On 04 Apr 2012, at 23:46, Joseph Knight wrote:
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 4, 2012, at 1:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
wrote:
2012/4/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You can be conscious of being here and now.
This is a key element in our disagreement. I maintain that by itself a
consciousness has no way to directly tell the difference between the hear
and now and the there and then. For example
On 4/5/2012 1:20 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You can be conscious of being here and now.
This is a key element in our disagreement. I maintain that by itself a consciousness has
no way to directly tell the
On Thu, Apr 5, 2012 at 4:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Suppose that the environmental conditions were identical only for the
first 50min of the hour.
Then the split happened after 50min, obviously.
And both those consciousness'es could access identical memories of the
first
On 04 Apr 2012, at 06:05, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 8:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
The point is that comp predicts white noise. That something else
predicts white noise too is not relevant in the proof.
So in the setup the screen changes at RANDOM
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You confuse consciousness of being here and now with consciousness
would be here and now.
How in the world could anybody be confused by a idea stated as crystal
clearly as you just did ?
And the only answer you can
On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
You confuse consciousness of being here and now with
consciousness would be here and now.
How in the world could anybody be confused by a idea stated as
crystal clearly
2012/4/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You confuse consciousness of being here and now with consciousness
would be here and now.
How in the world could anybody be
On 4/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You confuse consciousness of being here and now with consciousness
would be
here and now.
How in
On 04 Apr 2012, at 20:45, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/4/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please help
him. If some people believe, like I begin to believe, that John
Clark only fake to not understand, and that I should abandon to
On 04 Apr 2012, at 21:04, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 April 2012 18:55, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please
help him. If
some people believe, like I begin to believe, that John Clark only
fake to
not understand, and that I
On 04 Apr 2012, at 21:52, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
snip
By comp we can simulate Moscow and Washington precisely enough
so that you
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 4, 2012, at 1:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/4/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You confuse consciousness of
On 02 Apr 2012, at 18:14, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Apr 1, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
you've added tons of bells and whistles but for all the complex
convolutions you have not added one single bit of additional
information about what is likely to happen.
On the
On 02 Apr 2012, at 18:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/2/2012 9:14 AM, John Clark wrote:
If Everett is right the probability must be derived from the
statistics of measurements *as described by the wave evolution*.
If Everett is right then you can use the square of the absolute
value of the
On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 8:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The point is that comp predicts white noise. That something else predicts
white noise too is not relevant in the proof.
So in the setup the screen changes at RANDOM and comp predicts white noise
will be the most likely
On Sun, Apr 1, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
you've added tons of bells and whistles but for all the complex
convolutions you have not added one single bit of additional information
about what is likely to happen.
On the contrary, comp entails that you should expect white
On 4/2/2012 9:14 AM, John Clark wrote:
If Everett is right the probability must be derived from the statistics of
measurements *as described by the wave evolution*.
If Everett is right then you can use the square of the absolute value of the Schrodinger
Wave Equation to help you
On 3/31/2012 11:11 AM, David Nyman wrote:
The alternative to this analysis is to abandon MWI (or comp) as
inconsistent with the empirical facts. This is the tack Kent in fact
adopts, proposing a mechanism for the pruning of all but one of the
alternative branches,
I think he just proposes
On 1 April 2012 07:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I think he just proposes pruning the density matrix cross-terms by some
mechanism. Once they are gone then the realized branch is just 'selected'
stochasitcally per the Born rule. I've often contemplated such a move
based on the
On 31 March 2012 01:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
That seems like conjuring a mystery out of nothing. Is your question why is
my observational perspective associated with my brain?
It's only a mystery out of nothing if you have already accepted as
unproblematic the primitive
Hello Stephen,
On 31 Mar 2012, at 18:29, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/31/2012 3:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp is just the assumption that we are machine, to said it
shortly. Then it is shown as a consequence that not only we cannot
neglect the physical reality, but that we have to
On 1 April 2012 21:02, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I'm all in favor of epistemology first. But that means point-of-view comes
first, and only some things happen comes second. The primitive,
micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption way down the line.
No argument from me
On 4/1/2012 1:28 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 April 2012 21:02, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I'm all in favor of epistemology first. But that means point-of-view comes
first, and only some things happen comes second. The primitive,
micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption
On 30 Mar 2012, at 23:29, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/30/2012 2:48 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/30/2012 4:08 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/30/2012 3:08 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:23 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Take my favorite thought experiment. Suppose I design two Mars
On 31 Mar 2012, at 01:23, David Nyman wrote:
On 30 March 2012 19:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The problem with all this (as Kent makes explicit) is that there is
nothing in the mathematics of the game physics that corresponds to
this kind of momentary selection of subjective
On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You should care to be able to answer the simple question: what do you
expect to feel in the multiplication-movie experience
I would expect to feel exactly the same as if duplicating chambers and
multiple copies of myself were not
On 3/31/2012 3:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp is just the assumption that we are machine, to said it shortly.
