Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Sep 2009, at 10:35, Flammarion wrote:

> Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an
> ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent
> truth.

So Platonism is different from AR.
comp (CTM) assumes AR, not platonism.
UDA uses AR, not Platonism. UDA uses only the commitment that the  
truth of the arithmetical theorem Ex(x = UD) is independent of me.



>
>>  Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
>> unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the  
>> HP,
>> which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
>> take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
>> don't).
>
> You have answered your own question. Platonism says numbers, and
> therefore
> and immaterial UD are RITSIAR. Otherwise you just have a statement
> about
> what a UD would do if one existed.


You never answered my repeated question: is the second "I" of RITSIAR  
the 1-I or the 3-I?
The 1-3 distinction is the key of both UDA1-7 and UDA-8 (MGA). The  
Hard Consciousness problem, which is really the usual "mind-body"  
problem is the 1-person/3-person relation problem. The 1-person is the  
subjective private non-communicable experience, but self-duplication  
provides a tool to talk about it. Have you ever read the read the paper?


> I have explained that several times. It clarifies the issue
> that AR needs to be an ontological commitment, not
> just a commitment to mathematical truth. Platonism
> is not an uncontroversial entailment of CTM or CT, hence
> "comp" is not the only premise needed. Hence the need
> to distinguish between comp, which embeds Platonism like
> a Trojan horse, and CTM which doesn't.


Where does comp uses platonism? I use only the idea that the truth of  
the propositions having the type "ExP(x)" are independent of me. And  
this only at step 8.



>> Could you refer to a contestation of MGA.
>
> Could you explain how it differs from Maudlin?. In SANE04 you say
> "That result has been found independently by me and Tim Maudlin
> (Marchal 1988, Maudlin 1989). Maudlin�s argumentation provides more
> information"



The result is the same, the proof are completely different. Russell  
Standish made an interesting critics of Maudlin's proof, which helped  
me to realize that MGA is simpler and less prone to possible critics  
based on special interpretation of quantum mechanics. The "more  
information" was a red herring, despite the intrinsic interest of that  
information.




> Yes it is,because following from physical necessity
> is not the same as logical tautology. Logically,
> the governign equation of the universe could
> have been different, so "the governing equation
> of the universe is the SE" contains shannon information
> and so does such a physical universe.


How do you distinguish the Shannon information of the SWE and the  
Shannon information of the axioms of elementary arithmetic?



> Exactly. GIT does not suggest there is unproveable
> truth,only truths unproveable with a given system.


I guess GIT = Gödel incompleteness Theorem.  I agree with you but  
don't see the relevance, given that the information made by internal  
observer appears within systems, and is relative.
There is 0 information produced in a self-duplicating systems, yet,  
from the points of view of the duplicated system, they get one bit of  
information.



> If there is no UD, neither is runnign on it.

If the sqrt(2) does not exist, I am the pope.


>> I have to ask you if you understand the difference between the 1-you
>> and the 3-you?
>
> That there is a difference depends on your metaphsyics.


Are you identifying your consciousness with your body? Well then you  
are no more in the CTM frame at all.



> Mathematical existence is a mere metaphor, not RITSIAR.

With your PM axioms, may be. My point is that I refer you to an  
argument that CTM + PM leads to an epistemological contradiction.



>> Do you agree that the UD exists in the same sense that the prime
>> numbers exists in arithmetic?
>
> Yes
>
>> I need no more.
>
> No, you need more because merely fictive of formal or metaphorical
> existence is not enough
> to generate my RITSIAR



Then by MGA you have to attribute some telepathy ability to the  
neurons. I agree that MGA is quite concise in the sane04 paper.  
Consult the list MGA thread. The best version are there.


>> You cannot deny the existence of the UD in arithmetic, like you  
>> cannot
>> deny the existence of 13 in arithmetic.
>
> No. Instead I can assert that "in arithmetic" means in a fictive,
> conceptual world, not in a real ontological realm,


Idem.



>> Some physical process can easily be shown to implement mathematical
>> computation, but this does not give a physical definition of
>> computation, physics lack a criteria to say when a computation is not
>> implemented, as the Mallah-Putnam-Chalmers threads illustrated in the
>> list.
>
> How can anyon eelse have such 

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 24 Sep, 18:17, David Nyman  wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> >> But this is the very hinge of disagreement.  CTM's Trojan Horse is the
> >> incoherence of its posit of materialism.
>
> > Accordign to whom?
>
> >>It's demonstrably as
> >> dependant on AR as comp is;
>
> > What is dependent on AR? Materialism?
>
> CTM.  But you still won't accept this; perhaps this is not resolvable.

If ti was demonstrable, i woudl accept it.

> >>there's no difference - that's Bruno's
> >> point.  As to committing ontologically, whether to materialism or AR,
> >> this is surely merely a linguistic distinction.
>
> > Really   If I say I'm gopig to give you the £100 I owe you,and
> > give  you a 3-day old haddock instead, is that a merely
> > lingusitic distinction?
>
> Thanks, Peter - that genuinely made me LOL!  I think that we're
> diverging again in our use of RITSIAR.  You want any theoretical
> entities proposed to be cashable as RITSIAR, and that's why you insist
> on the ontological commitment.

I don't think reality can spring from unreality.

> I see what you mean, but I think that
> this is perhaps to be in too much of a rush to close the gap.  In my
> view, we just don't have a viable strategy for closing it, so why not
> wait and see where the theories and their empirical consequences lead?

Why not start by rejecting what is blatantly wrong? Otherwise
we will never make progress.

>  If comp could get us near enough, that might be the time to resolve
> exactly how AR = RITSIAR.
>
> David
>
> >  This message is part of the topic "Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology"
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 24 Sep, 18:16, David Nyman  wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> >> > You seem to be assuming a workign MGA
>
> >> Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
> >> intelligibility of CTM,
>
> > I haven't seen you give an argument that CTM is incompatible
> > with phsycalism, only that CTM wouldn't give the seame
> > sort of answer to the HP if it gave an answer
>
> No, it's more damaging than that.  I've argued, without any refutation
> AFAICS, that since CTM ex hypothesi makes no consistent appeal to
> physical causation, whatever sort of answer it could give to the HP
> couldn't be a consequence of any appeal to physical explanation in any
> standardly accepted sense.

It is by no means unversally accepted that
any physcial solution to the MBP must involve causation.

>If there's supposed to be some other
> relevant sense of physical explanation in this regard, AFAICS CTM
> remains demurely silent on the issue.

1) identity
2) compatibility with physicalsim
3) pre-existing physicai accounts of comptuaiton
4) not requrie ing anythign non-phsycial


> > Hih?
> > You mean AR as Platonism is a posit of comp?
> > Is "comp" here Bruno's idea or the standard CTM?
>
> He says - and I agree - that they're no different in this respect, as
> a consequence of CTM's implicit dependency on AR.

That is jsut the confusion I was trying to unpick

> >>  Labelling this "Platonism" can provide
> >> nothing further in the way of illumination, but I follow Popper in
> >> holding arguing about words to be futile, so I won't.
>
> > I have just explained why it does. Bruno keeps inssisting
> > that AR is only a statement about truth, but such a purely
> > episemological claim is not enough to whisk a ways the material
> > world and replace it with adn arithmetical Platonia.
>
> At this level of analysis, it is merely begging the question to assume
> that there is a material world to be whisked away.

Why isn;t it begging the quesiton to assume Platonism?

Didnt we agree that both were beign postied abductivley
in order to explore their consequences?

> I agree with you
> that there is a reality - RITSIAR - that is indubitable.  The question
> of the link between this reality and a more general theory is however
> precisely what is in dispute amongst rival theories such as
> materialism and mathematical approaches like comp.

That does not imply that materialism is deplorably question-begging

>  Of course one may
> feel there are grounds for holding one theory as stronger than the
> others - to regard it as the champion, if you like - but this does not
> justify giving it extra assistance in the ring, or allowing hitting
> under the belt.

Whatever. Bruno still does not have a disproof of materialism
without an assumption of Platonism. Perhaps I don't have
a disporrof of Platonism without an assumption of materialism.
But you are only accusing one of us of question-begging.

> As to ontology, no theory can lean on more than its explanatory power
> on the basis of certain premises.

I don't see the relevance of that comment. Ontology
is a subject matter. Onltologcial claims can be made
tentatively

>I don't see much point in debating
> your use of 'Platonism' in this regard any more.



> > U...no. I already know I am RITSIAR
>
> I would never dispute this.
>
> > Whatever is postied as explaining my undoubted reality
> > has to be postied as real itself.
>
> No, I disagree

Uh-huh. You think the Purple Rose of Cairo scenario si plausible,
then?

> I think that you're too quick to jump the gap

I think I am appealing to a well-established priinciple.
As Hume put it . you can't reach an evaluative conclusion
without makign evaluative assumptions. As I put it,
you can';t reach ontological conclusios without
making ontological assumptions.


> >> In developing third-person accounts of
> >> persons and states of affairs, we seek to explicate consistent
> >> nomological relations between the posited theoretical entities.  But
> >> beyond this, the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person
> >> account remains a mystery in the face of any known explanatory
> >> strategy.
>
> >> It
>
> > What is "it"
>
> "the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person account"
>
> >>does not seem susceptible to causal association with
> >> processes or events in any intelligible sense, nor does the posit of
> >> unsupported 'identities', between entities radically non-identical by
> >> any consistent standard, seem more effective than a whistle in the
> >> dark.
>
> > ?
>
> Does that mean you have a solution to proffer for the HP?

I don't think your outline of the problem makes much sense.
If we don't really know what anythign is (as you keep saying)
then we can't rule out an identity between the true natrue
of experience and the true nature of matter.  You seem to have
allowed youseld, as sceptics and idealists often do,  a
chink in the Veil of Perception
that is closed to others.

> >> Hence I th

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/24 Flammarion :

>> But this is the very hinge of disagreement.  CTM's Trojan Horse is the
>> incoherence of its posit of materialism.
>
> Accordign to whom?
>
>>It's demonstrably as
>> dependant on AR as comp is;
>
> What is dependent on AR? Materialism?

CTM.  But you still won't accept this; perhaps this is not resolvable.

>>there's no difference - that's Bruno's
>> point.  As to committing ontologically, whether to materialism or AR,
>> this is surely merely a linguistic distinction.
>
> Really   If I say I'm gopig to give you the £100 I owe you,and
> give  you a 3-day old haddock instead, is that a merely
> lingusitic distinction?

Thanks, Peter - that genuinely made me LOL!  I think that we're
diverging again in our use of RITSIAR.  You want any theoretical
entities proposed to be cashable as RITSIAR, and that's why you insist
on the ontological commitment.  I see what you mean, but I think that
this is perhaps to be in too much of a rush to close the gap.  In my
view, we just don't have a viable strategy for closing it, so why not
wait and see where the theories and their empirical consequences lead?
 If comp could get us near enough, that might be the time to resolve
exactly how AR = RITSIAR.

David

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/24 Flammarion :

>> > You seem to be assuming a workign MGA
>>
>> Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
>> intelligibility of CTM,
>
> I haven't seen you give an argument that CTM is incompatible
> with phsycalism, only that CTM wouldn't give the seame
> sort of answer to the HP if it gave an answer

No, it's more damaging than that.  I've argued, without any refutation
AFAICS, that since CTM ex hypothesi makes no consistent appeal to
physical causation, whatever sort of answer it could give to the HP
couldn't be a consequence of any appeal to physical explanation in any
standardly accepted sense.  If there's supposed to be some other
relevant sense of physical explanation in this regard, AFAICS CTM
remains demurely silent on the issue.  Consequently, like it or not,
it's stuck with computational supervenience or it's a dead duck.

> Which neither
> pshycialism nor CTM currently do.

Agreed

>>and my conclusion, like Maudlin's, was to
>> reject CTM.
>
> ...in favour of physicalism?

Yes

> Hih?
> You mean AR as Platonism is a posit of comp?
> Is "comp" here Bruno's idea or the standard CTM?

He says - and I agree - that they're no different in this respect, as
a consequence of CTM's implicit dependency on AR.

>>  Labelling this "Platonism" can provide
>> nothing further in the way of illumination, but I follow Popper in
>> holding arguing about words to be futile, so I won't.
>
> I have just explained why it does. Bruno keeps inssisting
> that AR is only a statement about truth, but such a purely
> episemological claim is not enough to whisk a ways the material
> world and replace it with adn arithmetical Platonia.

At this level of analysis, it is merely begging the question to assume
that there is a material world to be whisked away.  I agree with you
that there is a reality - RITSIAR - that is indubitable.  The question
of the link between this reality and a more general theory is however
precisely what is in dispute amongst rival theories such as
materialism and mathematical approaches like comp.  Of course one may
feel there are grounds for holding one theory as stronger than the
others - to regard it as the champion, if you like - but this does not
justify giving it extra assistance in the ring, or allowing hitting
under the belt.

As to ontology, no theory can lean on more than its explanatory power
on the basis of certain premises.  I don't see much point in debating
your use of 'Platonism' in this regard any more.

> U...no. I already know I am RITSIAR

I would never dispute this.

> Whatever is postied as explaining my undoubted reality
> has to be postied as real itself.

No, I disagree.  I think that you're too quick to jump the gap

> Deciding between rival
> posits is another matter.  I think you are much being much
> to "quick" to decide it is a hopeless mystery.

To say that it is mysterious is not to dismiss it as hopeless.
Perhaps being too quick to unsatisfactory solutions may cause a
genuine resolution to escape us for longer.

>> In developing third-person accounts of
>> persons and states of affairs, we seek to explicate consistent
>> nomological relations between the posited theoretical entities.  But
>> beyond this, the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person
>> account remains a mystery in the face of any known explanatory
>> strategy.
>
>> It
>
> What is "it"

"the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person account"

>>does not seem susceptible to causal association with
>> processes or events in any intelligible sense, nor does the posit of
>> unsupported 'identities', between entities radically non-identical by
>> any consistent standard, seem more effective than a whistle in the
>> dark.
>
> ?

Does that mean you have a solution to proffer for the HP?

>> Hence I think it may be missing the point to insist that any
>> theoretical entity deployed for the purpose of a third-person account
>> is itself RITSIAR; rather we should regard such accounts as successful
>> insofar as they take us ever closer to the brink of the gap, on the
>> other side of which RITSIAR can be glimpsed.  IOW, RITSIAR invokes the
>> Hard Question: how can that be me?
>
> I think you have got the question of positing somehting
> AS real in a theory confused with the question of
> confirming  a theory. A theory according to which
> the real can spring from the unreal (as in
> Woody Allens Purple Rose of Cairo) is a non-starter.

No, it's not a confusion.  I'm saying that to posit something as
RITSIAR prior to such confirmation, or at least elucidation, is to put
the cart before the horse.  As to AR, you're hooked on your insistence
that it is unreal.  If attaching a label makes it any more real for
you, perhaps you could just repeat the word "platonism" to yourself
whenever you see "AR", and then we would have no further need to
argue.

David

> >
>

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 24 Sep, 16:48, David Nyman  wrote:
> On Sep 24, 9:39 am, Flammarion  wrote:
>
> >> Could you either
> >> state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit
> >> of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop
> >> your insistence on it?
>
> > I have explained that several times. It clarifies the issue
> > that AR needs to be an ontological commitment, not
> > just a commitment to mathematical truth. Platonism
> > is not an uncontroversial entailment of CTM or CT, hence
> > "comp" is not the only premise needed. Hence the need
> > to distinguish between comp, which embeds Platonism like
> > a Trojan horse, and CTM which doesn't.
>
> But this is the very hinge of disagreement.  CTM's Trojan Horse is the
> incoherence of its posit of materialism.

Accordign to whom?

>It's demonstrably as
> dependant on AR as comp is;

What is dependent on AR? Materialism?

>there's no difference - that's Bruno's
> point.  As to committing ontologically, whether to materialism or AR,
> this is surely merely a linguistic distinction.

Really   If I say I'm gopig to give you the £100 I owe you,and
give  you a 3-day old haddock instead, is that a merely
lingusitic distinction?

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 24 Sep, 16:01, "david.nyman"  wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> >> AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
> >> priori truth.  The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
> >> consequence of a reasoned argument.  The alternative is that CTM is
> >> false on the posit of PM.
>
> > You seem to be assuming a workign MGA
>
> Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
> intelligibility of CTM,

I haven't seen you give an argument that CTM is incompatible
with phsycalism, only that CTM wouldn't give the seame
sort of answer to the HP if it gave an answer. Which neither
pshycialism nor CTM currently do.

>and my conclusion, like Maudlin's, was to
> reject CTM.

...in favour of physicalism?

>But I'm prepared to grant Bruno's reversal of matter and
> mathematics as a working hypothesis to retain the possibility of a
> computational mind-body theory, to be justified abductively.



> >>.If it
> >> were to turn out somehow that the mind-body problem and the whole of
> >> physics besides could be elucidated by the explanatory power of comp
> >> on the basis of AR+UDA+CT etc then what could the posit of Platonism
> >> add to this?
>
> > Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an
> > ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent
> > truth.
>
> Well then we're in agreement.  AR as we have defined it is
> unambiguously a posit of comp.

Hih?
You mean AR as Platonism is a posit of comp?
Is "comp" here Bruno's idea or the standard CTM?

>  Labelling this "Platonism" can provide
> nothing further in the way of illumination, but I follow Popper in
> holding arguing about words to be futile, so I won't.

I have just explained why it does. Bruno keeps inssisting
that AR is only a statement about truth, but such a purely
episemological claim is not enough to whisk a ways the material
world and replace it with adn arithmetical Platonia.

> >> Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
> >> unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the HP,
> >> which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
> >> take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
> >> don't).
>
> > You have answered your own question. Platonism says numbers, and
> > therefore
> > and immaterial UD are RITSIAR.
>
> Ah, if you are proposing that, beyond theoretical and methodological
> constraints, any metaphysical posit per se could disambiguate what is
> RITSIAR, I must disagree.

U...no. I already know I am RITSIAR

>In developing third-person accounts of
> persons and states of affairs, we seek to explicate consistent
> nomological relations between the posited theoretical entities.  But
> beyond this, the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person
> account remains a mystery in the face of any known explanatory
> strategy.

Whatever is postied as explaining my undoubted reality
has to be postied as real itself. Deciding between rival
posits is another matter.  I think you are much being much
to "quick" to decide it is a hopeless mystery.

> It

What is "it"

>does not seem susceptible to causal association with
> processes or events in any intelligible sense, nor does the posit of
> unsupported 'identities', between entities radically non-identical by
> any consistent standard, seem more effective than a whistle in the
> dark.

?

> Hence I think it may be missing the point to insist that any
> theoretical entity deployed for the purpose of a third-person account
> is itself RITSIAR; rather we should regard such accounts as successful
> insofar as they take us ever closer to the brink of the gap, on the
> other side of which RITSIAR can be glimpsed.  IOW, RITSIAR invokes the
> Hard Question: how can that be me?

I think you have got the question of positing somehting
AS real in a theory confused with the question of
confirming  a theory. A theory according to which
the real can spring from the unreal (as in
Woody Allens Purple Rose of Cairo) is a non-starter.

Bruno needs Platonism for his theory to be
coherent, let alone true.

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

On Sep 24, 9:39 am, Flammarion  wrote:

>> Could you either
>> state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit
>> of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop
>> your insistence on it?
>>
> I have explained that several times. It clarifies the issue
> that AR needs to be an ontological commitment, not
> just a commitment to mathematical truth. Platonism
> is not an uncontroversial entailment of CTM or CT, hence
> "comp" is not the only premise needed. Hence the need
> to distinguish between comp, which embeds Platonism like
> a Trojan horse, and CTM which doesn't.

