) numbers are.
It *is* a theorem in logic, that we can't define them "univocally"  
in first order logical system. We can define them in second order  
logic, but this one use the intuition of number.


If you agree that physics is well described by QM, an explanation  
of 34 < 36 should be a theorem in quantum physics,


I'm sure it is.  If you add 34 electrons to 36 positrons you get two  
positrons left over.


Physics is not an axiomatic system.


That is the main defect of physics. But things evolve. Without making  
physics into an axiomatic, the whole intepretation problem of the  
physical laws will remain sunday philosophy handwaving. Physicists are  
just very naïve on what can be an interpretation. The reason is they  
"religious" view of the universe. They take it for granted, which is  
problematic, because that is not a scientific attitude.





Physicists use mathematics (in preference to other languages) in  
order to be precise and to avoid self-contradiction.


That is the main error of the physicists. They confuse mathematics  
with a language. Even Einstein was wrong on this. Wheeler, Deutsch and  
Penrose are already far less wrong on this. Mathematics is independent  
of language. We can be wrong on this because mathematics is highly  
dependent on language when we want to *communicate* mathematical  
facts. Logic can help to make this precise. But when logic is studied  
superficially, it can aggravate the confusion, due to the role of the  
formal languages.





That doesn't mean that physics is mathematics.


A good point. Even with comp, physics is not mathematics, nor is  
theology pure mathematics. But with comp, math plays a more  
fundamental role, and in a sense, theology (of a provably correct  
machine) is a branch of arithmetic. But it happens we cannot know that  
for ourselves. This is coherent with the fact that the proposition "I  
am conscious" cannot be made mathematical. The first person is, from  
its point of view, beyond math (and physics).





That || is fewer than ||| is a fact about the world,


... about reality. OK. The word "world" is ambiguous.



that 5<7 is a theorem in mathematics which may be interpreted as a  
description of that fact.


I would say that it is a justification, or explanation of that fact.  
The description is still another thing.




But when talking philosophy we should be careful to distinguish  
facts from descriptions of the facts.


And to distinguish description and justification-proof, which can  
themselves be described, like in logic-metamathematics.






but the problem here is that quantum physics assumes real numbers  
and waves (trigonometrical functions), and that reintroduce t

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-18 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 17 Jul 2011, at 19:52, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



The interior of the
singularity is the interior of the cosmos with all of the spacetime
vacuumed out of it. Spacetime is what exteriorizes the big bang
(meaning it's more of a Big Break, where the void of space rushes
inward. There is no exterior to the big bang since it prefigures
timespace, therefore it can only be conceived of accurately from the
interior perspective. explicates matter as volume and the void of time
explicates 'energy' (the experience of matter) as sequence-memory. The
Singularity then is always happening and never happening, since it is
outside timespace, the hub of the wheel of Runtime/UD.

The UD is a mathematical being. It is an open question if the  
apparent physical universe run a UD, without stopping.
One has run, in my office, for one week. Such a program is demanding  
in memory, to say the least.



Bruno,

Is the source of this program available?  I am curious how many  
lines of (Fortran?) code is was.



Jason,

Click on

Φ-LISP & Φ-DOVE

in the volume 4 of "Conscience et Mécanisme" here:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html

It is not in FORTRAN, but in LISP. The UD is written in a personal  
LISP, described itself there too (in Allegro Common Lisp).


Sorry for the comments in french, but if you know a few LISP, the code  
is self-explaining. Examples are given for most subroutines. The whole  
program makes about 300 lines.


Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-17 Thread Craig Weinberg

>I don't know what you mean by singularity, runtime, etc. In the UDA I
>use some consensual reality to support an argument, but in fine I
>isolated an axiomatic theory.

By singularity I mean the sum total of all phenomena minus timespace.
The idea of a monad from which all temporal phenomena emerges through
a program-like process or 'Runtime', within which spacetime sequences
are strictly observed. That's what I thought you meant by UDA - the
layer of reality in which we participate where we are limited by the
constraints of what kind of a thing we are - what scale, position, how
much matter in what kind of arrangement, etc.

>You talk like if you knew the truth. Are you a sort of guru of what?

No, it's just that it gets redundant to constantly use words like 'I
think' 'my guess is', etc. I'm just presenting a hypothetical
cosmology, so everything I say should be assumed to be my own opinions
and ideas.

>>Motive power is inversely proportionate to the
>> difference in the scale of the two densities, so that it's not gravity
>> exerting a field of force holding you to the ground,

>?

I'm saying that gravity is not a field that physically exists in
space, it's more like a function of how matter is organized. I think
that gravity may be like a Kryptonite effect which drains the
effectiveness of motive force exerted against a greater body.

>> but rather principles having an experience
>> of concreteness (by pretending they are the opposite end of what they
>> essentially are - ie chasing their tail, thus becoming existential and
>> completing the sensorimotive circuit of the singularity to become the
>> opposite of the singularity: not just everything and anything, but
>> finite, coherent things which come and go into existence, as well is
>> less coherent non-things that are literally felt out of insistence).

>?

I'm describing why I think phenomena come into existence. I'm
suggesting that the Singularity is the ground of being, but that it
seeks to temporarily be the opposite of itself, and that it does this
by dividing itself through the creation of timespace (Runtime) within
itself, so that each discrete phenomena has a sensorimotive and an
electromagnetic nature. The sensorimotive side is the immaterial side
which seeks a circuitous experience of breaking apart from the
Singularity, and then returning to it's source, thus giving rise to
sequence and the experience of time, which is perception. The
electomagnetic side is the container of sensorimotive experience which
serves to physically define the relations between the exteriors of
phenomena in space.

The nature of electromagnetic existence, then, is exterior phenomena
coexisting in space, while the sensorimotive experience is an
insistence felt from within. When we see a magnet attract an iron
filing, we experience it objectively as a iron filings being passively
pulled by invisible magnetic waves. What I'm suggesting is that like
gravity, magnetism is experienced from within as a powerlessness to
escape becoming part of something more powerful.

>It is very hard to make sense of what you are saying.
> From my work you can take deduce that you need special non Turing
>emulable components in some primitive matter (nor even quantum
>emulable).

The only primitive matter would be the Singularity, which would be
both primitive and the teleological antithesis of primitive, since it
is the container of all spacetime production and not a product of
spacetime processes.

Craig

On Jul 17, 11:38 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 15 Jul 2011, at 14:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-17 Thread meekerdb


On 7/17/2011 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Jul 2011, at 18:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too 
much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that 
math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could 
you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a 
physics which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers.



||


Nice, indeed. We do agree that 34 is less than 36, and what that means.
 I am not sure your proof is physical thought. Physics has been very 
useful to convey the idea, and I thank God for not having made my 
computer crashed when reading your post, but I see you only 
teleporting information. That fact that you are using the physical 
reality to convey an idea does not make that idea physical.
I was expecting a physical definition of the numbers. 


Of course there is no physical definition of the numbers because the 
usual definition includes the axiom of infinity.  As finite beings we 
can hypothesize infinities.


By thinking that I can understand your proof, you are presupposing 
many things, including the numbers, and the way to compare them.


On the contrary I think you (and Peano) conceived of numbers by 
considering such such examples.  The examples presuppose very little - 
probably just the perceptual power the evolution endowed us with.




So it is a funny answer, which did surprise me, but which avoids the 
difficulty of defining what (finite) numbers are.
It *is* a theorem in logic, that we can't define them "univocally" in 
first order logical system. We can define them in second order logic, 
but this one use the intuition of number.


If you agree that physics is well described by QM, an explanation of 
34 < 36 should be a theorem in quantum physics, 


I'm sure it is.  If you add 34 electrons to 36 positrons you get two 
positrons left over.


Physics is not an axiomatic system.  Physicists use mathematics (in 
preference to other languages) in order to be precise and to avoid 
self-contradiction.  That doesn't mean that physics is mathematics.  
That || is fewer than ||| is a fact about the world, that 5<7 is 
a theorem in mathematics which may be interpreted as a description of 
that fact.  But when talking philosophy we should be careful to 
distinguish facts from descriptions of the facts.


but the problem here is that quantum physics assumes real numbers and 
waves (trigonometrical functions), and that reintroduce the numbers at 
the base.


If it were an axiomatic system it would have lots of axioms (probably 
including Peano's) but it isn't.  I'm not sure axioms are "assumptions" 
though.


Brent





Bruno





Brent

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-17 Thread Jason Resch

On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>
>  The interior of the
>> singularity is the interior of the cosmos with all of the spacetime
>> vacuumed out of it. Spacetime is what exteriorizes the big bang
>> (meaning it's more of a Big Break, where the void of space rushes
>> inward. There is no exterior to the big bang since it prefigures
>> timespace, therefore it can only be conceived of accurately from the
>> interior perspective. explicates matter as volume and the void of time
>> explicates 'energy' (the experience of matter) as sequence-memory. The
>> Singularity then is always happening and never happening, since it is
>> outside timespace, the hub of the wheel of Runtime/UD.
>>
>
> The UD is a mathematical being. It is an open question if the apparent
> physical universe run a UD, without stopping.
> One has run, in my office, for one week. Such a program is demanding in
> memory, to say the least.
>
>
Bruno,

Is the source of this program available?  I am curious how many lines of
(Fortran?) code is was.