Then it is shown as a consequence that not only we cannot neglect the
physical reality, but that we have to retrieve it from arithmetic,
without using any probabilistic
On 31 March 2012 17:24, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
You should care to be able to answer the simple question: what do you
expect to feel in the multiplication-movie experience
I would expect to feel exactly the same as if duplicating chambers and
multiple copies of myself were
On 3/29/2012 10:23 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Take my favorite thought experiment. Suppose I design two Mars Rovers and I want them
to coordinate their movements in order to round up Martian sheep. I can easily
distribute the artificial intelligence between the two of them, using data links
On 29 Mar 2012, at 21:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the hairsplitting about that YOU, that
you are using here, so
David,
Selection was even earlier proposed by Leibniz in his Monadology philosophy
along with many other principles about half of which have been confirmed by
scientific theory and experimentation.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/leibniz.htm
Richard David Ruquist
On
On 3/30/2012 3:08 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:23 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Take my favorite thought experiment. Suppose I design two Mars
Rovers and I want them to coordinate their movements in order to
round up Martian sheep. I can easily distribute the artificial
intelligence
On 30 March 2012 03:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
My reading of Kent is that he rejects MWI. I don't think he believes there
is a single conscious copy and the rest are zombies; he believes there's
just one world and it is 'selected' probabilistically.
Yes, I understand that. My
On 30 March 2012 10:11, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
David,
Selection was even earlier proposed by Leibniz in his Monadology philosophy
along with many other principles about half of which have been confirmed by
scientific theory and experimentation.
On 3/30/2012 4:08 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/30/2012 3:08 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:23 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Take my favorite thought experiment. Suppose I design two Mars Rovers and I want
them to coordinate their movements in order to round up Martian sheep. I can
On 3/30/2012 4:38 AM, David Nyman wrote:
The problem with all this (as Kent makes explicit) is that there is
nothing in the mathematics of the game physics that corresponds to
this kind of momentary selection of subjective localisation.
Unfortunately, his own proposal doesn't really solve the
On 3/30/2012 2:48 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/30/2012 4:08 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/30/2012 3:08 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:23 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Take my favorite thought experiment. Suppose I design two Mars
Rovers and I want them to coordinate their movements in
On 3/30/2012 2:29 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/30/2012 2:48 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/30/2012 4:08 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/30/2012 3:08 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:23 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Take my favorite thought experiment. Suppose I design two Mars Rovers and I
On 30 March 2012 19:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The problem with all this (as Kent makes explicit) is that there is
nothing in the mathematics of the game physics that corresponds to
this kind of momentary selection of subjective localisation.
Unfortunately, his own proposal
On 3/30/2012 4:23 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 30 March 2012 19:54, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The problem with all this (as Kent makes explicit) is that there is
nothing in the mathematics of the game physics that corresponds to
this kind of momentary selection of subjective
On 28 Mar 2012, at 19:29, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my
symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the
third person point of view then it seems
On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Identical bodies have identical minds,
Yes.
but identical minds can have different bodies.
Who cares? It's consciousness I'm interested in.
The universe does not know you are John Clark. You do.
In my symmetrical room example
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Comp (and MWI) is a deterministic theory.
Many Worlds is deterministic but I don't know about comp because comp
is a homemade term never completely defined and used on this list and
nowhere else. I don't even know if I agree with
On 29 Mar 2012, at 18:31, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Identical bodies have identical minds,
Yes.
but identical minds can have different bodies.
Who cares? It's consciousness I'm interested in.
We discuss only on the consequence of the
On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the hairsplitting about that YOU, that you are using here, so
as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed the indeterminacy about the first
person experience displayed in the WM duplication
On 29 Mar 2012, at 18:46, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Comp (and MWI) is a deterministic theory.