But this is the very hinge of disagreement.  CTM's Trojan Horse is the
incoherence of its posit of materialism.  It's demonstrably as
dependant on AR as comp is; there's no difference - that's Bruno's
point.  As to committing ontologically, whether to materialism or AR,
this is surely merely a linguistic distinction.  We have already
agreed that the only substantive distinctions are theoretical and
methodological.  If that amounts to an ontological commitment for you,
so be it.  But that doesn't bridge the gap to RITSIAR.  The acid test
of either posit in that regard will be its ability to get us to a
point where our hesitation on the brink of that gap can - just - be
overcome.

David

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

On Sep 24, 2:44 am, Brent Meeker  wrote:

> Of course Johnson's refutation didn't change any idealist
> minds, but he pointed to the use of operational definitions
> as the basis of science which ultimately had a lot more
> influence than Berkeley.

That is very true.  The idealist road is a hard one.

David

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[david.nyman]

2009/9/24 Flammarion :

>> AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
>> priori truth.  The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
>> consequence of a reasoned argument.  The alternative is that CTM is
>> false on the posit of PM.
>
> You seem to be assuming a workign MGA

Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
intelligibility of CTM, and my conclusion, like Maudlin's, was to
reject CTM.  But I'm prepared to grant Bruno's reversal of matter and
mathematics as a working hypothesis to retain the possibility of a
computational mind-body theory, to be justified abductively.

>>.If it
>> were to turn out somehow that the mind-body problem and the whole of
>> physics besides could be elucidated by the explanatory power of comp
>> on the basis of AR+UDA+CT etc then what could the posit of Platonism
>> add to this?
>
> Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an
> ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent
> truth.

Well then we're in agreement.  AR as we have defined it is
unambiguously a posit of comp.  Labelling this "Platonism" can provide
nothing further in the way of illumination, but I follow Popper in
holding arguing about words to be futile, so I won't.

>> Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
>> unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the HP,
>> which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
>> take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
>> don't).
>
> You have answered your own question. Platonism says numbers, and
> therefore
> and immaterial UD are RITSIAR.

Ah, if you are proposing that, beyond theoretical and methodological
constraints, any metaphysical posit per se could disambiguate what is
RITSIAR, I must disagree.  In developing third-person accounts of
persons and states of affairs, we seek to explicate consistent
nomological relations between the posited theoretical entities.  But
beyond this, the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person
account remains a mystery in the face of any known explanatory
strategy. It does not seem susceptible to causal association with
processes or events in any intelligible sense, nor does the posit of
unsupported 'identities', between entities radically non-identical by
any consistent standard, seem more effective than a whistle in the
dark.

Hence I think it may be missing the point to insist that any
theoretical entity deployed for the purpose of a third-person account
is itself RITSIAR; rather we should regard such accounts as successful
insofar as they take us ever closer to the brink of the gap, on the
other side of which RITSIAR can be glimpsed.  IOW, RITSIAR invokes the
Hard Question: how can that be me?

> Otherwise you just have a statement about
> what a UD would do if one existed.

Yes, precisely.

>> He argues that the reversal of material and
>> mathematical primacy is a necessary posit for computational
>> supervenience - i.e. AR.  And he claims that the predictions of the
>> theory are empirically refutable, which means that its ultimate
>> justification is to be sought abductively.
>>
>>  >Other
>>
>> > peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark.
>>
>> Do they in fact?
>
> eg Tegmark

Oh, you mean that Bruno's isn't the only such theory?  No, of course not.

David

> >
>

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/24 Flammarion :

> The idealist defence agaisnt these refutations always involves things
> being arranged "just so" so as to givew he imitation
> of a material world with minds supervening on brains. And it
> doesn't give  a good reason why things should be just so. It's a much
> worse explanation than the explanations you are objecting to.

But Bruno's work is aimed precisely at providing a good reason why
things should be just so.  I understand that you differ with him on
the required posit with respect to the status of numbers, but that
apart, does the project per se seem adequately motivated to you?

David

> >
>

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 24 Sep, 07:25, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole
> > bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many
> > Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical
> > realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point
> > since the MGA and Olympia arguments are contestable.
>
> Could you refer to a contestation of MGA.

Could you explain how it differs from Maudlin?. In SANE04 you say
"That result has been found independently by me and Tim Maudlin
(Marchal 1988, Maudlin 1989). Maudlin�s argumentation provides more
information"



> >> Also you attach qualia to it, or you said that qualia can be attached
> >> to it. But if CTM is correct, such qualia can be attached
> >> accidentally, so it does need some essential properties.
>
> > I don't follow
>
> I was just asking how you attach contingent qualia to propertyless  
> primary matter.

The same way I attach contingent physcial properties.

> >> Then you cannot be physicalist either, because everything can be
> >> derived from Schrodinger equation + initial condition (or vaccuum).
>
> > No, the SE is not logically necessary.
>
> This is not relevant.

Yes it is,because following from physical necessity
is not the same as logical tautology. Logically,
the governign equation of the universe could
have been different, so "the governing equation
of the universe is the SE" contains shannon information
and so does such a physical universe.

>And also, the axioms of arithmetic are not  
> logically necessary either.
>
> > Have you an exampel fo a theorem which is provably
> > true, and which is not derived analytcially from axioms?
>
> ? "Provable" means "derivable from axioms". Be it in arithmetic or in  
> QM.

Exactly. GIT does not suggest there is unproveable
truth,only truths unproveable with a given system.



> > subjective indeterminacy is no more than subjective information.
>
> Exactly.
>
> >> All this dodges my question: do you agree that once you say yes to  
> >> the
> >> doctor, your many '3-you' appear, in the third person sense, in the
> >> execution of the UD?
>
> > I have answers that a million times. Since I don't agree that there
> > is either a material or an immaterial UD, i do not believe I am
> > running on a  UD
>
> No. If you contest MGA you can say that your 1-I is not running on a  
> UD. (but I am still waithing that contestation).
> But here I was not talking on the 1-you, but on the 3-yous.

If there is no UD, neither is runnign on it.

> Also you contradict yourself. You did accept that 7 (and thus the UD)  
> exists mathematically, and that is all I need to say that your 3-you  
> is runned (in the math sense) in the UD.
I never accpeted they exist Platonically. To say they
exist mathematically is just to say that certain statements are
true with a formal game.

> I have to ask you if you understand the difference between the 1-you  
> and the 3-you?

That there is a difference depends on your metaphsyics.

> >> The UD will generate all
> >> the computations generating that state.
>
> > A non-existent UD generates nothing.
>
> UD exists mathematically and generates many mathematical things.

Mathematical existence is a mere metaphor, not RITSIAR.

> > The problem is not that the UD only generates zombies. The problem
> > is that it does not exist.
>
> Do you agree that the UD exists in the same sense that the prime  
> numbers exists in arithmetic?

Yes

> I need no more.

No, you need more because merely fictive of formal or metaphorical
existence is not enough
to generate my RITSIAR

> >> The only way out would be to postulate a notion of primary matter,  
> >> and
> >> to attach consciousness to it in a way which cannot be Turing
> >> emulated.
>
> > That is false. All I have to do is reject the immaterial UD. (In
> > particular
> > I can accept PM and Turing Emulation so long as I reject Platonism
> > and the immaterial UD).
>
> You cannot deny the existence of the UD in arithmetic, like you cannot  
> deny the existence of 13 in arithmetic.

No. Instead I can assert that "in arithmetic" means in a fictive,
conceptual world, not in a real ontological realm,

> And the whole point of UDA  
> (with MGA) is that it entails that your primary matter is non Turing  
> emulable.
>
> > I don't think CTM solves the HP. I don't think CTM contradicts
> > physcialism.
>
> I guess HP is the hard problem. I do think that CTM, once we get the  
> UDA-point does solve the HP problem, except for a remaining gap which  
> is meta-solve, in the sense that the presence of that gap is shown to  
> be necessary. But it also solve the HM problem, and that is unique and  
> unexpected. (The HM problem = the Hard Matter problem, the problem of  
> explaining where matter comes from).
>
> >> Physicisist cannot yet define computation (except in a sense
> >> immaterial quantum computations).
>
> > I have absolutely no idea why you would say that. Physicists tend to
> > have computers on their d

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 24 Sep, 02:28, David Nyman  wrote:
> On Sep 22, 1:10 pm, Flammarion  wrote:
>
> > > No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a 
> > > x86
> > > computer than on an ARM based one ?
>
> > There's a difference between being independent of any
> > specific instantiation and being independent of all instantiations.
>
> Computational supervenience is not equivalent to no instantiation.
> Its realisation is derived from AR - i.e. the posit that all phenomena
> are consequential on a specific subset of mathematics and
> computational theory.

ie Platonism

> It is motivated by the inadequacy of physical
> supervenience as a basis for the computational theory of mind.  Its
> explanatory worth as a theory is to be judged abductively and
> empirically.
>
> > Platonism is not proved by multiple realisability.
>
> AFAICS nobody is trying to prove Platonism but you.

You just posited it above.

> Could you either
> state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit
> of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop
> your insistence on it?
>

I have explained that several times. It clarifies the issue
that AR needs to be an ontological commitment, not
just a commitment to mathematical truth. Platonism
is not an uncontroversial entailment of CTM or CT, hence
"comp" is not the only premise needed. Hence the need
to distinguish between comp, which embeds Platonism like
a Trojan horse, and CTM which doesn't.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 24 Sep, 02:10, David Nyman  wrote:
> 2009/9/23 Flammarion :
>
> >> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
> >> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
> >> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
> >> deployed in a particular research programme.
>
> > I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing
> > you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive
> > argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that
> > X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking "X exists"
> > as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth
> > of  a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori
> > self-evidence.
>
> AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
> priori truth.  The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
> consequence of a reasoned argument.  The alternative is that CTM is
> false on the posit of PM.  

You seem to be assuming a workign MGA

> either alternative forces anyone to adopt
> either PM or AR as a metaphysical posit a priori; it is a question of
> the consistency of two simultaneous posits.  And of course we are
> agreed that the justification of any posit whatsoever is its
> explanatory power.
>
> > He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism
> > as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he
> > is positing Platonism at all.
> > And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments
> > to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not
> > an abductive argument.
>
> But what extra explanatory value is Platonism supposed to have?  


>.If it
> were to turn out somehow that the mind-body problem and the whole of
> physics besides could be elucidated by the explanatory power of comp
> on the basis of AR+UDA+CT etc then what could the posit of Platonism
> add to this?

Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an
ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent
truth.

> Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
> unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the HP,
> which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
> take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
> don't).

You have answered your own question. Platonism says numbers, and
therefore
and immaterial UD are RITSIAR. Otherwise you just have a statement
about
what a UD would do if one existed.

> >> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
> >> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.
> >> The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
> >> mathematics.  Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
> >> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.
>
> > Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps
> > insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption.
>
> Surely that's not so.

I have ssenmay statements from him where he says comp
is his only assumption.

> He argues that the reversal of material and
> mathematical primacy is a necessary posit for computational
> supervenience - i.e. AR.  And he claims that the predictions of the
> theory are empirically refutable, which means that its ultimate
> justification is to be sought abductively.
>
>  >Other
>
> > peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark.
>
> Do they in fact?

eg Tegmark

> > You are putting forward
> > a better argument on his behalf than he is.
>
> TVM (ta very much)
>
> David
>
>
>
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 24 Sep, 01:19, David Nyman  wrote:
> 2009/9/23 Flammarion :
>
>
>
> >> > > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> >> > > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> >> > > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
> >> > > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
> >> > > without comp).
>
> >> > But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.
>
> >> Good point.  However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant
> >> distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking
> >> them seriously.  I would recommend the following piece, particularly
> >> the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface):
>
> >>http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf
>
> > That is just rehashed idealism with all the standard problems.
>
> The point is that Brent's comment - like Johnson's 'refutation' of
> Berkeley - is ineffectual as a dismissal of Bruno's theoretical
> position.  Hoffman gives a neat account of how this might go.  As to
> the problems, you pays your money..

The idealist defence agaisnt these refutations always involves things
being arranged "just so" so as to givew he imitation
of a material world with minds supervening on brains. And it
doesn't give  a good reason why things should be just so. It's a much
worse explanation than the explanations you are objecting to.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Sep 2009, at 18:48, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>
> He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism
> as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he
> is positing Platonism at all.
> And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments
> to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not
> an abductive argument.

This is because half the time you use platonism in the sense of  
arithmetical realism, and half the time you use it in a more general  
sense.
If you were using the carefully chosen vocabulary of the sane04 paper,  
and stick on it, that problem would never appear.


>
> I think Bruno has zero interest in AI,
> he is trying to argue towards Plotnistic
> mysticism.

My point is technical. Everett showed that the collapse is not needed,  
and I show that SWE *cannot* be needed.





>
> CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole
> bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many
> Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical
> realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point
> since the MGA and Olympia arguments are contestable.

Could you refer to a contestation of MGA. In the list some have  
contest it because they feel the movie can be conscious, but then it  
is not conscious qua computatio. To make this clear I am explaining  
what is the comp-supervenience thesis. This forces me to explain the  
mathematical notion of computation, which is made possible by Church  
thesis.



>
>
>> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
>> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.

Do you agree with this? Physicalism is still possible without  
introducing a notion of primitive matter.



>> Also you attach qualia to it, or you said that qualia can be attached
>> to it. But if CTM is correct, such qualia can be attached
>> accidentally, so it does need some essential properties.
>
> I don't follow

I was just asking how you attach contingent qualia to propertyless  
primary matter.


>> Then you cannot be physicalist either, because everything can be
>> derived from Schrodinger equation + initial condition (or vaccuum).
>
> No, the SE is not logically necessary.

This is not relevant. And also, the axioms of arithmetic are not  
logically necessary either.

> Have you an exampel fo a theorem which is provably
> true, and which is not derived analytcially from axioms?

? "Provable" means "derivable from axioms". Be it in arithmetic or in  
QM.


>> But even this is not relevant, given that the information are  
>> relative
>> from the view of the observer (the 3-observer in the UD, which
>> emulates all theories).
>
> You are appealing to your theory to justify your theory.

Not at all. I am appealing to the elementary math, given that I was  
talking here on 3-notions. That UD runs all 3-observers, and their  
theories is elementary computer science.

> subjective indeterminacy is no more than subjective information.

Exactly.


>> All this dodges my question: do you agree that once you say yes to  
>> the
>> doctor, your many '3-you' appear, in the third person sense, in the
>> execution of the UD?
>
> I have answers that a million times. Since I don't agree that there
> is either a material or an immaterial UD, i do not believe I am
> running on a  UD

No. If you contest MGA you can say that your 1-I is not running on a  
UD. (but I am still waithing that contestation).
But here I was not talking on the 1-you, but on the 3-yous.

Also you contradict yourself. You did accept that 7 (and thus the UD)  
exists mathematically, and that is all I need to say that your 3-you  
is runned (in the math sense) in the UD.

I have to ask you if you understand the difference between the 1-you  
and the 3-you?


>> The UD will generate all
>> the computations generating that state.
>
> A non-existent UD generates nothing.


UD exists mathematically and generates many mathematical things.

> The problem is not that the UD only generates zombies. The problem
> is that it does not exist.

Do you agree that the UD exists in the same sense that the prime  
numbers exists in arithmetic? I need no more.


>> The only way out would be to postulate a notion of primary matter,  
>> and
>> to attach consciousness to it in a way which cannot be Turing
>> emulated.
>
> That is false. All I have to do is reject the immaterial UD. (In
> particular
> I can accept PM and Turing Emulation so long as I reject Platonism
> and the immaterial UD).

You cannot deny the existence of the UD in arithmetic, like you cannot  
deny the existence of 13 in arithmetic. And the whole point of UDA  
(with MGA) is that it entails that your primary matter is non Turing  
emulable.

> I don't think CTM solves the HP. I don't think CTM contradicts
> physcialism.

I guess HP is the hard problem. I do think that CTM, once we get the  
UDA-point does solve the HP problem, except for a remaining gap which  
is meta-solve, in the sense that the

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Brent Meeker]

David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/23 Flammarion :
> 
> Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
> matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
> without comp).
 But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.
>>> Good point.  However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant
>>> distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking
>>> them seriously.  I would recommend the following piece, particularly
>>> the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface):
>>>
>>> http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf
>> That is just rehashed idealism with all the standard problems.
> 
> The point is that Brent's comment - like Johnson's 'refutation' of
> Berkeley - is ineffectual as a dismissal of Bruno's theoretical
> position.  Hoffman gives a neat account of how this might go.  As to
> the problems, you pays your money..
> 
> David

Of course Johnson's refutation didn't change any idealist 
minds, but he pointed to the use of operational definitions 
as the basis of science which ultimately had a lot more 
influence than Berkeley.

Brent

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

On Sep 22, 1:10 pm, Flammarion  wrote:

> > No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a x86
> > computer than on an ARM based one ?
>
> There's a difference between being independent of any
> specific instantiation and being independent of all instantiations.

Computational supervenience is not equivalent to no instantiation.
Its realisation is derived from AR - i.e. the posit that all phenomena
are consequential on a specific subset of mathematics and
computational theory.  It is motivated by the inadequacy of physical
supervenience as a basis for the computational theory of mind.  Its
explanatory worth as a theory is to be judged abductively and
empirically.

> Platonism is not proved by multiple realisability.

AFAICS nobody is trying to prove Platonism but you.  Could you either
state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit
of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop
your insistence on it?

David

> On 22 Sep, 12:59, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > 2009/9/22 Flammarion 
>
> > > On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > > > It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
> > > > (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation.
>
> > > Such existence is blatant Platonism.
>
> > No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a x86
> > computer than on an ARM based one ?
>
> There's a difference between being independent of any
> specific instantiation and being independent of all instantiations.
> Platonism is not proved by multiple realisability.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/23 Flammarion :

>> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
>> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
>> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
>> deployed in a particular research programme.
>
> I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing
> you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive
> argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that
> X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking "X exists"
> as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth
> of  a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori
> self-evidence.

AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
priori truth.  The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
consequence of a reasoned argument.  The alternative is that CTM is
false on the posit of PM.  Neither alternative forces anyone to adopt
either PM or AR as a metaphysical posit a priori; it is a question of
the consistency of two simultaneous posits.  And of course we are
agreed that the justification of any posit whatsoever is its
explanatory power.

> He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism
> as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he
> is positing Platonism at all.
> And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments
> to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not
> an abductive argument.

But what extra explanatory value is Platonism supposed to have?  If it
were to turn out somehow that the mind-body problem and the whole of
physics besides could be elucidated by the explanatory power of comp
on the basis of AR+UDA+CT etc then what could the posit of Platonism
add to this?  Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the HP,
which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
don't).

>> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
>> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.
>> The alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
>> mathematics.  Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
>> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.
>
> Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps
> insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption.

Surely that's not so.  He argues that the reversal of material and
mathematical primacy is a necessary posit for computational
supervenience - i.e. AR.  And he claims that the predictions of the
theory are empirically refutable, which means that its ultimate
justification is to be sought abductively.

 >Other
> peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark.

Do they in fact?

> You are putting forward
> a better argument on his behalf than he is.