Thanks,

Jason



>
>
>
>
>> I get what you are saying about Mickey Mouse as far as an Inception/
>> Matrix/Maya sense of value-weighted coherence within a semiotic frame
>> of reference, although I think there is something good there that you
>> are over looking. Something about the density of the simulated
>> universe which, by definition, can only be realized in comparison to
>> the experience of a denser, more discrete version of the simulation.
>> It's qualia of density/mass but there's something unique - it's the
>> qualia that pretends not to be qualia. I'm not seduced by the promise
>> of the Higgs or Einsteinian curved space (a brilliantly useful
>> metaphor, but the opposite of what is literally true)
>>
>
> You talk like if you knew the truth. Are you a sort of guru of what?
>
>
>
>
>  - more at a
>> concept of Cumulative Entanglement, where the sensotimotive relation
>> of processes separated by space is warped such that scale and density
>> is respected. Motive power is inversely proportionate to the
>> difference in the scale of the two densities, so that it's not gravity
>> exerting a field of force holding you to the ground, it's the
>> magnitude of the Earth, (and the momentum of it's rotation and
>> revolution? or no? Not an astrophysicist, haha) which weakens your
>> motive power to escape becoming part of it.
>>
>
> ?
>
>
>
>> So yes, I am certainly willing to entertain comp as far as the cosmos
>> not being a concrete stuff
>>
>
> I am agnostic about comp.
> I just show that comp makes Aristotle's theology wrong. With comp,  there
> is no basic primitive universe that you can relate to consciousness, but the
> physical reality appearance is explained by a self limitation property of
> universal machine (again a mathematical, arithmetical notion).
>
>
>
>
>
>  but rather principles having an experience
>> of concreteness (by pretending they are the opposite end of what they
>> essentially are - ie chasing their tail, thus becoming existential and
>> completing the sensorimotive circuit of the singularity to become the
>> opposite of the singularity: not just everything and anything, but
>> finite, coherent things which come and go into existence, as well is
>> less coherent non-things that are literally felt out of insistence).
>>
>
> ?
>
>
>
>  I
>> don't want to limit comp to numbers though. I see that numbers have an
>> interior topology as well. That's qualia, and that's what numerology
>> tries to tap into. You're right, it is poetry, but that is the
>> interior of the cosmos. It insists. One has a personality. It's the
>> first, the only, the new, the solitary, etc. It's bold yet timid (it's
>> only frame of reference is 0 and 2). Two is a whole emergent identity,
>> coupling, relation, cooperation, equality, inequality, etc. So any
>> definition of comp to me would have to include the qualitative
>> interiority of numbers, the potential feelings, figurative,
>> metaphorical evocations which tie in the echo of the future by
>> subtracting from the singularity interior. Poetry pulls it down from
>> 'heaven'.
>>
>> Happy day-after-the-full moon Bruno. My head is banging on too many
>> cylinders right now but I look forward to continuing this soon. We
>> should trade tips on how to lower the control rods into our own
>> psychic fission pile and turn off the machine.
>>
>
>
> It is very hard to make sense of what you are saying.
> From my work you can take deduce that you need special non Turing emulable
> components in some primitive matter (nor even quantum emulable).
>
> With comp, on the contrary, we need , more exactly: we can only use,
> addition and multiplication of natural numbers. The mind will correspond to
> whatever a universal machine can talk about when introspecting (well defined
> by Gödel like technics), and matter appearances are retrieved from limiting
> attribute of such a mind. I do not propose any new theory. I show that all
> this is

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-17 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 15 Jul 2011, at 18:41, meekerdb wrote:

On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too
much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that
math is about immaterial relation between non material beings.
Could you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a
physics which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers.

Nice, indeed. We do agree that 34 is less than 36, and what that means.
I am not sure your proof is physical thought. Physics has been very
useful to convey the idea, and I thank God for not having made my
computer crashed when reading your post, but I see you only
teleporting information. That fact that you are using the physical
reality to convey an idea does not make that idea physical.
I was expecting a physical definition of the numbers. By thinking that
I can understand your proof, you are presupposing many things,
including the numbers, and the way to compare them.

So it is a funny answer, which did surprise me, but which avoids the
difficulty of defining what (finite) numbers are.
It *is* a theorem in logic, that we can't define them "univocally" in
first order logical system. We can define them in second order logic,
but this one use the intuition of number.

If you agree that physics is well described by QM, an explanation of
34 < 36 should be a theorem in quantum physics, but the problem here
is that quantum physics assumes real numbers and waves
(trigonometrical functions), and that reintroduce the numbers at the
base.

Bruno

Brent

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-17 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Jul 2011, at 14:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Interesting stuff. I had a marathon info download with Stephen and
he's helping me access your theory more. Still scratching the surface
but at least getting a better idea of how to approach it.

What you call UDA I think of as 'Runtime' in comparison to the
hardware which I think of as the Singularity.


I use axiomatic. I understand a word only if you can related it to  
something I can understand. Normally, what you say should be word  
independent.
I don't know what you mean by singularity, runtime, etc. In the UDA I  
use some consensual reality to support an argument, but in fine I  
isolated an axiomatic theory.

You should bet I am 12 years old and explain things with simple terms.





The interior of the
singularity is the interior of the cosmos with all of the spacetime
vacuumed out of it. Spacetime is what exteriorizes the big bang
(meaning it's more of a Big Break, where the void of space rushes
inward. There is no exterior to the big bang since it prefigures
timespace, therefore it can only be conceived of accurately from the
interior perspective. explicates matter as volume and the void of time
explicates 'energy' (the experience of matter) as sequence-memory. The
Singularity then is always happening and never happening, since it is
outside timespace, the hub of the wheel of Runtime/UD.


The UD is a mathematical being. It is an open question if the apparent  
physical universe run a UD, without stopping.
One has run, in my office, for one week. Such a program is demanding  
in memory, to say the least.






I get what you are saying about Mickey Mouse as far as an Inception/
Matrix/Maya sense of value-weighted coherence within a semiotic frame
of reference, although I think there is something good there that you
are over looking. Something about the density of the simulated
universe which, by definition, can only be realized in comparison to
the experience of a denser, more discrete version of the simulation.
It's qualia of density/mass but there's something unique - it's the
qualia that pretends not to be qualia. I'm not seduced by the promise
of the Higgs or Einsteinian curved space (a brilliantly useful
metaphor, but the opposite of what is literally true)


You talk like if you knew the truth. Are you a sort of guru of what?




- more at a
concept of Cumulative Entanglement, where the sensotimotive relation
of processes separated by space is warped such that scale and density
is respected. Motive power is inversely proportionate to the
difference in the scale of the two densities, so that it's not gravity
exerting a field of force holding you to the ground, it's the
magnitude of the Earth, (and the momentum of it's rotation and
revolution? or no? Not an astrophysicist, haha) which weakens your
motive power to escape becoming part of it.


?




So yes, I am certainly willing to entertain comp as far as the cosmos
not being a concrete stuff


I am agnostic about comp.
I just show that comp makes Aristotle's theology wrong. With comp,   
there is no basic primitive universe that you can relate to  
consciousness, but the physical reality appearance is explained by a  
self limitation property of universal machine (again a mathematical,  
arithmetical notion).






but rather principles having an experience
of concreteness (by pretending they are the opposite end of what they
essentially are - ie chasing their tail, thus becoming existential and
completing the sensorimotive circuit of the singularity to become the
opposite of the singularity: not just everything and anything, but
finite, coherent things which come and go into existence, as well is
less coherent non-things that are literally felt out of insistence).


?




I
don't want to limit comp to numbers though. I see that numbers have an
interior topology as well. That's qualia, and that's what numerology
tries to tap into. You're right, it is poetry, but that is the
interior of the cosmos. It insists. One has a personality. It's the
first, the only, the new, the solitary, etc. It's bold yet timid (it's
only frame of reference is 0 and 2). Two is a whole emergent identity,
coupling, relation, cooperation, equality, inequality, etc. So any
definition of comp to me would have to include the qualitative
interiority of numbers, the potential feelings, figurative,
metaphorical evocations which tie in the echo of the future by
subtracting from the singularity interior. Poetry pulls it down from
'heaven'.

Happy day-after-the-full moon Bruno. My head is banging on too many
cylinders right now but I look forward to continuing this soon. We
should trade tips on how to lower the control rods into our own
psychic fission pile and turn off the machine.



It is very hard to make sense of what you are saying.
From my work you can take deduce that you need special non Turing  
emulable components in some primitive matter (nor even quantum  
emulable).


With comp, on the contrary, we need , m

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-15 Thread Craig Weinberg

nice

On Jul 15, 12:41 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too
> > much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that
> > math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could
> > you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a physics
> > which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers.
>
> 
> ||
>
> Brent

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-15 Thread meekerdb


On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too 
much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that 
math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could 
you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a physics 
which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers. 



||

Brent

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-15 Thread Craig Weinberg

Interesting stuff. I had a marathon info download with Stephen and
he's helping me access your theory more. Still scratching the surface
but at least getting a better idea of how to approach it.