Many Worlds is deterministic but I don't know about comp because
comp is a homemade term never completely defined and used on this
list
On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the hairsplitting about that YOU, that you
are using here, so as to convince me and others that it refutes
indeed the indeterminacy about the first
On 3/29/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the hairsplitting about that YOU, that you are using here, so
as to convince me and others that it refutes
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to create a
process
On 3/29/2012 6:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
conscious experience is a process then it is
On 3/29/2012 9:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
conscious experience is a process then it is
On 3/29/2012 7:37 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/29/2012 9:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if
On 3/29/2012 11:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 7:37 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/29/2012 9:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
experience is something a
On 28 Mar 2012, at 06:07, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Mar 27, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
so you do get the point of the difference of the 3-view and the 1-
view,
Truer words were never spoken. If 2 different consciousnesses can
not be distinguished in my symmetrical
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my
symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the third
person point of view then it seems pointless to insist that there are
really 2 and not
2012/3/28 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my
symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the third
person point of view then it seems
On 27 Mar 2012, at 06:14, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Mar 25, 2012 at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by
what you call 3-view but NOT identical by what you call 1-view,
show they deserve different names, do that
On Fri, Mar 23, 2012 at 5:12 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 3/23/2012 3:44 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Thu, Mar 22, 2012 at 6:40 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 3/21/2012 8:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Tue, Mar 20, 2012 at 10:25 AM, Stephen P.
On 25 Mar 2012, at 06:09, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Then what the hell IS the point you are making?
That comp entails 1-indeterminacy.
Comp entails indeterminacy PERIOD.
Comp is widely known as a 3-deterministic theory.
Give me a
On 24 Mar 2012, at 21:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/24/2012 12:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
You keep asking who is this you
Yes.
it is the usual you, as the one you use in your everyday
The word you works fine in the usual everyday world,
No, please answer the last part of the message.
On 24 Mar 2012, at 21:21, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/24/2012 12:58 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Google on theaetetus.
Socrates asked to Theaetetus to define knowledge. Theatetus gives
many definitions that Socrates critizes/refutes, each of them. One
of them consists in defining knowledge by
On Mar 26, 11:41 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Mar 2012, at 22:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
What is it you think my theory wants you not to ask?
Where does matter come from?
Matter comes from sense, as does 'where' and 'come from'.
Where does sense come from?
Everywhere
On Mar 24, 3:58 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
OK, nice. Many confuse comp (I am a machine) and digital physics
(reality is a machine), but comp makes reality, whatever it can be,
being NOT a machine, nor the output of a machine. It is more a
perspective effect on infinities of
On 23 Mar 2012, at 22:14, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Mar 23, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You are still avoiding the WM duplication.
There is no spliting in Many Worlds unless something is different,
if 2 universes are identical then they have merged and there is now
On Mar 24, 4:32 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 23 Mar 2012, at 00:06, Craig Weinberg wrote:
How does a digital artificial intelligence make sense of it's world
without converting or sampling every truth about that world
available
to it into digital?
First, the fact that
On Fri, Mar 23, 2012 at 5:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
From a 3rd POV, there is no indeterminacy,
From a 3rd POV there is ALWAYS indeterminacy, we don't know for sure what
the thing we're looking at will do. From a 1 POV there is ALWAYS
indeterminacy, we don't know for sure
2012/3/24 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Fri, Mar 23, 2012 at 5:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:
From a 3rd POV, there is no indeterminacy,
From a 3rd POV there is ALWAYS indeterminacy,
No in the f***ing though experiment you always want to change as you see
fit.
we
On 24 Mar 2012, at 18:44, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Mar 23, 2012 at 5:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:
From a 3rd POV, there is no indeterminacy,
From a 3rd POV there is ALWAYS indeterminacy, we don't know for
sure what the thing we're looking at will do. From a 1 POV
On 3/24/2012 12:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
You keep asking who is this you
Yes.
it is the usual you, as the one you use in your everyday
The word you works fine in the usual everyday world,
No, please answer the last part of the message. The everyday world
On 22 Mar 2012, at 21:31, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
This illustrates the problem I have with your ideas, it's not
your mathematics it's the assumption you make right at the start
which is the foundation for everything else.
Which
On Mar 23, 1:08 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/22/2012 9:49 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 22, 8:28 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/22/2012 4:24 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 22, 6:09 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/22/2012 2:53
From a 3rd POV, there is no indeterminacy, we know there will be two you
after the duplication.
From your 1st POV, even if you know it, you'll (both you) still feel
singular, and the you who was asked before the experience what he expect to
feel after the duplication was unable to predict which
On 3/23/2012 3:44 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Thu, Mar 22, 2012 at 6:40 AM, Stephen P. King
stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 3/21/2012 8:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Tue, Mar 20, 2012 at 10:25 AM, Stephen P. King
stephe...@charter.net
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 10:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
How does a digital artificial intelligence make sense of it's world
Superbly! A digital AI can make sense of it's world far better than you
can; if you doubt that statement just try competing against even a modest
On 22 Mar 2012, at 03:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 21, 3:23 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Mar 2012, at 17:40, Craig Weinberg wrote (partially).
It's not just 'we' but our entire participation in the world
that is
assumed to be digitally interchangeable. A
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
This illustrates the problem I have with your ideas, it's not your
mathematics it's the assumption you make right at the start which is the
foundation for everything else.