TVM (ta very much)

David

>
>
>
> On 23 Sep, 13:12, David Nyman  wrote:
>
>> >> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
>> >> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
>> >> one case.
>>
>> > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
>> > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>>
>> "That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of
>> the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of
>> persons and the appearance of matter on this basis.
>
> Isn't that what I have been saying.
>
>>The entities so
>> posited are of course trivially "immaterial".  You might as well say
>> that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be
>> "unmathematical".
>
> It does, so why not?
>
>> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
>> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
>> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
>> deployed in a particular research programme.
>
> I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing
> you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive
> argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that
> X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking "X exists"
> as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth
> of  a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori
> self-evidence.
>
>> >> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
>> >> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
>> >> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
>> >> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
>> >> >> explanatory scheme.
>>
>> >> > Who's been doing that?
>>
>> >> This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
>> >> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
>> >> Platonism to justify the UDA
>>
>> > He needs to make it clear he is ass

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/23 Flammarion :

>> > > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
>> > > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
>> > > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
>> > > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
>> > > without comp).
>>
>> > But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.
>>
>> Good point.  However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant
>> distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking
>> them seriously.  I would recommend the following piece, particularly
>> the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface):
>>
>> http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf
>
> That is just rehashed idealism with all the standard problems.

The point is that Brent's comment - like Johnson's 'refutation' of
Berkeley - is ineffectual as a dismissal of Bruno's theoretical
position.  Hoffman gives a neat account of how this might go.  As to
the problems, you pays your money..

David

>
>
>
> On 23 Sep, 16:10, David Nyman  wrote:
>> On Sep 22, 7:47 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>> > > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
>> > > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
>> > > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
>> > > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
>> > > without comp).
>>
>> > But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.
>>
>> Good point.  However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant
>> distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking
>> them seriously.  I would recommend the following piece, particularly
>> the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface):
>>
>> http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf
>
> That is just rehashed idealism with all the standard problems.
>
> >
>

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 23 Sep, 16:10, David Nyman  wrote:
> On Sep 22, 7:47 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
> > > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> > > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> > > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
> > > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
> > > without comp).
>
> > But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.
>
> Good point.  However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant
> distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking
> them seriously.  I would recommend the following piece, particularly
> the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface):
>
> http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf

That is just rehashed idealism with all the standard problems.

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 23 Sep, 15:33, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 23 Sep 2009, at 10:39, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> >> Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why
> >> does it organize into living being if it is propertyless?
>
> > It only lacks essential properties. It can have any property as
> > an accident.
>
> Then it needs the essential property of being able to have accidental
> property.

That's more of a purely logical 'Cambidge' property.

> Also you attach qualia to it, or you said that qualia can be attached
> to it. But if CTM is correct, such qualia can be attached
> accidentally, so it does need some essential properties.

I don't follow

> > How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD?
>
>  It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is
>  programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and
>  dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with
>  the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with
>  the
>  shape ExP(x) with P decidable).
>
> >>> I don;t see what that has to do with information.
>
> >> Which information? The Shannon like information comes from the
> >> arithmetical truth, and the "meaning-consciousness information" comes
> >> from the fixed point of machine self-observability.
>
> > The idea that mathematical theorems have shanning information
> > is contradicted by the idea that mathematical theorems are logically
> > necessarty
> > tautologies.
>
> Then you cannot be physicalist either, because everything can be
> derived from Schrodinger equation + initial condition (or vaccuum).

No, the SE is not logically necessary.

>Cf
> your own:



> > Why would they get different physical properties?
> > Answer: starting conditions+physical laws.
>
> But mathematical theorems are not necessary tautologies, in general.
> By Godel completeness theorem, all you can say is that they are true
> in all models of the (first order logical) theories.

Have you an exampel fo a theorem which is provably
true, and which is not derived analytcially from axioms?

> But even this is not relevant, given that the information are relative
> from the view of the observer (the 3-observer in the UD, which
> emulates all theories).

You are appealing to your theory to justify your theory.

> This is explains explicitly in AUDA. Even for ideally correct machine
> there is a notion of contingency, which is provided by the notion of
> consistency (unprovable by the theory), so that such machine develop
> according to different histories.
> Information is provided then by self-analysis after self-
> multiplication, like discovering "I am in Moscow" after the WM-
> duplication.

subjective indeterminacy is no more than subjective information.

I find myself in the world where Hitler lost WWII, but I just *am*
that version
of Peter. SO it boils down to the tatutology that Hitler-lost-WWII
Peter is in the
 Hitler-lost-WWII world,  Hitler-won-WWII Peter is in the
 Hitler-won-WWII world, etc.

> All this dodges my question: do you agree that once you say yes to the
> doctor, your many '3-you' appear, in the third person sense, in the
> execution of the UD?

I have answers that a million times. Since I don't agree that there
is either a material or an immaterial UD, i do not believe I am
running on a  UD

> Once you say "yes" to the digital surgeon, you know that your physical
> state will be truncated and encoded through a number (the digital
> backup, the teletransport information, ...).

AFIAC it is always encoded in some physical form.

>The UD will generate all
> the computations generating that state.

A non-existent UD generates nothing.

>For example, it will generate
> the quantum state of the Milky Way, and emulates its wave equation,
> and thus all relative states of all its subsystems. That emulation
> will generate your actual computational states, and the 3-you will be
> generated. All the 3-you will behave as if they were you, and talk
> about primary matter and so one.

None of that follows without the actual existence
of an immaterial UD. Equally, you will continue
to believe in dreamign machines even if every existing
thign is material and Platonism is completely false.

> Before the MGA, I can understand you may consider them as immaterial
> zombie.

The problem is not that the UD only generates zombies. The problem
is that it does not exist.

> The MGA shows that if you survive qua computatio then each of those 3-
> you will have a 1-you (actually captured by the non formalizable-by-
> you notion of Bp & Dp & p).
> To be sure the emulation of the galaxy will not be among the winning
> computations, but that is not the point here.
>
> The only way out would be to postulate a notion of primary matter, and
> to attach consciousness to it in a way which cannot be Turing
> emulated.

That is false. All I have to do is reject the immaterial UD. (In
particular
I can accept PM and Turing Emul

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[m.a.]

David,
Thanks so much. I have a feeling there are others so if and when I 
run across them, I'll add them to your list and ask again.  Best,   


   marty a.



- Original Message - 
From: "David Nyman" 
To: 
Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 10:48 AM
Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology



2009/9/23 m.a. :

CTM = Computational Theory of Mind
CT = Church Thesis
PM = Primitive Matter
(A)UDA = (Arithmetical) Universal Dovetailer Argument
AR = Arithmetical Realism
MR = Multiple Realisability
WR = White Rabbit
MGA = Movie Graph Argument
Olympia = Tim Maudlin's anti-CTM reductio argument
RITSIAR = Real In The Sense I Am Real

ITEODYNAM? = Is That Enough Or Do You Need Any More?

> >
>


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[m.a.]

Again thanks,
  Hopefully, these notes plus David Nyman's will allow me 
to orient myself--at least roughly--in the sturm und drang of debate.m.a.



  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 11:52 AM
  Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology




  On 23 Sep 2009, at 16:36, m.a. wrote:


Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes being 
used in this thread?  (e.g.  CTM, PM, UD etc.)




  CTM = computational theory of mind


  Comp = "computationalism" = a weak and preciser version of CTM (mainly "yes 
doctor" + Church's thesis (also referred as Church-Turing thesis, Post law, 
Gödel's miracle, etc..). It is Church thesis which makes possible to get a 
precise mathematical definition of the ideas of computability, computation and 
"all" computations.


  CT is used for Church thesis (btw). CT requires the belief that if a natural 
number has some verifiable property then we can find it soon or later, (a 
version of arithmetical realism).


  PM = Primary Matter (in Aristotle sense? or in Peter Jones, alias 1Z, alias 
Flammarion sense?). 


  UD is the Universal Dovetailer. It is a program (and a program belongs to the 
collection of  finite objects that you can identify by a number by using some 
computable bijection) which generates all programs, in all possible programming 
languages, and generates, little pieces by little pieces, all executions of 
those programs, with all possible arguments, in all possible environment, some 
being initial segments of the real, or of the complex, or octonions, etc.).
  The mandelbrot set can be seen as a nice approximation (at least) of a 
compact form of a universal dovetailing:
  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xmt3_5AJvQg&feature=channel_page


  UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument (in 8 steps to fix the things, from the 
Sane04 paper) including MGA as step 8. 


  MGA = the movie graph argument. MGA is UDA-8, and is independent of UDA1-7, 
and is a direct argument for showing that comp makes primitive matter 
'spurious', or physicalism 'wrong' (to be short). Comp forces the couple 
consciousness/realities to emerge from elementary arithmetic.  


  IMO, David correctly (re)defines Peter Jones theory, at least the one he is 
defending the plausibility here, as CTM+PM.
  I argue that CTM+PM is epistemologically extravaguant.
  IMO, Peter Jones, non correctly, (re)define comp as CTM + Platonism. When 
reasoning on computations, or just when defining them,  we have to accept a 
minimal amount of realism on the properties of numbers (much less so that most 
scientists, arguably a little more than some philosophers). Such a mimimal 
"Platonism" is already in Church thesis, and I prefer to name it by 
"arithmetical realism". I think that only  ultrafinitist does not believe in it.


  IMO = in my opinion.


  AFAICS isas far as I can see ...  I think :)


  I don't see other acronyms. Usually, when I introduce a new acronym, I 
redefine it, at each first occurrences in the first posts. But it is a good 
idea to ask, especially for those which are idiosyncratic with respect to a 
thread.


  Bruno





- Original Message -
From: "David Nyman" 
To: 
Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM
Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology



2009/9/22 Flammarion :

>> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
>> over the other, but it isn't forced.  Indeed, in the case of the MGA,
>> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then
>> the abduction is only to be expected.
>
> I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does
> not
> need premises of its own but negates the premises of its
> counterargumetns.
> Not
> that I accept it

AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively.
 It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM,
rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is
accepted.  In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified,
its consequences would of course be expected to match observation.

>> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
>> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
>> one case.
>
> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.

"That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of
the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of
persons and the appearanc

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 23 Sep, 13:12, David Nyman  wrote:

> >> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
> >> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
> >> one case.
>
> > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> "That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of
> the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of
> persons and the appearance of matter on this basis.

Isn't that what I have been saying.

>The entities so
> posited are of course trivially "immaterial".  You might as well say
> that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be
> "unmathematical".

It does, so why not?

> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
> deployed in a particular research programme.

I have been denying that either posit is apriori true. Nothing
you have said constradicts that. The point of an abductive
argument about metaphsycis is that you can argue that
X is metaphsycially primitive, without taking "X exists"
as an aprori truth -- the point of abduction is that the truth
of  a posit is justifed by its explanatory power, not by apriori
self-evidence.

> >> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
> >> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
> >> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
> >> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
> >> >> explanatory scheme.
>
> >> > Who's been doing that?
>
> >> This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
> >> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
> >> Platonism to justify the UDA
>
> > He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He
> > may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively.
>
> Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing.  Either you're demanding
> that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we
> seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't.



>On the evidence
> of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you.
>  He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is
> based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of
> mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism.

He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism
as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he
is positing Platonism at all.
And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments
to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not
an abductive argument.


> AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to
> abandoning CTM.  It is motivated by the desire to pursue a
> computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the
> face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM.
> In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive
> physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without
> the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes
> said as much).

I think Bruno has zero interest in AI,
he is trying to argue towards Plotnistic
mysticism.

CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole
bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many
Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical
realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point
since the MGA and Olympia arguments are contestable.


> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.

>The
> alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
> mathematics.  Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.


Maybe it does but that is not how Bruno is arguing. He keeps
insisting that computationalism is his *only* assumption. Other
peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark. You are putting forward
a better argument on his behalf than he is.


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Sep 2009, at 16:36, m.a. wrote:

> Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes  
> being used in this thread?  (e.g.  CTM, PM, UD etc.)
>
>

CTM = computational theory of mind

Comp = "computationalism" = a weak and preciser version of CTM (mainly  
"yes doctor" + Church's thesis (also referred as Church-Turing thesis,  
Post law, Gödel's miracle, etc..). It is Church thesis which makes  
possible to get a precise mathematical definition of the ideas of  
computability, computation and "all" computations.

CT is used for Church thesis (btw). CT requires the belief that if a  
natural number has some verifiable property then we can find it soon  
or later, (a version of arithmetical realism).

PM = Primary Matter (in Aristotle sense? or in Peter Jones, alias 1Z,  
alias Flammarion sense?).

UD is the Universal Dovetailer. It is a program (and a program belongs  
to the collection of  finite objects that you can identify by a number  
by using some computable bijection) which generates all programs, in  
all possible programming languages, and generates, little pieces by  
little pieces, all executions of those programs, with all possible  
arguments, in all possible environment, some being initial segments of  
the real, or of the complex, or octonions, etc.).
The mandelbrot set can be seen as a nice approximation (at least) of a  
compact form of a universal dovetailing:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xmt3_5AJvQg&feature=channel_page

UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument (in 8 steps to fix the things,  
from the Sane04 paper) including MGA as step 8.

MGA = the movie graph argument. MGA is UDA-8, and is independent of  
UDA1-7, and is a direct argument for showing that comp makes primitive  
matter 'spurious', or physicalism 'wrong' (to be short). Comp forces  
the couple consciousness/realities to emerge from elementary arithmetic.

IMO, David correctly (re)defines Peter Jones theory, at least the one  
he is defending the plausibility here, as CTM+PM.
I argue that CTM+PM is epistemologically extravaguant.
IMO, Peter Jones, non correctly, (re)define comp as CTM + Platonism.  
When reasoning on computations, or just when defining them,  we have  
to accept a minimal amount of realism on the properties of numbers  
(much less so that most scientists, arguably a little more than some  
philosophers). Such a mimimal "Platonism" is already in Church thesis,  
and I prefer to name it by "arithmetical realism". I think that only   
ultrafinitist does not believe in it.

IMO = in my opinion.

AFAICS isas far as I can see ...  I think :)

I don't see other acronyms. Usually, when I introduce a new acronym, I  
redefine it, at each first occurrences in the first posts. But it is a  
good idea to ask, especially for those which are idiosyncratic with  
respect to a thread.

Bruno


>
> - Original Message -----
> From: "David Nyman" 
> To: 
> Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
>
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
> >> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
> >> over the other, but it isn't forced.  Indeed, in the case of the  
> MGA,
> >> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM,  
> then
> >> the abduction is only to be expected.
> >
> > I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does
> > not
> > need premises of its own but negates the premises of its
> > counterargumetns.
> > Not
> > that I accept it
>
> AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively.
>  It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM,
> rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is
> accepted.  In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified,
> its consequences would of course be expected to match observation.
>
> >> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
> >> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at  
> least
> >> one case.
> >
> > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> "That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of
> the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of
> persons and the appearance of matter on this basis.  The entities so
> posited are of course trivially "immaterial".  You might as well say
> that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be
> "unmathematical".  I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
> ultimate

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

On Sep 22, 7:47 pm, Brent Meeker  wrote:

> > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
> > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
> > without comp).
>
> But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.

Good point.  However, Donald Hoffman makes a highly relevant
distinction between taking one's experiences literally, and taking
them seriously.  I would recommend the following piece, particularly
the section on the MUI (Multimodal User Interface):

http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf

Hoffman's 'conscious realism', I have recently discovered, is a
systematic effort to work out the consequences implicit in some of the
intuitions I've been attempting to share recently, with such
underwhelming results.  When I examine the effort he's put into this,
it's not hard to see how he is able to be coherent and empirical where
I am merely vague and suggestive (even to myself).  Nonetheless there
is a kinship of basic intuition.  A commentary on this which attempts
to align it with Husserlian phenomenology is:

http://www.urop.uci.edu/journal/journal06/03_matthews.pdf

I suspect that all of the above bears much kinship with at least
aspects of comp.  I'd be interested in Bruno's reaction.

David

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> >> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> > You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any  
> > "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD,  
> > and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense).
>
> > And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything  
> > epistemological.
>
> > Then, what you call "primary matter" is explained by the appearances  
> > of some irreductible invariant in universal 'dreams'. The real  
> > question is "why is it so symmetrical", is information preserved, is  
> > the empirical world coherent with the comp physics, etc.
>
> > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is  
> > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that  
> > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to  
> > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or  
> > without comp).
>
> But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> > Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it  
> > follows from comp)?
>
> > Bruno
>
> >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Quentin Anciaux]

CTM = Computational theory of mind
PM = Primary matter
UD = Universal Dovetailer
UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument
AUDA = Arithmetical Dovetailer Argument

Quentin

2009/9/23 m.a. 

>  *Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes
> being used in this thread?  (e.g.  CTM, PM, UD etc.)*
> **
> **
> **
> - Original Message - From: "David Nyman" 
> To: 
> Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
>
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
> >> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
> >> over the other, but it isn't forced.  Indeed, in the case of the MGA,
> >> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then
> >> the abduction is only to be expected.
> >
> > I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does
> > not
> > need premises of its own but negates the premises of its
> > counterargumetns.
> > Not
> > that I accept it
>
> AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively.
>  It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM,
> rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is
> accepted.  In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified,
> its consequences would of course be expected to match observation.
>
> >> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
> >> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
> >> one case.
> >
> > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> "That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of
> the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of
> persons and the appearance of matter on this basis.  The entities so
> posited are of course trivially "immaterial".  You might as well say
> that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be
> "unmathematical".  I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
> deployed in a particular research programme.
>
> >> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
> >> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
> >> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
> >> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
> >> >> explanatory scheme.
> >>
> >> > Who's been doing that?
> >>
> >> This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
> >> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
> >> Platonism to justify the UDA
> >
> > He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He
> > may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively.
>
> Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing.  Either you're demanding
> that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we
> seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't.  On the evidence
> of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you.
>  He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is
> based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of
> mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism.
>
> AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to
> abandoning CTM.  It is motivated by the desire to pursue a
> computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the
> face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM.
> In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive
> physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without
> the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes
> said as much).
>
> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.  The
> alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
> mathematics.  Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.
>
> >> Well then, surely we can agree.  One finds grounds for preferring a
> >> theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work.  Comp
> >> i

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/23 m.a. :

CTM = Computational Theory of Mind
CT = Church Thesis
PM = Primitive Matter
(A)UDA = (Arithmetical) Universal Dovetailer Argument
AR = Arithmetical Realism
MR = Multiple Realisability
WR = White Rabbit
MGA = Movie Graph Argument
Olympia = Tim Maudlin's anti-CTM reductio argument
RITSIAR = Real In The Sense I Am Real

ITEODYNAM? = Is That Enough Or Do You Need Any More?

David

> Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes being
> used in this thread?  (e.g.  CTM, PM, UD etc.)
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "David Nyman" 
> To: 
> Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
>>> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
>>> over the other, but it isn't forced.  Indeed, in the case of the MGA,
>>> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then
>>> the abduction is only to be expected.
>>
>> I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does
>> not
>> need premises of its own but negates the premises of its
>> counterargumetns.
>> Not
>> that I accept it
>
> AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively.
>  It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM,
> rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is
> accepted.  In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified,
> its consequences would of course be expected to match observation.
>
>>> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
>>> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
>>> one case.
>>
>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
>> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> "That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of
> the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of
> persons and the appearance of matter on this basis.  The entities so
> posited are of course trivially "immaterial".  You might as well say
> that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be
> "unmathematical".  I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
> deployed in a particular research programme.
>
>>> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
>>> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
>>> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
>>> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
>>> >> explanatory scheme.
>>>
>>> > Who's been doing that?
>>>
>>> This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
>>> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
>>> Platonism to justify the UDA
>>
>> He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He
>> may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively.
>
> Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing.  Either you're demanding
> that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we
> seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't.  On the evidence
> of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you.
>  He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is
> based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of
> mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism.
>
> AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to
> abandoning CTM.  It is motivated by the desire to pursue a
> computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the
> face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM.
> In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive
> physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without
> the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes
> said as much).
>
> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.  The
> alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
> mathematics.  Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
> to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.
>
>>&

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[m.a.]