What you call UDA I think of as 'Runtime' in comparison to the
hardware which I think of as the Singularity. The interior of the
singularity is the interior of the cosmos with all of the spacetime
vacuumed out of it. Spacetime is what exteriorizes the big bang
(meaning it's more of a Big Break, where the void of space rushes
inward. There is no exterior to the big bang since it prefigures
timespace, therefore it can only be conceived of accurately from the
interior perspective. explicates matter as volume and the void of time
explicates 'energy' (the experience of matter) as sequence-memory. The
Singularity then is always happening and never happening, since it is
outside timespace, the hub of the wheel of Runtime/UD.

I get what you are saying about Mickey Mouse as far as an Inception/
Matrix/Maya sense of value-weighted coherence within a semiotic frame
of reference, although I think there is something good there that you
are over looking. Something about the density of the simulated
universe which, by definition, can only be realized in comparison to
the experience of a denser, more discrete version of the simulation.
It's qualia of density/mass but there's something unique - it's the
qualia that pretends not to be qualia. I'm not seduced by the promise
of the Higgs or Einsteinian curved space (a brilliantly useful
metaphor, but the opposite of what is literally true) - more at a
concept of Cumulative Entanglement, where the sensotimotive relation
of processes separated by space is warped such that scale and density
is respected. Motive power is inversely proportionate to the
difference in the scale of the two densities, so that it's not gravity
exerting a field of force holding you to the ground, it's the
magnitude of the Earth, (and the momentum of it's rotation and
revolution? or no? Not an astrophysicist, haha) which weakens your
motive power to escape becoming part of it.

So yes, I am certainly willing to entertain comp as far as the cosmos
not being a concrete stuff but rather principles having an experience
of concreteness (by pretending they are the opposite end of what they
essentially are - ie chasing their tail, thus becoming existential and
completing the sensorimotive circuit of the singularity to become the
opposite of the singularity: not just everything and anything, but
finite, coherent things which come and go into existence, as well is
less coherent non-things that are literally felt out of insistence). I
don't want to limit comp to numbers though. I see that numbers have an
interior topology as well. That's qualia, and that's what numerology
tries to tap into. You're right, it is poetry, but that is the
interior of the cosmos. It insists. One has a personality. It's the
first, the only, the new, the solitary, etc. It's bold yet timid (it's
only frame of reference is 0 and 2). Two is a whole emergent identity,
coupling, relation, cooperation, equality, inequality, etc. So any
definition of comp to me would have to include the qualitative
interiority of numbers, the potential feelings, figurative,
metaphorical evocations which tie in the echo of the future by
subtracting from the singularity interior. Poetry pulls it down from
'heaven'.

Happy day-after-the-full moon Bruno. My head is banging on too many
cylinders right now but I look forward to continuing this soon. We
should trade tips on how to lower the control rods into our own
psychic fission pile and turn off the machine.

On Jul 15, 5:15 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 15 Jul 2011, at 00:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >> The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will
> >> needs the global structure of all computations.
> >> If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown
> >> physics.
>
> > I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't
> > disqualify 1p phenomena.
>
> So either you naturalize the quale, which can't work (it is a base on  
> a category error), or you introduce an identity thesis, which is ad  
> hoc, and logically incompatible with the comp. assumption.
>
> > I don't get why yellow is any less stable
> > than a number.
>
> Yellow, or any qualia. This is a consequence of the UDA. Are you  
> willing to imagine that comp *might* be true for studying its  
> consequence?
>
>
>
> >> Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think.
> >> And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything
> >> physical.
>
> > I get what you're saying, but you could put a drug in your brain that
> > affects your thinking, and your thinking can be affected by chemistry
> > in your brain that you cannot control with your thoughts. In my
> > sensorimotive electromagnetism schema, everything physical has an
> > experiential aspect and vice versa.
>
> That's a form of pant

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-15 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Jul 2011, at 00:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:


The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will
needs the global structure of all computations.
If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown
physics.


I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't
disqualify 1p phenomena.


So either you naturalize the quale, which can't work (it is a base on  
a category error), or you introduce an identity thesis, which is ad  
hoc, and logically incompatible with the comp. assumption.






I don't get why yellow is any less stable
than a number.


Yellow, or any qualia. This is a consequence of the UDA. Are you  
willing to imagine that comp *might* be true for studying its  
consequence?






Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think.
And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything
physical.


I get what you're saying, but you could put a drug in your brain that
affects your thinking, and your thinking can be affected by chemistry
in your brain that you cannot control with your thoughts. In my
sensorimotive electromagnetism schema, everything physical has an
experiential aspect and vice versa.


That's a form of pantheism, which does not explain what is matter, nor  
mind.





Bruno:
It is more an information pattern which can emulate all
computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It
exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in
the
physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at
least Turing universal.

CW: It sounds like what you're suggesting is that numbers exist
independently of physical matter, whereas I would say that numbers
insist through the experiences within physical matter.


I find natural to suppose that 17 is prime independently of universes  
and human beings. I need it if only to grasp actual theories of matter  
which presuppose them logically. I don't need to know what numbers  
are. I need only some agreement on some axioms, like "for all natural  
numbers x we have that s(x) is different from 0", etc. Then I can  
explain the appearances of matter and mind from the relations  
inherited by only addition and multiplication. It is amazing (for non  
logician) but if comp is true, we don't need more than elementary  
arithmetic. We don't need to postulate a physical universe, nor  
consciousness.








 The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither
physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study
the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp
hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument.


Hmm. If the universe isn't made of anything than your point isn't made
of anything either. I don't get it.


The game of bridge is not made of quarks and electron. No mathematical  
object is made of something. My point is a reasoning, you have to  
cjeck his validity. It is non sense to assume a logical point has to  
be made of something. You are confusing software and hardware (and  
with comp, the difference is relative, and eventually hardware does  
not exist: it is "in the head of the universal machines": that is  
enough to derive physics (which becomes a first person plural measure  
on possible computational histories).







Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just
a collection of true fact about immaterial beings.


Have you read any numerology?


Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too  
much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that  
math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could  
you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a physics  
which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers.







Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now
that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why  
numbers

have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can
already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a very
simple mathematical operation defines a montruously complex object.


The complexity is in the eye of the perceiver. Your human visual sense
is what unites the Mandelbrot set into a fractal pattern. There is no
independent 'pattern' there unless what you are made of can relate to
it as a coherent whole rather than a million unrelated pixels as your
video card sees it, or maybe as a nondescript moving blur as a gopher
might see it.


OK, but I don't take "human" as primitive. I explain "human" by  
(special) universal machine (a purely mathematical notion whose  
existence is a consequence of addition and multiplication). That  
explain matter, too. Indeed, that makes physics completely derivable  
(not derived!) from arithmetic. So we can test the comp. hyp. by  
comparing the comp physics, and empiric data.






I cannot be satisfied with this, because it put what I want to  
explain

(mind and matter) in the starting

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-14 Thread Craig Weinberg

But a person also makes changes to their chemical network by
exercising their will out of purely semantic conscious intent, having
no biochemical rationale or specific neurogeographical constraint. You
don't have to get from one part of your brain to another part to think
about something else, 'you' are already are at both places. I think
that the neural network and its sensorimotive content (perception) are
two ends of a single involuted topolology. I'm a big fan of TMS. I
wish there were a lot more research being done with it. (I thought it
was Transcranial?).

On Jul 14, 7:28 pm, "L.W. Sterritt"  wrote:
> What is a "person"?  What can a "person" be but the continuos response of a 
> wet chemical neural network to exogenous and endogenous inputs.  The response 
> will be modified by changes in the networks chemical environment, and now we 
> learn by strong external pulsed magnetic fields.  In a series of very 
> relevant experiments, with readily reproduced results, subjecting certain 
> brain regions to a pulsed magnetic field, changes the brains notions of 
> ethics/morality, while the field is applied.  When the field is turned off, 
> the brain returns to it's previous perceptions of the world.  The technique, 
> Transcutaneous Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) was first developed as a 
> noninvasive treatment for depression, being much less disruptive than ECT.  
> Then researchers asked, can we modify the functioning of "healthy" brains - 
> possibly even improve functions such as memory ?
>
> Participants in this exchange might enjoy a subscription to Nature: 
> Neuroscience.  It's not an easy read, but interesting.
>
> Lanny
>
> On Jul 14, 2011, at 3:42 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will
> >> needs the global structure of all computations.
> >> If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown
> >> physics.
>
> > I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't
> > disqualify 1p phenomena. I don't get why yellow is any less stable
> > than a number.
>
> >> Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think.
> >> And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything
> >> physical.
>
> > I get what you're saying, but you could put a drug in your brain that
> > affects your thinking, and your thinking can be affected by chemistry
> > in your brain that you cannot control with your thoughts. In my
> > sensorimotive electromagnetism schema, everything physical has an
> > experiential aspect and vice versa.
>
> > It is more an information pattern which can emulate all
> > computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It
> > exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in
> > the
> > physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at
> > least Turing universal.
>
> > It sounds like what you're suggesting is that numbers exist
> > independently of physical matter, whereas I would say that numbers
> > insist through the experiences within physical matter.
>
> >> The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither
> >> physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study
> >> the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp
> >> hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument.
>
> > Hmm. If the universe isn't made of anything than your point isn't made
> > of anything either. I don't get it.
>
> >> Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just
> >> a collection of true fact about immaterial beings.
>
> > Have you read any numerology?
>
> >> Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now
> >> that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why numbers
> >> have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can
> >> already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a very
> >> simple mathematical operation defines a montruously complex object.
>
> > The complexity is in the eye of the perceiver. Your human visual sense
> > is what unites the Mandelbrot set into a fractal pattern. There is no
> > independent 'pattern' there unless what you are made of can relate to
> > it as a coherent whole rather than a million unrelated pixels as your
> > video card sees it, or maybe as a nondescript moving blur as a gopher
> > might see it.
>
> >> I cannot be satisfied with this, because it put what I want to explain
> >> (mind and matter) in the starting premises.
> >> Then I show that comp leads to a precise (and mathematical)
> >> reformulation of the mind-body problem.
>
> > Are you more interested in satisfying your premise, or discovering a
> > true model of the cosmos?
>
> >>> You're not saying that Mickey Mouse has mass and velocity though,
> >>> right? I don't get it.
>
> >> It depends on the context. Mickey Mouse is a fiction. as such it has a
> >> mass, relatively to its fictive world. That world is not complex
> >> enough to at