Which assumption?
Your assumption that if a identical
On 3/22/2012 1:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
This illustrates the problem I have with your ideas, it's not your
mathematics it's the assumption you make right at the start which is the
On Mar 22, 10:46 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 10:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
How does a digital artificial intelligence make sense of it's world
Superbly! A digital AI can make sense of it's world far better than you
can; if you
On 3/22/2012 1:49 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 22, 10:46 am, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 10:00 PM, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
How does a digital artificial intelligence make sense of it's world
Superbly! A digital AI can make
On Mar 22, 4:58 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Then you agree with me: AI cannot make sense out of its world without
converting or sampling it digitally. That which it fails to digitize
is lost.
Sure. What you don't see you don't see - which is almost all of the EM
spectrum.
On 3/22/2012 2:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 22, 4:58 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Then you agree with me: AI cannot make sense out of its world without
converting or sampling it digitally. That which it fails to digitize
is lost.
Sure. What you don't see you don't see -
On Mar 22, 11:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Mar 2012, at 03:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 21, 3:23 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Mar 2012, at 17:40, Craig Weinberg wrote (partially).
It's not just 'we' but our entire participation in the world
On Mar 22, 6:09 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/22/2012 2:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 22, 4:58 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Then you agree with me: AI cannot make sense out of its world without
converting or sampling it digitally. That which it fails to
On Mar 22, 8:28 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/22/2012 4:24 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 22, 6:09 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/22/2012 2:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 22, 4:58 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Then you agree
On 3/22/2012 9:49 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 22, 8:28 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/22/2012 4:24 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 22, 6:09 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:
On 3/22/2012 2:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 22, 4:58 pm,
On 20 Mar 2012, at 20:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 20, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Mar 2012, at 17:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 20, 12:01 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
to explain things. But comp is a (scientific, modest) theology, in
which
On Mar 21, 5:12 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Mar 2012, at 20:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 20, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Mar 2012, at 17:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 20, 12:01 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
to
On Tue, Mar 20, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
on the 3-view you can have on your two necessary existing 1-views. [...]
if you confuse the 1-view on the 1-view, (really still just the 1-view),
and some 3-view on 1-views, which is just empathy [...] At the end of UDA,
we know it
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 10:11 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
No, my critique is that you seem to not see a problem with the fact
that COMP shows that the physical world is epiphenomena and thus
unnecessary. I see this as denying the mere possibility of observational
On 21 Mar 2012, at 17:40, Craig Weinberg wrote (partially).
It's not just 'we' but our entire participation in the world that is
assumed to be digitally interchangeable. A digitizable body can only
exist within a digitizable universe.
False. The exact contrary has been proved.
How has it
On 21 Mar 2012, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Mar 20, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
on the 3-view you can have on your two necessary existing 1-views.
[...] if you confuse the 1-view on the 1-view, (really still just
the 1-view), and some 3-view on 1-views, which is
On Tue, Mar 20, 2012 at 10:25 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
Dear Joseph,
How do numbers implement that necessary capacity to define each other
and themselves? What kind of relational structure is necessary? From what I
can tell, it looks like a net of Indra where every
On Mar 21, 3:23 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Mar 2012, at 17:40, Craig Weinberg wrote (partially).
It's not just 'we' but our entire participation in the world that is
assumed to be digitally interchangeable. A digitizable body can only
exist within a digitizable
On Mar 20, 1:52 am, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
might say that the standard of Integers is their truth, but that
itself is a measure requiring a standard of its own and, again, a means
to compare the standard with the numbers. What is the means of
comparison?
Hi Stephen,
I
On 3/20/2012 8:36 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 20, 1:52 am, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
might say that the standard of Integers is their truth, but that
itself is a measure requiring a standard of its own and, again, a means
to compare the standard with the numbers. What
On Mar 20, 10:34 am, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
Hi Craig,
I agree, it is sense or what the referent of the word sense is. My
point is that sense or whatever one designates it with is not the
primitive stuff, it has a separate identity.
Right. To me it's pretty clear
On 19 Mar 2012, at 19:59, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/19/2012 10:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Mar 2012, at 00:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/18/2012 10:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You seem to continue to oscillate between there is
On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I think we're arguing about whether duplication of persons provides a
valid model of quantum uncertainty; at least I think that's what Bruno's
argument tries to show.
Bruno claims he's found a completely new type of uncertainty that
On 3/20/2012 10:46 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 20, 10:34 am, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
Hi Craig,
I agree, it is sense or what the referent of the word sense is. My
point is that sense or whatever one designates it with is not the
primitive stuff, it has a
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