Would anyone care to provide a gloss to all the capital letter codes being used 
in this thread?  (e.g.  CTM, PM, UD etc.)



- Original Message - 
From: "David Nyman" 
To: 
Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:12 AM
Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology



2009/9/22 Flammarion :

>> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
>> over the other, but it isn't forced.  Indeed, in the case of the MGA,
>> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then
>> the abduction is only to be expected.
>
> I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does
> not
> need premises of its own but negates the premises of its
> counterargumetns.
> Not
> that I accept it

AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively.
 It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM,
rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is
accepted.  In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified,
its consequences would of course be expected to match observation.

>> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
>> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
>> one case.
>
> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.

"That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of
the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of
persons and the appearance of matter on this basis.  The entities so
posited are of course trivially "immaterial".  You might as well say
that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be
"unmathematical".  I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
deployed in a particular research programme.

>> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
>> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
>> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
>> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
>> >> explanatory scheme.
>>
>> > Who's been doing that?
>>
>> This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
>> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
>> Platonism to justify the UDA
>
> He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He
> may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively.

Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing.  Either you're demanding
that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we
seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't.  On the evidence
of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you.
 He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is
based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of
mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism.

AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to
abandoning CTM.  It is motivated by the desire to pursue a
computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the
face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM.
In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive
physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without
the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes
said as much).

In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.  The
alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
mathematics.  Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.

>> Well then, surely we can agree.  One finds grounds for preferring a
>> theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work.  Comp
>> is open to empirical refutation, so it's research.  Is your problem
>> that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"?
>
> No. But is has assumptions of its own.
>
>>If so, it
>> shouldn't be.  Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation
>> if one can find an error.  Further, even if one can't, this doesn't
>> force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the
>> coherency of CTM+PM into doubt.
>
> Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument.
> Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism.

Yes of cour

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Sep 2009, at 10:39, Flammarion wrote:
>
>> Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why
>> does it organize into living being if it is propertyless?
>
>
> It only lacks essential properties. It can have any property as
> an accident.

Then it needs the essential property of being able to have accidental  
property.

Also you attach qualia to it, or you said that qualia can be attached  
to it. But if CTM is correct, such qualia can be attached  
accidentally, so it does need some essential properties.



> How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD?
>>
 It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is
 programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and
 dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with
 the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with  
 the
 shape ExP(x) with P decidable).
>>
>>> I don;t see what that has to do with information.
>>
>> Which information? The Shannon like information comes from the
>> arithmetical truth, and the "meaning-consciousness information" comes
>> from the fixed point of machine self-observability.
>
> The idea that mathematical theorems have shanning information
> is contradicted by the idea that mathematical theorems are logically
> necessarty
> tautologies.

Then you cannot be physicalist either, because everything can be  
derived from Schrodinger equation + initial condition (or vaccuum). Cf  
your own:

> Why would they get different physical properties?
> Answer: starting conditions+physical laws.


But mathematical theorems are not necessary tautologies, in general.  
By Godel completeness theorem, all you can say is that they are true  
in all models of the (first order logical) theories.
But even this is not relevant, given that the information are relative  
from the view of the observer (the 3-observer in the UD, which  
emulates all theories).

This is explains explicitly in AUDA. Even for ideally correct machine  
there is a notion of contingency, which is provided by the notion of  
consistency (unprovable by the theory), so that such machine develop  
according to different histories.
Information is provided then by self-analysis after self- 
multiplication, like discovering "I am in Moscow" after the WM- 
duplication.

All this dodges my question: do you agree that once you say yes to the  
doctor, your many '3-you' appear, in the third person sense, in the  
execution of the UD?

Once you say "yes" to the digital surgeon, you know that your physical  
state will be truncated and encoded through a number (the digital  
backup, the teletransport information, ...). The UD will generate all  
the computations generating that state. For example, it will generate  
the quantum state of the Milky Way, and emulates its wave equation,  
and thus all relative states of all its subsystems. That emulation  
will generate your actual computational states, and the 3-you will be  
generated. All the 3-you will behave as if they were you, and talk  
about primary matter and so one.
Before the MGA, I can understand you may consider them as immaterial  
zombie.
The MGA shows that if you survive qua computatio then each of those 3- 
you will have a 1-you (actually captured by the non formalizable-by- 
you notion of Bp & Dp & p).
To be sure the emulation of the galaxy will not be among the winning  
computations, but that is not the point here.

The only way out would be to postulate a notion of primary matter, and  
to attach consciousness to it in a way which cannot be Turing  
emulated. But then you cannot say yes to the doctor "qua computatio".

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[m.a.]

How you can remember all those technical details is astonishing, but thanks 
for the confirmation and the trip down memory lane.  marty a.



- Original Message - 
From: "ronaldheld" 
To: "Everything List" 
Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 8:10 AM
Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology



in TOS: "the enemy within" On stardate 1672.1, in 2266, a strange ore
had altered the function of the transporter, causing one of the most
bizarre transporter accidents on record, in which Captain James T.
Kirk was split into two separate entities. No mention of where the
extra matter came from.
in TNG:"second chances"  In 2361, on Nervala IV, the USS Potemkin was
conducting an evacuation of the science outpost on the planet.
Lieutenant William T. Riker was part of the away team at the time.
in VOY "tuvix"  Lysosomal enzymes of an alien orchid were the cause of
another accident in that same year. Tuvok, Neelix and the orchid were
temporarily merged into one being during transport. Tuvix, as he named
himself (or themselves), was a complete mixture of the talents of both
crewmembers.

After discovering how to separate the two patterns and retrieve both
Tuvok and Neelix, Tuvix protested that such a procedure would be
equivalent to murdering him, but the procedure was undertaken anyway,
and Tuvok and Neelix were restored

in TNG"rascals" Coming back from a botanic expedition on planet
Marlonia where Keiko O'Brien found a specimen of Draebidium calimus,
the Fermi shuttle piloted by Ro Laren, Captain Jean-Luc Picard, Keiko
and Guinan falls victim of an energy anomaly. The emergency transport
back is difficult, and the USS Enterprise-D crew is shocked by the
return of a twelve year old Captain, bartender, botanist and Bajoran
Ensign instead of their adult selves.

These are all I had the time to remember, retrieve and post from
work.The descriptive text come from Memory Alpha
Ronald




An unusual distortion field meant the Potemkin had difficulty beaming
up Riker. A second confinement beam was initiated to overcome these
difficulties, with the intent of reintegrating the two beams in the
transporter buffer.

This was unnecessary as only one beam was successful at transporting
Riker, the modulation of the distortion caused the second beam to be
reflected back down to the surface, materializing two Rikers, one on
the ship, and one on the planet's surface. Unlike the two Kirks
created in 2266, both Rikers were functionally identical to the
original man.




On Sep 23, 4:39 am, Flammarion  wrote:
> On 23 Sep, 07:06, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:07, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > >>> On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> > >>>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > >>>>>> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does
> > >>>>>> not
> > >>>>>> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>
> > >>>>> "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
> > >>>>> machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate
> > >>>>> [the
> > >>>>> pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of
> > >>>>> computations
> > >>>>> (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted
> > >>>>> as
> > >>>>> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). "
>
> > >>>> This is in the eight step.
>
> > >>>> I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address
> > >>>> the
> > >>>> point.
>
> > >>>> I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual
> > >>>> existing
> > >>>> numbers.
>
> > >>> I mean exactly what you mean by "existing forever in the
> > >>> arithmetical
> > >>> Platonia which is accepted as
> > >>> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism"
>
> > >> I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x),
> > >> with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false
> > >> independently of me or of any consideration.
>
> > > But that doesn't mean the same thing at all.
>
> > Assuming comp, this is necessarily enough.
>
> > > Formalists
> > > can accept such truths, they just don't think that truths
> > > about what exists mathematically use a literal sense of
> > > "truth".

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/22 Flammarion :

>> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
>> over the other, but it isn't forced.  Indeed, in the case of the MGA,
>> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then
>> the abduction is only to be expected.
>
> I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does
> not
> need premises of its own but negates the premises of its
> counterargumetns.
> Not
> that I accept it

AFAICS mathematical primacy isn't necessitated by the MGA deductively.
 It's an additional assumption motivated by the desire to retain CTM,
rather than PM, once the mutually exclusive conclusion of the MGA is
accepted.  In this case, to the extent that such a move is justified,
its consequences would of course be expected to match observation.

>> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
>> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
>> one case.
>
> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.

"That is not possible" unless one adopts the theoretical assumption of
the primacy of mathematics and the consequent derivation both of
persons and the appearance of matter on this basis.  The entities so
posited are of course trivially "immaterial".  You might as well say
that arguing from the opposite position requires that entities be
"unmathematical".  I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to be
deployed in a particular research programme.

>> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
>> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
>> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
>> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
>> >> explanatory scheme.
>>
>> > Who's been doing that?
>>
>> This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
>> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
>> Platonism to justify the UDA
>
> He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He
> may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively.

Peter, this is becoming utterly confusing.  Either you're demanding
that Bruno commit to a notion of metaphysical 'primitiveness' that we
seemed to have agreed is gratuitous, or you aren't.  On the evidence
of the various comments above you appear to do either as it suits you.
 He has made it clear that his theoretical and empirical programme is
based on the explanatory primacy of that explicit subset of
mathematics he terms Arithmetical Realism.

AFAICS this is an a priori assumption adopted as an alternative to
abandoning CTM.  It is motivated by the desire to pursue a
computational programme of research into the mind-body issue in the
face of the deductive conclusions of the MGA with respect to CTM+PM.
In the view I've argued at some length here, the lack of substantive
physical commitment implicit in CTM forces these alternatives without
the need to rely on specific reductio arguments (Bruno has sometimes
said as much).

In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.  The
alternative assumption of AR has the equivalent entailment for
mathematics.  Either approach would of course subsequently be expected
to be justified abductively or fail as an empirical programme.

>> Well then, surely we can agree.  One finds grounds for preferring a
>> theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work.  Comp
>> is open to empirical refutation, so it's research.  Is your problem
>> that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"?
>
> No. But is has assumptions of its own.
>
>>If so, it
>> shouldn't be.  Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation
>> if one can find an error.  Further, even if one can't, this doesn't
>> force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the
>> coherency of CTM+PM into doubt.
>
> Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument.
> Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism.

Yes of course, that is not controversial in this discussion.  Frankly,
most people faced with the alternative of abandoning CTM or PM would
probably choose the former option.  However, Bruno has a point when he
observes that this could be mere Aristotelian prejudice.  The waste
bin of thought is stuffed with intuitively obvious ideas that turned
out to be the opposite of the truth.  I make no claim to knowing which
of these alternatives, if either, is correct.  We are discussing only
which conjunctions of claims may be consistent, and which theoretical
commitments make any difference worth bothering about.

David

>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 14:37, David Nyman  wrote:
>> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>>

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[ronaldheld]

in TOS: "the enemy within" On stardate 1672.1, in 2266, a strange ore
had altered the function of the transporter, causing one of the most
bizarre transporter accidents on record, in which Captain James T.
Kirk was split into two separate entities. No mention of where the
extra matter came from.
in TNG:"second chances"  In 2361, on Nervala IV, the USS Potemkin was
conducting an evacuation of the science outpost on the planet.
Lieutenant William T. Riker was part of the away team at the time.
in VOY "tuvix"  Lysosomal enzymes of an alien orchid were the cause of
another accident in that same year. Tuvok, Neelix and the orchid were
temporarily merged into one being during transport. Tuvix, as he named
himself (or themselves), was a complete mixture of the talents of both
crewmembers.

After discovering how to separate the two patterns and retrieve both
Tuvok and Neelix, Tuvix protested that such a procedure would be
equivalent to murdering him, but the procedure was undertaken anyway,
and Tuvok and Neelix were restored

in TNG"rascals" Coming back from a botanic expedition on planet
Marlonia where Keiko O'Brien found a specimen of Draebidium calimus,
the Fermi shuttle piloted by Ro Laren, Captain Jean-Luc Picard, Keiko
and Guinan falls victim of an energy anomaly. The emergency transport
back is difficult, and the USS Enterprise-D crew is shocked by the
return of a twelve year old Captain, bartender, botanist and Bajoran
Ensign instead of their adult selves.

These are all I had the time to remember, retrieve and post from
work.The descriptive text come from Memory Alpha
Ronald




An unusual distortion field meant the Potemkin had difficulty beaming
up Riker. A second confinement beam was initiated to overcome these
difficulties, with the intent of reintegrating the two beams in the
transporter buffer.

This was unnecessary as only one beam was successful at transporting
Riker, the modulation of the distortion caused the second beam to be
reflected back down to the surface, materializing two Rikers, one on
the ship, and one on the planet's surface. Unlike the two Kirks
created in 2266, both Rikers were functionally identical to the
original man.




On Sep 23, 4:39 am, Flammarion  wrote:
> On 23 Sep, 07:06, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:07, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > >>> On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >  On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > >> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does  
> > >> not
> > >> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>
> > > "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
> > > machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate  
> > > [the
> > > pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of
> > > computations
> > > (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted  
> > > as
> > > existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). "
>
> >  This is in the eight step.
>
> >  I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address  
> >  the
> >  point.
>
> >  I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual  
> >  existing
> >  numbers.
>
> > >>> I mean exactly what you mean by "existing forever in the  
> > >>> arithmetical
> > >>> Platonia which is accepted as
> > >>> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism"
>
> > >> I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x),
> > >> with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false
> > >> independently of me or of any consideration.
>
> > > But that doesn't mean the same thing at all.
>
> > Assuming comp, this is necessarily enough.
>
> > > Formalists
> > > can accept such truths, they just don't think that truths
> > > about what exists mathematically use a literal sense of
> > > "truth".
>
> > What is a 'literal' sense of truth
> > Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why  
> > does it organize into living being if it is propertyless?
>
> It only lacks essential properties. It can have any property as
> an accident.
>
>
>
>
>
> >  I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a
> >  digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the
> >  computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal
> >  amount of computer science.
>
> >  If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational
> >  numbers
> >  such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG
> >  Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not.
> >  Who knows?
>
> > >>> How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD?
>
> > >> It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is
> > >> programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and
> > >> dovetel o

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 23 Sep, 07:06, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:07, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>  On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does  
> >> not
> >> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>
> > "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
> > machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate  
> > [the
> > pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of
> > computations
> > (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted  
> > as
> > existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). "
>
>  This is in the eight step.
>
>  I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address  
>  the
>  point.
>
>  I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual  
>  existing
>  numbers.
>
> >>> I mean exactly what you mean by "existing forever in the  
> >>> arithmetical
> >>> Platonia which is accepted as
> >>> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism"
>
> >> I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x),
> >> with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false
> >> independently of me or of any consideration.
>
> > But that doesn't mean the same thing at all.
>
> Assuming comp, this is necessarily enough.
>
> > Formalists
> > can accept such truths, they just don't think that truths
> > about what exists mathematically use a literal sense of
> > "truth".
>
> What is a 'literal' sense of truth



> Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why  
> does it organize into living being if it is propertyless?


It only lacks essential properties. It can have any property as
an accident.

>  I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a
>  digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the
>  computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal
>  amount of computer science.
>
>  If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational
>  numbers
>  such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG
>  Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not.
>  Who knows?
>
> >>> How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD?
>
> >> It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is
> >> programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and
> >> dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with
> >> the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the
> >> shape ExP(x) with P decidable).
>
> > I don;t see what that has to do with information.
>
> Which information? The Shannon like information comes from the  
> arithmetical truth, and the "meaning-consciousness information" comes  
> from the fixed point of machine self-observability.

The idea that mathematical theorems have shanning information
is contradicted by the idea that mathematical theorems are logically
necessarty
tautologies.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 23 Sep, 06:59, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:15, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> >> 2009/9/22 Flammarion 
>
> >>> On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman  wrote:
>  On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion  wrote:
>
> > There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>
>  What do you mean by this?
>
> >>> since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
> >>> to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
> >>> be a property.
>
> >> That's kind of funny you denying any existence to "mathematical"  
> >> existence
> >> and aknowledging at the same time the existence of a "propertyless"  
> >> thing.
>
> > *A* propertyless thing is fine. But there is a contradiciton
> > in multiple proeprtiless things
>
> Why?

By the Identity of indescernibles, there can only be
one thing that has the empty set as the set of
its properties.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles

>And what's the relevance of this?

> Actually PM is even more non sensical if it is the lack of property  
> which makes possible to attach qualia to it.
> Why would that piece of matter get the qualia "seeing red", and that  
> other piece of matter having the qualia "seeing blue"?

Why would they get different physical properties?
Answer: starting conditions+physical laws.

Property dualism would require psychophysical laws
as per Chalmers.

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:32, m.a. wrote:

>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Bruno Marchal" 
> To: 
> Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2009 10:36 AM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
>
>
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote:
>>>
>>>> *And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators
>>>> worked, the spokesman replied, "Very well, thank you."*
>>>
>>> :)
>>>
>>> Actually the Heisenberg compensators, if they compensate really the
>>> Heisenberg uncertainties, would make such machine impossible: you
>>> just
>>> cannot compensate the Heisenberg uncertainties, unless those
>>> compensators send the classical bits needed to effectuate a quantum
>>> teleportation, and this would explain, retrospectively, why in star
>>> strek those devices always (?) annihilate the "original"... and why
>>> Star Strek did not exploit the self-duplication and
>
>
> I thought more devoted "Trekkies" than I would have pointed out by  
> now that
> Star Trek did indeed exploit self-duplication. There were several  
> episodes
> in which transmission problems produced two Kirks or two Spocks.

Nice. I miss them!


> There were
> other episodes in which people going through the transporter were  
> changed in
> subtle, overt or sinister ways.m.a.
>
>
>
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:12, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 21 Sep, 08:58, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> On 20 Sep 2009, at 02:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> So does being "pure thought" mean "without a reference", i.e. a
>>> fiction?  As in "Sherlock Holmes" is a pure thought?
>>
>> Consider the Many world theory of Everett, or the many histories of
>> comp. Does it make sense to say that Sherlock Holmes exists in such
>> structure? The problem is that a fiction like Sherlock Holmes is not
>> well defined. It is a bit like unicorns. I would not compare such
>> essentially fictional construction with a mathematical object, like a
>> computation or like a number, which admits forms of realism.
>
>
> I would not compare them in rigour or clarity.
> I would compare them in ontology.

?

You talk here like if you knew that primary matter exists. You told me  
that you can doubt that primary matter exists. I don't understand.

Also, I have no clue how primary matter and matter (as object of study  
by physicists) are related.

Is primary matter made of parts?

I think Plotinus did already understand that Aristotelian primary  
matter cannot belong to 'being', and has to be retrieved from a  
'bastard calculus" based on what God cannot determine. (This fits very  
well in the comp frame: cf even God or any conception of 'truth')  
cannot determine the first person indeterminacy).