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-14 Thread L.W. Sterritt

What is a "person"?  What can a "person" be but the continuos response of a wet 
chemical neural network to exogenous and endogenous inputs.  The response will 
be modified by changes in the networks chemical environment, and now we learn 
by strong external pulsed magnetic fields.  In a series of very relevant 
experiments, with readily reproduced results, subjecting certain brain regions 
to a pulsed magnetic field, changes the brains notions of ethics/morality, 
while the field is applied.  When the field is turned off, the brain returns to 
it's previous perceptions of the world.  The technique, Transcutaneous Magnetic 
Stimulation (TMS) was first developed as a noninvasive treatment for 
depression, being much less disruptive than ECT.  Then researchers asked, can 
we modify the functioning of "healthy" brains - possibly even improve functions 
such as memory ?

Participants in this exchange might enjoy a subscription to Nature: 
Neuroscience.  It's not an easy read, but interesting.

Lanny
 
On Jul 14, 2011, at 3:42 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>> The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will
>> needs the global structure of all computations.
>> If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown
>> physics.
> 
> I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't
> disqualify 1p phenomena. I don't get why yellow is any less stable
> than a number.
> 
>> Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think.
>> And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything
>> physical.
> 
> I get what you're saying, but you could put a drug in your brain that
> affects your thinking, and your thinking can be affected by chemistry
> in your brain that you cannot control with your thoughts. In my
> sensorimotive electromagnetism schema, everything physical has an
> experiential aspect and vice versa.
> 
> It is more an information pattern which can emulate all
> computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It
> exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in
> the
> physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at
> least Turing universal.
> 
> It sounds like what you're suggesting is that numbers exist
> independently of physical matter, whereas I would say that numbers
> insist through the experiences within physical matter.
> 
>> The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither
>> physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study
>> the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp
>> hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument.
> 
> Hmm. If the universe isn't made of anything than your point isn't made
> of anything either. I don't get it.
> 
>> Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just
>> a collection of true fact about immaterial beings.
> 
> Have you read any numerology?
> 
>> Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now
>> that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why numbers
>> have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can
>> already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a very
>> simple mathematical operation defines a montruously complex object.
> 
> The complexity is in the eye of the perceiver. Your human visual sense
> is what unites the Mandelbrot set into a fractal pattern. There is no
> independent 'pattern' there unless what you are made of can relate to
> it as a coherent whole rather than a million unrelated pixels as your
> video card sees it, or maybe as a nondescript moving blur as a gopher
> might see it.
> 
>> I cannot be satisfied with this, because it put what I want to explain
>> (mind and matter) in the starting premises.
>> Then I show that comp leads to a precise (and mathematical)
>> reformulation of the mind-body problem.
> 
> Are you more interested in satisfying your premise, or discovering a
> true model of the cosmos?
> 
>>> You're not saying that Mickey Mouse has mass and velocity though,
>>> right? I don't get it.
> 
>> It depends on the context. Mickey Mouse is a fiction. as such it has a
>> mass, relatively to its fictive world. That world is not complex
>> enough to attribute meaning to physical attribute, nor mental one, so
>> that your question does not make much sense.
> 
> How does Mickey Mouse have mass? Whoever is drawing the cartoon can
> make the universe he is in be whatever they want. It doesn't have to
> have pseudophysical laws like gravity. He can just teleport around a
> Mandelbrot set.
> 
> Craig
> 
> On Jul 13, 5:43 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> On 13 Jul 2011, at 01:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves
> differently than a biological plant.
>> 
 Sure. But they have not the same function.
>> 
>>> They both decorate a vase. How do we know when we build a chip that
>>> it's performing the sam

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-14 Thread Craig Weinberg

>The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will
>needs the global structure of all computations.
>If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown
>physics.

I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't
disqualify 1p phenomena. I don't get why yellow is any less stable
than a number.

>Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think.
>And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything
>physical.

I get what you're saying, but you could put a drug in your brain that
affects your thinking, and your thinking can be affected by chemistry
in your brain that you cannot control with your thoughts. In my
sensorimotive electromagnetism schema, everything physical has an
experiential aspect and vice versa.

 It is more an information pattern which can emulate all
computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It
exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in
the
physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at
least Turing universal.

It sounds like what you're suggesting is that numbers exist
independently of physical matter, whereas I would say that numbers
insist through the experiences within physical matter.

>The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither
>physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study
>the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp
>hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument.

Hmm. If the universe isn't made of anything than your point isn't made
of anything either. I don't get it.

>Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just
>a collection of true fact about immaterial beings.

Have you read any numerology?

>Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now
>that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why numbers
>have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can
>already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a very
>simple mathematical operation defines a montruously complex object.

The complexity is in the eye of the perceiver. Your human visual sense
is what unites the Mandelbrot set into a fractal pattern. There is no
independent 'pattern' there unless what you are made of can relate to
it as a coherent whole rather than a million unrelated pixels as your
video card sees it, or maybe as a nondescript moving blur as a gopher
might see it.

>I cannot be satisfied with this, because it put what I want to explain
>(mind and matter) in the starting premises.
>Then I show that comp leads to a precise (and mathematical)
>reformulation of the mind-body problem.

Are you more interested in satisfying your premise, or discovering a
true model of the cosmos?

>> You're not saying that Mickey Mouse has mass and velocity though,
>> right? I don't get it.

>It depends on the context. Mickey Mouse is a fiction. as such it has a
>mass, relatively to its fictive world. That world is not complex
>enough to attribute meaning to physical attribute, nor mental one, so
>that your question does not make much sense.

How does Mickey Mouse have mass? Whoever is drawing the cartoon can
make the universe he is in be whatever they want. It doesn't have to
have pseudophysical laws like gravity. He can just teleport around a
Mandelbrot set.

Craig

On Jul 13, 5:43 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 13 Jul 2011, at 01:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves
> >>> differently than a biological plant.
>
> >> Sure. But they have not the same function.
>
> > They both decorate a vase. How do we know when we build a chip that
> > it's performing the same function that a neuron performs and not just
> > what we think it performs, especially considering that neurology
> > produces qualitative phenomena which cannot be detected at all outside
> > of our personal experience. Maybe the brain is a haunted house built
> > of prehistoric stones under layers of medieval catacombs and the chip
> > is a brand new suburban tract home made to look like a grand old
> > mansion but it's made of drywall and stucco and ghosts aren't
> > interested.
>
> >> Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which  
> >> can
> >> still function at some high level, are Turing emulable.
>
> > But consciousness isn't observable in nature, outside of our own
> > interiority. Is yellow Turing emulable?
>
> The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will  
> needs the global structure of all computations.
> If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown  
> physics.
>
>
>
> >> By computers I mean universal
> >> machine, and this is a mathematical notion.
>
> > I don't know, man. I think computers are just gigantic electronic
> > abacuses. They don't feel anything, but you can arrange their beads
> > into patterns which act as a vessel for us to feel,

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 13 Jul 2011, at 01:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves
differently than a biological plant.



Sure. But they have not the same function.


They both decorate a vase. How do we know when we build a chip that
it's performing the same function that a neuron performs and not just
what we think it performs, especially considering that neurology
produces qualitative phenomena which cannot be detected at all outside
of our personal experience. Maybe the brain is a haunted house built
of prehistoric stones under layers of medieval catacombs and the chip
is a brand new suburban tract home made to look like a grand old
mansion but it's made of drywall and stucco and ghosts aren't
interested.

Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which  
can

still function at some high level, are Turing emulable.


But consciousness isn't observable in nature, outside of our own
interiority. Is yellow Turing emulable?


The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will  
needs the global structure of all computations.
If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown  
physics.






By computers I mean universal
machine, and this is a mathematical notion.


I don't know, man. I think computers are just gigantic electronic
abacuses. They don't feel anything, but you can arrange their beads
into patterns which act as a vessel for us to feel, see, know, think,
etc.


Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think.
And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything  
physical. It is more an information pattern which can emulate all  
computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It  
exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in the  
physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at  
least Turing universal.









That's a bad note! What is the first 5th % that you don't understand?


Each sentence is a struggle for me. I could go through each one if you
want:

"I will first present a non constructive argument showing that the
mechanist
hypothesis in cognitive science gives enough constraints to decide
what a "physical reality"
can possibly consist in."


This is the abstract. The paper explains its meaning.






I read that as "I will first present a theoretical argument showing
that the hypothesis of consciousness arising from purely mechanical
interactions in the brain is sufficient to support a physical reality.


Not to support. To derive. I mean physics is a branch of machine's  
theology.






Right away I'm not sure what you're talking about. I'm guessing that
you mean the mechanics of the brain look like physical reality to us.


I mean physics is not the fundamental branch. You have to study the  
proof, not to speculate on a theorem.






Which I would have agreed with a couple years ago, but my hypothesis
now makes more sense to me, that the exterior mechanism and interior
experience are related in a dynamic continuum topology in which they
diverge sharply at one end and are indistinguishable in another.


That's unclear.





Read just the UDA. The first seven steps gives the picture. Of  
course,
you have to be able to reason with an hypothesis, keeping it all  
along

in the reasoning.


I'm trying, but it's not working. I think each step would have to be
condensed into two sentences.

No, they are related to arithmetical relations and set of  
arithmetical relations.

Maybe that's the issue. I can't really parse math. I had to take
Algebra 2 twice and never took another math class again. If the
universe is made of math


The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither  
physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study  
the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp  
hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument.






I would have a hard time explaining that. Why
is math hard for some people if we are made of math?


Well, I could ask you why physics is hard if we obey to the laws of  
physics. this is a non sequitur.
Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just  
a collection of true fact about immaterial beings.






Why is math
something we don't learn until long after we understand words, colors,
facial expressions, etc?


Because we are not supposed to understand how we work. The  
understanding of facial expression asks for many complex mathematical  
operations done unconsciously. We learn to use our brain well before  
even knowing we have a brain.






God create the natural numbers, all the rest is created by the  
natural numbers.

Numbers create things? Why?


Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now  
that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why numbers  
have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can  
already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

Evgenii,

Why don't you make a course for dummies about this? (For example in
Second Life)

Because in the second life, the students already know that they are in
a virtual reality :)

It looks more difficult to explain this with first life inquirers.

But is it, really? Got the feeling that those who don't understand are
those who don't study, or don't make the necessary work. Psychological
contingent reasons? (I think on UDA, not on AUDA, which needs a one
year course in mathematical logic/computer science).

But your suggestion is pleasing and fun, and who knows, I might think
about it.

That will not cure my computer addiction, though :(

Bruno

On 11.07.2011 16:01 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 11 Jul 2011, at 14:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.07.2011 17:32 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 10 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:

...

Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain
out of ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations,
does it perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of
electromagnetism automatically, or does it see yellow when it's
own emulated units are vibrating on the functionally
proportionate scale to itself? Does the ping pong ball brain
see it's own patterns of collisions as yellow or does yellow =
electromagnetic ~580nm and nothing else. At what point does the
yellow come in? Where did it come from? Were there other
options? Can there ever be new colors? From where? What is the
minimum mechanical arrangement required to experience yellow?

Any mechanical arrangement defining a self-referentially correct
machine automatically leads the mechanical arrangement to
distinguish third person point of view and first person points of
view. The machine already have a theory of qualia, with an
explanation of why qualia and quanta seems different.

Bruno,

Could you please make a reference to a good text for dummies about
that statement? (But please not in French)

I am afraid the only text which explains this in simple way is my
sane04 paper(*). It is in the second part (the interview of the
machine), and it uses Smullyan popular explanation of the logic of
self-reference (G) from his "Forever Undecided" popular book.

Popular attempts to explain Gödel's theorem are often incorrect, and
the whole matter is very delicate. Philosophers, like Lucas, or
physicists, like Penrose, illustrate that it is hard to explain
Gödel's result to non logicians. I'm afraid the time has not yet come
for popular explanation of machine's theology.

Let me try a short attempt. By Gödel's theorem we know that for any
machine, the set of true propositions about the machine is bigger
than the set of the propositions provable by the machine. Now, Gödel
already knew that a machine can prove that very fact about herself,
and so can be "aware" of its own limitations. Such a machine is
forced to discover a vast range of true proposition about her that
she cannot prove, and such a machine can study the logic to which
such propositions are obeying.

Then, it is a technical fact that such logics (of the non provable,
yet discoverable propositions) obeys some theories of qualia which
have been proposed in the literature (by J.L. Bell, for example).

So the machine which introspects itself (the mystical machine) is
bounded to discover the gap between the provable and truth (the G-G*
gap), but also the difference between all the points of view (third
person = provable, first person = provable-and-true, observable with
probability 1 = provable-and-consistent, "feelable" =
provable-and-consistent-and-true, etc.).

When the machine studies the logic of those propositions, she
rediscovers more or less a picture of reality akin to the mystical
rationalists (like Plato, Plotinus, but also Nagasena, and many
others).

If you are familiar with the logic G, I might be able to explain
more. If not, read Smullyan's book, perhaps. All this is new
material, and, premature popular version can be misleading.
Elementary logic is just not yet well enough known.

In fact, the UDA *is* the human-popular version of all this. The AUDA
is the proper machine's technical version.

If you read the sane04(*) paper, feel free to ask for any
precisions.

Best,

Bruno

(*)
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

Oh, yeah I would agree with you if you are talking real world live
healthy human bodies then they are going to have a human experience.
In a hypothetical, you could not know whether a person was a zombie or
not for sure, just because subjectivity is airtight, but mechanically
there is no way to take away a person's soul without changing them
physically.

On Jul 12, 9:57 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 6:10 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> > **
> > On 7/12/2011 2:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
> >> Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the
> >> necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition,
> >> doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's
> >> ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a
> >> physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does
> >> not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it
> >> serves no special function that unconscious detection would not
> >> accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from,
> >> no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were
> >> it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color
> >> perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than
> >> time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm
> >> trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between
> >> zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence.
>
> > I think the problem with Chalmer's view, is that by assuming a universe
> > without qualia (or philosophical zombies) are possible, it inevitably leads
> > to substance dualism or epiphenominalism.  If zombies are possible, it means
> > that consciousness is something extra which can be taken away without
> > affecting anything.  Thus, conscious would have no effects, which I think is
> > against your view.  Are you familiar with this:
> >http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20(Raym...?
> > If not, it can give you a feel for why zombies may be logically
> > impossible.  So what is your thought on this subject?  Can a universe exist
> > just like ours but have different qualia or none at all?
>
> > I think there are two different questions in play.  Usually philosophical
> > zombies are defined as acting just like us; but  it is left open as to
> > whether their internal information processing is just like ours.
>
> That may be one definition.  The way I have heard zombies defined is that
> they are in all ways, physically indistinguishable; that there is no
> physical test that could ever tell apart a zombie from a non-zombie.  I was
> using this definition above in my example and reasoning.
>
> Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-12 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 6:10 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> **
> On 7/12/2011 2:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>> Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the
>> necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition,
>> doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's
>> ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a
>> physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does
>> not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it
>> serves no special function that unconscious detection would not
>> accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from,
>> no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were
>> it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color
>> perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than
>> time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm
>> trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between
>> zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence.
>>
>>
> I think the problem with Chalmer's view, is that by assuming a universe
> without qualia (or philosophical zombies) are possible, it inevitably leads
> to substance dualism or epiphenominalism.  If zombies are possible, it means
> that consciousness is something extra which can be taken away without
> affecting anything.  Thus, conscious would have no effects, which I think is
> against your view.  Are you familiar with this:
> http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20(Raymond%20Smullyan).pdf?
> If not, it can give you a feel for why zombies may be logically
> impossible.  So what is your thought on this subject?  Can a universe exist
> just like ours but have different qualia or none at all?
>
>
> I think there are two different questions in play.  Usually philosophical
> zombies are defined as acting just like us; but  it is left open as to
> whether their internal information processing is just like ours.
>

That may be one definition.  The way I have heard zombies defined is that
they are in all ways, physically indistinguishable; that there is no
physical test that could ever tell apart a zombie from a non-zombie.  I was
using this definition above in my example and reasoning.

Jason

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RE: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-12 Thread Jesse Mazer




> Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2011 15:50:12 -0700
> Subject: Re: Bruno's blasphemy.
> From: whatsons...@gmail.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> 
> Thanks, I always seem to like Chalmers perspectives. In this case I
> think that the hypothesis of physics I'm working from changes how I
> see this argument compared to how I would have a couple years ago. My
> thought now is that although organizational invariance is valid,
> molecular structure is part of the organization. I think that
> consciousness is not so much a phenomenon that is produced, but an
> essential property that is accessed in different ways through
> different organizations.
But how does this address the thought-experiment? If each neuron were indeed 
replaced one by one by a functionally indistinguishable substitute, do you 
think the qualia would change somehow without the person's behavior changing in 
any way, so they still maintained that they noticed no differences?