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:07, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
>
>>> On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
 On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does  
>> not
>> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>>
> "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
> machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate  
> [the
> pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of
> computations
> (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted  
> as
> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). "
>>
 This is in the eight step.
>>
 I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address  
 the
 point.
>>
 I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual  
 existing
 numbers.
>>
>>> I mean exactly what you mean by "existing forever in the  
>>> arithmetical
>>> Platonia which is accepted as
>>> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism"
>>
>> I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x),
>> with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false
>> independently of me or of any consideration.
>
> But that doesn't mean the same thing at all.

Assuming comp, this is necessarily enough.



> Formalists
> can accept such truths, they just don't think that truths
> about what exists mathematically use a literal sense of
> "truth".

What is a 'literal' sense of truth?

Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why  
does it organize into living being if it is propertyless?




>
 I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a
 digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the
 computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal
 amount of computer science.
>>
 If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational
 numbers
 such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG
 Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not.
 Who knows?
>>
>>> How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD?
>>
>> It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is
>> programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and
>> dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with
>> the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the
>> shape ExP(x) with P decidable).
>
> I don;t see what that has to do with information.



Which information? The Shannon like information comes from the  
arithmetical truth, and the "meaning-consciousness information" comes  
from the fixed point of machine self-observability.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:15, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>> 2009/9/22 Flammarion 
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman  wrote:
 On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion  wrote:
>>
> There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>>
 What do you mean by this?
>>
>>> since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
>>> to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
>>> be a property.
>>
>> That's kind of funny you denying any existence to "mathematical"  
>> existence
>> and aknowledging at the same time the existence of a "propertyless"  
>> thing.
>
> *A* propertyless thing is fine. But there is a contradiciton
> in multiple proeprtiless things



Why? And what's the relevance of this?

Actually PM is even more non sensical if it is the lack of property  
which makes possible to attach qualia to it.
Why would that piece of matter get the qualia "seeing red", and that  
other piece of matter having the qualia "seeing blue"?
MGA shows that matter is as much a problem than consciousness when we  
assume comp. Well, consciousness can at least be explained by the  
intrinsic gap between inferable truth and provable truth that all self- 
referential mathematical entity can discover about itself. Matter then  
emerge as a special modality (Bp & Dp), needed for having a  
probability one for the proposition "true in all consistent  
extension". The Dp is needed for preventing the cul-de-sac worlds  
where probabilities get awry.

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 22 Sep, 19:56, David Nyman  wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
> > since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
> > to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
> > be a property.
>
> In what might such attachment consist, in you view, beyond the mere
> assertion of its possibility?

What does the attachment of a material property like charge or
mass consist of? Such "attachment" is usually
considered a metaphysical primitive.


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[m.a.]

- Original Message - 
From: "Bruno Marchal" 
To: 
Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2009 10:36 AM
Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology




> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote:
>>
>>> *And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators
>>> worked, the spokesman replied, "Very well, thank you."*
>>
>> :)
>>
>> Actually the Heisenberg compensators, if they compensate really the
>> Heisenberg uncertainties, would make such machine impossible: you
>> just
>> cannot compensate the Heisenberg uncertainties, unless those
>> compensators send the classical bits needed to effectuate a quantum
>> teleportation, and this would explain, retrospectively, why in star
>> strek those devices always (?) annihilate the "original"... and why
>> Star Strek did not exploit the self-duplication and


I thought more devoted "Trekkies" than I would have pointed out by now that 
Star Trek did indeed exploit self-duplication. There were several episodes 
in which transmission problems produced two Kirks or two Spocks. There were 
other episodes in which people going through the transporter were changed in 
subtle, overt or sinister ways.m.a.



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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/22 Flammarion :

> since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
> to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
> be a property.

In what might such attachment consist, in you view, beyond the mere
assertion of its possibility?  Since you rule out intrinsic
properties, I assume you're not thinking of Chalmers' proposal.

David
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman  wrote:
>> On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion  wrote:
>>
>> > There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>>
>> What do you mean by this?
>
> since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
> to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
> be a property.
> >
>

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/9/22 Brent Meeker 

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
> >
> >> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> >> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
> >
> >
> > You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any
> > "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD,
> > and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense).
> >
> > And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything
> > epistemological.
> >
> > Then, what you call "primary matter" is explained by the appearances
> > of some irreductible invariant in universal 'dreams'. The real
> > question is "why is it so symmetrical", is information preserved, is
> > the empirical world coherent with the comp physics, etc.
> >
> > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
> > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
> > without comp).
>
> But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.
>
> Brent
>

Well if reality emerge from computations, that will not render it less
real... because it would be the real, then "believing" that does not render
you painless and superman.

Quentin


>
> >
> > Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it
> > follows from comp)?
> >
> > Bruno
> >
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >
> >
>
>
> >
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
> 
>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
>> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
> 
> 
> You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any  
> "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD,  
> and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense).
> 
> And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything  
> epistemological.
> 
> Then, what you call "primary matter" is explained by the appearances  
> of some irreductible invariant in universal 'dreams'. The real  
> question is "why is it so symmetrical", is information preserved, is  
> the empirical world coherent with the comp physics, etc.
> 
> Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is  
> obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that  
> it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to  
> matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or  
> without comp).

But I'll bet they still try to avoid being struck in the head.

Brent

> 
> Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it  
> follows from comp)?
> 
> Bruno
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> 


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion 
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman  wrote:
> > > On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion  wrote:
>
> > > > There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>
> > > What do you mean by this?
>
> > since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
> > to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
> > be a property.
>
> That's kind of funny you denying any existence to "mathematical" existence
> and aknowledging at the same time the existence of a "propertyless" thing.

*A* propertyless thing is fine. But there is a contradiciton
in multiple proeprtiless things
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:22, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 17:16, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
 On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>>
> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>>
 You are in a third person way.
>>
>>> That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>>
>> I agree. But as far as I look to what is sharable among us I see only
>> numbers.
>
> Is that supposed to be an argument for Platonism? Why should
> what exists be limited to what is shareable among humans?

In the comp hypothesis I don't limit what exists to what is sharable,  
quite contrary with the "qualia theories".



>
>> All papers in physics relies on theories relating measurable numbers
>> through mathematical relation.
>
> The properties fo the map need not be the
> properties of the territory.


Of course, but comp entails constraints and make possible some fixed  
points. Comp makes obvious some role of computer science, a branch of  
math, and the study of the consequences of the computationalist  
hypotyhesis, in what? math, physics ... To already choose would be to  
already known the answer. That's why it is preferable to use the  
vocable of 'theology'. After all it is a belief in a form of (material  
at first, but not necessarily primitively material) rencarnation.
And then G* can be described as the logic of general propositional  
theology of the (Löbian) Universal Machine.
And at the beginning of the reasoning the theology is agnostic on  
Plato or Aristotle, Primary Matter, Gods, whatever.
We assume numbers and programs, physical machine implementing the  
genuine relation between  numbers which sustained us relatively to our  
most probable history.

>
>> the e-rest is already instinctive bets
>> and qualia. But I see immaterial entities all the time: people,
>> images, games, nations, programs, melodies, planets, galaxies,  
>> plants,
>> and the famous bosons and fermions, which are famous for taking
>> formalism so seriously  :)
>
>
>
>
 If you are a program relatively to any
 "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material  
 UD,
 and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person
 sense).
>>
>>> Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD.
>>
>> But it is a theorem of arithmetic that the UD exists. (accepting
>> Church thesis, I mean CT is not a theorem of arithmetic, and probably
>> false from an (arithmetical)  first person point of view like Bp &  
>> p).
>
>
> CT only that it exists mathematically, which, if formalism
> is correct, means no more than mathematicians take it
> seriously. CT does not prove Platonism.

CT uses "platonism" in your sense. I mean CT uses the fact that a  
machine stop or not stop, to let the f_n disperse uncomputably into  
the phi_i.
CT uses arithmetical realism. No more than what is needed to make  
debugging procedure in computer science/use.

>
 And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything
 epistemological.
>>
>>> A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial
>>> one to take its place.
>>
>> It exists like PI, gamma, and some constructive real, but it is
>> probably richer in the internal information.
>> It does not mean that we have to believe in some immaterial realm,  
>> but
>> only that we have to trust classical logic on arithmetical  
>> proposition.
>
> If the UD has no actual existence, material or immaterial, I am not
> running on it.

1-you or 3-you. 3-you is in the UD by "yes doctor" + math, and 1-you  
is in by MGA.




> Existing in the sense that formalists think Pi exists -- in people's
> minds,
> like Sherlock Holmes -- is not enought to support RITSIAR.


I love Pi, I have read a lot of books on it. I prefer gamma. Your  
comparison between Sherlock Holmes is non relevant.
Numbers and programs obeys laws, like particles and waves. We have  
theories and a lot of results. It is very big field usually classified  
in the exact science (and thus with no pretension about application  
but through supplementary assumptions).




>
 Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that  
 it is
 obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and  
 that
 it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
 matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible  
 (with or
 without comp).
>>
 Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it
 follows from comp)?
>>
>>> There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem
>>> attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially
>>> emodied
>>> or not.
>>
>> To attach mind on Matter? there is a sort of consensus that with or
>> without comp, the mind bo

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 21 Sep, 08:58, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 20 Sep 2009, at 02:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> > So does being "pure thought" mean "without a reference", i.e. a
> > fiction?  As in "Sherlock Holmes" is a pure thought?
>
> Consider the Many world theory of Everett, or the many histories of
> comp. Does it make sense to say that Sherlock Holmes exists in such
> structure? The problem is that a fiction like Sherlock Holmes is not
> well defined. It is a bit like unicorns. I would not compare such
> essentially fictional construction with a mathematical object, like a
> computation or like a number, which admits forms of realism.


I would not compare them in rigour or clarity.
I would compare them in ontology.


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/9/22 Flammarion 

>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman  wrote:
> > On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion  wrote:
> >
> > > There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
> >
> > What do you mean by this?
>
> since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
> to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
> be a property.
>


That's kind of funny you denying any existence to "mathematical" existence
and aknowledging at the same time the existence of a "propertyless" thing.


> >
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman  wrote:
> On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion  wrote:
>
> > There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>
> What do you mean by this?

since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
be a property.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 22 Sep, 17:16, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> >>> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> >> You are in a third person way.
>
> > That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> I agree. But as far as I look to what is sharable among us I see only
> numbers.

Is that supposed to be an argument for Platonism? Why should
what exists be limited to what is shareable among humans?

> All papers in physics relies on theories relating measurable numbers
> through mathematical relation.

The properties fo the map need not be the
properties of the territory.

> the e-rest is already instinctive bets
> and qualia. But I see immaterial entities all the time: people,
> images, games, nations, programs, melodies, planets, galaxies, plants,
> and the famous bosons and fermions, which are famous for taking
> formalism so seriously  :)




> >> If you are a program relatively to any
> >> "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD,
> >> and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person
> >> sense).
>
> > Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD.
>
> But it is a theorem of arithmetic that the UD exists. (accepting
> Church thesis, I mean CT is not a theorem of arithmetic, and probably
> false from an (arithmetical)  first person point of view like Bp & p).


CT only that it exists mathematically, which, if formalism
is correct, means no more than mathematicians take it
seriously. CT does not prove Platonism.

> >> And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything
> >> epistemological.
>
> > A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial
> > one to take its place.
>
> It exists like PI, gamma, and some constructive real, but it is
> probably richer in the internal information.
> It does not mean that we have to believe in some immaterial realm, but
> only that we have to trust classical logic on arithmetical proposition.

If the UD has no actual existence, material or immaterial, I am not
running on it.
Existing in the sense that formalists think Pi exists -- in people's
minds,
like Sherlock Holmes -- is not enought to support RITSIAR.

> >> Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> >> obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> >> it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
> >> matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
> >> without comp).
>
> >> Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it
> >> follows from comp)?
>
> > There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem
> > attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially
> > emodied
> > or not.
>
> To attach mind on Matter? there is a sort of consensus that with or
> without comp, the mind body problem is unsolved. the closer to the
> comp consequence, on the consciousness issue (not on matter)  is Colin
> McGuin (the mysterianist).

> Then you seem to forget that computer science provide a very clean
> theory of self-reference, and (immaterial) machine themselves proves
> interesting things about what they can prove (know, observe, bet
> on...). Everett made QM intelligible by a use of comp. With Matter,
> except for quantum computation, the notion of computation is still not
> clearly defined (as we can expect from UDA/MGA).

So how can engineers build computers out of matter?
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

> > On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
>  You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
>  invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>
> >>> "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
> >>> machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the
> >>> pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of
> >>> computations
> >>> (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as
> >>> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). "
>
> >> This is in the eight step.
>
> >> I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the
> >> point.
>
> >> I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing
> >> numbers.
>
> > I mean exactly what you mean by "existing forever in the arithmetical
> > Platonia which is accepted as
> > existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism"
>
> I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x),
> with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false
> independently of me or of any consideration.

But that doesn't mean the same thing at all. Formalists
can accept such truths, they just don't think that truths
about what exists mathematically use a literal sense of
"truth".

> >> I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a
> >> digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the
> >> computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal
> >> amount of computer science.
>
> >> If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational
> >> numbers
> >> such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG
> >> Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not.
> >> Who knows?
>
> > How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD?
>
> It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is
> programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and
> dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with
> the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the
> shape ExP(x) with P decidable).

I don;t see what that has to do with information.

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion  wrote:

> There is no problem attaching consc to PM.

What do you mean by this?

David

> On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> > On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> > > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> > You are in a third person way.
>
> That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> >If you are a program relatively to any
> > "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD,
> > and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense).
>
> Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD.
>
> > And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything
> > epistemological.
>
> A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial
> one to take its place.
>
> > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
> > matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
> > without comp).
>
> > Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it
> > follows from comp)?
>
> There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem
> attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially
> emodied
> or not.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
>>> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>>
>> You are in a third person way.
>
> That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities.

I agree. But as far as I look to what is sharable among us I see only  
numbers.
All papers in physics relies on theories relating measurable numbers  
through mathematical relation. the e-rest is already instinctive bets  
and qualia. But I see immaterial entities all the time: people,  
images, games, nations, programs, melodies, planets, galaxies, plants,  
and the famous bosons and fermions, which are famous for taking  
formalism so seriously  :)



>
>> If you are a program relatively to any
>> "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD,
>> and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person  
>> sense).
>
> Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD.

But it is a theorem of arithmetic that the UD exists. (accepting  
Church thesis, I mean CT is not a theorem of arithmetic, and probably  
false from an (arithmetical)  first person point of view like Bp & p).



>
>> And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything
>> epistemological.
>
> A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial
> one to take its place.

It exists like PI, gamma, and some constructive real, but it is  
probably richer in the internal information.
It does not mean that we have to believe in some immaterial realm, but  
only that we have to trust classical logic on arithmetical proposition.


>
>
>> Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
>> obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
>> it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
>> matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
>> without comp).
>>
>> Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it
>> follows from comp)?
>
> There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem
> attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially
> emodied
> or not.

To attach mind on Matter? there is a sort of consensus that with or  
without comp, the mind body problem is unsolved. the closer to the  
comp consequence, on the consciousness issue (not on matter)  is Colin  
McGuin (the mysterianist).

Then you seem to forget that computer science provide a very clean  
theory of self-reference, and (immaterial) machine themselves proves  
interesting things about what they can prove (know, observe, bet  
on...). Everett made QM intelligible by a use of comp. With Matter,  
except for quantum computation, the notion of computation is still not  
clearly defined (as we can expect from UDA/MGA).


Bruno



> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:18, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>>
 You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
 invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>>
>>> "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
>>> machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the
>>> pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of  
>>> computations
>>> (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as
>>> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). "
>>
>> This is in the eight step.
>>
>> I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the
>> point.
>>
>> I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing
>> numbers.
>
> I mean exactly what you mean by "existing forever in the arithmetical
> Platonia which is accepted as
> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism"

I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x),  
with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false  
independently of me or of any consideration.




>
>> I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a
>> digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the
>> computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal
>> amount of computer science.
>
>
>
>> If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational  
>> numbers
>> such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG
>> Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not.
>> Who knows?
>
> How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD?

It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is  
programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and  
dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with  
the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the  
shape ExP(x) with P decidable).


>
>> I think you agree that dreamy-consciousness can supervene on the
>> physical laser-boolean graph activity. Does dreamy-consciousness
>> supervenes on the movie of the laser-boolean graph activity?
>
> I don't beleive it supervenes on causally-disconnected frames, no.

I agree with you. The movie cannot bring consciousness through comp,  
yet the physical activity of the movie can be made similar to the  
physical activity of the boolean graph. That is why if we want to keep  
the causal connectness relevant for having a computation, we have to  
replace the physical supervenience by the computaitonal supervenience,  
which is a very solid mathematical (even arithmetical,  
combinatoric, ...) notions, thanks to that unexpected Church thesis.
But then physical connection get blurred below our substitution level  
where an infinity of computations compete.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> You are in a third person way.

That is still not possible if there are no immaterial entities.

>If you are a program relatively to any
> "real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD,
> and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense).

Not if there is no immaterial (or as you call it, arithmetic) UD.

> And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything
> epistemological.

A material UD cannot be redundant unless there is an immaterial
one to take its place.


> Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to
> matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or
> without comp).
>
> Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it
> follows from comp)?

There is no problem attaching consc to PM. There is a problem
attachign consc. to mathematical structures, whether phsycially
emodied
or not.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:

> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.


You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any  
"real world", you are 'executed' infinitely often by the material UD,  
and by the arithmetical UD too in the corresponding third person sense).

And MGA makes the need of a material UD non sensical, for anything  
epistemological.

Then, what you call "primary matter" is explained by the appearances  
of some irreductible invariant in universal 'dreams'. The real  
question is "why is it so symmetrical", is information preserved, is  
the empirical world coherent with the comp physics, etc.

Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is  
obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that  
it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to  
matter, or to argue with those who believes that is possible (with or  
without comp).

Do you see the different 'big' picture (as opposed to believe it  
follows from comp)?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
> >> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>
> > "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
> > machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the
> > pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations
> > (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as
> > existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). "
>
> This is in the eight step.
>
> I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the
> point.
>
> I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing
> numbers.

I mean exactly what you mean by "existing forever in the arithmetical
Platonia which is accepted as
existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism"

> I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a
> digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the
> computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal
> amount of computer science.



> If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational numbers
> such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG
> Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not.
> Who knows?

How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD?

> I think you agree that dreamy-consciousness can supervene on the
> physical laser-boolean graph activity. Does dreamy-consciousness
> supervenes on the movie of the laser-boolean graph activity?

I don't beleive it supervenes on causally-disconnected frames, no.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:

>> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
>> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>
> "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
> machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the
> pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations
> (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as
> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). "


This is in the eight step.

I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the  
point.

I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing  
numbers.
I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a  
digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the  
computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal  
amount of computer science.

If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational numbers  
such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG  
Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not.  
Who knows?