> 
> I'll just throw out some thoughts:
> 
> If you take an MRI of a silicon brain, it's going to look nothing like
> a human brain. If an MRI can tell the difference, why can't the brain
> itself?
Because neurons (including those controlling muscles) don't see each other 
visually, they only "sense" one another by certain information channels such as 
neurotransmitter molecules which go from one neuron to another at the synaptic 
gap. So if the artificial substitutes gave all the same type of outputs that 
other neurons could sense, like sending neurotransmitter molecules to other 
neurons (and perhaps other influences like creating electromagnetic fields 
which would affect action potentials traveling along nearby neurons), then the 
system as a whole should behave identically in terms of neural outputs to 
muscles (including speech acts reporting inner sensations of color and whether 
or not the qualia are "dancing" or remaining constant), even if some other 
system that can sense information about neurons that neurons themselves cannot 
(like a brain scan which can show something about the material or even shape of 
neurons) could tell the difference.
> 
> Can you make synthetic water? Why not?
You can simulate the large-scale behavior of water using only the basic quantum 
laws that govern interactions between the charged particles that make up the 
atoms in each water molecule--see 
http://www.udel.edu/PR/UDaily/2007/mar/water030207.html for a discussion. If 
you had a robot whose external behavior was somehow determined by the behavior 
of water in an internal hidden tank (say it had some scanners watching the 
motion of water in that tank, and the scanners would send signals to the 
robotic limbs based on what they saw), then the external behavior of the robot 
should be unchanged if you replaced the actual water tank with a sufficiently 
detailed simulation of a water tank of that size.
> 
> If consciousness is purely organizational, shouldn't we see an example
> of non-living consciousness in nature? (Maybe we do but why don't we
> recognize it as such). At least we should see an example of an
> inorganic organism.
I don't see why that follows, we don't see darwinian evolution in non-organic 
systems either but that doesn't prove that darwinian evolution somehow requires 
something more than just a physical system with the right type of organization 
(basically a system that can self-replicate, and which has the right sort of 
stable structure to preserve hereditary information to a high degree but also 
with enough instability for "mutations" in this information from one generation 
to the next). In fact I think most scientists would agree that intelligent 
purposeful and flexible behavior must have something to do with darwinian or 
quasi-darwinian processes in the brain (quasi-darwinian to cover something like 
the way an ant colony selects the best paths to food, which does involve 
throwing up a lot of variants and then creating new variants closer to 
successful ones, but doesn't really involve anything directly analogous to 
"genes" or self-replication of scent trails). That said, since I am 
philosophically inclined towards monism I do lean towards the idea that perhaps 
all physical processes might be associated with some very "basic" form of 
qualia, even if the sort of complex, differentiated and meaningful qualia we 
experience are only possible in adaptive systems like the brain (chalmers 
discusses this sort of panpsychist idea in his book "The Conscious Mind", and 
there's also a discussion of "naturalistic panpsychism" at 
http://www.hedweb.com/lockwood.htm#naturalistic )

> 
> My view of awareness is now subtractive and holographic (think pinhole
> camera), so that I would read fading qualia in a different way. More
&

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

I think the point of philosophical zombies for Chalmers is not to
invoke dualism or epiphenominalism but to point out that we cannot
tell from the outside what is going on on the inside. I agree with
that, but it's not because human consciousness is a separate thing
from human neurology, but rather they are two separate ends of the
same continuum. Two sides of the same coin with perpendicular
ontologies.

>Can a universe exist just like ours but have different qualia or none at all?

The world you see in a mirror is a universe with some different and
absent qualia. It has no smell, no sound. Things are backwards.

>I believe qualia are a property of the mind, not a property of the physics on 
>which the mind is built.

I reconcile the two by saying that phenomena are quantitative on one
side and qualitative on the other, or electro on one side, magnetic on
side two, sensory on side three, and motive on side four. Maybe I'm a
quadralist.


On Jul 12, 5:30 pm, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the
> > necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition,
> > doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's
> > ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a
> > physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does
> > not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it
> > serves no special function that unconscious detection would not
> > accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from,
> > no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were
> > it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color
> > perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than
> > time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm
> > trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between
> > zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence.
>
> I think the problem with Chalmer's view, is that by assuming a universe
> without qualia (or philosophical zombies) are possible, it inevitably leads
> to substance dualism or epiphenominalism.  If zombies are possible, it means
> that consciousness is something extra which can be taken away without
> affecting anything.  Thus, conscious would have no effects, which I think is
> against your view.  Are you familiar with 
> this:http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20(Raym...
> If not, it can give you a feel for why zombies may be logically impossible.
> So what is your thought on this subject?  Can a universe exist just like
> ours but have different qualia or none at all?
>
> My view is that qualia are necessary and identical anywhere an identical
> processing of information, at some substitution level, is performed.  Thus,
> if it is done by a computer or a human, or a human in this universe or
> another universe, or a computer in this universe or a person in a different
> universe, the resulting qualia will be the same, because I believe qualia
> are a property of the mind, not a property of the physics on which the mind
> is built.
>
> Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

>> Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves
>> differently than a biological plant.

>Sure. But they have not the same function.

They both decorate a vase. How do we know when we build a chip that
it's performing the same function that a neuron performs and not just
what we think it performs, especially considering that neurology
produces qualitative phenomena which cannot be detected at all outside
of our personal experience. Maybe the brain is a haunted house built
of prehistoric stones under layers of medieval catacombs and the chip
is a brand new suburban tract home made to look like a grand old
mansion but it's made of drywall and stucco and ghosts aren't
interested.

>Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which can
>still function at some high level, are Turing emulable.

But consciousness isn't observable in nature, outside of our own
interiority. Is yellow Turing emulable?

>By computers I mean universal
>machine, and this is a mathematical notion.

I don't know, man. I think computers are just gigantic electronic
abacuses. They don't feel anything, but you can arrange their beads
into patterns which act as a vessel for us to feel, see, know, think,
etc.

>That's a bad note! What is the first 5th % that you don't understand?

Each sentence is a struggle for me. I could go through each one if you
want:

 "I will first present a non constructive argument showing that the
mechanist
hypothesis in cognitive science gives enough constraints to decide
what a "physical reality"
can possibly consist in."

 I read that as "I will first present a theoretical argument showing
that the hypothesis of consciousness arising from purely mechanical
interactions in the brain is sufficient to support a physical reality.
Right away I'm not sure what you're talking about. I'm guessing that
you mean the mechanics of the brain look like physical reality to us.
Which I would have agreed with a couple years ago, but my hypothesis
now makes more sense to me, that the exterior mechanism and interior
experience are related in a dynamic continuum topology in which they
diverge sharply at one end and are indistinguishable in another.

>Read just the UDA. The first seven steps gives the picture. Of course,
>you have to be able to reason with an hypothesis, keeping it all along
>in the reasoning.

I'm trying, but it's not working. I think each step would have to be
condensed into two sentences.

>No, they are related to arithmetical relations and set of arithmetical 
>relations.
Maybe that's the issue. I can't really parse math. I had to take
Algebra 2 twice and never took another math class again. If the
universe is made of math I would have a hard time explaining that. Why
is math hard for some people if we are made of math? Why is math
something we don't learn until long after we understand words, colors,
facial expressions, etc?

>God create the natural numbers, all the rest is created by the natural numbers.
Numbers create things? Why?

>> My focus is on describing what and who we are in the simplest way. To my 
>> mind,
>> what and who we are cannot be described in purely arithmetic
>> relations, unless arithmetic relations automatically obscure their
>> origin and present themselves in all possible universes as color,
>> sound, taste, feeling, etc.

>Nice picture. This is what happens indeed.

You are saying that there is an absolute ontological correlation
between numbers and phenomenon, ie all possible spectrums begin with
red, all possible periodic tables begin with Hydrogen - the
singularity of the proton is immutably translated as the properties of
elemental hydrogen in all physical universes?

>It is in between. Because physics is not the projection of the human
>mind, but the projection of all universal (machine (number)) mind.
I can go along with that, although I would not limit the universal
interior order to machine, number, or mind, but rather a more all-
encompassing phenomenology like 'sense' or 'pattern'.

>>By definition, mental phenomena are
>> exempt from physical constraints, such as gravity, thermodynamics,
>> etc.

>They are not; even in Platonia.

You're not saying that Mickey Mouse has mass and velocity though,
right? I don't get it.

>The complex problem is how pain are possible, and yes, I think that
>computer science has interesting things to say here.

Like what?

There might be a bit of a language barrier.. I'm just not sure what
you mean towards the end. Why does the universal machine pretend not
to be a machine?

Craig
On Jul 12, 3:58 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 11 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Jul 12, 3:58 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 11 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > I'm having trouble understanding what you're saying.
>
> >>> Computer chips don't behave in the same way though.
>
> >> That is just a question of choice of level of description. Unless you
> >> believe in substantial infinite souls.
>
> > Not

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-12 Thread meekerdb


On 7/12/2011 2:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg > wrote:



Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the
necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition,
doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's
ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a
physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does
not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it
serves no special function that unconscious detection would not
accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from,
no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were
it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color
perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than
time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm
trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between
zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence.


I think the problem with Chalmer's view, is that by assuming a 
universe without qualia (or philosophical zombies) are possible, it 
inevitably leads to substance dualism or epiphenominalism.  If zombies 
are possible, it means that consciousness is something extra which can 
be taken away without affecting anything.  Thus, conscious would have 
no effects, which I think is against your view.  Are you familiar with 
this: 
http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20(Raymond%20Smullyan).pdf 
 
?
If not, it can give you a feel for why zombies may be logically 
impossible.  So what is your thought on this subject?  Can a universe 
exist just like ours but have different qualia or none at all?


I think there are two different questions in play.  Usually 
philosophical zombies are defined as acting just like us; but  it is 
left open as to whether their internal information processing is just 
like ours.  I think one might be able to create an artificial person who 
acted just like us, but who had somewhat different internal processing.  
They might experience qualia somewhat differently - how would you tell.  
My wife and I are always disagreeing about where to draw the line 
between blue and green.  Is she experiencing the color differently?  
Part of the reason we assume other people experience qualia the way we 
do is that they are built like us.  Suppose after building the 
artificial person and confirming it acts just like we do, you added a 
lot of memory capacity so that everything the artificial person looked 
at was recorded - but not accessed.  Would this produce a difference in 
qualia?


Brent



My view is that qualia are necessary and identical anywhere an 
identical processing of information, at some substitution level, is 
performed.  Thus, if it is done by a computer or a human, or a human 
in this universe or another universe, or a computer in this universe 
or a person in a different universe, the resulting qualia will be the 
same, because I believe qualia are a property of the mind, not a 
property of the physics on which the mind is built.


Jason
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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

Thanks, I always seem to like Chalmers perspectives. In this case I
think that the hypothesis of physics I'm working from changes how I
see this argument compared to how I would have a couple years ago. My
thought now is that although organizational invariance is valid,
molecular structure is part of the organization. I think that
consciousness is not so much a phenomenon that is produced, but an
essential property that is accessed in different ways through
different organizations.

I'll just throw out some thoughts:

If you take an MRI of a silicon brain, it's going to look nothing like
a human brain. If an MRI can tell the difference, why can't the brain
itself?

Can you make synthetic water? Why not?

If consciousness is purely organizational, shouldn't we see an example
of non-living consciousness in nature? (Maybe we do but why don't we
recognize it as such). At least we should see an example of an
inorganic organism.

My view of awareness is now subtractive and holographic (think pinhole
camera), so that I would read fading qualia in a different way. More
like dementia.. attenuating connectivity between different aspects of
the self, not changing qualia necessarily. The brain might respond to
the implanted chips, even ruling out organic rejection, the native
neurology may strengthen it's remaining connections and attempt to
compensate for the implants with neuroplasticity, routing around the
'damage'. Qualia could also become more intense as the native brain
region gets smaller. Loudness seems to correlate with stupidity rather
than quiet behavior - maybe there's a reason for that. Maybe people
with less integrated neurons live in a coarser, more percussively
energitic version of the universe?

Of course, it's possible that silicon will not present as much of an
organizational incompatibility as I'm guessing, but my hunch is that
even if you could pull it off with chips, you would end up having to
reinvent living cells in semiconductor form before you can get feeling
out of them. I think there is a lot of organic firmware in there that
is not going to be supported on a solid state platform. Life needs
water. Our feelings need cells that need water. I see no reason to
think that water is less of a part of human consciousness than is
logic.

On Jul 12, 2:16 pm, Jesse Mazer  wrote:
> Craig, I wonder what you'd think of Chalmers' "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, 
> Dancing Qualia" argument athttp://consc.net/papers/qualia.htmlwhich to me 
> makes a strong argument for "organizational invariance", which says physical 
> systems organized the same way should produce the same qualia, so for example 
> a computer which simulated each of my neurons and their interactions with 
> sufficient accuracy would give rise to the same qualia as my biological 
> brain. The basic idea of the argument is that if you gradually replaced my 
> brain's neurons with computer chips that simulated the behavior of the 
> removed neurons and had the same input/output relationships, my qualia should 
> not change or fade in any reasonable theory of consciousness (an unreasonable 
> one would be one that had a total disconnect between qualia and behavior, so 
> that for example my qualia could be gradually fading or changing, or even 
> changing on a second-by-second basis, and yet behaviorally I would argue 
> emphatically that they were remaining unchanged)
> Jesse                                    

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-12 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
> Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the
> necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition,
> doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's
> ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a
> physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does
> not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it
> serves no special function that unconscious detection would not
> accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from,
> no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were
> it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color
> perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than
> time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm
> trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between
> zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence.
>
>
I think the problem with Chalmer's view, is that by assuming a universe
without qualia (or philosophical zombies) are possible, it inevitably leads
to substance dualism or epiphenominalism.  If zombies are possible, it means
that consciousness is something extra which can be taken away without
affecting anything.  Thus, conscious would have no effects, which I think is
against your view.  Are you familiar with this:
http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20(Raymond%20Smullyan).pdf?
If not, it can give you a feel for why zombies may be logically impossible.
So what is your thought on this subject?  Can a universe exist just like
ours but have different qualia or none at all?

My view is that qualia are necessary and identical anywhere an identical
processing of information, at some substitution level, is performed.  Thus,
if it is done by a computer or a human, or a human in this universe or
another universe, or a computer in this universe or a person in a different
universe, the resulting qualia will be the same, because I believe qualia
are a property of the mind, not a property of the physics on which the mind
is built.

Jason

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-12 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 11 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:


I'm having trouble understanding what you're saying.


Computer chips don't behave in the same way though.



That is just a question of choice of level of description. Unless you
believe in substantial infinite souls.


Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves
differently than a biological plant.


Sure. But they have not the same function.




A computer chip behaves
differently than a neuron.


Not necessarily. It might, if well programmed enough, do the same  
thing, and then it is a question of interfacing different sort of  
hardware, to replace the neuron, by the chips.






Why assume that a computer chip can feel
what a living cell can feel?


Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which can  
still function at some high level, are Turing emulable. In the case of  
biology, there is strong evidence that nature has already bet on the  
functional substitution, because it happens all the time at the  
biomolecular level.
Even the quantum level is Turing emulable, but no more in real time,  
and you need a quantum chips. But few believes the brain can be a  
quantum computer, and it would change nothing in our argumentation.








Your computer
can't become an ammoniaholic or commit suicide.



Why?


I'm talking about your actual computer that you are reading this on.
Are you asking me why it can't commit suicide or spontaneously develop
a hankering for ammonia?


Because, it is a baby, and its universality is exploited by the  
sellers, or the nerds.
And we don't allow it any form of introspection, except some disk  
verification. So it has no reason, and no real means, to think about  
suicide. He has still no life, except that (weird) form of blank  
consciousness I begin to suspect. My computer is not a good example,  
when talking about computers in general. By computers I mean universal  
machine, and this is a mathematical notion.


A physical computer seems to be a mathematical computer implemented in  
a well, another probable universal being in some neighborhood. With  
comp, they are numerous. With QM, too.







The other side is well explained in the comp theory.


I'm giving it a good try reading your SANE2004 pdf but I think I'm
hovering at around 4% comprehension.


That's a bad note! What is the first 5th % that you don't understand?




If you want me to be able to
consider your hypothesis I think that you will have to radically
simplify it's insights to concrete examples which are not dependent
upon references to anyone else's work, logical/mathematical/or
philosophical notation, teleportation, or Turing anything.


Read just the UDA. The first seven steps gives the picture. Of course,  
you have to be able to reason with an hypothesis, keeping it all along  
in the reasoning.






As near as I can tell, it seems like you are looking at the hows and
whys of sensation - how physics and sensation are both logical
relations


No, they are related to arithmetical relations and set of arithmetical  
relations.





rather than noumenal existential artifacts and why it might
be necessary. I can't really tell what your answer is though.


God create the natural numbers, all the rest is created by the natural  
numbers. Created or subselected by their ancestors in long  
computational histories.

Comp leads to a many-world interpretation of arithmetic.






My focus
is on describing what and who we are in the simplest way. To my mind,
what and who we are cannot be described in purely arithmetic
relations, unless arithmetic relations automatically obscure their
origin and present themselves in all possible universes as color,
sound, taste, feeling, etc.


Nice picture. This is what happens indeed.






No problem. That would mean that the substitution level is low. It
does no change the conclusion: the physical world is a projection of
the mind, and the mind is an inside view of arithmetic (or comp is
false, that is, at all level and you need substantial souls). But we
don't even find a substance for explaining matter, so that seems a
regression to me. Anyway, it is inconsistent with the comp  
assumption.


When you say that the physical world is a projection of the mind, do
you mean that in the sense that it might be possible to stop bullets
directly with our thoughts or in the sense of physicality only seeming
physical because our mind is programmed to read it as such?



It is in between. Because physics is not the projection of the human  
mind, but the projection of all universal (machine (number)) mind. So,  
we can' change the laws of physics by the power of the mind, but we  
can develop degrees of independence. That is why we can fly, and go to  
the moon.