I think you agree that dreamy-consciousness can supervene on the  
physical laser-boolean graph activity. Does dreamy-consciousness  
supervenes on the movie of the laser-boolean graph activity?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 08:37, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote:
>>
>>> *And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators
>>> worked, the spokesman replied, "Very well, thank you."*
>>
>> :)
>>
>> That's the problem. Star strek teleportation has been invented well
>> before Bennett & Al. discovered quantum teleportation, and a priori,
>> from the vague description of how teleportation works in Star Strek,
>> we can say nothing, except that it looks like classical  
>> teleportation.
>> Actually the Heisenberg compensators, if they compensate really the
>> Heisenberg uncertainties, would make such machine impossible: you  
>> just
>> cannot compensate the Heisenberg uncertainties, unless those
>> compensators send the classical bits needed to effectuate a quantum
>> teleportation, and this would explain, retrospectively, why in star
>> strek those devices always (?) annihilate the "original"... and why
>> Star Strek did not exploit the self-duplication and
>> self-indeterminacy, unlike the movie "the prestige" for example.
>>
>> This is not relevant for comp, note, because the "global" comp
>> indeterminacy bears on the states generated by the UD, and if quantum
>> cloning is impossible, the multiple preparation of similar states is
>> quantum possible and effectively done by the Universal Dovetailer.  
>> You
>> current quantum state is provably generated by the UD, an infinite
>> number of times, at all level of substitution.
>
> That raises a question which has bothered me.  Since the UD and it's
> operations and states exist in the sense of abstract mathematics, then
> the same state/calculation can only occur once - there are no  
> different
> instances of the number 2.


If this where true, comp would predict white noise in all  
circumstances. The measure on a computational states is only a  
relative measure on the computations going through that states.
It is a consequence of the structure of the phi_i that all computable  
(partial) functions are represented by infinitely many programs,  
including "stupid chains" of universal systems simulating universal  
systems. Actually there is a formidable redundancy in UD*. It is a  
deep object, unlike its Chaitin-Solovay-Kolmogorov compression.  Its  
border can be compared to the border of the Mandelbrot set, with  
everything resumed in every part, but disposed in geometrical elegant  
patterns.
In the UD* stories, the number two, not just you and me, will get  
infinitely many relative incarnations, in infinitely many contexts.
Comp predicts that below our (common) substitution level, we should  
met the (sharable) comp indeterminacy, and somehow Everett QM confirms  
this. AUDA makes this more precise formally, but intuitively Everett  
physics is a lucky event for comp, even through just UDA, if I can  
say. Like Church and Gödel.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 22 Sep, 15:10, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:50, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
> > well as CTM.
>
> CTM needs Church thesis (to define the C of CTM). This requires
> Arithmetical Realism, that is the belief that classical logic can be
> applied in the number realm. (and there is an intuitionist variant
> which works as well).

Classical logic doesn't give you an immaterial UD

> I make clear Arithmetical realism to avoid lengthy discussion with
> exotic philososophies of mathematics, like utltrafinitism, abusive
> formalism, etc.

A justification of the assimption that numbers exist immaterially
is just what is needed.

> I prefer to reserve Platonism for the deeper (neo)platonist idea that
> what we see and measure is the border, shadow or projection of
> something else. And that is part of the *consequences* of UDA1-8.

"Platonism" is often used just to mean that numbers exist
immaterially.,
e.g by Penrose.

> I have never met any defenders of CTM who is not an arithmetical
> realist, which is not so astonishing, given that the mere acquaintance
> with the idea of programming a computer, and reasoning on computers
> relies on this very usual and common notion, more or less taught in
> school.

If realism means bivalence, that is probably true. The
problem is using bivalence to smuggle in Platonism.

> Then the seven first step of UDA relies on CTM. Actually only the
> seventh requires Church Thesis.
>
> And it is at the eigth steps, the ancien preamble which can be read
> independently, which 'reminds us' that linking consciousness to
> physical activity (physical supervenience thesis) is just
> epistemologically incompatible with the CTM idea, unless you
> (re)define the physical as the border of the universal machine first
> person (plural) indeterminacies.

That CTM and phsycialism are incopatible is a philsophical
arguemnt, not a mathematical proof, and it has counter-arguments,
eg. Colin Klein's response to Maudlin's Olympia.

> This is mathematically definable, and its makes the comp theory
> testable. Comp is just a weaker and preciser version than Putnam
> functionalism. The existence of the level is itself a non constructive
> existence, which necessitates the realism.
>
> You did not answer my question: can you doubt about the existence of
> primary matter?

Yes. Can you doubt the actual existence of numbers?

> Would you be so astonished if the physicists themselves would resume
> the unification of forces by a relation among natural numbers?
>
> I could have use the combinators. I made a try on the list. No need to
> be sanguine on the positive integers. I could have use real numbers +
> a trigonometric function. To be realist about them consists in
> believing that their digital computations stop or does not stop
> independently of any consideration.
> You introduce confusion by using the term "Platonism" here. I know
> that mathematicians use sometimes Platonism in that sense (of
> accepting classical logic, and the truth of mathematical statements,
> including the non constructive one), but in the present context it
> hides the main facts which is that MGA makes it necessary to redefine
> the notion of matter. Observable Matter becomes an invariant for a
> digital notion of universal machine's observation.
>
> After the seventh thread, we will come back on the eight step. I
> suggest you follow that, and tell us where you object.
>
> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?

"Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the
pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations
(existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as
existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). "


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:57, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 18 Sep, 08:33, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> I start from pure cognitive science. Saying "yes" to the doctor is  
>> not
>> pure math.
>
> Saying yes to the doctor does not show
> that i am being run on an immateial UD.


That is why I use a material UD up to step seven. This provides the  
main part of the "reversal".






> The existence of an immaterial UD needs
> to be argued separately.


No. The existence of the "immaterial UD" is a consequence of Church  
thesis. That such an immaterial UD is necessarily enough is argued  
separately in step 8 (MGA).


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:50, Flammarion wrote:

> No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
> well as CTM.


CTM needs Church thesis (to define the C of CTM). This requires  
Arithmetical Realism, that is the belief that classical logic can be  
applied in the number realm. (and there is an intuitionist variant  
which works as well).

I make clear Arithmetical realism to avoid lengthy discussion with  
exotic philososophies of mathematics, like utltrafinitism, abusive  
formalism, etc.

I prefer to reserve Platonism for the deeper (neo)platonist idea that  
what we see and measure is the border, shadow or projection of  
something else. And that is part of the *consequences* of UDA1-8.

I have never met any defenders of CTM who is not an arithmetical  
realist, which is not so astonishing, given that the mere acquaintance  
with the idea of programming a computer, and reasoning on computers  
relies on this very usual and common notion, more or less taught in  
school.

Then the seven first step of UDA relies on CTM. Actually only the  
seventh requires Church Thesis.

And it is at the eigth steps, the ancien preamble which can be read  
independently, which 'reminds us' that linking consciousness to  
physical activity (physical supervenience thesis) is just  
epistemologically incompatible with the CTM idea, unless you  
(re)define the physical as the border of the universal machine first  
person (plural) indeterminacies.

This is mathematically definable, and its makes the comp theory  
testable. Comp is just a weaker and preciser version than Putnam  
functionalism. The existence of the level is itself a non constructive  
existence, which necessitates the realism.

You did not answer my question: can you doubt about the existence of  
primary matter?

Would you be so astonished if the physicists themselves would resume  
the unification of forces by a relation among natural numbers?

I could have use the combinators. I made a try on the list. No need to  
be sanguine on the positive integers. I could have use real numbers +  
a trigonometric function. To be realist about them consists in  
believing that their digital computations stop or does not stop  
independently of any consideration.
You introduce confusion by using the term "Platonism" here. I know  
that mathematicians use sometimes Platonism in that sense (of  
accepting classical logic, and the truth of mathematical statements,  
including the non constructive one), but in the present context it  
hides the main facts which is that MGA makes it necessary to redefine  
the notion of matter. Observable Matter becomes an invariant for a  
digital notion of universal machine's observation.

After the seventh thread, we will come back on the eight step. I  
suggest you follow that, and tell us where you object.

You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not  
invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 22 Sep, 14:37, David Nyman  wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
> >> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
> >> starting assumptions.  If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
> >> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
> >> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this.  OTOH
> >> if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of
> >> whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the
> >> opposite is the case,
>
> > That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that
> > there is a difference between assuming something because you
> > think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because
> > its consequences match observation (abduction)
>
> One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
> over the other, but it isn't forced.  Indeed, in the case of the MGA,
> if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then
> the abduction is only to be expected.

I don;t follow that. The MGA is an attempted reductio -- ie it does
not
need premises of its own but negates the premises of its
counterargumetns.
Not
that I accept it

> But if you agree with my
> formulation, I'm confused by what you go on to say below:
>
> >> and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why,
> >> on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as
> >> opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of
> >> computational theory.
>
> > No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
> > well as CTM.
>
> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
> one case.

He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.

>If you can show where he goes wrong, you may consider
> CTM+PM has been defended.  OTOH if one agrees with him, this obscures
> the association of consciousness with physics 'qua computatio'.  In
> this case, one could choose to abandon either CTM or PM.  If the
> latter, the move from MGA to UDA requires the reversal of the
> theoretical primacy of matter and (at least a branch of) mathematics.

There is no UDA without a Platonic UD.

> When you respond "That is pretty much what I have been saying" you are
> agreeing, aren't you, that what you mean by Platonism - whether or not
> you accept the MGA as motivating its entailment by CTM - is just a
> theoretical commitment to the primacy of the mathematical, as opposed
> to the material?

Yes.

>And this seems pretty much indistinguishable from
> Arithmetical Realism to me.

I think Bruno's use fo AR is ambiguous. Sometimes he uses
it to mean Platonism. sometimes he uses it to mean bivalence.

> >> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
> >> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
> >> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
> >> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
> >> explanatory scheme.
>
> > Who's been doing that?
>
> This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
> insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
> Platonism to justify the UDA

He needs to make it clear he is assuming it. He
may justify the assumption apriori or he may justify it abductively.


> >>  The opinions cited in the first posting assume
> >> the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take
> >> the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo.  Comp takes
> >> the opposite position.  The rest is a research programme, isn't it?
>
> > Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a  subject-matter.
> > It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of
> > irrefutable certainty.
>
> Well then, surely we can agree.  One finds grounds for preferring a
> theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work.  Comp
> is open to empirical refutation, so it's research.  Is your problem
> that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"?

No. But is has assumptions of its own.

>If so, it
> shouldn't be.  Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation
> if one can find an error.  Further, even if one can't, this doesn't
> force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the
> coherency of CTM+PM into doubt.

Which could lead to PM-CTM as in Maudlin's argument.
Maudlin of course is *not* assuming Platonism.

>Either conclusion might motivate a
> preference for one research approach over another.
>
> David
>
>
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/22 Flammarion :

>> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
>> starting assumptions.  If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
>> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
>> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this.  OTOH
>> if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of
>> whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the
>> opposite is the case,
>
> That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that
> there is a difference between assuming something because you
> think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because
> its consequences match observation (abduction)

One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
over the other, but it isn't forced.  Indeed, in the case of the MGA,
if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then
the abduction is only to be expected.  But if you agree with my
formulation, I'm confused by what you go on to say below:

>> and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why,
>> on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as
>> opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of
>> computational theory.
>
>
> No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
> well as CTM.

Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
one case.  If you can show where he goes wrong, you may consider
CTM+PM has been defended.  OTOH if one agrees with him, this obscures
the association of consciousness with physics 'qua computatio'.  In
this case, one could choose to abandon either CTM or PM.  If the
latter, the move from MGA to UDA requires the reversal of the
theoretical primacy of matter and (at least a branch of) mathematics.

When you respond "That is pretty much what I have been saying" you are
agreeing, aren't you, that what you mean by Platonism - whether or not
you accept the MGA as motivating its entailment by CTM - is just a
theoretical commitment to the primacy of the mathematical, as opposed
to the material?  And this seems pretty much indistinguishable from
Arithmetical Realism to me.

>> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
>> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
>> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
>> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
>> explanatory scheme.
>
> Who's been doing that?

This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
Platonism to justify the UDA.

>>  The opinions cited in the first posting assume
>> the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take
>> the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo.  Comp takes
>> the opposite position.  The rest is a research programme, isn't it?
>
> Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a  subject-matter.
> It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of
> irrefutable certainty.

Well then, surely we can agree.  One finds grounds for preferring a
theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work.  Comp
is open to empirical refutation, so it's research.  Is your problem
that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"?  If so, it
shouldn't be.  Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation
if one can find an error.  Further, even if one can't, this doesn't
force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the
coherency of CTM+PM into doubt.  Either conclusion might motivate a
preference for one research approach over another.

David

>
>
>
> On 18 Sep, 00:26, David Nyman  wrote:
>> 2009/9/17 Flammarion :
>>
>> > Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it
>> > is ontological.
>>
>> > Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure
>> > maths.
>> > But he can't. "mathematical existence" means that mathematicians take
>> > certain "exists" statements to be true. Whether "exists" should be
>> > taken
>> > literally in the mathematical context  is an ontological question, as
>> > the material
>> > in the first posting indicates
>>
>> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
>> starting assumptions.  If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
>> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
>> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this.  OTOH
>> if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of
>> whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the
>> opposite is the case,
>
> That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that
> there is a difference between assuming something because you
> think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because
> its consequences match observa

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 22 Sep, 13:15, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> Is mathematic dependant on human being from your point of view ?
>
> That's what I understand.

Yes, exactly.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Quentin Anciaux]

Is mathematic dependant on human being from your point of view ?

That's what I understand.

2009/9/22 Flammarion 

>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 12:59, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > 2009/9/22 Flammarion 
> >
> >
> >
> > > On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > > > It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
> > > > (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation.
> >
> > > Such existence is blatant Platonism.
> >
> > No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a
> x86
> > computer than on an ARM based one ?
>
> There's a difference between being independent of any
> specific instantiation and being independent of all instantiations.
> Platonism is not proved by multiple realisability.
> >
>


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 22 Sep, 12:59, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion 
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > > It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
> > > (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation.
>
> > Such existence is blatant Platonism.
>
> No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a x86
> computer than on an ARM based one ?

There's a difference between being independent of any
specific instantiation and being independent of all instantiations.
Platonism is not proved by multiple realisability.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/9/22 Flammarion 

>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
> > (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation.
>
> Such existence is blatant Platonism.
>

No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a x86
computer than on an ARM based one ?


> >
>


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
> (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation.

Such existence is blatant Platonism.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Quentin Anciaux]

It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
(mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation.

Regards,
Quentin

2009/9/22 Flammarion 

>
>
>
> On 18 Sep, 08:33, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> > I start from pure cognitive science. Saying "yes" to the doctor is not
> > pure math.
>
> Saying yes to the doctor does not show
> that i am being run on an immateial UD.
> The existence of an immaterial UD needs
> to be argued separately.
>
> >
>


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 18 Sep, 08:33, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> I start from pure cognitive science. Saying "yes" to the doctor is not  
> pure math.

Saying yes to the doctor does not show
that i am being run on an immateial UD.
The existence of an immaterial UD needs
to be argued separately.

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 18 Sep, 00:31, David Nyman  wrote:
> On Sep 17, 11:17 pm, Flammarion  wrote:
>
> > > Has it?  I thought we were discussing whether CTM made any meaningful
> > > commitments as a physical theory, not whether physics can or can't
> > > include consciousness per se.  Now you raise the question, I don't
> > > believe it can, simply because in common with virtually every other
> > > human attempt to characterise the world, its perspective is embedded
> > > in consciousness and hence can't envision it.
>
> > Unless consciousnes is just the very thing that envision itself.
>
> Just so.  But what is opaque is its relation to physics.

That opacity can''t be explained by some general law that nothing
can be self-referential or understand itself. It's all in the details.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 18 Sep, 00:26, David Nyman  wrote:
> 2009/9/17 Flammarion :
>
> > Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it
> > is ontological.
>
> > Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure
> > maths.
> > But he can't. "mathematical existence" means that mathematicians take
> > certain "exists" statements to be true. Whether "exists" should be
> > taken
> > literally in the mathematical context  is an ontological question, as
> > the material
> > in the first posting indicates
>
> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
> starting assumptions.  If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this.  OTOH
> if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of
> whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the
> opposite is the case,

That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that
there is a difference between assuming something because you
think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because
its consequences match observation (abduction)

> and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why,
> on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as
> opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of
> computational theory.


No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
well as CTM.

> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
> explanatory scheme.

Who's been doing that?

>  The opinions cited in the first posting assume
> the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take
> the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo.  Comp takes
> the opposite position.  The rest is a research programme, isn't it?

Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a  subject-matter.
It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of
irrefutable certainty.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote:
>
>> *And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators 
>> worked, the spokesman replied, "Very well, thank you."*
>
> :)
>
> That's the problem. Star strek teleportation has been invented well 
> before Bennett & Al. discovered quantum teleportation, and a priori, 
> from the vague description of how teleportation works in Star Strek, 
> we can say nothing, except that it looks like classical teleportation. 
> Actually the Heisenberg compensators, if they compensate really the 
> Heisenberg uncertainties, would make such machine impossible: you just 
> cannot compensate the Heisenberg uncertainties, unless those 
> compensators send the classical bits needed to effectuate a quantum 
> teleportation, and this would explain, retrospectively, why in star 
> strek those devices always (?) annihilate the "original"... and why 
> Star Strek did not exploit the self-duplication and 
> self-indeterminacy, unlike the movie "the prestige" for example.
>
> This is not relevant for comp, note, because the "global" comp 
> indeterminacy bears on the states generated by the UD, and if quantum 
> cloning is impossible, the multiple preparation of similar states is 
> quantum possible and effectively done by the Universal Dovetailer. You 
> current quantum state is provably generated by the UD, an infinite 
> number of times, at all level of substitution.

That raises a question which has bothered me.  Since the UD and it's 
operations and states exist in the sense of abstract mathematics, then 
the same state/calculation can only occur once - there are no different 
instances of the number 2.

Brent

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote:

> And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators  
> worked, the spokesman replied, "Very well, thank you."

:)

That's the problem. Star strek teleportation has been invented well  
before Bennett & Al. discovered quantum teleportation, and a priori,  
from the vague description of how teleportation works in Star Strek,  
we can say nothing, except that it looks like classical teleportation.  
Actually the Heisenberg compensators, if they compensate really the  
Heisenberg uncertainties, would make such machine impossible: you just  
cannot compensate the Heisenberg uncertainties, unless those  
compensators send the classical bits needed to effectuate a quantum  
teleportation, and this would explain, retrospectively, why in star  
strek those devices always (?) annihilate the "original"... and why  
Star Strek did not exploit the self-duplication and self- 
indeterminacy, unlike the movie "the prestige" for example.

This is not relevant for comp, note, because the "global" comp  
indeterminacy bears on the states generated by the UD, and if quantum  
cloning is impossible, the multiple preparation of similar states is  
quantum possible and effectively done by the Universal Dovetailer. You  
current quantum state is provably generated by the UD, an infinite  
number of times, at all level of substitution. Remember that quantum  
mechanics is Turing emulable. By quantum linearity, slight errors does  
not grow up, so that, in a sense, quantum mechanics is more easy to  
emulate than classical physics where chaos can make some need of  
infinite precision. Some classical analog machine will be not Turing  
emulable. Brains are well described by classical analog machines, but  
then to make it stable and robust, have a big redundancy to  
*compensate* sub-level discrepancies, making us most plausibly Turing  
emulable. If not, just smoking a cigarette would destroy our identity.