I would
agree that physicality arises only from the body's own physical
composition and our mind's apprehension of the body's awareness of
itself in relation to it's world, but I wouldn't say that physical
matter is

RE: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-12 Thread Jesse Mazer


Craig, I wonder what you'd think of Chalmers' "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, 
Dancing Qualia" argument at http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html which to me 
makes a strong argument for "organizational invariance", which says physical 
systems organized the same way should produce the same qualia, so for example a 
computer which simulated each of my neurons and their interactions with 
sufficient accuracy would give rise to the same qualia as my biological brain. 
The basic idea of the argument is that if you gradually replaced my brain's 
neurons with computer chips that simulated the behavior of the removed neurons 
and had the same input/output relationships, my qualia should not change or 
fade in any reasonable theory of consciousness (an unreasonable one would be 
one that had a total disconnect between qualia and behavior, so that for 
example my qualia could be gradually fading or changing, or even changing on a 
second-by-second basis, and yet behaviorally I would argue emphatically that 
they were remaining unchanged)
Jesse 

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Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

Part II

> What is your source of that information?
About human tetrachromats?
http://www.klab.caltech.edu/cns186/papers/Jameson01.pdf

Everything else is just my hypothesis.

>To "suspect that "..." is
>to bet that "..." is true. How different is that from what Bruno is
>talking about with the "Yes, Doctor"? You seem to be using Bruno's
>definition of /Theaetetian/ conception of knowledge without even
>acknowledging it! What is holding you back?

I don't get the connection. From Bruno's Yes, Doctor I get the idea of
substitution level, although most of what I'm talking about isn't to
do with prosthetic computation, it's about a topological hypothesis of
ontology. I haven't been able to make sense of Bruno's Theaetetian
conception yet so I can't say if I'm telepathically plagiarizing him.

> Seriously, Craig, you are asking for too much! A lack of an
>explanation that you can understand is not evidence of falsehood! How do
>you know that you understand the idea?

I think I understand Jason's idea if that's what you're referring to,
I just reject it on the grounds that it is contingent upon the
existence of something which I consider to be a logical impossibility.
There can be no ancestor of red. It either has red or it doesn't. It
can't be something that is almost color but still a little bit goat
horn. To quote you in the future... non-sequitur,

>At best you can bet that you are
>correct; you can not be certain. Yes, you can have certainty that X is X
>and that it cannot contradict its own existence, but what can this tell
>you of the properties of X?

It can tell you that you know more about X or red than you think you
do. If that's what you're asking.

> Knowledge of the "truth values" of questions
>about the properties of X implies that you can process the meaning of X
>is {a, b, c, ...} statements. How exactly do you "process meanings"?

Not sure what this means really. Meanings are not processed, they are
revealed. Understood (the etymology of understand gives a better sense
of this *nter-standing as in, entero, something that supports you in
the gut, that settles you as it settles within you). The gap between
the sense of what you are and what the meaning is closes so that the
sensorimotor circuit is completed - irrespective of physical presence.
You can understand things which are not physically present, but some
semblance of their meaning is semantically present.

>You use your brain.

More accurate to say that I am my brain? I don't use a brain to think,
I am a brain that thinks.

> If that brain is hardwired from DNA to process some
>range of frequencies as "red" then guess what, u will see red when some
>EMF excitation stimulated some rod or cone in the retina of your eye...

Where does the DNA get red from?

> All of this physical process involves work that generates entropy.
>So there is a physical aspect to this.

I would say that since sensorimotive phenomena is the interior side of
electromagnetism, and is it's ontological opposite, that qualia
generates negentropy which balances the existential-relativity-entropy
side.

>> If that were true, then unplugging your monitor would change the
>> content of the internet. Regardless of the form a computer presents
>> it's data to us in, it is processed the same way to itself, machine
>> language, bytes.

>[SPK]
> Non-sequitur.

I'm just saying that formatting is important to us, not to the
computer. It's a false equivalence to presume that just because you
see information formatted through a human friendly presentation layer
doesn't mean that that layer has it's own awareness. It's a drawing. A
cartoon.

> Don't know. That's more of a cosmological question. The ontology of
> awareness is not only mysterious, it is mystery itself.

 {SPK]
 obscurum per obscurius?

Yes and no. Mystery arises from the privatization of sense through the
subjective topology. Sensorimotive experience gives rise to mystery
just as wealth gives rise to poverty. Knowing means knowing that you
don't know, which is another way of saying that the self feels what it
is by feeling what it is not (how else could there be a self?)

> I agree, but we need to show necessitation of the
>"organic-somatic-neurological".

The interior topology is not about necessity, it's about freedom,
imagination, joy, violence. Color exists because it is desirable. On
the subjective side of the curtain, the universe, she just wanna have
fun.

>That is just 'level of substitution" specifications!

Not getting the connection.

> And what exactly defined "sense" as in "beneath
>arithmetic is sense"? Whose "sense"? Are you claiming that Consciousness
>is prior to Existence?

I doubt that whatever sense gives rise to arithmetic sense would be
recognizable to us as Consciousness, but since it's beyond time and
space, it could be described as both absolutely omniscient, absolutely
unconscious, and maybe even relatively semi-conscious too. Sort of
like Yahweh-Cthulhu-frisbee-ak

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-12 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 09 Jul 2011, at 04:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:

You assumptions are not enough clear so I never know if you talk of  
what is or of what seems to be.

I'm trying for 'what seems to be what is',


OK. But what is your assumption?




since what is isn't
knowable


In which theory. I think that a part of 'what is' is knowable (for  
example consciousness). And I think elementary arithmetical conviction  
is communicable. I am pretty sure I can prove to you that 17 is a  
prime number, or even (less obvious) that the equation x^2 = 2 *( y^2)  
has no non null integers solution.






and what seems to be doesn't matter if it doesn't reflect
what is.


OK. But the question is: what are you assuming? I get the feeling that  
you assume a primitively physical universe.
I am OK with that theory, which might indeed be true, except that even  
without QM, the question of the interpretation of the physical laws is  
not entirely trivial for me.
But then, as you do, (so you are coherent with comp) you need a non  
computationalist theory of mind.
My point is a proof that you are coherent. Sane04 sum up an argument  
showing that mechanism (comp) and materialism (physicalism) are  
logically (with some nuances) incompatible.


Now, in the branching dilemma materialism XOR mechanism, you keep  
materialism, apparently.


I keep doubting, but keeping mechanism for the sake of the reasoning,  
transforms the mind-body problem into a body problem in theoretical  
computer science (which is a branch of number theory).
The mind theory is then very natural: it is the study of what machine  
can prove, know, observe, feel, hope about herself.
The matter theory is counterintuitive. But not so much weird than most  
interpretation of QM.


The theory of everything becomes number theory.
And then a miracle occurs! By the incompleteness theorem of Gödel,  
which is among what machine can prove, numbers can distinguish (or  
numbers get deluded, I don't know) provability from knowledge,  
observation, sensations, etc.





I limit the mystery to the numbers through the notion of machines  
and self-reference.

If you limit the mystery, then won't what you get back be defined by
how you have defined those limits?


Sorry. I was unclear. Consciousness and Matter are the mysteries I  
work on. What I pretend, is two things:


1) if you (at least) agree that your daughter marries a guy who got,  
to survive some diseases, an artificial heart, an artificial kidney,  
and an artificial brain. The heart is "just" a pump, and the brain is  
"just" a computer. The idea here is that the brain is a natural carbon  
based computer. Computer, as it happens, can all emulate each others.  
Well, If you agree to think about that hypothesis, you can see that we  
have literally no choice: we have to extract the physical patterns and  
the reason of their stability in the way "machine's dreams" can become  
first person sharable, and relate to more particular universal number.


2) Some Löbian machine already exists, like PA and ZF, and are very  
well studied, and thanks to the work of Gödel and others, we can  
axiomatize completely the theology of the universal machine.
The proper theology is just computer science minus computer's computer  
science. In this epoch you can also paraphrazed it by Tarski minus  
Gödel (truth on computer minus what computers can prove).
But computer can do much more things than proving, than can know,  
observe, etc. Even in the "naïve" theory of ideally correct machine,  
with believable = provable, knowable = provable and true, observable =  
provable and consistent, feelable (sorry for that word) = provable and  
consistent and true.








Consciousness content, like fear, can modify the matter distribution
around. At a deeper level, we select the realities which support us
since a long time (deep computation).

I think that's true or half true, but not even the most evolved lama
or enlightened yogi can fail to react to multiple bullets fired
through their head or a massive dose of cyanide.



Of course. Although we don't know, for sure, their first person  
experiences.







The problem is to relate them to third person sharable notions.

They can't be related except through direct neurological intervention.


?

Are you using an brain-mind identity thesis. I guess so. It is OK,  
because, well you believe that your daughter married a (philosophical)  
zombie.




There is never going to be a quantitative expression to bring the
color blue to a mind which is part of a brain that has never seen
blue.


OK. (Except serendipitously)




You can, however, potentially intervene upon the brain
electronically, perhaps simulate a conjoined twin connection, and
create a memory of blue. Blue cannot be described quantitatively
however.


You are right on this. But "Blue cannot be described quantitatively"  
is a qualitative assertion, and machines can make qualitative  
assertion too. They too can understand that th

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.