Bruno




>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "ronaldheld" 
> To: "Everything List" 
> Sent: Monday, September 21, 2009 4:30 PM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
> >
> > Bruno and others, here is how a Star Trek transporter work(taken  
> from
> > Memory Alpha):
> >
> > A typical transport sequence began with a coordinate lock, during
> > which the destination was verified and programmed, via the targeting
> > scanners. Obtaining or maintaining a transporter lock enables the
> > transporter operator to know the subject's location, even in motion,
> > allowing the beaming process to start more quickly. This is an
> > essential safety precaution when a starship away team enters a
> > potentially dangerous situation that would require an emergency  
> beam-
> > out.
> >
> > A transporter lock is usually maintained by tracing the homing  
> signal
> > of a communicator or combadge. When there is a risk that such  
> devices
> > would be lost in the field or are otherwise unavailable, personnel  
> may
> > be implanted with a subcutaneous transponder before an away  
> mission to
> > still provide a means to maintain a transporter lock. Alternatively,
> > sensors may be used to scan for the biosign or energy signature of a
> > subject, which can then be fed into the transporter's targeting
> > scanner for a lock.
> >
> > Next, the lifeform or object to be beamed was scanned on the quantum
> > level using a molecular imaging scanner. At this point, Heisenberg
> > compensators take into account the position and direction of all
> > subatomic particles composing the object or individual and create a
> > map of the physical structure being disassembled amounting to  
> billions
> > of kiloquads of data.
> >
> > Simultaneously, the object is broken down into a stream of subatomic
> > particles, also called the matter stream. The matter stream is  
> briefly
> > stored in a pattern buffer while the system compensates for Doppler
> > shift to the destination.
> >
> > The matter stream is then transmitted to its destination via a
> > subspace frequency. As with any type of transmission of energy or
> > radiation, scattering and degradation of the signal must be  
> monitored
> > closely. The annular confinement beam (ACB) acts to maintain the
> > integrity of the information contained in the beam. Finally, the
> > initial process is reversed and the object or individual is
> > reassembled at the destination.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[m.a.]

And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators worked, the 
spokesman replied, "Very well, thank you."



- Original Message - 
From: "ronaldheld" 
To: "Everything List" 
Sent: Monday, September 21, 2009 4:30 PM
Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology


> 
> Bruno and others, here is how a Star Trek transporter work(taken from
> Memory Alpha):
> 
> A typical transport sequence began with a coordinate lock, during
> which the destination was verified and programmed, via the targeting
> scanners. Obtaining or maintaining a transporter lock enables the
> transporter operator to know the subject's location, even in motion,
> allowing the beaming process to start more quickly. This is an
> essential safety precaution when a starship away team enters a
> potentially dangerous situation that would require an emergency beam-
> out.
> 
> A transporter lock is usually maintained by tracing the homing signal
> of a communicator or combadge. When there is a risk that such devices
> would be lost in the field or are otherwise unavailable, personnel may
> be implanted with a subcutaneous transponder before an away mission to
> still provide a means to maintain a transporter lock. Alternatively,
> sensors may be used to scan for the biosign or energy signature of a
> subject, which can then be fed into the transporter's targeting
> scanner for a lock.
> 
> Next, the lifeform or object to be beamed was scanned on the quantum
> level using a molecular imaging scanner. At this point, Heisenberg
> compensators take into account the position and direction of all
> subatomic particles composing the object or individual and create a
> map of the physical structure being disassembled amounting to billions
> of kiloquads of data.
> 
> Simultaneously, the object is broken down into a stream of subatomic
> particles, also called the matter stream. The matter stream is briefly
> stored in a pattern buffer while the system compensates for Doppler
> shift to the destination.
> 
> The matter stream is then transmitted to its destination via a
> subspace frequency. As with any type of transmission of energy or
> radiation, scattering and degradation of the signal must be monitored
> closely. The annular confinement beam (ACB) acts to maintain the
> integrity of the information contained in the beam. Finally, the
> initial process is reversed and the object or individual is
> reassembled at the destination.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> >
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[ronaldheld]

Bruno and others, here is how a Star Trek transporter work(taken from
Memory Alpha):

A typical transport sequence began with a coordinate lock, during
which the destination was verified and programmed, via the targeting
scanners. Obtaining or maintaining a transporter lock enables the
transporter operator to know the subject's location, even in motion,
allowing the beaming process to start more quickly. This is an
essential safety precaution when a starship away team enters a
potentially dangerous situation that would require an emergency beam-
out.

A transporter lock is usually maintained by tracing the homing signal
of a communicator or combadge. When there is a risk that such devices
would be lost in the field or are otherwise unavailable, personnel may
be implanted with a subcutaneous transponder before an away mission to
still provide a means to maintain a transporter lock. Alternatively,
sensors may be used to scan for the biosign or energy signature of a
subject, which can then be fed into the transporter's targeting
scanner for a lock.

Next, the lifeform or object to be beamed was scanned on the quantum
level using a molecular imaging scanner. At this point, Heisenberg
compensators take into account the position and direction of all
subatomic particles composing the object or individual and create a
map of the physical structure being disassembled amounting to billions
of kiloquads of data.

Simultaneously, the object is broken down into a stream of subatomic
particles, also called the matter stream. The matter stream is briefly
stored in a pattern buffer while the system compensates for Doppler
shift to the destination.

The matter stream is then transmitted to its destination via a
subspace frequency. As with any type of transmission of energy or
radiation, scattering and degradation of the signal must be monitored
closely. The annular confinement beam (ACB) acts to maintain the
integrity of the information contained in the beam. Finally, the
initial process is reversed and the object or individual is
reassembled at the destination.






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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 20 Sep 2009, at 02:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> So does being "pure thought" mean "without a reference", i.e. a
>> fiction?  As in "Sherlock Holmes" is a pure thought?
> 
> 
> Consider the Many world theory of Everett, or the many histories of 
> comp. Does it make sense to say that Sherlock Holmes exists in such 
> structure? The problem is that a fiction like Sherlock Holmes is not 
> well defined. It is a bit like unicorns. I would not compare such 
> essentially fictional construction with a mathematical object, like a 
> computation or like a number, which admits forms of realism. 17 is prime 
> in all consistent extension of arithmetic, for example. And it makes 
> sense to say that 17 is prime independently of my own thought process, 
> or of any thought process, but it is not clear such independence can be 
> define for fictional object. Any one looking like Sherlock Holmes in the 
> UD* will be just like that: it looks like Holmes, but Conan Doyle could 
> always object by saying that it is not the "real" Holmes. There is a 
> lack of identity criterion. And if you decide to give a (non 
> contradictory) identify criteria for Holmes (like clever detective 
> living in the UK and having solved such an such case ...), then it is no 
> more a "pure thought" and it will exist somewhere in some UD*-history, 
> or in some quantum branch.
> 
> Bruno

But doesn't "not well defined" apply to just about everything beyond 
mathematics and those 
things we can define ostensively.  I can point and perhaps succeed in defining 
"that 
chair", but "chairs" is bound to have a fuzzy meaning not quite well defined at 
the edges. 
I agree that fictional constructions like Sherlock Holmes are different from 
mathematical 
constructions because the latter are constrained to be logically consistent 
(whereas 
Holmes companion is sometimes John Watson and sometimes James Watson).  But it 
seems to me 
that being well defined might be the meta-definition of things that don't exist 
physically.  It is by abstracting away all the fuzziness of what constitutes a 
pair of 
shoes, a married couple, twins, two apples, etc...that we arrive at the 'well 
defined' 
number 2.

Brent

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Sep 2009, at 02:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> So does being "pure thought" mean "without a reference", i.e. a
> fiction?  As in "Sherlock Holmes" is a pure thought?


Consider the Many world theory of Everett, or the many histories of  
comp. Does it make sense to say that Sherlock Holmes exists in such  
structure? The problem is that a fiction like Sherlock Holmes is not  
well defined. It is a bit like unicorns. I would not compare such  
essentially fictional construction with a mathematical object, like a  
computation or like a number, which admits forms of realism. 17 is  
prime in all consistent extension of arithmetic, for example. And it  
makes sense to say that 17 is prime independently of my own thought  
process, or of any thought process, but it is not clear such  
independence can be define for fictional object. Any one looking like  
Sherlock Holmes in the UD* will be just like that: it looks like  
Holmes, but Conan Doyle could always object by saying that it is not  
the "real" Holmes. There is a lack of identity criterion. And if you  
decide to give a (non contradictory) identify criteria for Holmes  
(like clever detective living in the UK and having solved such an such  
case ...), then it is no more a "pure thought" and it will exist  
somewhere in some UD*-history, or in some quantum branch.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[m.a.]

- Original Message - 
From: "Brent Meeker" 
To: 
Sent: Saturday, September 19, 2009 8:49 PM
Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology


>
> m.a. wrote:
>> - Original Message - 
>> From: "Brent Meeker" 
>> To: 
>> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 9:47 PM
>> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>>
>>
>>
>>> m.a. wrote:
>>>
>>>>>>>>> - Original Message -
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From: "Flammarion" 
>>>>>>> To: "Everything List" 
>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2009 11:25 AM
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m.a."  wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> the ocean of virtual particles which may give
>>>>>>>>> rise to all "real" particles exists somewhere between matter and
>>>>>>>>> thought.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I see no reason to believe that.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I would be most interested in your view of vacuum fluctuations of
>>>>>>> virtual
>>>>>>> particles.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why would they differ from what he WP article says?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> Brent Meeker's interpretation of the WP article seems to agree with my
>>>>> description.that virtual particles might not exist, does not establish
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>> there is some immaterial thing that does exist. If they don't exist, 
>>>> how
>>>> can they produce real particles?
>>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Who said virtual particles produce real particles.  They are
>>> computational terms in perturbation expansions.  Whether vacuum
>>> fluctuations exist is less clear, but all theories point to the total
>>> energy of the universe being zero, the positive energy of matter being
>>> just balanced by the negative potential energy of gravity - which would
>>> imply that particles and the rest of the universe can come out of 
>>> nothing.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> Brent, I apologize for misrepresenting your position but I don't see 
>> where
>> it undermines mine. I
>> said that virtual particles exist between matter and thought. You say 
>> they
>> are "computational terms" and the rest of the universe came out of 
>> nothing.
>> Perhaps I should just have said that they are pure thought...as are
>> computational terms. No?
>>
>
> So does being "pure thought" mean "without a reference", i.e. a
> fiction?  As in "Sherlock Holmes" is a pure thought?
>
> Brent


I feel I may still have an argument but lack the philo-physical "chops" to 
make it, so I'll stifle here.
>
>> marty a.
>
>
> > 


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Brent Meeker]

m.a. wrote:
> - Original Message - 
> From: "Brent Meeker" 
> To: 
> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 9:47 PM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
>
>   
>> m.a. wrote:
>> 
>>>>>>>> - Original Message -
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> From: "Flammarion" 
>>>>>> To: "Everything List" 
>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2009 11:25 AM
>>>>>> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m.a."  wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>   
>>>>>>>> the ocean of virtual particles which may give
>>>>>>>> rise to all "real" particles exists somewhere between matter and
>>>>>>>> thought.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I see no reason to believe that.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>   
>>>>>> I would be most interested in your view of vacuum fluctuations of
>>>>>> virtual
>>>>>> particles.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 
>>>>> Why would they differ from what he WP article says?
>>>>>
>>>>>   
>>>> Brent Meeker's interpretation of the WP article seems to agree with my
>>>> description.that virtual particles might not exist, does not establish 
>>>> that
>>>> 
>>> there is some immaterial thing that does exist. If they don't exist, how 
>>> can they produce real particles?
>>>   
>
>
>   
>> Who said virtual particles produce real particles.  They are
>> computational terms in perturbation expansions.  Whether vacuum
>> fluctuations exist is less clear, but all theories point to the total
>> energy of the universe being zero, the positive energy of matter being
>> just balanced by the negative potential energy of gravity - which would
>> imply that particles and the rest of the universe can come out of nothing.
>>
>> Brent
>> 
>
> Brent, I apologize for misrepresenting your position but I don't see where 
> it undermines mine. I
> said that virtual particles exist between matter and thought. You say they 
> are "computational terms" and the rest of the universe came out of nothing.
> Perhaps I should just have said that they are pure thought...as are 
> computational terms. No?
>   

So does being "pure thought" mean "without a reference", i.e. a 
fiction?  As in "Sherlock Holmes" is a pure thought?

Brent

> marty a.


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[m.a.]

- Original Message - 
From: "Brent Meeker" 
To: 
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 9:47 PM
Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology


>
> m.a. wrote:
>> >>>>> - Original Message -
>>>>> From: "Flammarion" 
>>>>> To: "Everything List" 
>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2009 11:25 AM
>>>>> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m.a."  wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the ocean of virtual particles which may give
>>>>>>> rise to all "real" particles exists somewhere between matter and
>>>>>>> thought.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> I see no reason to believe that.
>>>>>>
>>>>> I would be most interested in your view of vacuum fluctuations of
>>>>> virtual
>>>>> particles.
>>>>>
>>>> Why would they differ from what he WP article says?
>>>>
>>> Brent Meeker's interpretation of the WP article seems to agree with my
>>> description.that virtual particles might not exist, does not establish 
>>> that
>> there is some immaterial thing that does exist. If they don't exist, how 
>> can they produce real particles?


> Who said virtual particles produce real particles.  They are
> computational terms in perturbation expansions.  Whether vacuum
> fluctuations exist is less clear, but all theories point to the total
> energy of the universe being zero, the positive energy of matter being
> just balanced by the negative potential energy of gravity - which would
> imply that particles and the rest of the universe can come out of nothing.
>
> Brent

Brent, I apologize for misrepresenting your position but I don't see where 
it undermines mine. I
said that virtual particles exist between matter and thought. You say they 
are "computational terms" and the rest of the universe came out of nothing.
Perhaps I should just have said that they are pure thought...as are 
computational terms. No?
marty a.



>>>>
>>
>>
>> >
>>
>>
>
>
> > 


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Marty,

On 19 Sep 2009, at 02:37, m.a. wrote:

>I don't really remember what saying yes to the doctor  
> entails.
> If it signifies a willingness to be cloned by computation, shouldn't  
> we be
> saying yes to the Star Trek technician who controls the  
> transporter?   m.a.

I am not sure I have seen the precise technic of Star Trek  
transporter, but if I remember well, the original is always  
annihilated, a bit like in quantum teleportation, which is something  
very different from the classical comp transportation. With this one,  
like with the digital doctor, you are 'read and cut', and then pasted  
somewhere in virtue of your classical machine functioning, at some  
level of description. Saying "yes" to the comp-doctor is a sort of  
quasi operational way to accept the digital mechanist hypothesis. It  
helps to understand how *you* are immaterial relatively to your  
probable neighborhood, given that you could in principle change your  
body every morning. Then you are duplicable, like a piece of software,  
and this leads to the comp indeterminacy.
Eventually you can understand that a digital machine cannot see the  
difference between "reality", "virtuality", and "arithmetic" (with the  
Movie Graph Argument).
Technically, the reasoning goes through even if we are quantum  
machine, despite the fact that they are not clonable, because they  
need only to be "preparable" in the quantum sense, but this is  
something we can go back later.
I don't see how comp can be false without introducing actual infinite  
minds and matters.

OK?

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[m.a.]

Bruno,
I don't really remember what saying yes to the doctor entails. 
If it signifies a willingness to be cloned by computation, shouldn't we be 
saying yes to the Star Trek technician who controls the transporter?   m.a.




- Original Message - 
From: "Bruno Marchal" 
To: 
Sent: Friday, September 18, 2009 3:10 AM
Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology


SNIP...



 That is why I insist so much on the fact that saying yes
to the doctor ask for an act of faith, then all what I say becomes
relatively explainable from that act of faith.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/






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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/18 Flammarion :

>> In that case, what light does the comp approach shed on the 'causal
>> significance' of the inside view - i.e. with reference to the presumed
>> 'causal closure' of the physical narrative and the supposed
>> epiphenominalism or over-determination of consciousness with respect
>> to behaviour - Chalmers' zombies etc?
>
> Standard CTM holds that tokens of computation are identical to
> tokens of physical activity, so they have whatever causal
> powers their physical realisers have.

What are the ontological consequences for materialism of such a view
of computational-physical identity?   Is there a logically or
contingently possible material world that contains structurally
identical computational zombies, in your view?

David

>
>
>
> On 17 Sep, 17:35, David Nyman  wrote:
>> 2009/9/17 Bruno Marchal :
>>
>> > Then for the inside/personal views, the whole of human math including
>> > Cantor paradise cannot be enough to describe the human mind. It is
>> > more general:
>>
>> In that case, what light does the comp approach shed on the 'causal
>> significance' of the inside view - i.e. with reference to the presumed
>> 'causal closure' of the physical narrative and the supposed
>> epiphenominalism or over-determination of consciousness with respect
>> to behaviour - Chalmers' zombies etc?
>
> Standard CTM holds that tokens of computation are identical to
> tokens of physical activity, so they have whatever causal
> powers their physical realisers have.
>
> >
>

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2009, at 10:46, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 16 Sep, 18:52, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> On 16 Sep 2009, at 17:25, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m.a."  wrote:
 the ocean of virtual particles which may give
 rise to all "real" particles exists somewhere between matter and
 thought.
>>
>>> I see no reason to believe that
>>
>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_particle
>>
>> You are quite quick on this.
>>
>> There is a tradition in quantum mechanics , with von Neumann, Wigner,
>> Walker, Penrose, and in a sense Heisenberg, Pauli, Fuchs, ... to
>> ascribe to consciousness the ability to collapse the wave, in this
>> case field superpostion of number operator states (in the vaccuum,  
>> say).
>> This made essentially the (universal) state function into a  
>> (relative)
>> knowledge state.
>
>
> It is not a view in much favour nowadays, and it is not
> a view that has much to do with recent developments.
> It goes back to Bohr's writings which predate virtual particles, whcih
> arrived with Dirac's and Feynmans's work some decades later.

I was not saying you were wrong, but only that you were quick.
The views accepted nowadays, is the same, except that they are using  
an intuitive version of comp for defining the observer, so that  
consciousness is no more required to collapse the wave, but only to  
select the universe from the multiverse, like self-localization after  
a self-duplicating experiment. Now, my point is that such view leads  
to the reversal physics/psychology, or physics/theology. There is  
still an important resistance in physics, even against the multiverse,  
and they are searching and defending a psychological interpretation of  
the wave function (see the work by Christopher Fuchs on arXiv.org).
Comp, when taken seriously, marries the two views.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 16 Sep, 18:52, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 16 Sep 2009, at 17:25, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m.a."  wrote:
> >> the ocean of virtual particles which may give
> >> rise to all "real" particles exists somewhere between matter and  
> >> thought.
>
> > I see no reason to believe that
>
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_particle
>
> You are quite quick on this.
>
> There is a tradition in quantum mechanics , with von Neumann, Wigner,  
> Walker, Penrose, and in a sense Heisenberg, Pauli, Fuchs, ... to  
> ascribe to consciousness the ability to collapse the wave, in this  
> case field superpostion of number operator states (in the vaccuum, say).
> This made essentially the (universal) state function into a (relative)  
> knowledge state.


It is not a view in much favour nowadays, and it is not
a view that has much to do with recent developments.
It goes back to Bohr's writings which predate virtual particles, whcih
arrived with Dirac's and Feynmans's work some decades later.

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 17 Sep, 17:35, David Nyman  wrote:
> 2009/9/17 Bruno Marchal :
>
> > Then for the inside/personal views, the whole of human math including
> > Cantor paradise cannot be enough to describe the human mind. It is
> > more general:
>
> In that case, what light does the comp approach shed on the 'causal
> significance' of the inside view - i.e. with reference to the presumed
> 'causal closure' of the physical narrative and the supposed
> epiphenominalism or over-determination of consciousness with respect
> to behaviour - Chalmers' zombies etc?

Standard CTM holds that tokens of computation are identical to
tokens of physical activity, so they have whatever causal
powers their physical realisers have.

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Sep 2009, at 23:55, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 17 Sep, 00:52, David Nyman  wrote:
>> 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
>>
>>> The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers
>>> have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached.
>>> Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label
>>> "flammable" to it. Petrol *Is* flammable, and that
>>> makes the label-attachment correct.
>>
>> Yes, but 'flammable' and 'exists' are horses of different colours,
>> surely.  You and Bruno are disputing whether mathematics is a formal
>> abstraction from physics or vice versa.  But in either case this  
>> seems
>> to me fundamentally a question of methodological, not ontic,  
>> priority.
>
> In either case the  conclusion is ontological , so the assumptions
> must be.

No, the conclusion is epistemological. Physics becomes a branch of  
computer science/number theory.
The ontological "conclusion" is a consequence of Occam Razor, and is  
*optional*.



>
>>  We cannot hope to have any final criterion for what is really real;
>> rather we search for the deepest theory we can find, one that can
>> explain whatever we are currently persuaded needs explaining, and in
>> terms of which we are able to subsume subsidiary theories.  Then we
>> feel justified in saying that our theory describes what exists.   
>> Isn't
>> that about the size of it?
>
> Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it
> is ontological.
>
> Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure
> maths.

I start from pure cognitive science. Saying "yes" to the doctor is not  
pure math.
I'm afraid you are continuing to systematically confuse the  
consequences of comp and comp itself.

Bruno



> But he can't. "mathematical existence" means that mathematicians take
> certain "exists" statements to be true. Whether "exists" should be
> taken
> literally in the mathematical context  is an ontological question, as
> the material
> in the first posting indicates
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Sep 2009, at 18:35, David Nyman wrote:

>
> 2009/9/17 Bruno Marchal :
>
>> Then for the inside/personal views, the whole of human math including
>> Cantor paradise cannot be enough to describe the human mind. It is
>> more general:
>
> In that case, what light does the comp approach shed on the 'causal
> significance' of the inside view - i.e. with reference to the presumed
> 'causal closure' of the physical narrative and the supposed
> epiphenominalism or over-determination of consciousness with respect
> to behaviour - Chalmers' zombies etc?  I have the feeling in advance
> that you may say something that will re-define or negate the question
> rather than answer it directly, but no matter, I'm still interested.
> I suppose I'm asking what comp says about the relation between direct
> first person experience (as opposed to formulations of belief and
> other propositional or dispositional factors) and action in the third
> person sphere.


The direct phenomenal experience belongs to the non communicable or  
non believable part of the gap between G and G*, or their intensional  
variants. This is close to Descartes' idea that (put in a modern way)  
consciousness is the fixed point of the doubt.
There is of course no closure of the physical, given that the physical  
does not exist "ontologically": it is a production of the mind of the  
universal numbers (relatively to addition and multiplication). In  
particular consciousness is not epiphenomenal at all: its role is in  
self-speeding up universal being relatively to their most probable  
(normal) computational computation. This can be related to Gödel and  
Blum speed-up theorem in computer science.
Your question is very vast. Hope this can help. We may come back on  
this if we progress in the seventh step serie thread and beyond. I  
search a way to explain this without being technical, but when I do  
that, I realize Plato and Plotinus has already done that, in a way;  
and today, it just look a bit shocking because it is hard to abandon  
the Aristotelianist constructions.
I know that what I say is unbelievable. Indeed I show why it has to be  
unbelievable. That is why I insist so much on the fact that saying yes  
to the doctor ask for an act of faith, then all what I say becomes  
relatively explainable from that act of faith.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Brent Meeker]

m.a. wrote:
> - Original Message - 
> From: "Flammarion" 
> To: "Everything List" 
> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 6:30 PM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
>
>
>
>
> On 17 Sep, 14:12, "m.a."  wrote:
>   
>> - Original Message -
>> From: "Flammarion" 
>> To: "Everything List" 
>> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 6:17 AM
>> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>>
>> 
>>> On 16 Sep, 21:42, "m.a."  wrote:
>>>   
>>>> - Original Message -
>>>> From: "Flammarion" 
>>>> To: "Everything List" 
>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2009 11:25 AM
>>>> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>>>> 
>>>>> On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m.a."  wrote:
>>>>>   
>>>>>> the ocean of virtual particles which may give
>>>>>> rise to all "real" particles exists somewhere between matter and
>>>>>> thought.
>>>>>> 
>>>>> I see no reason to believe that.
>>>>>   
>>>> I would be most interested in your view of vacuum fluctuations of 
>>>> virtual
>>>> particles.
>>>> 
>>> Why would they differ from what he WP article says?
>>>   
>> Brent Meeker's interpretation of the WP article seems to agree with my
>> description.
>> 
>
>
> that virtual particles might not exist, does not establish that
> there is some immaterial thing that does exist.
>
> If they don't exist, how can they produce real particles? 

Who said virtual particles produce real particles.  They are 
computational terms in perturbation expansions.  Whether vacuum 
fluctuations exist is less clear, but all theories point to the total 
energy of the universe being zero, the positive energy of matter being 
just balanced by the negative potential energy of gravity - which would 
imply that particles and the rest of the universe can come out of nothing.

Brent

> Or are you saying 
> that those particles themselves might not exist? Are you following Bruno's 
> idea that the world is immaterial (in the conventional sense) because it is 
> composed of numbers?
>
>
>
> >
>
>   


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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[m.a.]

- Original Message - 
From: "Flammarion" 
To: "Everything List" 
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 6:30 PM
Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology





On 17 Sep, 14:12, "m.a."  wrote:
> - Original Message -
> From: "Flammarion" 
> To: "Everything List" 
> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 6:17 AM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
> > On 16 Sep, 21:42, "m.a."  wrote:
> >> - Original Message -
> >> From: "Flammarion" 
> >> To: "Everything List" 
> >> Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2009 11:25 AM
> >> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
> >> > On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m.a."  wrote:
> >> >> the ocean of virtual particles which may give
> >> >> rise to all "real" particles exists somewhere between matter and
> >> >> thought.
>
> >> > I see no reason to believe that.
>
> >> I would be most interested in your view of vacuum fluctuations of 
> >> virtual
> >> particles.
>
> > Why would they differ from what he WP article says?
>
> Brent Meeker's interpretation of the WP article seems to agree with my
> description.


that virtual particles might not exist, does not establish that
there is some immaterial thing that does exist.

If they don't exist, how can they produce real particles? Or are you saying 
that those particles themselves might not exist? Are you following Bruno's 
idea that the world is immaterial (in the conventional sense) because it is 
composed of numbers?



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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

On Sep 17, 11:17 pm, Flammarion  wrote:

> > Has it?  I thought we were discussing whether CTM made any meaningful
> > commitments as a physical theory, not whether physics can or can't
> > include consciousness per se.  Now you raise the question, I don't
> > believe it can, simply because in common with virtually every other
> > human attempt to characterise the world, its perspective is embedded
> > in consciousness and hence can't envision it.
>
> Unless consciousnes is just the very thing that envision itself.

Just so.  But what is opaque is its relation to physics.

David

> On 17 Sep, 00:02, David Nyman  wrote:
>
> > Has it?  I thought we were discussing whether CTM made any meaningful
> > commitments as a physical theory, not whether physics can or can't
> > include consciousness per se.  Now you raise the question, I don't
> > believe it can, simply because in common with virtually every other
> > human attempt to characterise the world, its perspective is embedded
> > in consciousness and hence can't envision it.
>
> Unless consciousnes is just the very thing that envision itself.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/17 Flammarion :

> Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it
> is ontological.
>
> Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure
> maths.
> But he can't. "mathematical existence" means that mathematicians take
> certain "exists" statements to be true. Whether "exists" should be
> taken
> literally in the mathematical context  is an ontological question, as
> the material
> in the first posting indicates

But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
starting assumptions.  If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this.  OTOH
if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of
whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the
opposite is the case, and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why,
on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as
opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of
computational theory.

In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
explanatory scheme.  The opinions cited in the first posting assume
the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take
the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo.  Comp takes
the opposite position.  The rest is a research programme, isn't it?

David

>
>
>
> On 17 Sep, 00:52, David Nyman  wrote:
>> 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
>>
>> > The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers
>> > have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached.
>> > Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label
>> > "flammable" to it. Petrol *Is* flammable, and that
>> > makes the label-attachment correct.
>>
>> Yes, but 'flammable' and 'exists' are horses of different colours,
>> surely.  You and Bruno are disputing whether mathematics is a formal
>> abstraction from physics or vice versa.  But in either case this seems
>> to me fundamentally a question of methodological, not ontic, priority.
>
> In either case the  conclusion is ontological , so the assumptions
> must be.
>
>>  We cannot hope to have any final criterion for what is really real;
>> rather we search for the deepest theory we can find, one that can
>> explain whatever we are currently persuaded needs explaining, and in
>> terms of which we are able to subsume subsidiary theories.  Then we
>> feel justified in saying that our theory describes what exists.  Isn't
>> that about the size of it?
>
> Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it
> is ontological.
>
> Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure
> maths.
> But he can't. "mathematical existence" means that mathematicians take
> certain "exists" statements to be true. Whether "exists" should be
> taken
> literally in the mathematical context  is an ontological question, as
> the material
> in the first posting indicates
> >
>

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 17 Sep, 14:12, "m.a."  wrote:
> - Original Message -
> From: "Flammarion" 
> To: "Everything List" 
> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 6:17 AM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
> > On 16 Sep, 21:42, "m.a."  wrote:
> >> - Original Message -
> >> From: "Flammarion" 
> >> To: "Everything List" 
> >> Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2009 11:25 AM
> >> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
> >> > On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m.a."  wrote:
> >> >>  the ocean of virtual particles which may give
> >> >> rise to all "real" particles exists somewhere between matter and
> >> >> thought.
>
> >> > I see no reason to believe that.
>
> >> I would be most interested in your view of vacuum fluctuations of virtual
> >> particles.
>
> > Why would they differ from what he WP article says?
>
> Brent Meeker's interpretation of the WP article seems to agree with my
> description.


that virtual particles might not exist, does not establish that
there is some immaterial thing that does exist.
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 17 Sep, 00:02, David Nyman  wrote:

> Has it?  I thought we were discussing whether CTM made any meaningful
> commitments as a physical theory, not whether physics can or can't
> include consciousness per se.  Now you raise the question, I don't
> believe it can, simply because in common with virtually every other
> human attempt to characterise the world, its perspective is embedded
> in consciousness and hence can't envision it.

Unless consciousnes is just the very thing that envision itself.

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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Flammarion]

On 17 Sep, 00:52, David Nyman  wrote:
> 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
>
> > The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers
> > have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached.
> > Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label
> > "flammable" to it. Petrol *Is* flammable, and that
> > makes the label-attachment correct.
>
> Yes, but 'flammable' and 'exists' are horses of different colours,
> surely.  You and Bruno are disputing whether mathematics is a formal
> abstraction from physics or vice versa.  But in either case this seems
> to me fundamentally a question of methodological, not ontic, priority.

In either case the  conclusion is ontological , so the assumptions
must be.

>  We cannot hope to have any final criterion for what is really real;
> rather we search for the deepest theory we can find, one that can
> explain whatever we are currently persuaded needs explaining, and in
> terms of which we are able to subsume subsidiary theories.  Then we
> feel justified in saying that our theory describes what exists.  Isn't
> that about the size of it?

Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it
is ontological.

Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure
maths.
But he can't. "mathematical existence" means that mathematicians take
certain "exists" statements to be true. Whether "exists" should be
taken
literally in the mathematical context  is an ontological question, as
the material
in the first posting indicates
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Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[David Nyman]

2009/9/17 Bruno Marchal :

> Then for the inside/personal views, the whole of human math including
> Cantor paradise cannot be enough to describe the human mind. It is
> more general:

In that case, what light does the comp approach shed on the 'causal
significance' of the inside view - i.e. with reference to the presumed
'causal closure' of the physical narrative and the supposed
epiphenominalism or over-determination of consciousness with respect
to behaviour - Chalmers' zombies etc?  I have the feeling in advance
that you may say something that will re-define or negate the question
rather than answer it directly, but no matter, I'm still interested.
I suppose I'm asking what comp says about the relation between direct
first person experience (as opposed to formulations of belief and
other propositional or dispositional factors) and action in the third
person sphere.

David

>
>
> On 16 Sep 2009, at 18:33, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>> David Nyman wrote:
>>> 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
>>>
>>>
> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
> between numbers existing mathematically and numbers existing
> Platonically, other than that different labels are being used.
> What
> precisely is the latter supposed to entail that the former does
> not,
> and what difference is this supposed to make?  Can you help, Peter?
>
 Existing mathematically doesn't have any ontoloigcal meaning.
 Both formalists and Platonists can agree that 7 exists,
 since they agree Ex:x=7 is true, but only the latter think
 7 has Platonic existence.

>>>
>>> Yes, but I still don't see what difference the word 'ontological'
>>> makes in this context.  Surely whatever world-conjuring power numbers
>>> may possess can't depend on which label is attached to them?  If a
>>> mathematical scheme fulfils a deep enough explanatory role (a moot
>>> point I admit) isn't that 'ontological' enough?
>>>
>>> David
>> Sure.  There are different models of the world.  Each model takes some
>> things as existing and tries to explain the rest in terms of
>> relations,
>> processes, interactions, or whatever.  The Standard Model takes quarks
>> and leptons and does a pretty impressive job of explaining everything
>> but gravity and consciousness (which is probably what inspired Penrose
>> to try to explain mind in terms of gravity).  String theory tries to
>> explain both particles and gravity in terms of strings (or branes);
>> but
>> it has it's own 'white rabbit' problem.  Bruno wants to take
>> arithemetic
>> as basic.
>
> Not really. I am just saying that if you say yes to the digital
> doctor, then ontologically, we need no more than the mathematical
> existence of the natural numbers, with their laws of addition and
> multiplication. To believe that there is something more "ontological"
> than this is not only absolutely undecidable, but provably irrelevant,
> except for shortening the proofs (but that is already pragmatical or
> epistemological).
> Then for the inside/personal views, the whole of human math including
> Cantor paradise cannot be enough to describe the human mind. It is
> more general:
> Above the "universal" threshold of complexity, all universal machines
> are no more enough clever to understand themself. But above the Löbian
> threshold, all universal machine are clever enough know that! They are
> clever enough to understand completely why they can no more understand
> themselves. And they can understand that their physical realities have
> to emerge from the web of their intrinsical ignorance, etc.
>
>
>> But so far I don't see that his theory has predicted (as
>> opposed to retrodicted) anything except that it has a white rabbit
>> problem too.
>
> Computationalism reduces the mind body problem to the body problem,
> and it reduces the body problem to a "white rabbit measure" problem.
> The shape of the solution may be provided by the 8 arithmetical
> hypostases, including an explanation of both measurable and sharable
> quanta and measurable and non sharable qualia.
> OK, up to now, nothing new in physics has been discovered from the
> comp-physics. I don't expect it soon (centuries). Yet, it is the first
> explanation of consciousness and its relation to matter, and this by
> using one of the oldest rational theory of mind (mechanism). It comes
> from India, China. But those who get the points were the rationalists,
> like the platonists Greek,  with an open mind for mystical experiences
> (consciousness is the most basic one (we are blasé), dreams, and
> entheogenic experience, or brain damaged experiences are others).
> Unfortunately we are still a bit brainwashed, I' afraid, by
> Aristotelian theology (used by late 88% Christians, late 70% Muslims
> and 70% Jews, due to Maimonid, but 30% Buddhist, 20% Indian, according
> to a rough early 20th century evaluation). It is really the Plato/
> Aristotle difference, although "Aristotle" refers to the followers of

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Sep 2009, at 18:33, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
>>
>>
 I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
 between numbers existing mathematically and numbers existing
 Platonically, other than that different labels are being used.   
 What
 precisely is the latter supposed to entail that the former does  
 not,
 and what difference is this supposed to make?  Can you help, Peter?

>>> Existing mathematically doesn't have any ontoloigcal meaning.
>>> Both formalists and Platonists can agree that 7 exists,
>>> since they agree Ex:x=7 is true, but only the latter think
>>> 7 has Platonic existence.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but I still don't see what difference the word 'ontological'
>> makes in this context.  Surely whatever world-conjuring power numbers
>> may possess can't depend on which label is attached to them?  If a
>> mathematical scheme fulfils a deep enough explanatory role (a moot
>> point I admit) isn't that 'ontological' enough?
>>
>> David
> Sure.  There are different models of the world.  Each model takes some
> things as existing and tries to explain the rest in terms of  
> relations,
> processes, interactions, or whatever.  The Standard Model takes quarks
> and leptons and does a pretty impressive job of explaining everything
> but gravity and consciousness (which is probably what inspired Penrose
> to try to explain mind in terms of gravity).  String theory tries to
> explain both particles and gravity in terms of strings (or branes);  
> but
> it has it's own 'white rabbit' problem.  Bruno wants to take  
> arithemetic
> as basic.

Not really. I am just saying that if you say yes to the digital  
doctor, then ontologically, we need no more than the mathematical  
existence of the natural numbers, with their laws of addition and  
multiplication. To believe that there is something more "ontological"  
than this is not only absolutely undecidable, but provably irrelevant,  
except for shortening the proofs (but that is already pragmatical or  
epistemological).
Then for the inside/personal views, the whole of human math including  
Cantor paradise cannot be enough to describe the human mind. It is  
more general:
Above the "universal" threshold of complexity, all universal machines  
are no more enough clever to understand themself. But above the Löbian  
threshold, all universal machine are clever enough know that! They are  
clever enough to understand completely why they can no more understand  
themselves. And they can understand that their physical realities have  
to emerge from the web of their intrinsical ignorance, etc.


> But so far I don't see that his theory has predicted (as
> opposed to retrodicted) anything except that it has a white rabbit
> problem too.

Computationalism reduces the mind body problem to the body problem,  
and it reduces the body problem to a "white rabbit measure" problem.
The shape of the solution may be provided by the 8 arithmetical  
hypostases, including an explanation of both measurable and sharable  
quanta and measurable and non sharable qualia.
OK, up to now, nothing new in physics has been discovered from the  
comp-physics. I don't expect it soon (centuries). Yet, it is the first  
explanation of consciousness and its relation to matter, and this by  
using one of the oldest rational theory of mind (mechanism). It comes  
from India, China. But those who get the points were the rationalists,  
like the platonists Greek,  with an open mind for mystical experiences  
(consciousness is the most basic one (we are blasé), dreams, and  
entheogenic experience, or brain damaged experiences are others).  
Unfortunately we are still a bit brainwashed, I' afraid, by  
Aristotelian theology (used by late 88% Christians, late 70% Muslims  
and 70% Jews, due to Maimonid, but 30% Buddhist, 20% Indian, according  
to a rough early 20th century evaluation). It is really the Plato/ 
Aristotle difference, although "Aristotle" refers to the followers of  
Aristotle. Aristotle himself was more Platonist than we thought today.

The problem is:  "is there a universe, and the minds emerge from it"  
versus "is there a mind, and the universes emerges from it". With comp  
there are numbers, and from this is the mind of the universal numbers  
and the (internal) explanation how those minds wreathe (braid, plait,  
twine, weave) the fabric of realities.

I just try to explain that comp needs us to bactrack to the Platonists  
and even the Pythagorean neoplatonist theologian. But, as you know,  
the field "non confessional theology" is still a bit taboo ...  
Enlightenment restituted one half of the Greek Science. The rest is  
still coming ...


>  The discussion seems to have gotten stuck on whether it
> has been proven that physics can't be fundamental because it can't
> include consciousness.  I consider that a diversion.  Since we don't
> really have a definite idea of what consci